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# Formatting Guide

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3. Use Heading 3 on more specific arguments ex: A2: multilat links or A2: specific impact scenarios (label link or impact)
4. Use heading 3 and label generic responses as if it were something specific (see below)
5. Use numbered responses and bold the tag use the normal text
6. Underline and Hyperlink author but keep normal text
7. Bold/Underline the important parts of the card, subscript (Ctrl and ,)
8. When inserting a new response, cut all the content of the previous response hit enter after the previous tagline, type the new tagline, paste the content of the previous response where it should be (be sure to put a space before and after the content of a response)
9. Once you are done with a section (heading 3) put it onto a separate page

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# A2 AFF

## https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/16/uks-saudi-weapons-sales-unlawful-lords-committee-findsA2 Limiting Yemen War

1. **NU: Other countries fill the gap, Saudi can still bomb all they want (PG)**

[**Zengerle of Reuters**](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-politics-dissident-arms/u-s-weapons-makers-rattled-over-saudi-arabia-deals-idUSKCN1MM1VF) **(October, 2018)**

Turkish reports that journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a vocal critic of Riyadh, was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and removed have hardened resistance in the U.S. Congress to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, already a sore point for many lawmakers concerned about the Saudi role in Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia rejects the allegations in Turkey as baseless. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday he was wary of **halting arms sales** to Riyadh because of Khashoggi as it **would just shift** its**[Saudi Arabia’s] weapons purchases to Russia and China**. Saudi Arabia, where Trump last year announced a $110 billion arms package, has been a centerpiece of his overhaul of weapons export policy in which he has gone further than any of his predecessors in acting as a weapons salesman. However, critics say the new approach gives too much weight to business interests versus human rights concerns.

[CBS 2018](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jamal-khashoggi-killing-european-parliament-weapons-surveillance-sales-saudi-arabia/) (JW)

**Should Western nations halt their sales, one country that might step in is Russia.** Russian and Saudi officiaals discussed possible arms sales including S-400 air defense systems during a landmark visit by King Salman last October, but no contract was signed. Saudi Arabia also has expressed interest in setting up production of Russian Kornet-EM anti-tank missiles, TOS-1A rocket launchers and AGS-30 automatic grenade launchers and the latest version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle in their country. It is unclear if any of those deals are nearing implementation. Russia's cautious stance on Khashoggi's murder could be changing that, experts say. Kirill Semenyov, a Middle East expert on the Foreign Affairs Council which advises the Kremlin, said the Saudis would be looking for alternatives like Russia if one of their key partners were to pull out of the deals. **"If the U.S. or Britain were to renege on the contracts to supply fighter jets or other weapons like tanks, it would be a serious blow, that would push Saudi Arabia to buy arms from Russia like T-90 tanks or Su-35 planes,**" he said.

[Bisaccio 2018](http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/196962/us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia%3A-policy-options.html) (DS)

Across the Atlantic, the Canadian government made no move to terminate the sale of armored vehicles to Saudi Arabia even after the kingdom rather publicly snubbed the Canadian government in August of this year. It **[other countries] may not follow the U.S. if it did cut off Saudi Arabia – France has been perfectly willing to fill the void of American sales to Egypt,[xi] for example – which would undermine the effectiveness of a U.S. arms embargo**, too.

**Historical Precedence (NO)**

[Chatham House 2017](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-sendstad.pdf)

Efforts to penetrate markets recently dominated by US and European suppliers have also begun to bear fruit. **In 2014, Russia agreed a multi-billion-dollar deal to supply attack helicopters and MiG29 fighter aircraft to Egypt**.64 **This was important because Egypt has relied on the US for arms since the late 1970s**. Russia has also supplied attack helicopters and air-defence systems to Iraq, and there is speculation that the latter will purchase fighter aircraft in the future.65 There have even been rumours that Russia might be able to carve out a position in Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest buyer of weaponry, although this is a market traditionally dominated by US and European suppliers, reflecting Riyadh’s close political relationships with the US and European governments.66 However, Russia’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria may complicate its efforts to forge closer arms ties with countries like Saudi Arabia that are actively supporting his opponents.

1. **NU: US is pulling already out and Senate already voted to eliminate US involvement in War, severely hurting Saudi’s ability to do war (PG)**

[**Scott Detrow (Dec, 2018)**](https://www.npr.org/2018/12/12/676152310/senate-poised-to-vote-to-end-u-s-military-support-for-war-in-yemen)

**The Senate voted with support from lawmakers in both parties Thursday to end U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen.** The 56-41 vote marks the first time the Senate utilized powers granted under the 1973 War Powers Act, which gives Congress the power to demand an end to military actions. The years-long conflict, viewed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has spiraled into a growing humanitarian disaster. **The U.S. military has provided refueling for Saudi aircraft carrying out strikes — assistance the Trump administration ended amid growing criticism** — and helped Saudi Arabia with other strategic assistance, as well.

1. **Status quo solves : US bipartisanship pushes for overseeing Saudi Arabia arms in yemen (CK)**

[Bazzi of The Atlantic](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/)

As public anger over **America’s role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown**, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America’s longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. **Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia** and the UAE **are taking “demonstrable actions” to avoid harming civilians and making a “good faith” effort to reach a political settlement to end the war.** Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon **to continue providing military assistance to the coalition.** This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and

[billions of dollars](https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/21/yemen-embargo-arms-saudi-arabia) worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force.

1. **Complete withdrawal is dangerous, should provide anti-missile arms but US should maintain presence to thwart off terrorist groups and possibly civil conflict. (CK)**

[Byman of the Brookings Institute in 2018](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/)

Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) [would still be](https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524) militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. **Local actors would continue to fight: The country is** [**highly divided**](https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/73524)**, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces.** The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are [brutal and authoritarian](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45639276) as well as tied to Tehran. **Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival.** Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed.

**[HE CONTINUES]**

**The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles**. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. **Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation.** An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

1. **NU: arm sales will not change the policy shift the U.S. has made to increase military support to Saudi Arabia in Ending the Yemen War. (NR)**

[Bazzi 2018](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/trump-yemen-saudi-arabi-war-us-involvement-worsening-crisis)

Donald Trump is quietly escalating America’s role in the Saudi-led war on Yemen, disregarding the huge humanitarian toll and voices in Congress that are trying to rein in the Pentagon’s involvement. **Trump administration officials are considering a request from Saudi Arabia** and its ally, the United Arab Emirates, **for direct US military help to retake Yemen’s main port** from Houthi rebels. **The** Hodeidah **port is a major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen, and a prolonged battle could be catastrophic for millions of civilians who depend on** already limited **aid.**

**The increased US military support for Saudi actions in Yemen is part of a larger policy shift by Trump and his top advisers** since he took office, **in which Trump voices constant support for Saudi Arabia** and perpetual criticism of its regional rival, Iran. The transformation was solidified during Trump’s visit to the kingdom in May 2017, which he chose as the first stop on his maiden foreign trip as president.

1. **Turn: U.S. presence in the Yemen war saves more civilians. (NR)--> reason why AQAP membership increase is because of violence/civ deaths**

[Walsh NYT 2018](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html)

American mechanics service the jet and carry out repairs on the ground. American technicians upgrade the targeting software and other classified technology, which Saudis are not allowed to touch. The pilot has likely been trained by the United States Air Force. And at a flight operations room in the capital, Riyadh, **Saudi commanders sit near American military officials who provide intelligence and tactical advice,** mainly **aimed at stopping the Saudis from killing Yemeni civilians.**

1. **TURN: Ending arm sales increases civilian deaths in Yemen because Saudi Arabia will use more deadly arms (DL)**

[Cordesman The Hill 2018](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/379542-saudi-arabia-is-a-critical-american-security-partner-in-the-middle-east)

**The United States, especially members of Congress, needs to remember that we have had at least as many military problems in fighting the Iraq and Syria wars as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have faced in fighting in Yemen. Cutting U.S. arms shipments to Saudi Arabia may do little more that lead the Saudis to ignore the systems that the United States has helped set up to limit targeting of civilians and using unguided and more damaging air munitions. It raises a whole new round of questions about the U.S commitment to its partners in the region.**

1. **DL: Saudi Arabia has large stockpiles and would be able to continue bombing regardless**

[Knights (Washington Institute) 2018](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev) (DS)

Based on a rough sense of prewar stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, **Riyadh could** probably **keep bombing at its current rate for several years even if all new U.S.** PGM **deals were rejected**. Thus, while cutting off such sales may be a good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, **the data indicates that it would not meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon**

1. **NU: The UAE would just continue the fight (NO)**

[The Guardian 2018](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war)

**The Saudis have attracted the bulk of the world’s displeasure for their** bloody **intervention in Yemen, but the UAE plays a more forceful role on the ground** – and its allies in the south, including local militias, Salafi fighters, and south [Yemen](https://www.theguardian.com/world/yemen) separatists who want to break away from Hadi’s government, have been known to fight against the Saudis’ own proxies in the country.

…

In fact, it **[The Yemeni Civil War] is no longer even a single war. It began as a conflict with two clear antagonists – the Saudi-led coalition** allied with the government **versus the Houthi militia supported by Iran. But** the force and funding of **outside intervention – especially from the UAE – has helped to fragment the war into multiple conflicts** and local skirmishes **that will not** necessarily **be ended by any peace agreement.** Yemen is now a patchwork of heavily armed fiefdoms and chaotic areas, where commanders, war profiteers and a thousand bandit kings, like Ayman Askar, thrive.

1. **Turn: The best way to protect Yemeni civilians is a Saudi victory (NO)**[The National Interest 2018](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801)

There is no question that Yemen is confronting a humanitarian crisis that has been exacerbated by the entry of the Saudi-led coalition into the war. However, much of this crisis has been manufactured by the Houthis themselves. **The Houthi government’s total neglect of sanitation services, and its failure to maintain and repair sewer and water infrastructure, has contributed to the deepening of the cholera epidemic. Additionally, the Houthi have confiscated food, medicine, and critical life-saving medical equipment** to give to militia members or to sell on the black market at wildly inflated prices. Also, they have widely used landmines and the forced recruitment of child soldiers, many of whom are under fifteen years of age, all of which further compounds Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. **In contrast, areas that the Saudi-led coalition have restored to Yemeni government control do not suffer the same disastrous conditions that civilians in Houthi-controlled regions are experiencing.**

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia can buy bombs from the UK (NO)**

[The Guardian 2018](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/23/uk-hides-arms-trade-saudi-arabia--yemen)

**The export of Paveway IV bombs, Storm Shadow missiles and Brimstone air to surface missiles are made under a** longstanding government-to-government **defence cooperation programme between the UK and Saudi Arabia,**” the spokesman explained. “OIELs are not a simple or quick option for exporters and the application process can take several months. Terms and conditions for use will vary depending on the goods and export destinations. Holders of OIELs are subject to audit by DIT compliance inspectors.

(Considering that Saudi Arabia already buys munitions from the UK, interoperability and the cost of switching systems shouldn’t be an issue)

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia will never give up fighting or pressure in Yemen. Even if we ground their planes, they will find other ways to respond**

[Reardon 2014 Al Jazzera](https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye-201492984846324440.html) (YZ)

Is Yemen really that important to Saudi Arabia and Iran? The short answer is yes, and each side seems prepared to draw their proverbial line in the sand. **For Saudi Arabia, what happens south of their border is a matter of grave national security, particularly now that the future of Yemen is in question. They cannot allow instability there to give Iran a solid foothold on the peninsula or AQAP free movement northwards.**

1. **Mines (JM)**

[**Hatem Mohamed (18)**](http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302702114)

RIYADH, 4th August, 2018 (WAM) -- **One million mines have been planted by Houthi militia's coup perpetrators in Yemen in three years, killing 1194 civilians, 216 of whom are children**, according to a senior official at the Saudi Project for Landmine Clearance (MASAM), which aims to make Yemen landmine-free to protect civilians and safeguard the delivery of urgent humanitarian supplies. Speaking to the Emirates News Agency (WAM), Osama Al Qasibi, MASAM Director-General, said, "MASAM teams have managed to detect and remove 919 mines and explosive charges in Taiz, Red Sea Coast, Beihan, Osailan, Saada, Shabwa and Marib, only during the two weeks that followed the launch of the project." **"Most of these are internationally banned anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines that originate from difference sources in addition to 288 locally devised or Iranian made mines,**" he added. The coup perpetrators are developing anti-vehicle mines and turn them to anti-personnel explosives as part of their sectarian scheme to intimidate and terrorise the civilians and feed their expansionist plans, he indicated. **MASAM, launched by King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief) on June 25th 2018, tackles the plague of landmines left behind by Iran-backed Al Houthi militants as they retreat from battlefield losses. Landmines constitute a major impediment to social and economic development efforts and expose citizens to potentially fatal risk for generations to come, MASAM says.**

[**Saudi Gazette (June, 2018)**](http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/537603)

Riyadh — The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief) announced on Monday the Saudi project for land mine clearance (Masam) in Yemen.The humanitarian project aims at clearing Yemeni territories of land mines and explosive remnants of war. **Some nine million people will benefit from the project. Al Rabeeah said that the authorities have so far found more than 600,000 landmines in the liberated areas in addition to 130,000 internationally embargoed anti-boat-and-vessel sea mines, out of which 40,000 in Marib governorate and 16,000 in Meyon Island. According to Yemeni government reports, a total of 615 people, including101 children and 26 women, were killed and 924 injured due to explosion of landmines during the period between since Dec. 2014 and Dec. 2016.**

[**The Guardian in 2018**](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/nov/28/arms-yemen-militia-were-supplied-by-west-find-analysts)

“Data shows that between 2011 and 2014 **Saudi Arabia** and the UAE **purchased 2,600 Oshkosh M-ATV mine-resistant ambush-protected (Mrap) vehicles from the US**. In 2015, the Abu al-Abbas group received three such vehicles whilst others have fallen into the hands of other Yemeni factions or the hands of Houthis,” Abo-Elgheit said.

[**AP News 2018**](https://www.apnews.com/bce0a80324d040f09843ceb3e4e45c1e)

They lurk under shifting desert sands, amid the debris of urban roadsides, and inside abandoned schools, some set to go off at the lightest touch. Land **mines scattered by Yemen’s Houthi rebels are largely unmapped and will remain a threat even if the latest push for peace succeeds in halting the conflict**, those involved in their eradication say. While the Houthis’ use of Scud and other retrofitted ballistic missiles has drawn attention for striking deep inside Saudi Arabia, **their widespread use of mines represents a risk for generations to come in the Arab world’s poorest country.**

1. **DL: Saudi Arabia is easing off Yemen conflict anyway**

[Shahine 2018 Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/saudis-to-cut-military-spending-as-trump-touts-weapons-sales) (EH)

**Saudi Arabia will cut military spending for a second straight year in 2019**, when education is set to overtake it as the budget’s biggest item, according to official projections published on Tuesday.

**The cutbacks on defense may reflect expectations that Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen is drawing to a close.** Earlier on Tuesday, **King Salman didn’t include soldiers fighting in the war in his decision to renew a package of cost-of-living allowances for another year.**

## A2 Aerial Refueling

1. DL: The US has stopped refueling for SA because Saudi Arabia can now refuel on their own.

[Stewart 18 Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-yemen-refueling/u-s-halting-refueling-of-saudi-led-coalition-aircraft-in-yemens-war-idUSKCN1NE2LJ) (YZ)

**Saudi Arabia**, in a statement released by its embassy in Washington, said it had decided to **request an end to U.S. aerial refueling for its operations in Yemen because it could now handle it by itself.**

Still, **a halt to refueling could by itself have little practical effect on the war.** U.S. officials told Reuters **only a fifth of Saudi-led coalition aircraft require in-air refueling from the United States.**

1. DL: The US already stopped aerial refueling bc of Yemen criticism you dumb dumbs

[Hudson Nov 2018 Wapo](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html) (EH)

**The Trump administration is ending the practice of refueling Saudi-coalition aircraft,** halting the most tangible and controversial aspect of U.S. support for the kingdom’s three-year war in Yemen, U.S. and Saudi officials said. **The move comes amid escalating criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct in the war.** Lawmakers from both parties have demanded that the United States suspend weapons sales to Riyadh and cut off aerial refueling of aircraft flown by the Saudi-led coalition, which monitoring groups have accused of killing thousands of unarmed civilians.

## A2 Airstrikes

1. **[Lay Appeal] Houthi rebels are using human shields (NO)**

[Huffington Post 2016](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-houthis-are-ensuring-that-yemeni-civilian-deaths_us_57ed006fe4b0972364deac9b)

**Houthi**-Saleh **militiamen have committed** heinous **crimes in violation of international humanitarian law** since the occupation of Sanaa and other regions**. The rebels have not only**  [**targeted**](http://sciscomedia.co.uk/yemen-blood-more-available-drinking-water/) **civilians , but also used**  [**human shields**](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/news-bulletin/2015/03/31/1900GMT.html)  **in schools and hospitals.**

In a  [report](https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/13/yemen-houthis-endangered-school-blind)  released by Human Rights Watch in January, the group slammed the Houthi forces placing militia in a school for the blind in Sanaa, saying this placed vulnerable children “at grave risk”.

**[For example] The Houthis have based armed men near a school for blind students, showing obvious disregard for the lives of some of the most at-risk civilians**,” wrote Shantha Rau Barriga, HRW’s disability rights director.

(Civilian deaths in airstrikes aren’t caused by Saudi targeting, they’re caused by Houthi rebels)

(I know it doesn’t actually delink anything, but it probably sounds important to a lay judge)

2. (Meme response) SA is moving to be independent

[Doug Cameron Wall Street Journal 2018](https://www.outline.com/kX4VHv)

Saudi Arabia’s huge arms bill has led the country to push for a greater share of the economic benefits, especially jobs. **The kingdom has said it wants to become less reliant on imports and spend half its weapons budget in domestic facilities—compared to just 2% at present—part of a plan to diversify its economy beyond the oil industry by 2030.**

**That has led U.S. companies to open Saudi subsidiaries and to agree to shift assembly and other production processes to the kingdom.** Boeing announced a joint venture in March that would place more than half the repair work for Saudi helicopters in the country, creating 6,000 jobs.

## A2 No other countries can fill the void

## A2 Cluster Bombs

1. **Delink: US Cluster Bombs don’t have duds (NO)**

[The Monitor 2017](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/saudi-arabia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx)

The CBU-105 is **the only cluster munition exported by the US**, and is only exported on the condition that it is not used in civilian areas. The weapon **must** also **have a failure rate that results in less than 1% unexploded ordnance**. [[27]](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/saudi-arabia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx#ftn27) In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia following reports of civilian harm in Yemen.[[28]](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/saudi-arabia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx#ftn28) Cluster munitions are not part of a major 2017 arms deal by the US with Saudi Arabia. On 30 August 2016, CBU-105 manufacturer Textron Systems announced that it is stopping its production of the weapons, effectively ending US production of cluster munitions as it was the last producer.[[29]](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/saudi-arabia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx#ftn29)

**Icu puk**

1. **Delink: US doesn’t sell Saudi Arabia cluster bombs anymore (NO)**

[The Monitor 2017](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/saudi-arabia/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx)

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1. **Delink: The US doesn’t even make cluster bombs (NO)**

[The Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/09/02/why-the-last-u-s-company-making-cluster-bombs-wont-produce-them-anymore/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ffb426db5045) reported in 2016 that

**Textron, the last U.S. company to build cluster bombs, announced** in a [securities filing](http://d1lge852tjjqow.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000217346/57f0bc04-5bf0-40d3-ab7c-159cbfc34be5.pdf?noexit=true) Tuesday that one of its subsidiaries **[it] would no longer produce the** controversial and internationally derided**munition**, citing dwindling demand.

The Rhode Island-based company’s decision comes **after the Obama administration** [**halted**](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/31/last-remaining-u-s-maker-of-cluster-bombs-stops-production/) **a shipment of** approximately 400 of their **cluster weapons** — called CBU-105s — **to Saudi Arabia** in May, following reports that the Saudis were using the weapons indiscriminately during their air campaign over Yemen.

