# Bronx Round 7 Neg

## Contention 1 – South China Sea

#### Recent UN meetings and negotiations have changed the course of international relations for good - Jorge Valero wrote yesterday that:

[Jorge Valero](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/jorge-valero/) 10/11/18, "Ambassador Zhang: China will do more to strengthen IP protection," euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/interview/ambassador-zhang-china-will-do-more-to-strengthen-ip-protection/, Date Accessed 10-12-2018 // WS

Since day one of ASEM, China has always been an active and cooperative member committed to building consensus. In recent years, China has been a vigorous advocate for connectivity cooperation in Eurasia and has contributed ideas to this end. Through the upcoming summit，China stands ready to join forces with other members to safeguard multilateralism, forge stronger partnerships, and strengthen the Asia-Europe cooperation in an open spirit for the benefit of all. At the China-EU Summit last July, leaders from both sides agreed to enhance strategic coordination, jointly safeguard multilateralism and the rules-based free trade system, promote greater openness of the global economy, and contribute to global peace, stability and prosperity. China hopes to act together with the EU in such a spirit, jointly preserve the UN-centered international system, especially the WTO-centered multilateral trade system, with a view to bringing a greater sense of certainty to this world. This serves the interests of not only China and the EU themselves but the world at large. At last year’s Davos Forum, President Xi Jinping reiterated China’s commitment to multilateralism, reform and opening up. That was a serious message from China’s top leader, loud and clear. It is encouraging to note that the speech has resonated well around the world.

#### Unfortunately this new era of Chinese multilateralism comes with some strings – Scott Kastner indicated two weeks ago that:

Scott Kastner, 9-30-2018, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/12/is-china-working-with-or-against-the-global-order/?noredirect=on, Date Accessed 10-12-2018 // JM

In our new book, “[China’s Strategic Multilateralism](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-strategic-multilateralism/AADC39A121E98036DDC12BCEB83A0D7F),” we show that China adopts different approaches to multilateral cooperation, depending on the strategic environment in any given context. Whether China actively helps sustain existing institutions, challenges them or simply free-rides on them depends not only on China’s interests as commonly understood, but also on its bargaining power and how it expects other countries to behave. Here’s an [for] example: China established the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization](http://eng.sectsco.org/) as a mechanism to help promote stability in Central Asia. It did so because it values cooperation — but also expects that other countries are unlikely to sustain cooperation in the absence of Chinese leadership on this topic. But China is more likely to free-ride when it understands that other countries value cooperation and are willing to sustain it on their own. Beijing, for instance, has contributed little to U.S.-led efforts to build and maintain effective institutions to manage global nuclear proliferation. And China is most likely to use its clout to restructure existing arrangements when other states view Beijing as indispensable to cooperative efforts. This dynamic was evident in China’s recent efforts to renegotiate in its favor [voting arrangements](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15573) and the [role of the renminbi](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket) at the International Monetary Fund.

#### This is because Xi views international law differently – Zihang Liu indicates in 2016 China views:

Zihang Liu, 8-29-2016, "How the Chinese view International Law," International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/29/how-the-chinese-view-international-law/, Date Accessed 9-9-2018 // JM

