

Agriculture

Civil war starts when low nutrition

Shimokawa 2008 [Satoru Shimokawa at Hong Kong University, “Do poverty and poor health and nutrition increase the risk of armed conflict onset?”, *Journal of Food Policy*, <<http://booksc.org/book/3039704>>] //CJC

Even after controlling for other predictors, **we observe positive and significant effects of income poverty and poor health and nutritional status on the likelihood of armed conflict**

onset (Tables 5 and 6). In the logit models, we observe that both headcount poverty index and under-five child mortality rates are positively associated with the risk of conflict (columns 7 and 9 in Table 5). The results indicate that, holding other factors at their mean levels, a 5 percentage point decrease in the headcount poverty index contributes to decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict onset by 2.5–3.0 percentage points; and a 10 decrease in under-five child mortality rates contributes to decreasing the likelihood by 3.0 percentage point. In the discrete-time hazard models (Table 6), **We observe a positive and significant effect of the** headcount poverty index in columns 2, 9 and 10, that of under-five child mortality in column 7, and that of **under-five child malnutrition rate** in columns 4 and 10. These results indicate that a 5 percentage point increase in the headcount poverty rate contribute to decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict onset by 1.5–3.0 percentage points; a 10 decrease in under-five child mortality rate contribute to decreasing the likelihood by 1 percentage point; and **a 5 percentage point decrease in under-five child malnutrition contributes to decreasing the likelihood by 1.0–3.5 percentage points.**

Most Cubans spend 80% of income on food

Siegelbaum 2013 [Portia Siegelbaum at CBS News, “Cuba economic reforms felt at the dinner table”, *CBS News*, <<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cuba-economic-reforms-felt-at-the-dinner-table/>>] //CJC

In other words, Cuba is moving away from being a welfare state for all and earmarking aid to those it judges need it the most. The problem is that even with the opening of a private sector and with people going into business for themselves, **the vast majority of Cuban workers are still employed by the state** and there is a huge gap between their wages and the cost of food they are forced to buy. In farmers markets, a single grapefruit costs eight pesos and goods at hard currency stores have a 240 percent markup. **In fact the economic opening has driven up prices. There are no wholesale markets where private restaurant owners, for example, can buy their ingredients. Instead they buy at the same farmers markets as the rest of the population. This situation pits the private sector against the public-sector worker.** People complain that bakeries run out of bread before they can get there because the cafeteria owners buy it up to make sandwiches. And the price of pork, a staple on the menu of most private eateries, has risen so that a pound of it now costs the average state worker more than a day's pay. And many Cubans find that those 7 pounds of cheap rice doesn't last them but rice sold por la libre or without limits at a higher price is becoming hard to find as private restaurant owners buy it up by the sack load – at 500 Cuban pesos or about 20 U.S. dollars a sack – the equivalent of a month's average salary and therefore out of reach for the majority. On a recent afternoon, the CBS News crew found a long line of hopeful customers outside of the old “5 & 10 cent” store on a main Havana thoroughfare hoping to buy rice for their families at 5 pesos a pound. But out on the sidewalk were the early buyers sitting on entire sacks of rice while they waited for transportation. People at the end of the line, meanwhile, expressed the fear that by the time they made it inside the store there wouldn't be a single grain left. **Cubans working in state jobs** repeatedly told CBS that they **are forced to spend up to 80 percent of their income just on food.** Luckily, health care and education are free and mortgage payments never more than 10 percent of a household's combined income. And doctors are being told their salaries are going to be doubled come January. Teachers are hoping something similar will happen in education. But most of these state employees are taking a wait and see attitude unsure of whether the government will really be able to come up with the funds for these raises.

The aff is a prerequisite to any impact—food distribution comes prior to survival

Watson, 77 - Professor of Philosophy @ Washington U, PhD from University of Iowa (Richard, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)//HAL

These arguments are morally spurious. That **food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life.** The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity per se. Consequently, **the moral action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences.** This is the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—supersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice one's life or one's nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, **if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies).** That an **action is necessary to save one's life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral.** No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one's life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. **If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty.** It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one's life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even if the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint, the human species—like the nation—is of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.

Government collapse

Parenti, 2011 [Christian Parenti, Christian Parenti is an American investigative journalist, academic, and author, "When food shortages mean war", *Salon*, http://www.salon.com/2011/07/19/food_shortage_politics/] //AKC

The answer is: far more than you might imagine. For one thing, that loaf can be "read" as if it were a core sample extracted from the heart of a grim global economy. Looked at another way, it reveals some of the crucial fault lines of world politics, including the origins of the Arab spring that has now become a summer of discontent.

Consider this: **between June 2010 and June 2011, world grain prices almost doubled. In many places on this planet, that proved an unmitigated catastrophe. In those same months, several governments fell, rioting broke out in cities from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to Nairobi, Kenya, and most disturbingly three new wars began in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.**

Even on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Bedouin tribes are now in revolt against the country's interim government and manning their own armed roadblocks.

And **in each of these situations, the initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread.** If these upheavals were not "resource conflicts" in the formal sense of the term, think of them at least as bread-triggered upheavals.

70% income on food is life threatening when price increase

Earth Policy Institute 2004 ("Outgrowing the earth", book, <http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Out/index.htm>)

"Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security," said Brown, "but **for much of humanity**, the effect of water shortages and rising temperatures on **food security are far more important issues. For the 3 billion people** who live on 2 dollars a day or less and **who spend up to 70 percent of their income on food, even a modest rise in food prices can quickly become life-threatening.** For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding concern."


Cuba is not hungry

International Food Policy Research Institute 2016 ["Cuba", *IFPRI*. Accessed at: <http://ghi.ifpri.org/countries/CUB/>.] //DNP

The 2016 GHI Score for Cuba is **<5**.

