# SV – TOC Neg [Non Alignment + Nuclear Status]

## Contention 1 is a Break in Foreign Policy

#### Harsh Pant indicates that India at a crossroads – he argues that:

Harsh V. Pant, 8-5-16, "Gradually burying non-alignment,", Mint – an Indian financial daily newspaper, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/aGnhCRbhSnkSQQHGgO0PTK/Gradually-burying-nonalignment.html, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // WS

Finding an effective grand strategy inevitably requires a balancing act. Non-alignment has been India’s answer to this challenge and an influential tenet of its foreign and security policy since its emergence from colonization. This approach has in the past enabled India to avoid many of the limitations and entanglements of formal alliances; but it has also left the country in the position of shaping policy in a reactive manner. India is now at a crossroads. China’s rise and assertiveness as a regional and global power and the simultaneous rise of middle powers in the region mean that this balancing act is increasing in both complexity and importance, simultaneously. China’s growth presents great opportunities for positive engagement, but territorial disputes and a forward policy in the region raise concerns for New Delhi, particularly in the Indian Ocean and with Pakistan. The region itself is riddled with rivalries; a desire to balance China may push states together, while other issues divide them. The same applies on the global level as well, as noted by the unpredictability in Sino-US relations. Indian policymakers have continued to place emphasis on strategic autonomy, a relic of non-alignment, as a means of mitigating the potential costs of a strategic partnership with the US. This balancing act is evident in relations with China: despite interest in cooperation with the US, India stands to benefit from an economic partnership with China and wishes to avoid antagonizing its more powerful neighbour by serving as the lynchpin of the US pivot to Asia, which the Chinese broadly perceive as a measure of containment. There is also lingering concern over US reliability, not only owing to its relationship with Pakistan but also because of its vulnerability to China during the financial crisis of 2008–09. Likewise, India has balanced its still strong defence relationship with Russia against its interests in cooperation with the US. New Delhi has sided with Russia, China and Iran in avoiding interference in Syria’s civil war and, despite voicing concern over the spread of the Islamic State network, has continued to promote a Syrian-led process of institution-building. Finally, there is a general concern in India that the country’s capabilities in the event of a conflict with Pakistan may be limited by over-reliance on the US, which continues to extend defence aid to Pakistan despite a drop after 2011.

#### Emmanuel indicates that:

Nikolas Emmanuel, 3-28-2016, "The Impacts and Limits of India’s Soft Power," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/the-impacts-and-limits-of-indias-soft-power, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

While hard power resources are necessary for India’s defense and development, India should also preserve its rich heritage of soft power resources, which was conceived more as an alternative to hard power than as a supplement. Many of India’s non-alignment objectives – including an egalitarian economic order, universal disarmament, discourse on sovereignty in the context of human rights issues, and the democratic spread of knowledge and technology – remain unfulfilled. The Nehruvian vision of a peaceful and democratic world should remain an inspiration for India, with the promotion of a peaceful regional order serving as a stepping stone to this vision. While India’s engagement with major economic and military powers has improved disproportionately in relation to its regional engagement, it should ensure moving forward that it engages its neighbors on favorable terms so as to make a concerted effort to assuage their perceptions of India as a threat.

#### However, a seat on the UN Security Council NECESSITATES India to break this foreign policy stance. Paras Ratna argues that:

Paras Ratna, 10-12-2015, "A Permanent Seat on the UNSC: A “Feather” on the Hat or the “Hat” Itself? – South Asian Voices," South Asian Voices, https://southasianvoices.org/a-permanent-seat-on-the-unsc-a-feather-on-the-hat-or-the-hat-itself/, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // JM

Next is the jackpot question of veto power, which is one of the major reasons for these [persistent efforts](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/29-Sep-2015/unsc-reforms-and-g-4-countries) made by G-4 countries, especially India, to gain a permanent UNSC seat. Given India’s policy of [non-alignment](http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement) in the past, veto power might complicate things further. A close look at voting patterns reveals that Russia and China are mostly on one side, while NATO partners are on the other. Given the [strategic partnership](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2253135/Strategic-relations-suit-India.html) that India maintains with each of these countries, taking a stance would not only adversely affect India’s relationship with them, but would also give a severe blow to India’s non-alignment stance. Hence, strained relations with these nations could lead to a possibility of exposing India to increased international pressure on issues like the Kashmir dispute, human rights abuse in the north east, and climate change reform

#### This policy of non-alignment is the SINGULAR REASON there has not been a war in the area. Arzan Tarapore argues in 2018 that:

Arzan Tarapore, 6-18-2018, "Using Uncertainty as Leverage: India’s Security Competition with China," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/using-uncertainty-as-leverage-indias-security-competition-with-china/, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // JM

