South Korea and Japan will get nukes soon, fueled by fear of US abandonment

David Feith, Nov 11 **2016** [WSJ editorial writer, "With Drumpf, Asia's Nuclear Crisis Expands," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/with-trump-asias-nuclear-crisis-expands-1478797800] MJS 12-27-2016

Cheong Seong-chang will be calling for South Korean nuclearization either way. Speaking in Seoul last week, before America voted**, the** soft-spoken scholar and **government advisor argued that his country needs nukes to defend itself, that a majority of his countrymen agree, and that skeptics in government will embrace the view sooner or later**. Sooner if a Drumpf administration backs it, he says, but within a decade regardless. Mr. Cheong argues that at this point North Korea won't let its nuclear program be rolled back diplomatically, "no matter how many sanctions we impose." China's policy of protecting its ally from collapse "will remain unchanged." And when Pyongyang inevitably acquires a credible capability to hit the U.S. with nuclear-tipped missiles, "the U.S. will have no choice but to come to the negotiating table" and sue for peace. This will yield, "if not a total abandonment of South Korea," then a bargain aimed at mere containment: "If North Korea has 50 nuclear weapons, and promises not to build any more, and to suspend missile tests, the U.S. will strike a deal." Tensions between Pyongyang and Washington may cool, he says, "but South Korea will continue to be held hostage. **Hence the need to go nuclear. South Korea's civilian nuclear infrastructure—24 plants providing 30% of the country's energy—could be used to produce 5,000 bombs worth of fissile material,** Mr. Cheong says, dwarfing Pyongyang's capability. Embracing the necessary technologies, including plutonium reprocessing, could be "the game-changer that will enable South Korea to manage North Korean problems." J**apan may indeed seek to go nuclear,** Mr. Cheong acknowledges, but it too could placate its rivals by keeping its arsenal small and co-managed. "The U.S. should assure China that Japan will not build more than a certain number of nuclear weapons large enough to counter the North Korean threat," allowing China to "maintain its nuclear advantage over other Asian countries." Taiwan, for its part, has to sit on its hands.Such prescriptions seem rather tidy given all the uncertainties and dangers involved, and for years Seoul and Washington could dismiss them as non-starters. Even **as majorities of South Koreans have told pollsters since the 1990s that they support nuclearization, policy makers in both capitals have been overwhelmingly opposed. That may no longer be so. Several potential candidates in South Korea's looming presidential election back nuclearization**, including former National Assembly floor leader Won Yoo-cheol and Nam Kyung-pil, governor of the country's most populous province. Mr. Cheong, who acknowledges that "experts and technocrats have tended to be against going nuclear," says that officials have privately expressed greater interest since Pyongyang's latest nuclear test in September. Once Pyongyang completes a hydrogen bomb, he says, "many experts will switch their views." Then there's **Donald Trump['s]**. If he sticks to supporting South Korean and Japanese nuclearization, he might as well hold a bonfire of traditional U.S. nonproliferation dogmas on the White House lawn.Even if he reverses course, though, his **record of denigrating U.S. allies has already made South Koreans and others more fearful of abandonment and therefore more likely to hedge their bets and consider going nuclear, despite the costs.** Mr. Trump reportedly had a good phone call with South Korea's president Wednesday night, but it's no surprise that headlines this week in Seoul are blaring about "shock" and "panic."

Japan will go Nuclear - taboo has eroded because US cred is low

Henry Sokolski, May 8 2016 [, "Japan and South Korea May Soon Go Nuclear," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-and-south-korea-may-soon-go-nuclear-1462738914] MJS 12-27-2016

On Friday North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un praised his country's recent hydrogen bomb test and satellite launch as "unprecedented" achievements that will "bring the final victory of the revolution." Such rhetoric is nothing new, but North Korea's nuclear-weapons program and **a growing sense that security arrangements with the U.S. aren't sufficient has eroded the Japanese taboo against nuclear weapons**. On April 1, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's cabinet announced that Japan's constitution did not ban his country from having or using nuclear arms. **Japan already has stockpiled 11 tons of plutonium, separated from fuel used in its nuclear-power reactors. A bomb requires roughly five kilograms (or 1/200th of a ton). The old shibboleth, popular with the nuclear industry, that such "reactor-grade" plutonium is unsuitable for weapons, is essentially irrelevant for a technologically advanced country. Japan also has built**—but not operated—**a large reprocessing plant** of French design **that can separate about eight tons of plutonium a year.** The shutdown of Japan's power reactors following the 2011 Fukushima disaster means there are no reactors online that can use this plutonium. But Japan says it will proceed with reprocessing anyway, putatively to keep open the distant possibility of fueling a new generation of so-called fast-breeder reactors. Japan's nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington allows it to do this with U.S.-origin fuel. **South Korea's** agreement prohibits this without U.S. approval, something Seoul chafes at. It **sees itself the equal of Japan. Should Japan operate Rokkasho, as it plans to do late in 2018, it will be impossible politically to restrain South Korea from following suit.**

Increased military spending is key to maintaining military dominance, which is the prereq to diplomacy and key to leadership and influence — and budget cuts deck allied cred

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review] //CJC

In the first half of the 20th century alone, the world experienced two devastating world wars, the rise of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian menace, and the advent of the nuclear age. This grim history and **the threats to America and her interests following World War II prompted America's leaders to employ our extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and military power to establish and support the current rules-based international order that has greatly furthered global peace and prosperity and ushered in an era of post- war affluence for the American people. This order is not self-sustaining; it requires active, robust American engagement** and sustained contributions by our allies. To be sure, other nations have benifited and will continue to benefit. But make no mistake, **America provides this international leadership because it greatly enhances America's own security and prosperity**. (3)[1] **There is clearly a cost to this kind of leadership, but nowhere near what America paid in the first half of the 20th century when con ict was allowed to fester and grow until it rose to the level of general war**. Indeed, our policy of active global engagement has been so beneficial and is so ingrained that those who would retreat from it have a heavy