1. **Turn: Russia would sell Saudi Arabia even more cluster bombs (NO)**

[The Monitor 2017](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/russian-federation/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx)

**Russia**, and historically the Soviet Union, **is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions.** Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”

A good example of Russia’s policy on cluster bombs is its relationship with Syria

[The CMC in 2017 quantifies that](http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2582190/Cluster-Munition-Monitor-2017_web4.pdf)

**All cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by** the Soviet Union or its successor **Russia with two exceptions**.52 When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions and in what quantities remains unknown.53 Of the cluster munition remnants that could be identified from 238 attacks in the reporting period, 115 involved the use of AO-2.5RT submunitions and 65 used ShOAB-0.5 submunitions.

Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015 **[and]** **the past year has seen a more than 200% increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria [after Russian involvement]**.

## A2 Grounding Saudi Air Force

1. **NU: They are already grounded, doesn’t matter if they have bombs**

[**Axios (NOV 10th)**](https://www.axios.com/us-to-stop-aerial-refueling-of-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen-162d8978-9500-48b2-b570-2119dc136545.html) **(PG)**

**Saudi Arabia will no longer receive aerial refueling assistance from the U.S. in Yemen, according to statements released by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on Friday.** The big picture: Pressure has been building on the U.S.-Saudi relationship since the killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and the increased attention on the atrocities taking place in Yemen. The move comes as the U.N. envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths is working to gather the warring parties in Yemen for peace talks, which Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have thrown their support behind.

[**HuffPo (2016)**](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/barack-obama-could-end-the-killing-in-yemen-in-hours_us_57f7d5dee4b0b6a43031ba4e) **(PG)**

**“There’s no question that American refueling, providing tankers, greatly enables the bombing of Yemen. If the Saudis had to do it without our tankers, the level of bombing would be enormously reduced, probably by a factor of three**,” former Pentagon official Pierre Sprey told HuffPost.

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia already has the capability to repair their jets (NO)**

[Sudetic 2017](https://chargedaffairs.org/can-saudi-arabia-decrease-its-reliance-on-foreign-defense-imports/)

But **servicing, arming, and sustaining [its aircraft]** SME equipment **is already within reach for the Saudis**. **The Al Salam Aircraft Company, for example, has maintained the Kingdom’s fleet of fighter jets for years**. Recently, it won a sole-source [contract](http://militaryedge.org/articles/al-salam-aircraft-awarded-32-5-million-service-saudi-f-15s/) from the US Air Force to provide support to the Kingdom’s F-15S fleet in upgrading three of the airframes to the newer F-15SA configuration. **The Middle East Propulsion Company also provides maintenance** [**services**](http://www.mepcsa.com/Products---Services/F100-PW-220.aspx) **for F-15 engines**.

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia has plenty of non-American planes to fly (NO)**

[Mizokami 2018](https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a14929167/yemen-rebels-shot-down-f15-tornado/)

The Saudis did not disclose what kind of fighter had been shot down. **Saudi Arabia operates** one of the largest and most powerful air forces in the world (on paper anyway). In the category of twin-seat combat jets alone, it flies 87 American-made [F-15SA multi-role strike fighters](https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this-is-a-fully-armed-f-15sa-the-most-advanced-product-1715732294) and **81 European** [**Panavia Tornado IDS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panavia_Tornado) **strike jets.**

[Donald 2018](https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-03-12/green-light-follow-saudi-typhoon-deal)

On March 9 **the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [has] signed a [deal]** Memorandum of Intent (MoI) **with the UK government to purchase 48 Eurofighter Typhoon** swing-role **fighters.** Leading the sale on behalf of the Eurofighter partner companies, BAE Systems—along with the UK government—had been pursuing a follow-on Saudi buy for several years, **having earlier** sold **[bought] 72 Typhoons** to the Kingdom. For the partner companies and their suppliers throughout Europe the deal, if finalized, represents a major boost, coming on top of a [Qatari order for 24 Typhoons](https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2017-12-08/qatar-boosts-its-order-rafales-and-confirms-typhoons) signed in December. Before the order Typhoon production at the BAE Systems Warton plant had been expected to shut down in 2022 without further orders, but the two new deals secure thousands of jobs for several more years.

(Even if the US grounded Saudi Arabia’s F-15 jets, the Saudis would still have over 100 other fighter jets to bomb Yemen with)

## A2: [US needed for Saudi involvement in Yemen](#_popx50wix1xd)

1. Empirically, other countries like Russia and China were able to fill in gaps of Saudi Arabia’s military (MZ)

[Jeff Daniels 2017](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html)

Even so, the Russians appear willing to sell advanced weapons systems that probably wouldn't get approved by the United States due to opposition from Israel and members in Congress.

Indeed, the Saudis previously expressed interest in ballistic missiles from Russia, particularly the Iskander missile system. Back in the 1980s, the Saudis turned to China for advanced ballistic missiles.

**"When the Saudis struck that arms deal with China, it was because the United States was not inclined at the time to provide that kind of capability to Saudi Arabia, so they went elsewhere,"** Dalton said.

At the same time, **it's also possible Russians could one day help the Saudis develop a homegrown ballistic missile capability,** which is something Iran demonstrated last year when it tested a Zolfaqar solid-fuel missile. Iran previously threatened to use the tactical missile against its rival Israel.

**Russia helped Iran build its first civilian nuclear power plant in 2011 and have teamed with them on a second plant. Moscow also offered assistance to the Saudis as they embarked on an ambitious $80 billion plan to build more than a dozen nuclear power plants.**

## A2 US Conflict Resolution (See Daniel’s AFF)

1. NU: U.S. has already condemned Saudi Arabia (VR)

**The Senate** on Thursday delivered back-to-back rebukes of President Trump’s embrace of Saudi Arabia, **first voting to end U.S. participation in the Saudi-led war in Yemen and then unanimously approving a measure blaming the kingdom’s crown prince for the ghastly killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.**

## A2 Diplomatic Pressure

1. It’s not Saudi Arabia who isn’t joining the negotiating table, it’s the Houthi rebels

[Stratfor 2018](https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/yemen-peace-talks-fail) (JW)

**U.N.-backed peace talks in Geneva over Yemen's conflict were officially canceled after Houthi rebel representatives failed to arrive**, Gulf News reported Sept. 9. The Houthi delegation claims the Saudi-led coalition never granted them the necessary authorization to fly, a claim the Saudi-led coalition denies. **Because the peace talks failed before they even began, it appears there are few avenues for compromise between the Houthi rebel movement and the Saudi-led coalition.** Fighting is likely to further intensify now that talks have officially failed, particularly near the port city of al-Hudaydah.

More importantly, both sides have important incentives to keep the conflict going

Al-Dawsari from the [Project on Middle Eastern Democracy 18](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/) (JW)

It is also widely believed that neither side is genuinely interested in ending the conflict. According to the most recent UN Security Council experts report on Yemen, **the Houthi-Saleh alliance controls Sanaa taxation and finances. They have taken advantage of the conflict to develop a wide range of income streams through smuggling and other illicit activities.**[39](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/#note39) For the Houthis, the war is “a luxury they can afford” according to a Yemeni economist.[40](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/#note40) **On the other side, Hadi knows that a peace deal might require his removal and removal of the patronage he has built around himself over the past few years.**

2. Even if Saudi Arabia steps out of the conflict, there are other parties who would take Saudi Arabia’s place and escalate violence instead.

[The Economist in 2018](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/12/15/faint-hopes-of-ending-the-war-in-yemen) (JW)

Fighting elsewhere shows how complicated the conflict has become. Pro-government forces control Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, which is besieged by the Houthis. But **there has been fighting even within the pro-government ranks. Forces aligned with Islah, an Islamist party, have clashed with fighters backed by the UAE, which is vehemently anti-Islamist.** **The UAE, despite supporting the government, has also worked with forces that want independence for South Yemen, which was a separate state until 1990.** Other areas neglected by the government are pushing for autonomy and a greater share of the country’s resources. It will be impossible to satisfy everyone.

3. Negotiations don’t include critical actors (including Southern Yemen, which demands autonomy), so they will always fail

Al-Dawsari from the [Project on Middle Eastern Democracy 2018 (JW)](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/)

**The key problem in the UN-led mediation as currently structured is that it is again only dealing with** the Houthi-Saleh alliance on one side and Hadi’s government on the other. Both sides only represent **the interests of northern political elites. The other two critical dimensions of the conflict, namely the demands of Shafi’i areas for more equitable governance and the threat of southern secession, have been neglected.**

This is literally how the war started in the first place

Al-Dawsari from the [Project on Middle Eastern Democracy 2018 (JW)](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/)

The UN Secretary General appointed Jamal Benomar as Special Adviser to Yemen, and he worked closely with the GCC, the United States, and western diplomats to pressure Yemeni political actors to accept the GCC deal and oversee the two-year transition process.[32](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/#note32)**When the political actors finally agreed to the GCC Initiative in mid-2011, hundreds of thousands of Yemenis took to the streets to protest the terms of what they considered a deeply flawed deal** that sidelined their demands for political reform, and kept in place the corrupt leaders they originally rose up against.[33](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/#note33) The GCC Initiative also granted Saleh immunity and preserved his influence over most of the armed forces, which allowed him to disrupt the transition process and then, in alliance with the Houthis, overthrow the government and drag the country into civil war. As a result, **many local leaders and activists believe the GCC brokered agreement planted the seeds of today’s civil war**.[34](https://pomed.org/pomed-policy-brief-breaking-the-cycle-of-failed-negotiations-in-yemen/#note34) **To many Yemeni actors, the GCC process and the NDC that emerged from it were fundamentally flawed because they focused on resolving the conflict between traditional political elites from the northern part of the country and ignored key grievances from other critical actors and groups.**

## A2 Promoting Democracy in SA

**1. TURN: Democracy promotion leads to war (VR)**

[Jones of USU](https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=gradreports)

For example, according to the Congressional Research Service report for Congress Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy?, the promotion of democracy has

potential downsides. For example, **democracy promotion can have a destabilizing effect on the entire country** (CRS 2007, 10. [**because] During the transition process, the country can become unstable and susceptible to attacks from neighboring countries.** A 2005 Harvard study stated that "our research shows that incomplete democratic transitions-those that get stalled before reaching the stage of full democracy-increase the chance of involvement in international war in countries where governmental institutions are weak at the outset of the transition" (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 4). Ultimately, the authors claim **[they conclude] that democracy promotion will lead to war and not a democratic government.**

**2. TURN: It’s legit imperialism and will only lead to corruption (VR)**

[Oberoi 11](https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=gradreports)

Sidharth Oberoi contends that **democracy promotion constitutes as an act of imperialism** (20 11, 12). The author argues that **US foreign policy makers are invading other countries merely for the benefit of the US. Also, the new government will be devoid of legitimacy, as the government was forced upon them.**

**3. TURN: Saudi Arabia needs US arms so selling arms maintains US’ leverage over Saudi Arabia and promotes democratic policies (MZ)**

[Ariane M. Tabatabai 2018](https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html)

At the same time, **Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States** than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. **Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030**—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. **And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support.**

Both the Obama and Trump administrations watched as the kingdom's policies became more assertive, leading to the widely held assumption that America can't change the Saudi calculus. But this is far from the truth. As the Saudis' chief political and military partner and the undisputed security guarantor in the Middle East, the United States has considerable influence it can wield over Saudi decision making. It has thus far gone virtually unused. In reality, the United States may have more leverage over Saudi Arabia today than at any other time except during the 1991 Gulf War.

The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. **Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power.**

**4. Non-unique: Saudi Arabia is already planning to diversify arms sales and will have the same ability to suppress activism (MZ)**

[Pieter D. Wezeman 2018](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/saudi-arabia-armaments-and-conflict-middle-east)

**Efforts by China and Russia to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia** have had limited success. However, the deliveries of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) from China since 2014—while few in number and lower in capability compared to the weapons delivered by the USA and the UK—are still significant as they could **mark the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to diversify the sourcing of its weapons beyond Western countries.**

**This diversification is likely to be driven by efforts to improve its bargaining position on the arms market, to widen and deepen its international political network and in order to minimize the effects of the restrictive arms export policies of current supplier states on Saudi Arabian arms procurement.** The latter has been of increased relevance as a number of European states critical of Saudi Arabia’s use of military force in Yemen successively announced severe restrictions on arms exports to the Kingdom. The Netherlands led the way in early 2016 and by late 2018 Germany, Finland and Denmark had followed. However, the main European arms exporters to Saudi Arabia —such as the UK, France, Spain and Italy—have discussed such restrictions but not implemented them.

5. US has more control in a world with leverage (JM)

[Roundup 2010](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea)

**The Saudi arms sale will not buy much security in the long run in the Persian Gulf. But there are no good reasons not to sell the Saudis those weapons, and there are some potentially positive results (besides the economic benefits to the U.S.) that might come from the sale--most importantly U.S. leverage on Riyadh on nuclear proliferation issues.**

## A2 Arm Sales Promote Instability/Civil War

## A2 US Image/Soft Power

1. **NU: Not enough to solve bad image. US looks bad for a ton of other reasons (MR)**

[**Michael Fuchs 2018 Brookings Institution**](https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/06/28051854/DestroyingUSforeignPolicy-brief-1.pdf)

In the span of just a few days in June, President Donald **Trump** became the first U.S. president to refuse to sign onto a statement of the G-7 leaders as well as the first sitting American president to meet with a North Korean leader. These two encounters have **[has] shaken the foundations of U.S. foreign policy and may irreversibly damage America’s security and prosperity**. Specifically, they have signaled **[signaling] that the United States under Trump will disregard its closest allies and embrace the world’s most brutal dictators**. For months, President **Trump has** chipped away at America’s role as a global leader. He has **withdrawn the** **United States** **from both the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement and has praised dictators such as Kim Jong Un**, to name just a few examples. However, in the past few weeks, the events of the G-7 and Singapore summits may have triggered the beginning of a fundamental break between America and the alliances and democratic values that have grounded U.S. foreign policy for decades. And in the coming weeks, there is the potential for even more damage as Trump visits Europe in July for a state visit to the United Kingdom, the NATO summit in Belgium, and a U.S.-Russia summit. In only 17 months in office, President Trump has managed to scuttle decades of hard-won U.S. global credibility and has swung open the door to China and Russia, two countries that will seize the advantage at the expense of America’s security and economic interests.

1. **Other countries still selling to SA. It wouldn’t make sense for countries to worsen US relations. (MR)**

[**Daniel Boffey from The Guardian October 2018**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/meps-back-call-for-eu-members-to-halt-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia)

In recent days there has been a determined effort to distance the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, from any responsibility despite the fact that several members of his personal guard and other trusted officials were involved in the killing. The prince has called the killing heinous and painful, and vowed that justice will be delivered to the perpetrators. **Apart from Germany, few other arms-exporting countries have acted on the words of condemnation that have flowed in recent weeks**. Canada’s prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has threatened to cancel a multimillion-dollar defence contract in response to Khashoggi’s death. Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Finland already had a policy of not selling arms to Saudi Arabia.

1. **Turn: US has more soft power in Middle East with Saudi relations (can maybe weigh saying soft power pertaining to the Middle East is most important) (PG)**

[**ABC (May 2017)**](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-21/what-do-we-know-about-saudi-arabias-arms-deal-with-america/8544892)

Middle East correspondent Matt Brown says Donald Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia is a telling triumph of commercial interest and strategic orthodoxy over his campaign rhetoric. Beyond the economic significance of **the military deal** — "jobs, jobs, jobs", in the words of the US President — Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said it **would send a "strong message to our common enemies". He's largely talking about Iran**, which has backed the opposite sides to America and Saudi Arabia in Syria and Yemen. **Mr Tillerson said America intends to intensify its efforts to deter Iran from engaging in Syria and Yemen, and Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said stronger US ties would allow the region to "drain the swamps from which extremism and terrorism emanates"**.

1. **American soft power is unworkable – nations don’t believe in benevolent hegemony enough to overwhelm their resentment and fear (PG)**

[**Christopher Layne**](https://books.google.com/books?id=M0-SAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT80&lpg=PT80&dq=Doubtless,+American+primacy+has+its+dimension+of+benevolence,+but+a+state+as+powerful+as+the+United+States+can+never+be+benevolent+enough+to+offset+the+fear+that+other+states+have+of+its+unchecked+power.+In+international+politics,+benevolent+hegemons+are+like+unicorns%E2%80%94there+is+no+such+animal.+Hegemons+love+themselves,+but+others+mistrust+and+fear+them%E2%80%94and+for+good+reason.+In+today%27s+world,+others+dread+both+the+overconcentration+of+geopolitical+weight+in&source=bl&ots=HR58VqWccT&sig=ACfU3U2Vu0uU3tNpKYxHQw6sZxHBbfy8bQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiCwJr90o_gAhXRCDQIHbwcB0UQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=Doubtless%2C%20American%20primacy%20has%20its%20dimension%20of%20benevolence%2C%20but%20a%20state%20as%20powerful%20as%20the%20United%20States%20can%20never%20be%20benevolent%20enough%20to%20offset%20the%20fear%20that%20other%20states%20have%20of%20its%20unchecked%20power.%20In%20international%20politics%2C%20benevolent%20hegemons%20are%20like%20unicorns%E2%80%94there%20is%20no%20such%20animal.%20Hegemons%20love%20themselves%2C%20but%20others%20mistrust%20and%20fear%20them%E2%80%94and%20for%20good%20reason.%20In%20today's%20world%2C%20others%20dread%20both%20the%20overconcentration%20of%20geopolitical%20weight%20in&f=false) (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 68

Doubtless, **American primacy has its dimension of benevolence, but a state as powerful as the United States can never be benevolent enough to offset the fear that other states have of its unchecked power.** In international politics, **benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there is no such animal. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them**—and for good reason. **In today's world, others dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical weight in America's favor and the purposes for which it may be used**. After all,"Nogreat power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a greatdeal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such bythem. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, butthey are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by theexistence of countervailing power and the possibility of it being exercised."**While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of American power is tangible.** Others must worry constantly that ifU.S. intentions change, bad things may happen to them. **In a one-superpower world, the overconcentration of power in America's hands is an omnipresent challenge to other states's ecurity, and Washington's ability to reassure others of its benevolence is limited by the very enormity of its power.**

1. **Soft power is a myth. States won’t buy it – tangible power is all that matters, not intentions (PG)**

[**Christopher Layne,**](http://articles.latimes.com/2002/oct/06/opinion/op-layne6) visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, Los Angeles Times, October 6, 2002

U.S. **strategists believe that** "it can't happen to us," because **the United States is** a different kind of hegemon, **a benign hegemon that others will follow willingly due to the attractiveness of its** political **values** and culture. While flattering, this self-serving argument **misses the** basic **point**: **Hegemons are threatening because they have too much power**. And **it is America's power--not** the self-proclaimed benevolence of **its intentions--that will shape others' response** to it. **A state's power is a** hard, **measurable reality, but its intentions**, which can be peaceful one day but malevolent the next, **are ephemeral**. Hegemony's **proponents claim that the United States can inoculate itself** against a backlash **by acting multilaterally. But other states are not going to be deceived by** Washington's **use of international institutions as a fig leaf to cloak** its **ambitions of dominance**. And in any event, there are good reasons why the U.S. should not reflexively embrace multilateralism. When it comes to deciding when and how to defend American interests, Washington should want a free hand, not to have its hands tied by others.

