

**Aff**

We affirm

## Our sole contention is peacekeepers

Current UN peacekeeping is failing. [Autesserre of Foreign Affairs 19](#) reports UN peacekeepers often fail to meet their basic objectives and end up watching helplessly while war rages. The root cause is often left unresolved causing fighting to flare up in the future, causing up to 75% of missions to end in failure.

Fortunately affirming solves in 2 ways.

## **Subpoint A is peacebuilding**

**De Coning 18** defines peacebuilding as missions aimed at addressing the root cause of the conflict. Problematically, **Lal 17** reports less than 1% of the peacekeeping budget is dedicated to peacebuilding. Indeed, **Hearn of NYU 14** continues the Security Council overlooks peacebuilding efforts. Thankfully, **The Pioneer 19** finds India has advocated budgeting more funds budget towards peacebuilding and align current operations with peacebuilding objectives. Crucially, **Arthur of NYU 18** argues that peacebuilding reform in the UN lacks a catalyst and requires a lead country. The impact is lives as **Fortna of Columbia University 08** quantifies peacebuilding cuts the risk of renewed fighting by 94%.

## **Subpoint B is troop participation.**

**Passmore 18** reports UN missions have experienced an average monthly shortfall of 22% in troops. This has devastated the efficacy of missions specifically in Sudan as **Oladipo of BBC 17** explains the Sudan crisis remains insolvable due to a lack of appropriate manpower. Increasing troops is essential as **Specia 18** reports 76,600 people die every year the conflict persists.

Fortunately, there are 3 ways affirming ensures adequate troops for Sudan and for missions abroad.

### **First is decreasing deployment delays.**

**Benson of the ORF 18** reports UN peacekeeping missions take an average of 10 months to reach peak deployment. Thankfully, **Agarwal of the ORF 18** observes the last time India was on the council, it pursued peacekeeping reform specifically for faster deployment. Affirming enables this as **Mampilly of Vassar 18** furthers permanent members of the council possess a disproportionate influence over peacekeeping.

### **Second is preventing Indian withdrawal.**

**Vira of SWJ 18** explains that historically, India provided troops with the belief that they would eventually be rewarded with a permanent seat. Unfortunately, **he** continues that Indian leaders have begun to lose hope in this prospect and as a result have reduced the unconditionality of their contributions. **Vira** concludes Indian troop contributions will be increasingly tied to Indian involvement in the mandate generation process. Already, **Mampilly 18** reports Indian withdrawal of helicopters increased civilian casualties in some regions. Fortunately, affirming would resolve Indian concerns, thus motivating them to continue supplying troops. More widely, **Vira** finds even small reductions in Indian support would devastate current missions, triggering a cascading reaction where countries such as Pakistan would also withdraw their troops.

### **The third is increasing donor contributions.**

**Samarasinghe 15** reports the UNSC has become increasingly illegitimate due to a lack of regional representation specifically in the African Union. This decreases troop contributions. **UN reports in 2019**, due to mistrust with the council, African union members have begun turning away from the UNSC and are acting alone instead. **Whitaker 18** explains the perceived legitimacy of the council's initiatives dictate the willingness of donor states to contribute troops. Fortunately, affirming reverses this trend as **Annan of the Guardian 15** reports adding India as a permanent member would increase the legitimacy and consequently, the troop contributions of emerging countries.

Overall, **Hultman of AJPS 13** finds the addition of 1,000 peacekeepers to a mission can decrease casualties by as much as 60% per month.

Moreover, **Andrea of the journal of conflict resolution 13** for every 1,000 peacekeepers deployed, cooperation by the host country population increases by 2%.

However, absent troops, affirming bolstering the UNSC's legitimacy in the eyes of host nations. **Sambrow of the JIP 16** confirms peacekeeping missions currently lack legitimacy due to a

perceived lack of representation within the UNSC. Thankfully, **The Press Times of India 19** confirms India has advocated for representation for regions such as Africa within the UN. This is why the **Guardian** concludes if the council adds India it will drastically increase cooperation from emerging countries. **Sambrow** warrants local populations will only cooperate with these missions if they are seen as legitimate. This is especially important in resolving the Congo conflict as **Verweijen of Ghent University 17** explains the lack of cooperation on the part of the Congolese army has frozen progress. Crucially, **Moszynski of NCBI 18** quantifies 45,000 people die every month the DRC conflict continues.

Thus we affirm

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# C1: Peacekeeping

**Agarwal of the ORF 18** writes due to its huge contributions in peacekeeping, India has advocated for specific reforms needed to maximize UNSC efforts. Indeed, **Choedon of Jawaharlal Nehru University 17** furthers the last time India held the non-permanent seat on the Council, it identified peacekeeping as a key area of reform. However, affirming is key to make these reforms materialize as **Mukherjee of Princeton University 13** corroborates a permanent seat is necessary as the changes that India advocated for peacekeeping on the UNSC would take more than a two-year term. **Mampilly of Vassar College 18** furthers permanent members of the security council possess a disproportionate influence over peacekeeping operations.

This materializes in four ways.

## **First is ending deployment delays.**

**Benson of the OEF 18** reports over the last 25 years, UN peacekeeping missions have taken an average of 10 months to reach peak deployment. Problematically, **Hultman of the American Journal of Political Science 13** finds for each month UN military troops are deployed, the expected number of civilian casualties in a conflict decreases by 98%. Thankfully, **Agarwal** adds that India has made it a reform goal to advocate for faster deployment.