burden of proof to present an alternative that would better serve the security interests and well-being of the United States of America. Since World War II, no matter which party has controlled the White House or Congress, ***America's global military capability and commitment has been the strategic foundation undergirding our global leadership.*** Given that reality, **the defense budget cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act (BCA)** of 2011, **coupled with the additional cuts and constraints on defense management under the law's sequestration provision, constitute a serious strategic misstep on the part of the United States. Not only have they caused significant investment shortfalls in U.S. military readiness and both present and future capabilities, they have prompted our current and potential allies and adversaries to question our commitment and resolve. Unless reversed, these shortfalls will lead to a high risk force in the near future. That in turn will lead to an America that is not only less secure but also far less prosperous**. In this sense, these cuts are ultimately self-defeating. **The effectiveness of America's other tools for global influence, such as diplomacy and economic engagement, are critically intertwined with and dependent upon the perceived strength, presence, and commitment of U.S. armed forces**. Yet **the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, hereafter referred to as the QDR, clearly exceed the budget resources made available to the Department. This gap is disturbing if not dangerous in light of the fact that global threats and challenges are rising, including a troubling pattern of territorial assertiveness and regional intimidation on China's part, the recent aggression of Russia in Ukraine, nuclear proliferation on the part of North Korea and Iran, a serious insurgency in Iraq that both reflects and fuels the broader sectarian conflicts in the region, the civil war in Syria, and civil strife in the larger Middle East and throughout Africa. These are among the trends that mandate increased defense funding**. Others include the rapidly expanding availability of lethal technologies to both state and non-state actors; demographic shifts, including increasing urbanization; diffusion of power among many nations, particularly rising economic and military powers in Asia; and heated competition to secure access to scarce natural resources. These and other trends pose serious op-erational challenges to American military forces. (9–11) Conflicts are likely to unfold more rapidly. Battlefields will be more lethal. Operational sanctuary for U.S. forces (rear areas safe from enemy interdiction) will be scarce and often fleeting. Asymmetric conflict will be the norm. (17–19**) In this rapidly changing environment, U.S. military superiority is not a given; maintain-ing the operational and technological edge of our armed forces requires sustained and targeted investment**.

Military spending is low now — kills allied assurances and cred

Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15

(Bruce at The Davis Institute for National Security, "Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?," Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot__107662.html)

The Asia Pivot policy is sound only if the requisite military forces are deployed in the Pacific—a number that must be commensurate with a stated increase in the region's importance. Without such a deployment, **the Pivot will fail to reassure allies or deter potential opponents**. Claims that U.S. forces in the Pacific will be immune from duties elsewhere or from budget cuts that will affect the U.S. Joint Force over the next several years simply do not hold water. Though the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were increased by 100,000 troops to handle the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, U.S. soldiers and Marines were also removed from Asia to serve in those wars. Even well before sequestration-mandated budget cuts, it was obvious that the United States was underfunding defense requirements essential to maintaining security commitments in Asia. In February 2012, Panetta testified that the United States would rebalance its force posture to emphasize Asia, but he added that the defense budget maintained only the current bomber, aircraft carrier, and big-deck amphibious fleets and restored Army and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific to preIraq and pre-Afghanistan deployment levels. On the surface, the Obama Administration's 2015 budget projections appear to maintain current levels of defense spending. As economist Robert Samuelson points out, defense spending in nominal dollars (unadjusted for inflation) remains static between 2013 and 2024: $626 billion in 2013 and $630 billion in 2024. However, **a closer review** of these numbers reveals that, once adjusted for inflation, **U.S. defense**

spending drops by 25 percent.16 It is difficult to envision how the President's Pivot can be executed successfully with such a decrease in defense spending, a point underscored by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, who has stated that, with sequestration budget cuts, the military is in danger of becoming **"a hollow force,** one that is not ready, one that is not capable of fulfilling assigned missions. In the longer term, after trimming the military enough to restore readiness and modernization, the resulting force would be too small—too small to fully execute the president's defense strategy." Asia Pivot Derailed by Defense Budget Cuts Although there have been no force reductions in the Pacific as there have been in other commands, the cuts in the overall defense procurement and training budgets have already negatively affected U.S. forces in the Asia–Pacific region. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina G. McFarland admitted in March 2014 that as a result of defense budget cuts, "Right now, **the [Asia] pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can't happen."** The ability of the **U.S. to fulfill its security obligations rests on two factors: the actual number of military forces available and the quality of those forces**. Having requisite forces in the long term requires sufficient ongoing funding for their procurement. The quality of those forces is determined in part by adequate training. Current **U.S. defense budgets for military forces in the Pacific are insufficient to provide for numbers or quality**, let alone both. Navy. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert has told Congress that in order to meet the global needs of combatant commanders, the Navy would need a 450-ship fleet. Currently, the Navy has 289 ships and hopes to achieve a 306-ship fleet by the end of the decade, but attaining 306 ships would require a shipbuilding budget of $18 billion per year over the next 20-plus years. Since the current FY 2013–FY 2019 plan is for only $13 billion per year, "the largest fleet of current ship designs that the Navy would be able to afford is 30% smaller than the goal—or about 220 ships." Representative Randy Forbes (R–VA), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, has expressed concern that "in 2007 we met 90-percent [sic] of the combatant commander's requirements. This year we will only meet 43 percent."20 In addition, the current defense budget does not include funding to refuel and overhaul the USS George Washington, which could lead the Navy to have to **decommission the aircraft carrier**. Doing so would reduce the carrier fleet from 11 to 10, despite the former Secretary of Defense Panetta's pledge that "the President of the United States and all of us have decided that it is important for us to maintain our carrier presence at full strength. And that means we'll be keeping 11 carriers in our force." Given that the Navy historically dedicates from one-third to one-quarter of its deployed fleet to operations in the Pacific, such a dramatic decrease in fleet size can only have a negative impact on the United States' naval capabilities in the region. Marine Corps. Naval and amphibious operations are the backbone of U.S. military deterrence and defense capabilities in the Pacific. Yet Admiral Samuel Locklear, III, PACOM commander, testified that due to a lack of large amphibious ships, landing craft, and other amphibious vehicles, the Navy and Marine Corps do not have enough assets to carry out contested amphibious operations in the Pacific if a crisis were to arise. Locklear added that there is a "continuing demand" for PACOM to provide other deployed and ready forces to the other regional combatant commanders, creating "periods in PACOM where we lack adequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as key response forces, ultimately degrading our deterrence posture and our ability to respond." The Marine Corps has stated that it would need 54 amphibious assault ships to fulfill the validated requirements of all the combatant commanders. That would be the number needed to deploy three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), since each MEB requires at least 17 ships for a force of 17,500 Marines and all their gear. But the Navy's shipbuilding budget— a critical factor for U.S. forces in the Pacific—has not been sufficient to meet combatant commander requirements for years, so the Marine Corps and Navy have had to settle for the ability to transport and deploy less than two full MEBs—**nearly half of required capabilities.** The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) again validated the requirement for 38 amphibious warships to move two MEBs, but current fiscal pressures led to a decline from 33 to 28 warships, meaning that the Corps' actual ability to conduct a large-scale amphibious operation will amount to a mere 1.5 MEBs, or roughly a half-dozen battalions of Marines with their supporting aviation—presuming that all amphibs from around the world were brought together for a single operation. The latest Navy plans do not envision a force of 33 amphibious warships until at least the mid-2020s, which would still meet only two-thirds of the total requirement. Then-Marine Commandant General James Amos warned that defense cuts could "translate into increased loss of personnel and materiel, and ultimately [place] mission accomplishment at risk." Twenty retired Marine Corps generals wrote Congress in March 2014 to warn that the shortage of amphibious ships—and the reduced maintenance of the existing fleet—had "degraded our current national security capabilities and will have negative effects long into the 21st century." Beyond this, Marine Corps fighter squadrons used to have 12–14 aircraft available. Now they usually have 12, but in 2015 that **may decrease to eight deployable aircraft per squadron.** U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Force has grounded 13 combat squadrons (250 planes), nearly one-third of its active-duty fighter and bomber squadrons. Air Force officials said they have implemented a "tiered readiness" approach for active-duty air combat units and warned that there may not be sufficient combat air power to respond immediately to contingencies. Moreover, for every month a squadron does not fly, it takes an equal number of months to retrain the pilots. Recently, the Air Force had to cancel a two-week flying exercise in which units from the Asia–Pacific region and allied air forces would have trained together. The 374th Airlift Wing in Japan had to cut its flying program by 25 percent and cancel its participation in a combined drill in Thailand called Cope Tiger. U.S. Army. The Army has had to cut training above squad and platoon levels, including all but one of the Combat Training Center rotations scheduled for brigades this fiscal year. Depot maintenance was also halted, and the Army cut flying hours from aviation training, creating a shortfall of pilots. General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that "should a contingency arise, there may not be enough time to avoid sending forces into harm's way unprepared." General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of U.N. and U.S. forces in Korea, testified that he has doubts about America's ability to counter a largescale North Korean attack effectively due to the low readiness of forces stationed outside of Korea. He warned that "[a]ny delay in the arrival or reduction in readiness of these forces would lengthen the time required to