1. **Negative perception of American foreign policy overwhelms any cultural attraction. (PG)**

[**Zbigniew Brzezinski**](https://booksc.xyz/book/52576673/51f79c)(Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor of foreign policy @ Johns Hopkins) 2004 “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership” p 186-8

**Polls** of worldwide public opinion **suggest that virtual familiarity breeds affection for much of the American way of life even as it intensifies resentment of U.S. policies.** Although such polls, because they reflect instant personal reactions to changing circumstances, are inherently volatile, certain patterns seem evident. A review of several polls' indicates that **an overwhelming number of countries worldwide**, including even France, China, and Japan (the major exceptions being Russia and the Middle East, followed to a lesser extent by Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh), **view American popular culture favorably. At the same time, however, the spread of American "customs" is viewed predominantly as"bad" in a majority of countries** (with even 50 per-cent of Britons reacting critically), the only major exception being Japan. **Unlike American culture, American foreign policy is largely viewed negatively. Its perceived bias in favor of Israel** against thePalestinians **is frequently cited** as the specific reason, **as is America's perceived indifference to other countries' interests.** Majorities in most countries believe that the United States is actually intensifying the gap between rich nations and poor ones. Thus **the cultural impact of virtual familiarity with America collides with the political**. The major political consequence of America's cultural seduction is that **more is expected of America than of other states**. To act selfishly in the name of "the national interest" is generally viewed as normal international behavior—yet America tends to beheld to a higher standard. In the aforementioned polls, **those** who were **most dissatisfied with the state of their own countries** tended to entertain a more jaundiced view of America, reinforcing the hypothesis that they **expect more of America and hold it somehow accountable for the deplorable state of the world**. This may partly be due to the highly self-righteous rhetoric of American political leaders, with its heavyreliance on idealistic and religious invocations. But the global publicopinion polls suggest that it is also a double-edged compliment bythose who truly expect more from America and resent its failure tomeet such elevated expectations when it comes to actual policy. **Anti-Americanism bears the trappings of betrayed affection**. America is thus admired and resented at the same time. Envy contributes to but is not the sole cause of the resentment. It stems from the sense that America's global reach affects almost everyone, especially **those who have vicariously become an extension of America through virtual experience.They are captives of,** and even more fre-quently willing participants in, **the American mass-cultural sphere, but they feel that they are not heard in the American process of decision-making.** The historic (American) slogan"No taxation without repre-sentation"finds its contemporary global equivalent in "NoAmericanization without representation."

**7. Nonunique: US soft power in the Middle East is already at rock bottom (NO)**

[MEPC](https://www.mepc.org/us-power-middle-east-not-declining) 2014

**The United States has suffered important damage to its** ideational **power in recent years because of the invasion and occupation of Iraq,** certain aspects of the global **war on terrorism, and its continued support for Israel.**17 Polls and anecdotal evidence suggest that there was a spike in U.S. appeal in 2009 in the wake of the election of Barack Obama and his June 2009 speech in Cairo promising a new era of relations between the United States and the Muslim world. This, however, proved ephemeral.18 **The bottom line is that** even though the situation is not deteriorating, **it remains difficult for the United States to use the appeal of its ideas and values in the pursuit of foreign-policy objectives.** The Arab uprisings, in particular, have shown that the United States has limited leverage in this area.

8. Turn: US

[Eisenstadt 2016](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus143_JeffreyEisen-4.pdf)

Because the Islamic Republic’s leadership came to power through revolution, survival remains its foremost concern and counterrevolution its greatest fear. As noted earlier**, Iran’s leaders believe U.S. “soft warfare”—perceived efforts to** inculcate *[promote]* **foreign ideas, values, and ideologies in order to undermine the Islamic Republic—is a greater threat to the regime’s survival than a** foreign **military strike or invasion.**

## A2 Human rights

1. **Arms sales holds historically ineffective (AJ)**

[Gould 2018](https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/18/will-congress-really-cancel-us-saudi-arms-deals-its-complicated-but-let-us-explain/)

**The Obama administration used arms-sale holds in an attempt to improve a customer nations' behavior on human rights, but to limited effect**, said Becca Wasser, a researcher with the think tank Rand.

"You have to ask the question: What end is the hold supposed to achieve? Is it intended to condition a partner’s behavior or punish them?” Wasser said. “I have a healthy amount of skepticism on both counts.” Wasser predicted that **holding up arms sales is not going to massively impact the U.S. defense industry or bin Salman’s signature economic agenda, Vision 2030.** As for Magnitsky sanctions, Wasser argued they’re more effective in Russia, targeting businessmen in the oligarch class who have reach with the Kremlin. “It is less likely to be effective in Saudi, where the royal family and upper echelons of government that may be implicated are insulated,” she said.

2. Trump doesn’t care about human rights anyways. (MR)

[Dominic Tierney The Atlantic November 2017](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/trump-human-rights-asia-trip/545843/)

And then along came **Trump—the creed-less president**. During a speech in Poland in 2017, Trump spoke vaguely about “the bonds of culture, faith and tradition that make us who we are.” **He** has also **assailed tyranny in North Korea**. But **human rights are** largely **irrelevant to the** emerging **Trump doctrine**. For one thing, **Trump backed policies that ride roughshod over individual rights**: water-boarding and “a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding” for suspected terrorists, targeting the families of the Islamic State, and banning all Muslims from entering the United States. **Trump has long been generous in his praise of autocrats,** whether it’s commending Vladimir Putin for “doing a great job in rebuilding the image of Russia and also rebuilding Russia period,” or congratulating Saddam Hussein for his counter-terrorism policy: “They didn’t read them the rights. They didn’t talk. They were terrorists. Over.” **Where Trump has mentioned human rights, he tends to focus narrowly on protecting co-nationals and co-religionists like Christians in the Middle East—echoing Putin’s vision of human rights that extends only to Russian speakers in neighboring countries.** He also certainly doesn’t see the United States as a city on a hill. Pressed by Bill O’Reilly about Putin’s murderous policies, Trump shot back: “You think our country’s so innocent?” Unsurprisingly, Trump’s vision of “America First” is largely stripped of the creed, and instead seeks to tear up unfair trade deals, get allies to take care of themselves, and kill bad dudes. **The current** reorganization of the **State Department**, for example, **has sidelined human-rights officials**.

3. Delink: Trump’s non cooperation means other countries probably won’t work anyways (MR)

[Ed Pilkington The Garudian January 4th 2019](https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jan/04/trump-administration-un-human-rights-violations)

**The Trump administration has stopped cooperating with UN investigators over potential human rights violations occurring inside America, in a move that delivers a major blow to vulnerable US communities and sends a dangerous signal to authoritarian regimes around the world**.Quietly and unnoticed, the state department has ceased to respond to official complaints from UN special rapporteurs, the network of independent experts who act as global watchdogs on fundamental issues such as poverty, migration, freedom of expression and justice. There has been no response to any such formal query since 7 May 2018, with at least 13 requests going unanswered. Nor has the Trump administration extended any invitation to a UN monitor to visit the US to investigate human rights inside the country since the start of Donald Trump’s term two years ago in January 2017. Two UN experts have made official fact-finding visits under his watch – the special rapporteurs on extreme poverty and privacy – but both were invited initially by Barack Obama, who hosted 16 such visits during his presidency. **The new breach with international experts comes at a perilous moment for the US, both externally and within its own borders. Externally, Trump has forged an increasingly unilateral path on foreign policy:** in June he shocked the world by pulling the US out of the UN human rights council, complaining it was a “cesspool of political bias”, and he has caused further consternation by siding with the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, despite evidence linking Prince Mohammed to the murder of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. Domestically, Trump has run roughshod over the constitutional rights of asylum seekers at the US border, attempted to deny the legal existence of transgender people and introduced tax cuts that have greatly exacerbated income inequality in a country in which 40 million people live in poverty, among many other controversies.

4. De-link: It’s all just rhetoric (VR)

[Gannoushi 18](https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/us-hypocrisy-cairo-tehran-1178298333)

**The rhetoric adopted by the US** and its allies **lacks any credibility, for the simple reason that this administration is the least qualified to promote democracy and human rights in the region, given its extensive financial transactions and involvement in arms and oil deals in the Middle East** (as demonstrated by Trump's recent visit to Saudi Arabia, from which he returned laden with contracts and gifts).

5. Tump’s foreign policy is literally to ignore HR abuses (VR)

[Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/25/one-year-senior-trump-officials-highly-selective-human-rights)

**Senior US officials have [said]** made comments on the Middle East recently that reinforce concerns that the **Trump administration will** largely **ignore human rights issues long considered important to US foreign policy.**

6. The US needs leverage over Saudi Arabia to end HR abuses (JM)

[Sedaca 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/05/the-united-states-should-use-its-leverage-over-saudi-arabia/)

**The global response to the journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s killing, which has Riyadh on the defensive in the face of international outcry, has opened a window of opportunity to exert leverage over Saudi policy.** Last week, the United States began pressuring the kingdom over its role in the war in Yemen.

**Washington should use this moment to exert pressure on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to extend his economic reform agenda to the Saudi domestic political and civil rights sphere as well.**

7. Saudi Arabia will soon change its behavior (JM)

[LobeLog 2018](https://lobelog.com/congress-white-house-reaching-breaking-point-on-yemen/)

At that point, although a presidential veto could save the coalition the fuel and munitions it needs to carry out its air campaign in the short term, **Saudi Arabia and the UAE will face the prospect of permanently damaging their standing with Congress if they don’t change their behavior in Yemen.** Not even Mohammed bin Salman, in his most intransigent moments, could believe that his alliance with the United States will weather hostile majorities in both chambers of Congress.

**8. Delink: Human rights law is a failure, we shouldn’t follow it anyways (NO)**

[Posner 2014](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights)

The truth is that **human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives**. **There is little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the wellbeing of people. The reason is that human rights were never as universal as people hoped, and the belief that they could be forced upon countries** as a matter of international law **was** shot through with **misguided** assumptions **from the** very **beginning**. The human rights movement shares something in common with the hubris of development economics, which in previous decades tried (and failed) to alleviate poverty by imposing top-down solutions on developing countries. But where development economists have reformed their approach, the human rights movement has yet to acknowledge its failures. It is time for a reckoning.

### 

## A2 Anti-American sentiment

1. **Trump’s America First narrative is the greatest reason why anti-American sentiment exists (DL)**

[**Bershidsky of Bloomberg 2018**](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-14/germany-is-getting-fed-up-with-trump-and-america)

**President Trump has adopted a tone that ignores 70 years of trust**. He **wants punitive tariffs and demands obedience. It is no longer a question as to whether Germany and Europe will take part in foreign military interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq. It is now about whether trans-Atlantic cooperation on economic, foreign and security policy even exists anymore. The answer: No.**

1. **Anti-American sentiment has very little impact (DL)**

[**Journalist Resource 2016**](https://journalistsresource.org/studies/international/the-roots-of-anti-americanism-in-the-middle-east/)

**The findings suggest while people may be hostile to U.S. policy, the animosity doesn’t stop them from engaging with nongovernmental organizations, according to the study author.** Therefore, “Middle East regional specialists, who have been arguing for years that people make this sort of distinction, can continue to work in the region without worrying they will be tainted with a “nationality-based, guilt-by-association” brush. Corstange also notes that the study “set a low bar for detecting anti-American sentiment: an interview request, which could easily be rejected by a study participant if he or she had even mild anti-American feelings. **He concludes that, “if we cannot uncover evidence of generalized anti-Americanism in Lebanon—especially among its Shia population—we may be hard pressed to find it anywhere.” The study’s findings, he says, “suggest that anti-Americanism, as a generalized and particularized phenomenon, may be more chimerical than real.”**

**3. Turn: Ending arms sales increases troop deployment, increasing Anti-American sentiment (NO)**

Arms sales act as a stand-in for US military deployments abroad

[Reveron 2012](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/soft-power-through-hard-power-weapon-sales)

**Outside of direct economic benefits of arms sales, the United States gains partners for global military operations**. Without aircraft like the F-16 and Mirage-2000, UAE could not have participated in [Libyan air operations](http://arabianaerospace.aero/uae-air-force-on-the-offensive-in-libya.html). With its new C-17 cargo aircraft, India will be able to better deploy and sustain its 10,000 UN peacekeepers around the world. New Persian Gulf missile defense radars enhance United States efforts to limit Iran’s military options to strike with ballistic missiles. And **for every** F-35 Japan **[weapon a partner nation] buys, the United States can field one fewer [abroad]**in Northeast Asia. As the 2012 US defense guidance noted, “Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice.”

Even if the US cuts arms sales to Saudi Arabia, our security interests in the Middle East won’t change, forcing the US military to take a more direct role. This is bad because US military presence creates backlash.

[RAND 2018](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf)

**U.S. troop presence in partner nations may be perceived by local populations as a[n]** soft **occupation** or through a lens of post-colonialism, **leading to nationalist sentiments against foreign invasion or involvement in domestic politics.** Foreign troop presence can also be associated with other negative consequences, such as increased demand for illicit activities, environmental damage, and disruptions to local markets that can further alienate local populations. **Such sentiments have plagued** external actors in domestic politics, notably in galvanizing militant support against Russian forces in Afghanistan and **U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.**29 As such, many experts assert that **U.S. troop presence abroad often helps foment popular opposition or radicalization** that U.S. security cooperation is designed to hinder

## A2 Iran

1. **Turn: US arms sales deter Iranian escalation to war (NO)**

[Foreign Policy 2018](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/07/the-first-saudi-iranian-war-will-be-an-even-fight/)

Thus, **the possible involvement of the United States would be the x-factor in any potential conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.** Even if the two states are quite evenly matched, **the military power that the United States could bring to bear would heavily tilt a conflict in Saudi Arabia’s favor. In other words, it would be incredibly risky for Iran to court escalation with Saudi Arabia.** Such a conflict likely wouldn’t involve just Saudi Arabia, and Iran does not possess the capabilities to outlast a coalition military effort against it.

## A2 SA Supports Terrorism

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia stopped supporting terror when they became a threat to the Saudis (NO)**

[AEI 2018](http://www.aei.org/publication/turkey-will-spread-islamic-terrorism-like-saudi-arabia-once-did/)

That **[Saudi support for terrorists] began to change** not in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, but rather **when al Qaeda terrorists attacked inside Saudi Arabia itself. The Saudis quickly understood the blowback they risked**. After all, al Qaeda essentially followed a theological exegesis and worldview taught in Saudi textbooks. **The kingdom could no longer ensure its own security by ensuring that its militants focused their efforts on conflicts beyond its borders.**

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia and Islamist terrorists are religious enemies (NO)**

[The Belfer Center 2016](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/myth-saudi-support-terrorism)

**From a religious perspective, al Qaeda, and the more recent ISIL, are sworn enemies of the [Saudi] Kingdom** and its political and religious leadership. This is **because both groups are ultimately looking to restore the caliphate** (an Islamic empire led by a supreme leader), **and with the Saudi kingdom the epicenter of Islam and the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina, the road to the caliphate lies through the kingdom and its monarchy.** In fact, ISIL has even launched a campaign against Saudi Arabia, called qadimun, or “we are coming” to take over the country.

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia and ISIS really hate each other (NO)**

[CRS 2018](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=14&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwil-uP0w4_gAhVSVK0KHYhfDOIQFjANegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Ffas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Fmideast%2FRL33533.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1_iCgGpjUpU-u5A3IJeXsZ)

Inside the kingdom, arrests of Islamic State (IS) supporters have continued since 2014, as Islamic State affiliates have claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks against Saudi security forces and members of the kingdom’s Shia minority across the country (see “The Islamic State’s Campaign against the Kingdom” below). **Saudi authorities report having disrupted planned IS attacks on government targets in 2017 and counted 34 terrorist attacks in 2016, including an attempted IS-claimed suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate General** in Jeddah**. Saudi leaders and** their **IS** adversaries **have reiterated their hostility toward each other since 2015, with Saudi leaders proposing new transnational counterterrorism cooperation and IS leaders redeclaring war against the royal family**, condemning official Saudi clerics, and urging attacks inside the kingdom (see “Terrorism Threats and Bilateral Cooperation”). The current U.S. State Department travel advisory for Saudi Arabia warns that “terrorist groups continue plotting possible attacks” and that “terrorists may attack with little or no warning.”

1. **Delink: The Saudi government has taken steps to end individual support for terrorists (NO)**

[CFR 2006](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/tracking-down-terrorist-financing)

Charities. Donations were once the largest source of terrorist funding, coming mostly from charities and wealthy individuals. **For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia were the most important source of funds for** [**al-Qaeda**](https://www.cfr.org/publication/9126/), **according to a 2002 CFR Task Force Report. A** [**2004 update**](https://www.cfr.org/publication/7111/) **to that report shows Saudi officials have taken steps to disrupt terrorist financing in their country**, yet charities continue to play a role in the sponsorship of terrorist groups. "In the Islamic world, there are tens of thousands of charities," says Robert O. Collins, coauthor of the new book *Alms for Jihad*. While as few as a hundred may sponsor terrorism, "these are some of the wealthiest charities," Collins says. Experts say some of these organizations raise funds with the express intent of supporting terrorists; others seek to promote Islam through legitimate programs, but can be coopted by jihadists who then use the funds to promote their own radical cause.

1. **Delink: The Saudi government considers Islamist terrorism to be an existential threat (NO)**

[Boghardt 2018](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/is-saudi-arabias-counterterrorism-approach-shifting)

While the influence of international appeals on the image-conscious Saudi leadership should not be dismissed, the latest counterterrorism developments are best understood in the context of Riyadh's evolving views about its own security interests. **The [Saudi] leadership has come to regard certain social aspects of religious extremism and political Islamist ideology as serious threats to security and stability.** Just like **Riyadh's keen interest in disrupting IS and al-Qaeda plots**, its desire to weaken at least some extremist influences and Islamist forces **is self-driven.**

1. **Turn: Saudi Arabia is the best counterterrorism partner for the US for [4] reasons:**

**1. Saudi oil money gives them the resources needed to fight terrorism (NO)**

[Boucek 2011](https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia-pub-45520)

**There are not too many countries that have successfully dismantled and muzzled terrorism like Saudi Arabia has done.** **The government dedicated a great deal of money to the issue and employed both hard-security methods and softer tactics.** This included arrests, better intelligence, amnesties, and counter-radicalization programs, as well as efforts by the governing and religious establishments to mobilize the population against terrorist activities.

…

Early on, however, Saudi Arabia realized that it did not want to make the same mistakes that Egypt and Syria made when too many people were arrested. Massive, unaccountable arrests run the risk that family members will be radicalized. Riyadh realized that it needed to reduce the impact of arrests and prove to the population that it was working to take care of them. The government and religious authorities worked to drive a wedge between extremists and the public by proving that extremists are not acting in the population’s best interests and funded disengagement and rehabilitation programs. Riyadh put all kinds of resources and money into this and has enjoyed some success, but **the sheer amount of financial backing, resources, and top-level focus makes the [counterterrorism] programs hard to emulate in different countries.**

**2. Saudi involvement in Yemen is critical to counterterrorism (NO)**

[Boucek 2011](https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia-pub-45520#saudis)

**Saudi Arabia**’s influence and interest in combating terrorists operating in its smaller neighbor mean that Riyadh **has a leading role in reducing the threat of terrorism coming out of Yemen.** And **the Saudis can do things in Yemen that Americans cannot. Saudis tipped off U.S. officials to the bombs** concealed inside cargo packages **destined for the United States in October 2010, demonstrating the good intelligence that Riyadh collects and shares with Washington. This averted what was likely to be a major attack.**

**3. Saudi counterterrorism programs are more humane (NO)**

[**Porges 2010**](https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/saudi-deradicalization-experiment)

**Saudi deradicalization programs** began in 2004, when the Interior Ministry responded to a series of domestic terrorist incidents by transforming its counterterrorism strategy, taking **[take] steps to balance traditional security efforts with techniques that address ideological sources of violent extremism. One critical component** of this new approach was **[is] the rehabilitation of extremists in prison through religious reeducation and psychological counseling.** Over time, the Saudi rehabilitation program grew in scope and prestige as graduates appeared to reintegrate successfully into society.

**(Analysis: Saudi rehab programs are better at upholding human rights than drone strikes and “enhanced interrogation”)**

**4. Saudi Arabia is the only nation with the clout to lead a regional counterterrorism effort (NO)**

[**Alam 2017**](https://rusi.org/commentary/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-islamic-anti-terrorism-effort-coalition-willing-or-anti-iran-front)

**The launch of Saudi Arabia’s new** [**Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition**](https://imctc.org/English) **(IMCTC)** went practically unnoticed in the West as much of the focus was on the current turmoil in the Middle East.