## **Second is offensive operations.**

**De Coning of the Norweigan Institute 19** reports starting in 2013 with the Force Intervention Brigade in the Congo, UN missions have been trending towards more offensive mandates. He furthers missions in Mali, Somalia, and the Middle East, have all been involved in more militaristic campaigns than in the past. Problematically, **Kofi of Nova Southeastern 11** quantifies UN forces that use offensive measures increase the number of civilian deaths by 1,681 per year. **Roberts of the Hinckley Journal of Politics in 2014** furthers that the presence of offensive support increases the probability of civil war recurrence for a given year by 680%. Thankfully, **Fabricius the Institute for Security Studies 14** confirms troop contributing countries such as India have been in opposition to these types of operations due to the danger they pose to their own troops.

## **Third is peacebuilding**

While typical peacekeeping missions focus on managing conflicts, **De Coning of News Deeply 18** defines peacebuilding as missions aimed at addressing the root cause of the conflict and seeking ways to remove it. Problematically, **UN Ambassador Tanmaya Lal 17** reports less than 1% of the funds allocated to peacekeeping are available to peacebuilding efforts. Indeed, **Hearn of NYU 14** continues members of the Security Council often overlook peacebuilding efforts. Thankfully, affirming would shift this dynamic as **The Pioneer 19** finds India has advocated for diverting a portion of the current peacekeeping budget towards peacebuilding and align current operations with peacebuilding objectives. Crucially, **Arthur of NYU 18** argues that peacebuilding reform in the UN lacks a catalyst and requires a lead country. The impact of greater peacebuilding is more successful missions. **Fortna of Columbia University 08** quantifies multidimensional approaches such as peacebuilding cut the risk of renewed fighting after troops have left by 94%. Moreover, **Steinert of the University of Konstanz 15** writes peacebuilding missions contribute to the economic recovery of a nation by rebuilding infrastructure and providing for people's basic

needs. Specifically, in a country hosting a peacebuilding mission, the probability of more democratic governance increases by 68%. This is crucial as **Diamond of the Carnegie Commission 95** concludes democratic countries less likely to engage in conflict, begin genocides, or sponsor terrorism.

#### **Fourth is cooperation**

**Samarasinghe of the Guardian 15** reports the UN has become increasingly irrelevant on the world stage due to a lack of representation for many regions around the globe specifically in the African Union. However, **The Press Times of India 19** confirms India has empirically advocated for greater representation for the most underrepresented regions as Africa within the UN structure. Greater representation is crucial to the success of peacekeeping. **Sambrow of the Journal of International Peacekeeping 16** confirms UN peacekeeping missions currently lack legitimacy within the host country due to a lack of representation within the UN. This local level legitimacy is crucial to successful peacekeeping operations. **Sambrow** continues local populations will only consent and cooperate with these missions if they are seen as legitimate. Critically, **Sambanis of Yale 7** quantifies consent-based UN peacekeeping missions decrease the risk of conflict reoccurrence by 50% opposed to non-consensual missions. Even worse, **Sebastian of the Stimson Center 18** concludes missions that lack consent from host governments end up advancing the agenda of the authoritarian leaders and harming host populations instead.

Thus we affirm.



# Cards

# C1: Peacekeeping

## **Indian peacekeeping reforms/ history**

Pallav Agarwal, (), 18, "70 years of peacekeeping: Achievements, challenges and need for reforms", ORF, 12-10-2018, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/70-years-of-peacekeeping-achievements-challenges-and-need-for-reforms-46135/>, DOA 4-15-2019, (HAS)

India has a long history of cooperation with the UN peacekeeping. One of the earliest peacekeeping missions deployed in India was the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1948 itself. India has been at the vanguard of peacekeeping right from 1950 when it supplied medical personnel and troops to the UN Repatriation Commission in Korea. Since then, India has participated in 49 missions sending more than 2,08,000 troops. 156 Indians have sacrificed their lives in these peacekeeping operations, the largest sacrifice by any troop-contributing nation. India has developed a well-rounded policy for participation in UN peacekeeping operations. It has established a training centre in Delhi under the Centre for UN Peacekeeping. This centre has provided the secretariat for International Peacekeeping Institutes for almost two decades. This has enhanced its image and it has begun to be accepted as an important player on the world stage. Acknowledging India's contribution, UN secretary general Antonio Guterres said that it would be an understatement to say that India's contribution to global peace has been remarkable. India has been very vocal and at the forefront regarding reforms for peacekeeping forces. **India wants a greater say in decisions pertaining to peacekeeping. From India's point of view, better training of peacekeepers is required. It is against the idea of a more robust peacekeeping and wants greater allocation of funds. India wants that the UNSC should decide peacekeeping operations within 30 days or a maximum period of 90 days in order to avoid tragedies because of delays. India also wants the involvement of experts from various fields in peacekeeping in order to better deal with emerging challenges. There should also be a sound exit policy for peacekeepers. New Delhi has a huge role to play when it comes to introducing reforms to peacekeeping.** The Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, part of the A4P initiative, has highlighted the crucial areas for reforms. For instance, improving the safety of peacekeepers, holding them accountable for their actions, strengthening protection provided by peacekeeping forces, and finding political solutions to conflicts and enhancing the political impact of peacekeeping. India should take advantage of its rising global stature and should take a lead in order to make this arm of the UN more effective.