accomplish key missions in crisis or war, likely resulting in higher civilian and military casualties." In other words, cuts in the defense budget affect the ability of the U.S. military to prepare for and engage in operations in general, but **especially the Pivot to Asia.**

Perceived lack of US resource commitment to security emboldens NoKo and China—no one else secures Asia, military is key

Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15 (Bruce, "Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?," Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot__107662.html) //CJC

Perceptions that U.S. rhetoric has not been backed by sufficient resources and commitment and that Washington remains focused on a series of unresolved crises elsewhere can have **profound implications for Asia. North Korea and China**, for example, may be emboldened to test the **U**nited **S**tates as they **pursue policies** that are **inimical to peace and stability in Asia.** Asia's Strategic Importance to the United States. Asia has been since the 19th century—and will continue to be—a region of vital importance to the United States. At present, Asia contains more than half of the world's population; two of the three largest global economies (China and Japan); and the world's fastest-growing economies, which generate 40 percent of the world's GDP growth—more than any other region. Asia is America's largest trading partner, accounting for 38 percent of total U.S. trade in goods for 2013, compared with 30 percent with North America and 20 percent for Europe. Five of the United States' seven major defense treaties are with Asia–Pacific nations, and Washington has strong partnerships with many other nations in the region. Consequently, **control of Asia by a hostile power would threaten American economic and security national interests.** Yet **stability in Asia is already being threatened by a number of factors: North Korea's growing military capabilities, China's increasingly aggressive behavior**, long-standing sovereignty disputes, historical animosities, and rising nationalism. In the absence of any regional architecture comparable to either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, **the United States has proven to be the only nation with both the capabilities and the historical record necessary to assume the role of regional balancer and "honest broker." But to reassure allies and deter opponents, the United States must maintain a strong** economic, diplomatic, and **military presence throughout Asia.** Such an unambiguous approach is the key to regional peace and stability.

American Commitment is Key to Japan's Non-Nuclear Principles

Satoh 2009 [Yukio, President of the Japan institute of international Affairs in Tokyo & former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, "Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament," *Nautilus Institute*. http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09018Satoh.html] //DNP

For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, **given Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's progressing nuclear and missile programs and China's growing military power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo**. Japan has long been committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing nuclear

weapons, not producing them and not permitting their entry into the country. A prevalent and strong sentiment against nuclear weapons among the Japanese people lies behind the policy to deny themselves the possession of nuclear weapons in spite of the country's capabilities to do otherwise. The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain vivid national memories. **Yet, strategically, Japan's adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles depends largely, if not solely, upon the credibility** of the Japan-US Security Treaty, or more specifically, that **of the United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats.** In response, the US government has been steadfastly assuring the Japanese in an increasingly clear manner of American commitment to provide deterrence for Japan by all means, including nuclear. Against this backdrop, the argument made by the aforementioned four eminent strategists in the tone-setting joint article published in The Wall Street Journal of January 4, 2007, that "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete", was received with mixed reactions in Japan: welcome for the sake of nuclear disarmament and caution from the perspectives of security and defense. **As depending upon the US' extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan's only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence.** A unique feature of the Japan-US security arrangements is that there have been no consultations on how American extended deterrence should function, nor even any mechanism put in place for such consultations. This has been largely due to Japan's reluctance to date to be involved in American nuclear strategy. The Japanese government had gone even further in promising the people that it would strictly apply the Non-Nuclear Principles to the entry of US vessels and aircraft even at a time when tactical nuclear weapons were reportedly aboard some of them. In recent years, though, the Japanese have been more concerned about the credibility of the American commitment. Exposed to a series of threatening actions by Pyongyang, particularly its test-shooting of missiles over Japan (1998) and its nuclear testing (2006), the Japanese have come to realize anew how indispensable American deterrence is to their security. The abduction of Japanese citizens by Pyongyang's agents, which became public knowledge in 2002, had added to Japanese security concerns about North Korea, so that the Bush administration's decision to rescind (prematurely in Japanese eyes) the designation of the DPRK as a State Sponsor of Terrorism raised voices in Japan questioning Washington's sense of solidarity with an ally. It is indeed difficult to judge whether and how the concept of nuclear deterrence would work vis-a-vis North Korea, whose unpredictability makes it difficult to exclude the possibility that Pyongyang might use nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction out of desperation. Japan has therefore been engaged in the development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in cooperation with the United States. Although BMD systems need to be much improved before they can be considered reliable, they are designed to eventually function, at least conceptually, as a supplementary means for defending the country against North Korea's missiles if and when deterrence were to fail. In addition, their purely defensive characteristics are stabilizing, rather than destabilizing, regional strategic balance. In the meantime, Japanese concern about the credibility of American extended deterrence could increase if the US government would unilaterally move to redefine the concept of nuclear deterrence and to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in providing deterrence.

Credible security guarantee is key to check South Korean prolif

Richard **Weitz 13**, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, "North Korean Threats Deepen Southern Nuclear Insecurities," 7-4-2013, Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/north-korean-threats-deepen-southern-nuclear-insecurities/, DOA: 8-1-2015, y2k

It became clear at the 28th Annual Conference of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies in Seoul this past week that the DPRK's recent escalatory rhetoric and other provocations has reinforced the concerns of some South Korean strategists about **the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in Asia.**

As the United States becomes vulnerable to a North Korean nuclear strike, the credibility of its extended deterrence guarantees to its Asian allies is **called into question**. Some South Koreans, including some of the former ROK general officers at the conference, already doubt that the U.S. officials would defend them against a DPRK attack if North Korea could destroy Los Angeles in retaliation. They want to acquire their own national nuclear deterrent, whose use in response to an attack against them would be much more credible than that of a third party.