However, for the countries involved – and particularly **[involving] the three dominant players of** [**Saudi Arabia**](http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-crown-prince-opens-mega-anti-terror-meeting-in-riyadh-1.2130488)**,** [**Egypt**](https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/34266/What-you-need-to-know-about-IMCTC) **and** [**Pakistan**](https://dailytimes.com.pk/150600/forging-positive-alliance/) — the initiative **is** considered **a significant event that could alter the course of [the Middle East]** the region.

...

Meanwhile, with the full support of MbS – Sharif praised him as ‘one of fertile mind, and energy’ – **the region could soon see a ‘Muslim-centric’ approach to ending conflicts and countering radicalism.**

**The IMCTC has stated its goal to ‘take Islam back’ from non-state, radical actors by beating them at their own game. The presence of senior Islamic clergy at the IMCTC launch reinforces this intention.**

1. **Turn: Arms sales fund US counterterrorism training programs (NO)**

[CRS 2018](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf)

**The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG) oversee U.S. defense cooperation with the kingdom and have been** active under special bilateral agreements and **funded by Saudi purchases since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively.** Saudi military and national-guard forces have, until recently, been under the leadership of two different members of the royal family, and it is unclear what if any effect recent leadership changes may have on patterns of U.S. weapons acquisition and training among these forces.62 Since 2009, a series of high-value U.S. proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been announced, including the 2010 announcement that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would reconstitute and

expand its main fighter forces with advanced U.S. F-15 aircraft (see Table B-1.)

**8. ANALYTICAL Response to Wahhabism (CK)**

**Very minimal evidence that Saudi Arabia is funneling wahhabism for the sole purpose of spreading terror as it is very counterintuitive to its top CT program.**

[The New York Times Editorial Board](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-qatar-isis-terrorism.html) in 2017

AUDI ARABIA **Since the Sept 11 attacks,** staged mainly by Saudi-born hijackers, and a series of attacks by Al Qaeda and ISIS against the kingdom, **Saudi Arabia has become more serious about extremism; some experts regard it as the top counterterrorism partner in the region.** It has taken a zero-tolerance approach to ISIS and joined the American-led coalition fighting the group**.** Even so, American government reports say financial support for terrorism from Saudis “remains a threat to the kingdom and the international community.” And while this has been ignored by Mr. Trump, **[Yet] Saudi Arabia undermines whatever good work it does by continuing to spend billions of dollars spreading Wahhabism,** its ultraconservative brand of Islam **— which in turn inspires ISIS, Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists — through a network of imams and mosques in countries like Kosovo, Indonesia and Pakistan.**

**2 implications**

**1- This shows that SA is fundamentalist, which terror groups use to their advantage a recruiting ground, meaning it's unintentional**

**2- No Solvency on the aff. If this is their “main method” of spreading terror, halting arm sales wont affect this at all.**

## A2 Hurting SA Government Stability

1. **TURN: Saudi Arabia will retaliate if stability is harmed (argue that ending arm sales is a sanction) (DL)**

[Davies of The Guardian Oct. 2018](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/15/how-much-damage-can-saudi-arabia-do-to-the-global-economy)

An editorial in Arab News by Turki **Aldhakhil, the general manager of the official Saudi news channel**, Al Arabiya, offers a hint of what could be in the offing.

He **said Riyadh was weighing up 30 measures designed to put pressure on the US if it were to impose sanctions** over the disappearance and presumed murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the country’s Istanbul consulate. **These would include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 (£60) a barrel to more than $400, more than double the** [**all-time high of$147.27**](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/jul/12/oil.commodities) **reached in 2008.**

**This would have profound consequences globally, not just because motorists would pay more at the petrol pump, but because it would force up the cost of all goods that travel by road.**

**Saudi Arabia has shown in the past that it is not afraid to leverage its unique political and economic position to get its own way.** An investigation into allegations of bribery [involving the British defence firm BAE Systems in the country](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/06/us-investigation-into-bae-saudi-arms-deal-watered-down-leaked-memo-suggests) was dropped under Tony Blair’s government in 2006. Blair said **Riyadh had threatened to stop cooperating on intelligence matters, putting Britain at greater risk of a terrorist attack.**

1. **TURN: Destabilizing Saudi Arabia will increase oil prices, forcing EU countries to buy oil from Russia, causing a ground war (DL)**

[**Abner of Columbia 2016**](https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/collapse-saudi-arabia-cataclysmic-power-shift-middle-east-2)

**The destabilization of Saudi Arabia would lead to volatile and ultimately increased oil prices** across Europe, the United States, and many Asian countries, the latter of which make up more than 50 percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports. While the United States is the largest producer of oil in the world, **the demand created by U.S. citizens far outweighs the nation’s current production capacity.** Saudi Arabia surprisingly only makes up a total of 8 percent of oil exporters to both the United States and the European Union.7 **Meanwhile, Russian oil makes up the bulk of European supplies as more than 30 percent of oil imported by European nations comes from the former Soviet Union.8**

**Furthering**

Unlike the United States,**Europe would have very little choice but to purchase both oil and gas from Russia. This** crucial detail **would give Russia the leverage required to have sanctions lifted and ease its short term fiscal constraints through borrowing funds**. By being able to leverage the European Union into lifting the economic sanctions, **Putin would be able to aid his ailing economy while extending military operations in Syria and Ukraine**. In the long term, the increase in oil prices would most likely bring a steady recovery to the Russian economy.

Vladimir Putin’s icon throughout his career in the KGB and as a Russian lawyer and politician was the czar Peter the Great. The latter had two ambitions that he was most famous for: one was to establish an overseas colony for the Russian people in the new world. He accomplished this by annexing Alaska. The second was to establish a warm-water port in the Middle East. If able to lift the economic sanctions, **Putin**, who hung a portrait of Peter the Great over his desks throughout his career,**would** be able to expand military operations to **include ground operations** in Syria.9Putin would most likely use a Russian victory in Syria **to establish a larger, more permanent base in the country from which he will be able to project Russian power throughout the region. This will have drastic long-term effects** for Turkey, whose ties with Russia were strained when a Russian fighter jet was shot down over Turkish airspace in November 2015.

1. **TURN: Destabilization increases terror influence as Al-Qaeda and ISIS see a religious foothold (DL)**

[**Abner of Columbia 2016**](https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/collapse-saudi-arabia-cataclysmic-power-shift-middle-east-2)

**The second scenario would be the rise of radical Salafism in a destabilized Saudi Arabia. With Wahhabism being one of the most popular forms of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia, it would seem only logical as this would be the immediate threat in the Kingdom. ISIS would undoubtedly take advantage of the destabilization of Saudi Arabia in the same manner as in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. As radical Salafism is the widely practiced form of Sunni Islam in both al-Qaeda and ISIS, it would only be a matter of time before the two powers took a more active role in the country.**

**4. TURN: it will embolden Iran (JL)**

[**Yadlin 2018**](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/adkan21-1ENG_3-33-45.pdf)

**Iran is likely to improve its strategic position under each of the scenarios, and exploit possible shocks in the kingdom in order to expand its regional dominance. In the event of a significant political crisis in the kingdom, the Houthis will gain the upper hand in Yemen, and Iran will encounter less resistance in maintaining its supremacy in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.** If the Saudi royal house encounters serious difficulties, it is uncertain whether Iran will use force to help achieve Shiite independence in the eastern province of the kingdom and escalate destabilization in Bahrain. One clear result of a prolonged civil war along the lines of events in Iraq and Syria will be damage to Saudi Arabia’s ability to retain control of its borders and any parties crossing them in either direction. Thus along with which internal groups might participate in the fighting in its early stages, at issue is which external groups are likely to be active in Saudi Arabia in more advanced stages of a civil war

5. Losing Control of Advanced weapons system (JL)

[Yadlin 2018](https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/adkan21-1ENG_3-33-45.pdf)

**Another risk is future control of the kingdom’s advanced Western weapon systems if stability is undermined. In the event of total instability in the kingdom, the weapon systems are liable to fall into the “wrong hands,” as happened to less sophisticated weapon systems in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq**

## A2 Aid

1. Turn: Even if the aid goes through, much of it won’t reach those in need, it would just give the terrorists more supplies and funding.

[Gulf news 2019](https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/al-houthis-looted-65-of-yemen-humanitarian-aid-1.61270369)

Aden: Iran-backed Al **Houthi militants have seized and looted 65 per cent of the humanitarian aid** sent for the people of Yemen through the port of Hodeida, according to Yemeni Minister of Local Administration, Abdul Raqeeb Fatah.

“Over the past three years, Al Houthis have been showing wilful disregard for the tough humanitarian circumstances being faced by the Yemeni people,” the minister, who is also the Chairman of the Higher Committee for Relief, told the Emirates News Agency, WAM.

[BBC 15](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34920858)

"**Houthi** and [allied] popular committees **are blocking supply routes and continue to obstruct the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian aid and supplies** into Taiz city," Mr O'Brien said. Mr O'Brien was alarmed by reports that **some of the aid destined for [civilians]** Taiz **had been diverted away from the people for whom it was intende**d, which he said was "unacceptable".

## A2 Violating UN arms treaty

1. **Delink?: The US never ratified the ATT (NO)**

[The Economist 2018](https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/a-un-treaty-to-regulate-the-global-arms-trade-has-little-impact)

Every country in the European Union has ratified the treaty; when it was being crafted, Britain was a keen advocate. But Russia and China have stayed out. The American administration (under Barack Obama) inked the accord, but it **[The Arms Trade Treaty] has yet to be ratified by the Senate and this looks unlikely to happen**. **The treaty**, which covers everything from tanks to small arms, was **[is] opposed by America’s gun lobby**. Conservative critics in Washington, DC, now call it a piece of liberal Utopianism which would hobble America without reining in its main rivals.

1. **Delink: The ATT doesn’t ban arms sales to Saudi Arabia (NO)**

[The Economist 2018](https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/a-un-treaty-to-regulate-the-global-arms-trade-has-little-impact)

The fear of hobbling may be exaggerated. **A year ago, the High Court in London** disappointed anti-war campaigners. It **ruled that Britain’s deliveries of weaponry to Saudi Arabia were not in violation of the [ATT]** treaty, **despite the terrible civilian casualties in Yemen**, where a Saudi-led coalition is fighting an Iranian-backed one. NGOs that brought the case have pledged to fight on, and were recently given the right to appeal.

1. **Delink: ATT changes nothing about the state of arms control (NO)**

[Bromund 2018](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-must-unsign-the-arms-trade-treaty-2018)

**In practice, the ATT has achieved nothing.** That is no surprise. **If a nation wants a control system for its arms exports, it can impose one: No treaty is necessary. If a nation lacks the desire** or the ability **to impose such a system, a treaty will not improve its governance. The ATT contains no verification provisions and creates no incentives for compliance**. In short, it is a perfect example of an aspirational treaty, one defined by pious wishes, not serious commitments.

1. **Delink: Nations don’t comply with the ATT (NO)**

[Bromund 2018](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-must-unsign-the-arms-trade-treaty-2018)

**The low level of national compliance with the ATT’s most minimal requirements demonstrates the treaty’s substantive failure. Over the ATT’s first two budgets, only 78 of the 140 assessed nations** (55 percent) **paid** into the treaty.13 **Only** 49 nations out of 75 **(65 percent) submitted the required national report on arms imports and exports** for 2016.14 Activists now bemoan the ATT’s failure, which they define solely as its inability to stop Western arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

1. **Turn: The ATT would prevent the US from supporting its allies in future conflicts (NO)**

[Forbes 2018](https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedbromund/2018/10/31/why-the-arms-trade-treaty-is-no-answer-for-the-saudi-problem/#21f384061a7a)

Third, **if the ATT had existed over the previous decades, and was interpreted as tightly as its advocates appear to demand, it would have** [**imperiled**](https://www.heritage.org/node/12274/print-display) **a lot of [justifiable] U.S. arms transfers** that almost everyone would today regard as sensible and justifiable**. U.S. military aid to Britain before the U.S. entered the Second World War would be dubiously legal under the ATT,** because the British bombing campaign against Nazi Germany inflicted a lot more civilian casualties than the Saudis have in Yemen. **Same for U.S. military aid to South Korea. Same for U.S. arms supplies to Bosnian Muslims resisting Serbian aggression in the 1990s. Same for U.S. arms supplies to rebels resisting the murderous Assad regime in Syria.**

1. **Turn: ATT jeopardizes US arms sales to Israel (NO)**

[Ahronheim 2018](https://www.jpost.com/International/Amnesty-International-concerned-weapons-supplied-to-Israel-Saudi-Arabia-565321)

Many **governments are**continuing to fuel conflicts around the world by **breaking the rules of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)** and **[by] supplying weapons to** known human rights violators such as **Israel**, Amnesty International said on Tuesday. “Earlier this year the Israeli military, which receives generous arms supplies from the USA and EU states, shot dead at least 140 Palestinian protesters and injured thousands more in Gaza,” said Patrick Wilcken, Amnesty International’s Researcher on Arms Control and Human Rights.

**Israeli arms sales are critical to maintaining US leadership in the Middle East**

[Greenblatt 2016](https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/296131-us-military-aid-to-israel-makes-sense-for-both-countries)

In a post-Cold War world, this logic holds fast, albeit through a different lens. Once again, **the moderate states across the Middle East are watching American behavior closely.** Reports of Saudi concern about perceived American weakness in the face of Iranian hostility and expansionism have circulated widely. This frustration was attributed as the reason why the [Saudis turned down a seat](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-rejects-security-council-seat.html) on the UN Security Council in 2013 -- an unprecedented move.

**In this environment, America’s massive [arms] commitment to Israel** through the MOU **sends the clearest message** not only to Israel, but to moderate countries across the region. They see **that in the conflict between the U.S. and its allies against Iran and its proxies, one can count on American leadership and steadfast support.** America is not in retreat — It is doubling down on democracy and renewing its relationships with its core allies.

1. **Turn: If anything the ATT just incentivizes bad actors to export and manufacture arms (NO)**

[Bromund 2018](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/why-the-us-must-unsign-the-arms-trade-treaty-2018)

**Today, China,** India, **Iran,** Pakistan, **Russia, and many other major arms exporters and importers are not party to the ATT.** By the U.S.’s own criterion, the ATT is therefore “less than useless.” This is because, **to the extent that the treaty reduces arms exports from the West**, it **[the ATT] can only have the perverse effects of driving potential importers to buy from China or Russia—or to develop their own indigenous arms industries** that will not fall under the treaty’s purview

## A2 Stopping Arms Race

1. Read all the russia/china fill in arguments.
2. Turn: Saudi Arabian increases military spending when it feels threatened by Iran (and by extension the Houthis) (BW)

[Foreign Policy Association 18](https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/02/27/saudi-arabia-uae-heat-arms-race-iran/)

The spending boom among the gulf states, the Saudis and Emiratis chief among them, has accelerated in recent years but is not a wholly new phenomenon. Careful observation can discern that **increases in Saudi military spending appear to be linked to moments when the House of Saud feels threatened by the growing power of** its Persian neighbor. Following the Islamic revolution in **Iran** in 1979—a moment that also coincided with the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca by extremists and Saudi financial involvement in repelling the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—the Saudis embarked on a spending spree, buying sophisticated weapons from Western countries in the billions.

1. Turn: Arm sales give defensive technology key to stopping a nuclear arms race with Iran (BW)

[Cordesman 10](https://www.csis.org/analysis/saudi-arms-sale)

Iran already poses a missile and chemical weapons threat and may pose a nuclear one within the next 3-5 years. **Upgrades of the Saudi Patriots have created a base for an integrated approach to air and missile defense. They lay the groundwork for follow-on sales of advanced missile defense systems system like THAAD, and an emphasis on defense** – not Saudi purchases of missiles or nuclear systems. Coupled to recent US offers of “extended regional deterrence,” and the new proposed arms sales that can help create a Saudi Air Force that is more of a threat to Iran than Iran’s conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia, **US arms transfers offer the best hope of both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping the spread of a nuclear arms race in the region.**

1. Arms Races empirically decrease conflict (BW)

[Diehl 83](https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/68822)

The determination of a mutual military buildup or its absence for each dispute was combined with the outcome of that dispute and the aggregated results are presented in Table II. **No meaningful covariation exists here between mutual military buildups and dispute escalation. Only 25% of the disputes which were preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the major power wars constituting this sample population were preceded by periods in which there was no incidence of joint and rapid spending increases by the protagonists.** Of the three disputes which fit the escalation hypothesis, one is World War I and the other two led to the Second World War. However, even these cases raise questions about the impact of mutual arms buildup on the outbreak of war. There were five other disputes prior to World War II which were preceded by this type of buildup and yet did not escalate to war. This suggests that the cases which support the escalation model might only be the product of a spurious association. Overall, it appears that most seriou

5. Saudi Arabia will get missiles from China or Russia anyways, especially if US influence declines(JL)

[Saab 2018](https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/the-coming-middle-east-missile-arms-race/)

With US influence in the Gulf seemingly declining, it is unlikely that Washington’s preferences will register as strongly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as they did in the past. To be sure, **the drive for autonomy in national-security decision making has its limits, given the Gulf countries’ military dependence on Washington, but US weapons are not the only game in town, with both Russia and China making inroads into the region lately.**

**Saudi Arabia** and the Emirates may not be able to buy offensive missiles from the United States and other countries that are members of the [Missile Technology Control Regime](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr), but they**will find China and Pakistan**—who are not part of the regime—**to be ready sellers [of missiles]. Saudi Arabia would not have to start from scratch, given that since 1987 it has possessed a (likely small) number of medium-range Chinese ballistic missiles. It paraded them for the first time in 2014, possibly to put Iran on notice and send a message to Washington of displeasure with US policy.** It is only a matter of time before Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed Bin Salman issues an order to build up the country’s Strategic Rocket Force.

6. US security guarantee would prevent a nuclear arms race (JL)

[Jerome 2010](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea)

Coupled with recent **U.S. offers of "extended regional deterrence" and the creation of a Saudi Air Force that is more of a threat to Iran than Iran’s conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia,** they **offer the best hope of both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping a nuclear arms race in the region.**

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# A2 NEG

## A2 SA Will Cut Off Oil

1. **Turn: Encourage investment in renewables**

[**Egan 18**](http://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-oil-imports-united-states/index.html)

**Egan**, Matt. “Saudi Arabia Is No. 2 Supplier of Oil to the United States.” CNN, Cable News Network, 15 Oct. **2018**, (NA) [www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-oil-imports-united-states/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-oil-imports-united-states/index.html).

**By spiking prices, Saudi Arabia would only be encouraging more investment in US shale, renewable energy and electric vehicles.** In other words, Saudi Arabia would be shooting itself in the foot.

**"That would be a self-defeating strategy," said Vincent Piazza, an energy analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence. "Demand erosion due to higher prices would create a negative feedback loop."**

[Jaffe 18](https://www.cfr.org/blog/opecs-bigger-problems)

Amy Meyers **Jaffe**, Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, **December 8, 2018**, “OPEC’s Bigger Problems,” Center for Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/opecs-bigger-problems> (accessed 1/7/19) (NA)

The very concept that these alternative technologies exist has changed the politics of U.S. oil-for-security alliances from within U.S. domestic political leadership circles. U.S. Democrats are far more vociferously questioning the usefulness of the U.S.-Saudi alliance these days. Importantly, Democrats are still highly committed to the clean energy transition so any arguments that Saudi Arabia is an important U.S. ally on oil prices falls on deaf ears**. Oil price volatility is a defacto raison d’etre to support electric vehicles and the full left-wing agenda on clean tech.** Thus, President Trump’s rhetorical comment that a failure to resolve U.S.-Saudi differences constructively could lead to $150 oil fails to stimulate concerns. **High oil prices** promoted by OPEC **would undoubtedly hasten the clean tech revolution while at the same time stimulating U.S. jobs in the shale industry.** If U.S. motorists don’t agree, the U.S. Congress has a piece of legislation to sell that would authorize the U.S. attorney to file anti-trust charges against OPEC for manipulating oil prices.

1. **Delink: No incentive to cut off oil: hurts SA and creates lasting damage to their oil industry (reasons below)**
2. **Switch to Iran**

[**Cunningham 18**](https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Does-The-US-Really-Need-Saudi-Oil.html)

**Cunningham**, Nick. “Does The U.S. Really Need Saudi Oil?” *OilPrice.com*, 22 Nov. **2018**, (NA) <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Does-The-US-Really-Need-Saudi-Oil.html>.