LEVEL **Low**

Global hunger index evolution



Detailed score for 2016

	Proportion of undernourished in population (%)	Prevalence of wasting in children under five years (%)	Prevalence of stunting in children under five years (%)	Under five mortality rate (%)
Country data (in %)	0.8	2.1	4.9	0.6

High food prices and food insecurity is comparatively the GREATEST threat to humanity. Causes failed states, terrorism and independently collapses civilization

Brown 2009 [Lester, environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, "COULD FOOD SHORTAGES BRING DOWN CIVILIZATION?," Scientific American, May 2009, Vol. 300 Issue 5, p50-57, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/><https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/>] //CJC

In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in [stocks](#). When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. ¶ **As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos.** Unable to buy grain or grow their own, **hungry people take to the streets.** Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But **if the food situation continues to deteriorate,** entire **nations will break down** at an ever increasing rate. **We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states.** It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. ¶ **States fail when national governments can no longer provide** personal security, **food security** and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. ¶ **Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere.** Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is **a hotbed for terrorist training.** Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six). ¶ Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. **If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten** the stability of **global civilization** itself.

Tourism increase 1.5m

Stone 2015. "U.S. hotel chains circle Cuba as visitors surge, restrictions ease." Wed Sep 30, 2015 | 9:19am EDT. By Mike Stone and Mitra Taj | NEW YORK/LIMA, PERU. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-hotels-idUSKCN0RU0BZ20150930> GST

The race for Cuba's beach-front is on. Executives from major U.S. hotel chains have stepped up their interest in the Communist island in recent months, holding informal talks with Cuban

officials as Washington loosens restrictions on U.S. firms operating there. Executives from Marriott International, Hilton Worldwide and Carlson Hospitality Group, which runs the Radisson chain, are among those who have held talks with Cuban officials in recent months, they told Reuters. **"We're all very interested."** said **Ted Middleton, Hilton's senior vice president of development in Latin America.** **"When legally we're allowed to do so we all want to be at the start-line ready to go."** The United States wants to strike a deal that lets U.S. airlines schedule Cuba flights as soon as possible, a State Department official said last week, amid speculation that a U.S. ban on its tourists visiting Cuba could be eased. **U.S. hoteliers are not currently allowed to invest in Cuba,** and the Caribbean island officially remains off-limits for U.S. tourists unless they meet special criteria such as being Cuban-Americans or join special cultural or educational tours. Foreign companies have to partner with a Cuban entity to do business and U.S. hoteliers expect they will have to do likewise if and when U.S. restrictions are lifted. While they wait for the politicians to iron out their differences, U.S. hotel bosses are conducting fact-finding missions in Havana and holding getting-to-know-you meetings with government officials in Cuba and various European cities. **A recent relaxation of some of the restrictions on U.S. travelers has encouraged over 106,000 Americans to visit Cuba so far this year, more than the 91,254 who arrived in all of 2014,** according to data compiled by tourism professor José Luís Perelló of the University of Havana. **Overall, tourist arrivals are up nearly 18 percent this year after a record 3 million visitors in 2014,** making Cuba the second-most popular holiday destination in the Caribbean behind the much-smaller Dominican Republic. **"If and when the travel ban is lifted. We estimate there will be over 1.5 million U.S. travelers on a yearly basis,"** said Laurent de Kousemaeker, chief development officer for the Caribbean & Latin American region for Marriott.

Lifting the embargo crushes Cuban Ag — food imports and buying land — 300k people lose their jobs

Altieri 2016 [Miguel Altieri, Professor of Agroecology, University of California, Berkeley, "Cuba's Sustainable Agriculture at Risk After U.S.-Cuba Relations Thaw", *New Republic*, <https://newrepublic.com/article/132055/cubas-sustainable-agriculture-risk-us-cuba-relations-thaw>] //CJC

"U.S. producers are eager to help meet Cuba's need for healthy, safe, nutritious food," Vilsack said. The U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba, which was launched in 2014 to lobby for an end to **the U.S.-Cuba trade embargo, includes more than 100 agricultural companies and trade groups. Analysts estimate that U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba could reach \$1.2 billion if remaining regulations are relaxed and trade barriers are lifted,** a market that U.S. **agribusiness wants to capture.** When agribusinesses invest in developing countries, they seek economies of scale. **This encourages concentration of land in the hands of a few corporations and standardization of small-scale production systems.** In turn, **these changes force small farmers off of their lands and lead to the abandonment of local crops** and traditional farming ways. **The expansion of transgenic crops and agrofuels in Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia since the 1990s are examples of this process.**

If U.S. industrial agriculture expands into Cuba, there is a risk that it could destroy the complex social network of agroecological small farms that more than 300,000 campesinos have built up over the past several decades through farmer-to-farmer horizontal exchanges of knowledge.

This would reduce the diversity of crops that Cuba produces and harm local economies and food security. If large businesses displace small-scale farmers, agriculture will move toward export crops, increasing the ranks of unemployed.

There is nothing wrong with small farmers capturing a share of export markets, as long as it does not mean neglecting their roles as local food producers. The Cuban government thus will have to protect campesinos by not importing food products that peasants produce.

Cuba still imports some of its food, including U.S. products such as poultry and soybean meal. **Since agricultural sales to Cuba were legalized in 2000, U.S. agricultural exports have totaled about \$5 billion. However, yearly sales have fallen from a high of \$658 million in 2008 to \$300 million in 2014.**

U.S. embargo strengthened Cuban agricultural industry – checking starvation

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Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, Cuba lost the market for its sugar and the favorable terms of trade for oil. The country was plunged into an economic crisis called the “periodo especial” (special period) characterized by an intense lack of food, fuel, fertilizer, chemicals, spare parts and other industrial and agricultural inputs. During the special period, average caloric, protein and vitamin intake dropped by 30%. Average caloric intake dropped from 2908 to 1863 in five years, and the average Cuban lost 20 pounds during that time. By necessity, Cubans made use of the available resources and created urban gardens to prevent starvation. **The U.S. embargo plunged Cuba into intense economic hardship but gave the government the opportunity to enact agricultural policies** counter to the existing neoliberal model, **protecting Cuban farmers against competition from the extremely subsidized agricultural industry in the U.S. and E.U.** Cuba shifted from export-oriented, chemical-intensive monoculture to organic agriculture and food production for the domestic market. With over three quarters of the country’s population living in cities, **urban agriculture played a central role in achieving food security** and took many forms, depending on local circumstances. By 2003, farmers had converted over 300,000 backyard patios to gardens and hope to reach half a million in the future. Organopónicos are a unique feature of Havana’s urban agriculture. These raised bed containers are filled with nutrient-rich compost and installed on previously paved or infertile lots, in order to achieve intense vegetable production in urban settings of poor soil or asphalt. On a larger scale, state farms became cooperative agricultural production units (UBPCs) in 1993 to increase efficiency and provide incentives for productivity. By 1997, UBPCs comprised 42% of the agriculture sector. The break-up of state farms made individuals or small teams responsible for production, rewarding efficiency and tying their incomes to the output. Additionally, urban agriculture provides employment and income: in 2003, 22% of all new jobs in the Cuban economy were in this sector. **By 2002 Cuba had met the goal of providing every settlement of over fifteen**