India’s refusal to quickly escalate security competition with China or to bind itself too closely to the United States may seem like frustrating ambivalence. But it carries at least one key advantage. The uncertainty over India’s intentions — and specifically, the extent to which it cooperates with the United States — is India’s greatest leverage over China. More than any geographic, material, or ideational advantage New Delhi can muster in its asymmetric balance with Beijing, its potential but as-yet unrealized partnership with Washington [concerns Beijing the most](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-biggest-fear-us-indian-encirclement-12225). In this light, the ambiguities of Indian policy are a feature, not a bug. Uncertainty over India-U.S. relations has probably already moderated Chinese behavior — including Beijing’s willingness to [de-escalate the Doklam stand-off](https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/), and to adopt a more solicitous tone in recent months. China’s strategy is focused on preventing and disrupting counter-balancing coalitions — hence its [stern opposition to the Quad](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/08/c_137024428.htm). A brash declaration of a “hard-balancing” U.S.-Indian compact would likely elicit much more aggressive Chinese actions on the Himalayan border and across South Asia, designed to stress and break that compact. Less nuanced Indian security competition, then, would probably accelerate the expansion of inimical Chinese influence in the region, and elevate the risk of open war. India’s distinct style of competition suggests its strategists may deserve more credit than [they are often given](https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/america-has-high-expectations-for-india-can-new-delhi-deliver/). It should not, however, be a convenient catch-all excuse for moments of Indian prevarication or loss of nerve. Even more, it should not absolve India of the need to continue building national power. India can and often should do more – especially in military modernization and reorganization. At some point the current Modi-Xi bonhomie will pass and the pendulum will swing again, perhaps with another militarized crisis on the border or a [contest of wills](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics/asian-giants-china-and-india-flex-muscles-over-tiny-maldives-idUSKCN1GJ12X) elsewhere in the region. At that point, New Delhi will be tested to ensure its careful escalation management does not devolve into submission to a stronger foe. India’s policies benefit from uncertainty, but the ultimate currencies of security competition — and the ultimate guarantors of a free and open Indo-Pacific — are military power and political resolve.

#### Mizokami concludes that the war the status quo has prevented is significant. He argues that:

Kyle Mizokami, 6-12-2018, "Why a War Between China and India Is Not Unthinkable (And Would Be a Total Horror Show)," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-between-china-india-not-unthinkable-would-be-total-26238, Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia. A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region,[and] cause thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory. India and China border one another in two locations, northern India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with [territorial disputes in both areas](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm). China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.

## Contention 2 is Nuclear Status

#### The US-India Nuclear Deal has complicated the region in terms of nuclear power as George Peter indicated on April 16 that:

George Peter, 4-16-2019, “Foreign nuclear assistance to India and its implications,” <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1951513/6-foreign-nuclear-assistance-india-implications/>, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // JM

A closer view of the steps taken by India in the past one and a half decades reveals that India has treacherously repeated the episode of 1974. India has almost applied the same strategy for the building of its secret nuclear city, which was adopted by it in the past. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran, after making the whole world believe that it is a peaceful country and has no aim of becoming a nuclear power. Similarly, India has deceitfully managed to strike a nuclear deal with the US under the garb that it would use the nuclear fuel for civilian purposes but diverted the entire indigenous uranium for its nuclear weapon programme. The global powers must realise that India has misused the US-India nuclear deal, and has managed to increase the stockpile of nuclear arsenals to a gigantic scale. The international community must take into consideration the fact that the US-India nuclear deal has contributed to increasing the arms race in the region, which is not only destructive but likely to grow more and more in future. So, in the best interest of the people of the region and to prevent the devastating implications of an arms race hovering over the region, immediate steps are required to be taken by the international community. Major powers must put their efforts for withdrawal of nuclear waiver granted to India immediately. Steps should also be taken to compel India to roll back its massive nuclear project as it would disturb the strategic balance of the region in its designs of attaining regional hegemony.

#### Unfortunately, granting India a permanent seat would increase the risk of nuclear conflict for two reasons. First, it would legitimize their standing as a nuclear power. Nawaz argues in 2017 that:

Shamsa Nawaz, 2017, "Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership," No Publication, <http://issi.org.pk/violation-of-the-un-resolutions-on-kashmir-indias-quest-for-unsc-permanent-membership/>, Date Accessed 4-1-19 // MN

The permanent seat in the UNSC will also give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right. This would certainly have a potential to destabilize the region by fueling regional confrontation and conflicts. Even the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point in the Indian politics. The UNSC still upholds legitimacy for a worldwide action. It is crucial in maintaining the international order while looking after the super powers interests. However, it is difficult to see the role of the UN in such a world order more than a rubber-stamp. For example, the UN was emasculated when Iraq was invaded and Afghanistan was attacked.