## **India a good at peacekeeping**

Yeshe Choedon professor, Centre For International Politics, Organization and Disarmament School Of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India corresponding Author, 17, (), India's UN Peacekeeping Operations Involvement in Africa, SAGE Journals, 12-7-2017, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0020881717719184>, DOA-4-10-2019 (RP)

**India accords high significance to its participation in the UN peacekeeping** in Africa. Apart from examining India's contribution in quantitative terms and the varieties of personnel involved, it highlights the Indian peacekeepers' unique characteristics in terms of professionalism, reliability, humane approach and other distinctive features. It also discusses blemishes they brought on the country because of allegations of corruption and sexual abuse, and how India tackles those issues. The major focus is on **the driving factors, which motivated India to participate in the risky operations** in Africa that have evolved in keeping with the geopolitical shifts at the global level. Initially, the rationale for its participation was to express solidarity with African countries, but now it is more to **ensure energy security and to maximize the opportunity for trade and investment. The aspiration for recognition as a great power remains a constant factor of its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations** in Africa, and India has been leveraging this contribution for claiming a permanent seat at the UN Security Council since the early 1990s. It discusses the apprehension of **a shift in India's participation due to frustration at the lack of progress in UN reform. However, the indicators direct that the attempt is more to reconfigure its participation and to highlight the need to go back to the traditional root of the peacekeeping operations,** keeping in view the diversions that took place in the post-Cold War.

### **The good part of Malone**

Rohan Mukherjee & Malone, 13, (), "(PDF) India and the UN security council an ambiguous tale", ResearchGate, 7-1-2013, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111\\_India\\_and\\_the\\_UN\\_security\\_council\\_an\\_ambiguous\\_tale](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111_India_and_the_UN_security_council_an_ambiguous_tale), DOA-4-16-2019 (MO)

The international community's second expectation of India was that it would engage constructively with the UNSC and its members to make the UN a more effective and legitimate organisation in world politics. **From the Indian point of view, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations had repeatedly been called into question by the UNSC's inability to provide clear mandates, sufficient resources, and adequate operational guidance to troops on the ground.** India, having contributed more than 1,00,000 peacekeepers to various missions for over six decades (PMUN 2011d), made the improving effectiveness of peacekeeping a major plank of its diplomacy at the UN. In particular, **it decried the increasingly ambitious mandates of UN peacekeeping operations which, it argued, made excessive use of Chapter VII (on coercive measures) of the UN Charter without first exhausting other diplomatic options.** Moreover, **India was critical of the manner in which the mandates of individual peacekeeping missions were gradually expanded to include tasks that might be labelled as nation building, which was not historically the role peacekeepers played for the UN.** In a speech made to the UNSC in August 2011, Hardeep Singh Puri, India's ambassador to the UN, summarised the problem, **"Ambitious agendas are not being backed with the financial, operational, and logistical resources.** This lack of resources tells on the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping and casts a shadow on the credibility of the council's mandates" (PMUN 2011d). **The changes that India advocated on peacekeeping in the UNSC are ones that would take more than a two-year term to**

see to fruition. It is therefore difficult to evaluate its contribution to overall UNSC effectiveness so soon.

### **Security council members have influence over peacekeeping**

ZACHARIAH MAMPILLY, 18, (Professor of Political Science at Vassar College), " SHIFTS IN GLOBAL POWER AND UN PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE: INDIA'S RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN AFRICA", No Publication, 3-22-2018, <http://pages.vassar.edu/mampilly/files/2018/09/African-Affairs-Mampilly.pdf>, DOA-4-9-2019 (MO)

After agreeing to authorize a peacekeeping mission, the UN faces two related challenges: who will pay for the mission and who will contribute troops? Regarding costs, Article 17 of the UN Charter, requires all members of the General Assembly (GA) to pay a share. Yet, while the GA apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a complex formula that takes into consideration relative economic wealth of member countries, the five members of the UNSC are apportioned an additional share on the basis that they have a special responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security.<sup>21</sup> **In practice, this creates a tiered system in which permanent members of the UNSC, the so-called P-5, possess disproportionate political influence over peacekeeping operations** (i.e. every mission must get the approval of all UNSC members).

### **Peacekeeping Slow rn**

Jay Benson, (), 18, "Faster Force Deployment: How to Make UN Peacekeeping More Effective", OEF Research, 2-26-2018, <https://oefresearch.org/think-peace/five-ways-un-peacekeeping-more-effective-faster-force-deployment>, DOA 4-13-2019, (HAS)

**UN peacekeeping missions are often slow to deploy. Over the last 25 years, UN peacekeeping missions have taken an average of ten months to reach peak deployment. That is ten months in which the UN may have declared a conflict a crisis of global priority, but has still failed to effectively intervene.** Such delays have devastating effects on civilians. Conflicts can intensify and spread, sides may become further entrenched, and political solutions can become more difficult to achieve. The longer it takes a force to fully deploy, the more the situation is likely to devolve. Empirical research shows that the presence of peacekeeping missions at or near full deployment significantly reduces violence against civilians. As the nature of UN peacekeeping evolves toward more frequent peace enforcement interventions, such as that of the Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the speed of deployment becomes even more critical. There is evidence to suggest that peace enforcement of this kind initiates an increase in the use of violence against the civilians by the armed group faced with intervention. Slowly deploying peace enforcement missions can increase threats toward civilians before troops arrive to protect them.