He suggests that China should, as it has often done in the past, follow the tenets of realism, under which sovereignty is valued and states pursue their own interests as often as possible. Thus, when applying international laws or participating in the lawmaking process, he argues that the furtherance of national interests is the ultimate purpose for which China should strive. He additionally contends that international laws generally fail to function as consistent rules according to which states must adjust their behavior or accept punishment for transgressions. He asserts that international law has instead become the constantly evolving product of state interactions. Essentially, international law has a rather dynamic nature that constantly alters as state’s practices change. Therefore, international law does not offer a system of rule that governs nations but rather [as] a system of compromises, agreements, and treaties that constantly adapt to national demands and interests. The legality of the nine-dash line demarcating sovereignty in the South China Sea, for instance, is not legitimized by existing international law; rather, it is empowered via state recognition and practices. As a result, he asserts that the nine-dash line will likely become a new norm of international law as long as it continues to be customarily accepted by states in the region. This method of interpreting international law renders it flexible enough to be utilized as a tool forwarding Chinese state interests on the international stage. It is furthermore able to accommodate China’s evolving state interests, such as the state’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea. Many in the West strive to enshrine the theory of liberalism and construct an international system wherein democratic states choose to avoid military aggression, while instead interacting, cooperating, and peacefully competing according to set principles, adopting a Lockean approach. However, as China’s past practices have shown, and as Professor He has demonstrated, China continues to hold state sovereignty and state interests in esteem. In contrast to the West, China essentially considers the international community in a manner more similar to Thomas Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan, whereby one must act for oneself and by oneself. For China, therefore, national interests and sovereignty are supreme, while international law can be manipulated in order to serve the state’s needs. This conflict in values thus creates a dilemma between two distinct sets of ambitions. While China and the West have generally worked concomitantly to develop international laws, their agendas occasionally diverge on critical issues. For instance, while the United States, Japan, and other states adhered to customary international law by upholding Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) with regard to the South China Sea, China, as a party to UNCLOS, they fiercely fought for its sovereignty over the territory. Alternatively, China’s support of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) has led to great success in terms of cooperation and reconciliation between China and the West. R2P provides a framework under which the UN Security Council can sanction the use of force in order to prevent atrocities and human rights violations in independent states. Thus far, such unanimity has already significantly supported stabilization efforts in, for example, Côte d’Ivoire. As China’s history has shown, however, its leadership often values state sovereignty and national interests above all else. Therefore, rather than maintaining universal values, China remains more concerned with its own interests. Nevertheless, by understanding the approach that China takes in international relations and global lawmaking, it is feasible to work with the nation to develop a more cooperative international community. Thus, in the future, we may see more coordinated achievements resembling the enactment of R2P if Western states take note of China’s international relations philosophy.

#### UNCLOS specifically disrupts this status quo success f two reasons. First, disagreements about American military presence. Liu indicates:

Zihang Liu, 8-29-2016, "How the Chinese view International Law," International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/29/how-the-chinese-view-international-law/, Date Accessed 9-9-2018 // JM

He suggests that China should, as it has often done in the past, follow the tenets of realism, under which sovereignty is valued and states pursue their own interests as often as possible. Thus, when applying international laws or participating in the lawmaking process, he argues that the furtherance of national interests is the ultimate purpose for which China should strive. He additionally contends that international laws generally fail to function as consistent rules according to which states must adjust their behavior or accept punishment for transgressions. He asserts that international law has instead become the constantly evolving product of state interactions. Essentially, international law has a rather dynamic nature that constantly alters as state’s practices change. Therefore, international law does not offer a system of rule that governs nations but rather [as] a system of compromises, agreements, and treaties that constantly adapt to national demands and interests. The legality of the nine-dash line demarcating sovereignty in the South China Sea, for instance, is not legitimized by existing international law; rather, it is empowered via state recognition and practices. As a result, he asserts that the nine-dash line will likely become a new norm of international law as long as it continues to be customarily accepted by states in the region. This method of interpreting international law renders it flexible enough to be utilized as a tool forwarding Chinese state interests on the international stage. It is furthermore able to accommodate China’s evolving state interests, such as the state’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea. Many in the West strive to enshrine the theory of liberalism and construct an international system wherein democratic states choose to avoid military aggression, while instead interacting, cooperating, and peacefully competing according to set principles, adopting a Lockean approach. However, as China’s past practices have shown, and as Professor He has demonstrated, China continues to hold state sovereignty and state interests in esteem. In contrast to the West, China essentially considers the international community in a manner more similar to Thomas Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan, whereby one must act for oneself and by oneself. For China, therefore, national interests and sovereignty are supreme, while international law can be manipulated in order to serve the state’s needs. This conflict in values thus creates a dilemma between two distinct sets of ambitions. While China and the West have generally worked concomitantly to develop international laws, their agendas occasionally diverge on critical issues. For instance, while the United States, Japan, and other states adhered to customary international law by upholding Freedom of Navigation Operations [like] (FONOPS) with regard to the South China Sea, China, as a party to UNCLOS, they fiercely fought for its sovereignty over the territory. Alternatively, China’s support of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) has led to great success in terms of cooperation and reconciliation between China and the West. R2P provides a framework under which the UN Security Council can sanction the use of force in order to prevent atrocities and human rights violations in independent states. Thus far, such unanimity has already significantly supported stabilization efforts in, for example, Côte d’Ivoire. As China’s history has shown, however, its leadership often values state sovereignty and national interests above all else. Therefore, rather than maintaining universal values, China remains more concerned with its own interests. Nevertheless, by understanding the approach that China takes in international relations and global lawmaking, it is feasible to work with the nation to develop a more cooperative international community. Thus, in the future, we may see more coordinated achievements resembling the enactment of R2P if Western states take note of China’s international relations philosophy.