#### Second, it would allow India more access to more uranium. Bethany Allen explains in 2017 that:

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 9-4-2017, "U.N. Security Council Members Are More Likely to Receive World Bank Loans," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/un-security-council-members-are-more-likely-to-receive-world-bank-loans-united-states-mexico/, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

The World Bank is supposed to distribute loans based on the needs of developing countries. But a recent study has found that countries with seats on the United Nations Security Council receive a disproportionate amount of loans, indicating the World Bank can be a tool for donor countries, particularly the United States, to wield geopolitical influence. Traditional World Bank loans typically take two to three years to disburse. But after 2007, in response to criticism of its bureaucratic snail’s pace and as the world faced a food and energy crisis, the bank implemented a change that dramatically increased the amount and frequency of supplemental loans. These loans can now be approved in as little as 100 days. Since then, supplemental loans have accounted for up to 30 percent of all World Bank loans, up from as low as 1 or 2 percent in earlier decades. And indeed, Christopher Kilby and Erasmus Kersting, both professors at Villanova University in Pennsylvania who study international aid and organizations, found evidence of such correlation in a 2016 [paper](http://repec.library.villanova.edu/workingpapers/VSBEcon30.pdf) and subsequent research. They analyzed World Bank loan data and found a clear correlation between U.N. Security Council membership and the disbursement of these supplemental loans. In fact, Kilby and Kersting’s analysis of 2015 data revealed that a full 10 percent of all supplemental lending was related to Security Council membership. Mexico, for example, has sat on the Security Council for 8.5 percent of its total time in the U.N., but during its tenure as a council member received 67.9 percent of the total amount of supplemental loans it has ever received from the World Bank, according to data provided by Kersting. If Security Council membership were unrelated to the disbursement of supplemental loans, those two numbers should be similar. Mexico served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council from 2009 to 2010. In 2010, it received a massive supplemental loan of $1.25 billion. Numerous other countries display the same pattern. Jordan has also sat on the Security Council for 8.5 percent of its total time in the U.N., but it received 60.2 percent of its supplemental loans during this period. For Uruguay, the numbers are 5.6 percent and 58.1 percent; for Rwanda, 5.6 percent and 41 percent. Other countries that show a similar correlation include Brazil, Senegal, Bolivia, Nigeria, Vietnam, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Togo. Correlation between Security Council membership and World Bank supplemental loan disbursement also may not be an explicit quid pro quo. Countries that sit on the council may generally be viewed as more important, be mentioned more frequently, or have a louder megaphone with which to advertise their needs and, as a result, are more likely to receive loans.

#### That’s important considering the UN has reclassifying uranium to be purchased using World Bank loans. TNI argued on April 18 that:

The News International, 4-18-2019, "UN action maypave way for easier Uranium acquisition," No Publication, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/459382-un-action-maypave-way-for-easier-uranium-acquisition, Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // JM