## Number of civilians saved per month

Lisa Hultman, 13, (), "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War", American Journal of Political Science, 5-8-2013, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12036>, DOA-4-15-2019 (MO)

Figure 4 shows the estimated relationship between these variables as derived from Model 1 of Table 1 using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2002).<sup>5</sup> For reference, the figure also includes a histogram indicating the percentage of observations that fall within specific categories across the range of UN Military Troops. **The figure shows that increasing the number of troops has a dramatic effect on improving the safety of noncombatants. With no troops deployed to a conflict, the expected number of civilians killed in a given month is approximately 106. When the number of UN military troops increases to 8,000, the expected value of civilian deaths declines to 1.79.** Conditional on the other variables being held at the specified values, supplying only several thousand military troops<sup>5</sup> For Figures 4 and 5, the predictions represent a situation in which continuous variables are held at their means, the war was fought over government control, and violence against civilians had been committed in the previous month. nearly mutes violence completely as the number of troops approaches the upper values reported. Figure 5 presents a similarly strong decline in the expected value of civilian deaths as UN police forces committed to a civil war increase. Again, the figure includes a histogram of the percentage of observations that fall within categories across the range of UN Police. With no UN police on the ground, the expected value of civilian deaths in a given month is 96. As the graph indicates, conditional upon the other variables being held at the specified values, 200 police reduce the expected number of civilians killed dramatically, from about 96 to fewer than 14, and the presence of 500 police nearly eliminates civilian deaths. **Bear in mind that the values presented are expected civilian deaths per month.** These are not inconsequential reductions in violence. Indeed, given that the average length of a conflict in these data is nearly 65 months, deploying highly equipped missions can mitigate or wholly avert humanitarian disasters.

## Gumlias offensive trend card

Cedric de Coning Mateja Peter, 19, (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs), "United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order", palgrave macmillian, xx-xx-xxxx, [https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2019\\_Book\\_UnitedNationsPeaceOperationsIn.pdf](https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2019_Book_UnitedNationsPeaceOperationsIn.pdf), DOA-4-21-2019 (RG)

Although **the Congolese experience** has not been entirely replicated in other missions so far, it **does indicate a wider trend towards more robust UN operations, opening doors for offensive use of force.** For example, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UN 2013a) assimilated an extant Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission named AFISMA, which was previously mandated to support the government of Mali, an ECOWAS member nation, in its fight against Islamist rebels in the northern Mali conflict. **The resolution**

establishing MINUSMA also authorised French troops conducting Operation Serval to use all necessary means to intervene within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment in support of elements of MINUSMA, essentially mandating an intervention brigade just outside the UN command structures. UN missions are, as these examples indicate, increasingly more robust. One good indication of increasing involvement of UN peacekeepers in enforcement of political and military solutions can be found in the types of capabilities that these missions are relying on. The UN has advocated for the use of surveillance drones in the eastern DRC, on the border between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, in South Sudan, and in Mali. In Somalia, the UN is engaged in strategic communication campaigning and has hired a consultancy firm that, according to its statements, "runs a fully integrated campaign to counter the radicalising effect of Al-Shabaab and engage Somalis in building a positive future for their country" (Albany Associates 2017). In Mali, peacekeepers have been openly relying on strategic intelligence in their engagement with Islamic rebels. In 2000, when the Brahimi report suggested incorporation of field intelligence in peace operations so that they could better respond to complex situations (UN 2000, para. 51), member states flat out rejected the proposals. A good decade later their outlooks have changed. Drones, intelligence, and strategic communication all evoke ideas of stabilisation missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

### **UN Offensive mandates increase civilian deaths by 1681 per year over defensive-only mandates:** Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies

Kofi Nsia-Pepira (Nova Southeastern University), "Robust Peacekeeping? Panacea for Human Rights Violations," **Peace and Conflict Studies**, Volume 18, Number 2, Fall 2011, p. ol, [http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/fall\\_2011.pdf](http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/fall_2011.pdf), doa – 1/15/15 (DNM)

Considering other factors, I found that conflict parties kill 1611 more civilians per year with major power participation in UN missions in civil conflicts. Furthermore, I found that 1681 more civilians' deaths per year occur when the mandate permits UN mission forces to use force for purposes other than self defense only. These findings might give pause to easy assumptions that involving major powers is a reliable way to stabilize local violence or that broad latitude in use of force by peacekeepers is reliable for purposes of civilian protection.

### **Offensive support increases "civil war recurrence" by 680%, while defensive support decreases civil war recurrence 93%:** Hinckley Journal of Politics

Jordan Roberts (Univ of Utah), "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of Civil War Recurrence: The Effect of External Military Support on Peace Duration," **The Hinckley Journal of Politics**, 2014, p. ol, <http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php/HJP/article/viewFile/1234/908>, doa – 1/15/15 (DNM)

While Model 2B provides compelling results, Model 2D revealed a much more interesting finding: that when both offensive support and defensive support are included in a model, both variables are highly significant, have the expected impact on peace duration, and have large magnitudes. When paired together, both offensive support and defensive support are significant at a 99% confidence level—meaning that each form of support experiences increased significance when the opposite form is controlled. Furthermore, the presence of offensive support increases the probability of civil war recurrence for a given year by 680%, while the presence of

defensive support decreases the probability of civil war recurrence for a given year by 93%.