#### Second, how disputes are handled in UNCLOS. Michael Mazza indicates in 2011 that:

Michael Mazza, 10-14-2011, "The South China Sea and regional security," AEI, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-south-china-sea-and-regional-security/, Date Accessed 9-16-2018 // JM

Let me start with UNCLOS. When UNCLOS was conceived, it was hoped that by codifying customary international law, freedom of the seas would be protected and international disputes would be more easily resolved. To date, UNCLOS has failed on both counts. UNCLOS’s failure to clearly and precisely describe conditions for delineating maritime borders has actually heightened disputes, rather than the reverse. Indeed, [however] UNCLOS may have even helped create[d] disputes where [there were none] before there were none. What were once shallow reefs in the South China Sea suddenly became land features to which UNCLOS applied, and which could determine the extent of a country’s exclusive economic zone. Rather than contribute to enhanced stability, then, UNCLOS has had the very opposite effect, heightening tensions amongst neighbors, who can now claim to all have international law on their side. UNCLOS has similarly failed to ensure continued freedom of navigation on the high seas, at least as understood and defended by the United States and its allies since the end of World War II. While Article 87 does guarantee freedom of the high seas, its definition of that freedom is too vague. Indeed, the language is vague enough that China can use UNCLOS to claim that its exclusive economic zone is, in effect, territorial waters, and that U.S. military assets are, then, not free to operate in and above those waters. Rather than represent a successful codification of customary international law, then, UNCLOS has instead provided China with a legal argument–however weak–to curtail the lawful operations of others’ military assets in the South China Sea, nearly the entirety over which China claims sovereignty. Beijing has essentially entered into a contest with Washington over the fate of freedom of the seas in the waters in and around China–UNCLOS, unfortunately, does nothing to weaken China’s hand.

#### The underlying reason is because it creates an “us versus them" dichotomy. Vicedo furthers that when the US gets involved:

Christian Vicedo & Ananda Devi Almase, 3-19-2014, “Testing the Waters: The Strategic Implications of an Idealist approach in the South China Sea Dispute,” NDCP Policy Brief, <http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/publications/Executive%20Policy%20Brief%20No%203%20-%20Vicedo%20and%20Almase.pdf>, Date Accessed 9-16-2018 // JM

Compared to the western norm of resolving disputes through formal and legal instruments, such as judicial arbitrations, the “ASEAN Way” of dispute settlement relies more on informal and personal engagements to arrive at a consensus. This norm of dispute resolution can be observed in bilateral and multilateral talks between and among ASEAN member countries. Aside from this, the principle of non-interference essentially constitutes the ASEAN Way. Keeping conflict unobtrusive protects the credibility of parties concerned and avoids escalation of dispute due to misperceptions. On the whole, several constructs shape the development of the SCS dispute: China’s emerging power and aggressive posture in the region; the US role and interest in regional stability; and, the Philippine course of action to seek for judicial remedy from the ITLOS. China aims to bolster its military strength and expand its sphere of influence in the region. Domestic pressure from Chinese nationalists fuels China’s aggressive stance in claiming historic rights in the contested SCS.xv To note, it appears that China considers its exclusive political and economic interests, as well as its strategic goal of becoming a world power, of greater value than its negative image as a threat in the region.xvi The US interest in the Asia Pacific, particularly in the SCS, is seen to play an important role in serving as a force in balancing power and managing conflict in the Asia Pacific and other regions of the world. The rapid force deployment capability of the US poses as a diplomatic leverage in assisting its allies and upholding international laws. The image of the US [is seen] as a super power, global leader, and champion of liberal democracy is deemed crucial in its disposition to serve as a counterweight against China. There is thus a need to protect this image as a credible deterrence against violations of international norms and democratic peace. If the US reneges on this role and fails to make a stand, it is taken as a sign of weakness not only on its part but also on the spirit of international laws that it guards. Given the fact that the Philippines internationaliz[ing]ed the dispute by filing an arbitration case in the ITLOS,[makes] the eyes of the international community are now focused on the Philippines, China, and US. In a bid [so in an effort] to resolve the SCS conflict, the arbitration case formalized the negative impact of China’s aggressive behavior in that maritime region. Since China’s nine-dash line theory is contested by the Philippines in the arbitration case, the legitimacy of China’s territorial claim is effectively challenged. With this, a favorable perception and response of the international community to China’s territorial claim would be unlikely.