If more South Koreans lose faith in the U.S. willingness or capacity to defend them, or they come to fear that potential foreign aggressors doubt the credibility of U.S. assurances, then South Korea might **pursue alternative security**

policies, including possibly **seeking** their own **nuclear weapons**. Such a move could easily prove counterproductive by harming the ROK's relations with the United States and other countries, **resulting in a net decrement to the country's security.**

Historical Precedent shows States Turn to Proliferation without American Security Guarantees

Toshi **Yoshihara and** James R. **Holmes 2009**, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, "Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option" , Naval War College Review, https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f1dc7a03-fab4-4a5b-9be2-f8c3e5baf430/Thinking-about-the-Unthinkable--Tokyo-s-Nuclear-Op] //DNP

Indeed, **historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region**. In the past, **perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out**. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, **Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula**. **As a consequence**, according to Seung-Young Kim, "**Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons**" despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. (36) **Such fears compelled President Park** Chung Hee **to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program.** To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter's abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park's pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, **China's nuclear test** in 1964 **kindled "fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction.**" (37) **This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang** Kai-shek **to launch a nuclear-weapons program**. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communique, which began the normalization process**, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island.** As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, "**The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves" including nuclear weapons.** (38) Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade. (39) **In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option**. **The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States.** While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.

Japan & SoKo prolif wrecks global non-prolif regime---triggers nuclear war in every hotspot

Robert Zarate 14 is Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI), "America's Allies and Nuclear Arms: Assessing the Geopolitics of Nonproliferation in Asia," 5-7-14, http://www.project2049.net/documents/Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Nonproliferation, DOA: 7-27-15, y2k

U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and the Middle East would use America's diminished military power and geopolitical influence as justification to pursue their own *nuclear options*. If Washington were perceived as acquiescing in any way to *nuclear breakout* by Tokyo or Seoul, then we should expect *signatories of* the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (*NPT*),25 including some U.S. friends, to cite *discriminatory doublestandards* and even *quit the NPT*. Likely candidates in the Middle East would include *Saudi Arabia* and other *Arab Gulf security partners* who are already threatened by *Iran*'s drive to rapid nuclear weaponsmaking capability in violation of the NPT and numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In Asia, candidates would include the region's many *technologically-advanced* and technologically-rising *nations*. *Taiwan* might be tempted to restart its reversed nuclear bomb-making efforts from the 1970s and 1980s. *Australia*, birthplace of the SILEX method of laser enrichment that General Electric hopes someday to commercialize,26 may see prudence in developing, at the very least, *a latent nuclear weapons-making capability*. So might partners like *Singapore*, *Indonesia* and *Vietnam*.

China, *Russia*, *North Korea* and perhaps others would likely use Japanese and South Korean *nuclear breakout*—and any accompanying breakdown in the international nuclear order—as an excuse to proliferate, rather *overtly*, nuclear weapons-making technologies or nuclear weapons themselves to problematic states. Moreover, the *U*nited *S*tates could expect Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, if not also *India and Pakistan*, potentially to ramp up the size and capabilities of their *respective nuclear arsenals*. In terms of strategic nuclear forces, the regional and global distribution of military power would shift further against America's advantage. *Nuclear war* would likely go from being in the background of *interstate conflicts* in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, to the *immediate foreground*. In turn, the *worsening nuclear dimensions* of the international security environment would gravely strain the formal *security guarantees* of America's treaty-based bilateral alliances and informal guarantees of its bilateral security partnerships.

Nuclear proliferation results in nuclear war- laundry list of reasons — lack of second strike

Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, **2015** (Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future] //CJC

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plusyear tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear

weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO's conventional inferiority.51 As Russia's conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan's military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a 'threat that leaves something to chance'. 52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents

nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism- intentional transfers, underdeveloped security, and state collapse

Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, **2015** (Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future] //CJC

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a 'religious duty' for Al-Qa'eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan's atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa'eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan's nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran's nuclear arsenal.

Hegemony is declining now—shifts to Asia and decreasing military spending gap

Suslov 14 – National Research University Higher School of Economics (Dmitry, "US Global Leadership Dilemma as a Challenge for the US-Russia Relations," p. 3-6, February 20, 2014) //AGK