houses with its own food production capacity, either through organopónicos, community gardens or individual plots. There are environmental and social benefits in addition to economic ones. Intercropping improved the soil fertility, resulted in diversified diets and strengthened food security. Between 1994 and 1999, production of vegetables quadrupled, production of root crops and plantains tripled, potato production increased by 75% and cereals by 86%. (Meanwhile sugar dropped from 70% of export revenue in 1992 to 39% in 1998.) A lack of fuel and tractors forced farmers to use oxen labor, resulting in stark reductions in greenhouse gas-producing petroleum products. In 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture used “less than 50% of the diesel fuel it used in 1989, less than 10% of chemical fertilizers and less than 7% of synthetic insecticides.” Furthermore, “the Havana City Government passed a law prohibiting the use of chemical pesticides in agriculture within the city limits. Thus, the crops are grown almost entirely using active organic methods.” Socially, urban gardens boost cooperative involvement and dedication to the community. Gardeners often make food donations to the neighborhood, and especially to schools and daycare centers. In terms of the country’s health, urban agriculture has been tremendously successful. By 2000, food availability in Cuba again reached 2,600 calories daily per capita, proving that a country can achieve food security for its population through organic means, and providing an example for other third world countries.

Tourists divert food resources, increase shortages and prices

Ahmed 2016 [Azam, “Cuba’s Surge in Tourism Keeps Food of Resident’s Plates,” *The New York Times*.

Accessed at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/world/americas/cuba-fidel-castro-food-tourism.html>.] //DNP

HAVANA — For Lisset Felipe, privation is a standard facet of Cuban life, a struggle shared by nearly all, whether they’re enduring blackouts or hunting for toilet paper. But this year has been different, in an even more fundamental way, she said. She has not bought a single onion this year, nor a green pepper, both staples of the Cuban diet. Garlic, she said, is a rarity, while avocado, a treat she enjoyed once in a while, is all but absent from her table. “It’s a disaster,” said Ms. Felipe, 42, who sells air-conditioners for the government. “We never lived luxuriously, but the comfort we once had doesn’t exist anymore.” The changes in Cuba in recent years have often hinted at a new era of possibilities: a slowly opening economy, warming relations with the United States after decades of isolation, a flood of tourists meant to lift the fortunes of Cubans long marooned on the outskirts of modern prosperity. But the record arrival of nearly 3.5 million visitors to Cuba last year has caused a surging demand for food, causing ripple effects that are upsetting the very promise of Fidel Castro’s Cuba. Tourists are quite literally eating Cuba’s lunch. Thanks in part to the United States embargo, but also to poor planning by the island’s government, goods that Cubans have long relied on are going to well-heeled tourists and the hundreds of private restaurants that cater to them, leading to soaring prices and empty shelves. Without supplies to match the increased appetite, some foods have become so expensive that even basic staples are becoming unaffordable for regular Cubans. “The private tourism industry is in direct competition for good supplies with the general population,” said Richard Feinberg, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, and specialist on the Cuban economy. “There are a lot of unanticipated consequences and distortions.” There has long been a divide between Cubans and tourists, with beach resorts and Havana hotels effectively reserved for outsiders willing to shell out money for a more comfortable version of Cuba. But with the country pinning its hopes on tourism, welcoming a surge of new travelers to feed the anemic economy, a more basic inequality has emerged amid the nation’s experiment with capitalism. Rising prices for staples like onions and peppers, or for modest luxuries like pineapples and limes, have left many unable to afford them. Beer and soda can be hard to find, often snapped up in bulk by restaurants. It is a startling evolution in Cuba, where a shared future has been a pillar of the revolution’s promise. While the influx of new money from tourists and other visitors has been a boon for the island’s growing private sector, most Cubans still work within the state-run economy and struggle to make ends meet. President Raúl Castro has acknowledged the surge in agricultural prices and moved to cap them. In a speech in April, he said the government would look into the causes of the soaring costs and crack down on middlemen for price gouging, with limits on what people