#### That’s why Vicedo explains the impact of conflict. These actions:

Christian Vicedo & Ananda Devi Almase, 3-19-2014, “Testing the Waters: The Strategic Implications of an Idealist approach in the South China Sea Dispute,” NDCP Policy Brief, <http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/publications/Executive%20Policy%20Brief%20No%203%20-%20Vicedo%20and%20Almase.pdf>, Date Accessed 9-16-2018 // JM

The development of the SCS dispute, due to China’s aggressive territorial claim, can be illustrated in a Causal Loop Diagram or CLD below. Notably, the diagram has two causal loops: one is a reinforcing (R), vicious cycle of a security dilemma; and, the other is a balancing (B) act of the arbitration case filed in the international court. In the first reinforcing causal loop, it can be seen that China’s aggressive stance in the SCS creates insecurity in the region. This would likely project a negative image in the international community due to China’s lack of respect for the UNCLOS. Consequently, this image would drive[s] the international community to pressure China to adopt an attitude of good neighborliness, and make the latter refrain from making aggressive actions in the SCS. But tensions arising from the internationalization of the SCS dispute would also likely reinforce China’s assertive behavior in claiming and controlling the disputed maritime zone. It can be inferred that had the Philippines not taken a decisive course of action in seeking for legal arbitration, the [this] turn of events would be a vicious and reinforcing security dilemma. Initial talks with China and through the ASEAN multilateral platform had fallen short of resolving the SCS dispute, prompting the Philippines to resort to legal channel and internationalize the issue. However, China’s rejection of the arbitral proceedings and reiteration of its “indisputable sovereignty” in the contested territory hampered the immediate resolution of the dispute.

#### Resulting in war

## Contention 2: Refugee Policies

#### As climate change only increases, the amount of refugees globally increase – Matthew Taylor explains that:

Matthew Taylor, 11-2-2017, "Climate change 'will create world's biggest refugee crisis'," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/02/climate-change-will-create-worlds-biggest-refugee-crisis, Date Accessed 10-13-2018 // WS

Tens of millions of people will be forced from their homes by climate change in the next decade, creating the biggest refugee crisis the world has ever seen, according to a new report.Senior US military and security experts have told the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) study that the number of climate refugees will dwarf those that have fled the Syrian conflict, bringing huge challenges to Europe.“If Europe thinks they have a problem with migration today … wait 20 years,” said retired US military corps brigadier general Stephen Cheney. “See what happens when climate change drives people out of Africa – the Sahel [sub-Saharan area] especially – and we’re talking now not just one or two million, but 10 or 20 [million]. They are not going to south Africa, they are going across the Mediterranean.”

#### That’s problematic as Robert Malley explained in September that:

Robert Malley and Stephen Pomper, 9-18-2018, "Trump’s Refugee Fiasco," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/18/trumps-refugees-announcement-220063, Date Accessed 10-12-2018 // JM

