# KG September – October 17’ Anti-Missile Defense

**Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interests.**

## History

### Summary/Previous History

**1945- End of WW2.**

**1948- Single government falls. Then Divided by the 38th parallel [Now known as the DMZ]**

**1950- Korean War begins. Started by Kin Il Sung to reunify countries under communist rule. 36,000 American deaths and 5 Million casualties total.**

**1953- 2 countries agree on a ceasefire. Signed an armistice, but not a peace treaty. This means, technically, the war still goes on.**

**1989- South Korea becomes democratic and more industrialized. President with a term of 5 years.**

**1991- North and South Korea join UN**

**1994- When relationships between US and North Korea became more tense- more productive. Passed the Agreed Framework which set ground rules for what each country should do and the ideas on proliferation.**

**2000- South Korea becomes a developed nation and economy.**

**2002- George W. Bush blamed North Korea for building a bomb- created mistrust and the agreement fell apart. North Korea issues first nuclear threat.**

**2006- North Korea conducts first missile threat.**

### North Korean Leaders

**Kim Il Sung- Dies in 1994, passes dictatorship to son. Started the nuclear project.**

**Kim Jong Il- Dies in 2011 from illness and passes dictatorship to son.**

**Kim Jong Un- Current Leader**

### January 1985

**North Korea signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html]**

### October 2005

**North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, China,**[**Japan,**](http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/26/world/asia/japan-fast-facts/index.html)[**Russia**](http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/russia-fast-facts/index.html)**and South Korea say they will provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html]**

### February 2013

**North Korea's National Defense Commission**[**says it will continue nuclear testing and long-range rocket launches**](http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test/)**in defiance of the United States. The tests and launches will feed into an "upcoming all-out action" targeting the United States, "the sworn enemy of the Korean people," the commission says.**[**Conducts third nuclear test.**](http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/12/world/north-korea-nuclear-reax/)**This is the first nuclear test carried out under**[**Kim Jong Un.**](http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/26/world/asia/kim-jong-un---fast-facts/index.html)**Three weeks later, the**[**United Nations**](http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-fast-facts/index.html)**orders additional sanctions in protest.**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html]**

### March 2014

**North Korea warns that it is prepping another nuclear test and the following day, the hostility escalates when the country fires hundreds of shells across the sea border with South Korea. In response, South Korea fires about 300 shells into North Korean waters and sends fighter jets to the border.**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html]**

### April 2016

**The U.S. and South Korean governments kicked off official talks recently on deploying a THAAD system, following North Korea's latest nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Establishing a missile defense system to cope with a growing North Korean nuclear missile threat is also a matter closely related to the national security of Japan, another key security ally of the U.S. in the region. During his tense meeting with Obama, Xi used tougher-than-expected language on the THAAD issue, as China sees the deployment of such a system to South Korea as a threat to its own security. According to the Chinese side, Xi told Obama that China is "resolutely opposed" to the deployment of a THAAD system to South Korea as it would "cause harm and trouble" to China. [https://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-warns-Obama-over-THAAD-missile-system]**

### June 2016

**A U.S. Patriot missile battery in Japan has been brought to South Korea for a joint exercise amid growing concerns about additional provocations from North Korea, an official of the U.S. Forces Korea.**

**[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/07/116\_210082.html]**

### January 2017

**With missiles at their borders and neighbors aligning with an adversary, China and Russia could feel boxed in. But they're in it together, and the two appear to be taking steps together against US global hegemony. The countries released a joint statement this week voicing their opposition to US and South Korean plans to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system, according to both Russian and Chinese state media.**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/13/asia/russia-china-thaad/index.html]**

### March 2017

**The U.S. military's THAAD anti-missile system is now operational in South Korea, according to U.S. officials. The system's deployment to defend against a North Korean missile threat has become an issue in the South Korea's upcoming** [**presidential election**](http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/elections/presidential-election.htm) **and with China, which is concerned that the system's long-range radar could track Chinese missile systems. [http://abcnews.go.com/US/thaad-anti-missile-system-operational-south-korea/story?id=47137843]**

### June 2017

**Moon’s office said it would suspend the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system. The antimissile battery is designed to protect the South against North Korea, but it has elicited strong opposition, particularly where it is being deployed. The U.S. Army**[**expedited the movement of the THAAD battery**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-military-starts-installing-controversial-anti-missile-battery-in-south-korea/2017/04/25/3efe2fba-2a2a-11e7-86b7-5d31b5fdc114_story.html?utm_term=.cb436d09b3ec) **to South Korea ahead of Moon’s anticipated victory in a snap presidential election last month. Moon vowed to review the previous government’s decision to host the system.**

**[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-suspends-deployment-of-american-missile-defense-system/2017/06/07/6215f314-4b60-11e7-b69d-c158df3149e9\_story.html?utm\_term=.d8cc6aa0e74b]**

### July 2017

**A United States-built missile defense system on Tuesday successfully intercepted its target during a test run, the US Missile Defense Agency said.**

**The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system successfully shot down a target over Alaska, according to a news release. It said this was the 15th successful intercept in 15 tests for the weapons system known as THAAD, which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. July 28th- North Korea tested a missile that could hit the U.S. mainland called the Nuclear ICBM KN-14. July 30th- China unveils new weapons for 90th anniversary of PLA with 300 new weapons. Include the J20 that can outclass the U.S. F-35 aircraft. Unveiled DM ICBM with multiple nuclear warheads.**

**[http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/11/politics/us-thaad-missile-defense-test/index.html]**



### September 2017

**The Defense Ministry issued a public statement to announce that it had completed the placement of four additional THAAD launchers on Sept. 7 at the USFK military base in Seongju County. The Ministry stated that, “The government, in response to the various missile and nuclear tests on the part of North Korea, and in order to safeguard the lives and security of our people from the North’s intensifying threats, has today completed the temporary placement of four additional THAAD launchers in accordance with the agreement with USFK.” The day before, the Defense Ministry had announced that the equipment for the remaining four launchers would be moved, and USFK personnel transported the launchers overland from Osan Air Force Base to the base at Seongju early in the morning of Sept. 7.**

**[http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/810080.html]**

## Topic Background

**South Korea has two main anti-missile defense systems, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Lockheed Martin (PAC3).**

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### Definitions

#### **Anti-Missile Systems** - Conveying a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat, however it is commonly used for systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles.

#### **Deployment** - to spread out, utilize, or arrange for a deliberate purpose. Putting the system in use.

#### **Interests -** Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegate thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances.

### Country Backgrounds

USA

Country Leader - Donald Trump

Current Missile Defense - Most common, but now [deprecated](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deprecated#Other_usage): U.S. National Missile Defense, the limited ground-based nationwide antimissile system in development since the 1990s. In 2002 this system was renamed to [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-Based_Midcourse_Defense) (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, laser, robotic, or high-altitude intercept programs. As of 2006, this system is operational with limited capability. It is designed to intercept a small number of nuclear-armed ICBMs in the mid-course phase, using interceptor missiles launched from within the United States in [Alaska](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska). They use non-nuclear [kinetic warheads](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projectile#Kinetic_projectiles).

South Korea

Country Leader – Moon Jae-In

Impeached/ Previous Leader – Park Jeun Hye.

Current Missile Defense - **An American missile-defense system deployed to counter growing threats from**[**North Korea**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)**has gone into operation in**[**South Korea**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/southkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo), officials said on Tuesday**. The installation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery has roiled the South Korean presidential campaign, partly over questions of who will pay for it, and drawn**[**objections from China**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html), which said the deployment undermined its own missile defense abilities. **The United States and South Korea**[**began installing**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/world/asia/north-korea-military-anniversary-artillery-drills.html)**the radar and other important components of the system, known as THAAD, last week at an abandoned golf course in Seongju, 135 miles southeast of Seoul, after**[**reaching an agreement**](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-missile-defense-system.html)**to deploy it last July.**

**China**

Country Leader – Xi Jinping

Current Missile Defense- “**China worries about the impact the US missile defense system would have on China’s counter strike capability,”** Zhao Tong, a research fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy in Beijing. **“It’s China’s biggest concern. To deal with that, China would develop new ground-based, sea-based or multi-head missiles.” The reality is the arms race was already underway, as China has been developing improved missile systems**. China has been actively developing hypersonic glide vehicle to evade defenses, enhanced maneuverable reentry vehicles, and improved ICBMs. **The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has been diversifying its arsenal, and in January, the military**[**tested**](http://dailycaller.com/2017/01/31/china-tests-new-multiple-warhead-missile-amidst-tensions-with-trump/)**a DF-5C long-range missile carrying ten warheads. As China relies heavily on projectile-based defense, an improved U.S. missile shield is disconcerting.**

Russia

Country Leader – Vladmir Putin

Current Missile Defense- “**This destroys the strategic balance in the world,” Putin told reporters at an economic forum.”What is happening is a very serious and alarming process. In Alaska, and now in South Korea, elements of the anti-missile defense system are emerging.** Should we just stand idly by and watch this? Of course, not. **We are thinking about how to respond to these challenges.” Putin declared that the U.S. is using North Korea as an excuse to develop its anti-missile capabilities. Russia, like China, has also been developing its offensive weaponry, exploring hypersonic missile delivery systems and other improvements.**

### Topic & Political Philosophy

**Political Realism- Nations are always motivated by their best interest. Nations argue that the more power you have allows for one country to do better.**

**Political Liberalism- Identifies that broad ties between countries means that you cannot find the interests of one country. Advocates for more ties between countries and integration on national interests. Brought together by globalization, rapid rise in communications technology, international trade treaties**

**South Korean Political Realism- Best Interests include security. Means that they want to ensure lives of other people and through this continue to push for THAAD. Also, want to focus on economy. Majority of Koreans want a focus on economy and ROK has rapidly modernized to give its citizens a better quality of life. Denuclearization of North Korea which leads to a higher level of stability.**

# PRO (A/2 CON)

## Overviews

### Diplomacy Bad

1. **On a quick overview regarding diplomacy- remember, their entire case hinges on the fact that diplomacy works, but they’re giving you only half the story. Here are 4 reasons why diplomacy isn’t a plausible solution.**
2. **Andrea Mitchell of NBC finds that 20 years of diplomacy for denuclearization have resulted in only utter failure and it won’t succeed in the future.**

[https://www.**NBCNews**.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-nuclear-program-20-years-diplomacy-has-failed-tillerson-n734216](https://www.NBCNews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-nuclear-program-20-years-diplomacy-has-failed-tillerson-n734216)

1. **The U.S. won’t allow for diplomacy. Matthew Pennington of TIMES Politics finds that American defense chiefs are pushing for a military option, completely disregarding the diplomatic option.**
2. **Even if diplomacy does happen, North Korea won’t denuclearize. Jon Wolfsthal of The Atlantic notes that North Korea simply won’t seek an agreement for denuclearization with any country, meaning there’s no chance of ending North Korean proliferation.**
3. **If you want diplomacy, it comes only through THAAD. Amitai Etzioni of The Diplomat finds that THAAD gives China an incentive to do diplomacy with North Korea through the form of a bargaining chip.**
4. **At the end of the day, deploying THAAD is the only way to solve the problems in this round. This is true for one key reasons.**
5. **Probability- Remember, diplomacy has almost no chance of occurring, and even if it does occur there’s almost zero chance of it working. On the other hand, THAAD is working now, proved by Lyon and Stewart from case who point out that THAAD and a layered defense system never will fail.**

### NK Irrational

1. **They continuously try and justify that North Korea is rational and won’t actually execute a launch, but instead will do diplomacy. Here are three unique reasons why, in actuality, North Korea will attack regardless of what happens.**
2. **First, look to Bruce Klinger of The National Interest who finds that North Korea will further their nuclear program regardless of whether AMDs are deployed or not.**

Bruce **Klingner** July 22, **2016** “Why South Korea Needs THAAD” Bruce Klingner July 22, 2016 “Why South Korea Needs THAAD” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-south-korea-needs-thaad-17095?page=2>

1. **Then, Joel Wit of Columbia University finds that by 2020, North Korea will increase nuclear stockpile by ten times, and development will continue no matter what because North Korea wants to send a signal.**

Wit 15 [Joel **Wit**, Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS and Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies.; “North Korea’s Unstoppable Nuclear Program; 04/22/**2015**; accessed 06/30/2016; <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas- unstoppable-nuclear-weapons-program-12686?page=1>.]

1. **This is problematic because Artyom Lukin of the Huffington Post finds that Kim Jong Un will never denuclearize or give up nukes because it gives North Korea a sense of security.**

Artyom **Lukin** Professor Far Eastern Federal University at Vladivostok, Russia. January 07, **2016** Why Russia and China Won’t Curb North Korea Any More Than the U.S. Will Curb Saudi Arabia <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/russia-china-north-korea-saudi-us_b_8931672.html>

1. **At the end of the day, lives come first for two key reasons.**
2. **Irreversability- Lives always comes first. They can’t be replaced, while an economy can always be revamped or diplomacy can happen multiple times.**
3. **Magnitude- At the point where North Korea is going to attack no matter what, something is always better than nothing. Remember, Lyon from case finds that interoperable systems stop any nuclear strike which means at the end of the day, voting pro is the only way to solve.**

### SK-China Relations

1. **Their entire case hinges on the fact that South Korean-Chinese relations are ruined with the deployment of THAAD. One overarching problem is that nothing they talk about they materialize.**

**a. Reuters finds that despite the decision to deploy THAAD, China and its president Xi Jiping remain committed to keeping a good relation with South Korea and wants to keep the diplomatic ties strong.**

No Author, "China's Xi pledges to address differences with South Korea: Xinhua," **Reuters**, August 23 **2017**. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-southkorea-idUSKCN1B403P?il=0>

**China’s President Xi Jinping pledged to make concerted efforts with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in to address differences between the two countries properly, the official Xinhua news agency said on Thursday. Xi made the remarks in a congratulatory message sent to Moon on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of China-South Korea diplomatic relations,** Xinhua said. Development of China-South Korea relations made a positive contribution to regional peace and development, Xinhua cited Xi as saying. The news agency did not provide further details. South Korea and the United States agreed to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in response to the growing missile threat from North Korea. However, the installation of the missile system has angered China, which says its powerful radar will be able to look deep into its territory and undermine regional security. China has pressed South Korean businesses through boycotts and bans, such as ending Chinese group tours to South Korea and closing most of South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group’s Lotte Mart retail stores in China. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the exchange congratulatory messages was consistent with usual practice. Many tangible and mutual benefits had been delivered to people of both countries since the establishment of diplomatic ties, she told a daily news briefing. “**We hope the South Korean side can summarize and look back on the experiences and lessons from the 25 years of diplomatic relations and take constructive actions to appropriately address relevant sensitive issues and differences to improve relations between China and South Korea,”** Hua said. “On the issue of THAAD, China’s position is very clear, resolute and there is no change.”

**b. At that point, nothing they talk about will happen, because any Chinese anger is very short term, and in the long term, the relationship continues meaning there is no reason to prioritize international relations. At the end of the day, national security comes first because it’s a current threat that could materialize at any time.**

## A/2: Economy

### A/2: General Economic Harms

1. **In general, saving lives is always going to be more important than boosting a countries economy. It’s always going to be more advantageous for South Korea to be protected and face a slight dent to their economy rather then become a nuclear wasteland.**
2. **Turn- Richard E. Ebling of The Future of Freedom Foundation finds that trade deficits don’t matter and that historically, a balance of trade deficits feed economic development, eventually financing industrial development.**

**Ebling**, Richard E. “Trade Deficits Don't Matter – Unless Caused by Government.” The Future of Freedom Foundation, 15 May **2017**, [www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/trade-deficits-dont-matter-unless-caused-government/](http://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/trade-deficits-dont-matter-unless-caused-government/).

During a good part of the nineteenth century, the young United States experienced an overall balance of trade deficit with its international trading partners. In other words, the citizens of the United States were net importers of capital to fund and finance investments and other capital projects. In exchange, American business entities traded bonds (promises to pay back the borrowed money at some time in the future) or stocks (offered titles of partial ownership into these enterprises to attract the needed financial capital). **It was this foreign capital reflected in annual balance of trade deficits that accelerated America’s emerging industrial revolution in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, an industrial revolution that, otherwise, would have had to be dependent on domestic savings alone. By the second half of the 1870s, the United States began to have balance of trade surpluses, as the citizens of the country exported more to its trading partners than they imported. There were a variety of reasons for this change, but as the nineteenth century progressed a leading one was that American citizens were paying back the foreign loans that has financed American industrial development.** In the years immediately before the start of the First World War in 1914, American citizens began to become net exporters of financial capital to other nations around the world. The United States became a creditor rather than a debtor nation. But whatever the national trade statistics may have shown for the country as a whole in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fact was that the nation-wide statistics of imports and exports were (and are) ultimately derived from and based upon the buying and selling, the “importing” and “exporting,” of each and every individual within the confines of the boundaries of the nation-state. Individuals are the “active” agents; the national trade data is merely a reflection of their producing and consuming, their buying and selling, their saving and investing decisions, both within the country and between them and the citizens of other nations around the world.

1. **Economic harms are short term. Mikael J. Malmaeus in his book ‘Ecological Economics’ finds that potential economic instabilities are in the short term, but in reality, in the long term the problems are balanced out or adapted to, eventually not having much of an effect.**

**Malmaeus**, Mikael J. “Potential Consequences on the Economy of Low or No Growth - Short and Long Term Perspectives.” Ecological Economics, Elsevier, 19 Jan. **2017**, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916300477#t0010.

**Many of the potential effects of low or no economic growth discussed above are related to temporal instabilities and are likely to occur in the short term. This would for example include unemployment, financial meltdown and rising levels of debt caused by economic depressions.** Secondary effects including poverty and inequalities resulting from unemployment or deteriorating government finances would also take place on the same time horizon, although possibly with a time lag, and the same would be true for some effects on trade and globalization. Any effects related to the level of production as such would also play out in the long term. Levels of poverty, government spending and the struggle for economic resources including distributional conflicts should reasonably be affected by the rate of economic growth. Specifically, the relation between economic growth and inequality as discussed by Piketty (2014) and others operate in the long term. However, many effects depend very much on political prioritizations and are not mechanically determined by the rate of growth. If lower growth rates result in fewer investment opportunities and a shrinking financial sector it would occur in the long term. It is also possible that other forms of businesses and business relations will develop that are better adapted to a low growth environment. If labor productivity increases without increasing levels of production this might cause unemployment in the long term. But as observed in Section 3.2 there are other possible mechanisms that might work in the other direction. Due to social inertia, resuming business-as-usual tends to be the dominating response to any interrupted development, and this may delay adaptions to alternative growth paths. In the long term, however, our review indicates that a new balance may be found in the economy stabilizing government finances, levels of indebtedness and the labor market. The financial sector, the business sector and global trade patterns will need to adapt to survive in a low growth economy. A very brief summary of potential effects of low or no growth in the short and the long term based on the findings in our survey is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. **Economic effects of unmanaged low or no economic growth in the short and long term.**

|  | Short term | **Long term** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Government finances** | Negative impact | **Potentially balanced** |
| **Labor employment** | Negative impact | **Potentially balanced** |
| **Poverty** | Negative impact | **Potential effects** |
| **Inequality** | Unclear impact | **Potential effects** |
| **Indebtedness** | Negative impact | **Potentially balanced** |
| **Financial sector** | Negative impact | **Adaptions required** |
| **Businesses** | Negative impact | **Adaptions required** |
| **Globalization and trade** | Negative impact | **Adaptions required** |

### A/2: Tourism

1. **Responding to 20% cut from travel ban [Ren]- They’re exaggerating the impact as Ren only talks about potential GDP growth, meaning that the travel ban doesn’t really make a current time impact and South Korea would have to see unlikely drastic economic growth for their impacts to materialize.**

**Ren**, Shuli “Chinese Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink South Korea Economy” **Barrons Magazine** 5, Mar. **2017**

**China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea** and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group's supermarket operations in China. **China's travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea's GDP growth** this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. **Chinese tourists**, who come as part of tour groups, **contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea's economy, or 0.5% of its total GDP**. **Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP**. So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea's GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse.And things could get worse. China has asked for a boycott of Lotte Group's products, but China's displeasure has so far only been directed at cosmetics, duty-free shops and Korean casinos. Will China launch

sanctions against Korean smartphones and car makers too?

1. **The true decline, if any, in tourism comes North Korea’s threat. Jiyeun Lee of Bloomberg finds that tensions and geopolitical risk is the true deterrent of tourism in South Korea. The only way to solve for this is the deployment of AMDs which provides a perception of safety for incoming tourists.**

**Lee**, Jiyeun. “Missile Tension Deters Tourists From Visiting South Korea.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 24 Aug. **2017**, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-25/missile-tension-deters-tourists-from-visiting-south-korea.

**Escalating tension on the Korean peninsula is turning foreign tourists away from South Korea. The number of visitors plunged almost 41 percent in July from a year earlier, the biggest decline since a deadly respiratory virus hit the nation in 2015.** While the drop was driven by a slump in Chinese tourism after Beijing banned package tours in retaliation for South Korea deploying theThaad missile shield, the **number of visitors from Japan and Europe also slid as geopolitical risk increased, according to the Korea Tourism Organization.**

1. **South Korea still can make money without China. Simon Mundy of The Financial Times finds that 40 percent of plastic surgery business in South Korea is from overseas, with around one million visitors from Japan, South East Asia, and Russia. Mundy reports that there will be almost 1 million medical tourists in the coming years, creating a 3.5 trillion Won industry. There’s still ways to make money without China, even if they don’t point them out.**

**Mundy**, Simon. “Subscribe to Read.” Financial Times, 16 Oct. **2014**, [www.ft.com/content/b84a4f08-4570-11e4-9b71-00144feabdc0](http://www.ft.com/content/b84a4f08-4570-11e4-9b71-00144feabdc0).

About 40 per cent of my customers are now from overseas,” says Park Yang-soo, founder of Dream Plastic Surgery**, one of the leading cosmetic surgery companies**. China is the most common source of business, with **others coming from Japan, southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union**. “Chinese customers want an obvious outcome – bigger eyes, a higher nose. But Japanese want something more natural.” South Korea’s ambitions in medical tourism extend well beyond plastic surgery. Most of the country’s leading hospitals have started wooing foreign tourists with special international health centres. The hospitals promise patients from developing Asian nations treatment that rivals that offered in the world’s richest countries, at a significantly lower price. At Incheon International Airport meanwhile, there is a special information desk for medical tourists, as large as the one catering to all other visitors. The business has spread well beyond Seoul. Lee Dong-wha set up Dowoo Tour four years ago to cater to tourists seeking plastic surgery in the southern city of Daegu. The company takes care of visa arrangements, hospital and hotel bookings, as well as organising sightseeing trips for recuperating patients. It has an office in Vietnam, and partnerships with agencies in other markets including China and Russia. “Daegu is a medical city – the cost is much cheaper than Seoul, but the medical quality is high,” Mr Lee says. South Korea’s government this year announced plans to further encourage medical tourism, including a help centre providing legal support to foreign patients unhappy with their treatment, and relaxed visa requirements for medical tourists. The Korea Tourism Organisation is making ambitious forecasts for the sector: **it projects that the annual number of medical tourists will rise from 399,000 last year to 998,000 in 2020, with resultant revenue rising from from Won1tn to Won3.5tn. The government is encouraging South Korean hospital groups to establish businesses abroad; at the end of last year there were 111 such operations in 19 countries** including China, the US and Mongolia. Meanwhile, it wants to attract foreign hospital operators to invest in special economic zones that have been established in areas such as Jeju, a southern holiday island, and Songdo and Incheon, in the area around Seoul. However, the first such proposal was blocked in September, when the government ruled that China Stem Cell Health Group was not qualified to build its planned for-profit hospital on Jeju.

1. **Tourism isn’t really decreasing. Frances Cha of CNN in 2017 quantifies that there has been an 11.9 percent increase of tourists and for the first time in South Korean history, a million plus international visitors. Cha continues that there has been no noticeable dip in bookings for airlines or hotels- none of their impacts have truly materialized.**

**Cha**, Frances. “Don't Be Afraid, Seoul's Message to Tourists.” **CNN**, Cable News Network, 15 June **2017**, www.cnn.com/travel/article/south-korea-tourism/index.html.

**Despite concerns, tourism numbers in South Korea are up. Way up. Last week, the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) announced a record number of visitors for the month of March. For the first time in history, inbound international tourists numbered more than a million -- an 11.9% increase** compared with the same month last year. Numbers for April won't be available until May. "We've had record numbers from every country except Japan and Germany," KTO's Kang Sun-duk told CNN. According to Kang, tourist numbers are impacted by geopolitics, but not necessarily those involving North Korea. "Many of the Chinese tourists who would have been visiting Japan are now coming to South Korea due to the island disputes between China and Japan," said Kang**. South Korea's largest airline, Korean Air, and several major hotels in Seoul, tell CNN there has been no noticeable dip in bookings.** "We have not seen any impact from the news from North Korea thus far, but we'll have to see about any further impact," a Korean Air public relations representative told CNN. This past weekend at Imjingak, an area within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) popular with tourists, business appeared down only slightly. Though parking lots were jammed with Chinese tour groups and Korean families on day trips, the DMZ appeared to have fewer Western visitors than usual. "We've seen around a 20% decrease in business, but it's not too bad," said Kim Bong-nam, 57, who has been selling hot dogs at the DMZ for 30 years. "There was a similar drop in visitors when the Yeonpyong Island shelling happened," he said, referring to the 2010 incident when two civilians and two South Korean marines died after a North Korean attack. KTO's DMZ office said tours were operating normally. The KTO was unable to provide specific DMZ visitor data. "We are not afraid at all!" said a member of a group of tourists from Hebei, China, when asked why they'd decided to visit the DMZ in the midst of current reports. "There will be only peace here."

### A/2: Chinese Sanctions

1. **They can’t link into their impacts. Kang Seugng Woo of The Korea Times finds that sluggish Chinese economy will prevent retaliatory action against South Korea and that the two nations have close economic ties, so economic retaliation would impact China’s economy very negatively. At the end of the day, China isn’t going to damage its own economy to put useless sanctions.**

Kang Seung-Woo, 2/15/**20**16 (staff writer, “Korea-China relations turning sour,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/116_198058.html>, 7/17/17, (AD)

There are mixed reactions on the prospects of the issue. "Although the Chinese government is protesting against the THAAD deployment at a diplomatic level during its lunar New Year, it is expected to begin to take retaliatory actions from now," Cheong said, adding that the nation's cultural industry catching on among Chinese as well as trade may be adversely affected. However, Bong Young-shik, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said that should China opt for economic retaliation and that such a move may meet a headwind in terms of security. "China protests against THAAD out of concerns that it means the ROK-U.S. alliance will develop into a bigger regional strategy focusing on encircling China in Northeast Asia," he said. "However, a possible THAAD-triggered economic retaliation will ask for trouble."Park **Won-gon said that China's current sluggish economy may prevent the government from taking retaliatory action, as well. "The two nations have close economic ties, so economic retaliation may also affect its own economy negatively**," he said. Meanwhile, the two nations' vice foreign ministers will meet in Seoul today to discuss pending issues between them, according to the South Korean foreign ministry. First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam will sit down with his Chinese counterpart Zhang Yesui in the 7th Korea-China Strategic Dialogue. Zhang is the first senior Chinese official to visit South Korea since the North conducted its fourth nuclear test. They are highly expected to discuss sensitive issues such as the THAAD deployment and a rift over the level of punishment against the North.

1. **Salvatore Babones of Al Jazeera finds that China simply doesn’t have the economic capabilities to enter a trade war. At the end of the day, even if China wants to enforce harsher sanctions, they can’t because of a lagging economy.**

Salvatore **Babones,** (specialist in global economic structure), "Can China afford to challenge the United States?," Al Jazeera, 3-6-**2017**, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/china-afford-challenge-united-states-170305104843474.html, 7-18-2017 (SA)

**For the past two years, China has been floating its economy on a massive wave of deficit spending.** State-owned firms, state-owned banks, local governments, and the central government itself have pulled out all the stops to maintain China's official target of 6.5 percent minimum annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth.  This week the National People's Congress, or NPC, is widely expected to endorse a slightly lower growth target because of concerns that **[Government] debt is spiraling out of control.** Like all countries, China faces two options when it comes to controlling deficits: raise taxes or cut spending. With perhaps as many as 100 billionaires sitting as members of the NPC, spending cuts are the likely outcome.  One area where China is eyeing major cuts is defense. Throughout the early 2000s, China's defence spending grew by double-digit percentages each year. Security experts once expected a whopping 20 percent increase for 2016. The reality was a slowdown to 7.6 percent growth in 2016, followed by a recently announced seven percent growth target for 2017.

1. **Sanctions won’t end up working. Matma Badkar of Business Insider finds that sanctions are only effective 5 percent of the time and the world needs a drastic change before sanctions don’t fail and work on countries as a whole.**

**Badkar**, Mamta. “Here's Why Sanctions Don't Work.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 16 July **2014**, [www.businessinsider.com/why-sanctions-wont-work-july-16-2014-7](http://www.businessinsider.com/why-sanctions-wont-work-july-16-2014-7).

A study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot (HSE) first promulgated "key evidence that sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals." In their study, the reviewed 115 cases between 1914 and 1990 where sanctions were used, and found that 40 cases, or 34% were successful. In a seminal paper for International Security, titled "Why Economist Sanctions Do Not Work," **Robert A. Pape writes that sanctions were in fact only effective 5% of the time, not 34%. Pape argues that the world would need to change significantly before economic sanctions could "be a reliable alternative to military force."** Here are some of his key arguments. The political cooperation we saw in the early 1990s is unlikely to continue, as countries are increasingly likely to put their interests first before considering Western policies. The main reason sanctions fail is because of the nature of the target state. "**They key reason that sanctions fail is that modern states are not fragile. Nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon their national interests. States involved in coercive disputed often accept high costs, including civilian suffering, to achieve their objectives**. …Even in the weakest and most fractured states, external pressure is more likely to enhance the nationalist legitimacy of rulers than to undermine it." The expectation that cooperation from different states will make sanctions more effective, relies on two expectations: "that greater cooperation will increase the economic punishment on target states, and, more critically, that increased punishment will make targets more likely to concede." The latest especially is "dubious," according to Pape. For this to work, economic punishments will have to be "dramatically higher" than they have been in the past, and even this is only a "speculative possibility."

1. **Current sanctions are insignificant. Matt Stiles of The Sydney Morning Herald finds that current sanctions are only on insignificant items such as K-Pop and cosmetics, meaning that the sanctions don’t have much of an impact.**

**Stiles**, Jonathan Kaiman and Matt. “South Korean K-Pop Targeted by China Upset over THAAD Missile-Defence System.” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 Mar. **2017**, www.smh.com.au/world/south-korean-kpop-targeted-by-china-upset-over-thaad-missiledefence-system-rollout-20170301-guol5t.html.

**One day the system could destroy North Korean missiles in mid-flight, a remarkable feat of military might and technical prowess. But so far, its main victims have been South Korean pop stars, cosmetics companies, and TV shows**. Washington and Seoul plan to deploy the US-developed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system on South Korean soil before the end of the year, a long-envisioned response to North Korea's repeated missile tests and threats to attack South Korea, Japan and the United States. Yet Beijing, a longtime ally of Pyongyang, sees the system as part of a US strategy to contain China, since it could also be deployed against Chinese missiles. And as THAAD's deployment date draws near, its denunciations have reached fever pitch, spurring retaliations online and in the streets.

1. **The problem solves itself. William Ide of VOA News writes that Beijing is currently working so solve the dispute and put China-SK relations back on track, including the future return of KPOP and 4,000 travel agents currently reaching out towards South Korea to resume travel.**

William **Ide**, “Hopes Growing China May Ease Informal South Korea Sanctions”, **VOA News**, May 2017 <<https://www.voanews.com/a/hopes-growing-china-may-ease-informal-south-korean-sanctions/3866996.html>>

On Friday, **Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with an envoy of South Korean President Moon, he said Beijing was willing to work together with Seoul to “properly handle disputes” and “put China-South Korea relations back onto a normal track.”** Over the past few days, reports in the Chinese state media have noted signals that the ice-breaking may have already begun. **Two South Korean musicals already have performance dates in Beijing and Shanghai. “Bballae,” which means laundry in Korean, will begin in late June. Performances of another musical, “My Bucket List,” will begin in Beijing and Shanghai in August, reports said.** According to a report in the National Business Daily, which was also carried in the Communist Party-mouthpiece People’s Daily, **4,000 Chinese employees of an unnamed medical equipment company are reaching out to travel agents in Seoul to book a group trip to South Korea.**

1. **Even with sanctions, South Korean companies keep investing in China. Reuters in 2017 finds that South Korean Lotte Group continues to invest in its Chinese businesses despite sanctions and tensions, meaning that any sanctions implemented don’t materialize because South Korean business still carry about normal activities.**

**Reuters**. “South Korea's Lotte Group to Keep Investing in China Despite Tensions.” Lotte Group to Keep Investing in China Despite Tensions | Fortune.com, Fortune, 3 Apr. **2017**, fortune.com/2017/04/03/south-korea-lotte-china-thaad/.

**South Korea's Lotte Group will continue to invest in its China business despite diplomatic tensions over the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system, a Lotte executive said on Monday, denying rumors it wants to scale back its China operations**. Chinese authorities last month closed dozens of Lotte retail stores following inspections, ramping up pressure on South Korea's fifth-largest family-run conglomerate after it agreed to provide land for the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system outside Seoul. South Korea and its ally the U.S. say the system is designed to thwart nuclear-armed North Korea's missile threat, but Beijing says its radar can also reach far into China. Chinese state media have called for a boycott of Lotte businesses in response to the THAAD deployment. **"Currently we plan to continue to invest in our China business and continue to strengthen the business," top executive Hwang Kag-gyu told reporters**. CHINA Records of Ivanka Trump’s Business Dealings With China Are Getting Harder to Find Hwang is the head of Lotte Corporate Innovation Office and is viewed as the second-highest executive next to Chairman Shin Dong-bin. "It's been 20 years since Lotte entered the China market ... we believe the China business is still in an investment period," he said. South Korean media including wire service Yonhap have raised the possibility of Lotte scaling back its China business in the wake of the backlash against the company there.

1. **Even cosmetics companies continue to thrive despite sanctions. Thomas Buckely of Bloomberg finds that recently, Unilever paid 2.27 billion to the sanctioned cosmetics industry, now predicted to make 6.3 billion in revenue driven by the K-Pop industry. Even sanctioned sectors continue to thrive, so economic impacts are almost nonexistent.**

**Buckley**, Thomas, and Sterling Wong. “Unilever Bets $2.7 Billion on South Korean Cosmetics Boom.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 25 Sept. **2017**, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-25/unilever-buys-korean-makeup-firm-for-2-7-billion-from-goldman.

**Unilever agreed to pay 2.27 billion euros ($2.7 billion) for one of South Korea’s biggest makers of beauty products, seeking a larger slice of a booming business fueled by its links to the country’s pop stars and TV actors**. Unilever plans to buy Carver Korea Co., maker of AHC skincare products, from shareholders including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Bain Capital Private Equity. It’s the biggest acquisition yet for the Anglo-Dutch company in the world’s fourth-largest skincare market, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. For the owner of Ben & Jerry’s ice cream and Dove soap, the deal follows recent purchases in niche areas like organic tea and vegan mayonnaise as Chief Executive Officer Paul Polman pursues a commitment to sustainability. The company has also been building up a “prestige” arm within its personal-care business, targeting high-end brands founded in developed markets, such as Dermalogica, Ren and Murad. **Skincare sales in South Korea are expected to reach $6.3 billion this year, according to research firm Euromonitor. Export demand has been boosted by ads featuring pop musicians and television actors endorsing the cosmetics. “The Korean wave, driven by K-pop and TV series, created a desire among Asian consumers to look and feel like Korean celebrities,”** said Sunny Um, a Singapore-based analyst at Euromonitor.

### A/2: Economic Downfall

1. **There’s no impact. Times of News explains that South Korea is taking measures to counteract future economic sanctions to minimize loses, meaning in the case economic backlash continues, South Koreans are prepared and will not suffer.**

“Seoul, Washington Slam China over THAAD Retaliation.” **Times of News South-Korea**, 3 Mar. **2017**, south-korea.timesofnews.com/seoul-washington-slam-china-over-thaad-retaliation.html.

**While reaffirming the deployment plan, the prime minister pledged to craft countermeasures to minimize the losses of South Korean businesses, considering the two countries’ multifaceted economic ties. The deployment process is set to kick into high gear now that Seoul’s Defense Ministry has secured land for the battery in Seongju, South Gyeongsang Province, through a pact struck Tuesday with Lotte Group.** “As the THAAD deployment is expected to pick up (and) China’s resistance to grow fiercer, we strengthen communications with China and draw up necessary steps in time, while continuing monitoring of the measures from the Chinese side,” Hwang said at the meeting.

1. **Non-Unique- Yonhap News Agency in 2017 reports that despite the tensions brewing in the East Asian region, South Korea’s economy remains stable and hasn’t seen much change. At the end of the day, no current scenarios, including Chinese are having much of an effect on South Korea’s economy.**

“S. Korea Economy Remains Stable despite N.K. Provocations: Ex-S&P Official.” **Yonhap News Agency**, 9 Sept. **2017**, english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2017/09/26/90/0501000000AEN20170926013000320F.html.

**A former Standard & Poor's official said Tuesday South Korea's economy remains stable due to its solid fundamentals, though North Korean provocations have emerged as a major threat. In a Seoul seminar arranged by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), John Chambers, former chairman of Standard & Poor's sovereign ratings committee, said South Korea's fundamentals are solid enough to cushion the impact from outside factors. He said the Korean economy is robust in terms of trade balance, fiscal status and real-sector economy though the country faces a variety of negative outside factors.** Chambers picked China's economic hard landing, renegotiations of the free trade agreement with the United States and continued nuclear and missile threats from North Korea as the factors. In the same seminar, former United Nations secretary-general Ban Ki-moon called on South Korean companies to focus on their businesses as South Korea and its major ally the U.S. overwhelm the North in military preparedness. He said the alliance between Seoul and Washington will work as a strong deterrent to the North's provocations though he acknowledged Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions have put the Korean peninsula almost "at the most dangerous point." North Korea conducted its sixth and apparently most powerful nuclear test so far on Sept. 3. The communist state has also staged 10 missile provocations since the Moon Jae-in administration took office in May with at least two of them involving intermediate or long-range ballistic missiles.

1. **Turn- With U.S. presence in place, South Korean economy is only improving and at its best performance as of recent. CNBC in 2017 finds that there is new expansion for job creation, with the fastest growth since 2014 at more than 3.3 percent, along with 10.2 percent increase in exports. At the end of the day, current events don’t impact South Korean economy, and it continues to improve.**

**CNBC**. “South Korea Sees 2017 Growth at Fastest in Three Years, Pushes Consumption and Jobs.” CNBC, CNBC, 24 July **2017**, www.cnbc.com/2017/07/24/south-korea-sees-high-growth-in-2017-pushes-consumption-and-jobs.html.