The central challenge that the US faces today is that in less than 20 years since **the US** declared victory in the Cold War**, became the only superpower and quickly assumed the role of a center of the unipolar world, a global leader** and manager of its own international system with a global reach, a global sheriff and bearer of values that seemed universal, it faced a sudden and comprehensive economic, foreign policy and political crisis.2 The magnitude and shock of this crisis, which is still to be realized and comprehended, is no less dramatic, than the history of the US rise itself, which in 200 years turned itself from a colony to the only superpower and center of a unipolar world.3 Indeed, the US history is a history of unprecedented success, expansion and dynamism. Moreover, until now it seemed as if the historic development itself was "proving" the basic American ideological assumptions: that it is an exceptional nation with universal values, which is destined to lead the world to a universal democratic peace. But as soon as the US reached the apex and, it appeared as if a key and decisive moment has come for the US to fulfill its historic mission – transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values – something went wrong.4 In the economy, the US, still being the biggest nation-state economy in the world, most diversified and traditionally dynamic and technologically advanced among the developed economies, still the founder and most influential player of the global economic governance institutions, became the center of the deepest economic crisis since the Great Depression. The major pillar of the world economic order has become its major problem. The role the US plays in global economic and financial governance is increasingly at odds with the volume of its foreign debt and to American monetary policies (printing more dollars). It takes a much longer time than it used to be for the US to resume growth after crisis (and the ways out of the current "Great Recession" are unclear). Unemployment is high (for US standards) and not reducing. Finally, for the 1st time in a century the US is losing an image of the most vibrant, dynamic economy and foundation of the world's economic growth to China.5 China, India, other "new rising centers" and Asia as a whole are perceived today as the "last hope" of the world economy, not the US. While trust in the US economic dynamism and progress has been one of the major foundations of American soft and hard power. Symbolic (in terms of determining perceptions of the vector, which is of utmost importance in today world) is a comparison between the booming Shanghai with the aging infrastructure in the US. Politically, the US is facing unprecedented in recent decades and self-destructing polarization between Democrats and Republicans, which can hardly find anything to agree upon in both domestic and foreign policies, and their mutual diminishing popularity and loss of appeal – witness the Tea Party movement. Both Parties, and especially the Republicans, are undergoing dangerous transformation, with the traditional center depleting and the center of gravity going to the flanks, which aggravates polarization. This means that for the next years the US political system will remain to be paralyzed, and thus reducing effectiveness of the US domestic and foreign policies, reducing a US capacity to act as a responsible and a reliable partner. In foreign and national security policy the US faces a crisis of leadership and military overextension.6 It turned out that indispensable of all its power preponderance and global presence, its diplomatic, military, economic, ideological, cultural and other instruments and assets, it is incapable of directing development of the international system in a way favorable for the US, incapable of transforming the world as it wishes. Despite the fact that the US is still the most powerful nation on Earth – militarily, diplomatically and economically, despite its efforts to consolidate unipolarity and global leadership under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and renew its global leadership under Barack Obama, despite its efforts to transform the international system in accordance with the US interests and values, *the world is clearly developing in a way unfavorable for the United States*.7 And quite notably, that it started developing that way after the US acquired a hegemonic positions in the world. The US has failed to preserve itself as an undisputed pole of a unipolar system. The "unipolar moment" was indeed a moment, while "unipolar stability" turned out to be a fake in the global context. The US has failed to achieve the macro- and micro tasks in the sphere of global security it was claiming to deal with during the last 2 decades. Afghanistan and Iraq, democratization and modernization of the Broader Middle East, Arab-Israeli conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, etc. – in all or majority of cases the situation is worse than before the American "management". There are reasons to say that Libya and Syria will follow these examples. Power is shifting from the West, including the US, to the rising centers, especially in Asia, and also diffusing more broadly among multiple actors.8 Thus, it is increasingly difficult for the US to consolidate and organize others to fulfill an American agenda: these others are more and more either unwilling or demand a bigger price for their cooperation. The examples of Syria, Iran, North Korea, Middle Eastern conflict, US-Chinese relations, global climate change, nuclear reduction agenda, etc. vividly depict that the capacity of the US to determine and drive events, both multilaterally and unilaterally, has reduced. As the power of the "new centers" rise, while the US relative and even absolute (decreasing defense budget and Armed Forces personnel, unwillingness of the Americans to fight new wars, economic troubles, deficit) power decreases, the US needs these new power centers to fulfill its agenda and pursue – sometimes vital - national interests. However, unless there is a convergence of interests, which is far from being the rule, these centers are unwilling to cooperate. Due to the diffusion of power the correlation of interests between the US and its allies and partners is becoming more complicated and non-lineal. On some cases they can be strong supporters of the US policy, while on the other, sometimes no less important ones for the US, they create difficulties. Turkish policies on Syria on the one hand, and on Iran and Iraq, on the other hand, is a bright example of this complexity. This puts additional limits on American leadership. The world is again becoming pluralistic and heterogeneous in terms of values. Universality of the American values is again under fire, which undermines the US basic ideological believes and world perceptions.9 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the capacity of the US military power to fulfill the necessary political targets – promoting democratization and overall reform of the international system through forceful regime change from the outside - was limited, and that the US is incapable to pursue an imperial foreign policy in the current conditions – just as all the other great powers. Besides these wars guarantee that the US will not return to an imperial practice in the observable future – which is already stipulated on the official level in Obama Administration's Strategic Defense Guidance in 2012 (rejection of long-term occupation).10 This significantly reduces the transformative component in the US Grand Strategy as such, making it to do more with the US "conventional" national interests, rather than with transformation of the international system, especially with the help of the military force. Moreover, these **wars have exhausted the US military, decreased American physical capability and moral will to engage in new wars** (witness the Obama Administration's approach on Libya, Syria and Iran), and contributed to a situation, when **the US was compelled to start reducing its defense budget and reviewing its global defense role and responsibility.** The latter is illustrated in the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance and the 2011 "National Strategic Narrative" paper by "Mr.Y".11 ***This contrasts with dynamic increase of the new poles' defense budgets, including China, Russia and India*.** For the 1st time since the end of the Cold War **the gap in military expenditures between the US and the nonWestern power centers started to shrink. *It is still enormous, but dynamic and vector matter. This all makes the future of the American global leadership in the increasingly multipolar and even polycentric world the central problem of the US foreign policy for the years to come*.**12 The **major challenge that the US faces is how to adapt**

itself to the new international conditions, what kind of modus operandi to employ, **to preserve the US primacy and leadership and reverse the tendency of the international environment becoming less favorable for the US.** This adaptation was – and still is – at the core of the Obama's Grand Strategy. Another answer to the same question is provided by the Republicans.

Closing military gap causes arms race, miscalc, and no US response to conflict because higher risks — empirically US leadership is best for peace

Khalilzad, 2011 – former director of planning at the Defense Department [Zalmay February 8, 2011 The Economy and National Security Accessed July 29 http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=1 The National Review Online]

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. **The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers**, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, **and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation**. The stakes are high**. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership**. By contrast, **multi-polar systems have been unstable**, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers**. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars**. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. **Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threat**s. Under this scenario, there would be a **heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict.** Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, **hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.** As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing's economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China's strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China's expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, **the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.**

Hegemony creates peace by preventing both great power and regional conflicts

Stephen M. **Walt**, 20**02**, American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, "AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls", http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf] //CJC

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons

why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 12 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Decline of hegemony invites great power war

Nye 1995 [Joseph Nye is professor of international relations at Harvard, ""International Conflicts After the Cold War"", *Aspen Institute*, <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/nye4152.htm>] //CJC

There are two general approaches to understanding the causes of international conflict. Realists argue that "wars arise from the efforts of states to acquire power and security in an anarchic world."[p. 66] Realism implies a pessimistic view of the usefulness of international institutions in preventing conflicts. Strong international institutions can only exist when there is sufficient agreement among the great powers to allow them to exist. Disharmony among great powers makes strong international institutions impossible. Liberals argue that conflicts "are determined not only by the balance of power, but by the domestic structure of states, their values, identities and cultures and international institutions for conflict resolution."[p. 66] Liberalism supports trade, since trade makes nations more interdependent, and so less likely to go to war. Liberals also note the democratic nations almost never war against one another. Nye argues that neither view is adequate on its own. By drawing upon elements of both perspectives, Nye describes two sources of great power conflict. First, **power transitions often lead to conflict. Declining nations may attempt to put down rising competitors. Sensing weakness, growing nations may attack declining ones to secure a more favorable place in the international system.** The present era is one of dramatic power transitions. However, Nye argues that "the United States is the only true superpower, with global assets in all the dimensions of power."[p. 67] **Were the U.S. in decline, great powers conflict would be more likely. As it stands the U.S.'s enduring and clearly superior position tends to stabilize the international system.**

China catching up to the US causes great power war — every historical example proves

Gilpin 2013 [Robert Gilpin is professor of international affairs at Princeton, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *Policytensor*, <https://policytensor.com/2013/02/25/theory-of-hegemonic-war/>] //CJC