In any normal administration, the State Department, which runs the refugee resettlement program, would have led the charge in arguing for a number that better represents the United States’ capacity and humanitarian traditions—something closer to the historical average of 80,000. But in the Trump era, allies of immigration uber-hawk Stephen Miller have occupied key positions at State, virtually guaranteeing that leadership would not come out of Foggy Bottom. Instead, it was reportedly left to the Department of Defense to point out what is actually true: Refugee resettlement creates goodwill, rewards the loyalty of local partners who risk their lives to help U.S. personnel in places like Iraq, can help stabilize host countries bordering conflict zones, and makes it easier to ask the states bearing the brunt of the refugee burden to stretch even further in the humanitarian support they provide. But however hard or well the Pentagon might have argued, the odds were never with them. Close observers of this administration’s refugee policy suggested to us that the writing was on the wall months ago. The White House would lower the [refugee] ceiling further into the historical basement, arguing that the program’s pathetic 2018 performance (the U.S. has actually admitted roughly 25,000 refugees, the lowest number in its history, and well short of the ceiling of 45,000) indicated a lack of capacity, and that it could hardly be expected to do better in the coming fiscal year. By way of further excuses, the administration could rely on its now familiar set of anti-resettlement tropes—pointing out America’s generosity with foreign aid (a point that would be more powerful if the administration had not worked so assiduously to slash assistance budgets) and arguing that resettlement personnel are needed to help adjudicate a growing backlog of asylum cases. And that’s not too far from how things actually played out. In his relatively thin remarks Monday explaining why the administration is lowering the ceiling, Pompeo did indeed invoke U.S. assistance generosity, while awkwardly referring both to the number of refugees the United States expects to consider for resettlement next year and the number of asylees it expects to process. (Never mind that the resettlement program, which creates a legal pathway to bring vetted refugees from all corners of the globe to the United States, and asylum processing, which deals with people who come to the border under their own steam, are legally and operationally distinct.) There is every reason to expect the administration and its allies will roll out a fuller suite of excuses over the coming days. If past is prologue, they will be largely nonsense. Let’s start with the idea that the U.S. government’s poor performance in 2018 was an actual reflection of its capacity. As a [report](https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states/002-how-save-us-refugee-admissions-program) just released by International Crisis Group shows, the poor 2018 numbers were the product of a conscious process of bureaucratic strangulation. Resettlement suffered because of a politically motivated suspension in 2017 that had huge ripple effects on resettlement logistics. It also suffered because of new vetting requirements, molasses-slow caseload processing and the malign neglect of a White House that gives every indication of wanting the program to go away. When the Bush and Obama administrations (one of us worked under Obama, the other under both) hit snags with the resettlement program, they threw themselves into fixing the problem. Not this White House. They’re “tickled pink,” one official told us. But while the administration’s hostility toward refugees is hardly unexpected—candidate Donald Trump made Syrian refugees into a campaign issue—it is still difficult to find a rational explanation. The usual anti-immigration tropes don’t make much sense in the context of refugee resettlement. It can’t be, for example, that the administration sincerely worries about uncontrolled waves of resettled refugees driving down wages for low-skilled workers. Refugees who come through the resettlement program don’t come in uncontrolled waves. Their numbers are capped, and at levels way too low to have a meaningful impact on wages.

#### Accession now allows for our refugee policy to worsen for two reasons. First, codification ensures the strongest legal basis and therefore become permanent law. Nora Markard indicates in 2016 that:

Nora Markard, 2016, “The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third Countries”, EJIL 27 (2016), 591–616, google, Date Accessed 9-25-2018 // JM

As mentioned above, a coastal state may interfere with the departure of foreign ships if their passage is not ‘innocent’ within Article 17 of UNCLOS. According to Article 19(2)(g) of UNCLOS, this includes the loading or unloading of persons contrary to the immigration laws and regulations of the coastal state. However, undocumented departure does not violate the coastal state’s immigration laws. The same is true for the coastal state’s enforcement powers in its contiguous zone ‘to prevent [and punish] infringements of its … immigration … laws and regulations’.137 Other prejudicial activities without ‘a direct bearing’ on the passage are covered by Article 19(2)(l) of UNCLOS. First, though, shipping out undocumented migrants does have a ‘direct bearing’ on the passage and, second, this catch-all clause is meant for very atypical cases and is not supposed to cancel out the limitations on the rights of the coastal state introduced by UNCLOS.13 According to Article 27(1) of UNCLOS, the coastal state can exercise criminal jurisdiction over merchant ships if the consequences of the crime extend to it or if the crime is ‘of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea’. Unlike drug trafficking, human smuggling or trafficking are not explicitly listed, which militates against subsuming them under the general category of disturbing crimes.139 However, if undocumented departure is criminalized in the coastal state, the consequences requirement will be fulfilled. However, even commercially operated refugee vessels will not usually be registered as ‘merchant ships’,140 except where scrap cargo ships are used.141. Under the Law of the Sea, the location of the vessel is crucial in determining the rights and duties of coastal States, the flag States, and the subject vessel. Many of the interdiction or “push back” practices are carried out in the E.E.Z. or in the high seas.441 Some occur in the straits used for international navigation such as the Strait of Gibraltar.442 In its territorial sea, the jurisdiction of the coastal State is plenary.443 This plenary jurisdiction, as a logical consequence of sovereignty over the territorial sea, allows coastal States to enact laws to intercept and arrest vessels and forcibly return them, and to enforce these laws in their territorial waters.444 The U.S., Australia, and E.U. Member States may use this plenary jurisdiction to justify its actions. Since freedom of the seas does not apply to the territorial sea,445 foreign-flagged vessels are only assured of their nonsuspendable right to innocent passage through the territorial sea.446 Any conduct that is prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State is deemed not innocent.447 The UNCLOS has also specified that the unloading of persons in violation of the State’s immigration law is considered non-innocent. 448 Thus, the American, Australian, and European policies authorizing their officials “to take necessary actions” enjoy strong legal support when they are enforced in their corresponding territorial waters.