What **if Saudi Arabia decided to significantly cut production in order to jack up prices in retaliation for punishment from Washington**? That’s possible, in theory, but it would also be hugely painful to Saudi Arabia. Cutting production and exports would reduce sales for Saudi Arabia; higher prices would ignite an even stronger response from U.S. shale; higher prices would aid Iran (Saudi Arabia’s enemy); and **higher prices would** also **put pressure on the U.S. to issue more waivers on importing oil from Iran in order to relieve market pressure**. All of this would be hugely negative for Saudi Arabia, and that is even before we consider the fact that an oil price spike would accelerate the long-term switch off of oil and bring on peak oil demand faster. As Liam Denning put it for Bloomberg Opinion, using “the oil weapon would be a self-own of colossal proportions.” Thus, **it simply wouldn’t happen.**

1. **Hurts global oil export, cutting off markets and destroying relations with large, growing oil importers**

[**Kemp 18**](https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ)

John **Kemp**, news analyst, October 16, **2018**, “RPT-COLUMN-Saudi Arabia's oil weapon doesn't work: Kemp,” Reuters, (NA) <https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ> (accessed 1/7/19)

The oil weapon does not work, which is why Saudi Arabia is unlikely to employ it in the dispute over the disappearance of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In the short term, Saudi Arabia might gain more revenue from a rise in prices than it lost from a reduction in sales. But rising prices would hit the global economy and consumption hard and threaten a renewed oil market slump within a year. The weapon cannot be wielded in a targeted way against specific consuming countries because the oil market is global and fully integrated. Restricting supplies to punish some countries pushes up oil prices for all consumers. **Wielding the oil weapon to pressure the United States would impose bigger costs on China and India, which are the largest and fastest-growing oil importers and crucial markets for the future. Saudi Arabia has spent decades marketing itself as a reliable oil supplier, especially to customers in Asia, and any attempt to employ the oil weapon would destroy that carefully crafted reputation.**

1. **Historical Precedence did not create any policy change**

[**Kemp 18**](https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ)

John **Kemp**, news analyst, October 16, **2018**, “RPT-COLUMN-Saudi Arabia's oil weapon doesn't work: Kemp,” Reuters, (NA) <https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ> (accessed 1/7/19)

**In October 1973, Saudi Arabia** and the other Arab oil producers **announced that t**hey would start cutting production by 5 per cent per month until Israeli forces evacuated from occupied Arab territories. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab producers announced **an embargo on oil sales to the United States and a number of other countries.** Global oil supplies had already become tight even before the decisions to cut production and embargo the United States, mostly as a result of low real prices during the 1950 and 1960s. Spare production capacity in the United States, which had been as much as 4 million barrels per day in 1968, had been used up by March 1972. In this context, the production cuts and embargo made an already tight market worse, sent oil prices surging, and produced a huge, short-term revenue windfall for Saudi Arabia and other oil producers. But the policy was a failure in its own terms, was reversed a few months later, and caused immense long-term damage to Saudi Arabia and OPEC that took decades to reverse. POLICY FAILURE **At the most basic level, the policy failed to achieve its stated objective of changing U.S. support for Israel or forcing Israel to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories.**

1. **Historical Precedent: embargo encourages development of alt oil sources, flooding the market and encouraging a switch away from oil like nuclear, coal, and natural gas, creating a permanent market loss**

[**Kemp 18**](https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ)

John **Kemp**, news analyst, October 16, **2018**, “RPT-COLUMN-Saudi Arabia's oil weapon doesn't work: Kemp,” Reuters, (NA) <https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-prices-kemp/rpt-column-saudi-arabias-oil-weapon-doesnt-work-kemp-idUSL8N1WW4DZ> (accessed 1/7/19)

At the most basic level, **the policy** failed to achieve its stated objective of changing U.S. support for Israel or forcing Israel to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories. More seriously for Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers, the surge in prices, which rose again after the Iranian revolution in 1979, **resulted in permanent demand destruction and encouragement of alternative suppliers. Rising prices helped spur the development of new supplies** in Alaska, the North Sea, the Soviet Union and China, which came onstream and **flooded the oil market in the 1980s. Rising prices** also **encouraged a wholesale switch away from the use of crude oil** and heavy fuel oil **in residential and commercial heating boilers as well as in power generation.** Homes and offices in **the United States and many other advanced economies switched from heavy fuel oil to** cheaper and more reliable heating using **natural gas or electricity generated from coal or nuclear.** Crude oil and fuel oil were replaced by a new generation of coal-fired power plants in the United States in the late 1970s and the 1980s (ironically the same coal plants that are now being closed and replaced by natural gas). **The oil shock also provided the impetus to develop a new generation of nuclear power plants in the United States, France, Japan, Britain** and other countries to reduce the reliance on imported crude. Cheap oil had been on the way to becoming the dominant fuel for power generation in the 1950s and 1960s, putting the coal industry under pressure**. By the late 1980s, however, expensive and unreliable oil had been largely pushed out of the power sector by cheaper and more secure coal, gas and nuclear, a permanent loss of markets from which it has never recovered.**

**E. Saudi Arabia owns American Refineries**

[Egan 18](https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/01/investing/saudi-arabia-buys-largest-oil-refinery-port-arthur/index.html)

**Saudi Aramco, the kingdom's state-owned oil behemoth, took 100% control of the sprawling Port Arthur refinery** in Texas on Monday, completing a deal that[was first announced last year.](http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/21/investing/saudi-arabia-largest-us-oil-refinery-port-arthur/?iid=EL)

Port Arthur is considered the crown jewel of the US refinery system. The Gulf Coast facility can process 600,000 barrels of oil per day, making it **the largest refinery in North America**.

1. DL: Embargo is meaningless - oil would still be sold to other countries and redirected to U.S. (NA)

[Cunningham 2018](https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Does-The-US-Really-Need-Saudi-Oil.html)

The fear implied in Trump’s comments is that Saudi Arabia would somehow restrict exports to the U.S., a nonsensical scenario. **Even if Saudi Arabia restricted shipments to the U.S., the oil would still flow elsewhere.** Crude oil is a “fungible” commodity, in the jargon, which is to say that **oil would still find its way to the U.S.** **If Saudi Arabia sent all of its oil to China instead of the U.S., that would simply displace oil heading from, say, Iraq to China. That Iraqi oil would then shift back to the U.S. and the end result would be minimal.**

4. DL: lack of regional cooperation neutralizes oil embargo

[Khoury 18](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/oil-arms-and-counterterrorism-a-look-at-saudi-options-and-how-far-the-kingdom-may-go) (AJ)

**An oil embargo would be difficult, if not impossible, to pull off today. Iran, Qatar, and Iraq, for a start, would not necessarily go along with such a policy, nor would they accept Saudi leadership in any confrontation with the West.**

[Russian oil exports](http://bit.ly/2EHk9Z8), which were not a factor in 1973, have increased dramatically and would today counteract any reduction in the oil flow from the Gulf.

To boot, the United States and Europe are working on replacing oil with other forms of energy. An embargo would only speed the process of weaning modern economies off oil.

**5. DL: Saudi Arabia cannot weaponized oil against the U.S. since the U.S. does not rely on Middle Eastern Oil imports anymore. (NR)**

[Robb USA Today 2018](https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/21/trump-should-cut-ties-saudi-arabia-khashoggis-death-talker/2078149002/)

For a very long time, the consensus view of the foreign policy establishment in both political parties has been that the United States has two fundamental objectives in the Middle East: Protect Israel and keep the oil, particularly Saudi oil, flowing to fuel the world economy.Lately, at least neoconservatives have added a third: Contain and deter Iran.Subjected to a cold-blooded assessment, none of these constitutes an actionable security interest for America. **These days, the United States doesn't rely much on Middle Eastern oil imports. Moreover, the Saudis are no longer in a position to weaponize oil exports, as they did against the United States in 1973.**

6. The U.S. is going to surpass Saudi Arabia in oil production (VR)

[CNBC 2019](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/09/us-oil-drillers-could-beat-saudi-arabia-and-rival-russia-by-2019.html)

The department's Energy Information Administration forecast Tuesday that **U.S. oil production will average 10.8 million barrels a day in 2019, a level that would put it on par with Saudi Arabia** and Russia. EIA **expects American output to top 11 million barrels a day for the first time ever in November 2019.**

## A2 SA Floods Oil Market

1. They said they won’t do it since it would wreck their oil industry. (BW)

[Wang 18](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/071918-saudi-arabia-says-it-will-not-flood-the-oil-market-sees-substantial-stock-draws-in-h2)

London — **Saudi Arabia will not flood the oil market and only supplies crude according to buyers' needs,** the country's OPEC governor, Adeeb al-Aama, said Thursday. "Saudi Arabia only exports barrels that are earmarked to match confirmed lifting requests by end users, and does not try to push oil into the market beyond its customers' needs," the statement said**. "Just as Saudi Arabia would not like to see unmet customer demand, an oversupplied market repels potential investment in the oil industry, curtailing future supply and contributing to volatility."**

1. The US is already flooding the market with oil - Saudi Arabia wouldn’t be able to sell any of it. (BW)

[Reuters 18](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-europe/trumps-revenge-u-s-oil-floods-europe-hurting-opec-and-russia-idUSKBN1HU1QK)

MOSCOW/LONDON (Reuters) - As OPEC’s efforts to balance the oil market bear fruit, **U.S. producers are reaping the benefits - and flooding Europe with a record amount of crude.** Russia paired with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries last year in cutting oil output jointly by 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd), a deal they say has largely rebalanced the market and one that has helped elevate benchmark Brent prices LCOc1 close to four-year highs. Now, the relatively high prices brought about by that pact, coupled with surging U.S. output, are making it harder to sell Russian, Nigerian and other oil grades in Europe, traders said. **“U.S. oil is on offer everywhere,**” said a trader with a Mediterranean refiner, who regularly buys Russian and Caspian Sea crude and has recently started purchasing U.S. oil. **“It puts local grades under a lot of pressure.”**

1. Saudi assurance it won’t flood market

[WSJ 2018](https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-gains-on-saudi-assurance-it-wont-flood-market-1532084948) (SL)

Oil prices rose on Friday after **top exporter Saudi Arabia said it wouldn’t flood the market with crude in an effort to cap on prices.**

1. US is the top oil exporter

[CNN 2018](https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/12/investing/us-oil-production-russia-saudi-arabia/index.html) (SL)

For the first time since 1973, the **United States is the world's largest producer of crude oil, according to** [**preliminary estimates**](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053&src=email) **published on Wednesday by the Energy Department.The United States isn't expected to cede its crown any time soon. The EIA expects US oil production to stay ahead of Russia and Saudi Arabia through 2019.**

## A2 Ending Arm Sales Hurts US Econ

1. Mitigation: ending arms sales will have no impact on US economy (MZ)

[Aaron Gregg of Washington Post 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/25/defense-contractors-stand-with-white-house-saudi-arms-sales/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a481574af297)

**Still, defense analysts believe U.S. defense contractors are unlikely to take much of a financial hit over the Saudi situation, even if arms sales are curbed significantly. With the U.S. defense budget growing again under a Republican-controlled Congress and White House, companies like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are more optimistic about future sales in the United States.**

“We are a global company providing technology and security solutions for over 80 countries and we have numerous global franchises,” Raytheon chief executive Thomas Kennedy said. “So I’m pretty confident that we will weather this complexity."

Lockheed took in more than $50 billion from U.S. government contracts last year, dwarfing its expected $500 million in Saudi sales for 2019.

**“So not a huge amount of dependency on the [Saudi] activity, even though the opportunities we’ve described are much larger than that obviously,” Lockheed chief financial officer Bruce Tanner said Tuesday.**

1. Exports to Saudi Arabia are a drop in the bucket (EH)

[Crooks 2018 FT](https://outline.com/nmKub2)

**For the US economy as a whole, arms sales to Saudi Arabia are insignificant.**Military equipment made up 18 per cent of US exports to Saudi Arabia last year, but just 0.13 per cent of total worldwide exports, according to official data. The two countries announced last year that the kingdom would buy $110bn of US arms in the coming years, and Mr Trump has suggested that these exports would support up to 500,000 jobs, but he has not given any source for that estimate, which has been greeted sceptically by analysts. **Most of the workforce in the US defence industry of roughly 1m is producing equipment for the federal government, which had a military procurement budget of $134bn in the past fiscal year alone, more than 40 times the value of exports to Saudi Arabia that year.**

2. US workers not dependent on Saudi Arabia sales for jobs (MZ)

[Alexia Fernández Campbell](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17967510/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-sales-khashoggi) Vox 2018

**Overall, the private US defense industry does directly employ a lot of US workers — about 355,500 in 2016, according to the most the recent estimates from the Aerospace Industries Association. But private-sector defense workers make up less than 0.5 percent of the total US labor force**, and that includes every person whose job depends directly on the sale or production of airplanes, tanks, bombs, and services for the entire US military. **It’s unlikely that many of them, if any, depend directly on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, and it’s also unlikely that those jobs would vanish if Saudi money disappeared.**

3. Arms sales is a tiny part of the defense industry (MZ)

[Jonathan D. Caverley 2018](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html)

Despite recent increases, **Saudi arms orders remain a manageably small part of the United States’ exports.** According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in 2017, a near-record year for annual purchases, the United States delivered $5.5 billion worth of arms, 20 percent of all foreign military sales. That may sound like a lot, but **the United States exports only 25 to 30 percent of its defense industry production, so exports to Saudi Arabia clearly remain a relatively small slice of the enormous defense industrial pie.**

And contrary to President Trump’s statement, exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively few American jobs. Based on Commerce Department figures, **releasing the billion dollars of munitions currently on hold in the Senate would “create or sustain” fewer than 4,000 jobs.** Here’s a more specific example: **Publicizing a recent $6 billion helicopter deal with Saudi Arabia, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 450 American jobs.**

4. Impact on defense companies is minimal (NM)

[CNBC Amanda Macias 2018](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/26/saudi-arms-sale-limits-would-have-slight-impact-on-us-defense-firms.html)

**America's top defense firms will face limited financial risks in their dealings with Saudi Arabia, even as lawmakers consider imposing limits on arms sales to the kingdom, according to analysts at Cowen Research.** "It would appear that these would be limited in duration and scope, and big-ticket buys of missile defense systems would not be impacted," the analysts wrote in the note**.** Of the major defense suppliers,[**Lockheed Martin**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/?symbol=LMT) **would have the most exposure, according to the note, but it would still amount to a relatively tiny portion of the company's business. However, if Congress imposed** short-term **restrictionson Saudi weapons sales the resulting impact looks to be less than 2 percent of sales for Lockheed Martin,** [**Raytheon**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/?symbol=RTN)**,** [**Boeing**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/?symbol=BA) **and** [**General Dynamics**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/?symbol=GD)**, and negligible for** [**Northrop Grumman**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/?symbol=NOC)**.**

5. Trump deal inflated (NM)

[Glenn Kessler of Washington post 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/11/trumps-billion-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-still-fake/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8608f32befe5)

**Most of the publicly announced items had been previously announced by the Obama administration and there appeared to be few, if any, signed contracts**. **Rather, many of the announcements were** MOIs — **memorandums of intent**. There were six specific items, adding up to $28 billion, but all had been previously notified to Congress by the Obama administration. After Trump’s remarks on Khashoggi, Reidel said the $110 billion figure was “still fake.” He said **the Saudis have not bought locked in the arms deals touted by Trump, even a $15 billion deal for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense** anti-ballistic missile system that has received preliminary approval from Congress. A review of the announcements on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency website **since Trump’s 2017 trip reveals that, besides THAAD, there have been six State Department announcements of approval of Saudi sales, totaling just $4 billion.** This is an example of a politician believing his own propaganda. **The $110 billion-figure is not real and unlikely to come to fruition – and even if it did, it represents sales far in the future.**

## A2 SA Needed to Counter Iran

1. Turn: SA strengthen Iran, not weaken

[The Cipher Brief 2018](https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/saudi-arabia-ineffective-against-iran) (SL)

President Donald Trump is seeking to minimize damage to U.S.-Saudi relations resulting from the planned October 2 killing in Istanbul of [Jamal Khashoggi](http://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-continuously-changing-saudi-explanation-for-the-murder-of-khashoggi/), a U.S.-based Saudi journalist and critic of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud. One key argument the administration has used for downplaying the Saudi atrocity is that the Kingdom is vital to Washington’s efforts to isolate Iran and roll back its malign regional influence. However, particularly since MBS emerged as the Kingdom’s [key policymaker](http://thesoufancenter.org/all-the-wrong-moves-saudi-foreign-policy/) in 2015, **Riyadh has instead become more of a liability than a benefit to U.S. efforts against Iran**. A series of drastic **miscalculations and strategic blunders by MBS(Mohammad bin Salman)** perhaps instigated by the leaders of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), **have strengthened, not weakened, Iran in the region.**

1. SA actions against Iran has been ineffective

[Hokayem 2017](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/saudi-iran-strategy.html) (SL)

Now Saudi foreign and security policy has gone into overdrive.**Rather than** carefully **pushing back Iran** and enrolling broad support for this effort, **the approach has been haphazard, unsettling and counterproductive — and Iran remains one step ahead.**

1. Only way to correctly counter Iran is by ending arm sales to SA which will stop the war in Yemen

[Hokayem 2017](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/saudi-iran-strategy.html) (SL)

Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen, on behalf of the government forces fighting against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels has been costly and inconclusive, even after more than two and a half years. In fact, it could lead to the very outcome that Riyadh most wanted to prevent: the transformation of the Houthi movement into something akin to Lebanon’s Hezbollah — except much closer to Saudi borders. I**ndeed, unless the war in Yemen comes to an end soon, those well-armed, Iran-backed militants will soon sit atop a shattered state and a starved society.**

[Sokolsky 2018 for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace (JW)](https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/12/u.s.-saudi-relationship-is-out-of-control-pub-77484)

**A Saudi-led military coalition is waging an inhumane campaign against the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen**, giving al-Qaeda and isis greater room to maneuver and **handing Iran greater opportunities to spread its influence in Yemen.** The wanton killing and destruction, much of it done with U.S. military support, has further sullied America’s reputation.

1. Nonunique: SA will counter Iran regardless

[O’Connor 2018](https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-says-it-will-build-nuclear-bomb-if-iran-restarts-program-917949) <middle east specialist at Newsweek> (KB)

When asked what **Saudi Arabia** will do, Jubeir said, "We will do whatever it takes to protect our people. We have **[has] made it clear that if Iran acquires a nuclear capability,** we **[it] will do everything** we can to do the same." Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS News in March, "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will **[to] follow suit as soon as possible.**"

This is already happening independently of US as [Washington Post 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/can-saudi-arabia-produce-ballistic-missiles-satellite-imagery-raises-suspicions/2019/01/23/49e46d8c-1852-11e9-a804-c35766b9f234_story.html?utm_term=.9a1a3b61f83d) finds

(KB)

**Satellite images suggest that Saudi Arabia has constructed its first known ballistic missile factory,** If operational, the suspected factory at a missile base in al-Watah, southwest of Riyadh, **[which] would allow [it]** Saudi Arabia **to manufacture its own ballistic missiles**, fueling fears of an arms race against its regional rival Iran.according to weapons experts and image analysts, a development that raises questions about the kingdom’s increasing military and nuclear ambitions under its 33-year-old crown prince.How the Saudis obtained the technological expertise necessary to build the facility is unclear. **One potential supplier [is]: China.** The Saudi engine test stand, according to Lewis, **[since experts say the design] looks particularly Chinese**.