What we can say is that China has tremendous war potential. **If China continues to grow rapidly and modernizes its military, China would be able to balance the US perhaps as early as 2025.** The world would then become bipolar. A necessary condition of this first step towards superpower status would be for China to secure its energy supply by becoming

militarily preponderant in Central Asia. If it continues to industrialize and grow for another decade or two it would emerge as a serious "peer competitor" to America. The United States will try in vain to shore up its power position, perhaps launching a cold war when it finds itself in relative decline. Initial moves towards such a scenario have already begun with the Obama administration's initiative to "rebalance towards east Asia". I think Copeland is right: it will be America that initiates a hawkish containment policy as soon as US policymakers are certain about relative decline. Once serious decline sets in the US, the governance of the international system will become weak and ineffective. **There will most certainly be a struggle for hegemony. Hopefully**, it will be a series of localized wars and **no nuclear weapons will be used.** Once the Strait of Malacca comes under Chinese protection, everyone will know who the top dog is. **No dominant state in history has ever relinquished its power position without a fight and no rising hegemon has ever established itself as the dominant state in the international order without fighting and winning a hegemonic war. There is no reason to believe that we have somehow passed into post-history** because of some ideational revolution in human consciousness. **The rule of force in world affairs has not been transcended. The organizing principle of the international system is still anarchy.** The international relations of states are still primarily characterized by power politics.

Military Readiness Poor — O&M Budget Cuts Make it WORSE in Squo

Majumdar 2016 [Dave, "The Pentagon's Readiness Crisis: Why the 2017 Defense Bill Will Make Things Worse," *National Interest*. Accessed at:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagons-readiness-crisis-why-the-2017-defense-bill-16954.] //DNP

According to an internal HASC minority staff document obtained by *The National Interest*—which is being circulated amongst Democratic military legislative assistants on the committee's member staffs—explicitly states that **the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act will not do anything to alleviate the problem.** Indeed, the Republican **bill actually cuts the very operations and maintenance** (O&M) **funds that would help the Pentagon dig out of its readiness deficit.**

"The House NDAA **cuts O&M by a net $11.6 billion** to fund procurement and it **forces higher troop numbers without providing the necessary infrastructure to support them, creating a hollow force that is less ready**," reads the HASC minority document. "It focuses on procuring new weapons that in some cases will replace older systems with newer ones that are not as fatigued. However, the **bulk of this effort goes toward procuring** these **systems without investing in the necessary O&M and support infrastructure to keep them well maintained and provide servicemembers with the training and supplies they need to be truly ready**."

But while the Democratic staff does not agree with the GOP's solution, there is broad agreement that there has been a drastic fall in U.S. military readiness—especially for the high-end near-peer fight. "**Data provided by the military services show a dramatic decrease in readiness for all the service branches starting in 2005 to 2007 and culminating in 2011**, particularly for the Army and Marine Corps," the document reads. "The readiness of the Army began to improve somewhat in 2012, but **sequestration hit in 2013. Since 2013 the Navy has been the only service to maintain a stable readiness level, but even the Navy's level is not optimum, and naval aviation has particular readiness problems**."

It will take the Pentagon almost a decade to recover from its readiness shortfall once factors such as sequestration have been resolved. "Once these constraints are lifted, it will take an estimated eight to ten years for readiness in the services to recover," the document reads.

The root cause of the readiness crisis stems from the multiple wars the nation has fought since September 11, 2001. All four branches of the military—but particularly the Army and the Marines—have faced constant deployments, which have degraded their readiness and worn-down their personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, **funds earmarked for modernization and procurement are continuously raided to pay for ongoing operations**. "The end results are that the services are very good at counterinsurgency, but they **are not prepared to endure a long fight against higher order threats from near-peer competitors**," the document noted. "The services are using their existing equipment far longer than its designed utility, which means more downtime for repairs and more obsolescence of parts. And our people are being deployed so often that there is little time between deployments to train for the higher-order fight, what we call full-spectrum readiness."

Military and civilian personnel cuts—and troop caps—have also played a role in the Pentagon's plummeting readiness. The result is that the Pentagon has lost skilled workers such as engineers and planning staffs while the uniformed military has lost many of its best and brightest technicians. One example of that is pointed out in the HASC document: "The Navy lost the in-house ability to technically—and critically—assess engineering proposals submitted by contractors for the design of new ship classes, which ends up costing taxpayers a great deal of money to correct."

Moreover, the Congressionally driven budget crises of the past several years have wrecked havoc on military training. "The Air Force flying hour program has been capped at levels 10% less than the minimum requirement to sustain its current readiness level; and Army Aviation is providing only 11.5 out of a required 14.5 training hours per month to achieve and maintain foundational flight skills and operate effectively in the field. It also means that **planned joint and international training exercises** where the skills needed **to integrate** not only **U.S.** but **allied military forces** that would be fighting together **are not rehearsed** and repeated again and again to achieve proficiency," the document reads. "These shortfalls mean that only 443 out of 1,040 Marine aircraft are currently ready to fly; and half of the Navy's F-18A-D aircraft are out of circulation. Although **a minimum 80% of the Air Force needs to be ready to meet a conflict with a near-peer competitor to the United States, less than 50% of the Air Force is ready to conduct all the operations necessary.**"

Military Readiness key to deterrence and its reverse causal — lack of readiness causes lashout — readiness isn't contingent on comparing the US to other countries either which takes out their unqiueness args

Spencer 2000 [Jack Spencer is Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, "The Facts about Military Readiness," *Heritage Foundation*, September 15, 2000.] http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness) //WGC

"In recent months, the major foreign policy issue of the 2000 presidential election campaign has been military readiness, with Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush each addressing the subject. Governor Bush has accused the Clinton Administration of military neglect, referring to the U.S. armed forces as "a military in decline."1 Vice President Gore, on the other hand, has countered that "Our military is the strongest and the best in the entire world."2

While there are clear signs that readiness is a problem for the U.S. military, Al Gore is factually correct when he contends that the U.S. armed forces stand far above any other military force. He is missing a more important point, however. **The United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, has responsibilities and national security concerns far beyond those of any other nation. U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once.** America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America

or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. **Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency.** The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 **Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace."**

Military Readiness First to Go — and lack of readiness → Failed interventions

Dunn 2013 [Richard, "The Impact of a Declining Defense Budget on Combat Readiness," *Heritage Foundation*. Accessed at:http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-impact-of-a-declining-defense-budget-on-combat-readiness.] //GST