**South Korea raised its growth outlook for this year on Tuesday and vowed to maintain an expansionary fiscal policy that would support job creation. The government projected economic expansion of 3 percent in 2017, the fastest since growth of 3.3 percent seen in 2014. The finance ministry's latest outlook revised growth up from an earlier estimate of 2.6 percent, and put it above the Bank of Korea's forecast 2.8 percent. It sees improving global demand for South Korean goods supporting growth in the second half of 2017**, along with increased fiscal spending from the 11 trillion won ($9.85 billion) supplementary budget approved on July 22. The ministry said the extra budget would lift growth by 0.2 percentage point this year, although Nomura said the supplementary budget's 0.2 percent boost to GDP growth was already included in its estimate of 2.7 percent for 2017. **The government sees exports surging 10.2 percent this year**, although private consumption is expected to grow at a slower 2.3 percent because of waning job growth and record household debt. "South Korea's potential growth rate is around 3 percent. As we noted earlier, posting 3 percent expansion looks achievable assuming the economy continues to undertake reforms for consumption-led growth," deputy finance minister Lee Chan-woo told an embargoed briefing. "Going forward, our budget, tax and other policies will be reformed to better focus on creating jobs," Lee said.

1. **South Korea alone is making more money. The Edge Markets reports that in the coming months, the South Korean exports are improving even without China, as a global demand from manufactures is soaring, with continuous expansion of the economy.**

**Reuters**. “S.Korea C.bank Sees Exports Continuing Gradual Improvement.” The Edge Markets, 25 Sept. **2017**, [www.theedgemarkets.com/article/skorea-cbank-sees-exports-continuing-gradual-improvement](http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/skorea-cbank-sees-exports-continuing-gradual-improvement).

**South Korea's exports will continue to gradually improve in the coming months, thanks to strong global demand for memory chips and petrochemical products, the country's central bank said in a regular report on Monday. An assessment from the Bank of Korea's 15 regional offices nationwide noted that manufacturers have expanded facilities to meet soaring global demand for memory chips and petrochemical products.** Exports from Asia's fourth largest economy rose at a double-digit pace in August, marking the eight straight month of expansion — the longest growth in shipments since 2011. The BOK, however, expects dwindling exports of cars and auto components as sales decline in China, after Beijing retaliated against South Korea's planned deployment of a U.S. anti-missile defense system in the country. Private consumption will sustain its current recovery as spending is expected to increase during the Autumn holiday season and as the government boosts fiscal stimulus on its job creation programme, the report said.

## A/2: Diplomacy

### A/2: Diplomacy Overall Good

1. **Completely Non- Unique. The Guardian in 2017 reports that in the time that THAAD has been deployed, China has negotiated with the United Nations and agreed to ban exports to North Korea in order to stop the North Korean threat. At the point where diplomacy and negotiations are occurring while THAAD is deployed, they can’t give you a unique reason why not having AMDs allows for diplomacy.**

“China to Enforce UN Sanctions against North Korea.” **The Guardian**, Guardian News and Media, 23 Sept. **2017**, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/23/china-to-enforce-un-sanctions-against-north-korea.

**China has said it will ban exports of some petroleum products to North Korea, as well as imports of textiles from the isolated country, in line with a United Nations security council resolution passed after Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test.** The announcement from Beijing came at the end of a week that saw tensions rise between the US and North Korea, with the leaders of both countries trading insults. The Chinese ministry of commerce said in a statement that exports of refined petroleum products would be limited from 1 October and exports of condensates and liquefied natural gas would be stopped immediately to comply with the UN sanctions**. Imports of textiles from North Korea would also be banned immediately**, but textile trade contracts signed before 11 September would be respected if import formalities were completed before 10 December, the statement said. **The moves follow the adoption of a unanimous UN security council agreement on sanctions after North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test on 3 September. The resolution imposed a ban on condensates and natural gas liquids, a cap of 2m barrels a year on refined petroleum products and a cap on crude oil exports to North Korea at current levels.**

1. **Any diplomacy with North Korea simply won’t be allowed by the US. John Haltiwanger of Newsweek finds in 2017 that 58 percent of Americans support military interventions. At the same time, 82 percent of democrats strongly support military interventions, which is key because majority of Congress is Republican, with the largest Republican majority since 1929. At the end of the day, diplomacy won’t happen.**

**Haltiwanger**, John. “A Majority of Americans Would Support Military Action in North Korea If Diplomacy Fails, a Poll Shows.” Newsweek, 16 Sept. **2017**

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**A majority of Americans, 58 percent, would support military intervention in North Korea if the U.S. ultimately fails to achieve its goals via peaceful means, according to a new Gallup poll. The last time Gallup asked this question, in 2003, 47 percent felt the same way. There's also a strong partisan divide on this issue. The vast majority of Republicans, 82 percent, would support military intervention, compared with 37 percent of Democrats.** Keep Up With This Story And More By Subscribing Now At the same time, most Americans, 59 percent, do not think an attack from North Korea is imminent. North Korea has been particularly aggressive over the past year, apparently making progress in its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States. In the past month alone, North Korea has launched two missiles over Japan. **President Donald Trump has responded to provocations from the reclusive nation with bombastic rhetoric, at one point threatening North Korea with "fire and fury**." The U.S. has no formal diplomatic relations with North Korea but has tried to convince the regime to end its nuclear program by actively pushing for harsh economic sanctions via the United Nations. Despite such sanctions, North Korea shows no signs of relenting. On Friday, several top Trump administration officials gave their thoughts on the current situation, with some stating that military options are definitely on the table. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said North Korea's recent actions endanger "the entire world." "For those who have said, and been commenting about a lack of a military option, there is a military option," National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said. "Now it is not what we would prefer to do." "**What we are seeing is they continue to be provocative, they continue to be reckless," U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said. She then noted that North Korea is already crippled due to sanctions imposed by the U.N. and that there's not much more that can be done on that end. "Having said that, I have no problem with kicking it to [Defense Secretary James] Mattis, because I think he has plenty of options," Haley added.**

1. **In general, all diplomacy can’t start on its own. VOA News finds in 2017 that any form of diplomacy through sanctions always needs to be backed up by a military option in the area, meaning THAAD is a necessary piece to complete the puzzle of diplomacy.**

**Heinlein**, Peter. “Trump's UN Priority: Global Diplomatic Isolation of North Korea.” VOA, VOA, 16 Sept. **2017**

“What we’re seeing is that they continue to be provocative, they continue to be reckless,” Haley said. “There is not a whole lot the Security Council is going to be able to do from here, when you cut 90 percent of the trade and 30 percent of the oil. So, having said that, I have no problem kicking it to (Defense Secretary) General (James) Mattis, because I think he has plenty of options.” **McMaster said global support for diplomacy backed by rigorous enforcement of sanctions** is **needed** to avoid **what he called “the military option.” “What we have to do is call on all nations, call on everyone to do everything we can to address this global problem short of war,” McMaster told reporters.**

1. **Turn- Tristan Volpe of Carnigie Endowment for International Peace writes that North Korea only uses diplomatic talks to force concessions, including the 6 Part Talks in which North Korea threatened to produce plutonium if they did not receieve aid and assistance.**

**Volpe**, Tristan. “The Unraveling of North Korea's Proliferation Blackmail Strategy.” **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 10 Apr. **2017**, carnegieendowment.org/2017/04/10/unraveling-of-north-korea-s-proliferation-blackmail-strategy-pub-68622.

**Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has repeatedly attempted to compel concessions from the United States by wielding the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1990s, North Korea threatened to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons unless Washington provided energy assistance.**1 During the Six-Party Talks a decade later, the North Koreans returned to concession-seeking diplomacy by restarting their mothballed plutonium facilities, producing large quantities of fissile material, and testing a nuclear device.2 After these negotiations reached an impasse, **North Korea avoided using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip until [in] February 2012, when it agreed to a moratorium on “missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities” in exchange for food aid.**

### A/2: Sunshine Policy

1. **In the past, there was a failure of the Sunshine Policy. There’s no point in implementing a failed policy over and over again.**
2. **This is confirmed by Ronald Popeski of Reuters finds that the previous Sunshine Policy had no positive changes despite a decade’s worth of work, and instead resulted in North Korea pursuing more nuclear arms.**

**Popeski**, Ronald. “Sunshine Policy Failed to Change North Korea: Report.” **Reuters**, Thomson Reuters, 18 Nov. **2010**, [www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-sunshine-idUSTRE6AH12520101118](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-sunshine-idUSTRE6AH12520101118).

**South Korea’s peaceful “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea failed, a government report has found, saying there have been no positive changes to Pyongyang’s behavior despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement**. <p>North Koreans take part in a parade to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang October 10, 2010, in this picture released by North Korea's KCNA news agency on Sunday. REUTERS/KCNA</p> Aid shipped to the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998-2008 also failed to make a difference to the lives of destitute North Koreans, said the Unification Ministry white paper, seen by Reuters on Thursday. **The policy review by current President Lee Myung-bak’s government pointed to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms and the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in March that killed 46 sailors as key examples of Pyongyang’s deceptive nature.** “The attack on the Cheonan proves that despite the qualitative growth in inter-Korea ties, North Korea has not changed,” the report said.

1. **Khang Vu of the East Asia Forum furthers that Moon’s Sunshine Policy is bound to be a failure and instead would case political capital to decrease as North Korea simply won’t negotiate.**

**But if President Moon is determined to champion his predecessors’ approach, he will likely invest his political capital into another unsuccessful round of tit-for-tat negotiation. Moon’s ‘Sunshine Policy 2.0’ will not be as revolutionary and unconditional as that of Kim and Roh given Pyongyang’s recent preponderance of provocations.** Nonetheless, Moon’s policy is clearly influenced by his predecessors’ legacy, hence his many proposals to restart dialogue with Pyongyang as well as his pledge to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex as incentives for denuclearisation.

1. **Turn- John Lee of NK News explains that the Sunshine Policy has undermined South Korea’s security, enriched and enabled North Korea to possible expand the Kim empire because of the excess aid provided through the policy.**

21st, **2016** John **Lee** September. “The Good Old Days? Misplaced Nostalgia for the Sunshine Policy.” **NK News** - North Korea News, 21 Sept. 2016, [www.nknews.org/2016/09/the-good-old-days-misplaced-nostalgia-for-the-sunshine-policy/](http://www.nknews.org/2016/09/the-good-old-days-misplaced-nostalgia-for-the-sunshine-policy/).

SEOUL (Reuters) - **South Korea's peaceful "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea failed**, a government report has found, **saying there have been no positive changes to Pyongyang's behavior despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement.** **Aid shipped to the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998-2008 also failed to make a difference to the lives of destitute North Koreans, said the Unification Ministry white paper,** seen by Reuters on Thursday. The policy review by current President Lee Myung-bak's government pointed to North Korea's pursuit of nuclear arms and the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in March that killed 46 sailors as key examples of Pyongyang's deceptive nature.That was supplied with no strings attached whatsoever. In other words, for South Korea, the Sunshine Policy meant giving something (a lot of something, actually) for nothing. Worse than nothing, in fact. Whether people care to admit it or not, the Sunshine Policy has undermined South Korea’s security, enriched and enabled its main enemy, and it is altogether possible that South Korea has still not yet faced its full consequences. It is plausible that the Sunshine Policy’s final effect could still come in the form of a North Korean peace: a unified peninsula ruled by Pyongyang. This is the legacy that is being championed by South Korean progressives like Park Won-soon, Moon Jae-in, Ahn Cheol-soo, and Choo Mi-ae – a return to a time when South Korea, stripped off its pride and will for self-determination, become nothing more than servile peasants who live only to ensure Kim Jong Un’s longevity and to fulfill his twisted fancies.

### A/2: Diplomacy with North Korea

1. **North Korea won’t come to the negotiating table. Leo Bryne of NK News finds that North Korea is simply too irrational of a regime to sit down at the negotiating table with any country, especially now with tensions brewing.**

**Bryne, Leo. “North Korea Is an ‘Irrational Regime’: Moon.” NK News - North Korea News, 20 June 2017,** [**www.nknews.org/2017/06/north-korea-an-irrational-regime-moon/**](http://www.nknews.org/2017/06/north-korea-an-irrational-regime-moon/)**.**

**South Korea’s new President Moon Jae-in said North Korea’s treatment of Otto Warmbier proves the DPRK is an “irrational regime” during an interview with CBS News on Tuesday.** The South Korean President told CBS This Morning’s co-host Norah O’Donnell the DPRK must bear a “heavy responsibility” for Warmbier’s death, which occurred on Monday following his release from North Korea last week. But Moon stopped short of saying North Korea had murdered the U.S. citizen, saying the circumstances that lead to his death were not known. **“I believe we must now have the perception that North Korea is an irrational regime. Working with such a country, we must achieve the goal of the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program,” Moon said during the interview. When asked how he hoped to negotiate with an irrational leader, Moon reiterated his commitment to engaging North Korea through dialogue, saying that sanctions and pressure had so far not worked.** Moon added he believed Kim Jong Un would prefer dialogue to the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. “So there is a possibility that Kim Jong Un continues to make the bluff with his nuclear weapons programs. But deep inside he is actually yearning or wanting dialogue. But in the end the only way to find out is to have a dialogue with North Korea.” The South Korean President added he did not believe his approach to be at odds with Washington’s and that he did not want to begin negotiations without preconditions. “I have never mentioned a dialogue with no preconditions whatsoever. I believe that first we must vie for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. And then, as a second phase, try to achieve the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program,” Moon said during the interview. Moon added that he believed solving the problems facing the Korean Peninsula would be both his and Trump’s greatest diplomatic achievements, and commended his U.S. counterpart for placing North Korea high on Washington’s priority list. The South Korean President will meet with Trump on June 29-30, with discussions on North Korea expected to be at the top of the agenda. “The leaders will also coordinate on North Korea-related issues, including countering the growing North Korean nuclear and missile threats,” a White House statement issued on June 13 reads. The meeting will follow a regional security dialogue with China also in Washington on Wednesday. The U.S. will look to build on an earlier meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in April, with the State Department saying on Monday Washington will be looking to persuade Beijing to apply additional pressure on the DPRK. But given the longstanding deadlock and apparently mismatched goals between China, the two Koreas, and the U.S., some experts are skeptical the meetings will create tangible results. **There is great concern that there is currently no obvious way out of this predicament. The equities in Seoul, Washington, Beijing, and Pyongyang are increasingly out of alignment,” Ken Gause, a North Korea leadership specialist at the CNA Corporation, told NK News. “What needs to happen to pave the way forward just isn’t politically feasible. At least not at this time.”**

1. **Any diplomacy never makes progress. Adam Taylor of The Washington Post finds that any attempts at North Korean diplomacy were called off because countries couldn’t agree on terms of discussion. Taylor furthers that North Korean officials won’t discuss denuclearization at all meaning the only way to provide safety is by implementing AMDs.**

**Taylor**, Adam. “Analysis | Does Diplomacy Stand a Chance in North Korea?” The Washington Post, WP Company, 15 Aug. **2017**, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/15/does-diplomacy-stand-a-chance-in-north-korea/?utm\_term=.106a95bdec8c.

**Unfortunately, the talks have made limited progress. Americans involved in recent Track II talks say that North Korea balks at Washington's preconditions for official talks, including the release of more U.S. citizens in the country. Likewise, demands that the United States call off joint military exercises with South Korea are a sticking point for Washington. The Washington Post's Josh Rogin reported that a high-level meeting between officials in New York in July was canceled because the two sides could not agree on the terms of the discussion**. The biggest issue may be North Korea's nuclear weapons themselves. Even as North Korea has made remarkable technological leaps in its nuclear and missile programs this year, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must give up its weapons. During Track II talks, **North Korean officials have said that they need these weapons as a deterrent and that they would not agree to even discuss denuclearization.**

1. **Diplomacy opportunities are over. Edith M. Lederer of ABC News finds that North Korea perceives that there has been a declaration of war and that North Korea feels it has the right to retaliate by shooting at troops internationally. Lerderer then continues that the muddled relation with North Korea causes a diplomatic solution extremely unlikely, if not possible.**

press, edith m. **Lederer** associated. “North Korean Diplomat Says Tweet by Trump 'Declared War'.” ABC News, ABC News Network, 25 Sept. **2017**, abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/north-korea-trump-declared-war-country-50078044.

**North Korea's top diplomat said Monday that a weekend tweet by U.S. President Donald Trump was a "declaration of war" and North Korea has the right to retaliate by shooting down U.S. bombers, even in international airspace.** It was the latest escalation in a week of undiplomatic exchanges between North Korea and the U.S. during the U.N. General Assembly's annual ministerial meeting. Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho told reporters that the United Nations and the international community have said in recent days that they didn't want "the war of words" to turn into "real action." But he said that by tweeting that North Korea's leadership led by Kim Jong Un "won't be around much longer," **Trump "declared the war on our country." Under the U.N. Charter, Ri said, North Korea has the right to self-defense and "every right" to take countermeasures, "including the right to shoot down the United States strategic bombers even when they're not yet inside the airspace border of our country."** Hours later, the White House pushed back on Ri's claim, saying: "We have not declared war on North Korea." The Trump administration, referring to the tweet, stressed that the U.S. is not seeking to overthrow North Korea's government. U.S. Cabinet officials, particularly Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have insisted that the U.S.-led campaign of diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea is focused on eliminating the pariah state's nuclear weapons program, not its totalitarian government**. But the more Trump muddies the picture, the tougher it may become to maintain cooperation with China and Russia, which seek a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis** and not a new U.S. ally suddenly popping up on their borders. It also risks snuffing out hopes of persuading Kim's government to enter negotiations when its survival isn't assured.

### A/2: Chinese Diplomacy

1. **China has no incentive to carry out acts of diplomacy. Wesley Rahn of DW News finds that its simply not in China’s interests to eliminate the Kim regime in Pyongyang due to concerns about weapons, refugees, and a broken regime at its doorstep. Rahn finds that China simply won’t do diplomacy because geopolitical interests in the region and won’t accept a united Korean peninsula.**

**Rahn**, Wesley. “Why China Won't Help US against North Korea | Asia | DW | 15.09.2017.” DW.COM, 15 Sept. **2017**, [www.dw.com/en/why-china-wont-help-us-against-north-korea/a-40525522](http://www.dw.com/en/why-china-wont-help-us-against-north-korea/a-40525522).

But even if China complies with what the US considers are watered-down sanctions, **the bottom line is that it is not in China's national interest to eliminate the Kim regime in Pyongyang. Observers agree that Beijing is less concerned about the North's weapons program than it is about a US-sponsored, re-united Korean peninsula. "China doesn't want the DPRK to collapse because that would leave many uncertainties regarding its weapons, refugees and a US base at its doorstep**," Eduardo Araral, Vice Dean of research at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, told DW. Araral added that the US would not be able to handle North Korea without cooperation from China. "US-China ties are so intertwined that the US cannot continue hurting China, for example on trade, without hurting itself," he said. A post- Kim peninsula? One of the major hurdles in preventing a united front from the US and China in dealing with the Kim regime, is the uncertainty of the geopolitical outcome on the Korean Peninsula if the North were to collapse and be folded into the South. US and Chinese interests do merge, however, in that both do not want a nuclear-ready North Korean military machine, and China especially does not want nuclear war in its backyard. It should be noted that China does not necessarily have friendly relations with North Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping has never met with Kim Jong Un and there are signals that China is willing to take a tougher stance on the regime. **Nevertheless, these considerations are outweighed by a tangle of Chinese geopolitical interests. For China to accept a united Korean peninsula, they would need to be assured that the US would demilitarize in the region and that a new regional security architecture could be created with Beijing's interests at the helm. This scenario presents a problem, not only for US interests, but also for Japan and South Korea.**

1. **China wants North Korea to stay as a nuclear threat meaning diplomacy never will happen. Ralph Peters of The New York Post finds that China’s interest in North Korea means that China simply won’t assist in denuclearizing North Korea because the buffer state country makes China more militarily and economically dominant in the Pacific.**

**Peters**, Ralph. “Why China Wants North Korea to Be a Nuclear Threat.” New York Post, New York Post, 4 Aug. **2017**, nypost.com/2017/08/03/why-china-wants-north-korea-to-be-a-nuclear-threat/.

Certainly not us, with our Pacific forces crippled to a degree the Japanese couldn’t have hoped to achieve in 1941. **The sole winner would be China — not even a party to the conflict. And that is a cardinal reason why Beijing will not help us halt Pyongyang’s nuke and missile programs.** Washington has deluded itself into bipartisan groupthink yet again, desperate to believe that, if only we better explain our argument, China will turn on its most important ally, North Korea. Our folly ignores the strategic perspective entirely: We don’t even try to identify China’s ultimate goals. **The central Chinese ambition is to become the dominant military (as well as economic) power in the Pacific. North Korea could fulfill that ambition for Beijing without the Chinese firing one shot.** Nor would our losses be limited to Pearl Harbor, Pacific Command Headquarters at Camp H.M. Smith, Ft. Shafter, Schofield Barracks, Hickam and Wheeler Fields, the vast and venerable Tripler Army Medical Center or the various other military facilities we’ve concentrated around Honolulu. North Korea would not rely on a single missile and one lonely warhead, but would wait to attack until it possessed an arsenal it believed could ravage our capabilities and break our will at one blow. (The North Koreans are confident that we lack the guts to use nukes even in response — they don’t understand us any better than we understand them.) Hawaii would top the target list, but Pyongyang’s intermediate range missiles would aim at our bases in Japan — not least, on Okinawa — while ICBMs also would target our bases in northwestern Washington state, from Joint Base Lewis-McChord to the Bangor naval base that’s our only Trident ballistic missile submarine sustainment facility in the Pacific theater. One nuke on Bangor, and our indispensable Trident subs are homeless. But the biggest mainland target would be the complex of Navy and Marine bases in San Diego County, Calif. With its active-duty population of 110,000 service members, the county’s the Pacific heart of our Marine Corps, as well as the home port for 66 irreplaceable surface vessels and submarines, almost a quarter of our current fleet. Hit those three target complexes hard enough — Hawaii, San Diego County and the greater Puget Sound area in Washington, then toss in Guam, and **China inherits the Pacific by default** — unless we want to fight Beijing with our arms already broken. Did I mention the Panama Canal? In World War II, the canal we built gave us a vital strategic advantage as we transferred forces and materiel between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. Today — thank you, President Carter — the canal is operated by a Chinese company that could close the canal to “all combatant nations” in time of war. North Korea has no navy to speak of, so that means us.

1. **Even China wanted to do diplomacy, it can’t. NBC Universal finds that as of recent, ties between China have deteriorated to the point where Beijing could become a target of North Korea. NBC continues that the near total breakdown of high level diplomacy between North Korea and China has prevented any meetings for over a year. At the end of the day, China simply has no diplomatic power in regards to North Korea.**

**Reuters**. “China's Diplomatic Ties With Ally North Korea Are Fraying.” NBCNews.com, **NBCUniversal** News Group, 8 Sept. **2017**, [www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/china-s-diplomatic-ties-ally-north-korea-are-fraying-n799736](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/china-s-diplomatic-ties-ally-north-korea-are-fraying-n799736).

**Since then, ties between the allies have deteriorated so sharply that some diplomats and experts fear Beijing may become, like Washington, a target of its neighbor's ire. While the United States and its allies — and many people in China — believe Beijing should do more to rein in Pyongyang, the acceleration of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities has coincided with a near-total breakdown of high-level diplomacy between the two. Before retiring this summer, China's long-time point man on North Korea, Wu Dawei, had not visited the country for over a year.** His replacement, Kong Xuanyou, has yet to visit and is still carrying out duties from his previous Asian role, traveling to Pakistan in mid-August, diplomats say. Related: China Grows Weary of Its Unruly Nuclear Neighbor The notion that mighty China wields diplomatic control over impoverished North Korea is mistaken, said Jin Canrong, an international relations professor at Beijing's Renmin University. "There has never existed a subordinate relationship between the two sides. Never. Especially after the end of the Cold War, the North Koreans fell into a difficult situation and could not get enough help from China, so they determined to help themselves."

1. **If anything, turn this argument. Guy Taylor of The Washington Times finds that THAAD gives the opportunity of a bargaining chip in order to pressure China to carry out diplomacy, giving them an incentive to act. Taylor finds that specifically, two days after THAAD was deployed, China expressed interested in increasing pressure on North Korea, meaning THAAD gives the perfect opportunity to have leverage on China and get it to act.**

**Taylor**, Guy. “THAAD Missile Shield to South Korea Gives Donald Trump Advantage over China on North Korea.” *The Washington Times*, **The Washington Times**, 8 Mar. **2017**, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/thaad-missile-shield-to-south-korea-gives-donald-t/](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/thaad-missile-shield-to-south-korea-gives-donald-t/).

**A sophisticated missile defense system being delivered to South Korea (THAAD) may give President Trump a bargaining chip that no other U.S. president has had to pressure China to rein in North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs.** Beijing has long expressed anger over the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) shield, and on Wednesday, just **two days after the Trump administration announced the start of the system’s deployment, Chinese officials suddenly signaled that they may be ready to increase pressure on [**North Korea**]Pyongyang. This is a unique time where China is for one of the first times ever concerned with actions on the Korean Peninsula, therefore, South Korea and the US have more leverage over China. THAAD is the perfect tool for getting China to agree to anything regarding NK.**

1. **Even if you don’t buy any of this, prefer our solvency because THAAD an automatic solvency. We do not know if leaders will follow through with their words to impose diplomacy. Prefer our solvency of interoperability and deterrence because of timeframe as we save more lives instantly, but diplomacy will need time to implement. In the end, we save lives faster which is key because current tensions are increasing at an exponential rate.**

### A/2: NK-China Sanctions [DON’T READ #3 W/COLLAPSE]

1. **Turn- The Crawford School of Economics and Government cites J.S. Robst, who finds that trade between two countries decreases the chance of war. This is problematic, as sanctions decrease trade, overall increasing the chance of war- the negative side simply promotes war, and doesn’t stop it.**

**Robst,** J, S. Polachek and Y. Chang **(2006**) ‘Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Con ict/ Cooperation’, IZA Discussion Papers 1988, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Robst et al. (2006) estimate the effects of geographical distance on political distance separately and **find that trade reduces conflict to a greater extent when two countries are geographically close**, but trade has a greater effect on cooperation when countries are distant. Closer countries have more interactions and there is more chance of territorial disputes and regional rivalries — both of which are relevant in analysing Japan and China. Robst et al. (2006) also find that proximity increases the number and severity of both conflict and cooperation events more among non-trading countries than countries with large trade. Their second finding does not relate to the study here, as Japan and China are close but trade is large. Robst et al. do find that although ‘proximity provides incentives for conflict, trade mitigates these incentives’ (2006: 5)

1. **Alex Ward of Vox finds that the window of time for sanctions to be effective has already passed, since North Korea has already established a nuclear program. Even with Chinese cooperation, the sanctions will fail. Ward furthers that this is portrayed throughout recent history as there’s been sanctions on North Korea before, but North Korea continued to nuclearized and the sanctions failed.**

Alex **Ward**, July 6, **2017**, Trump has 3 options for dealing with North Korea, they are all bad, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/6/15922824/trump-north-korea-icbm-options-bad>

Speaking of **sanctions**, they **tend to work much better *before* a country obtains what it wants**, Greitens noted. In this case, North Korea has achieved a big step toward its goal of having a missile that can carry a nuclear weapon to America’s largest cities**. It’s going to be hard at this point to use sanctions to change North Korea’s behavior when Pyongyang feels like it is so close to the finish line. Also, it’s not like North Korea sanctions are a new idea. In fact,**[**sanctions have already been placed**](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/25/news/north-korea-economy-sanctions/index.html)**on key items being imported or exported by North Korea:** weaponry big and small; coal, minerals, and fuel; luxury goods like yachts; funding for its missile and nuclear programs; and even a ban on travel into UN member states for those who work on the country’s nuclear program. **Despite all of that, North Korea continues to defy international pressure by improving its program.**

1. **Turn- Justin Hastings of the South China Morning Post finds that despite sanctions, North Korea is stable and actually is expanding by a rate of 3.9 percent. Hastings furthers that sanctions fail as sanctioned items still appear in North Korea, and private businesses continue to grow and import Chinese items despite sanctions.**

**Hastings**, Justin. “How North Korea Keeps Its Economy Humming despite the Sanctions.” South China Morning Post, 24 Sept. **2017**, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2112551/how-north-korea-keeps-its-economy-humming-despite.

While it would be wrong to say **the North Korean economy** is going like gangbusters, it **is surprisingly stable, despite increasingly onerous sanctions. Pyongyang is experiencing a building boom, food prices appear to have stabilised, North Korea is somehow able to fund an annual current accounts deficit with China, and the overall economy even grew 3.9 per** cent in 2016, according to the South Korean central bank. This raises the obvious questions of where North Korea’s money is coming from, and how it is getting – and paying for **– the sanctioned items that are showing up in Pyongyang markets, like luxury cars. The United States and other countries point to weapons sales, drug trafficking, computer hacking, insurance fraud, and the like, as the source of North Korea’s wealth, such as it is. But the truth is more complicated. The North Korean government, and the North Korean economy in general, have a plethora of ways of getting the money and supplies they want. North Korea is no longer a socialist economy, and it is not clear that the North Korean government is particularly dependent on the traditional targets of sanctions for its revenues. Private citizens have long run small businesses in North Korea, selling household goods, food and imported products in grey markets.** Photo: EPA Based on interviews, partly with Chinese doing business in North Korea, and site visits, partly to North Korean businesses, throughout China, South Korea and Southeast Asia, for my book A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy, it appears that North Koreans at all levels of society survive by becoming entrepreneurs, evincing a combination of pragmatism, creativity and ruthlessness. How North Korea evades UN sanctions At the bottom, private citizens have long run small businesses, and mainly women sell household goods, food and imported Chinese and South Korean products in grey markets that have sprung up across the country. Enterprising businesspeople have also registered their businesses as state companies in light of the ban on private business. Much of the intercity transport in North Korea is privately run but technically publicly owned, for example. The vehicles are imported by private entrepreneurs, who network with state officials to register the vehicles as state assets, make them managers, and give them political protection in exchange for a cut of the profits. Some North Korean businesses have started or provided waitresses for restaurants, with the majority of restaurants in North Korea apparently privately run but publicly owned in recent years, and at least 16 North Korean restaurants in Shenyang, northeast China were in 2013 operating with a variety of ownership schemes. State officials for their part have used their positions to go into business for themselves and with the Chinese. One Chinese businessman, for example, recounted how he paid US$100,000 to buy his North Korean partner a high-level rank in the North Korean military, which allowed his partner to protect their mutual business dealings.

1. **Sanctions have loopholes.** **Zeeshan Aleem of Vox explains that current sanctions imposed on North Korea are ineffective and contain loopholes that prevent North Korea from losing any money from sanctions. Aleem continues that due to North Korea’s importance to China, sanctions will never be complete and work as meant to.**

**Aleem,** Zeeshaan “Why Russia and China watered down the UN’s New North Korean Sanctions” **Vox News** September 12th, **2017**

**But all these measures fall well short of what the US was seeking to include in the original package. America wanted a ban on all oil flowing into North Korea, but that didn’t make it into the resolution. Instead, current crude oil imports into North Korea are capped at current levels, and the flow of refined oil products into the country are merely reduced. “Clearly the Security Council is treading lightly in banning exports to North Korea,” Kent Boydston, a research analyst who specializes in North Korea at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told me. The US also wanted to place a full asset freeze on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but that didn’t make it into the resolution. Instead, the sanctions target other government organizations with asset freezes. And the US wanted to ban countries from employing North Korean workers altogether, as they provide a useful source of revenue for Pyongyang, but that didn’t make it into the resolution either.** Instead, the sanctions ban future hiring of workers and the renewal of work contracts with North Korean laborers, leaving current working arrangements untouched. Currently, North Korea has close to 100,000 people earning wages abroad. Chinese and Russian negotiators ensured that the sanctions were watered down before they went for a vote. That’s because those countries bring a different set of calculations to the table when it comes to reining in North Korea’s fixation on becoming a global nuclear power. China isn’t as worried about North Korea’s nuclear program as it is the potential collapse of the country itself, which would create a refugee crisis on the Korean Peninsula and likely send millions of North Koreans pouring across the Chinese–North Korean border. **China also believes the US would dramatically increase its military presence in the region to deal with the fallout from the collapse and to secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons. A US military presence on China’s border is not something China’s leaders want to see anytime soon. As a result, China helps prop up the North Korean leadership knowing that a stable North Korea serves as a strategic buffer for itself. Russia is a more peripheral player on North Korea — it shares a much smaller border with the country, and its trade with Pyongyang is just a fraction of the trade between North Korea and China.** But it has a very real interest in regional stability and keeping US presence in the area as limited as possible. And some analysts believe that Moscow is also making a bid to become a power player in future negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program outside of the UN. “With Russia, this is not only about North Korea but about Moscow’s place in world politics,” Janka Oertel, a German Marshall Fund of the United States, told me in the runup to the vote. Russia has been inviting American diplomats to Moscow to discuss the possibility of such talks. If Russia succeeds in securing a seat at the table during serious negotiations, it can use that diplomatic process to pursue its own interests and make yet another claim to being a major player in global affairs. In the meantime, it might continue to make the US’s life harder at the UN.

1. **Edith M. Lederer of The Washington Post finds that even with so called Chinese sanctions, North Korea still illegally exported 270 million dollars of coal, iron, and other commodities to China, along with countries in the southeast Asia region. At the end of the day, even if sanctions are continued to be imposed, China won’t ever make an effort to collapse North Korea.**

**Lederer**, Edith M. “UN Experts: NKorea Exported $270 Million Illegally Recently.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 9 Sept. **2017**.

**North Korea illegally exported coal, iron and other commodities worth at least $270 million to China and other countries including India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka in the six-month period ending in early August in violation of U.N. sanctions, U.N. experts say. The experts monitoring sanctions said in a report released Saturday that Kim Jong Un’s government continues to flout sanctions on commodities as well as an arms embargo and restrictions on shipping and financial activities.** They said North Korea is also reportedly continuing prohibited nuclear activities with weapons-grade fissile material production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, construction and maintenance at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, and at a uranium mine in Pyongsan. The eight-member panel of experts said it is also investigating the widespread presence of North Koreans in Africa and the Middle East, particularly in Syria, “including their involvement in prohibited activities.” The experts said one inquiry is into “reported prohibited chemical, ballistic missile and conventional arms cooperation” between Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the country’s official name. **They said this includes activities on Syrian Scud missile programs and “maintenance and repair of Syrian surface-to-air missiles (SAM) air defense systems.” The panel noted that two unnamed countries reported intercepting shipments destined for Syria. It did not identify the contents and said Syria has yet to respond to its inquiries. The 111-page report was written before North Korea’s sixth and most powerful nuclear test last Sunday and its latest launch of a powerful new intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan.** It was made public two days before the United States has called for a vote on a new sanctions resolution. The original U.S. draft would impose the toughest-ever sanctions on North Korea including banning all oil and natural gas exports to the country and freezing all foreign financial assets of the government and its leader Kim Jong Un. The experts said implementation of existing sanctions “lags far behind what is necessary to achieve the core goal of denuclearization” of the Korean peninsula. They blamed “lax enforcement” of sanctions coupled North Korea’s “evolving evasion techniques” for undermining the achievement of this goal which would see the North abandon all weapons of mass destruction. On the export of commodities — a key source of foreign exchange for the DPRK — the experts said that following China’s suspension of coal imports from the North in February, the DPRK has been rerouting coal to other countries including Malaysia and Vietnam. “The panel’s investigations reveal that the DPRK is deliberately using indirect channels to export prohibited commodities, evading sanctions,” the report said. The panel said imports of DPRK coal, iron and iron ore violate U.N. sanctions unless the countries have received an exemption. **Between December 2016 and May 2017, for example, the DPRK exported over $79 million of iron ore to China, the report said. And between October 2016 and May 2017, it exported iron and steel products to Egypt, China, France, India, Ireland and Mexico valued at $305,713.**

### A/2: NK Aid

1. **Turn this- North Korea uses diplomacy to prop itself up and gain supplies. Andrea Mitchell of NBC Universal finds that denuclearization efforts through aid in exchange always end in North Korea bolstering their nuclear program using the aid given.**

**Mitchell**, Andrea. “North Korea Nuclear Program: 20 Years of Diplomacy Has Failed, Tillerson Says.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, 16 Mar. **2017**,

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson issued a blistering attack on two decades of bipartisan attempts to deter North Korea's nuclear program, saying the Trump administration will have a new approach. “**The diplomatic and other efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of de-nuclearization have failed. So we have 20 years of failed approach,” Donald Trump's top diplomat said during a visit to Japan on Thursday. "And that includes a period in which the U.S. provided $1.35 billion in assistance to North Korea as an encouragement to take a different pathway."** Tillerson was speaking at a joint press conference with Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida in Tokyo after the two discussed how to deal with the growing threat from Pyongyang. North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests and 24 ballistic missile tests in just the last year, including four last week that landed in the sea off Japan.

1. **Even then, it’s non-unique. Christine Kim of Reuters finds that a recent South Korean choice to send millions of dollars in aid to North Korea despite tensions rising in the Korean Peninsula. Aid is already happening with THAAD deployed.**

**Kim**, Christine. “South Korea Approves $8 Million Aid to North Korea, Timing to Be Decided Later.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 20 Sept. **2017**, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-southkorea-aid/south-korea-approves-8-million-aid-to-north-korea-timing-to-be-decided-later-idUSKCN1BW0AG](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-southkorea-aid/south-korea-approves-8-million-aid-to-north-korea-timing-to-be-decided-later-idUSKCN1BW0AG).

**South Korea approved a plan on Thursday to send $8 million worth of humanitarian aid to North Korea, the South’s Unification Ministry said, as part of an aid policy that the government says remains unaffected by geopolitical tensions with the North**. The aid decision was made after a meeting of government officials chaired by Unification Minister Cho Myong-gyon. It comes after the United Nations approved new sanctions against North Korea for its sixth nuclear test earlier this month. **The South said it aims to send $4.5 million worth of nutritional products for children and pregnant women through the World Food Programme and $3.5 million worth of vaccines and medicinal treatments through UNICEF**. The exact timing of when the aid will be sent, as well as its size, will be confirmed later, the ministry said in a statement. The WFP and UNICEF had approached the South Korean government in May and July this year to contribute in aiding North Korea, the statement added. “We have consistently said we would pursue humanitarian aid for North Korea in consideration of the poor conditions children and pregnant women are in there, apart from political issues,” said Cho in opening remarks at the meeting. Ahead of the meeting, UNICEF’s regional director for East Asia and the Pacific Karin Hulshof said in a statement the problems North Korean children face “are all too real”. “Today, we estimate that around 200,000 children are affected by acute malnutrition, heightening their risk of death and increasing rates of stunting,” Hulshof said. “Food and essential medicines and equipment to treat young children are in short supply.” Cho’s ministry had said earlier this month they were looking into giving North Korea aid, which launched a backlash of disapproval from both the public and opposition parties. It has dragged down South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s approval rating. Realmeter, a South Korean polling organization, said on Thursday Moon’s approval rating stood at 65.7 percent, weakening for a fourth straight month. Although the approval rate is still high, those surveyed said Moon had fallen out of favor due to North Korea’s continued provocations and the government’s decision to consider sending aid to North Korea, Realmeter said.