could charge for certain fruits and vegetables. “We cannot sit with our hands crossed before the unscrupulous manner of middlemen who only think of earning more,” he told party members, according to local news reports. But the **government price ceilings seem to have done little to provide good, affordable produce for Cubans. Instead, they have simply moved goods to the commercial market, where farmers and vendors can fetch higher prices, or to the black market.** Havana offers stark examples of this growing chasm. At two state-run markets, where the government sets prices, the shelves this past week were monuments to starch — sweet potatoes, yucca, rice, beans and bananas, plus a few malformed watermelons with pallid flesh. As for tomatoes, green peppers, onions, cucumbers, garlic or lettuce — to say nothing of avocados, pineapples or cilantro — there were only promises. “Try back Saturday for tomatoes,” one vendor offered. It was more of question than a suggestion. But at a nearby co-op market, where vendors have more freedom to set their prices, the fruits and vegetables missing from the state-run stalls were elegantly stacked in abundance. Rarities like grapes, celery, ginger and an array of spices competed for shoppers’ attentions. **The market has become the playground of the private restaurants that have sprung up to serve visitors. They employ cadres of buyers to scour the city each day for fruits, vegetables and nonperishable goods, bearing budgets that overwhelm those of the average household.** “Almost all of our buyers are paladares,” said one vendor, Ruben Martínez, using the Cuban name for private restaurants, which include about 1,700 establishments across the country. “They are the ones who can afford to pay more for the quality.” By Cuban standards, the prices were astronomic. Several Cuban residents said simply buying a pound of onions and a pound of tomatoes at the prices charged that day would consume 10 percent or so of a standard government salary of about \$25 a month. “I don’t even bother going to those places,” said Yainelys Rodríguez, 39, sitting in a park in Havana while her daughter climbed a slide. “We eat rice and beans and a boiled egg most days, maybe a little pork.” Mrs. Rodríguez’s family is on the lower end of the income ladder, so she supplements earnings with the odd cleaning job she can find. With that, she cares for her two children and an infirm mother. Trying to buy tomatoes, she said, “is an insult.” Another mother, Leticia Alvarez Cañada, described what it was like to prepare decent meals for her family with prices so high. “We have to be magicians,” she said. The struggle is somewhat easier now that she is in the private sector and no longer working for the government, she said. She quit her job as a nurse to start a small business selling fried pork skin and other snacks from a cart. Now she earns about 10 times more every month. “The prices have just gone crazy in the last few years,” said Mrs. Cañada, 41. **There’s just no equilibrium between the prices and the salaries.** While many Cubans have long been hardened to the reality of going without, never more than during what they call the “Special Period” after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new dynamic that has emerged in recent months threatens the nation’s future, experts warn. “The government has consistently failed to invest properly in the agriculture sector,” said Juan Alejandro Triana, an economist at the University of Havana. “We don’t just have to feed 11 million people anymore. We have to feed more than 14 million.” “In the next five years, if we don’t do something about it, food will become a national security issue here,” he added. The government gives Cubans ration books to help provide staples like rice, beans and sugar, but they do not cover items like fresh produce. Tractors and trucks are limited and routinely break down, often causing the produce to spoil en route. **Inefficiency, red tape and corruption at the local level also stymie productivity,** while a lack of fertilizer reduces yield (though it keeps produce organic, by default). Economists also argue that setting price ceilings can discourage farmers and sellers. If prices are set so low they cannot turn a profit, they argue, why bother working? Most will try to redirect their goods to the private or black market. “From the point of view of the farmer, what would you do?” asked Dr. Feinberg, the California professor. “When the differentials are that great, it requires a really selfless or foolish person to play by the rules.” Paladares sometimes go directly to farms to buy goods, and even provide farmers seeds for specialty products that do not ordinarily grow in Cuba, like arugula, cherry tomatoes and zucchini. Most acknowledge that they distort the market in some ways, and this year the government stopped issuing licenses for new restaurants in Havana. But some restaurant owners argue that it is the government’s responsibility to create better supply. “It’s true, the prices keep going up and up,” said Laura Fernandez, a manager at El Cocinero, a former peanut-oil factory converted into a high-priced restaurant. “But that’s not just the fault of the private sector. There is generally a lot of chaos and disorder in the market.” On the outskirts of Havana, Miguel Salcines has cultivated a beautiful farm. Rows of tidy crops stretch toward the edge of his modest 25 acres, where he employs about 130 people. Though he grows standard products on behalf of the government, there is no product he is more excited about than his new zucchini. A farmer for nearly 50 years, he had never grown the crop before, but planted a batch two months ago. Now, the vegetables are coming into shape, the spots of bright orange flowers visible amid the green plumage. He knows this crop is not for the regular market, or for the government. It is like the arugula he grows. It is for the tourist market and, by extension, the future. “We are talking about an elite market,” he said. “The Cuban markets are a market of necessity.”

Allowing US to import food to Cuba destroys Cuban urban agriculture

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On September 26, 2002, the largest-ever U.S. trade show in Cuba was held in a Havana suburb. Its purpose was to showcase U.S. food and agriculture. The sponsors included a dazzling list of U.S. agri-industrial superstars - from the makers of highly processed foods like Spam, M & M chocolate candies, and Sara Lee cakes, to the products of [*780] agribusiness giants like Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, and Tyson Foods. The next day, The New York Times plastered a picture on its front page of Cuban President Fidel Castro at the show, gingerly fingering a plate containing a hamburger and french fries, a chocolate milk shake nearby. One could hardly imagine a more vivid illustration of the challenges Cuban agriculture will face when the U.S. embargo is lifted. Specifically, **United States and other foreign agribusiness giants, eager to enter the Cuban market, anxiously await the time they can press everything from processed foods to genetically modified seeds and chemical fertilizers on the Cuban market.** Despite Cuban claims that they will resist this onslaught just as they have resisted the attempts to meddle with their internal politics since the Revolution, the expansion of agricultural markets could well prove an unstoppable juggernaut. **In a country where food purchases can require as much as two-thirds of an average Cuban's salary, the lure of comparatively cheap agricultural inputs and even cheaper food could easily lead to social unrest** if not permitted by the government. ⁿ²²⁵ In short, the pressure to accept cheaper U.S. and other foreign agricultural products, could well prove to be the necessity that next prods the Cuban frog to jump.

Latin Relations

Lifting embargo kills Latin rels — Obama proves

Azel 2015 [Jose Azel senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-cuba-policy-fallacies-and-implications>>] //CJC

Moreover, **the president's new measures will enrich primarily the Cuban military, which controls most economic activity**, and thus will bolster the regime. Any resulting improvement in US-Cuba relations will not diminish Castro's close alliance with Iran, Russia, or Venezuela. It will not prevent Cuban personnel from advising and training Venezuela's security apparatus or from handling the issuance of Venezuelan passports and other identity documents, which is also an opportunity to provide false documents to Iranian and Cuban agents to travel throughout the world posing as Venezuelan citizens. **The president's new policy has legitimized a totalitarian-military regime in the eyes of the world, and particularly in the eyes of Latin America. By opening the door to an oppressive regime that violates human rights with abandon, the president has reversed America's longstanding support for democratic governance in the region. Would-be dictators and their sycophants now know that suppressing civil liberties is not particularly troubling to the United States—and certainly not detrimental to good diplomatic and commercial relations. Contrary to the argument that the new policy will help improve relations with Latin America, Obama's implicit concessions to, and approval of, a military dictatorship further weaken American influence in the region and elsewhere, encouraging others to take positions inimical to US interests, as Cuba has done for decades.**

Latin American countries don't care about the embargo and are like Hillary — they publicly oppose it but privately are scared of a lift

Suchlicki 2000 (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it. //CJC

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

Cuba emboldened threatens US interests in Latin America and spreads socialism

Brooks '9 Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation. (Peter – Heritage foundation “Keep the Embargo, O” April 16, 2009 [//CJC](http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the

domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. **We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)** With an influx of resources, **the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism** in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), **Cuba still isn't free**. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. **The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it.** Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosening the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should *hold firm* onto the leverage the embargo provides.