Combat readiness is defined as "[t]he ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy."[1] This is the most important factor to our war fighters, but as basic as it is to them, it remains a complicated subject for others to understand. Due to its multidimensional and somewhat diffuse nature, it also has few natural supporters. For a state that builds ships, it is easy to support a policy that increases the number of ships in the Navy, but it is difficult to construct a constituency to support the complex issue of military readiness. Therefore, **readiness may suffer significant harm in the increasingly fierce competition for resources**. To fight effectively, the armed forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate under dangerous, complex, uncertain, and austere conditions—often with little warning. They require the right personnel operating the right equipment with the right training to win. Readiness is like a three-legged stool. **The personnel, equipment, and training "legs" need to be balanced and in sync to support the load.** The most modern equipment is useless without highly trained personnel to operate and employ it. Conversely, outmoded or unreliable equipment can hamper the effectiveness of the most highly motivated and skilled personnel. To fight effectively, personnel must train with their combat equipment, practicing their combat missions under realistic, demanding conditions. Quality personnel, equipment, and training are the essential dimensions of combat readiness. **Failure to maintain an appropriate balance among these dimensions during the current period of budgetary uncertainty will significantly degrade America's ability to respond to threats to its interests**. This can lead to major strategic setbacks and significant loss of life. The challenging balancing act requires wise and effective leadership across all defense-related institutions. History repeatedly shows that unanticipated events often catch us by surprise and that as a nation, **we have paid a high price in blood and treasure to compensate for our lack of preparedness**. Lower levels of defense resourcing have not been the sole cause of unpreparedness. In many cases, there is an inability to answer the fundamental question of "what are we preparing to do?" Absent an effective answer that guides the allocation of resources, we can end up with forces that are inadequately manned, equipped, or trained to meet a comprehensive range of threats, some of them unanticipated. Answering the "what, when, and where" question is particularly challenging and complicated in the current era of strategic uncertainty. The world is still a violent and dangerous place, and major existential threats remain vague and unfocused. In the Pacific, U.S. relationships with emerging powers and the future threats they may pose remain unclear. In the Middle East, the political instability that accompanied the Arab Spring may vastly alter the geopolitical landscape established in the 1920s, creating opportunities for a wide spectrum of Islamist parties to advance their undemocratic agendas. Terrorism by non-state actors like al-Qaeda continues to metastasize. At the same time, warfare is expanding into the economically vital cyberspace domain, and revolutionary developments in unmanned systems may be changing the very nature of conflict. **Rapid reductions in the defense budget are leading to the restructuring or elimination of many programs**. **This will**

damage the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats to vital U.S. national interests. Maintaining a military posture capable of achieving these aims requires both sufficient forces of various types and the readiness of those forces for combat. History's Painful Lessons All of these developments have the potential to harm U.S. interests significantly. Although we know that the future may hold significant dangers, they remain ill defined, creating a challenging analytical problem for national security policymakers. History can provide useful insights into how to approach strategic uncertainty. We know we cannot "get it entirely right." Therefore, we should strive not to get it so far wrong that we suffer unacceptable consequences when hit by unexpected threats. Under conditions of uncertainty, a hedging strategy that provides a range of options makes the most sense. Historically, maintaining effective balance among the different dimensions of readiness and having some ready capability to deal with a wide range of potential threats have been an effective way to hedge strategic bets. **In times of defense budgetary retrenchment, combat readiness of the armed forces often becomes one of the first casualties of fiscal tightening**. This was particularly true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression and isolationism made military preparedness a very low national priority. Despite the threatening war clouds rapidly expanding in Asia and Europe, the U.S. was woefully unprepared for global conflict. The shock of Pearl Harbor mobilized both the industrial capability and the moral determination to overcome the early, disastrous reversals in the Pacific and tactical defeats in North Africa. Once focused on military production, the U.S. economy rapidly produced overwhelming quantities of ships, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other matériel needed for America to become the "Arsenal of Democracy." However, U.S. forces quickly learned that training for combat, particularly in developing military leaders, was just as complex and demanding. It took several years of internalizing battlefield lessons learned at high cost to train the leaders at all levels that brought the war to a victorious conclusion. After the war, "no more Pearl Harbors"[2] became the rallying cry of the supporters of a strong national defense.

Regrettably, the record of U.S. military preparedness following World War II has been rather checkered. Since then, **the U.S. has had less than a year (often much less) to prepare for any of its major conflicts.**

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While history never exactly repeats itself, we can draw several useful insights from the historical record. First, our ability to predict rapidly emerging threats is imperfect at best. Even in cases in which employment of force was optional, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we have had well less than a year to prepare. Thus, **dependence on having sufficient time to bring forces back up to the desired level of readiness before employing them can be a recipe for disaster**. As a corollary to this point, **readiness can degrade very quickly, so maintaining it requires continuous attention.** Readiness is also somewhat specific to each scenario. Forces prepared for one type of conflict may not be as capable in another. Additionally, leaders trained to operate in one type of conflict may not have the mental agility to perform well in another. The Complexity of Military Operations Understanding the personnel, equipment, and training dimensions of combat readiness requires some understanding of the operations that military organizations perform. Combat operations of almost any scale are exceptionally complex, requiring integration and synchronization of myriad activities ranging from individual actions to coordinated movements by large, geographically dispersed organizations. They are usually executed under dangerous, uncertain, austere, and urgent conditions that compound the challenge. At the basic level of combat operations, individuals and crews must operate their equipment, ranging from individual weapons to combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships. This involves operating all of the systems for communications, situational awareness, etc. Then they must employ their equipment as part of larger unit teams, executing their part in tactical operations. Each smaller unit is part of an even larger team that incorporates many different functions ranging from fire support to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to logistical and medical support. As required, these can be combined into joint task forces that include all of these functions in land, sea, air, space, and even cyberspace dimensions. All of these organizations, from the smallest units to joint task forces, must be tied together by command, control, and communications networks that provide them with awareness of the friendly and enemy situations and orchestrate their individual activities to achieve the commander's intended objectives. At the same time, they all require support, including transportation, refueling, rearming with ammunition, maintenance, and medical evacuation and care. Joint forces are composed of interdependent "teams" at many different levels that are only as strong as their weakest members. For example, the Army may have great airborne paratrooper units, but they are ineffective unless Air Force transport aircraft can deliver them to the right drop zone. These transports, in turn, may require tanker aircraft to refuel them in flight to reach the drop zone. Therefore, the readiness of a joint force to conduct major combat operations is determined by the readiness of its individual components, in turn a function of their manning, equipping, training, and leadership and the balance among these dimensions. **Because of their complexity, combat operations are often vulnerable to single points of failure.** The loss to enemy action or equipment failure of a key communications node, radar, or other "low density" but essential capability at a critical point can put an entire operation at risk.[8] The Dimensions of Readiness The readiness of military organizations to execute these complex operations is a function of the personnel, equipment, and training dimensions of combat readiness and an appropriate balance among them. Regardless of service, combat organizations are designed to accomplish a specific range of tasks. For this purpose, they are allocated specific numbers of personnel of appropriate ranks, skills, and skill levels to man and maintain the various types and numbers of equipment that they are authorized to have to accomplish those tasks. They also receive annual budgets to provide the resources (e.g., fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts) to train with their equipment. Personnel. High-quality, well-trained, and motivated personnel in the necessary numbers and ranks are essential to combat readiness. In the U.S. all-volunteer force, the first task is to recruit sufficient numbers of citizens with the required motivation and physical and mental capabilities to perform complex tasks under austere and often dangerous conditions. Here, the services compete with other opportunities afforded by the civilian economy. The challenge, then, is to provide appropriate incentives to make military careers attractive. While patriotism should never be underestimated as a motive for service, **the armed forces have found it necessary to provide salaries, educational opportunities, quality of life, retirement benefits, and health care to attract and retain the required numbers of quality recruits**. The recent economic recession has reduced civilian opportunities, and the reductions in force size have reduced the number of recruits required to sustain personnel numbers and quality. However, if the economy recovers and generates more civilian opportunities, recruiting and retaining quality personnel may become increasingly more difficult. Once recruited, service personnel must be taught the individual skills unique to their military missions. Teaching all of these required skill sets is a task of immense scale and scope, ranging from teaching rifle proficiency to Army privates to training naval aviators to operate high-performance aircraft from aircraft carrier flight decks. This requires relatively large training organizations staffed with the highest quality instructors, facilities, and equipment. Moreover, personnel require individual training throughout their careers. Initially, junior officers must be taught basic tactics and leadership skills. As they become more senior and assume higher-level responsibilities, they must learn advanced skills ranging from organizational management techniques to national-level strategy. Enlisted personnel must also progress to become effective and mature leaders and managers at higher and higher levels. As military operations and their enabling technologies become increasingly sophisticated and complex, **the training required to master them demands even more time and resources. Thus, it is more effective and efficient to retain trained personnel by motivating them to remain in the service than it is to recruit and train replacements**. Recruiting and training activities are both resource and time intensive, and limited assets are available to perform them. This r**einforces the requirement to make continued military careers attractive by providing adequate salaries and benefits, especially for more mature personnel with families**. Leadership is the catalyst for the personnel dimension of combat readiness. It depends on native ability honed by training and experience. Leadership is an irreplaceable force multiplier. It often spells the difference between disaster and victory under the most trying of circumstances. Thus, the selection, development, and retention of the best leaders, especially those with combat experience, should be a top priority. Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as three to one." This remains as absolutely true today as when he said it. Although intangible, morale is essential to