**TCCs don't support new offensive operations – “Peacekeepers in ever-growing danger,” “Compromise principles of the UN Charter,” Vulnerable as enemy combatants:** Indian UN Ambassador Mukerji

**Peter Fabricius, “The pendulum swings back,” Institute for Security Studies Africa, June 12, 2014, p. 01, <http://www.issafrika.org/iss-today/the-pendulum-swings-back>, doa – 12/5/14 (DNM)**

On Wednesday this week, the Security Council held an open debate on peacekeeping in which these concerns and others were aired. Russia, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, called for the debate and articulated these concerns in a letter circulated to the Secretary-General, saying that the increasing deployment of UN peacekeeping missions in intrastate conflicts, where there is little or no peace to keep, is placing peacekeepers in ever-growing danger. India, one of the countries that historically contributed a large number of troops to these peacekeeping missions, strongly supported Russia's concerns. ‘By mandating UN peacekeeping operations to deal with such internal conflicts, the Council is effectively compromising the principles of the UN Charter, on which the principles of UN peacekeeping operations are firmly rooted.’ India's UN ambassador, Asoke Kumar Mukerji, said in the debate. ‘These principles are the consent of the parties to the operations, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence.’ He also complained about ‘the emerging proclivity’ of the Security Council to mix traditional UN peacekeeping mandates with new interventionist mandates for a small portion of the troops in the same operation – citing the example of the FIB and MONUSCO, in which India has more than 4 000 troops. This mixing of mandates was exposing traditional peacekeepers to unnecessary threats from armed internal conflicts which the UN has not itself instigated. He added: ‘Further, by being asked to be party to the internal armed conflict, all UN peacekeepers, and not only the interventionist "peace enforcers," become liable to be treated as "enemy combatants" under international law, and thus effectively forgo both their impartiality and their immunity from prosecution.’

### **Peacebuilding versus peacekeeping definition**

Cedric De Coning, 18, (), "What Peacekeeping Can Learn From Peacebuilding", Peacebuilding, 7-5-2018, <https://www.newsdeeply.com/peacebuilding/community/2018/07/05/what-peacekeeping-can-learn-from-peacebuilding>, DOA-4-15-2019 (MO)

A starting point in the peacebuilding and peacekeeping relationship is former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace, which chronologically sequenced peace efforts beginning with preventive diplomacy. In this sequence, if the U.N. was unable to prevent a conflict, it would help to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement (peacemaking) and deploy a mission to help implement these agreements (peacekeeping). Once the fighting ceased, peacebuilding activities were initiated – supporting elections, reconciliation, rebuilding state institutions and disarming combatants – all aimed at helping consolidate the peace and preventing a relapse into violent conflict. Peacekeeping was understood as managing a conflict by inter-positioning peacekeepers between the parties to a conflict, by taking steps to de-escalate tensions and by building confidence in a cease-fire or peace agreement.

**Peacebuilding, on the other hand, was understood as conflict resolution because it was aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict, and in this way seeking to remove the reasons why the conflict occurred in the first place.** This post-conflict phase understanding of peacebuilding was reinforced when the U.N. Peacebuilding Architecture was established in 2005, as a way of maintaining international attention on peace processes after peacekeeping missions were withdrawn and the country progressed off the Security Council agenda.

### **India wants peacebuilding instead of peacekeeping**

Pioneer, 19, (), "Divert part of UN peacekeeping budget to peace-building: India", 4-1-2019, <https://www.dailypioneer.com/2017/india-abroad/divert-part-of-un-peacekeeping-budget-to-peace-building-india.html>, DOA-4-4-2019 (MO)

**India has suggested diverting a portion of the peacekeeping budget to the under-funded peace-building activities because there can be lasting peace only with development and political solutions.** Criticising UN peacekeeping, **India's Deputy Permanent Representative Tanmaya Lal** called on Tuesday for reforming the operations to align them with peace-building objectives and finding political solutions to conflicts -- a view shared by UN experts and several countries, including the US. **"There is an obvious lack of appropriate investment into the political dialogue and a huge mismatch between resource allocation for peacekeeping and peace-building,"** he told a Security Council debate on peacekeeping and sustaining peace. While this problem was acknowledged, only lip service was paid finding the resources, he said. Lal noted that only meagre resources are now available for development programmes and **peace-building is allocated less than one per cent of the funds set aside for peacekeeping.** The 2017-18 UN budget for peacekeeping operations is \$7.3 billion. Therefore, he said: **"We may consider whether allocation of an appropriate percentage of funds from the peacekeeping budget to activities related to peace-building and sustaining peace in those situations could be an option to move forward to achieve sustaining peace in the various intra-state conflicts we are facing."** **"The long extending peacekeeping missions that go on for decades and elusive political solutions remind us the need to focus on long-term investment in sustainable development or institution building and inclusive political processes,"** he added. While peacekeeping operations rely on the deployment of troops contributed by member-nations to try to physically prevent conflict, **peace-building and finding political solutions require civilian developmental, diplomatic and institution-building resources.** Lal welcomed Secretary-General Antonio Guterres's idea of ensuring greater cooperation between different departments of the UN, in particular bringing together the department of political affairs and peacekeeping operations for closer internal coordination, to effectively carry out its role of ensuring peace and security. The Chair of Advisory Group of Experts on UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review, Gert Rosenthal, pointed out that organisationally the responsibilities for peacekeeping and development were split between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. "While there is considerable overlapping in carrying out these functions, generally the traditional 'pillars' of peace, human rights and development do operate in the proverbial 'silos' we



all sadly have become accustomed to," he said. **"Peacekeeping missions alone cannot produce lasting peace,"** US Permanent Representative Nikki Haley said. **"They can help create space for peace to take hold, but they must be a part of a larger strategy of coordinating the resources of the UN to prevent conflict to begin with and to address its causes,"** she said. Haley called for "a larger strategy of coordinating the resources of the UN to prevent conflict to begin with and to address its causes".