#### Second, our policies get modeled. Cindy Huang explains empirically.

Cindy Huang, 6-20-18, “Reflecting on World Refugee Day: The Trends and Consequences of US Refugee Policy”, <https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2015/08/17/the-global-refugee-crisis-can-we-ignore-it-much-longer/>, Date Accessed 10-12-2018 // JM

America’s retreat from support for refugee resettlement has far-reaching humanitarian, strategic, and economic consequences. By withdrawing from refugee resettlement, the United States is encouraging others to do so the same. As Ms. Ash argued, the current practice of branding refugees as “undeserving, economically burdensome, and unsafe” is contributing to a global “decline in commitments and obligations to refugee protection.” And, by doing less than its fair share, the United States is forcing developing countries to reconsider their outsized responsibilities, encouraging overall trends toward “closed borders, forced or encouraged returns, and increasing restrictions on refugees in host countries.” From a humanitarian perspective, this means that many of the 1.5 million refugees identified as in need of resettlement—these refugees are the most vulnerable or have been separated from their families—will be denied safe havens or their right to family reunification. Many will be forced to return to unsafe conditions in their home countries, and even more will continue living in environments with restricted rights and opportunities. From a strategic perspective, Mr. Gerson argued that when the United States leads, it catalyzes positive action from other countries. When it withdraws, it creates gaps that “get filled by chaos,” not by other good actors. Currently, the US withdrawal from the refugee crisis is straining its allies and creating “food insecurity, the risk of radicalization, [and] the destabilization of European politics.” And with rising levels of displacement on the horizon, more problems will emerge if the United States remains inactive. With the World Wars and 9/11 as examples, history shows that we cannot “ignore problems until they arrive on our doorstep” because regional disorder can cause “massive chaos” around the world. From an economic perspective, the United States is missing an opportunity by rejecting refugees. To provide just one example of how refugees can contribute economically, after 20 years in the United States, the average refugee has paid $21,000 more in taxes than they have received in benefits.

#### The impact of resettlement programs being cut is two-fold. First, millions will suffer and die. Shahzad Mojab writes in 2016 that even when refugees:

Shahrzad Mojab ,2016, "Refugees and Capitalism,", https://solidarity-us.org/atc/183/p4693/, Date Accessed 10-12-2018 // WS

Among the 10 million displaced Syrians, the majority are women and children. They flee war zones, but [they] cannot escape patriarchal religious violence. Rape and sexual assault are a frequent occurrence at checkpoints, on the borders, or in the camps. Displacement adds to economic insecurity and therefore forces young girls into early marriage or prostitution. Hibaaq Osman (2016) reports that “the rate of child marriage among Syrians in Jordan” doubled between 2011 and 2012, making “them more vulnerable to abuse.” The patriarchal relations under the condition of war and displacement have forced women to effectively live “under house arrest.” (Ibid.) It is well-established that rape and sexual violence are weapons of war. But other forms of violence against women such as domestic violence, abduction, forced prostitution, early marriage and sexual exploitation are daily experienced by women and young girls in the disruption of life by war. The Dadaab refugee camp[s] in Kenya is a case in point. Ben Rawlence’s City of Thrones: Nine Lives in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp (2016) presents a horrifying account of refugee lives. Dadaab literally means “the rocky, hard place;” but it also means a place of violence, brutality, starvation, rape, corruption, suffering and death.

#### Second, it increases terrorism – by returning refugees to their home countries or worse, refugee camps – we play into terror groups hands by giving them the narrative to increase terror recruitment. Refugees are absolutely vital to our fight on terror – Eleanor Acer argues that:

**Acer, 17 -** director of Human Rights First’s Refugee Protection program (Eleanor, “U.S. Leadership Forsaken Six Months of the Trump Refugee Bans” July, Human Rights First, <https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-US-Leadership-Forsaken-FINAL.pdf>