1. Turn: since SA is taking Iran on by itself, additional US missiles adds fuel to the fire

[Washington Post 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/can-saudi-arabia-produce-ballistic-missiles-satellite-imagery-raises-suspicions/2019/01/23/49e46d8c-1852-11e9-a804-c35766b9f234_story.html?utm_term=.9a1a3b61f83d) (KB)

Regardless, the complex — which satellite images suggest broke ground in 2013 when King Salman was defense minister — **[Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile site] highlights the nation’s intention to make its own advanced missiles after years of seeking to purchase them abroad**, at times successfully. While the United States sells an array of weaponry to Saudi Arabia, Washington has not sold ballistic missiles to Riyadh, in part because **such missiles traditionally have been seen as destabilizing for the region**. Saudi Arabia has turned to China in the past when met with refusals from the United States for certain weapons requests.

1. Saudi actions are the root of the problem

[Ahmadian 2018](https://www.sharqforum.org/2018/04/07/how-effective-is-saudi-arabias-counter-iran-policy/) (SL)

For **Tehran** also **interprets Riyadh’s policies as hostile and its own as reactions to those of Riyadh’s.** As such, **a security dilemma has been building up, with Saudi actions threatening Iran and Iran’s regional conduct threatening Saudi Arabia.** If this vicious cycle is not aborted at some point, this may well lead to conflict**. And that’s why Riyadh’s security-driven anti-status quo policies could be counterproductive. They might lead to more disequilibrium, adding more regional uncertainties and hence instabilities.**

## A2 Houthi Rebels are bad

1. **Link Turn: U.S. Presence enables Iranian expansion in Yemen → More Houthis**

[**Byman Foreign Affairs 2018**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-07-26/how-us-empowering-iran-yemen)

United States’ own policies have at times advanced rather than hindered Tehran’s regional ambitions. Nowhere is this clearer than in Yemen. **U.S. support for a brutal** [**Saudi-led military campaign**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-06-27/new-front-yemen) in the country has created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions, while offering **an opening for Iran to expand its influence in the country**.

1. **Link Turn: U.S. Support increases recruitment**

[Soter Yemen Peace Project 18](https://www.yemenpeaceproject.org/blog-x/strategic-peace)

The **US is complicit in the perpetuation of violence and instability in Yemen, not to mention thousands of civilian deaths, all of which feeds the anti-American narratives of non-state actors like the Houthis** and al-Qaeda, as well as Iran. The fact remains that neither the current conflict nor the wider challenge of Iranian expansion can be solved by endlessly bombing and starving Yemen.

3. Turn: Stopping Saudi Aggression gets rid of the Houthis’ justification for fighting

[The Economist in 2017](https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/30/how-and-why-to-end-the-war-in-yemen) (JW)

None of this will be easy. But a reasonable peace offer is more likely to crack the Houthis than more bombing. **Without the cover of fighting Saudi aggression, the Houthis will have to answer for their failures. The public is increasingly turning against them, the alliance with Mr Saleh is fraying and the Houthis themselves are divided.**

4. Turn: Saudi aggression has forced the Houthis to ally more closely with Iran

[Daragahi 2018 from the Independent (JW)](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-yemen-civil-war-iran-influence-saudi-arabia-bombing-trump-weapons-houthis-rebels-a8661546.html)

In the meantime, Iran has gone from training of Houthis to becoming the group’s primary global sponsor, and likely arms supplier, as well as a crucial player in any peace talks. Far from fighting Iranian influence, most analysts say **the Saudi-led intervention has backed the Houthis into a corner and forced them to ally more strongly with Tehran and Hezbollah, giving Iran even more sway.**

## A2 Controlling Bab El Mandeb Strait

1. (If impact is oil transport) DL: Saudi Arabia can export through its port at Yanbu

[Lee 2018 Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-26/bab-el-mandeb-an-emerging-chokepoint-for-middle-east-oil-flows) (EH)

**Saudi Arabia could pump** more of **its crude** across the country **by pipeline to its Red Sea port of Yanbu**, from **where the barrels could be loaded on tankers for delivery through the Suez Canal.** That would bypass **the [bypassing] Bab el-Mandeb.** **The** 1,200 kilometer (746-mile) East-West**pipeline has a capacity of 5 million barrels a day,** but it’s also used to deliver crude to four refineries along the Red Sea coast that can process as much as 1.4 million barrels a day. Saudi Aramco exported an average of 650,000 barrels a day from Yanbu this year, according to Bloomberg ship-tracking data. Supplies to the refineries and shipments from Yanbu indicate that Aramco is only using around 2 million barrels a day of capacity along the East-West pipeline. In other words, there’s a theoretical 3 million barrels a day spare.

1. Turn: Halting oil transport means pausing direct environmental harms

[Smith 2010 Wapo](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/01/AR2010040102800.html?noredirect=on) (EH)

Second, the countries from which we import oil have lower environmental standards than the United States has. In particular, many **foreign oil producers choose to vent methane** **-- a powerful greenhouse gas -- directly into the atmosphere** rather than spend extra money to capture or flare it. Mexico, for example, produces less than half the oil that the United States produces but emits six times as much methane. Third, **shipping oil** to the United States**requires burning a huge amount of diesel oil,** the exhaust from which is greenhouse gas pumped into the atmosphere. Just as environmentalists argue that eating locally grown food is better for the planet because it saves transportation costs and energy, locally produced oil has less of a negative impact. Depending on the country of origin and the tanker size, **1 percent to 3 percent of the oil in every tanker is consumed merely for delivery.**

3. The US can maintain control in other ways

[Dalton & Friend 2018 CSIS](https://www.csis.org/analysis/blowing-horn-how-united-states-can-reclaim-strategic-initiative-bab-al-mandeb) (NM)

So, how should **the United States** proceed? It **must think of the environment in at least three interdependent and overlapping dimensions: the Gulf crisis, regional relations in the Horn of Africa, and Chinese interests and objectives**. In terms of the Gulf, **the United States should update its policy to include considerations of Horn dynamics, leveraging the growing constraints on Iran in the region and seeking ways to bolster a common approach to a common challenge**. The United States also should review its military and economic interests in the region to ensure it is not taking vital access for granted or ignoring burgeoning markets where the United States could be competitive. **Paying careful attention to Ethiopia’s position is especially important. In the course of diversifying its port access, Ethiopia risks over reliance on China or the UAE. The United States should offer Ethiopians a meaningful insurance policy, perhaps by offering incentives in the booming aviation and air cargo sector. Finally, the United States must take the Chinese presence in the region seriously and identify ways to compete, deter, and cooperate.**

4. Only a fraction of the Saudi oil actually travels through this strait. Mostly through East-West pipeline.

[Mahdi 2018](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1346101) (NM)

**Saudi Arabia is already shipping oil and products from Yanbu port on the Red Sea to Europe via the Suez Canal. It still can use its East-West mega-pipeline to ship crude from its oil fields in the Arabian Gulf into Yanbu, bypassing the strait and keeping the European market within regular reach.** The East-West pipeline has a carrying capacity of about 5 million barrels a day. **The impact of the Saudi move on the oil market and prices is limited for now since only a small fraction of Saudi oil and products goes through Bab Al-Mandeb.**

## A2 Disincentivizing SA Proliferation

1. **Won’t ever prolif**

Triste [Volpe 15](https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/25/calling-out-saudi-nuclear-bluff-pub-61095)

**The Saudi prolifeT**[**ntic Council**](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-saudi-public-investment-fund-the-emerging-financial-vehicle-behind-vision-2030)

The **$230 billion Public Investment Fund (PIF)** is emerging as the central financial vehicle to consolidate and then exercise Saudi Arabian economic power in the service of goals outlined by the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). Its role in Saudi economic diversification makes the PIF**the critical organ for realizing Vision 2030**, and its newfound prominence at the expense of traditional economic power centers (like SAMA, the central bank) highlights the consolidation of authority under MbS.

The PIF, founded in 1971 as a relatively small investment fund to support a few Saudi companies, is quickly becoming the central repository for money to drive both state investment abroad and economic development at home. The PIF was notably reorganized in March 2015, changed to report directly to the powerful Council of Economic and Development Affairs (CEDA), and with MbS anointed as its chairman.

The PIF now **seeks to invest about half of its money abroad** (to constitute 25 percent of assets under management by 2020), and funnel the other half into strategic domestic projects and economic diversification.

**Saudi Vision 2030 is crucial because**

[Al-Khateeb Brookings 2016](https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/saudi-arabias-economic-time-bomb/)

However, the ‘mother of all problems’ facing the nation is not a growing budget deficit, regional terrorism and sectarian tensions but the growing and endemic youth unemployment that continues to endanger Saudi Arabia’s national security. Saudi Arabia needs to increase public-private sector cooperation to absorb millions of unemployed youth and avoid rendering them to the abyss of terrorism or civil unrest.

[Zakaria 15](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabias-nuclear-bluff/2015/06/11/9ce1f4f8-1074-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c5a5f08f24a9)

Any such effort would have to take place secretly, under the threat of sanctions, Western retaliation and interception. **Saudi Arabia depends heavily on foreigners and their firms to help with its energy industry, build its infrastructure, buy its oil and sell it goods and services. Were it isolated like Iran or North Korea, its economic system would collapse.**

[Lippman 08](https://www.mei.edu/publications/nuclear-weapons-and-saudi-strategy)

**Having watched Washington’s reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, the Saudis are well aware that US law requires economic and military sanctions against nuclear proliferators.** And whereas **Pakistan**and India **had friends in Congress, willing to help them escape the network of mandatory sanctions, Saudi Arabia does not**. If an angry Congress cut off Saudi Arabia from future purchases of US military equipment and Israel threatened a pre-emptive strike, the Kingdom’s position would be precarious to the point of untenability.

1. Delink: SA proliferation dependent on Iranian actions, not US

[O’Connor ‘18](https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-says-it-will-build-nuclear-bomb-if-iran-restarts-program-917949) (KB)

When asked what **Saudi Arabia** will do, Jubeir said, "We will do whatever it takes to protect our people. We have **[has] made it clear that if Iran acquires a nuclear capability,** we **[it] will do everything** we can to do the same." Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told CBS News in March, "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will **[to] follow suit as soon as possible.**"

1. US has been an ineffective disincentive. Despite years of arm sales, SA still starting nuclearization

[Institute for Science and International Security ‘17](http://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/SaudiArabiaProliferationRisks_30Mar2017_Final.pdf) (KB)

**Saudi Arabia is in the early stages of nuclear development.** Saudi Arabia does not possess much nuclear material, as evidenced by its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) instead of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) typical of countries that have a significant amount of nuclear materials. The general belief in the nonproliferation community is that Saudi Arabia is a nuclear ‘newcomer.’ Saudi Arabia **[and] appears genuinely committed to importing many nuclear reactors and has pursued numerous cooperation agreements with other countries.**

**4. China won’t risk U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation**

[Lippman 08](https://www.mei.edu/publications/nuclear-weapons-and-saudi-strategy)

Either way, covert or overt, acquiring nuclear warheads and installing them on modernized, retrofitted CSS 2 missiles capable of delivering them would require Chinese cooperation, which is unlikely to be forthcoming. Once a problem proliferator and the probable source of technology and material for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, **China now has a higher interest in maintaining the nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States that went into effect in 1998, making possible US commercial sales to China’s civilian nuclear power program.** Having joined the NPT system in 1992, China is obliged “not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”[[4]](https://www.mei.edu/publications/nuclear-weapons-and-saudi-strategy#_ftn4)**Under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, China would face revocation of the US nuclear cooperation agreement it worked so hard to secure, as well as economic sanctions, if it were deemed to have “aided or abetted” the acquisition of nuclear weapons.**

5. On timeframe, it’s logistically impossible for Saudi Arabia to actually produce a nuclear weapon anytime soon

[Guzansky 13](https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon)

**Due to its extremely limited research and development capabilities and know-how, Riyadh's** possible nuclear pursuit is likely to be done with external help and acquisition of an off-the-shelf deterrent. It **has nowhere near the level of indigenous technical capacity needed to produce, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. No long-term strategy for developing its nuclear sector has been publicly issued, nor does Riyadh possess the necessary institutional support (across regulatory, technical, and legal fields) to effectively retain nuclear deployments.**

Thus,

[Frantzman 2018 of the Jerusalem Post (JW)](https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Saudi-Arabia-wont-build-a-nuclear-bomb-546834)

Saudi Arabia is a signatory of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has met the safeguards related to the treaty. While it envisioned **its first nuclear power plants** providing electricity by 2032, according to reports, estimates now think they **wouldn’t be ready until 2040.**

6. Pakistan would never provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons

[Tabatabai 2018 from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (JW)](https://thebulletin.org/2015/04/why-nuclear-dominoes-wont-fall-in-the-middle-east/)

**Pakistan**—which covertly developed its nuclear arsenal outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime—**aims to normalize its nuclear status, rather than becoming further alienated from the international community.** Islamabad was already singled out for the activities of the world's biggest and most successful illicit nuclear trafficking network, led by a key figure in its nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan. What’s more, Islamabad is extremely proud of its nuclear achievements. In the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, “We will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own [bomb].” Pakistanis didn’t eat grass, but they [endured a great deal](http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/morrow64.pdf) of hardship to get the bomb. **The program was extremely costly for the country. So, it’s no surprise that many Pakistani officials and former officials take issue with assertions that their country might give nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia.**

[**Zachary Keck, the Diplomat aug 2013**](https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/no-pakistan-wont-sell-saudi-arabia-nukes/)

In contrast to forcing the Taliban to hand over bin Laden**, Pakistan has compelling strategic reasons for not giving Riyadh nuclear weapons. For one thing, Islamabad is** [**deathly paranoid**](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/308730/) **that its current arsenal is too small to survive an American or Indian first strike, and** [**is rapidly expanding its arsenal**](https://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/06/05/china-india-pakistan-expand-nuke-arsenals/) **and trying to conceal existing warheads as a result. It is therefore farfetched to think current Pakistani leaders would voluntarily part with some of their nuclear warheads in order to uphold a deal their predecessors made in the 1980s.**

**11. Historically, Saudi Arabia has always pursued policies that show it does not want to pursue obtaining nuclear weapons, and would limit its ability to do so in the future**

[Young (Carnegie Middle East Center) 2018](https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75723) (DS)

**So far, Saudi Arabia has done things that suggest it doesn’t want nuclear weapons. It is a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has a comprehensive inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Last year it voted for the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty at the United Nations.** The Saudis have informed the IAEA, the United States, Russia, and others that they want to build nuclear power plants to generate electricity, advance their technology basis, and reduce their dependence on fossil fuels. Because of Riyadh’s enmity toward Tehran, there is concern it might, like Iran, try to secretly enrich uranium that could be used for power or to build nuclear weapons. Unlike Iran, the Saudi nuclear infrastructure is rudimentary, with no clear path to an enrichment capacity. For security and commercial reasons, none of the countries enriching uranium to make nuclear fuel will likely share their technology.

11. NU: Saudi Arabia already pursuing measures for self proficient security (conventional arms)

[Turak CNBC (from 2/1 so like today) 2019](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/01/middle-east-arms-race-fears-spike-over-alleged-saudi-arabia-missiles.html) (EH)

**Satellite imagery reportedly revealing a ballistic missile facility deep in the Saudi desert spotlights Riyadh's increased investment in its independent warfighting capabilities**, U.S. defense experts say.

This, they believe, indicates **[indicating] a growing desire by the longtime ally to be able to take offensive measures without the approval of its main weapons sponsors in Washington.** "There's an arms race underway," Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon official and Arab affairs expert at the American Enterprise Institute, told CNBC. "Whiplash policy changes in Washington have had their impact on Riyadh: Saudi authorities are no longer going to be constrained by White House whispers. **The Saudis are demonstrating that they can take matters into their own hands.**"

**12. Delink: Saudi Arabia only nuclearizes in response to Iran, and Iran will never nuclearize (NO)**

[Obaid of The Belfer Center 2014](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwis3LPsyJvgAhUL5awKHXYOCnMQFjABegQIChAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.belfercenter.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Flegacy%2Ffiles%2FSaudi%2520Strategic%2520Doctrine%2520-%2520web.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2UeNj93NUqPlVfQ7CX_DLG)

However, as mentioned in the strategies section, KSA needs to be able to counter Israel and Iran in the case that the latter acquires nuclear weapons. KSA **[Saudi Arabia]** **continues to standby in** the process of **acquiring a nuclear deterrent until it is deemed that Iran has manufactured nuclear weapons.** If such a scenario occurs, KSA will initiate a domestic nuclear weapons program within a yet to be specified time-period to counter Iran’s acquisition. A credible nuclear strategy would mandate that a rapid nuclear deterrent be obtained in the short term and that the establishment of an indigenous nuclear weapons program take shape over the medium- to long-term. This policy will mitigate the threat of a nuclear Iran through the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) strategic paradigm, and is thus vital to Saudi national security. While KSA still prefers to advance the resources to protect a nuclear-free Middle East, it must be realistic in its preparation for the future

However, Iran will never build a nuke

[Politico 2019](https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/29/dan-coats-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-1133969)

During the hearing, **[The US Director of National Intelligence]** Coats said Iran **isn't taking any steps to make a nuclear weapon**. “We do not believe Iran is currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device," he said. CIA Director Gina Haspel, who also spoke at the hearing, said Tehran, "at the moment, technically they're in compliance" with the deal.

**This is because Iran doesn’t want to violate the current Iran nuclear deal**

**Since they ended nuclearization, Iran has reopened trade with several countries**

[Boston Globe 2019](https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2019/01/31/european-nations-move-keep-iran-nuclear-deal-alive-despite-trump-threats/tWSp4AvhqAuTQIVsLah10J/story.html)

On Thursday, the German TV network NDR and Reuters reported that **Britain, France, and Germany had registered a transaction channel that could**, theoretically, allow some **European companies to keep trading with Iran, despite the threat of US sanctions** against banks and other companies.

[Al Jazeera 2018](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/russia-sanctions-illegal-iran-trade-oil-181103072241718.html)

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak has said **Moscow will support** [**Iran**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/iran.html) **to counter US oil sanctions***.* Washington on Friday restored sanctions on Tehran, which had previously been lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal. The measures are due to come into effect on Monday. In an interview with the British Financial Times newspaper, Novak said that [**Russia**](https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/russia.html) **is looking to continue trading Iranian crude oil** beyond the Monday cut-off.

[The Diplomat 2018](https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/the-history-of-china-and-irans-unlikely-partnership/)

The Shah is long gone, but the Chinese Communist Party is not. **China** has been able to translate its early efforts to influence Iranian students into its current position as **[is] Iran’s most important trading partner,** and a strategic one for China’s own goals in the Middle East as a whole. Now, however, China must choose again and decide where its long-term interests really lie. Is it in protecting a regime with whom its closest ideological stance is probably a mutual dislike and distrust of the West, or is it with the modern world of nations committed to rule of law, protection of citizens’ rights, and peace and progress for humanity?

**Iran knows that resuming nuclearization would cause harsh sanctions**

**In 2006, the United States asked the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran if it didn’t agree to suspend uranium enrichment**. It said Iran violated its compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran insisted it was producing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, within its rights under the Treaty.

Iran ignored repeated Security Council Resolutions. It **[Iran] believed that sanctions would never be approved by its allies in the Council, Russia, and** [**China**](https://www.thebalance.com/china-economy-facts-effect-on-us-economy-3306345)**. It also thought France and the U.K. wouldn't want to interrupt their oil** [**imports**](https://www.thebalance.com/imports-definition-examples-effect-on-economy-3305851)**. Iran was wrong.**

**Between 2006 and 2010, the** [**United Nations**](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-united-nations-and-how-does-it-work-3306118) **imposed four rounds of** [**economic sanctions**](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10768146) **on Iran. The sanctions restricted financial transactions, imposed asset freezes and travel bans on Iranians, and banned arms sales.**

## A2 Nuclear Terrorism

1. **Not Probable (PG)**

[**Rand (18)**](https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html)

A nuclear terrorist attack would have grave consequences, but **it is currently not a realistic or viable threat given that it would require a level of sophistication from terrorists that has not yet been witnessed.** The recent focus of terrorist groups has been on simplistic strikes, such as knife and vehicular attacks. If countries are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to mitigate this risk could be to tighten security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of conventional weapons.