readiness. It is very much a function of leadership, training, and the overall condition of the force. Poorly led and trained personnel trying to operate unreliable equipment and living in substandard conditions will most likely have low morale and not be very combat effective. Equipment. Based on their missions, military organizations are authorized to have specific quantities of particular types of equipment. For example, armor battalions in the Army are authorized to have a certain number of tanks and the necessary support equipment, such as refueling and maintenance vehicles. Air Force fighter squadrons are authorized to have a certain number of fighter aircraft of specific models and associated ground support equipment. Equipment readiness depends on two factors: the number and types of equipment in organizations and the operational status of that equipment. Service regulations authorize organizations to have specific numbers of specific models of equipment. However, the equipment they actually have (their "equipment fill") depends upon inventories of existing equipment and the procurement of new, usually more modern equipment to replace equipment that wears out, is destroyed, or becomes obsolete. **As procurement accounts decline, procurement of new equipment can be delayed, affecting readiness in two ways**.First, **older generations of equipment are less effective than the newer generations**.Second, **delayed modernization means using older existing equipment, which is less reliable and more difficult and expensive to maintain**. This tends to lower the operational status of equipment fleets. Maintenance and repair of equipment are essential to combat readiness. They are also tremendously time and resource intensive, requiring large numbers of highly skilled personnel, technically sophisticated tools, and a steady, reliable supply of replacement parts. The scope of maintenance and repair ranges from the daily checks and services performed by operators and crews to repairs by unit maintenance personnel to detailed refurbishing done by depots, shipyards, and commercial corporations. As available funding declines, equipment maintenance and repair can be one of the first bill payers. As such, it is often an early indicator of collapsing combat readiness. For example, reduced funding for repair parts can lead to a vicious downward spiral in equipment operational readiness rates. Without replacement parts, units are tempted to cannibalize parts from equipment that is already non-operational. Removing parts to keep other equipment operating or flying not only places additional demands on maintenance manpower, but also creates "hangar queens" missing so many parts that they become very expensive to repair. Because most military equipment is designed for a long service life, it usually is scheduled for depot, shipyard, or commercial refurbishment several times during its "career." This is essential for corrosion control in aircraft and ships and replacement of major sub-assemblies, such as suspensions in ground vehicles. It is also economically smart because it can significantly extend the useful service life of the equipment. **As budgets tighten, such maintenance may be deferred, creating large backlogs and leaving organizations with less reliable equipment that is prone to breakdown**.

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One of the earliest shocks hit in June 1950 when Soviet-supported North Korea invaded South Korea. After the Berlin Blockade in 1949, U.S. forces were focused on the Soviet threat to Europe. Less than five years after the defeat of Germany and Japan, **they were ill prepared for more limited wars in areas of less than strategic interest.** When the U.S. recognized that land forces would be required to stem the rout of the South Korean military, **a hastily assembled force from an Army division on occupation duty in Japan was quickly committed to block the advancing North Korean army**. Named after its commander, **Task Force Smith was poorly equipped** with World War II–era weapons **and had no opportunity to train as a unit. In the opening battle between U.S. and North Korean forces, it was rapidly overrun and suffered disastrous losses.**[3] Decades later, "no more Task Force Smiths" was still an object lesson in preparedness for U.S. Army leaders.[4]

After ending the war in Korea, and concerned with the economic costs of maintaining a large standing army, President Dwight D. Eisenhower relied on strategic air forces to deter Soviet aggression with the threat of massive nuclear retaliation.[5] **The subsequent reduction in ground forces contributed to the difficulty the U.S. faced in dealing with the "wars of national liberation"** that cropped up in the early 1960s, **most significantly in Southeast Asia**.

Committed to combat in Vietnam, the U.S. Army rapidly increased in size. **This rapid expansion strained the Army's ability to induct and train new soldiers and junior officers.** The conflict also strained the intellectual adaptability of the Army's senior leaders, most of whom had their formative combat experiences in the firepower-intensive, large-unit operations prevalent during World War II and the Korean War. **Ultimately, this meant that leaders were slow in adapting to the different counterinsurgency requirements of Vietnam**.

U.S. forces adapted relatively quickly to the realities of the post-Vietnam situation and refocused on the massive Soviet conventional threat to Europe, **where combat readiness had suffered significantly during Vietnam**. New equipment and doctrine prepared the new all-volunteer force to fight and win while outnumbered. Most notably, Army and Air Force leaders recognized

the high value of synergistic air–land operations and developed the appropriate war fighting concepts and organizations.[6
[...]
This again proved to be the case in 2003 when U.S. air and ground forces swept into Iraq, seized Baghdad, and toppled Saddam Hussein's government. However, **when the U.S. occupation proved longer and more complicated than first thought**, **the U.S. Army was again slow in adapting to the changing nature of the conflict after having worked hard to put its Vietnam counterinsurgency experiences in its past.**

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