### **Cited pbc link ev**

Sarah Hearn, Alejandra Kubitschek Bujones, Alischa Kugel, 14, (), "The United Nations "Peacebuilding Architecture": Past, Present and Future", NYU, May 2014, [https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un\\_peace\\_architecture.pdf](https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/un_peace_architecture.pdf), DOA-4-15-2019 (MO)

**Actors in the PBC and the UN shared a view that the PBC's impact is also constrained by remaining insufficiently connected to the UN system's lead departments.** In addition, whilst the PBF was broadly recognized as a highperforming tool for the UN, and some Chairs reported that they were happy with the secretariat-type support that they receive from PBSO, there remains a broad-based consensus that PBSO struggles to deliver on its strategic and policy functions, without which the PBC itself NYU CIC The United Nations "Peacebuilding Architecture": Past, Present and Future 9 continues to struggle to define its vision, objectives and a substantive agenda. **We found limited evidence that trust and close working relations between the PBC and the Security Council had improved very significantly since 2010. Despite efforts to strengthen ties, the dynamics did not appear to have shifted significantly: whilst the Council was initially intended to have a proactive oversight role of the PBC, its interest had waned and the PBC had felt unduly marginalized from the Council's deliberations (given its mandate to advise the Council on progress in peacebuilding); and some members of the Council remained unconvinced as to the "value-added" and impact of the advice that the PBC (and PBSO) had offered vis-à-vis UN leaders in the field.**<sup>33</sup>

### **price replacement rusk cut**

Paige Arthur, 18, (), "The Secretary-General's Sustaining Peace Report—The Peacebuilding Fund Gets a Boost", No Publication, 3-2-2018, <https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/secretary-generals-sustaining-peace-report%e2%80%94peacebuilding-fund-gets-boost>, DOA-4-24-2019 (MO)

The biggest example of this gap—from the perspective of a report on sustaining peace—is that the we are left wanting new ideas on how PBSO will, as a matter of practice, act as a "hinge" (or be "revitalized") within the UN system. Within the peace and security architecture, a few issues waiting for clarity include how PBSO will engage with the new regional bureaus created within the peace and security architecture; how it will relate to the parallel and complementary thematic work undertaken by DPKO's Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions; and, in relation to the development and human rights pillars, **what structures or practices will facilitate a role for PBSO in bringing these actors together on sustaining peace.** Similar to the PBSO hinge function, there are many moments in the report where one is left with the question, but how will this change? Whether this is in relation to enhanced integration at country level, the production and consistent use of joint analysis across the system, risk-informed approaches, **the need for good leaders with a diversity of experiences—these are challenges that have**

already been identified; they pose concrete practical and political difficulties; and for these reasons they remain unresolved issues to this day."

**The first two parts define multidimensional as peacebuilding. The use the .04 part of the graph under multidimensional. The last part says how to interpret the chart (1-.04)**

Virginia Page Fortna., 8, (associate professor of political science at Columbia University), "Does peacekeeping work? : shaping belligerents' choices after civil war in SearchWorks catalog", Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2008,  
<https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7683684>, DOA-4-17-2019 (MO)

**The civilian tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping, including human rights monitoring, civilian police monitoring and training, election monitoring, reform of judicial systems—the tasks that the UN refers to as peacebuilding and the United States refers to as nation-building—are all aimed at establishing a system in which political conflict can be managed peacefully.** Building stable state institutions is an extremely difficult task, one that took centuries in Western democracies, and peacekeeping missions have rarely succeeded in creating ideal states. But to the extent that peacekeepers can shape the political process during the transition to peace so that neither side can completely exclude the other, they will raise the probability that the peacekept have an incentive to play within the system, rather than upend it by going back to war.<sup>107</sup>

Multidimensional missions consist of both military and civilian components helping to implement a comprehensive peace settlement. In addition to the roles played by observer or interpositional missions, they perform tasks such as the organizing of elections,<sup>19</sup> human rights training and monitoring, police reform, institution building, economic development, and so on. The missions in Namibia (UNTAG), El Salvador (ONUSAL), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ) fall in this category.

**TABLE 5.4**  
Effects of Peacekeepers: Less Conservative Estimates

	<i>Time-Constant Peacekeeping</i>						<i>Past and Current Peacekeeping</i>		
	<i>Model 1 Cox</i>		<i>Model 2 Cox</i>		<i>Model 3 Cox</i>		<i>Model 4 Cox</i>		
	<i>HR</i> <i>(RSE)</i>	<i>P &gt;  Z </i>	<i>HR</i> <i>(RSE)</i>	<i>P &gt;  Z </i>	<i>HR</i> <i>(RSE)</i>	<i>P &gt;  Z </i>		<i>HR</i> <i>(RSE)</i>	<i>P &gt;  Z </i>
All Peacekeeping	0.24 (0.10)	.00					Current Consent	0.32 (0.16)	.02
Consent-Based			0.26 (0.14)	.01			Current Enforce	0.25 (0.15)	.02
Monitoring					0.40 (0.24)	.12	Past Consent	0.13 (0.14)	.06
Interpositional					0.35 (0.22)	.09	Past Enforce	0.000 (0.000)	.00
Multidimensional					0.06 (0.07)	.01			
Enforcement			0.18 (0.12)	.01	0.16 (0.10)	.00			

The results in these tables are striking. The hazard ratios (HR) for peacekeeping in the first three columns of table 5.1 range from 0.38 to 0.45 (column 4 is discussed below). **In other words, having peacekeepers present reduces the hazard, or risk, of another war breaking out by 55%–62%, all else equal.** This estimated effect is statistically very unlikely (less than 3% chance) to arise by chance alone, passing the standard test for statistical significance, and is quite robust to various specifications of the model.<sup>2</sup> In the discussion of causal mechanisms in chapter 4, I argued that the effect of peacekeeping is diminished in cases where the rebels enjoy contraband financing. Access to easily “lootable” resources such as precious gems or drugs leaves belligerents much less beholden to the international com-