## A/2: Increase In Arms

### A/2: Arms Race General Process

1. **Response to that arms races increase war by 331% [Rider and BYU]- They only give you half the story. The card itself says in true rivalries, the probability of war is 78% lower with an arms race. At the end of the day, their own card contradicts itself, saying an arms race happen- there’s no probability of the argument happening.**
2. **Arms races don’t amount to anything, historically. Jospeh Maiolo of the History News Network finds that the historical precedent from the Cold War and the Indian-Pakistan rivalry proves that the majority of arms races don’t amount to anything.**

**Maiolo**, Joseph. “Do Arms Races Cause Wars?” History News Network, 28 Nov. **2010** ADAD.

**In any event, the end of the Cold War took the steam out of the debate. In the 1990s arms race studies lacked immediate relevance. The United States, after all, was the world’s only superpower, and the Americans pioneered advanced military technologies that would stave off any challengers.** After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the most dangerous threat became international terrorism. As the centenary of 1914 approaches, however, the arms race question is once again relevant. If Iran achieves nuclear capability, then its neighbors will likely follow suit. The outlook in South Asia and Asia is worrisome. Pakistan and India have built up their nuclear arsenals. North Korea exploded a crude atomic device and is probably working on better ones. Beijing is modernizing its army, air and missile forces, and expanding its navy at a pace that alarms Tokyo and Washington. Outer space and cyberspace are now arenas for escalating competition in lethal hardware and disruptive software. And we are on the threshold of a new race in autonomous killer robots and drones. Will these arms races end in war? My answer is yes, if we learn the wrong lesson from the three big arms races of the last century. To be sure, LordGrey’s formula was too simple: arms races do not “inevitably” lead to war. **The Cold War is a case in point. Underlying political conflicts cause wars and drive arms races. But the conventional lesson derived from the 1930s is equally crude.**

1. **Turn-Andrei Lankov of Al Jazeera finds U.S. presence is the only thing currently preventing an East Asians arms race, by preserving trust and preventing confrontation. Removing THAAD simply causes an arm race due to lack of U.S. hegemony in region.**

**Lankov**, Andrei. “A Nuclear Arms Race in East Asia?” Al Jazeera English, 3 June 2016, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/06/nuclear-arms-race-east-asia-160602091442504.html.

And then what? If the nuclear and missile arms race starts in East Asia, where will it stop? East Asia today is eerily reminiscent of Europe in the early 1900s, before the outbreak of World War I. **It is also a place where most nations deeply distrust their neighbors, and where old- style nationalism still reigns supreme. So far, age-old hatreds have been controlled by the US hegemony - Koreans and Japanese, in spite of their historical animosities, have been prevented from confrontation by their alliances with the US - as well as by the record high economic growth.** But will such a state of things continue indefinitely? This looks increasingly unlikely.

### A/2: NK Proliferation

1. **Argument is completely non-unique. North Korea has been proliferating since the early 2000’s, even while there were no anti-missile defenses. At the same time, they’ve continuously accelerated proliferation for the past two years. At the end of the day, North Korean proliferation happens without protection from it what and THAAD is necessary to provide safety from it.**
2. **Turn- THAAD isn’t the cause, it is past presidents claiming they would stop North Korean proliferation. Capital Flows of Forbes Magazine finds there have been three nuclear tests, each in response to countries publicly undermining the North Korean threat.**

**Flows**, Capital. “How To Stop North Korea: A Geoeconomic Approach.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 28 Feb. **2017**, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/28/how-to-stop-north-korea-a-geoeconomic-approach/#a013d5e18f13.

**During the past four years, North Korea conducted three nuclear tests, launched two satellites into low-Earth orbit, successfully flight-tested road-mobile and submarine-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and is currently reprocessing plutonium, enriching uranium, and stockpiling fissile materials. Past presidents have claimed they would not allow a nuclear North Korea; however, none were successful in undermining this threat or in dissuading China from supporting the Kim regime.** After years of strategic patience, there is a new sense of danger and an urgency that something must be done in a hurry—and that equivocation by China can no longer be tolerated.

1. **THAAD stops North Korean aggression. Masashi Murano of The Diplomat finds that missile development is the most practical way to deter North Korea and allows countries to contain North Korean aggression.**

**Murano**, Masashi. “Deterring North Korea.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 24 May **2017**, thediplomat.com/2017/05/deterring-north-korea/.

The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) agreement between Japan and South Korea is promising and opens the door to greater trust and cooperation among allies. Since 2016, the Japanese, U.S., and ROK navies have conducted four trilateral missile warnings and information sharing exercises. If North Korea’s provocations continue, the three should conduct a practical field training exercise, including a live missile intercept. More rapid, integrated, and seamless response requires an effective allied sensor system including U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)’s TPY-2 radars, Aegis systems, and interceptors through the C2BMC (Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication) in Hawaii. According to some U.S. officials, USFK’s THAAD and its TPY-2 radars will not be integrated into other regional BMD networks, including the C2BMC. This was reportedly undertaken to reassure China that the TPY-2 radar could not detect its ballistic missile launches as a forward-based sensor. Even if the TPY-2 radar operated in forward-based mode, it would not be able to detect ICBMs launched from the central Chinese missile sites, as they would follow a trajectory far north and west of the Korean Peninsula en route to the United States. **However, this BMD network would strengthen regional resiliency against China’s regional strike capability. Thus, it could be additional leverage if China fails to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. As the North Korean nuclear and missile threat grows, Japan, the United States, and South Korea must work together to take practical steps to contain and deter North Korean aggression**. Improving Japanese defense capabilities would be an important step in the right direction.

### A/2: SK Nuclearizing

1. **Argument should have happened by now- THAAD has been deployed for almost two weeks by there’s been literally no mention of excess South Korean nuclearizing. Make them show why there is a unique reason that South Korea would have nuclearized by now.**
2. **South Korea won’t proliferate. Christina Varriale of the Royal United Service Institute finds that it is highly unlikely South Korea would ever move towards nuclear weapons or withdraw from the NPT. Varriale furthers that the leap to acquire nuclear is too big for Seoul and the political impetus to drive forward a nuclear program isn’t present and doesn’t equate to a proliferation threat.**

**Varriale, Christina. “Trump and Asia: Tokyo and Seoul Proliferation Prospects.” RUSI, 5 Dec. 2016, rusi.org/commentary/trump-and-asia-tokyo-and-seoul-proliferation-prospects.**

**However, even with calls in South Korea and Japan for serious consideration of a move towards indigenous nuclear weapons, it still seems highly unlikely that either nation would incur the immense political costs that would come from withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and from launching a ‘race for a bomb’. Obtaining a nuclear capability is not a binary choice, but a matrix of both technical and political capacities. Although Japan and South Korea occupy different places along the capability spectrum, the leap across technical and political proliferation facets to acquire nuclear weapons remains, at present, too big for both Seoul and Tokyo.** Irrespective of the regional nuclear threats Japan faces, Tokyo has unwaveringly maintained an outstanding record of non-proliferation. However, Japan is also positioned in technological terms very close to a nuclear weapons capability. It has maintained a full nuclear fuel cycle with both enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, as well as vast quantities of stockpiled, weapons-useable plutonium and uranium. ‘Nuclear hedging’ is the model of proliferation whereby a state intentionally moves its nuclear programme towards the weapons line without creating an outright nuclear weapons programme. Although this level of infrastructure has been maintained for peaceful purposes, Japan’s technical nuclear independence and highly advanced capabilities make it easier for Tokyo to pursue varied proliferation options, should the political impetus to pursue a model of proliferation be present. While the outcome and benefit of a rhetorical or signalling shift will be contingent on many external factors, including threat context and legal and normative restrictions, Japan’s nuclear infrastructure does grant Tokyo strategic flexibility across the proliferation spectrum. **However, the official political impetus to drive forward this technological capacity into a weapons programme is not present, and such flexibility does not equate to an imminent proliferation threat.** The security context of Japan would need to alter significantly more than it has in recent months before consideration of the political leap to nuclear weapons can become a reality.

1. **South Korea can’t proliferate. Christina Varriale of the Royal United Service Institute furthers that South Korea’s lower technical abilities and lack of access to plutonium indigenously means they can’t create nuclear weapons. Then, Varriale continues that breaking the NPT severely damages the U.S.- South Korean alliance, which isn’t in the best interests of South Korea.**

**Varriale, Christina. “Trump and Asia: Tokyo and Seoul Proliferation Prospects.” RUSI, 5 Dec. 2016, rusi.org/commentary/trump-and-asia-tokyo-and-seoul-proliferation-prospects.**

However, the official political impetus to drive forward this technological capacity into a weapons programme is not present, and such flexibility does not equate to an imminent proliferation threat. The security context of Japan would need to alter significantly more than it has in recent months before consideration of the political leap to nuclear weapons can become a reality. Domestic calls for nuclearisation have been louder in South Korea than in Japan, with a number of opinion polls indicating that over half of the voters may now favour developing a nuclear arsenal. Although current public preoccupation is with the political scandal embroiling President Park Geun-hye, this will not override the long-term movement of nuclear discussions away from the fringes to the centre of public debate. Notwithstanding this, Seoul would face more practical hurdles than Japan to amending its non-proliferation policy, mainly as a result of two factors. **First, South Korea sits at a lower level of technical capability – a fact deliberately engineered as part of civil nuclear cooperation agreements with the US. In particular, South Korea is not permitted to reprocess plutonium indigenously – a key pathway to weapons-usable material. So although the political desire to explore the nuclear road, via hedging or otherwise, might be higher than in Japan, limited technical capacities reduce any imminent proliferation concern. Second, South Korea is not able to amend or ignore this restriction without substantially damaging its alliance with the US. Seoul is so heavily dependent on its US alliance for conventional force and deterrence against Pyongyang that it is unlikely to want to jeopardise this support by officially suggesting or pursuing an independent nuclear arsenal. Such a break would leave Seoul vulnerable for a period of time, lacking both the robust US backing that it has traditionally enjoyed as well as its own convincing capability.** Irrespective of alliance calculations, disapproval from the broader international community would surely follow any apparent increase in South Korean or Japanese nuclear steps. How this disapproval would manifest itself and to what extent such policy shifts would invite tangible punishment is difficult to assess at the moment. However, the assumption is that the risk of backlash is likely to be decisive in favour of the status quo for both Japan and South Korea. In both cases, therefore, gaps between current status and weapons acquisition are too large to raise immediate proliferation concerns. From a purely technical viewpoint, Japan’s advanced nuclear infrastructure would provide greater flexibility for approaching proliferation, but dramatic political changes remain unlikely.

1. **South Korea can’t legally nuclearize. Columbia Law finds that Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula states that South Korea simply can’t nuclearize, posses, store, or deploy nuclear weapons and are legally bound to not nuclearize. At the end of the day, South Korea can’t nuclearize or risks damaging its international reputation and causing instability.**

http://www2.law.**Columbia**.edu/course\_00S\_L9436\_001/North%20Korea%20materials/koreadenuclearization.htm

**The South and the North, desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and thus to create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world, Declare as follows; 1. The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. 2. The South and the North shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. 3. The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. 4. The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides**, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. 5. The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall establish and operate a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission within one (1) month of the effectuation of this joint declaration. 6. This Joint Declaration shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect. Signed on January 20, 1992 Chung Won-shik Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea; Chief delegate of the South delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks Yon Hyong-muk Premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Head of the North delegation to the South-North High-Level Talks

### A/2: Chinese Proliferation

1. **Argument is non-unique. BBC news in 2017 China says it will increase military spending by about 7% this year meaning China is going to increase arms regardless of THAAD’s implementation. They can’t show a unique reason why not deploying AMDs stops this increase, so you can’t weigh it.**

“China to Increase Military Spending by 7% in 2017.” **BBC News**, BBC, 4 Mar. **2017**, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39165080.

**China says it will increase military spending by about 7% this year, just days after Donald Trump outlined a boost to the US defence budget. The scheduled announcement was made ahead of the annual National People's Congress (NPC) in Beijing. China has been modernising its armed forces recently as its economy expands**. China's announced defence budget remains smaller than that of the US. But many China observers argue the real figure could be much higher. The announcement marks the second consecutive year that the increase in China's defence spending has been below 10% following nearly two decades at or above that figure. It means that total spending will account for about 1.3% of the country's projected GDP in 2017, the same level as in recent years, said government spokeswoman Fu Ying.

1. **Reuters finds that Chinese reliance on the U.S. is at an all-time high as its growth rate has tumbled 6.6 percent in the lasts business quarter, meaning China simply won’t risk a conflict the U.S. allies in the region. At the end of the day, Chinese proliferation won’t happen.**

“China's Economic Growth Slows to 7.3 Pct in Q3, near 6-Year Low.” Reuters, **Thomson Reuters**, 20 Oct. **2014**, www.reuters.com/article/china-economy-gdp/chinas-economic-growth-slows-to-7-3-pct-in-q3-near-6-year-low-idUSB9N0RQ01A20141021?feedType=RSS&feedName=marketsNews

**China’s economic growth cooled to 7.3 percent between July and September from a year earlier, the weakest expansion since the global financial crisis and reinforcing expectations that Beijing will need to roll out more stimulus to avert a sharper slowdown. With a faltering property market increasingly dragging on manufacturing and investment, the reading was the slowest for the world’s second-largest economy since early 2009, when the growth rate tumbled to 6.6 percent.** Economists polled by Reuters had expected third-quarter growth to cool to 7.2 percent from 7.5 percent in the second quarter, adding to worries about flagging global growth which have sent financial markets tumbling in recent weeks. On a quarter-on-quarter basis, growth eased to 1.9 percent versus expectations of 1.8 percent and down from 2.0 percent in the second quarter. Other data released alongside the gross domestic product (GDP) report on Tuesday showed factory output rose 8.0 percent in September from a year earlier, beating expectations for a 7.5 percent increase and up from August’s six-year low of 6.9 percent. Fixed asset investment, a key driver of the Chinese economy, was weaker than expected. It climbed 16.1 percent in the first nine months compared with the same period a year earlier, below forecasts for a 16.3 percent rise and cooling from 16.5 percent in the first eight months of the year.

1. **The international community is stopping Chinese proliferation. Ian J. Stewart of The Diplomat finds that Chinese approach to non-proliferation efforts in China have increased through laws and organizations that challenge Chinese power. At the end of the day, China can’t proliferate more even if they want to.**

**Stewart**, Ian J. “China and Non-Proliferation: Progress at Last?” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 15 Apr. **2015**, thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-non-proliferation-progress-at-last/.

**In the last 12 months, several important changes have been observed in China’s approach to implementation of non-proliferation controls that could be pivotal in efforts to prevent proliferation from and through China.** While these changes are unlikely to lead to a substantial shift on implementation overnight, they do nonetheless have positive implications in the medium term. Perhaps the main change is the creation of a bureau in the Ministry of Commerce to focus on strategic trade. The bureau has several divisions, including one focused on licensing, enforcement, and importantly also strategic trade cooperation. In parallel to the creation of the new bureau, China has also embarked upon the process of adopting a comprehensive export control law, which is expected in 2020. Another important change came in the form of a court judgment in autumn of last year. A Chinese court ruled that the supply of “restricted” (as opposed to “prohibited” goods) could result in criminal, instead of only civil, penalties. Evidently, the threat of criminal sanctions provides more of a deterrent than civil sanctions alone, so this decision would seem to provide a legal basis for Chinese export controls which, hitherto, may have been lacking. Taken together, these measures could allow for substantial progress in the implementation of export controls in China. **Nonetheless, the creation of laws or organizations alone cannot overcome the kinds of proliferation challenges China currently poses. Instead, forward movement is required on a day-to-day basis at the working level of China’s counter-proliferation architecture.** In this regard, an “emergency mechanism” that has been introduced to respond to specific concerns, including tipoffs from foreign governments, may be vital. Stronger working relations with key actors including the U.S. and EU will also be needed. (Indeed, such actors can and should provide assistance to China to implement controls – a free e-learning package on export controls in Mandarin developed by Project Alpha at King’s College London is a real-world example of the types of practical assistance that can be given.) If China can demonstrate progress the country could benefit. China’s desire to move up the manufacturing value chain would be aided, or at least less hindered, if export license decisions in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere were not continually delayed by the need for extra assurances that the goods would not be misused or diverted. Ultimately, despite **the progress that has been noted and the positive overall direction for China’s implementation of controls, skepticism about China’s implementation of non-proliferation controls is likely to remain until tangible progress is seen**

### A/2: Chinese Aggression

1. **Wayne Morrison of The Congressional Research Service quantifies that total U.S.-China trade rose from $3 billion in 1979 to $591 billion in 2016, and relations have trade increased more than 295%. At the end of the day, close trade ties provide no incentive for aggression against U.S. allies.**

**Morrison** 16, Wayne. "China-U.S. Trade Issues." *Congressional Research Service* (2017): 1. *FAS*. 15 Dec. 2015. Web. 12 Mar. **2016**. <<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf>> (AD)

U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past three decades. **Total U.S.- China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $591 billion in 2014.** China is currently the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. **In addition, according to one estimate, sales by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in China totaled $364 billion** in 2013. Many U.S. firms view participation in China’s market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors (GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2014. In addition, U.S. imports of low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers, and U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. **China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities** ($1.26 trillion as of September 2015). China’s

1. **There’s not going to be aggression because of this trade. Phillippe Martin of the Centre for Economic Policy Research empirically found that because trade increases the opportunity cost of war, it deters war altogether. At the point where China’s major trade comes from South Korea and the U.S., who are allies, China won’t risk its economy to enter an unnecessary level of aggression or war.**

Philippe **Martin** [Centre for Economic Policy Research, Paris School of Economics], **2008**, "Make Trade Not War," The Review of Economic Studies,<http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/koenig-pamina/martinmayerthoenig.pdf> (AD)

Our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to highlight the opposite effects of bilateral and multilateral trade on the probability of war and to base the empirical analysis on testable predictions generated by a theoretical model. We have shown that even in a model where trade increases welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not lead to more peaceful relations. Indeed, what matters ultimately is the geographical structure of trade and its balance between bilateral and multilateral openness. **Bilateral trade, because it increases the opportunity cost of bilateral war, deters bilateral war. Multilateral trade openness, because it reduces this opportunity cost with any given country, weakens the incentive to make concessions during negotiations to avert escalation and therefore increases the probability of war between any given pair of country.** From this point of view, an increase in trade between two countries pacifies relations between those but increases the probability of conflict with third countries. Our econometric analysis validates this prediction using a large number of alternative specifications and empirical strategies. Trade globalization also affects the nature of war: Multilateral openness increases the probability of local wars but should deter global conflicts. This last point, a logical consequence of our results but that we cannot test directly, is important. Given that these conflicts are certainly the most costly in terms of human welfare, this is not a small achievement.

1. **Even if war is wanted, China simply doesn’t have the ability to enter an aggressive state or war. Salvatore Babones of Al Jazeera finds that as Chinese devt spirals out of control with deficit spending, they are cutting down on security. China simply doesn’t have the monetary means to spend the money starting a war.**

Salvatore **Babones** 17, (specialist in global economic structure), "Can China afford to challenge the United States?," Al Jazeera, 3-6-**2017**, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/china-afford-challenge-united-states-170305104843474.html, 7-18-2017 (SA)

**For the past two years, China has been floating its economy on a massive wave of deficit spending. State-owned firms, state-owned banks, local governments, and the central government itself have pulled out all the stops to maintain China's official target of 6.5 percent minimum annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth.**This week the National People's Congress, or NPC, is widely expected to endorse a slightly lower growth target because of concerns that [**Government] debt is spiralling out of control**. Like all countries, China faces two options when it comes to controlling deficits: raise taxes or cut spending. With perhaps as many as 100 billionaires sitting as members of the NPC, spending cuts are the likely outcome.  **One area where China is eyeing major cuts is defense.** Throughout the early 2000s, China's defence spending grew by double-digit percentages each year. **Security experts once expected a whopping 20 percent increase for 2016. The reality was a slowdown to 7.6 percent growth in 2016, followed by a recently announced seven percent growth target for 2017.**

### A/2: Japan Proliferation

1. **Japan simply put, won’t go nuclear. Se Young Jang of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs finds that Japan simply won’t go nuclear due to domestic pressure and legislative elections, and anti-nuclear movements continue to grow.**

Se Young **Jang,** 5/4/**2016** (associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Will America's Asian Allies Go Nuclear?” <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055>, Accessed 7/17/**2016**, rwg)

With the already existing international and bilateral pressure, **another key driver discouraging the ROK and Japanese governments from going nuclear will be domestic pressure in the form of either elections or organized public movements. Korea’s recent legislative elections have interesting implications in this regard. One of the reasons that had led some lawmakers from the ruling conservative party to express their pro-nuclear opinion in public early this year was their confidence in victory in the April 2016 election**. As President Park Geun-hye and her ruling party had high approval ratings and were expected to overwhelmingly win the legislative election, they were less prudent than usual on such a controversial issue as nuclear armament. **The election, however, turned out to be a humiliating defeat for the ruling Saenuri Party**; not only did the party lose the parliamentary majority that they had held for sixteen years, but they secured even fewer seats than the main opposition Minjoo Party. **This poor result is likely to restrain the attempts of some right-wing politicians to use the North Korean threat for their pronuclear arguments.** Furthermore, opposition parties supportive of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula are expected to have a stronger voice in security issues when a new parliamentary term starts at the end of May. **In Japan**, the likelihood of opposition parties being able to pressure Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration on nuclear policy is more limited because the dominance of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet is not expected to change in the near future. Yet **Japanese civil society has nurtured a solid antinuclear culture through its own experiences: the U.S. atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasak**i in 1945, **and the Fukushima disaster** in 2011. The antinuclear movements in Japan started in the 1950s, and since then have mostly focused on opposing nuclear arms. For instance, Hidankyo (the Japan Confederation of A- and H- Bomb Sufferers Organizations) was nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize for its invaluable work to prevent a nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear weapons, and Mayors for Peace, initiated by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982, has also been actively working to raise international awareness about the necessity for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. However, it was not until when the Fukushima disaster happened that antinuclear sentiments, particularly against nuclear power, became popular among ordinary Japanese citizens. In June 2012, Japan witnessed the largest turnout of demonstrators in Tokyo since the 1960s—two hundred thousand people, according to the maximum estimates—in response to the government’s decision to restart Units 3 and 4 at the Oi nuclear power plant. Even though anti–nuclear power protests seem to have lost their momentum after the pronuclear LDP returned to power at the end of 2012, **Japan’s once highly motivated anti–nuclear power movements have the potential to grow.**

1. **James R. Homes of The Diplomat finds that technical and political hurdles block Japanese proliferation- at the point where Japanese citizens are completely against proliferation and are extremely pacifst, the chances of proliferation are zero.**

James, “Japan: Joining the Nuclear Weapons Club? It Could.,” http://**thediplomat.com/2012**/10/japan-joining-the-nuclear--club-it-could/

**Despite Japan's** renown for **high-tech wizardry** and long experience operating nuclear power plants**it would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a** working **nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years.** As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can carry it — and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few. Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese politics — a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But **Japan's painful past experience** as a target of atomic warfare, **its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation** accords, **and** the fury with which **pacifist-leaning citizens** and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet evidence of a bombmaking program **add up to a forbidding political barrier.** That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad — land- and sea-based missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers — holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientific-technical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers — much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain — but nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years down the road, then — not overnight — **a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down that road? I doubt It.** But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.

1. **Japan legally can’t proliferate. Sayuri Umeda of the Library of Congress finds that the 60-year-old Article 9 legal agreement prevents Japan from nuclearizing or maintaining war potential.**

**Umeda**, Sayuri. “Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution.” Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution | Law Library of Congress, 1 Feb. **2006**, www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php.

**Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war and prohibits Japan from maintaining the war potential. However, as the United States changed its policy of demilitarizing Japan, the United States asked her to share the burden of maintaining the security of Japan and, for the sake of international peacekeeping,** Japan gradually increased its defense capability and developed a somewhat more technical interpretation of article 9. Article 9 does not prohibit Japan from maintaining her defense capability. Article 9 had been popular in Japan for a long time; but as the Japanese started to take their security more seriously, more people have begun to accept the idea of amending article 9 of the Constitution. The ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, will bring the Constitutional amendment proposal to the Diet within the next few years.

### A/2: Russian Backlash

1. **THAAD has been deployed for a decent amount of time. In this timeframe, Russia hasn’t made any moves to support North Korea, nor has it bothered with the Korean peninsula in general. At the end day, Russia isn’t a factor in problems on the Korean Peninsula.**
2. **Alexander Titov of The Conversation finds that North Korea simply isn’t at the top of Russia’s security concerns, and that the Kremlin is happy to let other countries take the lead. At the end of the day, Russia won’t get involved with North Korean issues, meaning there’s no impact.**

Alexander **Titov**, 17, (), "Putin, North Korea and what Russia really wants in the region," Conversation, 5-17-2017, http://theconversation.com/putin-north-korea-and-what-russia-really-wants-in-the-region-77879, 7-21-2017 (AMK)

In simple terms, **North Korea is just not at the top of Russia’s list of security concerns**. This is instead dominated by Ukraine, Syria, relations with NATO and the terrorist threat from radical Islamic groups. So, while its priorities are engaged elsewhere, **the Kremlin is happy to let Beijing take the lead over North Korea.** Their core interests coincide in not allowing the US a greater military presence in Korea, while China has a much deeper strategic interest in the fate of North Korea. At the same time, Moscow sees itself as potentially playing a useful diplomatic role between different parties over Korea, gaining in its overall international standing. The political elite in Russia also understands the logic of having nuclear weapons as the only firm guarantee against regime change. In the 1990s it resorted to nuclear sabre rattling in the face of Western criticism of its war in [Chechnya](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/553304.stm). Boris Yeltsin, on his last foreign trip as Russian president in 1999, reminded Bill Clinton that Russia as a nuclear power [“won’t let the US determine the rules for the rest of the world”](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/10/123r-121099-idx.html). So, unlike many in the West, the Kremlin doesn’t see the regime in Pyongyang as crazy or irrational. In fact, from Russia’s perspective, Western interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya, and support for Maidan protesters in Ukraine are far more dangerous to Russia than North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons. Yet, ironically, **Russia is perhaps the only country in the region which genuinely wouldn’t mind if the tensions between North and South Korea were resolved**, and the countries reunited.

1. **Russia doesn’t have the timeframe to ally with North Korea. Tom O’ Connor of Newsweek finds that Russia doesn’t have the resources to amplify its involvement in the region, and for that reason would take too long to get involved.**

Tom **O'Connor 17**, (), "Russia may try moving in amid the North Korea-China feud, but it won't be easy," Newsweek, 5-8-**2017**, http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-feud-china-door-open-russia-596551, 7-21-2017 (SA)

**Russia has strategically grown closer to North Korea** as the reclusive, militarized state feuds with its greatest ally, China, over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, a recent analysis has found. **But** **the economic and political importance of China to North Korea may overshadow Moscow's attempts**..."North Korea’s political distancing from China has opened some political space between North Korea and Russia over the past few years, especially as US-Russia relations deteriorated, but I think **there are limitations as to how far that relationship can or will go**," Town told Newsweek.  **Russia, which has not played a proactive role in the region, would likely need to devote significant resources to shifting North Korea's dependence on China, which accounts for 90 percent of its trade.** While nearly a third of this activity reportedly originated from Russia, according to Stratfor's figures, **the infrastructure necessary to amplify Russia's involvement to that of China's would take extensive time and capital to develop.**

1. **If anything, Russia is displeased with North Korea and is for a form of protection from missiles. Will Kirby of The UK Express finds that with missile impacts range so close to Russia, the country simply isn’t happy with how the actions of North Korea are turning out and doesn’t support their beliefs.**

Will **Kirby**, 17, (), "'Russia won't be pleased' Donald Trump reacts to North Korea's latest missile launch," Express.co.uk, 5-14-**2017**, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/804316/donald-trump-north-korea-missile-launch-russia-japan-shinzo-abe-south-korea-moon-jae-in, 7-21-2017 (SM)

Hours **after North Korea launched its latest missile test** on early on Sunday morning, **the international community has moved to once again condemn the despot nation’s hostile threats. The White House released a statement, which read: "With the missile impacting so close to Russian soil - in fact, closer to Russia than to Japan - the President cannot imagine that Russia is pleased.”** It also urged for nations to implement greater sanctions against Pyongyang in a bid to rein in its nuclear weapons and missile development programs.

### A/2: Russian Arms Race

1. **Delink because Russia can’t proliferate. Tim Worstall of the Adam Smith Institute explains that recent Russian budget cuts mean that Russia simply doesn’t have the economic capabilities to enter an arms race. Worstall furthers that spending is too large on a burden on Russia as a result of strained finance because of a falling economy.**

**Worstall,** Tim. “Russia Has To Slash Military Spending To Balance The Budget.” Forbes, **Forbes** Magazine, 30 Dec. **2014**, www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/12/30/russia-has-to-slash-military-spending-to-balance-the-budget/#4c179e22663d.

This is not going to make Vladimir Putin happy**: it appears that the only way that the Russian government can balance the budget over the next few years is by slashing spending upon the military. And this right in the middle of a surge in such spending in an attempt to modernise the armed forces**. And it should be said that the state of the Russian conventional forces is pretty shoddy at present: it's always a source of amusement that the aircraft carrier cannot go anywhere outside of Russian territorial waters without a deep sea tug to deal with the likely occasion of the engine breaking down**. However, this spending is simply too large a burden on the strained finances as a result of the fall in the oil and gas prices.** It could even be said that it was too much of a strain before that. For the amount being spent upon that Russian military is truly horrendous:

### A/2: U.S. Preemptive Strike

1. **Preemptive Launch won’t happen. Felix Solomon of TIME writes that any preemptive strike is found as unlikely because it stokes unnecessary fires of war all while damaging the ever-important East Asia area.**

**Solomon**, Felix. “North Korea: Experts Say Unlikely U.S. Will Launch a Strike.” *Time*, Time, 14 Apr. **2017**, time.com/4739812/north-korea-donald-trump-preemptive-strike/.

**President Donald Trump drifted into dangerous waters last week when he dispatched a strike fleet near the Korean peninsula, stoking fears that the U.S. could carry out an attack on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, a move that would not be welcome in the region. Northeast Asia now hangs on tenterhooks as the war of words between Washington and Pyongyang threatens to escalate into a very real conflict — one that would be disastrous but, experts say, unlikely**. On Saturday, North Korea will celebrate one of its most important national holidays, the 105th anniversary of the birth of its founding father Kim Il Sung, prompting all manner of speculation about how its erratic leader might mark the occasion. More than 130 foreign journalists are now in Pyongyang on a rare invitation to visit the hermetic state, where they for the most part have reported that all is quiet in the capital. Anxiety abroad is high, however, as North Korea is expected to soon carry out its sixth nuclear test, progressing toward its stated aim of developing a nuclear-armed intercontinental missile that could reach U.S. soil. President Trump, as well as his counterpart Xi Jinping in China, has warned Pyongyang against further testing, but those calls may well be ignored. “It’s not a matter of if, it’s when,” a White House advisor told Agence France-Presse, adding that the U.S. is assessing possible “military options” to counter North Korea’s weapons program.

1. **U.S. can’t do a preemptive strike no matter what. Majorie Cohn of the Huffington Post finds that any preemptive launch is a violation of a UN treaty. Since the U.S. is a major member of the UN, they have to follow the policy and can’t launch a preemptive strike or risk angering an international council.**

**Cohn**, Marjorie. “A Preemptive Strike On North Korea Would Be Catastrophic And Illegal.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 14 Aug. **2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-preemptive-strike-on-north-korea-would-be-catastrophic\_us\_5991b404e4b063e2ae05815f.**

**A preemptive strike on North Korea would be illegal. It would violate the United Nations Charter, which forbids the use of military force unless conducted in self-defense or when approved by the Security Council. “Self-defense” is a narrow exception to the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force. Countries may engage in individual or collective self-defense only in the face of an armed attack. There must exist “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation**,” under the well-established Caroline Case. In the case of North Korea, there has been no armed attack, and there is no imminent threat of one. The charter specifies that non-forceful measures, including diplomacy, must be pursued in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. On Aug. 5, in response to North Korea’s recent test launches of two intercontinental ballistic missiles, the UN Security Council unanimously enacted a sanctions regime that would reduce North Korea’s annual export earnings by at least one-third, an estimated $1 billion. It would affect 90 percent of North Korea’s economy. Resolution 2371 targets North Korea’s primary exports, which include iron, iron ore, coal, lead, lead ore and seafood. It is also aimed at banks and joint ventures between North Korea and foreign corporations. The resolution imposes the toughest sanctions on North Korea to date. The resolution does not, however, authorize the United States or any other country to use military force against North Korea. It ends by stating that the Security Council “decides to remain seized of the matter.” That means that the Council, and only the Council, has the authority to approve military action. Tillerson has called for direct talks with North Korea and offered assurances that the United States is not its enemy and does not seek regime change. But CIA Director Mike Pompeo strongly intimated that the US is considering regime change in North Korea. For North Korea, the past is prologue. Determined to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein, who didn’t have nukes, as well as that of Muammar Qaddafi, who did but relinquished them, Pyongyang is developing a nuclear deterrent. Kim Jong-un has repeatedly maintained that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are critical to its self- defense. Indeed, Dan Coats, director of national intelligence, told the Aspen Security Forum of Kim Jong-un: “There is some rationale backing his actions, which are survival ― survival for his regime, survival for his country. And he has watched, I think, what has happened around the world relative to nations that possess nuclear capabilities and the leverage they have, and seen that having the nuclear card in your pocket results in a lot of deterrence capability.” Sign a Peace Treaty, End the Korean War Moreover, North Korea cannot forget the 1950-1953 Korean War, which reduced North Korea’s population of 10 million by approximately one-third. Sixty-four years ago, the United States and North Korea signed an armistice agreement, but the US never permitted the creation of a peace treaty. On several occasions, **North Korea has suggested a way to a lasting peace. Christine Hong, associate professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, wrote in the Progressive, “Unsurprisingly, few media outlets have reported on North Korea’s overtures to the United States, even as these, if pursued, might result in meaningful de-escalation on both sides. To be clear: peaceful alternatives are at hand. Far from being an intractable foe, Nort**

1. **On the Gomez card- The card does not actually say that the US will have a preemptive strike. It says that the US has less to lose if THAAD is in place. Call for the card because they are misrepresenting what Gomez said. You can’t buy this argument.**

### A/2: SK Preemptive Strike

1. **Moon Jae In would never allow a preemptive strike. Alexander Smith of NBC Universal finds that Moon Jae In’s strict policy against war means he would never allow for a first strike on North Korea in order to keep stability on the Korean Peninsula.**

**Alex,** et al. “South Korea's Moon Confident There'll Be No War With North.” NBCNews.com, **NBCUniversal** News Group, 17 Aug. **2017**, [www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-korea-s-moon-](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-korea-s-moon-) confident-there-ll-be-no-war-n793416.

In a sharp contrast to the bellicose language coming from President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the leader of South Korea said Thursday he was confident there would be no conflict with North Korea. "**The people worked together to rebuild the country from the Korean War, and we cannot lose everything again because of a war," President Moon Jae-in said [promised] in a nationally televised news conference, translated by The Associated Press. "I can confidently say there will not be a war again on the Korean Peninsula."**

1. **This is corroborated by Choe Sang-Hun of The New York Times who reports that South Korean leadership such as Moon Jae in has blocked unilateral military actions such as preemptive strike, deeming it intolerable and not allowed. Delink their argument right there, because a preemptive strike is never happening.**

**Sang-Hun**, Choe. “South Korea’s Leader Bluntly Warns U.S. Against Striking North.” **The New York Times**, The New York Times, 15 Aug. **2017**, www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/world/asia/south-korea-moon-jae-in-trump.html.

South Korea — With his public alarmed by President Trump’s recent threats to North Korea, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea issued an unusually blunt rebuke to the United States on Tuesday, warning **that any unilateral military action against the North over its nuclear weapons program would be intolerable. “No one should be allowed to decide on a military action on the Korean Peninsula without South Korean agreement,” Mr. Moon said in a nationally televised speech.** As a candidate for the presidency, Mr. Moon, a liberal who took office in May, said he would “say no to the Americans” if necessary. But he has aligned South Korea more closely with its military ally than many had expected. Though he suspended the deployment of a United States missile defense system opposed by China, he r eversed that decision last month after North Korea tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles.

## A/2: THAAD Bad

### A/2: Radar Bad

1. **The argument is Non-Unique. The Economist finds that the two THAAD radars in Japan can already see into China, meaning the radar isn’t a true unique link into any of their impacts.**

“Why China Is Wrong to Be Furious about THAAD.” The Economist, **The Economist Newspaper**, 23 Mar. **2017**, [www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-)south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear.

China has expressed two related criticisms of THAAD, which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defence. The first is that the powerful radar that THAAD uses to track and hit targets has the capability of “seeing” far into China and thus could be used to undermine the effectiveness of China’s own nuclear arsenal. The second is that the system, which is designed to intercept and destroy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their descent (terminal) phase, at altitudes of 40-150km, would not be effective because Seoul is so close to North Korean missile launchers. The implication, again, is that China is the real target. Neither of these arguments is c onvincing. **In the first place, there are already two THAAD radars in Japan, which can see into China**, albeit not quite as far as the radar going into South Korea.

1. **The benefits outweigh the harms. Michael Elleman at The International Instutide for Strategic Studies finds that the THAAD radar gives a marginal advantage in terms of safety towards South Korea. That’s always going to be more important than short term international relations.**

“Why China Is Wrong to Be Furious about THAAD.” The Economist, **The Economist Newspaper**, 23 Mar. **2017**, [www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-)south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear.

**Michael Elleman, a missile-defence expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the THAAD radar in South Korea might pick up Chinese missiles bound for the West Coast of America in their boost phase, but the advantage it would give would be “quite marginal”.** THAAD interceptors in South Korea cannot be used to hit Chinese missiles in their launch or boost phase and are in the wrong place to hit missiles attacking America in their terminal phase.

1. **The Economist furthers that China can blind the radar now, so there’s no more problems with the radar.**

“Why China Is Wrong to Be Furious about THAAD.” The Economist, **The Economist Newspaper**, 23 Mar. **2017**, [www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-)south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear.