1. **States won’t Sell nukes bc it can be linked back to them (PG)**

[**Belfer (1st para)**](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-states-wont-give-nuclear-weapons-terrorists) **and** [**Belfer (2nd para**](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IS3801_pp080-104.pdf)**) 2013**

Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran’s nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? **Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.**

Our ªndings have two important policy implications. **First, the fear of nuclear attack by proxy by itself does not justify costly military steps to prevent nuclear proliferation.** Nuclear proliferation may pose a variety of other risks, and the appropriate level of U.S. efforts to stop proliferation should depend on the cumulative effect of these risks, but the dangers of a nuclear handoff to terrorists have been overstated. **For example, Iranian leaders would have to be crazy or suicidal to think that they could give a nuclear weapon to one of their terrorist collaborators and face no repercussions. If leaders were that irrational, the bigger problem would be direct nuclear attack without concern for the retaliatory consequences, not the alleged problem of a nuclear handoff.**

## A2 Arm Sales give us leverage

1. **Delink**: Economic ties provide significant leverage, not arms sales

[Council on Foreign Relations 2018](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations) (KB)

“**Saudi** government **officials and businessmen,** both royals and commoners, **have deep ties to the United States that extend beyond oil to finance and Silicon Valley**. These ties, along with the large number of wealthy families in Saudi Arabia, have long made the country a source of investments in U.S. companies. **[For example]** **Following Khashoggi’s murder,** however**, dozens of top business leaders** and media sponsors **pulled out of a major investment conference for the kingdom.** Analysts say that it will be**[making it] difficult for Saudi Arabia to realize its vision for economic reform** without such foreign investment.”

Analysis: The strong economic incentives mean US and SA will continue to have influence over each other that outlives arm sale treaties. Economic unwinding weighed more heavily than military weakening, which won’t happen bc of easy supplements from China, etc, so US influence is a constant.

1. **Delink:** Look to historical precedent to see nonexistent leverage from arm sales

[Cato Institute 2018](https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf) (KB)

“Nor have arms sales helped restrain the human rights abuses of clients like Chile or Libya, or various Middle Eastern client states. **Although the United States has used the promise of arms sales or the threat of denying arms successfully from time to time, the failures outnumber the victories.** “

“The U.S. track record of generating influence through arms sales specifically is quite mixed. U.S. arms sales may have improved Israeli security over the years, for example, but **American** attempts to pressure Israel into negotiating a durable peace settlement with the Palestinians have had little impact. Nor have **arms sales** provided the United States with **[have not provided] enough leverage over the years to prevent** client states such as **Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco from invading their neighbors. “Nor have arms sales helped restrain the human rights abuses of clients like Chile or Libya, or various Middle Eastern client states. “**

1. **Mitigation**: US won’t have much leverage over an uncooperative SA for two reasons
2. Window of opportunity is closing

[Cato Institute 2018](https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf) (KB)

“Finally, **the conditions for successful leverage seeking** appear to be **[are] deteriorating**. First, Sislin’s study found that American influence was at its height during the Cold War when American power overshadowed the rest of the world. **With the leveling out of the global distribution of power,** both economic and military, **the ability of the United States to exert influence has waned**, regardless of the specific tool being used. Second, as noted above, **[Specifically] the U.S. share of the global arms market has declined as the industry has become more competitive and, as a result, American promises and threats carry less weight than before.** As William Hartung noted, “The odds [of] buying political loyalty via arms transfers are incalculably higher [worse] in a world in which there are dozens of nations to turn to in shopping for major combat equipment.”

1. Failed strategy with difficult nations

[Cato Institute 2018](https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf) (KB)

“ First, **the range of cases in which arms sales can produce useful leverage is much narrower than** is often **imagined**. By definition, then, the arms-for-influence strategy is limited to cases in which a currently noncompliant country might be willing to change its policies (at least for the right price or to avoid punishment). The second problem with the arms for influence strategy is that international pressure in general, whether in the form of economic sanctions, arms sales and embargoes, or military and foreign aid promises and threats, typically has a very limited impact on state behavior. **Though** again, **on paper, the logic of both coercion and buying compliance looks straightforward, research shows that leaders make decisions on the basis of factors other than just the national balance sheet.** In particular, leaders tend to respond far more to concerns about national security and their own regime security than they do to external pressure. **Arms sales, whether used as carrots or sticks, are in effect a fairly weak version of economic sanctions, which** research has shown **have limited [and unintended] effects**, even when approved by the United Nations, and tend to spawn a host of unintended consequences. “

**THE SAUDIS ARE USING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FASCINATION FOR “ACCESS” TO GET ACCESS TO WEAPONS WITH NO ACCOUNTABILITY**

Shapiro and Sokolsky ‘16 [Jeremy, Research Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations; and Richard; Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; WHAT A REAL REVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD SAY; War on the Rocks from the Texas National Security Network at University of Texas; 26 October 2016; https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudi-arabia-would-say/; retrieved 7 January 2019]

What remains is the idea that U.S. military assistance buys access to Saudi decision-making, but **access is not the same as influence.** The Saudis, in a form of reverse leverage, have often been able to use the American preoccupation with access to pursue more weapons deals. On the evidence, **there is no basis for the belief that U.S. military assistance has led the Saudis to take actions that they would otherwise not have taken. And in the case of Yemen, there is clear evidence that this assistance has empowered the Saudis to take actions that are not in American interests.** The Saudis see U.S. arms sales to them as a kind of entitlement, in part because they pay cash for these systems, rather than getting financial support from the United States. The U.S. government has more or less bought into this Saudi view. **As a consequence, the U.S. government has never given the Saudis any reason to believe that they have to work to earn U.S. military assistance.** On the contrary, the Saudis seem to have leveraged America’s desire to sell arms to secure American assistance in Yemen.

## A2 THAAD good

1. Turn: Ballistic missile defense contributes to Iranian arms race

[Stein 2019 Foreign Policy Research Institute](https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/middle-east-missile-race-the-missile-defense-review-iran-and-the-implications-for-the-gulf/) (EH)

**The proliferation of ballistic missile defense has prompted Iranian countermoves, designed to ensure that its missiles can defeat U.S.-made defenses.** To do so, **Iran is pursuing four** distinct **approaches**. First, Tehran is **investing in more short- and medium-range missiles,** **which** when fired in large numbers **would overwhelm** and defeat the comparatively smaller number of **missile defense systems deployed.** Second, Iran is **experimenting with creative** and asymmetric **approaches to attack missile defense radars,** **including with low-tech, off-the-shelf drones** that have reportedly been used in Yemen to target Patriot radars. Third, recent imagery from a Qiam missile launch in September 2018 shows small fins at the base of the re-entry vehicle, which could possibly indicate an **interest in developing some late-stage maneuvering capabilities to defeat terminal missile defense**, or, at the very least, to improve stability and increase precision. Finally, the Islamic Republic remains interested in the further **[and interest in] development of cruise missiles.** These missiles fly low to the ground and, therefore, pose a challenge for missile defenses designed to track and engage targets flying a ballistic trajectory.

**This is certain to continue,** given that the Gulf Arab element of the MDR repeats **the** long-standing American **effort to make regional defenses more capable**—an entirely reasonable strategy, but one **[is] destined to invite countermoves by Iran.**

1. Mitigation: Doesn’t solve for true solution which is missile detection prior to launch

[Stein 2019 Foreign Policy Research Institute](https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/middle-east-missile-race-the-missile-defense-review-iran-and-the-implications-for-the-gulf/) (EH)

The war in Yemen has underscored the difficulty of finding and targeting mobile missiles before they are launched. The Saudi-led coalition has the tools to search for missiles on the ground, but the Houthis have still managed to fire Qiam missiles at least eight times since July 2017 without being detected from the air. Despite these challenges, **it is important for the defender to include counterforce, specifically the ability to target missiles before they are launched, in the broader effort to defend against missile attack.**

This is important because missile defense can fail

[Daniels 2017 CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/04/patriot-defense-system-likely-failed-in-saudi-ballistic-missile-attack.html) (EH)

But the Times said a research team looking at evidence in photos and videos now believes those early reports were wrong and that “**the missile’s warhead flew unimpeded over Saudi defenses and nearly hit its target, Riyadh airport**. The warhead detonated so close to the domestic terminal that customers jumped out of their seats.” U.S.-made air defense systems are relied on not only by the Saudis to defend against missile attacks from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen but by South Korea, Japan and American forces to counter against North Korean missiles. But **experts say the defense systems can miss targets and are not foolproof.** Still, the Times said information gleamed from social media, including videos, shows that “**the pattern of missile debris littering Riyadh suggests missile defenses either hit the harmless rear section of the missile or missed it entirely.**”

3. It wouldn’t be operational until 2023.

[Tony Capaccio, 2018](https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/lockheed-s-15-billion-saudi-deal-at-risk-after-khashoggi-death-1.553306) (DS)

**Bruce Tanner, chief financial officer for Lockheed**, the biggest U.S. defense contractor, told analysts on the company's quarterly earnings call Tuesday that the Thaad deal with the Saudis is "the largest order we've been waiting on" that "has not taken place yet." He **said** the Bethesda, Maryland-based company is "not sure when that will take place." In any case, Tanner said, "we would not have significant sales in the near-term" in part because he understood **the Thaad system for Saudi Arabia wouldn't possess an initial combat capability until 2023.**

## A2 Saudi Counterterrorism

1. Turn: Weapons to Saudi Arabia only increase the amount of jihadist recruits through the alienation caused by Saudi human rights abuses using our weapons. (JF)

[Dunne 2014 Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/DunneWehrey_USArabCounterterrorism_Oct2014.pdf)

**The resulting political repression and human rights abuses** on a massive scale in Egypt, and on a smaller scale **in Saudi Arabia** and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), **are antithetical to American values and threaten to push more recruits into the jihadists’ ranks while alienating wide swaths of the population. Such an approach is likely to increase the problem of terrorism in Arab countries rather than reduce it,** and perceived U.S. support for repression will increase public antipathy to the United States.

1. Delink: Saudi Arabia is using counterterrorism laws and plans as a guise for perpetuating domestic oppression (JF)

[Human Rights Watch 2017](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/23/saudi-arabia-new-counterterrorism-law-enables-abuse)

**The law replaces a widely criticized counterterrorism law promulgated in 2014,** adding definitions of specific acts of terrorism and their corresponding sentencing guidelines. It includes criminal penalties of 5 to 10 years in prison for portraying the king or crown prince, directly or indirectly, “in a manner that brings religion or justice into disrepute,” **and criminalizes a wide range of peaceful acts that bear no relation to terrorism**. “Saudi authorities are already methodically silencing and locking away peaceful critics on spurious charges,” said [Sarah Leah Whitson](https://www.hrw.org/about/people/sarah-leah-whitson), Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of improving abusive legislation, Saudi authorities are doubling down with the ludicrous proposition that criticism of the crown prince is an act of terrorism.” The Penal Law for Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing, published on November 1, 2017, strips away extensive powers from the Interior Ministry, which Saudi authorities reorganized in 2017, and transfers them to the newly established Public Prosecution and [Presidency of the State Security](http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/513537/SAUDI-ARABIA/State-Security), both bodies that report directly to the king.

1. DL: Direct military intervention that US arms sales trigger do not effectively deal with terrorism

[Dorminey 2018 CATO](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy) (EH)

Moreover, even if one believed that the benefits would outweigh the potential costs, **arms sales** still **have almost no value as a tool in the war on terror for several reasons.** **First, the bulk of arms sales** (and those we considered in our risk assessment) involve major conventional weapons, which are ill suited to combatting terrorism. Many U.S. arms deals since 9/11 have involved **[involve] major conventional weapons systems**such as fighter jets, missiles, and artillery, **useful for traditional military operations, but of little use in fighting terrorists.** Insurgencies that hold territory, like the Islamic State, are one thing, but most terrorist groups do not advertise their location, nor do they assemble in large groups. **Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism.**Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”50 This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. **Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.**51 Given the experience of the United States since 2001, **there is little** **reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia,** Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates **will reduce terrorism,** much less anti-American terrorism specifically.

1. DL: Saudi Arabian counterterror efforts are ineffective (AJ)

[Dudley 18](https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/09/25/saudi-arabia-accused-of-turning-a-blind-eye-to-international-terrorism-financing-by-global-watchdog/)

The **proceeds of crime in Saudi Arabia are estimated to be anywhere between $12bn and $32bn.** The main areas where criminals are making money are thought to be illicit trafficking in narcotics, corruption, and counterfeiting and piracy. Most of the profits go elsewhere, with **an estimated 70-80% of proceeds of crime leaving the kingdom.** Despite that, the Saudi authorities failed to repatriate any criminal proceeds from abroad in the four years from 2013 to 2016. The report says there have been few if any convictions for standalone terrorist financing offences; most prosecutions are for financing linked to other terrorist-related offences. **The authorities also pay little attention if the terrorism is happening outside the kingdom.** There are also shortcomings identified in terms of terrorism financing. More than 1,700 terrorism financing investigations have been undertaken by the Saudi authorities since 2013, resulting in more than 1,100 convictions. However, the authorities tend to be rather selective in the type of people they go after. The report says there have been few if any convictions for standalone terrorist financing offences; **most prosecutions are for financing linked to other terrorist-related offences.** The authorities also pay little attention if the terrorism is happening outside the kingdom.

1. Turn: US Arms Sales has actually increased terrorism through a.) Saudi Arabia arming terrorist groups to fight the war and b.) Armed soldiers given US weapons sell them to the black market for a profit. These weapon diversions have depressed black market prices, increased weapon access, and rose terror risks world wide.

[Austin of Guardian 18](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/nov/28/arms-yemen-militia-were-supplied-by-west-find-analysts) (YZ)

An investigation into weapons being used in the war in [Yemen](https://www.theguardian.com/world/yemen) has shown numerous examples of **arms supplied by the**UK and the **US**, among others, **end**ing **up in the hands of militias including those linked to al-Qaida and Isis.**

The documentary accuses **the Saudi coalition, weapons suppliers and governments** of a sustained breach of “end user” certification laws stretching back to the beginning of the conflict in 2015. In 2016 UN Security Council issued a warning over **[has] “lax accountability”** on the part of the coalition, **and** expressed concern that **weapons may be diverted to the black market.**

A complex splintering and merging of factions has made the situation in Yemen particularly volatile, said Abo-Elgheit. “**Since the start of the war, the Saudi-backed government in Yemen has continued to merge popular resistance forces into the army, including [terrorist organizations]** Abu al-Abbas Brigades, which became part of the Armoured Brigade 35 in Taiz,” he said. “**By arming these groups** the coalition is in breach of international law, **fuelling all-round conflict and human rights abuses.”** Abu al-Abbas is on the terror watchlists of many countries, including Saudi Arabia. Brigadier General Mohamed al-Mahmoudi, former director of security in Taiz, said, “It is strange for an entity to be classified as a terrorist organisation, while being supported by those who classified it as such.” A Brigade spokesperson said: “Nothing has changed. The weapons and financial support are still the same as before.”

Ahmed Himmiche, coordinator of the Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen, said: “We learned from sources that **some Yemeni fighters had sold their weapons, especially when they did not receive wages.”**He said **battlefield weapons leaking into domestic arms markets increased the terror attack risk globally**. Monitoring the black market, Himmiche said prices were stable or declining despite the increased demand due to war: a clear and worrying indicator that **diversion into the black market was rising,** because of the resulting glut that **reduc[ing weapon] prices [despite high demand].**

The black market problem is likely to get worse. Trump plans to increase small arms sales, and with the top destination of these sales being Saudi Arabia, many of these would end up in war zones fueling terrorism and the black market.

[Shepp 18 of NYMag](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/02/the-american-gun-glut-is-a-problem-for-the-entire-world.html) (YZ)

**American guns** also **travel abroad via the legitimate small arms trade.** A [2016 study](https://apnews.com/9d3699a615dd443ba65e0f5eb14cf0a6) by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project, found that small arms imports in the Middle East nearly doubled from $342 million to $630 million between 2012 and 2013. The study also observed that some of **these guns were being passed on from licit importers in the region to the war zones of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen**. Again, not all of these guns were American, but many of them undoubtedly were, considering that the U.S. was the top small arms exporter in 2013, making $1.1 billion in sales. (The U.S. was also the top importer, to the tune of $2.5 billion.) **Those sales might be set to increase even further, if a plan drawn up by the Trump administration last September is put into action**. That plan, officials [told](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-weapons-exclusive/exclusive-trump-administration-prepares-to-ease-export-rules-for-u-s-guns-idUSKCN1BU2N8) Reuters at the time, would move oversight of foreign non-military firearms sales from the State Department to the Commerce Department, supposedly cutting red tape and **potentially boosting U.S. gun makers’ annual international sales by 15–20 percent**. (Manufacturers have been counting on more access to the global market to make up for their lost revenue, now that American gun enthusiasts are no longer afraid of the president taking their toys away.) [Critics](https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/09/25/five-dangers-of-giving-the-commerce-department-oversight-of-firearms-exports-commentary/) of the proposal say **it will raise the risk of these guns being diverted to unauthorized users and into conflict zones, while making it harder to prevent and prosecute illegal arms trafficking.** Those fears sound eminently reasonable, especially **considering that Saudi Arabia is one of the top destination countries for such exports. Trump has also looked to** [**loosen restrictions**](https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/29/trump-global-arms-sales-243282) **on the sale of U.S. arms to foreign governments and to have the Departments of State and Defense act as even more aggressive salespeople for American arms manufacturers.**

1. We are only trying to fix the problem we’ve created. US Arm Sale is used by Yemen terrorist groups as propaganda to recruit members as well as fueling anti American sentiments that will come back to haunt the US.

[Benjamin 17 Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/19/america-helping-saudi-arabia-bomb-yemen-consequences) (YZ)

USA Kills Yemeni People”, screams graffiti plastered on walls in Yemen’s capital Sana’a. **The Yemeni** people who have been **on the receiving end of US bombs dropped by Saudi pilots know** all too well that **the United States is complicit in their suffering.**

**The intense anti-US sentiment in** [**Yemen**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/yemen) **should be a wake-up call for Americans**: if you don’t care about the millions of suffering Yemenis, you might think about the future blowback. Two US Senators, the Republican Rand Paul and the Democrat Chris Murphy, understand full well the implications and have been trying to halt the weapons sales. “**The United States has** no business supporting a war that has **only served to embolden our terrorist enemies, exacerbate a humanitarian crisis, and incite fear and anger among the Yemeni people toward the United States.** This will come back to haunt us,” warned Murphy.

1. Arms sales don’t function as leverage, military interaction does

[Ryan 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-crisis-intensifies-whats-at-stake-in-americas-military-partnership-with-saudi-arabia/2018/10/12/3ce0994e-cd75-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html) For Saudi Arabia, the race to arm itself has been aimed not just at boosting its fighting power but also deepening political ties with producer nations like the United States. The favor those sales have curried was starkly visible in Trump’s Oval Office comments this week. But **analysts and former officials said the cultivation of Saudi Arabia as the top U.S. arms customer had not yet turned the kingdom into Washington’s essential military partner in the Arab world.** “In terms of the military or security benefit we get, **there’s no automatic translation from those weapons into an operational capacity** unfortunately,” said Andrew Miller, deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy. “T**here would need to be more of an emphasis on training and less of an emphasis on the systems themselves.**”

## A2 Saudi Relations

1. Relations are already on a downward trend (JM)

[NYT 2018](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemen-saudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html)

**The Senate voted on Thursday to end American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen in the strongest show of bipartisan defiance against President Trump’s defense of the kingdom over the killing of a dissident journalist.**

The 56-to-41 vote was a rare move by the Senate to limit presidential war powers and sent a potent message of disapproval for a nearly four-year conflict that has killed thousands of civilians and brought famine to Yemen. **Moments later, senators unanimously approved a separate resolution to hold Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia personally responsible for the death of the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi.**

Together, the votes were an extraordinary break with Mr. Trump, who has refused to condemn the prince and dismissed United States intelligence agencies’ conclusions that the heir to the Saudi throne directed the grisly killing.