### the better democracy quantification

Janina Isabel Steinert, 15, (University of Konstanz), "Too good to be true? United Nations peacebuilding and the democratization of war-torn states", Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2015,  
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b599/209d391b254b8ddbe03f1490b6939ddcbdf0.pdf>, DOA-4-22-2019 (MO)

The findings of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in Table 7. The findings obtained from the analysis indicate that UN peacebuilding is positively associated with post-war democratization. Freedom House rankings denote that an increase in democracy (compared with no change) is significantly more likely where a UN peacebuilding mission is deployed. As shown in model 3, the presence of a peacebuilding mission raises the multinomial log-odds for an increase in democracy relative to no change by 1.801. **In more comprehensible terms, when all other variables are held at their means, the probability of an increase on the democracy**

**scale stands at 68% for countries hosting a UN peacebuilding mission**, almost twice as high as for post-war countries without UN peacebuilding involvement. Further, the model predicts that a hypothetical country with all of the least favorable characteristics (i.e. IMR and battle deaths at the 95th percentile, favorable domestic conditions such as democratic tradition and democratic neighborhood at 0, oil reliance at 1) would still have a 20% chance of democratization (compared with no change) after a UN peacebuilding intervention, compared with only 7% without UN involvement. Assuming a particularly favorable setting, with IMR and battle deaths at the 5th percentile and conducive domestic circumstances, the likelihood for democratic transition turns out to be 84% with a UN deployment and 58% without. The predicted probabilities for each outcome of the dependent variable (decrease, no change, increase) are displayed in Table 8, broken down by UN peacebuilding deployment. In addition, there is a clear-cut relationship between a country's regime type at the outset and the prospects for democratization. A country that is ranked more liberal at the first time point is significantly more likely to experience a decrease in its democracy ranking within a 5 year post-war period. The effect is most salient in model 3, where we would expect the multinomial log-odds of a movement toward a more autocratic regime to be increased by 1.624—when compared with no changes on the Freedom House scale for a one-unit increase in regime type (e.g. from not free to partly free). That is, democratic nations are more likely to experience some transition towards more illiberal regime types in the aftermath of a civil war. In addition, this finding implies that there is some kind of saturation effect at work: the more liberal a country is at the outset, the less likely a further move towards democracy on an index's continuum becomes. One might therefore reason that UN peacebuilding missions are especially needed in former democratic countries so as to prevent "autocratization".

## **Democratic governance is key to international stability – prevents terrorism, genocide, and environmental destruction**

**Diamond 95**, a professor, lecturer, adviser, and author on foreign policy, foreign aid, and democracy [Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict", December 1995, <http://wwics.si.edu/...pubs/di/di.htm>]

The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations**, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. **Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another**. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. **Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships**. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, **democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.**

## **Council needs to add India or it will become increasingly irrelevant; the world has changed so the UN needs to too or it will be challenged by new emerging countries**

Guardian, 15, (), "Natalie Samarasinghe: Security Council reform needs more impetus from powerful states", United Nations Association, 9-23-2015, DOA 4-23-2019, <https://www.una.org.uk/news/natalie-samarasinghe-security-council-reform-needs-more-impetus-powerful-states>, (NR)

The UN Security Council must take in new permanent members or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant on the international stage, the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned. In an interview with the Guardian, Annan said Russia, China, the US, France and the UK should take advantage of the imminent 70th anniversary of the UN to modernise the pre-eminent global security body by welcoming in powers such as India and Germany. "One should always take advantage of the accident of the calendar and really push for major reforms," said Annan, who was Secretary-General from 1997-2006. "I firmly believe that the Council should be reformed: it cannot continue as it is. The world has changed and the UN should change and adapt. If we don't change the Council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the Council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries. "I think those in privileged positions will have to think hard and decide what amount of power they are prepared to release to make the participation of the newcomers meaningful. If they do that, they will get cooperation; if they don't, we risk confrontation."

## **India k2 African representation**

Press Trust Of India, 19, (), Majority of UN members support expansion of UNSC membership: India, No Publication, 2-26-2019, [https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/majority-wants-unsc-permanent-membership-expanded-india-119022600777\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/majority-wants-unsc-permanent-membership-expanded-india-119022600777_1.html), DOA-4-24-2019 (RI)

India has said a majority of the UN members support the expansion of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council. Participating in the informal meeting of the Plenary on the Intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on an increase in the membership of the Security Council, **India's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin** said, "We have heard many refer to the need for respect for democratic expressions. Will those who are speaking of democracy be ready to accept this democratic expression listed in a GA (General Assembly) document. On the issue of Categories of Membership, a total of 113 Member States, out of 122 who submitted their positions in the Framework Document, support expansion in both of the existing categories, he said. "In short, more than 90 per cent of the written submissions in the document are in favour of expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of the Council." "We have heard many refer to the need for respect for democratic expressions. Will those who are speaking of democracy be ready to accept this democratic expression listed in a GA (General Assembly) document," he said. Similarly, on the issue of Regional Representation, India noted that the majority of Member States have called in their submissions for equitable geographical representation and need for addressing the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in the permanent and non-permanent category. Akbaruddin cited the example of the Asia-Pacific group, where 52 states are vying for 2 non-permanent seats, while in the West European & Other Group states there are 25 members in the pool vying for 2 seats. "Put another way, there are more than 3 billion of we the people' from Asia-Pacific seeking representation through 2 seats with a 2-year term, while people' from no other region face such daunting challenges in seeking to be represented equitably, he said. **Akbaruddin reiterated India's support for representation of Africa in the Council in both categories of UNSC membership as well as support for further consideration of cross-regional representation arrangements to**