America says it has repeatedly offered Chinese officials technical briefings on the radar’s capabilities and limitations. They have shown little interest, possibly because they do not really disagree about the threat THAAD represents. **Chinese military analysts have boasted of China’s ability to “blind” THAAD (meaning to incapacitate it through electronic interference)—a further indication that the outrage is politically motivated.**

### A/2: Effectiveness Bad

1. **THAAD works against all short ranged missiles. Rob Lyon of the National Interest finds that THAAD can shoot down medium, short and is designed to shoot down high level missiles.**

Rod **Lyon**, 2-23-**2016**, “The Hard Truth about THAAD, South Korea and China”, National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/THthe-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295

Let’s start with THAAD’s abilities. **Its manufacturer describes it as a “capability to defend against short and medium range ballistic missiles.” And a quick look at the THAAD flight test results shows that the bulk of its testing has been against short-range targets. Here’s a video of the November 2015 test in which THAAD intercepts both a short-range missile and a medium-range one.** By contrast, it’s largely unproven against longer-range threats such as intermediate-range ballistic missiles. **In essence, then, THAAD is quite capable of intercepting short-range missiles: indeed, its mobile radar, the AN/TPY-2, can provide end-to-end coverage of short-range missile flights, enhancing the prospects for successful interception**. True, the South Koreans have already committed to upgrade their Patriot-2s to PAC-3s. That’s been in train since early 2015 and might take a year or two to unfold. So their missile defense capabilities are already getting better. But Patriot’s a point-defense system; THAAD adds both another layer and a larger footprint to the Patriot system. Both systems could still easily be swamped, of course, as interceptor numbers remain limited.

1. **Bruce Klinger of The Heritage Foundation finds that THAADs 100 percent success rate only provides improvement to the countries safety. That’s key because at the end of the day, something is better than nothing.**

Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center, 6-12-**2015**, “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense”, **Heritage Foundation**, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

**The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.** A Lockheed Martin simulation showed that three batteries would cover all of South Korea.[20] The four most recent senior U.S. commanders in Korea[21] have recommended that South Korea should deploy the THAAD system and join the allied missile defense network. **Similarly, the two most recent South Korean Defense Ministers Han Min Koo and Kim Kwan-jin have assessed that THAAD would improve the country’s defense.**

1. **This is corroborated by Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute who finds that THAAD is the most reliable U.S. AMD which provides friendly protection abroad.**

Richard **Weitz**, Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 1-5-**2015**, “Avoiding Ballistic Blindness”, **Hudson Institute**, <http://www.hudson.org/research/10917-avoiding-ballistic-blindness>

**THAAD is one of the most reliable systems in the U.S. inventory.** Since 2005, the THAAD program has successfully completed 12 flight tests with 11-for-11 intercepts. [But] the number of radars available to the United States is inadequate. **These systems are crucial for the protection of both U.S. forces deployed abroad and friendly countries such as Israel and South Korea.**

1. **South Korea wants THAAD. Michele Tantussi of Reuters finds that President Moon ordered the negotiations for THAAD. At the the end of the day, fulfilling South Korea’s safety concerns is key to acting in the country’s best interest.**

**Tantussi**, Michele. Journalist for The National Geographic and July 28, **2017**.  South Korea's Moon orders talks with U.S. to deploy more THAAD units after North Korea ICBM test. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-thaad-idUSKBN1AD2ES>

**President Moon ordered discussions to be held with the United States on deploying additional THAAD anti-missile defense units following North Korea's test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.** Moon also wanted the United Nations Security Council to discuss new and stronger sanctions against the North.

### A/2: Coverage Bad

1. **Remember, Lyon from case finds that interoperability cover the entire country. The argument isn’t valid, because even if you agree THAAD doesn’t protect Seoul, interoperability does.**
2. **It’s going to get fixed. Elizabeth Shim of United Press International finds that additional THAAD launchers will be placed at a different cite, to cover more area. Affirming solves the problem because more AMDs are deployed to cover a hole.**

**Shim,** Elizabeth. “THAAD Launchers in South Korea Could Be Deployed at New Site.” UPI, UPI, 31 July **2017**, www.upi.com/Top\_News/World-News/2017/07/31/THAAD-launchers-in-South-Korea-could-be-deployed-at-new-site/6591501505273/.

“South Korea's new defense minister said Monday President Moon Jae-in not only wants to deploy **additional THAAD interceptor launchers but also remains open to placing the additional launchers at a different site. He proposed additional THAAD launchers to Moon, and that the deployment was to be a "temporary placement" at a site other than Seongju.”**

1. **Covering the hole is done. William Brown of 38 North finds that only two THAAD batteries are required to defend all of South Korea. That’s key because Bridget Martin of The Center for Research on Globalization finds that the recent redeployment of THAAD lead to four launchers in South Korea, meaning everything is covered.**

North, 38, et al. “Two Illustrative Layered Defense Deployments | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North, 11 Oct. **2017**, [www.38north.org/reports/2016/03/thaad-what-it-can-](http://www.38north.org/reports/2016/03/thaad-what-it-can-)and-cant-do/section-3/.

Figure 2 assumes that North Korea launches missiles from much farther south, from a base near Wonsan, just north of the demilitarized zone. Given this launch position, covering the entire territory of South Korea under varying North Korean launch positions, missile trajectories and missile types, will require two batteries. **A single battery still provides coverage of most of South Korea, except for the northeastern corridor**. The shape of the footprint is different primarily because the interceptor and Hwasong launch locations are near enough to each other to allow THAAD to intercept in the North Korean missile’s ascent phase, in addition to the terminal phase of flight. THAAD’s ability to intercept short-range missiles in the ascent phase has yet to be demonstrated, so prudence dictates that a second THAAD battery located near the south end of the peninsula would be required to ensure short-range missiles launched by North Korea from positions within 100 km of the DMZ can be engaged successfully. **All told, this preliminary analysis of THAAD capabilities indicates that two THAAD batteries are required to defend all of South Korea.**

**Martin**, Bridget. “Moon Jae-In’s THAAD Conundrum: South Korea’s ‘Candlelight President’ Faces Strong Citizen Opposition on Missile Defense.” **Center for Research on Globalization**, 19 Sept. **2017**, [www.globalresearch.ca/moon-jae-ins-thaad-conundrum-south-koreas-candlelight-president-faces-strong-citizen-](http://www.globalresearch.ca/moon-jae-ins-thaad-conundrum-south-koreas-candlelight-president-faces-strong-citizen-) opposition-on-missile-defense/5609654.

**Moon has claimed that the deployment of the four launchers is only temporary. However, given US insistence on the deployment, and in light of the tense militarized situation on the Korean peninsula, “temporary” could turn out to be a very long time**. Earlier in his term Moon said that he was “shocked” to learn that four more THAAD launchers—the very ones he would later allow to be deployed—had been brought into South Korea from the US. They had arrived secretly without his knowledge. Moon was so dismayed that he ordered a probe into the issue.1

### A/2: China Threat Bad

1. **Delink the argument. Bruce Bennet of the RAND Corporation finds that China has their own AMDS and it is hypocritical for them to say that SK can’t have them too. At that point, you can’t buy the argument because China has no reason to be aggravated and it won’t last.**

**Bennett**, Bruce W. “Why THAAD Is Needed in Korea.” **RAND Corporation**, [www.rand.org/blog**2017**/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html](http://www.rand.org/blog2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html).

**Lest there be any doubts about the importance of THAAD, consider the fact that China has reportedly deployed an S-400 missile defense system, which is similar to THAAD, on the Shandong Peninsula, between Pyongyang and Beijing. It appears that China put it in place to defend against North Korean missiles. So it is unclear why China is waging economic warfare against South Korea for defending itself with the THAAD system**, or why China is unwilling to perform far more serious economic warfare against North Korea for posing an offensive missile threat to both South Korea and China. China often complains about THAAD's over-the-horizon radar, which can detect targets at long ranges and potentially collect information inside China, but **China has reportedly deployed at least two similar radars in the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula. China should recognize that if it needs such long-range radars to defend against North Korean missiles, it is only fair for the United States to put in place** similar capabilities to defend South Korea.

1. **The argument is inherently false because China is motivated by strategic interests, not security. Bruce Klinger of The Hertige foundation reports that China simply is worried about regional interests, and is more focused on strategic interests beyond missile defenses.**

**Klingner** 2015 (Bruce Klingner, Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia., June 12 **2015**, &quot;South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense&quot;, **Heritage Foundation**, http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea- needs-thaad- missile-defense, Accessed 07/11/2017) M.E.M

**“China’s arguments against THAAD deployment are factually wrong. They are either extraordinarily ill-informed or motivated by strategic interests far beyond missile defense**. Beijing is seeking a veto over Seoul’s defense and national security decisions.”

### A/2: Arms Spending Bad

1. **Turn- John Abell of The Journal of Peace Research writes that military spending is linked to an increase in jobs, as it is connected to employment, meaning an increase in spending betters the economy by creating more jobs.**

Military Spending and Income Inequality Author(s): John D. **Abell** Source: **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Feb., **1994**), pp. 35-43 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/425581> Accessed: 17-08-2017 02:30 UTC

However, as has been recently observed in the ongoing debate regarding military base closing in on the USA, there is indeed merit to the conservative argumentthat **military spending in intimately connected with employment. Millions of jobs in every congressional district are either directly or indirectly related to the military, thus making military reductions in general, and base closing in particular, a most unpopular political opinion.**

### A/2: Not Wanted

1. **The argument is negligible at most, logically. If something is in South Korea’s best interest, it isn’t the same as whether they want it or not. For example, I don’t always want always eat my vegetables, but that doesn’t mean that they aren’t healthy and in my best interest.**
2. **The assertion that South Korean citizens don’t want THAAD is simply not true. The Hanyorkeh cites a 2017 Gallup Poll which quantifies that**

“72% Of South Koreans in Favour of Decision to Temporarily Deploy THAAD Launchers.” **Hankyoreh**, 6 Aug. **2017**, english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_national/805679.html.

**72% of South Koreans have a positive view about President Moon Jae-in’s orders to temporarily deploy the THAAD missile defense system, a new poll found. Concerns about the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula are higher now than they were after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test last year. In a public opinion poll carried out by Gallup Korea from Aug. 1 to 3, 72% of respondents said that Moon had done the right thing when he gave orders for four THAAD launchers to be temporarily deployed soon after North Korea’s second launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.** Just 14% of respondents disagreed with the decision. Approval of the decision was lowest around Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, the area where THAAD is being deployed, with 63% in favor and 21% against. Among supporters of the Minjoo Party, 74% rated Moon’s decision highly.

## A/2: Other

### A/2: Biological Weapons

1. **It’s completely improbable. Similar to what we allude to in first cross, North Korea has literally never used biological weapons nor have they truly developed them, meaning that the chance of those weapons being used is essentially zero.**
2. **North Korea simply can’t acquire anthrax. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention finds that Anthrax is found in South America, Europe, and the Caribbean. That’s important because insofar that North Korea has no international allies or connections to the outer world, they can’t access any biological weapons.**

“Anthrax.” **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention**, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1 Sept. **2015**, www.cdc.gov/anthrax/basics/index.html.

**Anthrax is most common in agricultural regions of Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa**, central and southwestern Asia, **southern and eastern Europe, and the Caribbean**. Anthrax is rare in the United States, but sporadic outbreaks do occur in wild and domestic grazing animals such as cattle or deer. Anthrax is more common in developing countries and countries that do not have veterinary public health programs that routinely vaccinate animals against anthrax. In the United States, yearly vaccination of livestock is recommended in areas where animals have had anthrax in the past. For more information, see Travelers.

1. **They’re overblowing the claim. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley of George Mason University gives the probability analysis, finding that the odds are low that North Korea has a bioweapons program. Ouagrham-Gormley finds this is true for two reasons, one because the threat assessments based on unreliable information is over exaggerated, but two and more importantly, North Korea’s medical sector cannot safely store and weaponize deadly pathogens because of the lack of medical economic stability.**

Loria, Kevin. “Everything We Know about North Korea's Bioweapons Program.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 26 July **2017**, [www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-biological-warfare-bioweapons-program-2017-7.](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-biological-warfare-bioweapons-program-2017-7)

**But Ouagrham-Gormley suggested that if you look at the scientific requirements for maintaining such a program and the political and technological infrastructure required, "the odds that North Korea has established a successful bioweapons program appear much lower than some estimates would suggest."**. But Ouagrham-Gormley cautioned against assuming too much based on those images: "**When threat assessments are made solely on the basis of the equipment to which nations have gained access, grossly exaggerated evaluations of capabilities are possible** — just witness Libya and Iraq’s nuclear and biological weapons programs," she wrote. In other words, it's possible that North Korea's photo ops with lab equipment are choreographed in the same way as the TV reports we see of smiling people, missiles paraded through Pyongyang, and malls filled with products that aren't actually for sale. Plus, developing a bioweapons program requires a tradition of scientific expertise, with knowledge passed on within institutions and junior scientists free to question, criticize, and collaborate with those in charge of such a program. It's hard to create that atmosphere in an autocratic setting, according to Ouagrham-Gormley. The absence of a scientific tradition is largely why the Iraqi biowarfare program under Saddam Hussein was less far along than we expected. **Economic stability is also needed to ensure that the power stays on in labs and that there are adequate security precautions in place to protect facilities packed with deadly, contagious, and fragile microorganisms. From what we know about North Korea's medical sector, the country would likely struggle to safely store and weaponize these sorts of pathogens.**

### A/2: Cyber Attacks

1. **Turn- Kaveh Waddel of The Atlantic finds that cyber-attacks encourage aggression and retaliation, setting of dangerous long term consequences by angering China and Russia by disrupting the North Korean regime even more. Waddel continues that a straightforward military approach is also just as effective as cyber-attacks, with less risks.**

**Waddell**, Kaveh. “Is It Wise to Foil North Korea's Nuclear Tests With Cyberattacks?” **The Atlantic**, Atlantic Media Company, 5 Mar. **2017**, [www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/north-korea-cyberattack-nuclear-program/518634/](http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/north-korea-cyberattack-nuclear-program/518634/).

Attacking another country’s nuclear arsenal risks disrupting the delicate balance of deterrence that generally keeps powerful militaries from lobbing nukes at one another. The prospect of mutually assured destruction that has thus far staved off nuclear war could be thrown into jeopardy. If a nation expects its valuable warheads to be destroyed at any moment, it could develop a “use it or lose it” mentality, said Vince Houghton, the historian and curator at the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. That could encourage an unpredictable leader like Kim to launch a working missile before it’s too late and it’s remotely disabled. What’s more, a country that thought it had disabled an adversary’s nuclear arsenal “might be more tempted to take the risk of launching a preemptive attack,” wrote David Sanger and William Broad in the Times. “If this is effective, it might be worth doing—even at the isk of pissing off the Russians and the Chinese.” **The last known time the U.S. military trained a cyber-weapon on another country’s nuclear program was when it infected nuclear control systems in Iran with Stuxnet, a sophisticated piece of malware that was co- developed with Israeli forces, nearly a decade ago. But that strike, which set back Iran’s nuclear program by years, isn’t the same as meddling in North Korea’s nuclear program**, Houghton said. “Stuxnet was an attack on a country that didn’t yet have weapons, so the idea was to avoid a shooting war while still slowing down progress toward a deliverable warhead,” he said. “When you have a country that is already a nuclear power, the dynamic is somewhat different**.”Launching targeted cyberattacks is just one in a host of options available to the president for disrupting North Korea’s nuclear development. Houghton said China, North Korea’s friendly neighbor and political benefactor, may be more willing to tolerate a cyberattack on its client state than a conventional attack. But if it’s all the same to Beijing, Houghton said, a straightforward military strike could be just as effective**—if, of course, it were able to hit all of the sensitive targets at once, including some that may be hidden underground or in caves.“In my opinion, if you are taking the risk of a country responding to a cyberattack with a nuclear response, why use something as touch and go as cyber?” he said. “Just drop a JDAM”—a computer-guided bomb—“on their nuke sites, or command and control facilities. Why get cute?”A conventional attack could, of course, provoke a dangerous, immediate response from North Korea**. But a cyberattack might set off dangerous longer-term consequences, said James Acton, the co- director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. China and Russia have long been worried that the U.S. would use its cyber weapons to disrupt their nuclear arsenals, Acton said**, even though the U.S. has assured the countries that it’s not developing technology to undermine their nuclear deterrence. “To actually see the U.S. exercise its capability will be pretty concerning to them,” Acton said. “In the longer term, this could set off very serious alarm bells in Beijing and Moscow.”

1. **It’s non-unique. Spencer Ackerman of the Guardian in 2017 finds that the U.S. currently has the ability to jam a missile to ensure it does not fly far away from the peninsula, and that they are likely to carry out this approach.**

**Ackerman**, Spencer, and Justin McCurry. “US Military Considers Shooting down North Korea Missile Tests, Sources Say.” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 18 Apr. **2017**, [www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/18/us-military-shoot-down-north-](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/18/us-military-shoot-down-north-)korea-missile-tests.

**Another factor complicating a shoot-down would be the risk of embarrassment should Aegis interceptors miss a North Korean target, which might embolden Pyongyang and unnerve US regional allies. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, agreed that failure to bring down a missile would give North Korea a “psychological advantage”. Cronin said the US was “far more likely to try to jam a missile test to ensure it does not fly far from the peninsula”.** US military officials are said to have been deeply disturbed after being taken by surprise at a North Korean missile launch in February. The commander in charge of US nuclear weapons, air force Gen John Hyten, recently told the Senate that the 11 February test was staged “out of a place we’d never seen before”. North Korea’s advancements in solid-fuel rockets, mobile launch vehicles built for the north’s unpaved roads and cloud cover which frustrates satellite surveillance are causing US planners to fear that they may have little time to detect the next wave of North Korean missiles.

### A/2: Kill Chain

1. **Robert Burns of The Chicago Tribune notes that Kill Chain is among one of the most unlikely options to attack, and provides two reasons why. One, Burns explains intuitively, the U.S would not go through with a dicey decision that has a high probability of leading to a devastating war. Seconds, Burns furthers The U.S is leading with several other alternatives before it turns to a preemptive strike.**

**Burns**, Robert. “Of 'severe things,' US military strike on N. Korea is unlikely,” **Chicago Tribune** July 06, **2017**. <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-north-korea-us-military-strike-20170706-story.html>

**A pre-emptive military strike may be among the "pretty severe things**" President Donald Trump says he is considering for North Korea, **but it's [is] a step so fraught with risk that it ranks as among the unlikeliest options.** Even a so-called **surgical strike aimed at the North's partially hidden nuclear and missile force is unlikely to destroy the arsenal or stop its leader, Kim Jong Un, from swiftly retaliating with long-range artillery that could kill stunning numbers in South Korea within minutes. An all-out conflict could then ensue. And while Trump's Pentagon chief, Jim Mattis, says the U.S. would prevail, he believes it would be "a catastrophic war."** "I don't like to talk about what I have planned, but I have some pretty severe things that we're thinking about," the president said. "**That doesn't mean we're going to do them." North's intercontinental missile capability doesn't "in itself bring us closer to war." Trump, he said, has been clear "we are leading with diplomatic and economic efforts**." Trump didn't mention which "severe" options he is weighing following North Korea's July 4 test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The administration has been reviewing its overall North Korea policy for months, having declared earlier attempts at "strategic patience" with the North to have failed. The administration has spoken about starving North Korea of cash for its nuclear program and getting other countries to add diplomatic and economic pressure. "Any effort by North Korea to start a war would lead to severe consequences" for that country, he said.

1. **Sanger from the New York Times explains that for the past 11 years, the North has built too many missiles, of too many varieties, to make the benefits of a strike like that worth the risk. It has test-flown a new generation of missiles, which can be easily hidden in mountain caves and rolled out for quick launch. Thus, Sanger concludes the US knows that the risk of a pre-emptive strike is too high to strike first.**

David E. **Sanger**, “What Can Trump Do About North Korea? His Options Are Few and Risky”, **The New York Times**, July **2017** <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/us/politics/trump-north-korea-missile-icbm.html>

But Mr. Perry noted recently that “even if you think it was a good idea at the time” — and he now seems to have his doubts — “it’s not a good idea today.” **The reason is simple: In the intervening 11 years, the North has built too many missiles, of too many varieties, to make the benefits of a strike like that worth the risk. It has test-flown a new generation of solid-fuel missiles, which can be easily hidden in mountain caves and rolled out for quick launch. And the North Koreans still possess their ultimate weapon of retaliation: artillery along the northern edge of the Demilitarized Zone that can take out the South’s capital,** Seoul, a city of approximately 10 million people and one of the most vibrant economic hubs of Asia.

### A/2: NK Not Threat

1. **Bruce Klinger of The Heritage Foundation finds that North Korea is an international threat because of its major nuclear capabilities which it refuses to get rid of and instead continues to bolster.**

**Klingner,** Bruce. “Allies Should Confront Imminent North Korean Nuclear Threat.” **The Heritage Foundation** on June 3, **2014**, 0ADAD, www.heritage.org/asia/report/allies-should-confront-imminent-north-korean-nuclear-threat.

This analytic construct is flawed because the available unclassified evidence indicates North Korea has likely already achieved warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its medium-range missiles, and a preliminary ability to reach the continental United States with a missile. As such, the United States and its allies face a greater threat today than is widely construed. **North Korea also poses a global nuclear and missile proliferation threat. Pyongyang has clearly shown that it will not negotiate away its nuclear arsenal, and it even revised the North Korean constitution to enshrine itself as a nuclear nation. The regime now claims it can strike the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons**. The always dangerous North Korea seems even more so under its new leader Kim Jong-un. He has maintained his father’s foreign policy—in a more reckless and unpredictable manner. Kim Jong-un’s actions have poisoned the well, denying North Korea from receiving the level of resources and benefits necessary to improve the national economy. As a result, the regime’s inability to achieve its diplomatic and economic objectives through its current “charm offensive” will lead it to return to more high-risk confrontational measures.

1. **Choe Sang-Hun of The New York Times reports that North Kore has literally threatened to launch a nuclear arsenal towards South Korea, and has the capability to do so- they have to be acknowledge as a threat, if anything.**

CHOE **Sang-Hun**. “North Korea’s Potential Targets: Guam, South Korea and Japan.” *The New York Times*, **The New York Times**, 9 Aug. **2017**, www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/asia/north-korea-guam-japan-targets.html.

The conventional wisdom holds that any **North Korean retaliation would target** American Air Force and military bases in **South Korean** towns like Kunsan and Osan, as well as major ports in the South to hamper and delay the arrival of American military reinforcements. **Seoul itself lies within range of North Korean artillery and rockets that are deployed in large numbers along the border.The North Korean military warned on Wednesday that it would “burn up all the objects” in border regions of the South, including Seoul,** “the moment the U.S. reckless attempt at preemptive attack is spotted” and that “the whole of the southern half” of Korea would be its target.

1. **Jonathan Pollack of The Brookings Institute reports that North Korea currently has the most nuclear weapons and is actively testing their weapons, and Pollack furthers that North Korea is the biggest threat to peace on the Korean peninsula due to the stockpile of weapons combined with consistent testing.**

**Pollack**, Jonathan D. “The Threat from North Korea.” **Brookings**, Brookings, 10 May **2017**, www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/04/24/the-threat-from-north-korea/.

In one very concentrated bit of geography, **North Korea is one of the most heavily armed locations on Earth. North Korea is the only state in the world to have tested nuclear weapons in the 21st century, which it has done on five separate occasions. In the last 16 months alone, North Korea has conducted approximately 30 ballistic missile tests, which is contributing to a sense of mounting danger in the region.** Despite this growing danger, North Korea does not currently pose a direct threat to the United States, though it does pose a threat to Americans in South Korea, including military personnel, business people, students, and visitors. **The real threat that North Korea poses at present is a regional threat to the Korean Peninsula.**

1. **Thus, The Real Truth Magazine confirms that North Korea is willing to use its nuclear arms to retaliate internationally.**

IV, July-August **2017**VOL. 15 NO. “North Korea's Global Impact.” **The Real Truth** - A Magazine Restoring Plain Understanding, July 2017, realtruth.org/articles/130422-002.html.

**Despite international warnings, North Korea has defiantly stated it has the right to a nuclear “self-defense” deterrent and continues to develop its missile and nuclear program. This belligerent approach has strained its relationship with** the United States, **South Korea**, Japan and even China, all of which are concerned about Pyongyang’s military intentions. **As a result, North Korea is widely seen as the greatest threat to peace in the Far East.**

# CON (A/2 PRO)

## Overviews

### Regional Stability/China Key

1. **Look to Harvard University, in a report which finds South Korea's geopolitical position dictates that the country needs to maintain a strong alliance** **with China because preventing conflict with China also serves the interests of South Korea in terms of preserving peace and stability in Northeast Asia**

No Author, 10-28-**2015**, "Korea's Growing Role in Asia : Regional Cooperation & National Unification," No Publication, [https://ash.**Harvard**.edu/event/koreas-role-asia-regional-cooperation-national-unification](https://ash.harvard.edu/event/koreas-role-asia-regional-cooperation-national-unification)

1. **At the end of the day, regional stability is going to be the main issue for this round. This is true for two key reasons:**
2. **Magnitude- It ensures future conflicts don’t arise and stops all violence before it happens. Having regional stability is the best way to save lives because regional stability stops war at its roots, stopping potential deaths because lives are never lost as conflict is stopped before it happens, achieving peace for the full country.**
3. **Timeframe- The benefits of regional stability are persistent and preserved for the future. Any military option is simply a temporary fix, but regional stability is permanent.**

### THAAD Bad

1. **Their entire case hinges on the fact that THAAD works. However here are four reasons why THAAD doesn’t work**
2. **Slate News finds empirically missile defense system tests are largely incorrect and heavily scripted when predicting the accuracy of AMDs. At the end of the day, any statistic they read you about THAAD being good is most likely scripted and false.**
3. **Even then, THAAD won’t work versus North Korea. The Washington Post finds that North Korea specifically tailors their missile tests in order to bypass THAAD defenses, meaning even if THAAD works in tests it won’t work in actual battle.**
4. **But even then, THAAD can’t protect from current attacks. Jeff Daniels of CNBC finds that THAAD would be overwhelmed by a swarm attacks and SCUD missiles. This is problematic as Ernie Regehr of Operation Canada confirms that North Korea currently is planning to launch SCUDs and swarm attacks.**
5. **THAAD also angers China. The Kyodo News finds that China being displeased with THAAD results in the building of hypersonic missiles to neutralize THAAD. At the end of the day, THAAD only angers China, resulting in a higher chance of war, but is also useless against modern technology.**
6. **At the end of the day, diplomatic action comes first in the round, which is true for two key reasons.**
7. **Probability- Diplomatic Action has a higher chance of working then THAAD. Remember, Davenport from case tells you Chinese Diplomacy has worked in the past with a 10-year nuclear freeze, and with the U.S. stepping out it will work in the future.**
8. **Magnitude- Diplomacy saves the most people. By stopping war at the roots through denuclearization of North Korea, no missiles are launched meaning no lives are ever lost, saving all of South Korea and in turn the world. This means to saving lives only comes through voting Con.**

### North Korean Threat

1. **They continuously tell you that North Korea will attack which is the reason for using AMDs. But, at the end of the day, nothing they talk about will materialize, and here are three reasons why.**
2. **Anna Fifield of The Washington Post finds that Kim’s verbal warnings and threats are only used as ones of deterrence, not first strike, meaning he won’t actually fire.**

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/**2017**/08/11/are-we-on-the-brink-of-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-the-consensus-is-probably-not/?utm\_term=.d6ee4996b21](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/11/are-we-on-the-brink-of-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-the-consensus-is-probably-not/?utm_term=.d6ee4996b21)f

1. **The Nautilus continues that North Korea doesn’t have anything to gain from a preemptive strike and that North Korea doesn’t have its logistics in place to launch a preemptive strike.**

Roger **Cavazos**, "Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 26, **2012**, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and->y6[;koreality/

1. **Policy Wire concludes that If North Korea actually was to attack, they would be obliterated by the international community, specifically the United States and China, ruining the North Korean diplomatic image.**

[http://**thepolicywire**.com/why-thaad-is-good-for-nothing/](http://thepolicywire.com/why-thaad-is-good-for-nothing/) **2016**

1. **North Korea is all bark, no bite. Don’t weigh this round on security because it isn’t being threatened.**
2. **Instead, weigh it on regional stability and cooperation which are all important for one key reason.**
3. **Magnitude- It ensures future conflicts don’t arise and stops all violence before it happens. Having regional stability is the best way to save lives because regional stability stops war at its roots, stopping potential deaths because lives are never lost as conflict is stopped before it happens, achieving peace for the full country.**

### East Asia First

1. **East Asia stability is the biggest impact in today’s round.**
2. **Walter Mead from American Interest asserts that East and South Asia will be where the 21st century is shaped, as he finds that the region will be the geopolitical epicenter for interests encompassing economic, democratic, environmental, and success against terror. Due to the growing tensions in the area, stability there is the most critical**.

Walter **Mead**, **2010**, “Obama in Asia”, American Interest, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/133465

1. **Topicality- At the end of the day, to be topical and preserve South Korean interests, East Asia must come first.**

### THAAD Doesn’t Work

1. **There are too many workarounds.**
   1. **Artillery/low altitude missiles. Pastreich of the Huffington Post explains that North Korea wouldn’t attack South Korea with high altitude missiles, it would probably use artillery, which THAAD doesn’t defend against.**

**Pastreich**, Emanuel. "The Unbearable Sadness Of THAAD". Huffington Post. N.p., 2017. Web. 24 June **2017**

To start with, **THAAD is an outdated technology** whose ability to stop missiles is doubtful. To the degree that THAAD might work, it does so for missiles flying at high altitudes. **North Korea does not need to send missiles at high altitudes to attack South Korea,** if such an unlikely scenario unfolded. After all, **if North Korea wanted to kill tens of thousands or more South Korean civilians, it does not need to use any missiles at all, but rather can use its substantial artillery units for which Seoul is fully within range. THAAD is entirely useless against artillery.**

* 1. **Submarines. Mariani of the Institute for International Affairs writes that North Korean submarines can circumvent the THAAD radar and hit the missile defenses system from behind**

**Mariani**, Lorenzo. "Assessing North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programmes: Implications for Seoul and Washington." Institute for International Affairs, Mar. 2017. Web. 24 June **2017**. [<http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1711.pdf>.](http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1711.pdf)

Despite its limited range, this missile proved to be strategically relevant when, in a 24 August 2016 test, a Pukkuksong was shot into Japan’s air identification zone. Although the missile will not be ready before 2020, it will represent a significant tactical response to the THAAD system that the US wants to install in South Korea. **With the Pukkuksong-1, it will not be difficult for North Korean submarines to circumvent the THAAD’s radar, which provides a limited 120-degree field of view, and hit the missile-defence system from behind. Furthermore, the US missile shield is not designed to intercept intermediate-range ballistic missiles but has been tested only against medium-range devices.**

* 1. **Haystacking. McClennan of 38 North writes that based on defense experts’ knowledge of North Korean developments, any actual nuclear attack would be haystacked, meaning it would hide its nuclear warheads among a full battlefield of ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, McClennan concludes THAAD can’t cope with haystacking.**

**McLennan**, Garth. "Needle In A Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight A Nuclear War". 38 North. N.p., 2017. Web. 24 June **2017**.

**THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads.** The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool, one that forms a central part of defending America’s military base in Guam, but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack. At present, such a system does not exist. If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities.

* 1. **These all function as turns, because Watson of Defense One in 2017 explains that insofar the missile defense system is ineffective, North Korea will be further emboldened to capitalize on weakness, and will become more aggressive.**

**Watson**, Ben. "The Extreme Risks Of Shooting Down North Korean Missiles; Pence To DPRK: ‘The Sword Stands Ready’; Mattis Talks Yemen War In Saudi Arabia; Russia, From The Arctic To US Airspace; And A Bit More.". Defense One. N.p., 2017. Web. 1 July 2017.

Is it a challenge? It would constitute many challenges, he says: “The answer is it’s possible but it would be a demanding job. A lot of factors would have to line up. First, Aegis SM-3 Block IAs, IBs/SM-2s/SM-6s missiles not designed or tested to intercept in boost phase (as missile is blasting toward space). Thus, even if we could shoot down in midcourse or terminal phase DPRK could still learn a lot from a test. Whether the U.S. could shoot a test [missile] down would depend on how much warning we had, test trajectory, having ships and radars in right place at the right time, etc.” What’s more, he said, “Preparing to shoot down [a] test would entail lot of calculated guesswork. Meanwhile North Korea is getting better at concealing when and where it will test. Given [those] challenges, it seems more likely we’d try to disrupt a test in other ways, as [Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security] [notes](https://twitter.com/PMCroninCNAS/status/854339419196751872). It also allows for plausible deniability. And, of course, apart from a high technical bar, trying to shoot down a test carries major costs and risks, whether we’re successful or not.” **And that last point may be the most prohibitive in all this notional planning. The price of a failed attempt to stop a missil launch would very likely embolden North Korea further.**

## A/2: North Korean Problems

### A/2: NK Launch

1. **Turn this- Joe Cirinicione of International Security Advisory Board and the Council on Foreign Relations finds that North Korea simply shows off through propaganda and truly poses no threat, and alarmists who emphasize this simply distract everyone from a peaceful solution by promoting violence.**

North Kean “nuclear threat” is laughable at best Joe **Cirincione** 5-12 (5/12/**15**; Leading nuclear expert, resident of Ploughshares Fund, member of Secretary of State John Kerry's International Security Advisory Board and the Council on Foreign Relations; North Korea’s Missile Test Is Less Impressive Than You Think; http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/05/north-koreas-missile-test-less-impressive-you-think/112600/)

Kim Jong Un was all smiles and cigars in photos that showed a surprise May 9 test of a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the waters off North Korea. But there was less to the dictator’s photo op than meets the eye. If North Korea could perfect this technology, it would be an impressive and dangerous new capability. Missiles launched from subs are traditionally “second strike” weapons. They are harder to detect and thus harder to take out in an initial attack. So this system—once operational—could give North Korea the ability to respond to an attack, whether conventional or nuclear, with a nuclear strike. In a crisis, that could stay the hand of South Korea, the United States, or another adversary. It could also be used in a surprise first strike. The photos, predictably, produced a surfeit of officials and experts ringing alarm bells. **Relax. North Korea has a very long way to go. This elaborate photo celebration appears to have been staged at an “ejection test,” designed to demonstrate the ability of a sub to shoot up a missile from under the water, have it ignite, and begin flight. The missile appears to have gone about 100 or 150 meters, according to South Korean officials, about the length of a football field. That sub would have to be awfully close to its target to hit anything. The photos of Kim watching the missile pop up through the surface could be enhanced, but they could well be genuine. Regardless, there were no photos released of the missile plopping back into the ocean a few seconds later.** They showed the pop but not the plop. Furthermore, as Tyler Rogoway notes in his piece for Foxtrot Alpha, “Just because the missile shown in the photos appeared to safely clear the water and climbed out through low-altitude doesn’t mean that the missile is fully capable of traveling thousands of miles to a specific target.” He’s right. Putting a missile up is actually easier than bringing it’s warhead back down and on target. This requires sophisticated guidance, staging, exquisite reliability and, most importantly, a re-entry vehicle that can survive the heat, vibrations and gravitational stresses of coming back into the atmosphere and continuing all the way to a successful strike. North Korea has not demonstrated or tested any of these abilities. “North Korea’s ability to manufacture such a precise instrument,” wrote Rogoway, “that can survive long periods installed atop a missile, housed in submarine, and then endure the rigors of a launching and atmospheric re-entry remains questionable at best.” Further, though North Korea seems to have made some progress on reducing the size of its tested nuclear weapon, there is no public evidence that it has shrunk the device enough to fit it into the warhead of a missile. “The miniaturization of a nuclear warhead,” says Gene Habiger, a retired general who once led the U.S. Strategic Command, “is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face.” Habiger notes that it took the United States six to eight years of intensive engineering and testing to get our weapons down to warhead size. To put this in perspective, the United States today has 1,152 hydrogen bomb warheads on sub-launched missiles that can land within the area of a football field almost anywhere on Earth in under 30 minutes. It also fields 450 similar weapons on long-range land-based ballistic missiles. North Korea has enough material for perhaps six atomic bombs, maybe more, but there is no available evidence that it has operationalized any weapons. North Korea plays its weak hand very well. It puts on an impressive show with ancient technology. The sub in this test appears to be based on the Soviet Golf class that entered service in 1958. The missile itself seems to be a 1970s Soviet system. Claims by some South Korean officials **that Kim could develop a real SLBM within three to five years overestimate the ability of even the clever North Koreans to stretch these mid-20th-century technologies. Even if the alarmists are correct, this missile can fly no more than 1,500 miles. That means, as nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis has noted, the North Koreans would have to sail their sub 60 to 90 days to get within range of the continental United States, during which time it would run a very high risk of detection and destruction. Kim Jong Un would be much better off having FedEx deliver the warhead. That, at least, would ensure it would get there within three days.**

### A/2: Collapse

1. **For the past 20 years, North Korea has been predicted to be on the verge of collapse, but they haven’t. Their impacts should’ve materialized by now- they must show why the current situation is a unique reason for North Korean collapse or else they don’t access any impacts.**
2. **North Korean collapse simply won’t happen. Robert E. Kelly of The National Interest finds that North Korea simply doesn’t follow political science, and in most imminent collapse scenarios continues to persevere and stay afloat. North Korea isn’t likely to collapse as they continue to uphold a fear ridden regime that blocks out any bad ideas from its citizens.**

**Kelly, Robert E, Feb 13 2017. “South Korea Needs to Realize That North Korea Isn't Going to Collapse.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-needs-realize-north-korea-isnt-going-collapse-19427.**

**But of course, it does not collapse. Even if it violates much of what we “know” in political science and economics, it has some source of strength—extreme nationalism, a genuine belief in the Kim cult, the regime’s willingness to do anything to survive—that helps it through crises which would bring down similar nation states. North Korea has survived the end of the Cold War; the cutoff of Soviet aid; the death of founder-turned-godhead Kim Il-sung; the famine of the late 1990s; the death of the founder’s heir, Kim Jong-il; and ever-tightening United Nations sanctions**. If the North has survived all this, then none of the various ideas out there for change—chasing North Korean money in Chinese banks, inward information flows, airstrikes on missile sites, more sanctions—are a likely to be a magic bullet. All are worth discussion, of course, but given what the regime has survived to date, we must admit that it will be with us for a long time. This will be a long, grinding stalemate—as it has been to date—in which the side that “hangs tough” will triumph. Seen in that light, the Obama administration’s much-maligned “strategic patience” is not so bad after all. It recognizes that the democracies on the outside—particularly South Korea, Japan and the United States—can do little to proactively force change in North Korea. They can cut it off and harden themselves against its provocations and misbehavior, but it will be a long grind. Sanctions, missile defense, the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the crackdown on North Korea’s diplomatic relationships (which frequently double as sanctions) are necessary to slowly choke off the country and push it back to a precarious, exclusive dependence on its Chinese patron. Just as the Soviet Union was slowly internationally isolated and eventually ground to a halt, so too can the democracies of this cold war can hunker down.

1. **North Korea’s consistent safeguard from China prevents its collapse. Beina Xu of the Council on Foreign Relations finds that China is North Korea’s main ally, and props them up in times of need by sustaining Kim Jong-Un’s regime and stopping collapse. Xu finds this is to stop a refugee influx and keep North Korea as a Chinese buffer state.**

**Xu**, Beina. “China Has the Most Leverage on Kim Jong-Un's Regime. Will It Use It?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 July **2017**, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.

**China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border.** Pyongyang’s fifth nuclear test and ongoing missile launches have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top North Korean officials since its young leader came to power and the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s exiled half brother, in Malaysia also spurred renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North Korean leadership. Yet China’s policies have done little to deter its neighbor’s nuclear ambition.