President Trump has described his refugee ban orders as necessary to protect the country from security threats. However, refugees are already more rigorously vetted than any other population of travelers to the United States, a point that has been confirmed again and again by former U.S. national security and intelligence officials and former military leaders who have served both Democratic and Republican administrations. 81 Refugees are interviewed repeatedly by trained Department of Homeland Security officers and vetted as well by national intelligence agencies, the Department of Defense and by INTERPOL, a process that includes intelligence from foreign intelligence agencies as well. Their fingerprints and other biometric data are checked against terrorist and criminal databases.82 Any necessary enhancements can and should, as former intelligence and national security officials have pointed out, be implemented without halting the program. The Trump refugee bans are not only unnecessary to safeguard U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, but have actually damaged our foreign policy and national security interests as well as U.S. global leadership. As detailed above, the refugee bans and their cuts to resettlement have impacted U.S. allies and undercut U.S. support for nations whose stability is key to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. For example, refugee resettlement from Jordan fell by 64 percent in the first five months of 2017 and resettlement from Lebanon fell by 35 percent. Resettlement to the United States from Turkey has dropped by 79 percent in recent months. Former national security officials and military leaders who have served both Democratic and Republican administrations have repeatedly expressed concerns that the derailment of resettlement undermines our ability to support the stability of strategically important nations, including U.S. allies.83 For example: n In the wake of the March 6 order, former officials with national security expertise wrote that “resettlement initiatives advance U.S. national security interests by protecting the stability of U.S. allies and partners struggling to host large numbers of refugees,” that the ban is “harmful to U.S. national security” and that “the order’s drastic reduction in the number of refugees to be resettled … weakens this country’s ability to provide global leadership and jeopardizes our national security interests by failing to support the stability of our allies that are struggling to host large numbers of refugees.”84 n These concerns have been raised repeatedly over the last year and half. For example, Former CIA Director Hayden and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis wrote last year in the Miami Herald, “The global refugee crisis is straining the resources and infrastructures of Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, which are hosting the vast majority of Syrian refugees. By doing more to host and help refugees, the United States would safeguard the stability of these nations and thereby advance its own national security interests.” In a letter sent to Congress in December 2015, former national security and military leaders, including former CIA Directors General David Petraeus and General Michael V. Hayden; former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff; former Secretaries of Defense William S. Cohen, William J. Perry, Chuck Hagel, and Leon Panetta; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; and former National Security Advisors Stephen Hadley and General James L. Jones, wrote that accepting refugees “support[s] the stability of our allies and partners that are struggling to host large numbers of refugees,” and warned that restricting acceptance of refugees would “undermine our core objective of combating terrorism.”85 The cuts, suspension, and derailment of U.S. resettlement instigated by the executive orders, along with their targeting of Syrian and Muslim refugees and travelers, has harmed national security interests in other ways as well. Some former national security, intelligence and military officials have reported that the orders are damaging counter-terrorism cooperation and related intelligence sharing: n In a January 30, 2017 letter, former officials, diplomats, military leaders, and intelligence professionals who served in both the G.W. Bush and Obama Administrations wrote that the January 27 order “will harm our national security” and reported that “Partner countries in Europe and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation, are already objecting to this action and distancing themselves from the United States, shredding years of effort to bring them close to us.”86 n In early February 2017, a group of former officials with national security expertise concluded that the January 27 order “will disrupt key counterterrorism, foreign policy, and national security partnerships that are critical to our obtaining the necessary information sharing and collaboration in intelligence, law enforcement, military and diplomatic channels to address the threat posed by terrorist groups such as ISIL.” They reported that the executive order “has alienated U.S. allies” and concluded that the order “will strain our relationship with partner countries in Europe and the Middle East, on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism cooperation, undermining years of effort to bring them closer.” 