Latin American democracy key to global democracy

Hillman, 2 – Ph.D., Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Democracy and Human Rights, St. John Fisher College (Richard Hillman, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin American, Preface, p. vii) //WGC

“Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, **are particularly relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and economic systems in order to provide a decent standard of living** and incorporate previously excluded populations into the **national mainstream**. The past record, of course, is far from acceptable. **The advent of the twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress for the institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and suffering. The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with democracy has never been greater.** Clearly, the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these experiments is not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as contemporary challenges. Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitively entered the political lexicon and discourse throughout the world.”

Appeasement

No rapprochement – appeasement is fundamentally incompatible with the political landscape

Hanson and Lee 13

(Stephanie Hanson, and Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-Cuba Relations" January 31, 2013 <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>)

//CJC

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, **experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations.** Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, **you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.**" Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. **The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations.** Such a process **is sure to be controversial,** as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapprochement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig. **A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations,** experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "**the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs,**" says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

Removing the embargo's a concession to rogue regimes

Karon 10

- is a senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since 1997. (Tony - TIME "Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba?" Wednesday, Apr. 21, 2010

<http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,48773,00.html>)//CJC

Lifting the embargo will strengthen Castro's government There's no private sector in Cuba; its economy is predominantly state-owned, and trading with it inevitably **strengthens the state.** The government in Havana has been reeling since the collapse of its Soviet patron, but **lifting the embargo would ease its financial crisis and therefore strengthen its hand.** **Cuba's trade with other Western countries hasn't eased repression** Cuba has been trading normally with most of Latin America and Europe for more than a decade now, and **Castro has shown no sign of reforming his system or ending repression.** The idea that **trade promotes human rights is a self-serving myth promoted by corporate America,** and there's little reason to believe that an end to the embargo would automatically improve the political situation in **Cuba. Easing the**

embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong signal Castro continues to defy international standards on democracy and human rights, and **lifting the embargo now would be to reward that defiance**. His regime rejected even the reformist communism of Gorbachev in the '80s, but even though it has struggled to survive economically in the '90s, it has steadfastly maintained its hard line. Democracy should be the condition for lifting the embargo.

Engagement with Cuba is appeasement and solves nothing

Rubin, 2011 - Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist (Jennifer, "Obama's Cuba appeasement", Washington Post, 8/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)//CJC

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: "According to news reports, **the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens.** If true, **such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism.** Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn't try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. **Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.**"

As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn't stop there. The [Associated Press](#) reported, "The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by **senior U.S. officials** in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross' release. He also **told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.**"

Former deputy national security adviser [Elliott Abrams explained](#), "It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: **local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every** American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime."

The administration's conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. **Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic**

reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross's imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.

Throughout his tenure, President **Obama** has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He **has offered** armfuls of **goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots' behavior has worsened.** ***There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.***

Whether it is Cuba or **Iran,** the administration reverts to "engagement" mode when its engagement **efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression.** Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We'll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We'll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We'll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. ***The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration's willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.***

Cred is key and appeasement wrecks it — emboldens enemies, decks allies

Fettweis '4 Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004, "Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror," online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html //CJC

The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.¹² ***The loss of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and irresolution, which,*** the thinking goes, ***emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies.*** Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation and the observer, but perhaps ***the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goal with sufficient resolve.*** By doing so, ***a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist powers.***¹³ Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus ***the credibility imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with "appeasement,"*** which is of course a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

Appeasement causes global aggression and multiple scenarios for conflict.

Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p.

<http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/> //CJC

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? **Can anything good result from President Obama's marked submissiveness before the world?** Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of **diplomacy rests on public perceptions**, however trivial. **We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemony, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting** to see who's going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be **1979 redux**, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, **Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten** ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and **Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe**, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There's an outside shot that **North Korea might do something really stupid** near the 38th parallel and **China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India's borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up**. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

Appeasement crushes US leadership and emboldens global rivals

Henriksen '99

(Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, "Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States" February 1, 1999 <http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159>) //CJC

At the dawn of a new millennium, **the United States finds itself entering an era of neither war nor peace**. Rather, it confronts an uncertain and increasingly deadly world. **We face not one arms race but many, in which weapons of mass destruction have fallen--or are falling--into the most desperate hands. Rogue adversaries covet nuclear, chemical, or biological capabilities** to obliterate ancient enemies or to terrorize their way into the circles of the great powers. **They are also rapidly acquiring the long-range missiles** to deliver awesome destruction to our allies' and our own shores. A congressionally chartered Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld concluded in 1998 that Iran and North Korea will be able "to inflict major destruction on the United States" within five years and Iraq within ten. **How the United States handles rogue states will be of decisive importance to America's well-being and global primacy. If it is judged timorous in the use of power, it will be open to challenge as its own vulnerability becomes apparent.** Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, emphasized that war is to be understood as the continuation of

politics by other means. Our adoption of severe remedies short of declared conflict must be seen as an extension of diplomatic instruments to realize our strategic goals. **Power must be employed to further diplomatic goals.¶ Sanctions and criminal legal proceedings make up part of our arsenal.** These initial steps can build international support for more draconian measures. Offensive military operations and other measures short of war are our best defense for peace and continued security. **They represent political warfare, provided, of course, that the United States has the tenacity and wherewithal to complete them once begun.¶ By backing away from realistic approaches we will demonstrate to our opponents that they can oppose us without cost. Our allies will take note and go their own way.** This turn of events will cause still further problems down the road. If the forces of global disorder come to dominate the world scene, the human condition will be degraded, producing fertile soil for still more extreme elements to take root. **The alternative to American leadership is growing international anarchy. Unless we restore power, and the credibility it represents, to U.S. diplomacy, we await the dire consequences of our feebleness.**

Gradualism

Perception of govt weakness causes civil war

Ruggeri 2010 [Andrea Ruggeri, Department of Government, University of Essex, "Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war", *Journal of Peace Research*, <<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343310362293>>] //CJC

Theories of mobilization suggest that **groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity structures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling governments.**

However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for violence and **civil war** empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict.