### A/2: Use It or Lose It

1. **“Use It or Lose It’ is a completely illogical policy for the North Korean regime leaders. Instead of wasting a full nuclear arsenal when in a corner, Kim Jong-Un is more logically likely to go into hiding to preserve his regime, which has always been his main goal.**
2. **Take out their solvency. In the case of a final launch, no missile defense system can stop a massive nuclear launch from North Korea. Alex Lockie of Business Insider finds that not even the greatest missile defenses could withstand a salvo launch from North Korea. At the end of the day, they can’t prevent the Use It or Lose It attack from causing deaths.**

**Lockie**, Alex. “North Korea Just Showed the World It's Serious about Nuclear War - and the US's Response Won't Cut It.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 6 Mar. **2017,** www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-2017-3

**But**[**experts have repeatedly told Business Insider**](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-koreas-missile-defense-2017-2)**that even the greatest missile defenses don't offer complete protection from North Korea's ballistic missiles, and as North Korea refuses to play by the West's rules, missile defense becomes increasingly irrelevant. What North Korea demonstrated on Sunday was a salvo fire, which intends to overwhelm missile defenses with a volume of missiles. North Korea could launch hundreds of missiles from mobile launchers hidden across the country at any given moment.** Some of them could be decoys. Some of them could be long-range missiles lofted higher away from earth to reenter the atmosphere at speeds no interceptor missile could hope to match. North Korea's submarine could sail beyond the range of US and allied defenses and launch a nuke from the high seas. **In short, missile defenses can be fooled, and North Korea showed on Sunday it doesn't intend to be outfoxed.**

1. **Mark Bowden of The Atlantic finds that Kim Jong Un seeks to prevent destruction, and won’t get rid of his arsenal because it provides him a perception of safety to the point where he can still control his regime.**

**Bowden**, Mark. “How to Deal With North Korea.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 9 Aug. **2017**, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/.

True, time works in favor of Kim getting what he wants. Every test, successful or not, brings him closer to building his prized weapons. When he has nuclear ICBMs, North Korea will have a more potent and lethal strike capability against the United States and its allies, but no chance of destroying America, or winning a war, and therefore no better chance of avoiding the inevitable consequence of launching a nuke: national suicide. Kim may end up trapped in the circular logic of his strategy. **He seeks to avoid destruction by building a weapon that, if used, assures his destruction. His regime thrives on crisis. Perhaps when he feels safe enough with his arsenal, he might turn to more-sensible goals, like building the North Korean economy, opening trade, and ending its decades of extreme isolation. All of these are the very things that create the framework needed for disarmament.** But acceptance, while the right choice, is yet another bad one. With such missiles, Kim might feel emboldened to move on South Korea. Would the U.S. sacrifice Los Angeles to save Seoul? The same calculation drove the U.K. and France to develop their own nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Trump has already suggested that South Korea and Japan might want to consider building nuclear programs. In this way, acceptance could lead to more nuclear-armed states and ever greater chances that one will use the weapons.

### A/2: Elite Coup

1. **They delink themselves in the initial argument. At the point where they tell you that Kim Jong Un is literally killing off any elites who threaten to destabilize the regime, there’s never going to be any chance of the elites rising up and making an impact on the regime because they are killed before anything can happen.**
2. **DW News which finds that historically, North Korean coups fail because North Korea keeps a close eye on those with any power, stopping coordination for any sort of uprising.**
3. **DW News furthers that there’s almost nothing to convince a North Korean official to betray the regime for three reasons. One, the life of the official and his or her family are threatened if caught, meaning anyone who is disloyal would be held accountable along with their family. Two, the monitoring and instruments of punishment held by the Kim regime deter any sort of uprising. Three, the rebel’s dilemma which is a scenario in which the Kim dynasty showers the loyal with gifts beyond a Korean’s wildest dreams, brainwashing elites into having the utmost desire to remain loyal and creating no upsides in betraying the country.**

(www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. “Can North Korea's Elites Oust Kim Jong Un? | Asia | **DW** | 02.06.2017.” DW.COM, **2017**, [www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374](http://www.dw.com/en/can-north-koreas-elites-oust-kim-jong-un/a-39091374).

North Korean refugees find help in the South Analysts, however, point out **that previous coup attempts have failed in the North and that the regime keeps a very close eye on those with any degree of power, making the coordination of any uprising a very difficult proposition.** RAND has identified what it believes are the five conditions that would need to be satisfied for senior members of the present regime in Pyongyang to conclude that reunification of the Korean peninsula would be beneficial for them.

**Yet analysts believe that no inducement will be enough to convince a North Korean official who fears for his life - and that of his extended family - to betray the regime.** They point to the case of **Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle, who was summarily executed in 2013 despite serving as a mentor to the young dictator. "There is no question that ousting the Kim dynasty by fracturing the elite is a strategy that has been considered and that outcome would be popular, but we cannot underestimate the monitoring carried out by the regime's instruments of repression and the punishments that are handed out to anyone who is disloyal,**" said Daniel Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University. "**And even if there is a person in the regime who is so committed to removing Kim that he would be willing to risk his life, then we have to remember that under the North Korean system, the family of anyone who is disloyal is also held accountable," he told DW. Read: North Korea coverage guarantees big ratings The Kim dynasty has also, down the decades, been cunning in the ways in which it rewards those who are loyal, showering them with**  **gifts that are beyond the wildest dreams of ordinary North Koreans, such as new Mercedes cars and homes in shiny new apartment complexes, Pinkston added. Yet another hurdle that must reneged on at a later date.** Despite the clear disincentives for any plotters, Toshimitsu Shigemura, a professor at Tokyo's Waseda University and an authority on North Korea's ruling family, points out that there have been attempted coups against the Kim family, most recently in 2013.

### WIP A/2: Dissent

1. **They tell you dissent is increasing. One main problem from Park Si-Soo of The Korea Times who finds that the peak number of defectors with a high level of descent was in 2009. That’s extremely problematic for two reasons. One, Park reports that the overall trend of dissenters has decreased as Kim increases surveillance and continues an iron fisted rule meaning at the end of the day dissent is truly decreasing. Two, Park continues that even at the peak point of dissent in the 2009 North Korean regime, there was simply no impact to a high level of dissent and nothing materialized. Even if you buy that there is dissent, it will simply lead to nothing.**

**Si-Soo**, Park. “Number of N. Korean Defectors up 11% in 2016.” Koreatimes, The Korea Times, 2 Jan. **2017**, [www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/01/485\_221297.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2017/01/485_221297.html).

**The number of defectors reaching the South peaked at 2,914 in 2009, but the pace of growth had fallen off since 2011 as Kim strengthened border control and surveillance over North Koreans. A rise in defection was largely attributable to Kim's move to strengthen his iron-fisted rule and the toughening of international sanctions**, the government said. "Last year, more North Korean overseas workers including restaurant staff s tationed in foreign countries defected to South Korea," said a ministry official. "Defections by elites also rose."

### A/2: Miscalculation

1. **Make them give you one other instance where North Korea’s tech has gone awry and hit another country. After so many tests, their impacts should have happened yet. The argument is super improbable, and at that point they don’t access any of its impacts because bad tech to miscalculation never happens.**
2. **Uniqueness swamps the link. In missile launches, the U.S. has currently shown the ability to hack and blow up mock missiles. David E. Sanger of The New York Times finds that eighty percent of North Korea’s test launches have self-destructed since the American hacking program was launch three years ago. Sanger continues, that this contributes to North Korea’s testing string of troubles. Overall, with U.S. stopping most test missiles, there’s not much of a chance of an uncontrolled missile hitting.**

**Sanger,** David E. “Hand of U.S. Leaves North Korea’s Missile Program Shaken.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Apr. **2017**, [www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html?mcubz=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html?mcubz=0).

When a North Korean missile test went awry on Sunday, blowing up seconds after liftoff, there were immediate **suspicions that a United States program to sabotage the test flights had struck again. The odds seem highly likely: Eighty-eight percent of the launches of the North’s most threatening missiles have self-destructed since the covert American program was accelerated three years ago. But even inside the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency**, where the operation is centered, it is nearly impossible to tell if any individual launch is the victim of a new, innovative approach to foil North Korean missiles with cyber and electronic strikes. Bad welding, bad parts, bad engineering and bad luck can all play a role in such failures — **as it did in the United States’ own missile program, particularly in its early days. And it would require a near impossible degree of forensic investigation to figure out an exact cause, given that the failed North Korean missiles tend to explode, disintegrate in midair and plunge in fragments into faraway seas. But this much is clear, experts say: The existence of the American program, and whatever it has contributed to North Korea’s remarkable string of troubles, appears to have shaken Pyongyang and led to an internal spyhunt as well as innovative ways to defeat a wide array of enemy cyberstrikes. By all accounts, the program that President Barack Obama stepped up in 2014** has been adopted with enthusiasm by the Trump administration. President Trump’s national security aides are eagerly hoping that the Chinese, among others, will get North Korea to freeze or reverse its program. Yet they have no compunctions about using this new class of weapon against missile tests that the United Nations has already prohibited.

1. **CNBC finds that North Korea currently has precision missiles, which can execute a deep, precise strike. The chance of bad tech causing an awry launch is highly improbable.**

Cnbc. “North Korea Vows More ‘Gift Packages’ of Missile Tests for US.” CNBC, **CNBC**, 5 July **2017**, www.cnbc.com/2017/07/05/n-korea-vows-more-gift-packages-of-missile-tests-for-us.html.

**U.S. and South Korean forces, in response to Tuesday's launch, engineered a show of force for Pyongyang, with soldiers from the allies firing "deep strike" precision missiles into South Korean territorial waters.** South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered the drills arranged with the United States to show "North Korea our firm combined missile response posture," his office said. A North Korean test of an ICBM, confirmed later by U.S. and South Korean officials, is a momentous step forward for Pyongyang as it works to build an arsenal of long-range nuclear-armed missiles that can hit anywhere in the United States. The North isn't there yet — some analysts suggest it will take several more years to perfect such an arsenal, and many more tests — but a successful launch of an ICBM has long been seen as a red line, after which it would only be a matter of time — if the country isn't stopped. Worry spread in Washington and at the United Nations, where the United States, Japan and South Korea requested a U.N. Security Council emergency session, to be held later Wednesday. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. response would include "stronger measures to hold the DPRK accountable," using an acronym for the nation's formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

### A/2: Misinterpretation

1. **Make them give you one other instance where North Korea has misinterpreted an action and decided to wage war. After so much global proliferation and tension, their impacts should have happened yet. The argument is super improbable, and at that point they don’t access any impacts because North Korea almost never strikes first solely on misinterpretation.**
2. **North Korea won’t unnecessarily launch on untrustworthy information or join a losing fight. Alex Ward of Vox finds that North Korea even withdrew a potential strike towards Guam to not risk war directly with the U.S.**

**Ward**, Alex. “North Korea Just Pulled Back from a Guam Attack.” Vox, Vox, 15 Aug. **2017**, [www.vox.com/world/2017/8/15/16150238/north-korea-guam-attack-kcna-statement](http://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/15/16150238/north-korea-guam-attack-kcna-statement).

**North Korea just announced it won’t imminently attack Guam. Kim Jong Un “will watch a little more the foolish and stupid conduct” of the United States before he decides to launch any missiles toward Guam, the country’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported on Monday.** However, Kim warned that if the US persists in its “extremely dangerous reckless actions on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity,” he may reconsider his decision. This is the first major sign of deescalation by North Korea since both sides exchanged threats in the past week. And it could provide an opening for the US and North Korea to walk back from the tit-for-tat escalation many feared could spiral into war. “The statement sure looks like a [North Korean] attempt at deescalation,” Mira Rapp-Hooper, an Asia security expert at Yale Law School, said in an interview. “But,” she adds, “this is a pause, not a full reprieve.” So, at least for now, North Korea is backing away from its threat to fire missiles near Guam. But both sides have a lot more work to do to avoid a crisis — and it’s not clear that will happen in the near future. “The implicit threat remains,” MIT nuclear expert Vipin Narang told me. “Kim Jong Un is now briefed and poised to give the order if he thinks the US gives him a reason to.”

### A/2: U.S. Preemptive Launch

1. **Preemptive Launch won’t happen. Felix Solomon of TIME writes that any preemptive strike is found as unlikely because it stokes unnecessary fires of war all while damaging the ever-important East Asia area.**

**Solomon**, Felix. “North Korea: Experts Say Unlikely U.S. Will Launch a Strike.” *Time*, Time, 14 Apr. **2017**, time.com/4739812/north-korea-donald-trump-preemptive-strike/.

**President Donald Trump drifted into dangerous waters last week when he dispatched a strike fleet near the Korean peninsula, stoking fears that the U.S. could carry out an attack on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, a move that would not be welcome in the region. Northeast Asia now hangs on tenterhooks as the war of words between Washington and Pyongyang threatens to escalate into a very real conflict — one that would be disastrous but, experts say, unlikely**. On Saturday, North Korea will celebrate one of its most important national holidays, the 105th anniversary of the birth of its founding father Kim Il Sung, prompting all manner of speculation about how its erratic leader might mark the occasion. More than 130 foreign journalists are now in Pyongyang on a rare invitation to visit the hermetic state, where they for the most part have reported that all is quiet in the capital. Anxiety abroad is high, however, as North Korea is expected to soon carry out its sixth nuclear test, progressing toward its stated aim of developing a nuclear-armed intercontinental missile that could reach U.S. soil. President Trump, as well as his counterpart Xi Jinping in China, has warned Pyongyang against further testing, but those calls may well be ignored. “It’s not a matter of if, it’s when,” a White House advisor told Agence France-Presse, adding that the U.S. is assessing possible “military options” to counter North Korea’s weapons program.

1. **U.S. can’t do a preemptive strike no matter what. Majorie Cohn of the Huffington Post finds that any preemptive launch is a violation of a UN treaty. Since the U.S. is a major member of the UN, they have to follow the policy and can’t launch a preemptive strike or risk angering an international council.**

**Cohn**, Marjorie. “A Preemptive Strike On North Korea Would Be Catastrophic And Illegal.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 14 Aug. **2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-preemptive-strike-on-north-korea-would-be-catastrophic\_us\_5991b404e4b063e2ae05815f.**

**A preemptive strike on North Korea would be illegal. It would violate the United Nations Charter, which forbids the use of military force unless conducted in self-defense or when approved by the Security Council. “Self-defense” is a narrow exception to the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force. Countries may engage in individual or collective self-defense only in the face of an armed attack. There must exist “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation**,” under the well-established Caroline Case. In the case of North Korea, there has been no armed attack, and there is no imminent threat of one. The charter specifies that non-forceful measures, including diplomacy, must be pursued in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. On Aug. 5, in response to North Korea’s recent test launches of two intercontinental ballistic missiles, the UN Security Council unanimously enacted a sanctions regime that would reduce North Korea’s annual export earnings by at least one-third, an estimated $1 billion. It would affect 90 percent of North Korea’s economy. Resolution 2371 targets North Korea’s primary exports, which include iron, iron ore, coal, lead, lead ore and seafood. It is also aimed at banks and joint ventures between North Korea and foreign corporations. The resolution imposes the toughest sanctions on North Korea to date. The resolution does not, however, authorize the United States or any other country to use military force against North Korea. It ends by stating that the Security Council “decides to remain seized of the matter.” That means that the Council, and only the Council, has the authority to approve military action. Tillerson has called for direct talks with North Korea and offered assurances that the United States is not its enemy and does not seek regime change. But CIA Director Mike Pompeo strongly intimated that the US is considering regime change in North Korea. For North Korea, the past is prologue. Determined to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein, who didn’t have nukes, as well as that of Muammar Qaddafi, who did but relinquished them, Pyongyang is developing a nuclear deterrent. Kim Jong-un has repeatedly maintained that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are critical to its self-defense. Indeed, Dan Coats, director of national intelligence, told the Aspen Security Forum of Kim Jong-un: “There is some rationale backing his actions, which are survival ― survival for his regime, survival for his country. And he has watched, I think, what has happened around the world relative to nations that possess nuclear capabilities and the leverage they have, and seen that having the nuclear card in your pocket results in a lot of deterrence capability.” Sign a Peace Treaty, End the Korean War Moreover, North Korea cannot forget the 1950-1953 Korean War, which reduced North Korea’s population of 10 million by approximately one-third. Sixty-four years ago, the United States and North Korea signed an armistice agreement, but the US never permitted the creation of a peace treaty. On several occasions, **North Korea has suggested a way to a lasting peace. Christine Hong, associate professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, wrote in the Progressive, “Unsurprisingly, few media outlets have reported on North Korea’s overtures to the United States, even as these, if pursued, might result in meaningful de-escalation on both sides. To be clear: peaceful alternatives are at hand. Far from being an intractable foe, North Korea has repeatedly asked the United States to sign a peace treaty that would bring the unresolved Korean War to a long-overdue end.”**

1. **On the Gomez card- The card does not actually say that the US will have a preemptive strike. It says that the US has less to lose if THAAD is in place. Call for the card because they are misrepresenting what Gomez said. You can’t buy this argument.**

### A/2: SK Preemptive Strike

1. **Preemptive Strike part of Kill Chain, and takes on all negatives of Kill Chain. [**[**READ A/2 Kill Chain**](#_A/2:_Kill_Chain)**]**
2. **It’s non-unique. Julian Ryall of The Telegraph finds that South Korea is going to accelerate the national defense program regardless of what happens, meaning that any negative impacts they give will happen whether you affirm or negate, so you can’t weigh it.**

**Ryall**, Julian. “South Korea Developing Graphite 'Blackout Bombs' to Paralyse North's Electrical Grid.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 9 Oct. **2017**, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/09/south-korea-developing-graphite-blackout-bombs-paralyse-norths/.

**South Korea is bringing forward the deployment of its "three pillars" of national defence by as much as three years as a result of the growing threat posed by Pyongyang's nuclear and missile development programmes**. The three-pronged strategy was originally scheduled to be in place by the mid-2020s, but North Korea's increasingly aggressive and unpredictable behaviour has forced Seoul to revise that timeline. The Kill Chain programme is designed to detect, identify and intercept incoming missiles in the shortest possible time and operates in conjunction with the Korea Air and Missile Defence system for lower-tier defence inbound missiles**.**

### A/2: NK Irrational

1. **This is blatantly wrong. George Friedman of NewsMax finds that North Korea is far from being irrational as their history of being a 70-year-old country, while surviving the fall of the Soviet Union and the transformation of China shows that the regime carries sense to have the best interests for the country.**

**Friedman**, George. “North Korea Is Far From Being Irrational ... It Has a Plan.” Newsmax, Newsmax Inc. Newsmax Inc., 18 Aug. **2017**

This seems to be irrational behavior**. But if North Korea was an irrational regime, how has this same regime, founded by the current leader’s grandfather, survived since 1948? It survived a devastating war, managed to stay nimble during the Sino-Soviet confrontation, and endured the fall of the Soviet Union and the transformation of China, starvation in the 1990s, and confrontation with the United States. The regime should have collapsed many times. It didn't.**

1. **This is corroborated by Max Fisher of the New York Times who finds that most political scientists see North Korea as rational. Fisher finds that a while a rational state may not always seem moral and intelligent on face, the leaders of countries that last often have a high level of mental fitness allowing them to behave according towards their best interests, first of which is self-preservation. He cites political scientist David Kang who finds that North Korean Leaders make sophisticated and precise decision in terms of international and domestic politics.**

**Fisher**, Max. “North Korea, Far From Crazy, Is All Too Rational.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Sept. **2016**, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile-programs-rational.html?\_r=0.

**When political scientists call a state rational, they are not saying its leaders always make the best or most moral choices, or that those leaders are paragons of mental fitness. Rather, they are saying the state behaves according to its perceived self-interests, first of which is self-preservation**. When a state is rational, it will not always succeed in acting in its best interests, or in balancing short-term against long-term gains, but it will try. This lets the world shape a state’s incentives, steering it in the desired direction. **States are irrational when they do not follow self-interest. In the “strong” form of irrationality, leaders are so deranged that they are incapable of judging their own interests.** In the “soft” version, domestic factors — like ideological zeal or internal power struggles — distort incentives, making states behave in ways that are counterproductive but at least predictable. North Korea’s actions, while abhorrent, appear well within its rational self-interest, according to a 2003 study by **David C. Kang, a political scientist now at the University of Southern California. At home and abroad, he found, North Korean leaders shrewdly determined their interests and acted on them. (In an email, he said his conclusions still applied.) “All the evidence points to their ability to make sophisticated decisions and to manage palace, domestic and international politics with extreme precision,” Mr. Kang wrote. “It is not possible to argue these were irrational leaders, unable to make means-ends calculations.”** Photo Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, at a parade last year in Pyongyang, the nation’s capital. Tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula. Credit Wong Maye-E/Associated Press Victor Cha, a Georgetown University professor who served as the Asian affairs director on George W. Bush’s National Security Council, has repeatedly argued that North Korea’s leadership is rational. Savage cruelty and cold calculation are not mutually exclusive, after all — and often go hand in hand. States are rarely irrational for the simple reason that irrational states can’t survive for long. The international system is too competitive and the drive for self-preservation too powerful. **While the North Korean state really is unlike any other on earth, the behaviors that make it appear irrational are perhaps its most rational.**

1. **Turn- THAAD makes North Korea irrational by destroying their political legitimacy. Max Fisher finds that North Korean militarization is the only way to oppose a weak state and allow for self-preservation, but THAAD makes it seem like the conflict is no longer survivable to the point where North Korea sacrifices its political legitimacy to the point where they eventually become irrational.**

**Fisher**, Max. “North Korea, Far From Crazy, Is All Too Rational.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Sept. **2016**, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile-programs-rational.html?\_r=0.

“North Korea is aware of [the risk of an actual war breaking out] but seems to believe it has no choice. For this reason, and perhaps because of the United States-led invasion of Iraq and the NATO intervention in Libya against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi**, it appears to earnestly fear an American invasion. And this is rational: Weak states that face more powerful enemies must either make peace — which North Korea cannot do without sacrificing its political legitimacy — or find a way to make any conflict survivable.”**

**Fisher**, Max. “North Korea, Far From Crazy, Is All Too Rational.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 Sept. **2016**, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile-programs-rational.html?\_r=0.

**When political scientists call a state rational, they are not saying its leaders always make the best or most moral choices, or that those leaders are paragons of mental fitness. Rather, they are saying the state behaves according to its perceived self-interests, first of which is self-preservation**. When a state is rational, it will not always succeed in acting in its best interests, or in balancing short-term against long-term gains, but it will try. This lets the world shape a state’s incentives, steering it in the desired direction. **States are irrational when they do not follow self-interest. In the “strong” form of irrationality, leaders are so deranged that they are incapable of judging their own interests.** In the “soft” version, domestic factors — like ideological zeal or internal power struggles — distort incentives, making states behave in ways that are counterproductive but at least predictable. North Korea’s actions, while abhorrent, appear well within its rational self-interest, according to a 2003 study by **David C. Kang, a political scientist now at the University of Southern California. At home and abroad, he found, North Korean leaders shrewdly determined their interests and acted on them. (In an email, he said his conclusions still applied.) “All the evidence points to their ability to make sophisticated decisions and to manage palace, domestic and international politics with extreme precision,” Mr. Kang wrote. “It is not possible to argue these were irrational leaders, unable to make means-ends calculations.”** Photo Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, at a parade last year in Pyongyang, the nation’s capital. Tensions are rising on the Korean Peninsula. Credit Wong Maye-E/Associated Press Victor Cha, a Georgetown University professor who served as the Asian affairs director on George W. Bush’s National Security Council, has repeatedly argued that North Korea’s leadership is rational. Savage cruelty and cold calculation are not mutually exclusive, after all — and often go hand in hand. States are rarely irrational for the simple reason that irrational states can’t survive for long. The international system is too competitive and the drive for self-preservation too powerful. **While the North Korean state really is unlike any other on earth, the behaviors that make it appear irrational are perhaps its most rational.**

## A/2 AMDs Good

### A/2: General Arguments

1. **Turn- AMDs create Anti-Americanism and destroys security in South Korea. CNBC in 2017 finds that anger and tensions boil in villages around THAADs implementation areas. CNBC continues, noting South Koreans have rallies against America, contributing to overall Anti American sentiment.**

“Anger Grows in South Korea over US Anti-Missile System.” **CNBC**, CNBC, 3 May **2017**, www.cnbc.com/2017/05/03/anger-grows-in-south-korea-over-us-anti-missile-system.html.

**The anger is palpable on a narrow road that cuts through a South Korean village where about 170 people live between green hills dotted with cottages and melon fields.** It's an unlikely trouble spot in the world's last Cold War standoff. Aging farmers in this corner of Seongju county, more than 200 kilometers (125 miles) south of the capital Seoul, spend the day sitting by the asphalt in tents or on plastic stools, watching vehicles coming and going from a former golf course where military workers are setting up an advanced U.S. missile-defense system. "**Just suddenly one day, Seongju has become the frontline," said a tearful Park Soo-gyu, a 54 year-old strawberry farmer. "Wars today aren't just fought with guns. Missiles will be flying and where would they aim first?** Right here, where the THAAD radar is." THAAD is shorthand for Terminal High Altitude Defense, which the South Korean and U.S. governments say is critical to cope with a growing missile threat from North Korea. When completed, the battery will consist of six truck-mounted launchers that can fire up to 48 interceptors at incoming missiles detected by the system's x-band radar**. Anger has boiled over in Seosongri village since last week when U.S. and South Korean military workers used the early-morning hours to rush key parts of THAAD into place.** The system had been scheduled to enter operation by the end of the year, but South Korea's Defense Ministry said Tuesday that it is already capable of defending against North Korean missiles. The ministry didn't say when the deployment would be completed. Hundreds of banners hang on trees and fences along a kilometer (half-mile) stretch of the road up to where police have cut off access. **They say "Withdraw the illegal THAAD immediately" and "Stop US militarism," slogans that would feel familiar in a leftist rally but are unusual in the country's traditionally conservative southeast. "Yankee, go home!" a man yelled as he banged his fist on a car apparently carrying American soldiers, before dozens of police officers peeled him and other protesters away from the vehicle.**

1. **Turn it again- AMDs create protests which result in South Korean people becoming injured. CNBC finds that recently, 13 people were treated at hospitals for injuries from 8,000 police officers in a protest, along with several people who were hurt blocking U.S. military trucks from entering the THAAD site. As THAAD gets worked on, more and more South Koreans are hurt.**

“Anger Grows in South Korea over US Anti-Missile System.” **CNBC**, CNBC, 3 May **2017**, www.cnbc.com/2017/05/03/anger-grows-in-south-korea-over-us-anti-missile-system.html.

"We have been living very peacefully as farmers, but our daily lives have been shattered after the arrival of this weapon; we can't rest comfortably for a day and can't work without worrying," said Kim Yoon--seong, a 60-year-old melon farmer. He says many younger residents with children are considering leaving Seongju. **Residents say at least 13 people were treated at hospitals for injuries including broken bones and teeth after a violent clash last week between dozens of villagers and supporters and some 8,000 police officers who were mobilized to remove them from the road. Three days later, more than a hundred police officers ended an hourslong standoff by swarming a handful of people who had been blocking a mountain path with a tractor to prevent construction equipment from entering the THAAD site. Police detained a man and drove away the tractor as villagers showered them with insults, including "dogs" and "Americans' slaves."** "We won't allow any U.S. military and construction vehicles to pass through the two roads," said Rev. Kang Hyun-wook, a minister of Won Buddhism, an indigenous form of the religion. The grounds include a site Won Buddhists consider as sacred and are no longer allowed to visit. "If they fly in (the THAAD parts) with helicopters, then fine, it's their money to spend and we can't do anything about that." **Several people were hurt in another clash on Sunday as police tried to remove protesters blocking two U.S. military oil trucks from entering the THAAD site.** Residents said the trucks turned away because cars protesters had parked to block the road couldn't be towed.

1. **Alex Lockie of Business Insider explains that there simply isn’t enough capacity in any AMD on the planet can guarantee the safety of every person in a certain area, and it’s impossible to catch everything North Korea can throw.**

**Lockie**, Alex. “North Korea Just Showed the World It's Serious about Nuclear War - and the US's Response Won't Cut It.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 6 Mar. **2017**, www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-2017-3.

**"The major issue with relying on the missile defense system is capacity**," Ian Williams, associate director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Business Insider. Davenport said: "**Missile defense is not a surefire way to negate the threat posed by another country's nuclear-capable ballistic missiles**." The US has 25,000 troops deployed to South Korea and more than 50,000 in Japan. Seoul, South Korea's exposed capital city, is home to 10 million civilians. **No missile defense system on the planet can guarantee the safety of every one of these people. The US just doesn't "have enough interceptors to sit and play catch with everything that North Korea can throw,**" Williams said. "US and allied missile defenses could likely absorb a first wave, but there would need to be coordination with strike forces to start knocking out North Korea's missiles out before they could be launched."

1. **Finally, turn this. Liu Xin of Xinuhua News finds that South Korean president Moon Jae In’s approval rating continues to drastically fall, falling up to 2.3 percent in the last week. This becomes problematic when the 2017 Index of Economic Freedom by Heritage finds that the South Korean concerns about the government lead to political instability to improve the country, preventing structural reform and decreasing economic freedoms.**

“South Korea.” South Korea Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption, **2017**, [www.**Heritage**.org/index/country/southkorea](http://www.Heritage.org/index/country/southkorea).

South Korea’s economy is at a crossroads. Despite its relatively well-maintained macroeconomic stability and openness to global commerce, the **economy has been flagging, with momentum for growth increasingly subdued in the absence of decisive policy reforms to improve overall efficiency and flexibility. Ongoing political instability and uncertainty have made structural economic reform almost impossible. The rule of law has been fairly well institutionalized in South Korea, supporting such other pillars of economic freedom as regulatory efficiency and market openness. However, repeated high-profile corruption scandals have raised concerns about government integrity and eroded the public’s trust and confidence in government.**

**Xin**, Liu. “S. Korean President's Approval Rating Falls for 3 Weeks on Geopolitical Risks.” S. Korean President's Approval Rating Falls for 3 Weeks on Geopolitical Risks - Xinhua | English.news.cn, 14 Sept. **2017**, news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/14/c\_136609237.htm.

**South Korean President Moon Jae-in's approval rating fell for three straight weeks on rising political risks on the Korean Peninsula, a survey showed Thursday. According to the Realmeter poll, support for Moon was 66.8 percent this week, down 2.3 percentage points from the previous week.** It was based on a survey of 1,527 voters conducted from Monday to Wednesday. It had 2.5 percentage points in margin of error with a 95 percent confidence level. Moon's support scores dipped for the third consecutive week as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s sixth nuclear test led to the rising sense of security crisis, the pollster noted.

### A/2: Security

1. **Turn this- THAAD only ruins South Korean security. Theodore Postol of MIT reports in 2017 that THAAD only hurts the security of South Korea, along with damaging the security of states in East Asia and the U.S. as well.**

**Postol**, Theodore. “[Interview] Expert Says THAAD Needlessly Raises Tension, Hurts Security.” Hankyoreh, 11 July **2016**, english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/751801.html.

**I am truly sorry for this decision, as it hurts the security of South Korea, the other states in East Asia, and the United States as well. The THAAD defense can be expected to provide South Korea with essentially no useful defense capacity, but it will infuriate the Chinese who are worried about THAAD being used by the US against them to aim the US National Missile Defense at China.** The North Koreans can counter THAAD by simply cutting ballistic missile into pieces after the missile has completed its powered flight - propelling its warhead and the pieces of the empty rocket towards a target in South Korea. THAAD’s infrared homing kill vehicle would not be able to distinguish between the warhead and pieces of debris when fed interceptors attempt to engage the warhead and decoy cloud at high altitudes. This capability has already been demonstrated by the North. The pieces of the rocket would act as credible decoys down to an altitude of 65 to 70 km before atmospheric drag causes them to slow up relative to the warhead. If THAAD interceptors were launched at the warhead at that time, the interceptors would not be able to reach their minimum intercept altitude before the warhead had passed on to the ground. **The Chinese are concerned about the THAAD radar because it was designed from its beginning to provide cuing information to the US National Missile Defense. The placement of a THAAD radar in South Korea has the unambiguous technical appearance of placing the radar in a location where it can provide track information on Chinese ICBMs before they rise over the curved earth-horizon and can be seen by the main radars of the US National Missile Defense in Alaska.**

1. **Turn it again- RT Global News finds that THAAD missile system only undermines security on the Korean Peninsula as a whole and doesn’t have any positive effect on North Korea, and only causes countries such as Russia and China to feel aggravated and bolster arms to preserve their security in the region.**

“THAAD Deployment to S. Korea Undermines Region's Strategic Security – Chinese President.” **RT International**, 3 July **2017**, [www.rt.com/news/395088-xi-jinping-thaad-korea/](http://www.rt.com/news/395088-xi-jinping-thaad-korea/).

**The deployment of the US THAAD anti-missile systems in South Korea undermines security on the Korean peninsula and in the entire region while contributing nothing to the process of denuclearization of North Korea, China’s President Xi Jinping said. “The deployment of the US THAAD missile defense system in South Korea does serious damage to the strategic security interests of all countries in the region, including China and Russia, and disrupts the regional strategic balance,”** Xi warned ahead of his visit to Moscow in an interview with TASS news agency and the Rossiyskya Gazeta daily. The Chinese president also said that this move would not help denuclearize Pyongyang in any way and would by no means contribute to maintaining stability and peace in the region as it would only provoke further tensions. He added that Beijing already repeatedly expressed its deep concern over this issue. **Moscow and Beijing have a “similar view on the nature of the THAAD deployment and its negative impact” on the situation in the region, the Chinese leader also said, adding that the two countries maintain a close cooperation in dealing with this security problem. “Russia and China would take adequate measures to ensure their national security and strategic balance in the region both in cooperation with each other and on their own,” Xi told the Russian media.** He then once again called on the “relevant parties to stop THAAD deployment to the Republic of Korea and back away from this decision,” apparently addressing the US and Korean leadership. The Chinese leader also said that the crisis on the Korean Peninsula should be resolved only through dialogue that would take into account the “reasonable concerns” of all parties involved. He then suggested using a “two-track approach” that would involve both gradual nuclear disarmament of North Korea and cessation of the massive joint US-South Korean drills in the region.

1. **Current military drills already preserve security. Ben Blanchard of Reuters finds that current military drills in cooperation with China and Russia are a show of force in response to North Korea, thereby providing the necessary perception of security.**

**Blanchard**, Ben, and Hyonhee Shin. “Korean Peninsula Draws Range of Military Drills in Show of Force against North Korea.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 18 Sept. **2017**, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/korean-peninsula-draws-range-of-military-drills-in-show-of-force-against-north-korea-idUSKCN1BT0CK](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/korean-peninsula-draws-range-of-military-drills-in-show-of-force-against-north-korea-idUSKCN1BT0CK).

**The U.S. military staged bombing drills with South Korea over the Korean peninsula and Russia and China began naval exercises ahead of a U.N. General Assembly meeting on Tuesday where North Korea’s nuclear threat is likely to loom large.** The flurry of military drills came after Pyongyang fired another mid-range ballistic missile over Japan on Friday and the reclusive North conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test on Sept. 3 in defiance of United Nations sanctions and other international pressure. **A pair of U.S. B-1B bombers and four F-35 jets flew from Guam and Japan and joined four South Korean F-15K fighters in the latest drill, South Korea’s defense ministry said. The joint drills were being conducted “two to three times a month these days”, Defence Minister Song Young-moo told a parliamentary hearing on Monday**. In Beijing, the official Xinhua news agency said China and Russia began naval drills off the Russian far eastern port of Vladivostok, not far from the Russia-North Korea border. Those drills were being conducted between Peter the Great Bay, near Vladivostok, and the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk, to the north of Japan, it said. The drills are the second part of China-Russian naval exercises this year, the first part of which was staged in the Baltic in July.

### A/2: THAAD Good

1. **Take out their solvency. Maresca of USA Today reports in 2017 that anti-missile systems in S.K. are intended to only protect military bases. That’s why he reports that if a missile strike were directed at Seoul, a city with 25 million people, anti-missile systems would be unable to stop it. They don’t save lives, only military bases which is not nearly as big of an impact on South Korea as they imply.**

**Thomas** Maresca, 17, 5-19-**2017,** "U.S. missile defense system built in South Korea has some mad as hell," USA TODAY, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/19/divisions-thaad-missile-defense-system-south-korea-china/101788990/>

**“They say THAAD is here for safety, but it will put Korea in greater danger,” Kim said. “We can’t resolve North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear weapons with a military approach. The proper way of solving the problem would be a peaceful dialogue with North Korea, the U.S. and China.”** The United States has about 28,000 troops in South Korea, and THAAD would be effective in protecting against North Korean missile attacks at strategic southern targets such as Kunsan Air Base and the port of Busan. **It is too far away from Seoul, home to 25 million people, to protect against a North Korean strike there. In Soon Boon, 63, a Seongju farmer, said the THAAD system is there only to defend U.S. troops.** “We want peace, we don’t want war,” she said. “We want the U.S. to bring their weapons back to their own country. We never wanted these weapons here.

1. **Turn- Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan of the World Economic Forum finds that U.S. deployment of THAAD leads to a missile defense arms race between the Koreas, China, and Japan. He furthers, noting that it would have destabilizing consequences and leads to mutual vulnerability.**

**Rajgopalam**, Rajeswari Pillai. "Will North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions Provoke a New Arms Race?" World Economic Forum. N.p., 7 July **2017**. Web. 10 Aug. 2017.

If North Korean nuclear and missile program is not contained, one likely consequence is that all the countries that are threatened will move towards developing defensive capabilities such as missile defences. **The issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the context of the US deploying the**[**THAAD system**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terminal_High_Altitude_Area_Defense)**in South Korea, as well as expanding US efforts to develop more capable BMD systems to deal with North Korean missiles, also impacts the deterrence equations between the US and China. Therefore, one of the consequences of the US, Japan and South Korea developing missile defence is that China and Russia will also feel the need to develop their own. So there is going to be potentially a missile defence race, as each party tries to ensure that they are not left behind in a critical area of technology. This will have destabilizing consequences.** One is for nuclear deterrence relationships between the major powers: US, China and Russia. These deterrence relationships are based on mutual vulnerability. Moving towards missile defence will undermine this central plank of nuclear deterrence. The importance of mutual vulnerability and the fear that one side might develop a strategic technological advantage was the reason why the [ABM Treaty](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty) was negotiated in the late 1960s. China has repeatedly opposed ballistic missile defences for this reason.