NEW YORK: Diplomats at the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been reclassifying uranium as a “critical material.” That would allow countries to tap funding from the World Bank and other development institutions to ensure supply under the guise of the UN’s sustainable development goals. While the change could potentially cut mining waste, it might also lead to a reduction of the scrutiny uneconomical projects get from nuclear inspectors. The biggest beneficiaries to the new rules would be countries including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which have large reserves of phosphate and growing populations that need to be fed with the crops it fertilizes. However, the extraction process could weigh on the uranium market, where prices have stagnated since the last recession started in 2008, international media reported. “The main use of phosphate is in fertilizer, but it can also contain a lot of uranium,” said Harikrishnan Tulsidas, a UN official and former IAEA mining adviser who was one of the proposal’s authors. By turning uranium into a byproduct of phosphate, the nuclear industry could blunt “boom-bust” mining cycles by linking uranium supply with other industries, like agriculture, he said. Strong links between phosphate and uranium emerged as far back as the 1950s in the US, according to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report co-authored by Vitaly Fedchenko. America’s earliest nuclear arsenal used uranium derived from a fertilizer plant in Florida. Countries like Israel, India and Pakistan have also looked to phosphate as a way around import restrictions for atomic material, according to Kelley, who called the method “a sore on the non-proliferation landscape.” To derive uranium, phosphate rocks are ground and milled at the plants before being fed into a chemical process yielding phosphoric acid. Another stage of chemical treatments yields a black uranium concentrate that can appear in powdery or sludge-like form, according to Kelley, who now advises governments from a Swedish security institute. Though in its elemental form uranium can’t fuel a reactor or make a bomb – it first must be enriched or turned into plutonium -- it’s the fundamental ingredient for all nuclear programs. BHP Group Ltd.’s Olympic Dam is currently the world’s biggest uranium mine. The kingdom is pursuing nuclear power but has also has warned it could seek weapons too. Saudi Arabia is unique among countries with the potential to extract uranium from phosphate: it’s flush with oil money to invest and has signaled an ambition to build a nuclear program. The technology needs big financial backing. Commercial plants cost as much as $1.3 billion, according to Julian Hilton, who advocates for “green nuclear fuel sources” and helped draft the UN’s new guidelines. “This is at the center of the food, energy and water triangle that’s the key to everything,” Hilton said in an interview. Phosphate extraction is a “win-win for everybody,” resulting in cleaner fertilizer, at reduced energy intensity, with uranium collected as a valuable byproduct, he said. The risk that uranium is diverted for weapons could be reduced if countries adopted stricter international rules to safeguard uranium stockpiles. But implementing tougher rules, what the IAEA calls an additional protocol, aren’t required as a precondition to get aid in recovering uranium from phosphate, according to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. That’s a concern among non-proliferation experts because of the IAEA’s checkered past with uranium. The agency helped Pakistan develop resources that likely went into that country’s weapons program. In Syria, under investigation since 2007 over clandestine nuclear work, the IAEA helped build a pilot extraction facility at a fertilizer plant in the city of Homs. “Doing it with the IAEA and UN gives a kind of cover that allows countries to take one small step without raising suspicions,” said Scott Kemp, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who advises the U.S. government on non-proliferation. “If this technology is used, it begs the question what will be done with the material?” Based on current prices, it’s cheaper for countries that want nuclear power to buy uranium on the market than it is to invest in new exaction. Over the last decade, the market for reactor fuel has been battered by safety concerns, cheap natural gas and the shift toward decentralized electricity grids powered by renewables. “Recovering uranium from phosphate is not economic at the moment,” said Nick Carter, a vice president at UX Consulting Co, which advises makers of nuclear fuel. Prices would have to rise three-fifths just to break even, he said. Farm demand for uranium-free phosphate fertilizers is also slack, according to Alexis Maxwell, research director of Green Markets, a fertilizer research firm owned by Bloomberg LP. The Houston-based analyst said that adopting uranium extraction would “pose risks to fertilizer companies.” With the UN set to issue its final uranium-resource guidelines later this year, the weapons-investigator Kelley said international monitors should pay attention to those market signals. “Because this process isn’t economically competitive, the IAEA should be especially cautious when assisting countries to produce uranium.” Kelley said. “It means they’re acquiring uranium for other purposes than power and that should raise a flag.”

#### This is vital for India’s supply as they historically face shortages. Chaudhury explains in 2019 that

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, 1-19-2019, “India inks deal to get uranium supply from Uzbekistan,” <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-inks-deal-to-get-uranium-supply-from-uzbekistan/articleshow/67596635.cms>. Date Accessed 4-18-2019 // JM

Uzbekistan is the seventh largest exporter of uranium in the world, according to the World Nuclear Association, an international organisation that represents the global nuclear industry. India needs nuclear fuel as part of a plan to create a strategic uranium reserve that can sustain the country’s reactors for the next five years. In the past, India’s rectors have under performed due to a shortage of uranium arising out of sanctions imposed by the West after the 1974 Pokhran nuclear tests.

#### India’s nuclear strength increases the probability of Pakistani first strike. Toby Dalton indicates in 2016 that:

Toby Dalton & George Perkovich, 9-19-2016, "Pakistan and India: The Art of Peace," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/09/19/pakistan-and-india-art-of-peace-pub-64638, Date Accessed 4-19-2019 // JM

The more damage India might inflict on the Pakistani military, the greater the probability that Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons. India’s primary coercive options could centre on army incursions, or more limited airborne strikes, or covert operations. India’s development of operational military and intelligence capabilities to support these options aims to deter cross-border terrorism through the threat of future punishment. Depending on which of these options India pursues, nuclear strategy and capabilities would play a reinforcing role. For example, if Indian leaders decided to unleash major ground and air operations – as envisioned in ‘Cold Start’ – they would have to anticipate possible Pakistani nuclear responses and deploy more credible nuclear forces and plans to counter Pakistan than the current Indian doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ implies. Since these are the options most discussed in India, they require deep analysis.

#### The Telegraph concludes that:

The Teleagraph, 12-10-2013, "India-Pakistan nuclear war could 'end human civilisation'," Telegraph.co.uk, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html, Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that could kill two billion people and effectively end human civilization, a study said Tuesday. Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear weapons would wreak havoc in the atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects multiplied as global food markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a billion people.