The regime is tightly controlling the pace of reform to maintain stability

Piccone '13 (Joseph, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy, Opening to Havana, 1/17/13, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana>) //CJC

Under Raul Castro, the Cuban government has continued to undertake a number of important reforms to modernize its economy, lessen its dependence on Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, and

allow citizens to make their own decisions about their economic futures. **The process of reform, however, is gradual, highly controlled and short on yielding game-changing results that would ignite the economy.** Failure to tap new offshore oil and gas fields and agricultural damage from Hurricane Sandy dealt further setbacks. Independent civil society remains confined, repressed and harassed, and strict media and internet controls severely restrict the flow of information. **The Castro generation is slowly handing power over to the next generation of party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process.**

Gradual reforms now – key to a stable transition

Piccone 13 (Joseph Piccone, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute, “Time to Bet on Cuba” March 18, 2013

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana>, //CJC

Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. **Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing.** The updating of the Soviet-style economic system **is a gradual and highly controlled process.** But the recent legal emergence of formal, **small-scale private businesses** (cuentapropistas) that **can now compete on a more equal footing** with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. **The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.** Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, **the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens,** which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. *The gradual handoff of power* **to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process** is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.

Diaz Canel will take over in 2018

Newsmax Dec 2016 [NewsMax, “Castro Heir Apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel to Shake Up Havana?”, Newsmax, <<http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/castro-heir-apparent-miguel-diaz-canel/2016/12/02/id/761798/>>] //CJC

Castro heir apparent Miquel Diaz-Canel is patiently awaiting his hour after Fidel Castro's death and his brother **Raul Castro's vow to step down as president within 15 months.** **Diaz-Canel**, an advocate for modernizing Cuba's state-run media and abysmal internet access, was elevated to the position of first vice-president in 2013, putting him **next in line for the presidency**, reported Reuters. At 56, he is a relative youngster in the ruling Communist Party's leadership and will need to appeal to younger generations if Cuban communism is to thrive beyond the Castro brothers. Fidel Castro died Nov. 25 at age 90 and the 85-year-old **Raul Castro, who took over as president in 2008, says he will step down in February 2018**, at the end of his second five-year term.

Diaz-Canel will continue economic liberation- already played key role in FDIs for Cuban hotels

George 13 – writer for Se Mancha (Samuel, Se Mancha, “Cuba in Transition, United States Stuck in Yesterday”, March 3, 2013, <http://semancha.com/2013/03/03/cuba-in-transition-united-states-stuck-in-yesterday/>)//CJC

Fidel Castro, who removed himself from power in 2008 due to ill health, made a rare appearance at the National Assembly meeting on Sunday where Diaz-Canel's appointment was made, appearing to add his seal of approval to the choice.¶ Yet compelling indicators suggest that **Diaz-Canel is more than a party hack, and that he will continue Raúl's progress towards economic liberalization.** **Diaz-Canel has distinguished himself for his pragmatism.** **He is believed to have played a key role in facilitating foreign investment in Cuban hotels.** As Minister of Higher Education, he gained the respect of his peers by listening and probing, rather than dictating. The ascension of Diaz-Canel represents a break from the geriatric revolutionary leaders – a break that was likely a precondition for any serious modernization.¶ Moreover, Diaz-Canel would struggle to hold a hard line even if he wanted to.¶ **Raúl's reforms have been slow and halting, but they have also been irreversible.** The Economist reports that “much of Cuban farming” has been privatized and that, by 2015, one-third of the workforce will be in the private sector. With cars, computers and phones already traded, the momentum of commercialization – the allure of possession – will be difficult to stymie. The Castros' success in containing reform momentum owes much to personal allegiance and veneration. Diaz-Canel will command no such respect.

Lifting the Embargo would pressure Cuba for rapid reforms

Cave, 12 – foreign correspondent for The New York Times, based in Mexico City and has a B.A. from Boston College and an M.S. from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism (Damien, “Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo”, NY Times, 11/19/12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)//CJC

Still, in a country where Cubans “resolve” their way around government restrictions every day (private deals with customs agents are common), many **Cubans anticipate real benefits should the United States change course.** Mr. López, a meticulous mechanic who wears plastic gloves to avoid dirtying his fingers, said legalizing imports and investment would create a flood of the supplies that businesses needed, overwhelming the government's controls while lowering prices

and creating more work apart from the state. Other **Cubans, including political dissidents, say softening the embargo would increase the pressure for more rapid change by undermining one of the government's main excuses for failing to provide freedom, economic opportunity or just basic supplies.** “Last month, someone asked me to redo their kitchen, but I told them I couldn’t do it because I didn’t have the materials,” said Pedro José, 49, a licensed carpenter in Havana who did not want his last name published to avoid government pressure. “Look around — Cuba is destroyed,” he added, waving a hand toward a colonial building blushing with circles of faded pink paint from the 1950s. “There is a lot of work to be done.”

Weakening of Embargo has Emboldened Dissenters

Llorente 2016 [Elizabeth Llorente “Cuba's opposition movement has grown stronger since U.S.-Cuba deal, dissident says” *FoxNews*, June 2016
<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/03/cuba-opposition-movement-has-grown-stronger-since-us-cuba-deal-dissident-says.html>] //WGC

“The thawing of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States is having a little-spoken-about side effect – people on the island are feeling bolder about challenging the government, says one of Cuba's leading dissidents.

“Without a doubt, the people of Cuba grow weary,” said Jose Daniel Ferrer, leader of Cuba's largest and increasingly influential dissident group, in an interview with Fox News Latino. “It’s been too many years of misery and oppression.”

The change in relationship between the two countries has been accompanied by more outside sources of news and perspectives reaching Cubans long accustomed to state-run media. “International and internal forces within Cuba have resulted in Cubans being exposed to more information, and that drives Cubans to feel more inspired and oppose the regime,” said Ferrer, who is visiting the United States after receiving a short-term permission from the Cuban government to travel outside the island. “Each time the size of disillusioned, frustrated people grows broader and so do the number of people who oppose and challenge the government.”