1. **Even if they prove that THAAD will be deployed closer to Korea this is still negative. Eric Gomez of the National Interest finds that THAAD in Seoul is effectively useless as it still can’t protect the city from artillery and low altitude missiles, which are the true threat to the city if North Korea is angered.**

**Gomez**, Eric “THAAD wont save Asia (or America) from North Korea” **The National Interest.**May 15th, **2017**

Last week U.S. officials confirmed that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery deployed on a South Korean golf course reached initial operating capability. As tensions grow on the Korean peninsula, THAAD’s deployment is supposed to improve deterrence by bolstering the ability of the United States and South Korea to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles. While THAAD does reduce the chances of a successful North Korean missile attack against important U.S. military bases and some South Korean cities, it probably won’t do much to cool down the situation on the peninsula. In fact, **THAAD could contribute to instability and increase the likelihood of a crisis.**Why is that? First, it is important to understand what the THAAD system is and isn’t capable of doing. **THAAD is not able to defend Seoul from North Korean missiles**because most of the capital city is just outside the 200 km range of THAAD’s interceptors. While not in a position to defend Seoul, THAAD could protect several locations that are essential for conducting sustained combat operations against North Korea, such as the port of Busan and Kunsan air base. **Moreover, even if THAAD were deployed closer to Seoul, it would not be able to defend against the conventional artillery threat to the city. Critically, THAAD would not be able to shoot down a North Korean missile test or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) heading for the U.S. homeland.**THAAD can only engage missiles as they fall back down to earth. If a missile is falling within the engagement range of THAAD’s interceptors, then North Korea is not testing a missile, it is attacking South Korea. It will not work for U.S. homeland defense, either. The only thing capable of defending the continental U.S. from ICBMs is the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which has a spotty testing record. While THAAD could not shoot down an ICBM, its radar could provide targeting data to the GMD to improve the chance of a successful intercept, but that is hardly a guarantee of success. With these technical limitations in mind, THAAD’s main purpose is to provide a protective umbrella for U.S. air force bases in South Korea, and the port of Busan, the primary port of entry for follow-on U.S. ground forces in the event of a long-term fight with North Korea. But although missile defense systems are usually viewed as solely defensive, the protection they provide also creates a perverse incentive for U.S. military planners to use force offensively. If U.S. planners believe essential military facilities are relatively safe from missile attack, they could be emboldened to launch first strikes against North Korea’s nuclear forces. Currently, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea all face strong incentives to go first in a conflict. The best way for the United States and South Korea to limit the damage of a North Korean attack is to destroy the North’s nuclear weapons on the ground or kill Kim Jong Un before he can give the order. The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but THAAD does reduce them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike. **Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive. The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.**

1. **Turn- THAAD aggravates China, leading to less influence over North Korea. Tucker Reals of CBS News finds that China is furious about the implementation of THAAD and will take any measures necessary to uphold their interests such as military drills which destabilize the region.**

**Reals**, Tucker. “Why THAAD Is Controversial in South Korea, China and Russia.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 2 May **2017**, [www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/).

**China is furious about the THAAD deployment, and that complicates the already-daunting challenge President Trump faces in trying to resolve the standoff with North Korea. China vows military drills as U.S. rolls out THAAD system in South KoreaChina vows military drills as U.S. rolls out THAAD system in South Korea** While Beijing has almost certainly grown weary of Kim Jong Un's repeated refusals to play by the rules of international conduct and stop testing nuclear devices and missiles, China remains, at least for the purposes of broad definition, an ally of North Korea and a strategic competitor of the United States. It is not the prospect of the U.S. shooting down a North Korean missile irking Beijing, but rather the ability. THAAD's advanced radar system gives the U.S. military the ability to peer across the Yellow Sea into China's own airspace and potentially to track the movement of Chinese military hardware on the ground. Beijing has voiced its strong disapproval since the THAAD deployment in South Korea was first announced. **That annoyance was reiterated Tuesday by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang, who urged "relevant sides to immediately stop the deployment." He added, without any clarification, that China would "firmly take necessary measures to uphold our interests."**

### A/2: PAC-3 Good

1. **They read a lot of information about how PAC-3 is good but ignore what it lacks. For the past year, PAC-3 has failed to provide any form of deterrence to slow down North Korea. Without any true use, it isn’t a reason to vote for them.**
2. **Um Ji-Won of The Hankyoreh finds that in actual battle Pac-3 went 0 of 44 in shooting down missiles, resulting in a zero percent successful rate. PAC-3 doesn’t work in actual battles, even if the tests make it seem like a plausible choice.**

**Ji-Won,** Um. “US Expert Says North Korean KN-11 Missiles Would Neutralize THAAD.” Hankyoreh, 3 Oct. **2016,** [**www.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/763861.html**](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/763861.html)**.**

Making [military] plans does not actually bring about the desired results,” Postol said, citing the example of the missile defense provided by the American Patriot interceptors during the Gulf War.Shortly before the Gulf War in 1991, the Patriot missile defense system posted a 100% success rate, reaching goals in 17 out of 17 tests. **But when the system was used in actual battles, the success rate fell to 0% in 44 attempts. Patriots failed to shoot down a single Iraqi Scud missile.**

**Wei-Han**, Chen. "PAC-3 Missiles Deployed to East Coast." Taipei Times. N.p., 2 Mar. **2017**. Web. 11 Aug. 2017.

**The Ministry of National Defense said Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile batteries have been deployed on the east coast in response to an increased Chinese military presence in the area.** To improve integrated air defense capabilities, the ministry has deployed missiles to Hualien and Taitung counties, and merged the Air Defense Missile Command with the air force to streamline the chain of command, a ministry report submitted to the Legislative Yuan said. The reorganization and relocation was ordered after the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted several long-distance naval and aviation training missions — featuring an aircraft carrier and fleets of nuclear-capable bombers — in the East China Sea, South China Sea, East Indian Ocean and western Pacific Ocean to demonstrate its long-range power projection capabilities and Beijing’s ambition to dominate the Asia-Pacific region

1. **Alex Hempel of White Fleet finds that PAC-3 has a shorter range than most missiles, meaning it can’t reach missiles high up or far away. He furthers, noting that the outdated Patriot missile design means PAC-3 cannot stop more sophisticated ballistic missiles, which means it will not always be successful.**

**Hempel,** Alex. "Raytheon Claims 100% Success Rate for Patriot Missiles in Saudi Service." WhiteFleet.net. N.p., 07 July **2017**. Web. 11 Aug. 2017.

To improve PAC-2 lethality, many PAC-2s were upgraded to PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEMs). PAC-2 GEMs feature a new digital fuze and guidance equipment, significantly increasing the probability of a kill on the target’s warhead. Raytheon engineers also made improvements to other components of the system, especially the electronics, to improve performance. The biggest advancement, however, was the PAC-3 program, a massive departure from PAC-2 in terms of interceptor design. Patriot versions up to PAC-2 GEM featured launchers with four large missiles each. **PAC-3 scrapped the quadruple launcher, instead using sixteen smaller interceptors.** As a result, each Patriot battery can engage more targets before depleting its interceptor supply. **The smaller missiles also facilitate maneuvering. Because of the size reduction, the PAC-3 missiles have a much shorter range than the PAC-2 missiles, which makes them less attractive for engaging traditional targets such as airplanes and helicopters**, although they are still capable of doing so. The biggest improvement, however, was the redesigned warhead. Instead of an explosive, PAC-3 interceptors destroy their target with sheer kinetic energy. PAC-3 also vastly improved radar and guidance performance through upgrades and software tweaks. However, the job of Patriot engineers is far from complete. **While SCUD-type missiles are challenging targets, their underlying design is decades old**. Russia and China have produced **more modern missiles designed specifically to defeat US missile defense systems which Patriot has yet to face. For example, the Iskander tactical ballistic missile has onboard countermeasures** **and can execute high-g maneuvers to avoid interception. Patriot’s combat capabilities against these more sophisticated ballistic missiles remains unknown.**

### A/2: Iron Dome Good

1. **Responding to 90% Success [Harel]- Ninety Percent only tested in Israel. Have to be topical and prove that its 90% successful versus North Korean ICBMs.**
2. **Responding to link into buying Iron Dome [Melman]- Date is 2013. Iron Dome still hasn’t been bought or implemented, meaning that there’s not a true link into impacts if Iron Dome is never used. Have to give a unique argument that Iron Dome is going to be used.**
3. **Theodore A. Postol of the MIT Technology Review finds rate at which the Iron Dome intercepts is a mere 5 percent, and its performance is not improving. Postol furthers, noting that Iron dome tracker radar and guidance system doesn’t function well and cannot engage successfully with rockets with erratic behavior, resulting in low intercept rates.**

**Postol**, Theodore A. "An Explanation of the Evidence of Weaknesses in the Iron Dome Defense System." MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, 19 Sept.. Web. 11 Aug. 2017.

In the early weeks of July 2014 the conflict between Israel and Palestinians in Gaza has again flared up. This has resulted in a new round of large-scale rocket attacks launched by Hamas, operating from Gaza, against Israeli population centers. The last time such large-scale rocket attacks occurred between Hamas and Israel was in November 2012. During the November 2012 conflict **a large number of photographs of Iron Dome interceptor contrails were observed in the sky. These contrails revealed that the Iron Dome interceptor rate was very low—perhaps as low as 5 percent or below.** This paper explains why the geometry of the contrails photographed in the sky indicates whether or not an Iron Dome intercept attempt had any chance of intercepting an artillery rocket target. I will show sample pieces of data **indicating that Iron Dome performance was very low in November** 2012, and I will show similar data for July 2014, which **indicates that Iron Dome performance almost a year and a half later has probably not improved.** I do not know why the Iron Domes were not engaging most artillery rockets using the proper front-on geometry. **However, it is clear that the Iron Dome radar tracking and guidance system is not working, as it is initially sending Iron Dome interceptors to intercept points that then result in the interceptor not being able to achieve the right geometry for a successful engagement against the artillery rockets.** I will show photographs of contrails from November 2012 and from July 2014 indicating that **the Iron Domes are still behaving erratically—resulting in continued very low intercept rates.**

### A/2: KAMD Good

1. **Karen Montague of George C. Marshall Institute finds that the Patriot/PAC missiles and AEGIS are the AMDs that make up KAMD. This means all disadvantages of the Patriot/PAC and AEGIS are applied to KAMD. [**[**READ PAC/AEGIS DISADS**](#_A/2:_AEGIS_Good)**]**

**Montague**, Karen. "A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs." Marshall Policy Outlook (**2014**): 1-7. Marshall.org. George C. Marshall Institute, Mar. 2014. Web. 12 Aug. 2017

South Korea’s dedication to increasing its missile defense is sho wn through its defense budget. In the summer of 2013, *Yonhap News* reported that the ROK’s Ministry of Defense proposed to spend 13.7% of its budget on missile defense for the 2014-2018 fiscal years,5 which is reportedly a 4.2% increase from the 2013 defense budget.**6 The U.S.-made elements that will be used in the KAMD system and are currently owned by the ROK, are the PATRIOT PAC-2 missile defense system, PAC-2 GEM-T missile, SM-2 missile, PAC-3, and Aegis equipped cruisers.**

1. **Bruce Klinger of The Heritage Foundation finds that KAMD would only consist of a lower tier land based missile system, without ballistic missile capability. This means KAMD simply can’t strike down any of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal because they are centered around ballistic missile. At that point they lose any impact of safety because KAMD can’t stop a North Korean nuclear launch.**

**Klingner**, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The Heritage Foundation. N.p., 12 June **2015**. Web. 12 Aug. 2017.

The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[[17]](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense" \l "_ftn17) Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework. **Only Low-Level Interceptors. South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability.** Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[[18]](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense" \l "_ftn18) South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). **Resisting an Allied System.**Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program. In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

1. **KAMD cannot work with other U.S. systems. Bruce Klinger of The Heritage Foundation finds that KAMD can’t be truly integrated with U.S. systems as Korea wants to have a national strategy and due to budget issues and public sentiment.**

**Klingner**, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The Heritage Foundation. N.p., 12 June **2015**. Web. 12 Aug. 2017.

**Seoul has focused on an independent South Korean missile defense system rather than an inte­grated regional defense. The Korean network will reportedly be linked to U.S. theater air and missile defenses in Seoul to bolster alliance defense.****[[22]](http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-case-comprehensive-missile-defense-asia" \l "_ftn22) How­ever, the extent to which the KAMD would be truly integrated with U.S. systems remains uncertain.** In February 2009, Minister of Defense Lee Sang-hee said that Seoul was “considering joining the U.S.-led global missile defense system in a strategic manner.” **Yet he added that Korea needs to “con­sider it from the perspective of a national strategy after taking into account the Korea–U.S. alliance, the security conditions on the Korean Peninsula, budgetary issues, and public sentiment.**”[[23]](http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-case-comprehensive-missile-defense-asia" \l "_ftn23) After North Korea’s April 2009 launch of a Taepo Dong-2 missile, Defense Minister Lee stated Seoul was considering purchasing the more sophisticated SM-3 missile to augment the planned purchase of 48 PAC-2s, but it has not yet done so.

**4. Turn- KAMD promotes Kill Chain. Jun Ji-Hye of The Korea Times finds that KAMD is part of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation and Kill Chain plan. Ji-Hye furthers that continuing to implement KAMD means that the Kill Chain plan will solidify, increasing the chance of Pre-Emptive Strikes. [Read A/2 Kill Chain]**

**Ji-Hye,** Jun. "3 Military Systems to Counter N. Korea: Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR." Koreatimes. N.p., 31 Oct. **2016**. Web. 12 Aug. 2017.

**The three elements are the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan. Kill Chain is a system to carry out a preemptive strike against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile facilities if Seoul is faced with an imminent threat, while the KAMD would trace and shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles heading for South Korea.** The KMPR would be used to punish and retaliate against North Korea if it strikes South Korea. The government initially planned to deploy the three systems in the mid-2020s. But after the North claimed that during the latest test it detonated a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile, the government said on Oct. 18 it will hasten the system's introduction by a couple of years. This year, the isolated state has conducted two nuclear tests and launched more than 20 ballistic missiles, despite warnings from the international community. **"The military is developing the three-pillar system that will provide tailored measures to deter threats from the North's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)," Defense Minister Han Min-koo told the National Assembly. "The military is also strengthening defense cooperation with other countries."**

### A/2: AEGIS Good

1. **David B. Larter of the Defense News in 2017 finds that the June 2017 AEGIS ballistic missile test was a failure. Larter furthers, noting that the medium range ballistic missile had to be called off, after AEGIS failed. If AEGIS failed in simple tests, there’s no guarantee it will work to save lives.**

**Larter**, David B. “US Navy Ballistic Missile Intercept Test Fails.” Defense News, 22 June **2017,** www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/06/22/us-navy-ballistic-missile-intercept-test-fails/

**The U.S. Navy conducted a failed ballistic missile intercept Wednesday with its SM-3 Block IIA off the coast of Hawaii. The destroyer John Paul Jones, running the Navy's top-of-the-line Aegis Baseline 9.C2 combat system, failed to intercept a medium-range ballistic missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility** at Kauai, Hawaii. The destroyer detected and tracked the target on the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar but was unable to intercept it. It was the second test of this latest iteration of the SM-3. The John Paul Jones successfully shot down a target in February with it. That test was the first intercept using Baseline 9.2C.  "Program officials will conduct an extensive analysis of the test data," a news release for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said Thursday.

1. **Turn- Spencer Ackerman of the Guardian finds that AEGIS interceptors could miss, and if this failure occurs it gives North Korea a psychological advantage to keep testing missiles.**
2. **Spencer Ackerman of the Guardian in 2017 finds that the Asia Pacific Security Center For A New American Security is more likely to jam a missile instead of using AEGIS. This means that AEGIS isn’t always likely to be used.**

**Ackerman**, Spencer, and Justin McCurry. “US Military Considers Shooting down North Korea Missile Tests, Sources Say.” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 18 Apr. **2017**, [www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/18/us-military-shoot-down-north-](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/18/us-military-shoot-down-north-)korea-missile-tests.

**Another factor complicating a shoot-down would be the risk of embarrassment should Aegis interceptors miss a North Korean target, which might embolden Pyongyang and unnerve US regional allies. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, agreed that failure to bring down a missile would give North Korea a “psychological advantage”. Cronin said the US was “far more likely to try to jam a missile test to ensure it does not fly far from the peninsula”.** US military officials are said to have been deeply disturbed after being taken by surprise at a North Korean missile launch in February. The commander in charge of US nuclear weapons, air force Gen John Hyten, recently told the Senate that the 11 February test was staged “out of a place we’d never seen before”. North Korea’s advancements in solid-fuel rockets, mobile launch vehicles built for the north’s unpaved roads and cloud cover which frustrates satellite surveillance are causing US planners to fear that they may have little time to detect the next wave of North Korean missiles.

### A/2: LSAM Good

1. **John Pike of Global Security in 2017 observes that LSAM development starts in 2018 and LSAM will not be deployed until 2024. With a situation that escalates drastically every week, any impacts they imply won’t happen until it’s too late. Pike continues that the project is 1 trillion won, which simply isn’t logically affordable for South Korea. All in all, LSAM isn’t a viable option to affect the Korean situation in any way- don’t weigh this argument at all.**

**Pike**, John. “L-SAM Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile.” GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information, 14 Feb. **2017**, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm.

**After completing its development by around 2018, the the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) expected that the production of the L-SAM system will begin in 2023, the DAPA said, adding that more than 1 trillion won is forecast to be used for the research and development of the new interceptor system.** The L-SAM development is expected to greatly increase the capacity of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) by allowing a multi-layer system. South Korea said it would develop its own missile defense system to intercept missiles at a higher altitude instead of adopting the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The military decided to develop its indigenous Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM), which is compatible with the US-based Lockheed Martin's THAAD system, based on a pilot study by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), the country's arms procurement agency. **The military planned to develop its indigenous interceptor missile by 2022. It is expected to take some seven years to develop the L-SAM system, and it will be deployed** between 2023 and **2024. The Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) is a separate system from the US missile defense - the two systems are different geographically and structurally.** Initially South Korea was not considering the adoption of the Lockheed Martin's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Standard Missile (SM)-3 has also been excluded from candidates for Seoul's multi-layered missile defense as the SM-3 intercepts missiles at an altitude of 400-500 km.

1. **LSAM simply won’t work overall- Pike of Global Security continues that LSAM works through an integrated missile launcher, and at the point where the current missile launchers don’t function properly, deploying LSAM is simply isn’t a feasible solution.**

**Pike**, John. “L-SAM Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile.” GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information, 14 Feb. **2017**, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm.

**South Korea said overlapping its home-grown, long-range surface-to-air missile with the U.S.'s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system could create a multi-layer defense that would enhance national security**. L-SAM and THAAD are virtually separate systems since the nature and range they cover are different. A proposed South Korean air and missile defense system comparable with the Lockheed Martin Thaad will employ a large trailer-mounted radar with an active, electronically scanning array. The L-SAM Multi-Function Radar (Multi-Function Radar) can detect, identify and track aircraft, missiles and jammers in a single combined radar and **communicate such data to the integrated missile launcher.**

1. **LSAM can’t hit any North Korean missiles. John Pike of Global Security in 2017 finds that the LSAM system only hits missiles at an altitude of 50 through 60 kilometers up in the air. This is extremely problematic as Justin McCurry of The Guardian finds that current North Korean missile tests go to around 2,800 kilometers in the air. At the end of the day, LSAM simply can’t stop anything North Korea may use to attack.**

**Pike**, John. “L-SAM Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile.” GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information, 14 Feb. **2017**, [www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm).

The country has aimed to build up a multi- layered MD system, which means the failure of the first-stage interceptors leads to the second-stage interception in different altitudes. Seoul has been gradually building the KAMD since 2006 by acquiring Patriot missiles and long-range early warning radars. The KAMD involves an early warning radar as well as land-based missile defense systems. Seoul's Defense Ministry has said that the low-tier MD refers to intercepting missiles at an altitude of less than 100km. Seoul will upgrade its PAC-2 missiles to Lockheed Martin's PAC- 3 to shoot down missiles, possibly launched from the DPRK, at an altitude of less than 40km. South Korea planned to purchase the "hit-to-kill" type PAC-3 missiles, developed by US-based Lockheed Martin, between 2016 and 2020 to improve its anti-ballistic missile capabilities. **The L-SAM system will intercept missiles at an altitude of 40km or above [or an altitude of 50-60 km],** moderating worries that the PAC-2 and PAC-3 are not enough to shoot down DPRK missiles, possibly tipped with nuclear warheads. The DPRK continued to enhance its large-caliber multiple-rocket launchers to follow the global trend, noting that its weapons got to have a longer range and added functions such as the guided system. These projectiles can directly strike the headquarters of South Korea's Army, Navy and Air Forces located some 130 km south of Seoul**. The Korea Air and Missile Defense, which Seoul has sought to build up to intercept ballistic missiles from the DPRK, could not shoot down those short-range projectiles as the KAMD is a defense system for longer range missiles.**

**McCurry**, Justin. "North Korea's Missile Test: Everything You Need to Know." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 July **2017**. Web.

**Analysis by Japan and South Korea has supported the account given by North Korea’s Academy of Defence Science, which said the missile reached an altitude of 1,741 miles (2,802km) and flew 580 miles. The US initially described it as an intermediate-range missile but later conceded it was an ICBM.** There is general agreement that this was Pyongyang’s most successful missile test since its ballistic missile programme gathered pace in the late 1990s. Less convincing is the North’s claim that the missile can reach any target in the world. John Schilling, a missile expert at the 38 North thinktank in Washington, estimates it will take until at least 2020 for North Korea to be able to develop an ICBM capable of reaching the US mainland, and another 25 years before it will be able o build one powered by solid fuel.

### A/2: KM-SAM Good

1. **KM-SAM can’t hit any North Korean missiles. John Pike of Global Security in 2017 finds that KM-SAM can only hit targets at an altitude of up to 15 kilometers. This is extremely problematic as Justin McCurry of The Guardian finds that current North Korean missile tests go to around 2,800 kilometers in the air. At the end of the day, LSAM simply can’t stop anything North Korea may use to attack.**

**Pike**, John. “Military.” Cheolmae II / Cheongung (Iron Hawk) M-SAM Medium Surface to Air Missile, **2017**, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/m-sam.htm.

**Cheongung can intercept targets at an altitude of up to 15 kilometers and at a range of about 40 km, and simultaneously attack several targets with a multiple radar system. Korea will deploy indigenous surface-to-air guided missiles by the end of this year as testing has been successfully completed, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), 30 July 2015.** "The Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DTaQ) successfully conducted the quality certification firing of the Cheongung in late July," said the DAPA in a press release. "Mass production will begin in earnest this year following the completion of the quality-certification process." A DAPA official noted that the product received a pass mark if it hit its target twice out of three test-fires.

**McCurry**, Justin. "North Korea's Missile Test: Everything You Need to Know." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 July **2017**. Web.

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1. **John Pike of Global Security in 2017 observes that KM-SAM is already in the works and deployed. But, the KM-SAM literally hasn’t done anything- don’t weigh this argument at all.**

**Pike**, John. “Military.” Cheolmae II / Cheongung (Iron Hawk) M-SAM Medium Surface to Air Missile, **2017**, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/m-sam.htm.

Korea will deploy indigenous surface-to-air guided missiles by the end of this year as testing has been successfully completed, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), 30 July 2015. "The Defense Agency for Technology and Quality (DTaQ) successfully conducted the quality certification firing of the Cheongung in late July," said the DAPA in a press release. "Mass production will begin in earnest this year following the completion of the quality-certification process." A DAPA official noted that the product received a pass mark if it hit its target twice out of three test-fires**. The South Korean military reportedly deployed the newly developed anti-aircraft missile system along the maritime border in the Yellow Sea in March 2016. The surface-to-air guided missile system, known as Cheongung, was deployed in the northwest islands early in 2016 to defend against North Korean aircraft.**

### A/2: Multi-Layer Defense Systems Good

1. **[**[**W/ THAAD Bad O/V**](#_THAAD_Bad)**] Remember the overview that gives you 4 key reasons why THAAD doesn’t work. At the point where THAAD is the key part to allowing interoperability, multi-layer defense systems won’t work.**
2. **Rob Lyon of The National Interest in 2017 finds that even with new upgrades to make a layered missile defense system, all systems could simply be swamped because the interceptor numbers remain limited, meaning in a launch all missiles could never be stopped.**

Lyon, February, 23, 2017 [Rod, fellow at Asia Society Policy Institute and executive editor of The Strategist, “The Hard Truth About THAAD, South Korea and China”, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295>, BJM]

**True, the South Koreans have already committed to upgrade their Patriot-2s to PAC-3s. That’s been in train since early 2015 and might take a year or two to unfold. So their missile defense capabilities are already getting better. But Patriot’s a point-defense system; THAAD adds both another layer and a larger footprint to the Patriot system. Both systems could still easily be swamped, of course, as interceptor numbers remain limited.** Second, let’s turn to the U.S.–China issue. China worries primarily about the system’s surveillance capabilities. It’s not concerned that a THAAD missile battery in South Korea could intercept a Chinese strategic missile bound for continental America—that’s not a realistic scenario. Rather, it’s concerned that THAAD’s radar might be able to offer early tracking data to other parts of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system—in particular to the Ground Based Interceptors responsible for defending the U.S. homeland—thus degrading China’s ability to target the United States. Its anxiety is a classic case of a security trilemma, where actions taken by one country in response to the actions of another—here the deployment of enhanced U.S. BMD capabilities to offset North Korea’s growing missile capabilities—complicate relations with a third player. Still, China’s scarcely the first country to feel threatened by a ballistic missile defense radar. Russia worked itself into a tizzy—[not entirely without cause](http://russianforces.org/files/BriefOnEastEuropeMissileDefenseProposal_August24,2007_FinalReduced.pdf)—when George W. Bush’s administration proposed deploying a X-band radar in Europe to support a regional ballistic missile defense system against Iran.

1. **Mike Stone of Reuters finds that not only do multi-layer defense systems have mixed results in testing, but more experts find that the U.S. systems can only shoot down a small number of basic missiles and with North Korea advancing, and the U.S. layered defenses would be overwhelmed.**

**Stone,** Mike. “Can U.S. Defend against North Korea Missiles? Not Everyone Agrees.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 6 July **2017**, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-defenses-idUSKBN19Q32F.

Davis cited a successful test in May in which a U.S.-based missile interceptor knocked down a simulated incoming North Korean ICBM. **But he acknowledged the test program's track program was not perfect. "It's something we have mixed results on.** But we also have an ability to shoot more than one interceptor," Davis said. An internal memo seen by Reuters also showed that the Pentagon upgraded its assessment of U.S. defenses after the May test. **Despite hundreds of billions of dollars spent on a multi-layered missile defense system, the United States may not be able to seal itself off entirely from a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile attack. Experts caution that U.S. missile defenses are now geared to shooting down one, or perhaps a small number of basic, incoming missiles. Were North Korea's technology and production to keep advancing, U.S. defenses could be overwhelmed unless they keep pace with the threat.** "Over the next four years, the United States has to increase its current capacity of our deployed systems, aggressively push for more and faster deployment," said Riki Ellison, founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.

1. **Finally, the evidence says a lot about the pros of implementing missile defense, but doesn’t mention how its implemented or where its mentioned in evidence. Make them prove this to you. This is key because Richard Weitz of The Asian Institute for Policy Studies explains that South Korea has repeatedly declined to integrate their missile defense system with the rest of the US and Japan’s systems, meaning at the end of the day interoperability won’t happen.**

**Weitz**, Richard. “US Missile Defense Program and Its Asian Implications.” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 13 Oct. **2013**, en.asaninst.org/contents/us-missile-defense-program-and-its-asian-implications/.

The ROK and the United States collaborate in developing missile defenses for South Korea. The United States is helping the ROK develop an independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) for intercepting short-to medium-range ballistic missiles. It will have PAC-2 interceptors, Aegis destroyers equipped with Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) surface-to-air missiles, and early warning radars. According to current plans, the KAMD will not have the SM-3 or other longer-range capabilities, which will limit its capabilities to defending South Korea’s territory and population**. For various reasons, South Korea has declined to integrate its missile defense system into the larger Asian regional network being developed by the United States and Japan. Even the US BMD radars and PAC-3 interceptors deployed in South Korea are offìcially intended only to defending themselves and their host country from a DPRK missile attack.** For now, the United States and South Korea are considering at most establishing a joint mechanism to integrate the ROK’s Air and Missile Defense Cell (AMD-Cell) in Osan with the US Forces Korea’s Patriot air- defense missile system.

## A/2: Deterrence

### A/2: General Arguments

1. **Uniqueness swamps the link. Robert Gard of The National Interest finds that the U.S.’s current nuclear arsenal is enough to deter any country. Gard mentions a study by Sidney Drell of Stanford, who finds that simply 500 warheads for a country would be a sufficient deterrent for anything, and that the U.S. has nearly ten times this amount. At this point, one simple missile defense system won’t do much more to deter North Korea.**

**Gard, Robert. “American Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Minimal-Deterrence Policy.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 1 Dec. 2014, nationalinterest.org/feature/american-nuclear-strategy-the-case-minimal-deterrence-policy-11755.**

**The United States currently has an arsenal of about 4,800 nuclear warheads, enough for an estimated 1,400-megaton cumulative yield of destructive power. That is 87,500 times the blast power of the bomb that devastated Hiroshima and equal to the blast yield of 1,400,000,000 tons of TNT. Put another way, it would only take one tenth of the 1,400 megatons we possess to decimate the fifty most-populated cities in the United States.[**1] How much deliverable nuclear explosive power and destruction does it take to deter potential enemies? Obviously, under any conceivable scenario, the United States does not need a nuclear arsenal nearly this large. If instead of a counterforce strategy, the United States were to adopt a more practical and more stable minimal nuclear deterrent, it could significantly reduce its nuclear arsenal, along with the associated cost and risks, without compromising its security or that of its allies. For example, a 2012 study—chaired by former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James Cartwright, and with other responsible and knowledgeable former national-security officials such as committee members, including ambassadors Thomas Pickering and Richard Burt, then Senator Chuck Hagel and General (Ret.) Jack Sheehan—concluded that the United States could reduce its nuclear arsenal to 450 warheads deployed on nuclear submarines and bombers, with an additional 450 in reserve, without jeopardizing security. There have been other responsible studies of the number of nuclear weapons necessary for an effective deterrent, ranging from 311 to 1000 warheads**. The Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resource Defense Council released a study in 2009 concluding that 500 warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), nuclear submarines and bomber aircraft would be sufficient. A 2005 study conducted by Stanford physicist Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby estimated a 500 warhead stock of operational nuclear weapons on submarines, ICBMS, and bombers, with an additional 500 warheads in a reserve “responsive force,” would provide an effective nuclear deterrent.** The lowest estimate of these studies, conducted by two members of the faculty of the Air University and an active duty Air Force officer planner, described a 311-warhead force deployed on 100 ICBMS, twelve nuclear submarines and nineteen bombers as a sufficient deterrent.

1. **Mutually Assured Destruction is enough. Mark Bowden of The Atlantic finds that assured destruction between North Korea and U.S. is enough deterrence to prevent a strike towards South Korea, due to the fact that North Korea knows any missile they launch would trigger a lethal U.S. launch.**

**Bowden**, Mark. “How to Deal With North Korea.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 9 Aug. **2017**, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-worst-problem-on-earth/528717/.

Pyongyang has been constrained by the same logic that has stayed the use of nuclear arms for some 70 years. Their use would invite swift annihilation. In the Cold War this brake was called mad (mutual assured destruction). **In this case the brake on North Korea would be simply ad: assured destruction, since any launch of a nuclear weapon would invite an annihilating response; even though its missiles might hit North America, it cannot destroy the United States. There is already a close-to-even chance that, in the 30 minutes it would take a North Korean ICBM to reach the West Coast of the United States, the missile would be intercepted and destroyed.** But the other way of looking at those odds is that such a missile would have a close-to-even chance of hitting an American city. This is terrible to ponder, but Americans lived with a far, far greater threat for almost half a century. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. faced the potential for complete destruction. I was one of the kids who performed civil-defense drills in the 1950s, ducking under my school desk while sirens wailed. During the Cuban missile crisis, the possibility seemed imminent enough that I plotted the fastest route from school to home. The threat of nuclear attack is a feature of the modern world, and one that has grown far less existential to Americans over time. It is expensive to build an atom bomb, and very hard to build one small enough to ride in a missile. It is also hard to build an ICBM. But these are all old technologies. The know-how exists and is widespread. Preventing a terrorist group from acquiring such a weapon may be possible, but when a nation—whether North Korea or Iran or any other—commits itself to the goal, stopping it is virtually impossible. A deal to halt Iran’s nuclear program was doable only because that country has extensive trading and banking ties with other nations. **The Kim regime’s isolation means that no country besides China can really apply meaningful economic pressure. Persuading a nation to abandon nuclear arms depends less on military strength than on the collective determination of the world, and a decision made by the nation in question. What’s needed is the proper framework for disarmament—the right collection of incentives and disincentives to render the building of such a weapon a detriment and a waste—so the country decides that abandoning its pursuit of nukes is in its best interest.**

### A/2: North Korea Is a Threat [DO NOT READ WITH #1 DIPLOMACY OR NUCLEAR IMPACTS]

1. **There’s already enough deterrence. Dough Bandow of the CATO Institute finds that U.S. nuclear deterrence completely deters North Korea and that Pyongyang isn’t willing to fire.**

Doug Bandow, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), NORTH KOREA: PAPER TIGER, June 4, 2009. Retrieved April 1, 2010 from <http://www.campaignforliberty.com/article.php?view=100>, eo)

That could eventually change, of course, but **the DPRK obviously poses no present danger.** There is no cause for precipitous action. In fact, **Pyongyang is never likely to pose a genuine threat to America. The U.S. has the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal: any North Korean attack would be suicidal. Just one American missile with multiple warheads could destroy everything worth destroying in the North. If Washington could deter** Joseph **Stalin and** Mao **Zedong, two of the greatest mass murderers in human history, it can deter Kim Jong-il.**

1. **Even though North Korea seems threatening, it’s not. Suh and Jackson at the Center for a New American Security, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow find that North Korea often acts like it may cause conflict, but always eventually defer from escalation. There’s no point in aggravating countries around SK just to address a ghost threat.**

Van Jackson and **Hannah** Suh,2015. Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, and author of the forthcoming book Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in U.S.-North Korea Relations; and Program Coordinator for the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “The Biggest Myth about North Korea,” The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290?page=2>.

**Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a** pathology based on an imaginary North Korea.No matter one’s political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk. **This bears out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavior**—even during the so-called “second Korean war” of the late 1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks. Today, North Korea threatens South Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. **In repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows** and suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. **North Korea has had countless opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint.** Whatever North Korea’s rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track record shows a preference for not taking actions that would jeopardize the regime, and the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that. Even if North Korea responded with violence when attacked or retaliated against, there is a massive difference between responding with limited or tit-for-tat violence (its historical modus operandi) and responding with the most devastatingly lethal response it can come up with, like a nuclear first-strike or artillery barrages against Seoul. The latter are regime-ending actions, while the former may demonstrate resolve against the alliance and allow both sides a chance to sue for peace. To be clear, we’re not saying conflict with North Korea is impossible. On the contrary, North Korean military **adventurism may become more likely as it feels its expanding nuclear and missile capability affords it greater protections from retaliation.** But such conflicts won’t escalate to an all-out war, even if the alliance responds to North Korean violence with a limited counteroffensive. We are also not calling for preventive strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities at this time. A disarming first-strike against North Korea requires answering many questions. How confident are we of destroying 100 percent of the targets? How far would a first-strike set back North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? How can we disabuse North Korea of the perception that the alliance is pursuing regime change (the one scenario that would trigger devastating North Korean retaliation)? But we are arguing that it’s a mistake for alliance policy and military plans to be made on the assumption that any preventive or retaliatory strike inevitably escalates to total war and regime change. Not only is that contrary to North Korea’s own primary goal, it’s the kind of thing that paralyzes the alliance when faced with North Korean aggression. Just because something is possible, doesn’t make it probable. As a matter of historical observation—not rational assumption—North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival, and its foreign policy is bounded by a logic of consequences. If we accept those two propositions, then we must plan and formulate policy not on the assumption that North Korea will escalate in response to any offensive or counteroffensive alliance action, but rather with the expectation that North Korea will seek to keep any military friction limited for the sake of regime survival.

1. **Turn this- Joe Cirinicione of International Security Advisory Board and the Council on Foreign Relations finds that North Korea simply shows off through propaganda and truly poses no threat, and alarmists who emphasize this simply distract everyone from a peaceful solution by promoting violence.**

North Kean “nuclear threat” is laughable at best Joe **Cirincione** 5-12 (5/12/**15**; Leading nuclear expert, resident of Ploughshares Fund, member of Secretary of State John Kerry's International Security Advisory Board and the Council on Foreign Relations; North Korea’s Missile Test Is Less Impressive Than You Think; http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/05/north-koreas-missile-test-less-impressive-you-think/112600/)

Kim Jong Un was all smiles and cigars in photos that showed a surprise May 9 test of a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in the waters off North Korea. But there was less to the dictator’s photo op than meets the eye. If North Korea could perfect this technology, it would be an impressive and dangerous new capability. Missiles launched from subs are traditionally “second strike” weapons. They are harder to detect and thus harder to take out in an initial attack. So this system—once operational—could give North Korea the ability to respond to an attack, whether conventional or nuclear, with a nuclear strike. In a crisis, that could stay the hand of South Korea, the United States, or another adversary. It could also be used in a surprise first strike. The photos, predictably, produced a surfeit of officials and experts ringing alarm bells. **Relax. North Korea has a very long way to go. This elaborate photo celebration appears to have been staged at an “ejection test,” designed to demonstrate the ability of a sub to shoot up a missile from under the water, have it ignite, and begin flight. The missile appears to have gone about 100 or 150 meters, according to South Korean officials, about the length of a football field. That sub would have to be awfully close to its target to hit anything. The photos of Kim watching the missile pop up through the surface could be enhanced, but they could well be genuine. Regardless, there were no photos released of the missile plopping back into the ocean a few seconds later.** They showed the pop but not the plop. Furthermore, as Tyler Rogoway notes in his piece for Foxtrot Alpha, “Just because the missile shown in the photos appeared to safely clear the water and climbed out through low-altitude doesn’t mean that the missile is fully capable of traveling thousands of miles to a specific target.” He’s right. Putting a missile up is actually easier than bringing it’s warhead back down and on target. This requires sophisticated guidance, staging, exquisite reliability and, most importantly, a re-entry vehicle that can survive the heat, vibrations and gravitational stresses of coming back into the atmosphere and continuing all the way to a successful strike. North Korea has not demonstrated or tested any of these abilities. “North Korea’s ability to manufacture such a precise instrument,” wrote Rogoway, “that can survive long periods installed atop a missile, housed in submarine, and then endure the rigors of a launching and atmospheric re-entry remains questionable at best.” Further, though North Korea seems to have made some progress on reducing the size of its tested nuclear weapon, there is no public evidence that it has shrunk the device enough to fit it into the warhead of a missile. “The miniaturization of a nuclear warhead,” says Gene Habiger, a retired general who once led the U.S. Strategic Command, “is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face.” Habiger notes that it took the United States six to eight years of intensive engineering and testing to get our weapons down to warhead size. To put this in perspective, the United States today has 1,152 hydrogen bomb warheads on sub-launched missiles that can land within the area of a football field almost anywhere on Earth in under 30 minutes. It also fields 450 similar weapons on long-range land-based ballistic missiles. North Korea has enough material for perhaps six atomic bombs, maybe more, but there is no available evidence that it has operationalized any weapons. North Korea plays its weak hand very well. It puts on an impressive show with ancient technology. The sub in this test appears to be based on the Soviet Golf class that entered service in 1958. The missile itself seems to be a 1970s Soviet system. Claims by some South Korean officials **that Kim could develop a real SLBM within three to five years overestimate the ability of even the clever North Koreans to stretch these mid-20th-century technologies. Even if the alarmists are correct, this missile can fly no more than 1,500 miles. That means, as nuclear expert Jeffrey Lewis has noted, the North Koreans would have to sail their sub 60 to 90 days to get within range of the continental United States, during which time it would run a very high risk of detection and destruction. Kim Jong Un would be much better off having FedEx deliver the warhead. That, at least, would ensure it would get there within three days.**

### A/2: THAAD Deters

1. **THAAD isn’t effective enough to deter North Korea. Jack Kim of TIME finds the THAAD system will do little to deter the missile threat from North Korea and they will still continue to proliferate.**

**Kim**, Jack. “South Korea: THAAD Withdrawal Fears Amid North Korea Tests.” Time, Time, 31 May **2017** time.com/4800725/south-korea-thaad-moon-jae-in

The remarks were Moon 's first clear indication that he does not intend to stop the deployment, which has drawn angry protests from China, South Korea's biggest trading partner.