**ensure that Small Island Developing States (SIDS) find adequate avenues for representation in a reformed Council.**

**legitimacy un stuff**

Sophia Sabrow, 16, (), "Local perceptions of the legitimacy of peace operations by the UN, regional organizations and individual states – a case study of the Mali conflict", Taylor & Francis, 11-7-2016, <https://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2016.1249365?src=recsys&journalCode=finp20>, DOA-4-24-2019 (MO)

A mandate by the UNSC – although widely acknowledged as the basis for legitimate peace interventions<sup>104</sup> – does not legitimize peace operations to the interviewee. Likewise, the fact that AFISMA and MINUSMA were authorized by a UNSC mandate before their deployment, while Serval was only authorized later, did not influence journalists' or interviewees' view of the interventions. According to the interviewee, African states are generally under-represented by the UN system, which is dominated by powerful countries, especially former colonizers. Contradictory to the way it tries to position itself as an inclusive organization, the UN is seen as an instrument of powerful states in order to exert its will over the periphery

In contrast, the UN are likely to have low ideological legitimacy as host populations will have a harder time identifying with them. On the one hand, the sheer size of the UN will make it difficult for any one society to feel close cultural or historic ties to the UN. Various accounts furthermore show that UN troops often pay little attention to local practices and culture.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, societies receiving peace missions are unlikely to feel well represented in the UN. The UNSC, especially its permanent members (P5), have the 'real power' in the UN.<sup>41</sup> However, fragile states, which are likely candidates for hosting peace interventions, are systematically under-represented.

**un intervention decrease risk of peace failure by 50%**

Nicholas Sambanis, 07, (Yale University), "Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations", World Bank Economic Review, 2007, <http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/PCP3779S.PDF>, DOA-4-22-2019 (MO)

UN intervention is significant ( $p=0.039$ ) level and reduces the risk of peace failure by about 50%.<sup>34</sup> But, the strongest result, consistent with much of the literature on civil war onset, is that local capacities are critical in determining proneness to a new war outbreak. Local capacity variables now take away some of the effect of the hostility variables (only deaths and displacements is significant and this is not very robust). Countries with higher levels of income, fast-growing postwar economies, and lower dependence on natural resource exports are far more likely to experience longer peace durations despite the negative effects of postwar hostility. The effects of variables like the number of factions or the nature of the war (was it ethnic or not?) are non-significant as we might expect any impact that they have to be limited to the immediate postwar period.<sup>35</sup> High fractionalization has a significant ( $p=0.007$ ) negative effect on

peace duration, which lends support to our hypothesis about the difficulties of achieving longlasting peace in fractionalized countries after civil war.<sup>36</sup>

**Compromised consent causes the mission to aid an abusive host state government allowing them to maintain power and preventing them from providing assistance to populations who oppose the government**

Sebastian 18 Stimson, DOA 4-24-2019, <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/UN-PeacekeepingAndHostStateConsent.pdf>, (NR)

Compromised consent presents an additional, more pernicious risk: that the mission will end up unintentionally advancing the harmful agenda of an abusive host-state government. The mission is authorized to conduct activities that the government finds convenient or helpful, which allows the government to maintain popular support from some quarters. But it is prevented from undertaking activities that might threaten the government's hold on power by creating political space for opposition parties, exposing illegal or abusive activities by the government, or providing assistance to populations who oppose the government politically.

# Extra

We affirm

## **Second is Troop training.**

**Oladipo of BBC 17** says that lack of troop training causes inadequate civilian protection. For example, lack of training in the Central African Republic was directly attributed to 75 casualties during 2016. Thankfully, The **Hindu Times 19** reports India has begun a process of training a small number of UN peacekeepers, and has advocated for even greater action on the part of the Security Council.



## C1: China

**Chaudhury of India Times in 2018** reports Chinese aggression in the South China Sea has turned the region into a dangerous flashpoint. Indeed, **The Guardian this month** continues President Duterte has demanded that Beijing back off the Spratly Islands and threatened action in response to this expansion.

Despite the creation of an ASEAN code of conduct, **Oak of the ORF 18** writes it will do little to stop China's expansion due to a lack of enforcement. **The Japan Times 18** furthers China has taken advantage of its superior military and economic power to impose its will on the smaller countries of ASEAN. Even worse, **Chandran of CNBC 18** confirms US action has painted the picture of an unreliable actor. Instead, **he finds** countries are now looking to India as a counterweight to in the face of Chinese aggression. Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines have since strengthened ties with India, wanting them to take a more assertive role.

Unfortunately, India is on the wrong side of the negotiating table. **Stuenkel of Carta International 10** writes China is seen as a gatekeeper in their push for a permanent seat and thus India aimed to improve diplomatic relations in an attempt to gain their support. For example, **Madan of the War on Rocks 18** writes India has increased their support for Chinese projects and has supported China's current expansion.

With a permanent council position however, India would lose this incentive to keep positive relations with China, allowing them to make the shift. This is key, as even without siding with ASEAN, **Dabhade of the ORF in 2017** finds, India would serve as an equalizer to China by exerting newly achieved global power. Critically, **French of the Atlantic 14** concludes the more China sees a multilateral response to its military buildup, the more likely it is to turn towards diplomacy and decrease its aggression in the region.

Keeping tensions low is key, as **French** continues high tensions lead to a higher risk of conflict. For example, **Stout of Time 14** concludes, China's current aggression is on par with their 1980 Vietnam invasion which took the lives of 50,000 people in 6 weeks.