Ferrer does not criticize the many Cubans who have risked their lives trying to flee, most recently to Latin America in hopes of reaching the United States. That number has surged as more Cuban fear that improving relations between their homeland and the United States will spell the end of opportunities their northern neighbor gives Cubans to seek refuge there.”

Quick reforms snowball—causes backlash and escalating instability

Suchlicki 13 Jaime Suchlicki is the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami 3/4 “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro”

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> //CJC

In the meantime, Raul Castro will still rule with an iron fist. Some Cuba observers expect that Raul will open up the economy and even provide some political changes. Not so soon. With Fidel alive, or even when he is dead, it would be difficult for Raul to reject his brother's legacy of political and economic centralization. His legitimacy is based on being Fidel's heir. Any major move to reject Fidel's "teachings" would create uncertainty among Cuba's ruling elites - party and military. **It could also**

increase instability as some would advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms.

For Raul Castro, the uncertainties of uncorking the genie's bottle of reform in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving cautiously. For the past 52 years, political considerations have always dictated economic policies. He had been the longest serving Minister of Defense (47 years). He presided over the worst period of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power.

During his speech to Parliament, Raul Castro scoffed at any idea that the country would soon abandon socialism and embrace profound economic changes. "I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba," he emphasized. "I was elected to defend, maintain and continue to perfect socialism and not to destroy it."

General Castro faces significant challenges in his second term. A non-productive and highly dependent economy on Venezuela and other foreign sources, popular unhappiness, the need to maintain order and discipline among the population and the need to increase productivity. Raul is critically dependent on the military. Lacking the charisma of his brother, he still needs the support of key party leaders and technocrats within the government bureaucracy.

The critical challenge for Raul Castro will be to balance the need to improve the economy and satisfy the needs of the population with maintaining political control. Too

rapid economic reforms may lead to an unraveling of political control, a fact feared by Raul, the military, and other allies keen on remaining in power. A partial solution may be to provide more consumer goods to the population, including food, but without any structural economic changes.

Too much too fast is bad—causes escalating instability and a backlash against liberalization

Perez 10 David A. Perez, J.D. Yale Law School, working with Koh, former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187 //CJC

Policymakers in Washington must realize that **Cubans** will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former **so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the**

latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, **liberalizing the economy** by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but **could also**

alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. **If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the** normative and ideological **underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no**

doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. **A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability.** Given these concerns, **a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the** ^[*210] **state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.**

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that **China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years** yet the state

still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Slow change key to Cuban reform - avoids rapid regime collapse

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Diego, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., "Reaching Out: Cuba's New Economy and the International Response", November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf)/CJC

Gradualism: Gradualism in economic reform—as opposed to an Eastern European-style sudden regime collapse—appears to be the most likely scenario that Cuba will follow. As a result of economic reforms, albeit halting and partial, Cuba today is different from the Cuba of 1989 . In 2011, Cuba's current leadership, however aging and proud, promulgated reform guidelines that recognize the imperative of change and that empower the pro-reform factions. Moreover, as suggested by successful Asian experiences (Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, China), where political leadership provides stability and continuity, gradualism can be a feasible—indeed it may well be the only realistic—option. Gradualism must not, however, be an excuse for policy paralysis or a smoke-screen for maintenance of the status quo.

Rapid change risks Cuban civil war

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Diego, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., "Reaching Out: Cuba's New Economy and the International Response", November, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf)/CJC

Yet, within the national security bureaucracy of the U .S . Executive Branch, notwithstanding occasional presidential rhetoric, there is a strong preference for gradual, peaceful evolution in Cuba . A sudden breakdown, it is feared, would entail substantial risks for U .S . interests, including an immigration crisis right off of our shores, and in the worst case, irresistible pressures for intervention to quell a bloody civil war and halt a mass exodus of refugees.

Cuba will become a failed state if massive changes are implemented—large economic changes in Cuba would lead to destabilization and the collapse of all governmental systems in the country

Azel 2008 (José, "How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers," José Azel is currently a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf) //CJC

But suppose that the U. S. government and the other constituencies - Cubans in the island and in exile, and the international community - are persuaded that economic changes per se represent an opening that should be rewarded in some fashion. A case in point is the argument that, in the case of Cuba, a very gradual approach to changes is called for in order to avoid the possible chaos resulting from more comprehensive and rapid changes. **Cuba's abysmal set of initial sociopolitical and economic conditions is such that the introduction of comprehensive massive changes could result in a failed state.** Some may be tempted to dismiss this concern by noting that by some parameters (e.g. the pervasive informal economy, reluctance to participate in formal employment, etc.) Cuba is already a failed state. But technically Cuba is not a failed state.¹⁰ It is a stable closed state still able to implement and enforce government policy, albeit not uniformly particularly in economic matters. Therefore **the gradualist argument deserves more serious considerations as it is always possible for conditions to get worse.** The main concern hinges on the precarious balance between openness in a society and stability in that society. It is certainly the case that **economic reforms – particularly reforms to begin a transition from a command economy to a market economy – are destabilizing.** Decollectivization and desocialization create enormous social dislocations. **They require a repositioning of the role of the state and a new model of social relationships between the state and its people.** Whatever the specific strategies selected they will demand many difficult choices. As Ian Bremmer points out in "The J Curve," "for a country that is "stable because it's closed" to become a country that is "stable because it is open" it must go through a transitional period of dangerous instability." These are thoughtful security considerations that must be weighted by policymakers. Unfortunately Cuba's present politico-economic system can not be the starting point for a serious development and reconstruction process. The country's existing bureaucratic, institutional, and organizational framework is not conducive to the creation of a new state.

Cuba regime collapse causes a shit ton of bad shit and probably turns everything — refugees, econ, corruption, drugs, and no democracy or positive capitalist outcomes

NAÍM, 1 – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, "When Countries go Crazy", MARCH 1, 2001, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when_countries_go_crazy)//CJC

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain's neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: **Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy.** Lesson two: **The less**

internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more **traumatic and unsuccessful** its **transition** will be. Lesson three: **Dismantling a communist state is far easier** and faster **than building a functional replacement** for it. Lesson four: The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions. Lesson five: Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates. It is therefore safe to assume that **if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas.** But that is not the assumption on which U.S politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. **More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable.** New investments and privatizations will be mired in the legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than \$17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will paralyze the government, at least for a while. And **the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the \$2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994.**

[...]