Chung Eui-yong, Moon 's national security adviser, also denied that the controversy over the THAAD deployment would have a negative impact on the summit between Moon and Trump. We've sufficiently explained that this has nothing to do with our alliance," Chung told reporters before his departure. Chung said he would meet Trump's national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, and finalize the agenda for the summit. The presidential Blue House said on Wednesday the Defense Ministry had intentionally omitted details about the THAAD battery in a report made to Chung last week, when the government was preparing for the summit. Moon took office on May 10 without a transition period because a snap presidential election was held just two months after Park was ousted. He inherited her defense minister, along with the rest of the cabinet, and has yet to name his own. The THAAD battery was initially deployed in March in the southeastern region of Seongju with just two of its maximum load of six launchers to counter the North Korean missile threat. North Korea has conducted three ballistic missile tests since Moon took office, maintaining its accelerated pace of missile and nuclear-related activities since the beginning of last year in defiance of U.N. sanctions and U.S. pressure. The Pentagon said it had been "very transparent" with South Korea's government about the THAAD deployment. Moon 's decision to order an investigation into the THAAD deployment came amid signs of easing tensions between South Korea and China, which is North Korea's sole major diplomatic ally.China says **the THAAD system will do little to deter the missile threat from North Korea, while allowing the U.S. military to use its radar to look deep into its territory and at its own missile systems.**

1. **THAAD gets overwhelmed eventually by a swarm attack, so it will never deter. Alex Lockie of Business Insider finds that not even the greatest missile defenses could withstand a salvo launch from North Korea meaning deterrence wouldn’t ever apply as North Korea knows they can always overwhelm or fool any missile defense system.**

**Lockie**, Alex. “North Korea Just Showed the World It's Serious about Nuclear War - and the US's Response Won't Cut It.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 6 Mar. **2017,** www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-2017-3

**But**[**experts have repeatedly told Business Insider**](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-koreas-missile-defense-2017-2)**that even the greatest missile defenses don't offer complete protection from North Korea's ballistic missiles, and as North Korea refuses to play by the West's rules, missile defense becomes increasingly irrelevant. What North Korea demonstrated on Sunday was a salvo fire, which intends to overwhelm missile defenses with a volume of missiles. North Korea could launch hundreds of missiles from mobile launchers hidden across the country at any given moment.** Some of them could be decoys. Some of them could be long-range missiles lofted higher away from earth to reenter the atmosphere at speeds no interceptor missile could hope to match. North Korea's submarine could sail beyond the range of US and allied defenses and launch a nuke from the high seas. **In short, missile defenses can be fooled, and North Korea showed on Sunday it doesn't intend to be outfoxed.**

1. **Turn this- Suh of the Asia Pacific Journal in 2017 explains that deploying anti-missile defense in South Korea increases North Korea’s sense of insecurity so they start to increase their arms buildup. Consequently, this security dilemma pulls countries like China and Russia into this arms race as they will fear that North Korea’s arms can be used against them.**

Jae-Jung Suh is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at International Christian University and an expert on the international relations of the Korean Peninsula. “Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma: THAAD, Japan’s ‘Proactive Peace,’ and the Arms Race in Northeast Asia.” April 27, **2017**

Distinguishing these two paths helps us see the two different but related dangers being generated by THAAD. The U.S. and North Korea, on the one hand, are caught in an intensive security dilemma to the extent that **one’s security measures intensify the other’s sense of insecurity, prompting counter-measures, which in turn intensify one’s sense of insecurity. The intensive security dilemma lies at the heart of an asymmetrical arms race between the two states.3 The action-reaction chain, on the other hand, is not limited to these two actors. Their security dilemma extends to other states whose security is affected by their actions and reactions. North Korea’s weapons systems targeted at the U.S. military affect Japan’s and South Korea’s security as well, leading them to take countermeasures. U.S. weapons systems directed against North Korea likewise increase Chinese and Russians’ sense of insecurity and encourage them to build up against what they worry could be used against them**. The security dilemma between the United States and North Korea thus expands its geographical scope to entrap their allies and neighboring countries in a security dilemma.

### A/2: Deterrence Theory

1. **David Krieger of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation finds that implementing deterrence gives a false sense of confidence. Then, turn the argument. Krieger furthers, finding that when extra deterrence is implemented, the possessor of deterrence would often take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats, in turn, being counterproductive and possibly inducing more war.**

**Krieger**, David. “Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory.” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 8 Apr. **2014** [www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/](http://www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/).

Nuclear **deterrence is frequently confused with nuclear “defense,” leading to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide some form of physical protection against attack. This conclusion is simply wrong. The weapons and the threat of their use provide no physical protection. The only protection provided is psychological and once the weapons start flying it will become clear that psychological protection is not physical protection.** One can believe the weapons make him safer, but this is not the same as actually being safer**. Because nuclear deterrence theory provides a false sense of confidence, it could lead a possessor of the weapons to take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats in place. Such risks could be counterproductive and actually lead to nuclear war.**

1. **David Krieger of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation furthers that the overall effect of deterrence is a net increase in nuclear proliferation because the implementation of deterrence in one country pressures other countries to keep up and develop new weapons as other countries feel the need to keep up and have their own version of nuclear deterrence as well.**

**Krieger**, David. “Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory.” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 8 Apr. **2014** [www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/](http://www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/).

It doesn’t work against terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. Since it is not possible to retaliate against a foe that you cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances. Further, terrorists are often suicidal (e.g., “suicide bombers”), and are willing to die to inflict death and suffering on an adversary. For these reasons, nuclear deterrence will be ineffective in preventing nuclear terrorism. The only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to prevent the weapons themselves from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This will become increasingly difficult if nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials to build them proliferate to more and more countries. **It encourages nuclear proliferation. To the extent that the theory of nuclear deterrence is accepted as valid and its flaws overlooked or ignored, it will make nuclear weapons seem to be valuable instruments for the protection of a country. Thus, the uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence theory provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation. If it is believed that nuclear weapons can keep a country safe, there will be commensurate pressure to develop such weapons**.

## A/2 U.S. & South Korean Relations

### A/2: Nuclear Umbrella & South Korea Proliferation

1. **THAAD hasn’t been active until just recently- and if that means the nuclear umbrella is fraying, the impacts should have materialized already. Since South Korea hasn’t done anything yet, there’s no real reason to nuclearize because they still don’t need to nuke North Korea. Moreover, a few small politicians noting that South Korea will violate an international treaty won’t necessary mean they will carry out those actions.**
2. **A perception of loss of nuclear umbrella is still unlikely. There’s still a multitude of AMDs in play and not deploying THAAD won’t create a unique change in a lack of safety, especially when the nuclear umbrella has thrived for 60 years in the region.**
3. **Van Jackson of Center from New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations finds that a nuclear umbrella is reserved for its closest allies including currently South Korea, meaning that the nuclear umbrella isn’t deteriorating. Jackson furthers that it assures close allies that the U.S. will strike back if an ally is in danger. While U.S. has the strongest nuclear arms in the world, there’s not really a deterioration in nuclear umbrella through one small missile defense system.**

**Jackson**, Van. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My Nuclear Umbrella.” Foreign Policy, 19 May **2015**, foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclear-umbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/.

**In Asia, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is reserved for only its close allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea — as it should be. Promises of nuclear retaliation on behalf of others shouldn’t be made lightly. When the United States promises to defend allies against the greatest type of destruction imaginable — while at the same time upholding defense treaty commitments against non-nuclear attack — this should assure close allies of their security.** This is good for the United States because an assured ally is less likely to launch fear-based preventive strikes against adversaries; also, an assured ally also has no need to pursue its own nuclear weapons arsenal. If U.S. extended deterrence commitments work as intended, the confidence they provide to friends is just as important as the caution they should induce in would-be adversaries, like North Korea. But while U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea are the ultimate promise, it is a promise for the least-likely situation. And meanwhile, whether because of political expediency or the low stakes involved, the United States has played a marginal role in dealing with the smaller threats these two countries face: for Japan, Chinese harassment in waters around contested islands in the East China Sea; and for South Korea, conventional attacks by North Korea. The result? By failing to adequately tackle small-scale challenges with or on behalf of Tokyo and Seoul, the United States has cast doubt about its nuclear umbrella for those two countries. This in turn reflects an unstated paradox: the strongest form of U.S. commitment doesn’t address the much weaker quotidian challenges actually facing its allies. Consequently, Seoul and Tokyo look to Washington and see its credibility eroding. Frank Sinatra once sang that if he could make it in New York, he “could make it anywhere.”

1. **South Korea won’t proliferate. Christina Varriale of the Royal United Service Institute finds that it is highly unlikely South Korea would ever move towards nuclear weapons or withdraw from the NPT. Varriale furthers that the leap to acquire nuclear is too big for Seoul and the political impetus to drive forward a nuclear program isn’t present and doesn’t equate to a proliferation threat.**

**Varriale, Christina. “Trump and Asia: Tokyo and Seoul Proliferation Prospects.” RUSI, 5 Dec. 2016, rusi.org/commentary/trump-and-asia-tokyo-and-seoul-proliferation-prospects.**

**However, even with calls in South Korea and Japan for serious consideration of a move towards indigenous nuclear weapons, it still seems highly unlikely that either nation would incur the immense political costs that would come from withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and from launching a ‘race for a bomb’. Obtaining a nuclear capability is not a binary choice, but a matrix of both technical and political capacities. Although Japan and South Korea occupy different places along the capability spectrum, the leap across technical and political proliferation facets to acquire nuclear weapons remains, at present, too big for both Seoul and Tokyo.** Irrespective of the regional nuclear threats Japan faces, Tokyo has unwaveringly maintained an outstanding record of non-proliferation. However, Japan is also positioned in technological terms very close to a nuclear weapons capability. It has maintained a full nuclear fuel cycle with both enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, as well as vast quantities of stockpiled, weapons-useable plutonium and uranium. ‘Nuclear hedging’ is the model of proliferation whereby a state intentionally moves its nuclear programme towards the weapons line without creating an outright nuclear weapons programme. Although this level of infrastructure has been maintained for peaceful purposes, Japan’s technical nuclear independence and highly advanced capabilities make it easier for Tokyo to pursue varied proliferation options, should the political impetus to pursue a model of proliferation be present. While the outcome and benefit of a rhetorical or signalling shift will be contingent on many external factors, including threat context and legal and normative restrictions, Japan’s nuclear infrastructure does grant Tokyo strategic flexibility across the proliferation spectrum. **However, the official political impetus to drive forward this technological capacity into a weapons programme is not present, and such flexibility does not equate to an imminent proliferation threat.** The security context of Japan would need to alter significantly more than it has in recent months before consideration of the political leap to nuclear weapons can become a reality.

1. **South Korea can’t proliferate. Christina Varriale of the Royal United Service Institute furthers that South Korea’s lower technical abilities and lack of access to plutonium indigenously means they can’t create nuclear weapons. Then, Varriale continues that breaking the NPT severely damages the U.S.- South Korean alliance.**

**Varriale, Christina. “Trump and Asia: Tokyo and Seoul Proliferation Prospects.” RUSI, 5 Dec. 2016, rusi.org/commentary/trump-and-asia-tokyo-and-seoul-proliferation-prospects.**

However, the official political impetus to drive forward this technological capacity into a weapons programme is not present, and such flexibility does not equate to an imminent proliferation threat. The security context of Japan would need to alter significantly more than it has in recent months before consideration of the political leap to nuclear weapons can become a reality. Domestic calls for nuclearisation have been louder in South Korea than in Japan, with a number of opinion polls indicating that over half of the voters may now favour developing a nuclear arsenal. Although current public preoccupation is with the political scandal embroiling President Park Geun-hye, this will not override the long-term movement of nuclear discussions away from the fringes to the centre of public debate. Notwithstanding this, Seoul would face more practical hurdles than Japan to amending its non-proliferation policy, mainly as a result of two factors. **First, South Korea sits at a lower level of technical capability – a fact deliberately engineered as part of civil nuclear cooperation agreements with the US. In particular, South Korea is not permitted to reprocess plutonium indigenously – a key pathway to weapons-usable material. So although the political desire to explore the nuclear road, via hedging or otherwise, might be higher than in Japan, limited technical capacities reduce any imminent proliferation concern. Second, South Korea is not able to amend or ignore this restriction without substantially damaging its alliance with the US. Seoul is so heavily dependent on its US alliance for conventional force and deterrence against Pyongyang that it is unlikely to want to jeopardise this support by officially suggesting or pursuing an independent nuclear arsenal. Such a break would leave Seoul vulnerable for a period of time, lacking both the robust US backing that it has traditionally enjoyed as well as its own convincing capability.** Irrespective of alliance calculations, disapproval from the broader international community would surely follow any apparent increase in South Korean or Japanese nuclear steps. How this disapproval would manifest itself and to what extent such policy shifts would invite tangible punishment is difficult to assess at the moment. However, the assumption is that the risk of backlash is likely to be decisive in favour of the status quo for both Japan and South Korea. In both cases, therefore, gaps between current status and weapons acquisition are too large to raise immediate proliferation concerns. From a purely technical viewpoint, Japan’s advanced nuclear infrastructure would provide greater flexibility for approaching proliferation, but dramatic political changes remain unlikely.

### A/2: U.S. Most Important

1. **U.S isn’t key to making an effect on North Korea. Elenor Albert of The Council of Foreign Relations noted that China is 90% of North Korean trade, meaning the country that will have the biggest impact and influence on North Korea is always going to be China. This is key because Albert continues that China is fed up of North Korea’s behavior and wants a change, but refuse to take action because of THAAD.**

**Albert**, Eleanor. “China Has the Most Leverage on Kim Jong-Un's Regime. Will It Use It?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 July **2017**, [www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship](http://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship)**.**

Pyongyang economically. In February 2017, China’s commerce ministry temporarily suspended coal imports from North Korea through the rest of the year, a move that enhances the effectiveness of existing UN sanctions against North Korea. Beijing had previously banned coal imports from North Korea in April 2016 but had allowed exceptions for “people’s well-being.” Since the new ban, some vessels carrying coal have reportedly been turned away at Chinese ports. The Global Times, a semi-official Chinese newspaper, suggested in an April 2017 editorial that China may be supportive of measures banning oil exports to North Korea should Pyongyang conduct further nuclear tests, echoing similar calls from some Chinese experts. State-owned oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation also suspended fuel sales to North Korea in June 2017, citing concerns that North Korea would fail to pay the company. **Regional experts say such actions may suggest that the Chinese regime is “losing patience” with Pyongyang, while others say that these shifts by Beijing are merely tactical. Aid and Trade for Pyongyang China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for upwards of 90 percent of North Korea’s total trade volume. Conversely, China’s purchases from its neighbor include minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments. In the first quarter of 2017, China–North Korea trade was up 37.4 percent from the same period in 2016. “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.**

1. **China is more important to South Korea for two key regions. One, because China is the East Asia hegemon meaning a conflict with South Korea would involve all of East Asia taking China’s side because there’s a higher chance of them listening to the regionally stronger country. Two, because South Korea depends on China to run their economy. The Pan Asian Alliance finds that China is more than one fourth of South Korea’s export and their imports, being their top import and export partner, along with providing South Korea electric equipment and fuel.**

Korea- Trade .” **PAA**.Net, Pan Asian E-Commerce Alliance, **2017**, paa.net/?page\_id=580. <https://paa.net/?page_id=580> <https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/south-korea/tradestats>

**South Korea imports mainly Oil, Electronic equipment, Machines, engines, pumps, Iron and steel, Medical, technical equipment South Korea’s main trade partners for imports are China,** Japan, United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany**, South Korea’s most important export partners are again China**, United States, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Japan, and the products that South Korea exports are: Electronic equipment, Vehicles excluding trains and streetcars, Machinery, Mineral fuels including oil , Ships, boats and other floating structures.

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| **Top 5 Export Items** | Electronic equipment, Vehicles excluding trains and streetcars, Machinery, Mineral fuels including oil , Ships, boats and other floating structures |
| **Top 5 Import Items** | Oil, Electronic equipment, Machines, engines, pumps, Iron and steel, Medical, technical equipment |
| **Top 5 Export Partners** | **China, United States, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Japan** |
| **Top 5 Import Partners** | **China, Japan, United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany** |

1. **Turn- Strengthening and prioritizing U.S.- South Korean relations simply angers North Korea further. Foster Klug of The Miami Herald finds that often, U.S. government responses anger North Korea, causing responses that include weapons testing and nuclear detonation, contributing to regional instability. Klug finds that irrational U.S. statements contribute to North Korean anger and increase the chance of provocation.**

Press, **Klug** Associated. “Trump's North Korea Threat Leaves Asia Struggling to Explain.” Miamiherald, 19 Sept. **2017**, [www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article174259716.html](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article174259716.html).

Was it a bluff? A warning that Washington would shoot down North Korea's next missile test? A restatement of past policy? Or simply just what it seemed: a straightforward threat of annihilation from the president of the United States? Officials and pundits across Asia struggled Wednesday to parse Donald Trump's vow Tuesday at the U.N. General Assembly to "totally destroy North Korea" if provoked. In a region well used to Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons generating a seemingly never-ending cycle of threats and counter-threats, Trump's comments stood out**. South Korea officially played them down, while some politicians worried that Trump's words signaled a loss of influence for Seoul.** Tokyo focused on his mention of Japanese citizens abducted by the North. Analysts across Asia expressed surprise, worry, even wry amusement, in one case, that Trump's words seemed to mirror threats normally emanating from North Korean state media. Amid the speculation, the focus of Trump's belligerence, North Korea, remained silent in the hours after the speech. Officials from the office of South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a liberal who has advocated dialogue with the North while being forced into a hawkish position by the North's weapons tests, called Trump's words a signal of Washington's strong resolve to deal with the North, but also essentially a repetition of the basic stance that all options will be considered when confronting Pyongyang**. Trump has previously threatened the North with "fire and fury." Pyongyang responded to those past remarks with a string of weapons tests, including its sixth and most powerful nuclear detonation and two missiles that flew over U.S. ally Japan. Park Soo-hyun, a Moon spokesman, said that Trump's comments "reaffirmed the need to put maximum sanctions and pressure against North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations" so that Pyongyang realizes that abandoning its nuclear weapons is the only way forward. Marcus Noland, a North Korea specialist with the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, said in an online post that Trump's threat will feed a long-standing North Korean narrative that claims that the United States poses an existential threat. "With those words, President Trump handed the Kim regime the soundbite of the century. It will play on a continuous loop on North Korean national television," Noland wrote. North Korea's regular weapons tests are an attempt to create an arsenal of nuclear missiles that can threaten U.S. troops throughout Asia and the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang tested its first two intercontinental ballistic missiles** in July and claims that it can now accurately reach the U.S. homeland, though outside experts say the North may still need more tests before its weapons are fully viable. Each new test pushes the nation that much closer to that goal.

### A/2: ROK-US Relations Worsen

1. **American- South Korean haven’t changed throughout the course of the alliance and relations are stronger than ever. The U.S. Department of State notes that the US- South Korean relationships, which have been around for the past 60 plus years, endure today through shared values and interests and have allowed them to coordinate closely, even today. The U.S. Department of State continues to find that the people to people ties between the alliance have never been stronger. The argument they give you makes zero sense at the point where U.S.-SK relations have endured through a multitude of hardships through many years, and are the strongest today, meaning they won’t fall apart.**

“South Korea.” **U.S. Department of State**, U.S. Department of State, 25 Jan. **2017**, [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm).

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded the R.O.K.. Led by the United States, a United Nations coalition of 16 countries undertook its defense. Following China's entry into the war on behalf of North Korea later that year, a stalemate ensued for the final two years of the conflict until an armistice was concluded on July 27, 1953. A peace treaty has never been signed. **In 1953, at the conclusion of the Korean War, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, the foundation of a comprehensive alliance that endures today.** In the decades after the war, the R.O.K. experienced political turmoil under autocratic leadership, but developed a vocal civil society that led to strong protests against authoritarian rule. Pro-democracy activities intensified in the 1980s and the R.O.K. began the transition to what is now a vibrant, democratic system. U.S.-R.O.K. ties are based on common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. **The United States and the R.O.K. share a long history of friendship and cooperation based on shared values and interests. The two countries work together to combat regional and global threats and to strengthen their economies. The United States has maintained Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel in the R.O.K. in support of its commitment under the U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty to help the R.O.K. defend itself against external aggression. In 2013, the two countries celebrated the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance.** A Combined Forces Command coordinates operations between U.S. units and R.O.K. armed forces. The United States and the R.O.K. coordinate closely on the North Korean nuclear issue and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As the R.O.K.’s economy has developed (it joined the OECD in 1996), trade and investment ties have become an increasingly important aspect of the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship. In recent years, the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance has expanded into a deep, comprehensive global partnership, and the R.O.K.’s role as a regional and global leader continues to grow. The R.O.K. hosted the 2010 G-20 Summit, the 2011 Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, the 2013 Seoul Conference on Cyberspace, and the 2014 International Telecommunication Union Plenipotentiary Conference. In 2017, the R.O.K. will assume the chairmanship of the Global Health Security Agenda Steering Group. The R.O.K. is a committed member of various international nonproliferation regimes, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The R.O.K. has pledged more than half a billion dollars towards development efforts including $100 million to the Global Health Security Agenda, $200 million to its Better Life for Girls initiative, and $100 million in additional humanitarian assistance over the next three above its annual $44 million contribution. **People-to-people ties between the United States and the R.O.K. have never been stronger.** The R.O.K., on a per capita basis, sends the highest number of students to the United States to study of any industrialized country. Educational exchanges include a vibrant Fulbright exchange program as well as the Work, English Study, and Travel (WEST) program that gives a diverse group of Korean students the opportunity to learn more about the United States.

1. **The U.S.- South Korean relations simply can’t end in the present. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Fact Sheet as reported through the U.S. Department of State notes that the recent renewal of relationships such as a Civil Space Framework agreement to increase technological cooperation along with future Joint Committee Meetings meaning the contracts secure the future of the alliance and it staying intact.**

South Korea.” **U.S. Department of State**, U.S. Department of State, 25 Jan. **2017**, [www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm).

The emergence of the R.O.K. as a global leader has led to an increasingly dynamic U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance focused on future-oriented partnership opportunities including space, energy, health, climate change, and cyber. **The United States and R.O.K. renewed in 2015 the Civil Nuclear “123” Agreement and maintain a High-Level Bilateral Commission to address civil nuclear issues of mutual interest. Our two countries signed in 2016 a Civil Space Framework Agreement to increase cooperation in civil space exploration and we hold biennial cabinet-level Joint Committee Meetings on science and technology.** The R.O.K. is an active partner on efforts combat illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, and is working to establish a World Fisheries University. People-to-people ties between the United States and the R.O.K. have never been stronger. **The R.O.K., on a per capita basis, sends the highest number of students to the United States to study of any industrialized country. Educational exchanges include a vibrant Fulbright exchange program as well as the Work, English Study, and Travel (WEST) program that gives a diverse group of Korean students the opportunity to learn more about the United States.**

1. **Turn- AMDs such as THAAD solely make the relationship worse. Jennifer Williams of Vox finds that THAAD creates Anti-American protests, along with angering liberals in the government who oppose THAAD, and finally making the relationship worse by damaging relations with the current president who opposes the overall idea of THAAD being deployed.**

**Williams**, Jennifer. “South Korea Has a New President. He and Trump See North Korea Very, Very Differently.” Vox, Vox, 9 May **2017**, www.vox.com/world/2017/5/9/15583758/south-korea-president-election-trump-north-korea.

**The deployment of the US missile-defense system was approved back in July 2016 in an agreement between the Obama administration and then-President Park Geun-hye. During the campaign, Moon made clear he didn’t like the plan, and called for halting the deployment of THAAD “until the new president takes office and can evaluate its benefits and drawbacks.” “The delivery should be halted even how, and the next administration should ultimately decide this issue,” his campaign manager said** on April 26, less than two weeks before the country’s election. But why in the world would South Koreans object to a missile-defense system designed to protect them from incoming missiles from the North? The first reason is that China, one of South Korea’s most important trading partners, is livid over the deployment of THAAD, which it sees as a potential threat to its military capabilities. And the specter of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea is making some in South Korea reconsider THAAD. “I want to emphasize again that China is firm in its resolve to oppose the deployment of THAAD in [South Korea] and will resolutely take necessary actions to safeguard its own security interests,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said at a press briefing in Beijing in late February. “Any consequences entailed from that will be borne by the US and [South Korea]. We strongly urge relevant parties to stop the deployment process and not to go further down that wrong path,” he said.

### A/2: Troop Pullout

1. **Logically, any number of ground troops don’t impact security from nuclear weapons. At the end of the day, the troops don’t truly impact South Korean safety in any way.**
2. **Make them show you a bright-line. Logically, it’s not like the entire alliance is going to go away so they have to tell you exactly how damaged it actually is for you to weigh their impacts.**
3. **De-link as Vu of the National Interest gives two reasons why the US would never withdraw its troops. First, credibility in East Asia. Troops in South Korea represent a backbone of the US’ pivot to Asia and thus any setback in the US-South Korea alliance hurts US influence over countries like India and Vietnam. Second, nuclear proliferation. Vu explains that if the US were to withdraw its troops, it would have to deal with a more independent and nuclear-armed South Korea. In fact, when the US tried to withdraw troops in the 70s, South Korea began a nuclear arms program.**

Nonetheless, such a unilateral act would be at odds with Washington’s nonproliferation policy, and poses more difficulties for Washington to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the United States responded by deploying its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea, to alleviate its ally’s fear of being attacked by North Korean missiles and thereby impede South Korea’s nuclear ambitions. **If Washington were to withdraw its troops or signal to reduce its presence, it would have to deal with a potentially more independent and nuclear-armed South Korea. America knows this well thanks to its experience of the Park Chung-hee–Jimmy Carter crisis in the late 1970s. This crisis started when the U.S. president attempted to pull out American armed forces without proper consultations with South Korea, and Seoul launched its nuclear program to make up for the loss of American protection. South Korea’s nuclear bid only ended after the United States reassured its military support and slowed down its troop withdrawal.** This lesson should serve as a reminder that Washington will not be able to withdraw troops without negative repercussions.The third factor is America’s credibility with other East Asian countries. **The U.S.–South Korean alliance is an anchor for America’s influence in the Asia-Pacific and it also represents the backbone of America’s “pivot to Asia” policy. Amid U.S. efforts of forging closer ties with the Philippines, India and Vietnam, a setback in the U.S.-South Korea alliance will send an unfriendly signal to these countries and give China larger leeway to court regional middle powers.** America may withdraw if it wants to, but the price of such a withdrawal may cost it the hub-and-spoke system it created during the Cold War, or its credibility with other allies and partners in Europe or the Middle East. Burden sharing for troop presence with South Korea seems to be most viable choice for the United States at this moment, since it benefits not only South Korea but also America.

1. **U.S. troop pullout, if anything, reduces Korean Peninsula tensions. Motoko Rich and David Sanger of the New York Times find that North Korea is willing to suspend its war games if perceived threatening presence in the region from the U.S. disappears, including withdrawal of troops and tactical weapons.**

MOTOKO **Rich** and DAVID E. **Sanger**. “Motives of North Korea’s Leader Baffle Americans and Allies.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 3 Sept. **2017**, [www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un.html).

**The North has repeatedly called for the suspension of annual war games conducted by the United States and South Korea and an eventual withdrawal of American troops from the peninsula. It is likely to want a guarantee that the United States will never again station tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.** It will surely want sanctions lifted, and some economic aid, as well as diplomatic recognition. Critics of past negotiations with North Korea say it will never be satisfied. “It’s just this endless slippery slope of demands,” said Bruce Klingner, a Korean and Japanese specialist at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. **Some analysts say that what North Korea most wants is respect.** “There is a certain universality of wanting to be recognized and respected,” said Cameron Munter, former United States ambassador to Pakistan and now president of the EastWest Institute. **“And because Americans take this for granted, they don’t see just how deeply motivating that search for respect can be.”**

1. **Turn- If troop pullout does happen, it is good because it encourages South Korean to empower themselves while unburdening U.S. troops. Doug Bandow of National Interest finds that U.S. troops are outdated in the area, along with causing the U.S. to be economically endangered and militarily stretched. Bandow furthers that South Korea is simply held back by American presence and could outmatch North Korea on every level, and can currently do what is necessary to deter and defeat the northern antagonist.**

**Bandow**, Doug, et al. “Leaving Korea Will Unburden U.S. Troops and Help South Korea Grow Up.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 6 July **2016**, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/leaving-korea-will-unburden-us-troops-help-south-korea-grow-16866.

**The United States should try a different approach. Washington should withdraw from the Korean vortex. Then the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would be primarily a problem for its neighbors, who have the most at stake. Washington was blissfully unconcerned about the Korean peninsula until the end of World War II.** Earlier relations ended when Japan swallowed the Korean kingdom. Missionaries and independence activists remained busy in America making the case for a free Korea. But the peninsula’s status didn’t much matter to the U.S. government. Tokyo’s defeat changed that. Although Korea did not directly figure in World War II, that land could not be left with an aggressive empire that was being dismantled. Which put America in the position of joint occupier alongside the Soviet Union. Out of the Cold War came two separate, antagonistic countries, the Korean War, and an American security guarantee, backed by permanent troop deployments. **Yet Washington’s military presence became an anachronism long ago. In the 1960s the South Korean economy finally took off. Today the Republic of Korea outmatches the DPRK on every measure of national power save military, and the latter deficiency is a matter of choice. With twice the population and around forty times the GDP, South Korea could do whatever is necessary to deter and defeat its northern antagonist. Seoul doesn’t do so because America continues to spend the resources and risk the lives of its citizens on the Republic of Korea’s behalf.** That made sense during the Cold War, but no longer. Without such a global struggle the peninsula no longer is important let alone vital for U.S. security. A war there would be costly in economic and tragic in human terms, but the burden would mostly fall on surrounding nations. **Most important, the South is well able to defend itself, at least from any conventional threat. The United States is militarily stretched, economically embattled and fiscally endangered. It no longer can afford to subsidize the defense of prosperous and populous friends.**

1. **Turn it again- Doug Bandow of the National Interest continues that U.S. troop influence in the area makes South Korea targeted by North Korea, and a U.S. pullout would entice the Kim regime to back down, promoting more safety and stability in the region.**

**Bandow**, Doug, et al. “Leaving Korea Will Unburden U.S. Troops and Help South Korea Grow Up.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 6 July **2016**, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/leaving-korea-will-unburden-us-troops-help-south-korea-grow-16866.

**Absent its military commitment to the Republic of Korea, America would be of no concern to the latest Kim scion to rule over the impoverished land to the north. As it is, scarcely a week goes by without a new insult or threat emanating from Pyongyang directed at America. For instance, Kim Jong-un was recently quoted expressing his “great satisfaction” with the test of the midrange Musudan missile, which offers a “powerful means of attack” to help protect the DPRK from “hostile forces,” including the United States.** As a result, he explained, “We have the sure capability to attack in an overall and practical way the Americans in the Pacific operation theater,” apparently meaning to target Washington’s many bases. Even more dramatic have been tests, most recently in April, on a long-range missile capable of hitting North America. The weapon probably isn’t capable of targeting anything in particular, but further tests likely will improve its accuracy. This work has no value for a conflict on the peninsula or even nearby. It is useful only for threatening the United States. At the same time the DPRK is thought to be expanding its nuclear capabilities. The Institute for Science and International Security recently estimated North Korea’s arsenal at thirteen to twenty-one weapons. It may be adding four to six weapons a year. Yet North Korea’s threats do not occur in a vacuum. Pyongyang is targeting America with weapons as well as rhetoric because America is over there. **Kim does not spend his time denouncing Mexico or threatening to turn Toronto into a lake of fire. He does not vilify Europe at every opportunity. Brazil and Nigeria do not make Kim’s enemy list. If Washington were not threatening his nation with war, backed by forces based only a few miles south of his country and around the region, he wouldn’t waste his breath on America. Which creates yet another reason for the United States to bring home its forces.**

### A/2: North Korean Power Vacuum

1. **Completely non-unique because Vu Khang of The National Interest finds that whether there is a vacuum of power or not, the Pyongyang regime has no incentive to stop nuclearizing- nuclearizing happens with or without troops.**

**Vu**, Khang, et al. “The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 10 July **2016**, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904.

**Pyongyang clearly understands these facts; thus, it finds no incentive to give up its nuclear program and confronts Seoul in the realm of conventional warfare.** Moreover, American withdrawal does not guarantee that North Korea will not carry on with its nuclear programs. The collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks and the Leap-Day Agreement should serve as a reminder of North Korea’s untrustworthiness; therefore, Washington must not make the same mistakes in future engagements with Pyongyang. **In the meantime, the best way for the United States to curb North Korea’s nuclear program should be to enforce UN sanctions and persuade China to join forces**, and this approach only works as long as the United States sustains its influence in the region. It is better to deal with the devil we know than the devil we do not know.

1. **Khang of the National Interest continues that even without U.S. troops, North Korea can’t fill the power vacuum because South Korea military can defeat North Korea.**

**Vu**, Khang, et al. “The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 10 July **2016**, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904.

Second, withdrawing U.S. troops will not result in any breakthroughs in negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear bid does not originate from its fear of Washington’s threat; instead, it is the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula in Seoul’s favor that pushes Pyongyang to resort to nuclear capability. **Even if Washington were to withdraw all its troops from South Korea immediately, the South Korean military would still be able to defeat Northern aggression** (though a Pyrrhic victory). Moreover, with the absence of American military, miscalculations between North and South Korea will increase, which poses more threats to Pyongyang after than before U.S. troops’ withdrawal.

1. **Historical precedent shows that North Korean power vacuum has no real-world impacts. Thomas Reuters of The National Post in 2011 predicted a power vacuum in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong II. The report, which ended up being false because no war erupted in the region proving that historically, North Koreans don’t take the place of leaders to fill the power vacuum.**

**Reuters**. “As Kim Jong-Un Prepares to Succeed Father, Who Really Holds the Power in North Korea?” National Post, 20 Dec. **2011**, nationalpost.com/news/analysis-does-kim-jong-un-really-hold-the-power-in-north-korea.

The North’s power elite is formally a three-pronged structure of the military, the Workers’ Party of Korea and the parliament. The National Defense Commission is the state’s supreme leadership body, which Kim headed. The Workers’ Party of Korea was also headed by Kim until his death and a general meeting last year was meant to revive its status as the primary source of power. **Parliament is headed by Kim Yong-nam, a loyal but passive figurehead who analysts say poses no threat to the transition. They also say it is unclear how the individual interests of the elite will work to drive the state through what is the closet thing to a power vacuum it has known. One thing is clear — the elite want to survive and know they cannot afford a power struggle**. “The North Korean leadership is united,” said Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul. “They understand that they should hang together in order not to be hanged separately.” Jang, his wife Kim and Vice Marshal Ri are expected to make sure Jong-un survives as the third generational leader and that North Korea holds together at least through the centenary of Kim Il-Sung’s birth in 2012. “These people make up a crisis management community,” said Cho Min of the Korea Institute for National Unification. “They will be ensuring that everyone understands that it is in no one’s interest to try to stand up against Kim Jong-un.”

### A/2: Chinese Power Vacuum

1. **Non- Unique- The U.S. has already begun some withdrawal with no negative impacts. Carter Jonson of Brown Political Review finds that as the U.S. slowly retracts from Asia, Chinese influence only contributes to more regional stability by supporting free trade, lowing tariffs, and expanding trade with Latin America. Make them give you a unique reason why Chinese influence is bad.**

**Johnson**, Carter, et al. “Asia's Unstable Power Vacuum.” Brown Political Review, 28 Feb. **2017**, [www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/02/asias-unstable-power-vacuum/](http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/02/asias-unstable-power-vacuum/).

**Contrary to popular belief, the US has already retracted its leadership advantage in Asia.** China has quickly capitalized on the economic vacuum left by the American withdrawal from the TPP by furthering the RCEP as a substitute for the deal. **Chinese President Xi Jinping has promised to focus on lowering tariffs within the region and supporting free trade, creating the possibility of a Western Pacific common market. Vietnam and Malaysia have also shifted their attention from the TPP to the RCEP.** And although the TPP wouldn’t have significantly improved the US economy, leaving the Asian-Pacific economy could be detrimental for US exports in Japan. If the RCEP proves successful, the US could forfeit up to $5.3 billion annually to Chinese competition. **The partnership also shows signs of expanding — China has invited Latin American nations, and more nations are aligning their economies with China over America**. Over the past five years, World Bank data indicates that every member of the TPP, including Japan, increased imports from China and decreased imports from America. The emergence of the RCEP and the gradual detachment of US influence in Southeast Asia indicate America’s focus on national solipsism at the expense of economic pragmatism.

1. **Turn- China entering the power vacuum in South Korea improves the South Korean economy. The Market Mogul finds that Chinese investment in South Korean Samsung Electronics generated record earnings and will produce new flash memory chips, along with building in the global market.**

“Right to Privacy and Triple Talaq: A Week of Historic Indian Supreme Court Judgments.” **The Market Mogul**, 8 Sept. **2017**, themarketmogul.com/historic-indian-supreme-court-judgments/?hvid=KtNl0.

While **Samsung Electronics has had a good year, generating record earnings and overtaking Intel as the world’s largest semiconductor company,** its founding Lee family has not. The Group’s vice-chair and heir-apparent Lee Jae-yong has been sentenced to five years in prison for his part in a graft scandal involving ex-President Park Guen-hye, and there are worries of a “power vacuum” at South Korea’s largest company. **The group has announced the China investment, to produce NAND flash memory chips that are used in smartphones, to build on its over 40% market share in the global NAND and DRAM semiconductor market.**

1. **Turn- John Glaser of The National Interests finds that U.S. presence simply aggravates China and allowing China to feel more powerful would decrease overall Chinese aggression preventing China from going on the offensive lashing out at U.S. allies, including South Korea. Glaser concludes that U.S. relinquishing its role in East Asia doesn’t have negative impacts while preserving core U.S. interests.**

**Glaser**, John, et al. “The Ugly Truth About Avoiding War With China.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 28 Dec. **2015**, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ugly-truth-about-avoiding-war-china-14740.