87 n In March 2017, following the March 6 order, a group of former officials with national security expertise who had worked under both Democratic and Republican administrations concluded that “the revised executive order will jeopardize our relationships with allies and partners on whom we rely for vital counterterrorism operation and informationsharing.”88 n In April 2017, a group of former officials reported that the March 6 order would disrupt national security partnerships critical to addressing the ISIL threat and in particular that the order had already “alienated allies and partners” and that “[c]ountries in the Middle East expressed disapproval and even threatened and engaged in reciprocity in response to the January 27 Order, jeopardizing years of diplomatic outreach.”89 Former U.S. national security and intelligence officials have also concluded that the executive orders [refugee resettlement cuts] undermine U.S. national security by feeding into ISIS’s narratives: n The January 27 order “has already sent exactly the wrong message to the Muslim community here at home and all over the world: that the U.S. government is at war with them based on their religion. We may even endanger Christian communities, by handing ISIL a recruiting tool and propaganda victory that spreads their horrific message the United States is engaged in a religious war.”90 n The January 27 order “will aid ISIL’s propaganda effort and serve its recruitment message by feeding into the narrative that the United States is at war with Islam.”91 n The bipartisan group of former officials who wrote to President Trump in March 2017 explained that “To Muslims—including those victimized by or fighting against ISIS—it [the March 6 revised executive order] will send a message that reinforces the propaganda of ISIS and other extremist groups that falsely claim the United States is at war with Islam. Welcoming Muslim refugees and travelers, by contrast exposes the lies of terrorists and counters their warped visions.” n A group of former government officials pointed out that “less than a day after President Trump signed the January 27 Order, jihadist groups began citing its contents in recruiting messages online.”92 Former military leaders, veterans, and former national security officials have detailed concerns that the refugee bans, and the resulting cuts and further delays in resettlement, will endanger U.S. troops in the field: n In early February 2017, a group of former officials with national security expertise concluded that the January 27 order “could do long-term damage to our national security and foreign policy interests” and “endanger U.S. troops in the field.” n In April 2017 a group of former officials stated that the order “will endanger troops in the field.” Pointing to the refugee ban’s impact on the resettlement of interpreters and others who have assisted U.S. troops at great risk to their lives, the former officials concluded that “[b]y discouraging future assistance and cooperation from these and other affected military allies and partners, the Order will jeopardize the safety and effectiveness of our Service Members.”93 n Veterans themselves have explained that the refugee ban harms U.S. national security by abandoning the interpreters the military relies on to successfully carry out its missions around the world, stressing that “our mission, and sometimes our lives, depended on the interpreters, translators, and other local allies.”94 Conclusion In a Statement on America’s Commitment to Refugees, released on World Refugee Day in 2016, a group of former officials and retired military leaders—who had served under both Democratic and Republican administrations— joined together to emphasize this country’s strong commitment to protecting the persecuted: For more than two centuries, the idea of America has pulled toward our shores those seeking liberty, and it has ensured that they arrive in the open arms of our citizens. That is why the Statue of Liberty welcomes the world’s ‘huddled masses yearning to breathe free,’ and why President Reagan stressed the United States as ‘a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the darkness.’ The statement’s signatories included: Former Secretary of Defense and U.S. Senator William S. Cohen; Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel; Former Director of the CIA General Michael V. Hayden, U.S. Air Force (Ret.); Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael E. Leiter; Former U.S. Senator Carl M. Levin; Former Commander of U.S. Army Europe General David M. Maddox, U.S. Army (Ret.); Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matthew G. Olsen; Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry; Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy (Ret.); Former Homeland Security Advisor Frances F. Townsend; and, Former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. The damage done by President Trump’s refugee bans has been devastating to refugees, to refugee-hosting nations, to American allies and partners, to U.S. national security interests and to U.S. global leadership. The Trump Administration must change course, rescind the bans and launch a renewed and robust effort to lead the world’s nations in assisting, protecting, and resettling refugees. While this country has at times faltered, the U.S. commitment to protecting the persecuted has deep and strong roots. By restoring America’s role as a beacon to those searching for freedom, this country will not only safeguard its own national security and foreign policy interests, it will demonstrate that its guiding ideals are powerful and at the heart of what makes this nation strong. As U.S. Army veteran Adam Babiker, a former refugee who fled the genocide in Darfur, recently wrote: “We are a beacon, a force for good, and a symbol to the rest of the world. We help the oppressed and welcome the victims of war.”95

#### Stuart Shapiro indicates in 2017 that anti-refugee policies give:

Stuart Shapiro, 1-28-2017, "Trump's refugee ban is the perfect ISIS recruiting tool," TheHill, https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/316697-trumps-refugee-ban-is-the-perfect-isis-recruiting-tool, Date Accessed 10-13-2018 // JM

Well, guess who just got some amazing fodder for their anti-U.S. rhetoric? As Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) has said, the executive order has given ISIS a "path to rebirth." An organization that was on the run in Syria and Iraq has just been handed an amazing recruiting tool: A written proclamation from the U.S. president that everything they've been saying all these years about the United States being at war with Muslims is true. This recruiting tool is likely to be effective in messages consumed by individuals like those who perpetrated the awful attacks in Fort Hood, Orlando and San Bernardino. So while we will be keeping out individuals who mean the United States no harm and indeed are in many cases the victims of those who do, we will have handed our enemies an important weapon. By allegedly trying to decrease the risk of a terrorist attack, we may have increased it.