If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid, President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

Cuban collapse turns literally everything — terrorism, democracy collapse, instability, econ collapse, drug trade, US intervention, and anti-Americanism — seriously this card ends the round

Gorrell, 5 - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim Gorrell, "CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?" <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //CJC

When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the "wait and see" approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980

125,000 fled the island.²⁶ Many were criminals; this time the number could be **several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.**

Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. **Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia.** The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba's actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.²⁷ While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. **In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases.** **If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S.** or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. **Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency.** The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

Empirically, Countries like Cuba have a 78% chance of Civil war when Weak. Strong countries have a 0.04% chance.

Rost, Nicolas Human Rights Review (2011) 12: 417.

Building on studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003a) and Sambanis (2004), the role of rights violations in leading to civil war is tested empirically, yielding strong support for a close link between repression and civil war onset, especially in weak states. **According to one empirical model, the yearly probability of civil war onset is only 0.04% in strong, non-repressive states, but it is about 78% in weak states where the government violates basic human rights.** This study **contributes to the** understanding of the **repression–rebellion nexus** by testing the impact of violations of personal integrity rights—political imprisonment, torture, “disappearances”, and extrajudicial killings—**on the probability of civil war onset in multivariate models.** Two-stage models show that the link between repression and civil war is complex: **Repression is more likely during low-level conflict, but it increases the risk of an escalation to full-scale civil war. This risk is particularly high in weak states, which see both more human rights violations and more civil war.**

Probability of civil war 1-->88% when gov gets destabilized

Rost 2005 [Nicholas Rost, "WEAK STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR, *University of North Texas*. Accessed at: https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4748/m2/1/high_res_d/thesis.pdf.] //DNP

How do these effects combine in hypothetical cases? More specifically, what probabilities of civil war onset can be expected in the ideal types of a strong and a weak state, with and without repression (i.e. in the four subgames)? The ideal type of a strong state, in this simulation, refers to a fully consolidated democracy or a fully established authoritarian (not an anocracy), but not a military regime with a maximum level of economic development, but no or low-level oil exports. The ideal type of a weak state refers to an anocracy at Polity2 = 5, governed by a military regime, with oil exports and a minimum level of economic development. In this hypothetical case, the opportunity costs of rebelling are low and the potential spoils are high. For both cases, population, the percentage of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization are held at their respective means, and both are politically stable, since these variables were not significant in the Model 1. To represent the four subgames in Figure 1, both weak and strong states without (PTS = 1) and with high levels of repression (PTS = 5) are simulated. Strong states with no (or almost no) state-sponsored human rights abuses, as expected, are the least likely to experience a civil war; the probability reduces to .06%, only 12% of the probability of the 'average state.'

Strong states with high levels of repression [have] are 17.67 times more likely to face a civil war, with a probability of civil war onset of 1.06% (2.06 times that of the 'average country'). The effect of state weakness, however, (combined with a low n, a high s, and no repression) is much more dramatic, increasing the likelihood to 29.96% (more than 58 times that of the 'average country' and 500 times that of a strong state with no repression). Clearly, while repression has the single most substantial effect on civil war onset, the combination of different aspects of state weakness, large potential spoils, and low opportunity costs, outweighs the impact of the single repression variable. The game suggests that state weakness is a necessary condition for a civil war to start, while state weakness and repression combined are sufficient. Accordingly, **repression still increases the probability of civil war onset, even in weak states. Combining state weakness and repression, the expected probability of civil war onset skyrockets to 88%, almost three times higher than without repression**, 170 times higher than the 'average country,' and 1,470 times higher than in a strong state with no government repression.³⁹ From these simulated probabilities, then, one can conclude that state weakness and repression come quite close to being sufficient conditions.

Table 2. Simulated effects of statistically significant variables.

	change in independent variable	probability of civil war onset this year	ratio of probability / probability of 'average country'	probability of civil war onset over 5 years	probability of civil war onset over 10 years
'average-country'		0.51%	1.00	2.55%	5.03%
personal integrity abuses	+1 (from 1 to 2)	1.04%	2.03	5.11%	9.97%
	+4 (from 1 to 5)	8.21%	15.95	34.85%	57.56%
Democracy/Anocracy	Polity2 = +5; anocracy	1.77%	3.44	8.54%	16.35%
	Polity2 = -5; anocracy	0.15%	0.29	0.74%	1.47%
	no anocracy	0.24%	0.47	1.21%	2.42%
No military regime	military regime	1.16%	2.25	5.65%	10.99%
GDP per capita	+ 1 std. dev. (1985 US \$2,933)	0.29%	0.56	1.42%	2.82%
	to max: 1985 US \$28,901 (UAE)	0.13%	0.25	0.65%	1.30%
	to min: US \$215 (DR Congo)	1.94%	3.77	9.34%	17.81%
No oil exporter	oil exporter	1.40%	2.72	6.80%	13.14%
strong state, no repression		0.06%	0.12	0.31%	0.62%
weak state, no repression		29.96%	58.19	83.14%	97.16%
strong state, high repression		1.06%	2.06	5.18%	10.09%
weak state, high repression		88.09%	171.09	100.00%	100.00%
lowest predicted chance in sample	United Arab Emirates, 1983	0.04%	0.09	0.22%	0.45%
highest predicted chance in sample	Uganda, 1981	57.21%	111.11	98.56%	99.98%

Note: The 'average-country' is a country with all dummies and Polity2 set to '0', PTS at '1,' and all other variables at their mean. A 'strong state' has an authoritarian, stable, and non-military government (Polity2 = -10, no anocracy), a high GDP per capita of \$28,901 (in 1985 US constant \$), is not an oil exporter, and has an average population size and average levels of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization. A 'weak state' is a stable anocracy (Polity2 = 5) that is governed by a military regime, has a low GDP per capita of \$215, is an oil exporter, shows an average population size and average levels of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization. 'No repression' refers to a low level of '1' on the PTS, 'high repression' to a level of '5.'