But containment is problematic: it carries the dubious presumption that China’s most likely reaction to U.S. expansion in the region is to become a docile power, eager to give up its regional ambitions. **In reality, Washington’s determination to maintain dominance in East Asia is much more likely to generate an intense security dilemma.** To understand why, we have to try to see the world through China’s strategic lens. According to Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, **China sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” The Chinese view the United States as “a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests.” China’s feelings of encirclement are not unwarranted. America’s presence along China’s maritime periphery is highly militarized and provocative**, with the U.S. Pacific Fleet conducting countless exercises and training events with dozens of countries in the region. Washington’s massive military presence on the Korean Peninsula, and just across the East China Sea on the southern tip of the Japanese archipelago, are perceived as substantive threats to Chinese security. America’s position as the largest naval presence in the East and South China Seas also stokes fear in China, particularly because roughly 40 percent of Chinese oil imports come by sea and pass through sea-lanes that are subject to interdiction by the United States. **Currently, China’s “obvious orientation,” writes Lyle Goldstein “is defensive,” although “those tendencies could change if Beijing perceives that its strategic environment has substantially worsened.” So, what today might constitute a defensive Chinese foreign policy could in the future transform into a more aggressive stance if increased U.S. military presence in the region convinces Beijing that it is under threat. Fortunately, the United States can relinquish its outsized hegemonic role in East Asia without damaging its core interests. Nothing in China’s foreign policy indicates any intention to preemptively or preventively use force against America’s or its allies’ sovereign territory. Despite its naval buildup, China has not credibly threatened to cut off sea lines of communication or disrupt trade routes. The United States is arguably the most secure great power in history. With weak and pliant neighbors to its north and south, vast oceans to its east and west and a superior nuclear deterrent, it is remarkably insulated from external threats. Maintaining military predominance in East Asia simply doesn’t add much to our unusually secure position.**

### A/2: US-NK Diplomacy

1. **Responding to Guam & North Korea offering diplomacy with U.S. [Panda]- Panda goes on to contradict himself saying that a real solution is improbable.**
2. **Extremely improbable- Al Jazeera finds in 2017 that Trumps outlandish and strong language completely destroys any chance of a U.S.-North Korean relations, meaning North Korea will never go to the negotiating table with the U.S.**

Jazeera, Al. “'Tensions to Rise' after Trump's North Korea Comments.” USA News | **Al Jazeera**, Al Jazeera, 19 Sept. **2017**, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/rise-trump-north-korea-comments-170919172721028.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/rise-trump-north-korea-comments-170919172721028.html).

US President Donald Trump's highly-combative remarks against North Korea and its leader at the United Nations will only harden Pyongyang's resolve to continue developing its nuclear programme, analysts have warned. Using what was described as "unprecedented" language, Trump made his debut address at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Tuesday. In a wide-ranging 45-minute speech, the most anticipated foreign policy address of his tenure, **Trump vowed that the US would "totally destroy" North Korea if it is forced to defend itself or its allies. He also mocked Kim Jong-un, North Korea's leader, saying: "Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully, this will not be necessary." The sharp escalation in rhetoric came weeks after Trump warned that North Korea would be met with "fire and fury like the world had never seen" if it continues expanding its nuclear programme."I expected him to talk tough and strong - but I did not expect him to talk quite that tough and quite that strongly**," said Donald Kirk, a journalist and author of several books on Korea. He said Trump's remarks made the prospect of negotiations extremely unlikely. "North Koreans are not going to back down - if anything they are going to increase the tempo of their programme," Kirk told Al Jazeera from South Korea's capital, Seoul**. "I think we can forget about North Korea saying, 'let's go to negotiations.'" Kirk also said he expected that Trump's fiery approach would not be adopted by other leaders who are otherwise highly critical of North Korea's actions.** "We are in for some quite interesting questions here, and a lot of it is not going to be favourable to Trump," he said. "I get the general impression that tensions will increase and the line is drawn ever deeper."

1. **America can’t affect North Korea in anyway without China’s support. Ian Buruma of The Atlantic reports that America simply can’t change the North Korean regime’s actions, especially without China and current gestures from Washington simply stir up the North Korean populace, creating more Anti-Americanism.**

**Buruma**, Ian. “America Can't Do Much About North Korea.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 17 Apr. **2017**, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-china-beijing-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapon/523230/.

America doesn’t know exactly what North Korea's nuclear capability is, but it is likely sufficient to kill millions of South Koreans or Japanese. That North Korea would be smashed in retaliation is no consolation. **The fact is that there is nothing much America can do about Kim’s attempts to develop nuclear-tipped missiles, especially without China’s support. Even Trump, his brilliance notwithstanding, must realize that some problems just cannot be “solved.”** The litany of futile diplomatic overtures to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions reads like a history of failure. In 1994, President Bill Clinton promised aid to North Korea in exchange for a promise to freeze its nuclear program. In 2002, it became clear that the North Koreans had reneged on the deal. The thing is that Kim will not give up his nuclear arsenal, for it is all he has got. Without the bomb, North Korea would be no more than a small, impoverished dictatorship. With nuclear missiles, it can behave as a major power, or more importantly, hold other major powers at bay. Clinton also once considered bombing North Korean nuclear installations, but, in the end, considered the risk too high. It would be even higher now. **Not only are such installations now more dispersed throughout the country, making a clean hit very difficult, but the “collateral damage” inflicted by a cornered Northern regime would be horrendous: Seoul is a mere 35 miles from the North Korean border. Empty threats from Washington are not just ineffectual; they play into the Korean dictator’s hands. Whether most North Koreans really worship the Kim dynasty as much as they seem to is hard to know, since most of “these gestures of idolatry” are coerced. But Korean nationalism can be very easily stirred up**. One thing that holds North Koreans together is the fear, constantly stoked by the regime, of a wicked foreign attack.

1. **Max Fisher of The New York Times finds that the U.S. window to promote denuclearization is closed because American officials simply don’t have the ability and cannot slow or remove North Korea’s nuclear capacities.**

**Fisher**, Max. “North Korea and Its Weapons Programs Are Now a Fact of Life.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 7 July **2017**, [www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/asia/north-korea-weapons.html?mcubz=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/asia/north-korea-weapons.html?mcubz=0).

**North Korea’s once-unthinkable nuclear and missile capabilities are, as long as the country wants, here to stay. With each North Korean nuclear or missile test, American officials go through a ritual that appears increasingly at odds with reality. They declare that they will not tolerate the rogue programs they have demonstrated little ability to slow, much less remove**. They organize more of the talks or sanctions that have failed to alter North Korea’s strategic calculus. And they issue threats that, if carried out, would either change little or risk an all-out war. But the best that Washington can hope for, analysts and former officials increasingly say, may be to freeze the program in place. Even this would most likely come at a steep cost, a grim recognition both that the threat is severe and that American leverage is limited. “The window for denuclearization closed a long time ago,” Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, wrote in a column this week. The threat can be managed, he continued, only by “accepting the unacceptable” as a hard fact of life.

## A/2: Bargaining Chip

### A/2: General Arguments

1. **They concede in cross that a bargaining chip as never been used in the time that THAAD was deployed, and they can’t show you why their impacts didn’t materialize in the past. At that point, they can’t uniquely show that any of the plan to use a bargaining chip will work now.**
2. **It won’t happen. The Yonhap News Agency finds that the U.S. isn’t interested in negotiating with THAAD and past attempts to negotiate with China have been declined. They have literally no link at this point, because even if China wants the bargaining chip the U.S. won’t allow it to happen.**

**Yonhap News Agency, 16**, (), "(3rd LD) THAAD is not 'bargaining chip' with China: Russel," 2016/02/26 , http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/02/26/0301000000AEN20160226005553315.html, 7-22-2017 (AD)

Whether the United States would deploy its advance anti-missile shield in South Korea is not a matter of "bargaining" with China in the run-up to the United Nations' adoption of fresh sanctions on North Korea, a senior U.S. diplomat said Friday. **"There's no connection between what is going on in the diplomatic track in the U.N. Security Council and the question of the deployment of THAAD," Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel told reporters in Seoul. "THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip."** The comments suggest **the U.S.' push to deploy the anti-ballistic missile system, known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD, in South Korea will not waver despite China's strong opposition.** Earlier this week, the U.S. abruptly postponed the scheduled launch of a joint working group with South Korea on the deployment of a THAAD battery here. The delay coincided with the American and Chinese top diplomats' talks on adopting more stringent-than-ever sanctions on North Korea, sparking speculations that the U.S. may scrap the deployment plan in return for China joining the U.N.'s punitive actions against North Korea. Russel arrived in Seoul earlier in the day to discuss how to jointly respond to North Korea's recent nuclear and long-range rocket tests. He had meetings with Foreign Minister Yoon Byung-se and his counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun before holding a brief meeting with reporters. Russel **stressed the deployment is only defensive in nature and aims only to protect South Koreans and Americans here from North Korea's missile threats. "It aims not at a third country, not China, but defending the citizens of the Republic of Korea and U.S. citizens and service members here," he noted. He also reaffirmed the U.S.' position that there will be no peacemaking talks with North Korea until the communist country denuclearized itself.**

1. **Yin Whan-Yoo of the Korea Times finds that overall, THAAD isn’t a bargaining chip for diplomatic relations and after numerous foreign ministry meetings, even with deployment, there’s never going to be a diplomatic track using THAAD because of the political beliefs in South Korea.**

**Whan-Yoo**, Yi. “THAAD Is Not 'Bargaining Chip'.” Koreatimes, 26 Feb. **2016**, [www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/103\_199135.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/103_199135.html).

**A senior U.S. diplomat said Friday that the proposed deployment of an American missile system in South Korea is not "a bargaining chip" with China over tougher U.N. sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test and long-range missile launch.**  Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel dismissed allegations that the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system is a diplomatic bargaining chip in Washington's negotiations with Beijing over the North Korean issue and other security agendas in the region**. "There's no connection between what is going on in the diplomatic track in the U.N. Security Council and the question of the deployment of THAAD," Russel told reporters in Seoul. "THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip." Russel made the remarks after a meeting with Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam and Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun.** He visited Seoul to discuss issues related to a U.N. resolution on tougher sanctions against North Korea for its latest nuclear test and launch of a long-range rocket. His visit came prior to a visit scheduled for Sunday by Wu Dawei, China's top nuclear envoy. "This is a very important time to put our heads together and think about the way forward, particularly in implementing a new U.N. Security Council resolution once it's concluded," Russel told reporters upon arriving at Incheon International Airport. Wu will meet his South Korean counterpart Hwang Joon-gook, the special representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, and hold talks on resuming suspended dialogue on Pyongyang's denuclearization.

1. **Brent V. Benson of Vanderblit University finds that overall, democracies are more likely to make concessions with bargaining chips. At the point where China is a one-party state, Benson finds that the probability of that type of government responding to a bargaining chip with concessions isn’t likely.**

**Benson,** Brett V. “A Bargaining Model of Nuclear Weapons Development and Disarmament.” A Bargaining Model of Nuclear Weapons Development and Disarmament, vol. 1, July **2010,** pp. 23–24.

**The bargaining model we have developed is a useful baseline model to begin thinking about bargaining over nuclear weapons. The model can be extended in many different di- rections to advance our theoretical understanding of different aspects of nuclear bargaining. One promising direction would be to study the effects of verifiable arming on proliferation and counter-proliferation. In the current model, the counter-proliferator cannot observe B’s move to arm, because there are no weapons inspections or other verification mechanisms. The** model could be extended to include actions which are verifiable either because the aspi- rant permits weapons inspection sor becausei ttest sa nuclear weapon. The model could also be extended to evaluate the inclusion of sanctions as a possible counter-proliferation strategy. Sanctions accompany many decisions targeting nuclear aspirants, yet little is known about the reasons or effectiveness for such strategies. Other promising avenues include analyzing multilateral bargaining. North Korea preferred bilateral talks while the US preferred six-party talks. **What affects governments decisions to press for different negotiation en- vironments? Also, how does uncertainty about the counter-proliferator’s preferences affect bargaining? Finally, are democracies more vulnerable to making concessions in nuclear bargaining than autocracies because democratic audiences have higher worry?**

### A/2: Diplomacy with NK [DON’T READ #3 WITH DIPLOMACY]

1. **Diplomacy through a bargaining chip simply won’t work. Andrea Booth of SBS News finds that every time North Korea and the US talk through offers, North Korea simply speeds up its nuclear program.**

**Booth,** Andrea. "'Uncontrollable' North Korea Could Unleash a Nuclear War in next 18 Months: Analyst." News. SBS, 07 Aug. **2017**. Web. 10 Aug. 2017.

The US, South Korea, China, Japan and Australia are trying to reach a peaceful solution **with North Korea, according to Australian Strategic Policy Institute analyst Dr Malcolm Davis, but adds that diplomacy has little prospect of working. "We've tried since 1994 and North Korea has only accelerated its nuclear weapons and missile programs in return,"** the senior analyst in defence strategy and capability tells SBS World News. "We're going to continue placing pressure on North Korea to step back from the brink, but North Korea will probably not do that**." Pyongyang responded defiantly after being slapped on Saturday with UN sanctions drafted by the US for testing intercontinental ballistic missiles last month.** The tests are the latest in a series conducted by North Korea this year, including a medium-range ballistic missile in April, a ballistic missile in May and four anti-ship missiles off its east coast in June.

1. **North Korea won’t come to the negotiating table. Leo Bryne of NK News finds that North Korea is simply too irrational of a regime to sit down at the negotiating table with any country, especially now with tensions brewing, North Korea simply won’t sit down to negotiate with any other country.**

**Bryne**, Leo. “North Korea Is an ‘Irrational Regime’: Moon.” NK News - North Korea News, 20 June **2017,** [www.nknews.org/2017/06/north-korea-an-irrational-regime-moon/](http://www.nknews.org/2017/06/north-korea-an-irrational-regime-moon/).

**South Korea’s new President Moon Jae-in said North Korea’s treatment of Otto Warmbier proves the DPRK is an “irrational regime” during an interview with CBS News on Tuesday.** The South Korean President told CBS This Morning’s co-host Norah O’Donnell the DPRK must bear a “heavy responsibility” for Warmbier’s death, which occurred on Monday following his release from North Korea last week. But Moon stopped short of saying North Korea had murdered the U.S. citizen, saying the circumstances that lead to his death were not known. **“I believe we must now have the perception that North Korea is an irrational regime. Working with such a country, we must achieve the goal of the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program,” Moon said during the interview. When asked how he hoped to negotiate with an irrational leader, Moon reiterated his commitment to engaging North Korea through dialogue, saying that sanctions and pressure had so far not worked.** Moon added he believed Kim Jong Un would prefer dialogue to the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. “So there is a possibility that Kim Jong Un continues to make the bluff with his nuclear weapons programs. But deep inside he is actually yearning or wanting dialogue. But in the end the only way to find out is to have a dialogue with North Korea.” The South Korean President added he did not believe his approach to be at odds with Washington’s and that he did not want to begin negotiations without preconditions. “I have never mentioned a dialogue with no preconditions whatsoever. I believe that first we must vie for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. And then, as a second phase, try to achieve the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program,” Moon said during the interview. Moon added that he believed solving the problems facing the Korean Peninsula would be both his and Trump’s greatest diplomatic achievements, and commended his U.S. counterpart for placing North Korea high on Washington’s priority list. The South Korean President will meet with Trump on June 29-30, with discussions on North Korea expected to be at the top of the agenda. “The leaders will also coordinate on North Korea-related issues, including countering the growing North Korean nuclear and missile threats,” a White House statement issued on June 13 reads. The meeting will follow a regional security dialogue with China also in Washington on Wednesday. The U.S. will look to build on an earlier meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in April, with the State Department saying on Monday Washington will be looking to persuade Beijing to apply additional pressure on the DPRK. But given the longstanding deadlock and apparently mismatched goals between China, the two Koreas, and the U.S., some experts are skeptical the meetings will create tangible results. “**There is great concern that there is currently no obvious way out of this predicament. The equities in Seoul, Washington, Beijing, and Pyongyang are increasingly out of alignment,” Ken Gause, a North Korea leadership specialist at the CNA Corporation, told NK News. “What needs to happen to pave the way forward just isn’t politically feasible. At least not at this time.”**

1. **Alex Ward of Vox finds that the window of time for sanctions to be effective has already passed, since North Korea has already established a nuclear program. Even if we get China to cooperate, which is already unlikely, the sanctions will fail. Ward furthers that this is portrayed throughout recent history as there’s been sanctions on North Korea before, but North Korea continued to nuclearized and the sanctions failed.**

Alex **Ward**, July 6, **2017**, Trump has 3 options for dealing with North Korea, they are all bad, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/6/15922824/trump-north-korea-icbm-options-bad>

Speaking of **sanctions**, they **tend to work much better *before* a country obtains what it wants**, Greitens noted. In this case, North Korea has achieved a big step toward its goal of having a missile that can carry a nuclear weapon to America’s largest cities**. It’s going to be hard at this point to use sanctions to change North Korea’s behavior when Pyongyang feels like it is so close to the finish line. Also, it’s not like North Korea sanctions are a new idea. In fact,**[**sanctions have already been placed**](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/25/news/north-korea-economy-sanctions/index.html)**on key items being imported or exported by North Korea:** weaponry big and small; coal, minerals, and fuel; luxury goods like yachts; funding for its missile and nuclear programs; and even a ban on travel into UN member states for those who work on the country’s nuclear program. **Despite all of that, North Korea continues to defy international pressure by improving its program.**

### A/2: Chinese Concessions

1. **Benjamin Lim of Reuters finds that China is already against military alliances through bargaining chips. At this point, it isn’t likely that a military negotiation is going to appeal to China. To make the argument even slightly probable, they have to show a previous track record of military negotiations in similar scenarios and why China would engage in a military exchange in this scenario as compared to previous, more dangerous threats.**

**Lim**, Benjamin Kang. “China Sees THAAD Deployment as 'Weather Vane' under Trump.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 17 Nov. **2016**, [www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN13C0N5](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN13C0N5).

**Trump has created doubts over his commitment to security alliances with Japan and South Korea, suggesting they need to pay more for a U.S. military presence and even hinting they should develop their own nuclear weapons capability. Japan going nuclear would be China's worst nightmare and is likely to provoke strong reaction**, diplomats and analysts have said. China's relations with Japan have long been poisoned by what Beijing sees as Tokyo's failure to fully atone for its invasion and occupation of parts of China before and during World War Two as well as competing claims over a group of East China Sea islets. "Northeast Asia would be a powder keg," a second source said, referring to a nuclearized sub-region including China, Japan, North and South Korea. The State Council Information Office, or cabinet spokesman's office, had no immediate comment. **China is generally opposed to military alliances, seeing them as Cold War relics.**

1. **Deploying THAAD hurts East Asian stability before diplomacy can happen. Amital Etzioni of The Huffington Post finds that deploying THAAD raises tension between China and Japan, to the point of unnecessary excess nuclearizing. Since South Korea is a trade dependent nation on the rest of East Asia, deploying THAAD simply hurts South Korea’s overall interests, specifically in the short term.**

**Etzioni**, Amitai. “THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 14 Aug. **2017**, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip\_us\_5991b2abe4b0ed1f464c0c97.

Theodore Postol, professor emeritus at MIT, notes: **“[Deploying THAAD] puts South Korea at odds with China over a defense system that has no merit for South Korea’s defense, and it will certainly raise tensions between China and Japan.” Postol adds that an indirect and far-ranging consequence of THAAD could be the downgrade of American credibility, as deployment affirms “the view of many nations that deal with the U.S. that the U.S. is untrustworthy in terms of its commitments**.” Whether THAAD batteries are truly effective or their prowess much more limited than advertised, whether they are designed to work only against North Korean missiles but ignore Chinese ones, or whether the Chinese have reasons to be concerned—there is no doubt that they are highly destabilizing. The Chinese cannot simply accept that these anti-missile batteries will not hamper their ability to retaliate, especially given the U.S.’ continued refusal even to state that it will not strike first. The U.S. cannot simply remove the THAAD system, because of the very serious North Korean threat to U.S. forces in the region, to South Korea and Japan, and soon to the U.S. mainland. These batteries do seem to be able to mitigate such a threat to some extent. However, their destabilizing side effects strongly compel the U.S. to intensify the quest for more effective and compensative ways to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat. As I suggested here, such a drive best entails a major deal with China—in which the removal of THAAD can serve as one bargaining chip. The bargain entails a commitment from the U.S. that if China helps defang the North Korea threat—the U.S. will have no reason to keep THAAD in South Korea.

1. **Turn- the deployment of THAAD simply causes China to collapse South Korea’s economy. Adriana Zhang of CBS finds that the idea of deploying THAAD lead to a 39 percent decrease in Chinese tourism in South Korea. If THAAD was deployed, China would implement a travel ban, ending most of the South Korea tourism industry. Not deploying THAAD solves by preserving South Korean economy and preserving safety.**

**Zhang**, Adriana Diaz Shuai. “Angered by U.S. Anti-Missile System, China Takes Economic Revenge.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 7 Apr. **2017**, [www.cbsnews.com/news/china-retaliates-south-korea-us-thaad-missile-defense-lotte-and-k-pop/](http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-retaliates-south-korea-us-thaad-missile-defense-lotte-and-k-pop/)

The U.S. and South Korea insist THAAD is only aimed at protecting against a potential North Korean attack on South Korea, where nearly 30,000 American service members are stationed. Already this year, Kim Jong Un has ordered four missile tests, including one this week. So far, China’s political efforts to halt the U.S. deployment of a THAAD system in South Korea have failed. **But as South Korea’s biggest trading partner, China has significant economic leverage over Seoul and Beijing appears to be using it. China banned tour groups from visiting South Korea on March 15, leading to a 39 percent decline in Chinese tourism there last month compared to February.**

1. **China’s already started conceding without THAAD. Ben Blanchard of Business Insider finds that in August, China signed with UN to put sanctions on North Korea on drastically reducing exports. Blanchard continues that China will cut the revenue of North Korea by a third, and strictly implement the entire resolution. They start doing this without THAAD.**

**Blanchard**, Ben. “China Vows to Fully Adhere to New UN Sanctions on Its Treaty Ally, North Korea.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 8 Aug. **2017**, [www.businessinsider.com/china-vows-to-fully-adhere-to-new-un-sanctions-on-its-treaty-ally-north-korea-2017-8](http://www.businessinsider.com/china-vows-to-fully-adhere-to-new-un-sanctions-on-its-treaty-ally-north-korea-2017-8).

**China will pay the biggest price from the new U.N. sanctions against North Korea because of its close economic relationship with the country, but will always enforce the resolutions, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said. The U.N. Security Council unanimously imposed new sanctions on North Korea on Saturday over its continued missile tests that could slash the reclusive country's $3 billion annual export revenue by a third.** Speaking at a regional security forum in Manila on Monday, Wang said the new resolution showed China and the international community's opposition to North Korea's continued missile tests, the foreign ministry said in a statement on Tuesday. **Owing to China's traditional economic ties with North Korea, it will mainly be China paying the price for implementing the resolution," the statement cited Wang as saying. "But in order to protect the international non-proliferation system and regional peace and stability, China will, as before, fully and strictly properly implement the entire contents of the relevant resolution." China, North Korea's lone major ally, has repeatedly said it is committed to enforcing increasingly tough U.N. resolutions on North Korea, though it has also said what it terms "normal" trade and ordinary North Koreans should not be affected. The latest U.N. resolution bans North Korean exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood.** It also prohibits countries from increasing the numbers of North Korean laborers currently working abroad, bans new joint ventures with North Korea and any new investment in current joint ventures.

## A/2: Other

### A/2: Asteroids

1. **There’s literally no way this would happen. Tony Bonnici of The Times finds that NASA notes there is only a 1 in 63 thousand chance of an asteroid hitting the earth, or the chances of no impact are around 99.998 percent, meaning that an asteroid hit is extremely improbable.**

**Bonnici**, Tony. “Asteroid Has Just 1 in 63,000 Chance of Hitting Earth in 2032.” The Times & The Sunday Times, 19 Oct. **2013**, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/asteroid-has-just-1-in-63000-chance-of-hitting-earth-in-2032-srfh9nv86v6.

In space terms at least it was a close call. A newly discovered asteroid came within an astronomical whisker of the Earth on Wednesday, coming within 4.2 million miles (6.7 million km) of hitting the planet**. Unfortunately however, NASA have warned that it could be back by 2032, although even then there is only a one in 63,000 chance of an impact.** The asteroid known as 2013 TV135 was discovered on October 8 by astronomers at the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory in Ukraine. **Don Yeomans, manager of NASA’s Near-Earth Object Program Office at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, said the odds of it hitting the planet were slim. He said: “To put it another way, that puts the current probability of no impact in 2032 at about 99.998 percent.”**

1. **There’s no unique reason to vote for them, as there’s already plans for shooting down asteroids. Sarah Felch of Popular Science finds that there’s many current options to destroy an asteroid in development, such as an ion cannon and NASA’s Asteroid Redirect mission to move an asteroid. Felch continues, citing experts who say that nuking is solely a last-ditch option and wouldn’t be used.**

**Fecht,** Sarah. “What's The Best Way To Protect Earth From Incoming Asteroids?” Popular Science, 5 Jan. 2016, www.popsci.com/whats-best-way-to-protect-earth-from-incoming-asteroids#page-6.

Bombardelli and his colleagues evaluated a plan to shoot a beam of ions (charged particles) at the hypothetical asteroid**. The ions would travel at about 19 miles per second, transmitting their momentum to the asteroid when they crash into it, knocking it ever so slightly off its expected path. “It's a very tiny force,” says Bombardelli, “and the only way this force could work is if it is applied for a very long period of time.” For this paper, the team assumed the hypothetical asteroid weighed about 20 million tons, and by steadily applying about as much force as the weight of a strawberry for about two years, they were able to change its course by hundreds of miles. The ion beam could be generated by a spacecraft that uses ion engines, similar to the Dawn spacecraft that recently arrived at the dwarf planet Ceres in the asteroid belt.** **NASA's Asteroid Redirect Mission will explore a third strategy of moving asteroids: the spacecraft will travel to an asteroid, pick up a boulder, and use its increased mass as a sort of gravity tractor beam to slightly push the asteroid off course. This is another "slow push" method, but it's not as simple as the ion beam deflection method.** Finally, for very large and very close Earth-threatening asteroids, there's one more option: "**Nuking it is a last-ditch option it seems to me," says Chodas. "**It's more unpredictable, but it's certainly valuable to consider it in our toolbox. And we seriously discussed it at the conference. We think it could have been effective for this scenario." In the end, the best asteroid deflection method will very much depend on the situation. "If will vary from case to case," says Chodas, "depending on the warning time, the orbit of the asteroid, and the size of the asteroid."

1. **Link Turn- Ian O’ Neil of Universe Today reports that trying to blow up an asteroid would only cause a bigger problem because it increases the destructive power of the rock and scatters debris, killing more people.**

**O’Neil**, **Universe Today**, Dec. **2015** <https://www.universetoday.com/16066/bad-idea-blowing-up-asteroids-with-nuclear-missiles/>

Schweickart has expressed concern with the possibility of using nuclear weapons to destroy, or deflect Earth-bound asteroids, pointing out there are many other less harmful ways of dealing with the asteroid threat. At the moment he points out that we are completely unprepared to deal with asteroids, but by 2015, we should have developed a gentler means of deflection. **Simply blowing asteroids up have many knock-on implications. First and foremost, Schweickart believes that NASA may be open to manipulation to put forward the proliferation of space-based nuclear weapons under the guise of international “safety.” Another problem I can see is blowing up a large piece of rock only to create many smaller (but just as deadly) pieces of rock, doesn’t really extinguish the destructive power of an asteroid on collision course, in fact, it might increase it.**

1. **Can’t weigh this argument, it’s too much in the future. The nearest asteroid that has the highest chance of hitting earth, at around 0.002 percent, won’t even threaten anyone until 2032. Since nuclearizing is now and ends lives now, it outweighs on timeframe.**

### A/2: Kill Chain

1. **THAAD has already been deployed for a significant amount of time now- any Kill Chain protocol with THAAD would’ve happened by now. None of their impacts materialize in the real world because South Korea simply won’t use the Kill Chain protocol.**
2. **Jeff Nesbit of U.S. News finds that South Korea has not yet developed Kill Chain capabilities, meaning that there is nothing to stop. There’s no point in deploying THAAD just to stop a nonexistent threat.**

Jeff **Nesbit** Contributor, **17**, (), &quot;South Korea, With &#39;Kill Chain,&#39; Wants to Up Its Guard Against North Korea,&quot; US News &amp; World Report, 6-30- 2017, https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the- edge/articles/2017-06- 30/south-korea- with-kill- chain-wants- to-up- its-guard- against-north- korea, 7-24- 2017

But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the &quot;Kill Chain&quot; – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a pre-emptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war. **South Korea had originally planned to develop the scientific and technical expertise necessary to successfully implement a &quot;Kill Chain&quot; effort by the mid 2020s. But when North Korea claimed it had tested a miniaturized nuclear warhead in 2016, South Korea accelerated its timetable and began to see if it could lease satellite time from Israel or other countries.** It wants to monitor activity inside its northern neighbor, according to Korea Times.

1. **Turn- Choi Jong-Kun of The Hankyoreh finds that THAAD only solidifies Kill Chain because kill chain only starts with stronger military capabilities and needs a higher level of defense to function. At that point, all negative impacts of kill chain occur due to THAAD**

**Jong**-Kun, Choi. “[Analysis] The Politics of The.” Hankyoreh, 22 Oct. **2013**, [www.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/608038.html](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/608038.html).

The question then, is whether South Korea is capable of employing the kill chain strategy to beef up its security. The current “vision for national defense” has six components to a successful kill chain. First, intelligence authorities have to be able to detect signs of a North Korean attack within one minute of launch. Second, they need intelligence - also within one minute - on where and how the attack will take place. Third, the top military leader has to be able to order a preemptive strike within three minutes. Fourth, the strike has to be carried out before North Korea carries out its own. Fifth, authorities have to be able to rate the success of the strike - that is, whether it did in fact knock out the source of the provocation. And finally, they have to be able to respond to an enemy counterstrike. **What are the South Korean military’s current detection and strike capabilities? Here the holes are numerous. It has no military satellites. It is no high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle. Indeed, it has little more that can be put to military use than the Arirang-5 multi-purpose satellite, the Geumgang and Baekdu reconnaissance aircraft (which are capable of recording and listening in on front-line areas), and the radar on the navy’s Aegis vessels. In short, there is little to nothing it can detect on its own. It simply does not have enough eyes to observe North Korea. Some have blamed this on an overdependence on US intelligence. But even if the Ministry of National Defense were able to share all military intelligence with the US in real time, there are still very basic questions as to whether it could detect all of North Korea’s major attack installations and sensitive targets within one minute.** One of the most well-known failures came last winter, when military authorities in South Korea and the US were unable to detect signs of the launch of North Korea’s 30-meter-tall Unha-3 rocket, which had been left exposed at its launch site in Tongchang for several days. The focus now is on how - and if - South Korea’s military will be able to detect strategic installations throughout North Korea. Even if signs of a nuclear strike can be detected within one minute, and a target can be set, another problem remains. The only conceivable scenarios where North Korea might use a nuclear weapon on South Korea would be a quasi-state-of-war, or a situation where local war has erupted, or is about to erupt, in the border regions. In such cases, the president would have to exercise his or her authority to order a preemptive strike. This is the key phase for the kill chain: the crucial moment in a military emergency that calls for a political determination from the president - the point when the powers invested in the leader are invoked. The question that arises, then, is whether the South Korean president would even be able to issue such an order alone under exigent circumstances.

1. **Choi Jong-Kun of The Hankyoreh finds that South Korea simply can’t execute Kill Chain completely. Jong-Kun finds that South Korea’s current capabilities cannot fully execute kill chain as it doesn’t have the satellite capabilities to execute a strike or attack in the time to execute kill chain.**

**Jong**-Kun, Choi. “[Analysis] The Politics of The.” Hankyoreh, 22 Oct. **2013**, www.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/608038.html.

**A final fact to consider is that the final target, North Korea, is needed to complete the kill chain. That is, Pyongyang has to be convinced of Seoul’s commitment to its deterrent. Even if South Korea has perfect capabilities and a strong commitment to using them, the deterrent effect will be only minor if North Korea is not aware of it. This raises the question of just how Seoul can convince Pyongyang that it means business.** The way to do that is to give concrete proof of South Korean autonomy, Seoul’s ability to defend itself. And for that to happen, the OPCON transfer needs to take place on schedule. It would send a clear message to Pyongyang to any provocations would result in resolute retaliation. Another step that needs to be taken is the development of more balanced armed forces: establishing independent North Korean surveillance capabilities and improving the combat aviation skills to project military power at medium and long ranges. And through all of this, there is one other thing South Korea should not lose sight of: the need for dialogue. It definitely needs to send Pyongyang the message that it will not accept provocations and is willing to punish them. But if there are no provocations, then it should come up with a more flexible North Korea policy. This means assuring Pyongyang that a stable security environment on the peninsula and a relationship of reciprocity will help the North achieve its economic recovery. This sort of environment is needed for the kill chain deterrent to have a positive effect in promoting peace and stability. **The talk about “striking sources of provocation” rings hollow when South Korea’s capabilities and commitment are in question, as they are right now. Indeed, the belligerence may have the unintended consequence of fanning concerns about the security situation. It is a message South Korea’s leaders should take to heart: the kill chain starts with stronger military capabilities, and it won’t be complete without a commitment to autonomous defense and engagement with Pyongyang.**

### A/2: Trilateral Cooperation

1. **THAAD has already been deployed as of recent. There’s been literally zero talks of trilateral cooperation, and zero mention of a three-way alliance being reformed. At the end of the day, the impacts should’ve materialized by now.**
2. **Turn- THAAD creates North Korea, China, Russia trilateral alliance against South. Chung-In Moon of Yonsei University finds that South Korean relations with Russia and China are harmed, and opposition leads to a new Cold War structure in Northeast Asia.**

Moon, January, 2017 [Chung-in, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Yonsei University. He is also a Co-convener of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, “Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats: In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations”, Asia Policy, No. 23, <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.uky.edu/article/647788#back>, BJM]

China’s hostile response has polarized Seoul’s domestic politics. Conservative forces led by the ruling Saenuri Party have argued that the THAAD deployment is the right decision. They regard it as an unavoidable self-defense measure to cope with nuclear and missile threats from [End Page 78] North Korea and as a concrete sign of the U.S. alliance commitment.13 Meanwhile, **liberal and progressive forces** led by opposition parties **have taken a much tougher stance** by calling for the immediate relinquishment of the decision. **This faction argues that THAAD has limited military utility and believes that its deployment will not only harm relations with China, South Korea’s vital economic partner, but also pit China and Russia against South Korea while strengthening their ties with North Korea. Opposition groups see the deployment of THAAD as a prelude to the ROK joining a U.S.-led theater missile defense system**, which could in turn revive a new Cold War structure in Northeast Asia. Given such formidable domestic political opposition, the scheduled THAAD deployment might not be smooth.

1. **Tim Beal of The Journal of Political Criticism finds that only THAAD triggers trilateral conflict and that by deploying THAAD the U.S. enters a military challenge to China and Russia.**

Beal, December 2016 [Tim, Retired New Zealand-based academic who has written two books and numerous articles on Korean issues and US global policy, *Journal of Political Criticism*, “The Deployment of THAAD in Korea and the Struggle over US Global Hegemony”, Vol. 19, <https://www.timbeal.net.nz/geopolitics/Beal_JPC_THAAD.pdf>, BJM]

**The deployment of the first battery of THAAD in South Korea is but part of a wider geopolitical strategy impacting principally on China and Russia.** What then are the consequences for South Korea’s relationship with its mainland neigh- bours of the deployment?**Drivers and consequences, actors and institutions all have to be pieced together to provide an understanding of this attempt to maintain hegemony. This hegemony is a global phenomenon but it is in Northeast Asia, centred on the Korean peninsula, that it meets, and is challenged by, both its two principal adversaries, China and Russia. The United States competes and contests with China and Russia – in the fields of economics, soft power and propaganda, diplomacy, cyberwar, and so forth. There are various geographical locations where there is a sort of military stand-off** In between the US and one of the others. The South China Sea for China and Eastern Europe and Syria for Russia. **each case the other competitor is active,** and may well become more so in the future, **but his role is subsidiary**. Russia has joined with China in military exercises in the South China Sea and there are reports that it may reactivate its base in Vietnam.8) Fearful of Uyghur Islamists and separatism in Xinjiang China is being drawn into conflicts in the Middle East, especially Syria.9) **It is only in Korea,** with the deployment of THAAD**, that the US is entering into a direct, location-specific military challenge to both China and Russia.**

1. **Delink their argument. The Korea Herald finds that South Korea and the U.S. aren’t willing to share information with Japan for the alliance. At the end of the day, the alliance won’t occur because ROK-US don’t want to cooperate.**

Herald. “Seoul, Washington Won't Share THAAD Radar Info with Japan.” **The Korea Herald**, 25 July **2016**, [www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160725000613](http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160725000613)**.**

**South Korea and the United States will not share with Japan the information they obtain from the radar of an advanced anti-missile system that will be set up by late 2017, a government source said Monday.** Their remarks come amid speculations that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system to be deployed in South Korea is part of a wider move to integrate the South into the broader missile defense system operated by the U.S. and Japan. "**Under the trilateral information- sharing agreement with the U.S. and Japan, South Korea is obliged to share the information it gets on North Korea's nuclear and missile tests with Japan through the U.S. But the information detected by the THAAD radar won't be going to Tokyo," a government official familiar with the matter said. Another official said it is "not effective" to share information on an incoming missile at its terminal phase of flight**. This, he said, will not help as an early warning system. The THAAD battery to be deployed in Seongju, 296 kilometers south of Seoul, will be operated independently by U.S. forces in South Korea to protect U.S. military forces and its allied Korean forces, he added. Meanwhile, it takes about 4 billion won ($3.5 million) a year for U.S. Forces Korea to operate a THAAD battery here, twice the 2 billion won needed annually for a Patriot PAC-2 system, according to government sources. "There have been rumors that as it takes an astronomical amount of money to operate a THAAD system here, it will drive up the country's defense budget. But it does not demand a big budget," he said.

### A/2: Resolution Not THAAD

1. **THAAD should be the central component of this debate for 4 reasons.**
2. **First, examining a specific missile defense system gives us a clear set of policies to examine, making for an educational debate.**
3. **Second, predictability - THAAD was first deployed earlier this year and its deployment was halted in June of this year, so it’s clearly what the resolution is referring to.**
4. **Third, no other defense system has had such a diplomatic and security relevant impact in the region, which means other types of BMD should be weighed much less.**
5. **Fourth, resolution is in the present tense. THAAD is the only BMD whose deployment in question in the status quo - all others have been deployed or are in development meaning they are non-topical.**