

We negate.

Our sole contention is Russian militarization.

Bettina **Renz** at the University of Nottingham writes in 2016 that Russia has been building up their conventional military as a deterrent, but Putin currently has no plans to risk a war with NATO. Therefore, Lawson **Brigham** at the University of Alaska finds in July that the US and Russia are able to cooperate in the Arctic now on research, overfishing, trade, and the environment. Unfortunately, acceding to UNCLOS would undermine this positive trend in x ways.

First, oil drilling. Emily **Atkin**, staff writer at The New Republic, explains in April that oil companies in the US are eager to drill in the Arctic. Marta **Kolcz-Ryan** at the University of Dayton writes in 2011 that accession to UNCLOS would grant the United States sovereignty rights over an additional 350 nautical miles of land, enabling mass oil and gas drilling across the Arctic. Unfortunately, Michel **Chossudovsky** at the University of Ottawa finds in 2014 that the underlying objective of US arctic expansion is the appropriation of oil, which is fundamentally tied to militarization in the region. Empirically, as the US expands to extract fossil fuels, it has also heavily increased its military presence in those specific areas. Chossudovsky continues that Washington's Arctic strategy is fundamentally directed against Russia, setting the framework for conflict and potentially a new cold war.

Second, energy independence. Kolcz-Ryan continues that failure to ratify UNCLOS has prevented American energy independence by denying us access to our Arctic oil reserves. However, Kirkpatrick **O'Sullivan** at Harvard finds in 2014 that the threat of an increased oil supply would cause a massive short-term hit to Russia's economy by driving down oil prices and giving European consumers leverage to negotiate, and that a sustained price drop would collapse the Russian regime. Ultimately, Mark **Galeotti** at the Atlantic writes in August 23rd that if the economy collapses, Putin will blame the west and turn to militarism in order to rally domestic nationalism. Max **Fisher** at Vox confirms in 2014 that after western sanctions on Russia, Putin was forced to shift his political platform to one of nationalism in order to sustain popular support, culminating in domestic crackdowns and the invasion of Ukraine.

Third, legal disputes. Vladimir **Frolov** at Global Research writes in 2007 ratifying the treaty would allow the US to challenge Russian claims in the Arctic. Unfortunately, Ekaterina **Piskunova** at the University of Montreal finds in 2010 that Russia views Arctic resource competition as zero-sum and its Arctic development as essential to its economic survival. Therefore, Frolov concludes that US ratification would legitimize hardliners in Russia, leading to increased tensions and militarization.

Fourth, freedom of navigation. Valery **Konishev** at St. Petersburg University writes in 2014 that the US will only follow the convention when it wants to, meaning any territorial disputes will be resolved bilaterally. She continues that they will use the convention's freedom of navigation provisions to justify military operations near Russian territory in the Barents Sea, Bering Sea, and Chukchi Sea.

Bahauddin Foizee from Asia Times concludes in 2016 that Arctic militarization would most likely escalate to violent confrontation which in turn could spark a global conflict.