While the House will not take up the measure by the end of the year, **the day’s votes signal that Congress will take on Mr. Trump’s support of Saudi Arabia when Democrats take control of the House next month.**

**The action indicated a growing sense of urgency among lawmakers in both parties to punish Saudi Arabia for Mr. Khashoggi’s death, and to question a tradition of Washington averting its gaze from the kingdom’s human rights abuses in the interest of preserving a strategically important relationship.**

1. **Turn: Airstrikes, made possible by U.S. planes and bombs sold to Saudi Arabia, have led to civilian lives being lost. (NR)**

[Walsh NYT 2018](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html)

**American fingerprints are all over the air war in Yemen, where errant strikes by the Saudi-led coalition have killed more than 4,600 civilians**, according to a monitoring group. In Washington, that toll has stoked impassioned debate about the pitfalls of America’s alliance with Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who relies on American support to keep his warplanes in the air.

1. **NU: Saudi Arabia is already working off of dependency on US arms**

[Stratfor 2018](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030) (DS)

Saudi aspirations for an indigenous defense industry are certainly ambitious. **In its overarching Saudi Vision 2030 economic strategy, Riyadh wants to produce locally at least half of the equipment it will need for security and military use by 2030.** To move toward that goal, when Saudi Arabia negotiates major arms contracts with trade partners, it increasingly insists that component manufacturing and final assembly be done in the kingdom.

1. **Turn: The relationship was been counterproductive, as Saudi Arabia has gone behind the US’s back to persue policies that harm the US**

[Miller (WaPo) 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/25/the-u-s-saudi-relationship-is-worth-preserving-but-not-under-the-current-terms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bb738966c603) (DS)

**The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia is** therefore worth preserving — but **not [worth preserving] under current circumstances** or at any price. In the past two years, the Trump administration has allowed the dynamic to slip out of our control into the hands of the inexperienced, **overly ambitious and reckless Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman**, who **has not only taken U.S. support for granted but also exploited it to pursue policies that fundamentally undermine American interests and values.** The de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia has left a trail of failed and feckless policies abroad with which the Trump administration is now linked: **the kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister, the prosecution of a disastrous war in Yemen** that has become the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster, **and an ill-conceived boycott of Qatar** that has made it more difficult to form a united Gulf state front against Iran and, like the war in Yemen, has only enhanced Iranian influence.

## A2 Pivot to China

1. **TURN: Pivot to China increases Iran-Saudi Diplomacy**

[**Hindy the Century Foundation 2017**](https://tcf.org/content/report/rising-china-eyes-middle-east/?session=1)

Finally, **as China’s economic and military engagement grows with countries throughout the region, it could soon gain the standing and desire to try its hand diplomatically. A new arbiter is likely to be welcomed in some of the region’s conflicts**. So far, the only test was its role in the P5+1 negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal, for which it was widely praised but hardly the driving force.

head of a visit by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman to China on March 16, China’s foreign minister suggested that **Beijing would venture so far in the diplomatic realm as to play the role of mediator in talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, regional rivals with whom China has strong ties.**[**3**](https://tcf.org/content/report/rising-china-eyes-middle-east/?session=1#easy-footnote-bottom-3)

1. **Arms are not interoperable**

[Khoury 18](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/oil-arms-and-counterterrorism-a-look-at-saudi-options-and-how-far-the-kingdom-may-go) (AJ)

This dependency goes beyond mere dollar figures and percentages to the difficulty of changing weapon systems, personnel training, and war strategies. Here **the dependency is total because while European weapons can easily be made interoperable with US weapons, this is not the case with weapons purchased from Russia and China. The Saudis would need an entirely different approach and training for their military forces.**

[**Snyder 16 PRI**](https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-16/us-just-made-it-harder-saudi-arabia-bomb-yemen-people-yemen-barely-noticed)

Wezeman says other options for the Saudi air force, such as **buying smart bombs from Israel ("Out of the question") or from Russia or China ("The US would never allow it") mean that Saudi Arabia's ability "to buy similar bombs elsewhere, especially in the short term, are very limited."**

1. **Chinese SA relationship likely incompatible because rival allies/US Relationship stronger**

[Ramani 2018 Diplomat](https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-risks-of-the-china-saudi-arabia-partnership/) (EH)

As U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have improved considerably under Donald Trump, the need for Saudi Arabia to purchase arms from China will likely decrease in the years to come. As Qatar has been able to covertly purchase Chinese SY-400 missiles with little U.S. scrutiny, and China has a long-standing defense partnership with Iran, **[because of positive dealings with Qatar and Iran] the Chinese government is likely to forge stronger defense links with Saudi Arabia’s chief rivals, straining the Beijing-Riyadh partnership.**

[Al Quiasy 2018 Washington Institute](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/saudi-chinese-rapprochement-and-its-effect-on-saudi-american-relations) (EH)

**Both Saudi Arabia and China are mindful that, given the presence of American military bases in the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Riyadh will be unable to remove the U.S. from its position as the dominant military actor in the Persian Gulf.**

1. **NU: Saudi Arabia pivoting to pressure U.S. to send better arms**

[Ramani 2018 Diplomat](https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-risks-of-the-china-saudi-arabia-partnership/)

Even though many members of the U.S. military establishment were angered by Saudi Arabia’s covert arms contracts with China, U.S. concerns about a potential Saudi defection to China encouraged the Pentagon to expand its array of offensive weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. In light of this historical experience,**King Salman hopes that expanded security links with China will give Saudi Arabia swift access to sophisticated missile systems and convince Washington to outbid China by exporting some of its most prized military assets to Riyadh.**

1. **TURN: Chinese Influence spreads Non-interference**

[**Kivimaki 17**](http://theconversation.com/why-chinas-deals-with-saudi-arabia-could-be-the-beginning-of-a-profitable-new-relationship-83269)

At the same time, **if China’s power encourages greater respect for non-interference, it may encourage greater democracy on the international level. The tendency of powerful countries, even democracies, to interfere militarily in the domestic affairs of third word autocracies has not helped global democracy or the** [**well-being of global civilians**](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12157/abstract%20http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00523.x/abstract). Perhaps a greater Chinese presence in the Middle East would not be all that bad for the region after all.

**5. AT: Chinese Economic Takeover/Debt Diplomacy -- China is not entering Gulf Financials**

[Karen 19 AEI](https://www.aei.org/publication/dr-karen-young-on-the-gulfs-new-intervenitonists/)

**Within the Gulf banking sector, as well, Chinese entities have not emerged as primary actors, nor have they been seen as presenting any kind of economic threat to existing banking institutions.** To this end, most Saudi, Emirati, and Kuwaiti banks currently maintain either direct state ownership or ruling family ownership. **China is not looking to take control of Gulf Arab economies on a large scale.**

## A2 Stopping Saudi Arabian Reforms

1. Delink: As opposed to arms deals acting as leverage to further diplomacy and democracy within Saudi Arabia, Saudi has only reacted more aggressively in the Middle East against US foreign policy. (JF)

[Byman 2016 Brookings Institute](https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-u-s-saudi-arabia-counterterrorism-relationship/)

Changing Saudi policy still further is difficult. **Although the United States has sold the Kingdom almost $100 billion in arms during the Obama administration,** the Saudi media remains critical of the President as unreliable and hostile to the Kingdom. Riyadh, moreover, is frustrated with U.S. policy regarding Iran in particular but also in the region in general. **Saudi Arabia backed the coup in Egypt, in opposition to U.S. policy, and Saudi leaders were previously outraged that the United States abandoned the Mubarak regime.** The Obama administration has largely abandoned criticizing the Saudi regime on human rights grounds, but it is important to remember that most Saudis do not share U.S. values regarding women’s and homosexual rights, religious liberty, and other basic freedoms that are fundamental to American society.

2. Defensive Weighing: political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia is a hard sell due to the chaos resulting from the Arab Spring. (JF)

[Jenkins Rand Corporation 2016](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE189/RAND_PE189.pdf)

**Political reform has become a hard sell in the Middle East, especially in view of the chaos left in the wake of the Arab Spring.** It is difficult to gauge dissent, but **Saudis truly fear the kind of chaos that has afflicted Syria, and even those seeking political reform appear willing to keep quiet about a lot,** pointing out that “at least we aren’t killing each other.” Some progress has been made, but political liberalization in Saudi Arabia, to the extent that it occurs at all, is likely to be incremental and slow. Dramatic lurches could go in either direction—secularization and democracy or even more-ferocious religious fanaticism.

3. There “reforms” are only illusions set up by MBS to make Saudi Arabia look better while covering up human right abuses and the Yemen War.

[Mahdawi 18 Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/26/saudi-arabia-is-not-driving-change-it-is-trying-to-hoodwink-the-west) (YZ)

**Allowing women behind the wheel is a PR move by Saudi Arabia, designed not to modernise the kingdom,** [**but to render a repressive regime more palatable**](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/22/mohammed-bin-salmans-talk-reform-smokescreen). Yet many western **media outlets seem to be falling for this**strategic “women-washing”, as you might call it, hook, line and blinker.

**Last month,** [**Saudi Arabia locked up a number of women’s rights campaigners**](https://www.amnestyusa.org/urgent-actions/urgent-action-saudi-arabia-arrests-womens-rights-defenders-saudi-arabia-ua-105-18/#MBS%20)**.** At midnight on Sunday, when some Saudi women took to the roads for the first time, six high-profile activists who spent years campaigning for that right sat in Saudi Arabian jails, accused – according to declarations in state media reported by Amnesty International – of “[contact with foreign entities with the aim of undermining the country’s stability and social fabric](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/06/Saudi-Arabia-Release-Women-Human-Rights-Defenders/)”.

It was reported last year that **Saudi Arabia was** [**setting up global public relations hubs**](https://www.ft.com/content/c7d57f8e-96ca-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b) **to improve its international image amid its** [**bombing of Yemen**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/why-saudi-arabia-in-yemen-what-does-it-mean-for-britain) **and its** [**embargo of Qatar**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism)**.**Well, the Saudi PR machine has been very busy indeed. When Prince Mohammed visited the UK in March, he was accompanied by a massive advertising campaign. Messages such as “He is empowering Saudi Arabian women” covered billboards and taxis. They even [appeared in the Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/09/bad-adverts-for-the-saudi-crown-prince).

Saudi Arabia’s messaging points have been regurgitated by the media, too. In November, Thomas Friedman wrote what was essentially [a puff piece about Prince Mohammed](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arab-spring.html) in the New York Times, titled “Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at Last”. Then, in March, Prince Mohammed appeared on [CBS’s 60 Minutes](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-talks-to-60-minutes/), his first interview with an American television network. “He is emancipating women, introducing music and cinema and cracking down on corruption, in a land with 15,000 princes,” announced the introduction to an extremely softball interview. In the 30-minute segment, only a couple were devoted to Yemen, and these were glossed over quickly. **After all, who wants to talk about war crimes and dead Yemenis when you can talk about cinemas and women driving?** Particularly when [the US and the UK are complicit in Saudi Arabia’s disastrous war in Yemen](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/17/the-guardian-view-on-yemen-our-complicity-lies-bare).

4. The current economic reform plans will fail.

a.) Saudi Arabia can’t jump from a oil based economy to a tech based economy without a manufacturing sector.

[Asa-El 16 MarketWatch](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/saudi-economic-reform-plan-is-bound-to-fail-2016-04-29) (YZ)

Yes, the plan vies “to promote and reinvigorate social development in order to build a strong and productive society.” However, its **one mention of specific industrial production is “to localize over 50% of military equipment spending by 2030**.”**That makes no sense. What will Saudi Arabia’s workers manufacture that will supply so much of this** compulsive arms-purchaser’s buying list: Apache gunships? F-16s? **The transition the Saudis seek must start where Japan’s, Turkey’s, and China’s industrial revolutions started: low tech.** The program rightly aims to introduce “a modern curriculum focused on rigorous standards in literacy, numeracy, skills and character development.” However, **to become industrialized millions of farmers and shepherds will have to first become simple manufacturers in labor intensive conveyor belts**, the way Japanese fishermen became spinners before they made Toyotas and Chinese rice growers became toy makers before they made satellites.

b.) Saudi Arabia will never be able to truly privatize and industrialize as that self made entrepreneurs would challenge their political order.

[Asa-El 16 MarketWatch](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/saudi-economic-reform-plan-is-bound-to-fail-2016-04-29) (YZ)

This, alas, **the Saudis fear**, because in the factory some who start off as simple assemblers quickly rise to technicians and then to managers, and before you know it their children become engineers, entrepreneurs, and **[is] self-made millionaires who first match, then rival, and ultimately threaten the nobility’s political clout.**

C.) Saudi Arabia is failing to attract private investment both abroad and within because crackdowns and government interventions are discouraging investment that is needed for diversification.

[Wald 18 Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/07/25/signs-point-to-trouble-ahead-for-saudi-economy/#6cbb2947635d) (YZ)

**The IMF reported that Saudi banks are well capitalized and liquid, but it seems that wealthy Saudis are weary of investing in Saudi Arabia**. The Financial Times reported that **private businesses, exactly those the government needs to invest in the diversification of Saudi Arabia’s non-oil sectors, are not investing.** Instead, **they are sitting on their cash or attempting to** furtively **move it out of the kingdom.** According to bankers [interviewed](https://t.co/0aH37oyjAE) by the Financial Times, wealthy Saudis and private businesses are concerned that the government is monitoring their financial transactions and are taking steps to prevent these people from moving assets out of the country. Wealthy Saudis—princes and businessmen alike—must be taking precautions in case the economic or political fortunes of the country turn for the worse . This is not unprecedented in Saudi Arabia, but the trend indicates that there may be an entire class of powerful Saudis questioning the future, or at least preparing for a worst-case scenario. It has been more than six months **since 300** [**prominent**](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arrests-corruption/saudi-closes-hotel-detention-center-as-corruption-purge-winds-down-idUSKBN1FJ0NG) **Saudi royals and businessmen were rounded up**, accused of corruption and essentially forced to pay the government for their freedom. Many Saudis, at the time, applauded the government’s move as a long overdue attack on endemic economic and political corruption, but most honest observers took note of the extrajudicial process, lack of courts and lack of due process. This was not a straightforward crackdown as one might see in a liberal society in Europe or America. **The lasting impact of that crackdown** (or purge, depending on how you see it) **has been a stifling of the Saudi private sector, with** [**many wealthy Saudis unwilling to invest domestically despite Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s centralized push for business growth**](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fellenrwald%2F2018%2F07%2F25%2Fsigns-point-to-trouble-ahead-for-saudi-economy%2F&text=Many%20wealthy%20Saudis%20are%20unwilling%20to%20invest%20domestically%20despite%20MbS%27s%20centralized%20push%20for%20business%20growth) . The government, under the direction of the prince, is trying to compel economic growth and diversification, primarily through the Vision2030 [program](http://vision2030.gov.sa/en). **This has left the Saudi government as the major source of investment in the Saudi economy, which, ultimately, defeats the objectives of diversification and privatization.** Government investment can make Saudi economic numbers look good on paper, but it is a risky strategy. **When oil prices fall so does government spending (meaning government spending does not lead to diversification). This also sends a troubling signal to foreign investors and foreign businesses considering opportunities in the kingdom.** If Saudis are trying to move their money out of the country—and if the government is concerned enough to prevent them from doing so—foreign investors or companies looking to open businesses in Saudi Arabia will hesitate. **Without assurances that the rule of law is respected in Saudi Arabia, foreign businesses will consider Saudi Arabia too risky to enter. Capital flight from Saudi citizens is a key indicator.**

d.) The government fails to properly reform the education system and fund state sponsored research. Tech companies will fail without reliable human capital and basic government incentives.

[Middle East Eye 18](https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/saudis-economic-future-six-problems-it-needs-solve-vision-2030-plan-1907352248) (YZ)

But the **Saudi education system hardly delivers the most basic skills of Arab literacy and numeracy,** despite its [astronomical budget](https://www.mof.gov.sa/docslibrary/Budget/Documents/2017.pdf), which was more than $53 billion in 2017 budget.

**An** [**OECD report in 2016**](http://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=SAU&treshold=10&topic=EO) **found that “the percentage of today's young people expected to obtain a master's or an equivalent degree** during their lifetime is one of the lowest among OECD countries and partner economies with available data” and **ranked Saudi 37 out of 38 OECD members** and partner countries.

**The problem is not even the limited number of graduates**. Mohammad I Al-Hassan, vice president for educational and academic affairs at King Saud University, [asked a decade ago](https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/09/16/education-in-saudi/): “Why, if many from our staff graduated from Yale, Harvard, and Stanford, don't they make any real breakthroughs? **There is no tenure system [in Saudi Arabia]** here**, and we don't spend money on research**, so it is just not the right environment to promote originality.

e.) As a result, empirically, Saudi reforms have always failed.

[Albassam 15 Resource Policy](http://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.resourpol.2015.02.005) (YZ)

**The current analysis covers nine development plans from 1970 through 2013**. The analysis concludes that, **after more than 40 years of development plans aiming to diversify the Saudi economy, oil is still the main engine driving the economy.**

## A2 Emboldening Iran

1. Turn - The war in Yemen strengthens Iran and weakens containment.

[FNCL—](https://www.fcnl.org/documents/369)

US military escalation in Yemen emboldens Iran: Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Bush Admin: “Saudi Arabia’s rival Iran, too, benefits from the prolonged conflict. Iran has provided some support to the Houthis, but far less than Saudi Arabia and its partners have claimed. Iran seems to see the war as a low-cost way to mire Saudi Arabia and its allies in a quagmire in which each day brings fresh military, financial and reputational costs.” Katie Zimmerman, American Enterprise Institute: “**Giving more bullets and bombs to the Saudis will make things** worse, rather than better, in Yemen, which is now facing a mammoth humanitarian crisis a la Syria. Moreover, **it is likely to drive Yemeni rebel factions even further under Iranian contro**l, and enable the Saudis to continue to ignore a growing threat in Yemen from ISIS and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).”

## A2 Nuclear Terror

1. **Saudi Arabia Security apparatus is very thorough**

[Freedom House 2018](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/saudi-arabia)

Saudi Arabia’s absolute monarchy restricts almost all political rights and civil liberties. No officials at the national level are elected. The regime relies on extensive surveillance, the criminalization of dissent, appeals to sectarianism, and public spending supported by oil revenues to maintain power. Women and religious minorities face extensive discrimination in law and in practice. Working conditions for the large expatriate labor force are often exploitative.

## A2 Military Industrial Complex

## A2: Hamas

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia and Israel are allying against Iran right now, SA has no reason to aggravate Israel by allying with Hamas (NO)**

[BBC 2018](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43632905)

Context, as ever, is crucial. **The warming [between Israel and Saudi Arabia] has been under way for some time**. Both countries were alarmed at what their governments saw as the Obama administration's weakness in the region in the face of a rising Iran. **Both** **opposed the Iran nuclear agreement** - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). **And both want to see much tougher action taken against Tehran's spreading influence, not least in Syria.**

1. **Delink: Saudi Arabia considers Hamas as a terrorist organization, cross apply all the A2: SA supports terrorism responses (NO)**

[**Al-Moniter 2014**](https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/hamas-saudi-muslim-brotherhood-qatar-terror.html)

**Saudi Arabia took Hamas by surprise with its** [**unprecedented decision**](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/gulf-gcc-saudi-arabia-qatar-muslim-brotherhood-uae.html) **to designate a number of Islamist organizations** — including the Muslim Brotherhood — **as terrorist groups** on March 7. The decision also affirmed that the Saudis would show no tolerance for any individual who belongs to, or is affiliated with, the named groups.

Even though the Saudi decision did not include Hamas by name, the latter [it] regards the Muslim Brotherhood as its “parent movement” under [Article 2](http://www.aqsatv.ps/?section=op&pid=5&opi=op_details&did=114) of its charter.

Adding to Hamas’ anxiety are [comments made by a source](http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/406494) close to Saudi decision-makers that **the royal decree**, which placed the Muslim Brotherhood on the list of terrorist groups, also **encompasses** its branches in other countries — including **Hamas in Palestine.**

# Assignments

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| --- | --- |
| Pranay | A2 Grounding Saudi Air Force |
| Viswa | A2 US Conflict resolution |
| Mukund | A2 Yemen |
| Jacob | A2 Military Industrial Complex |
| Daniel | A2 Arm Sales promote instability/civil war |
| Noah O | A2 Hurts US Image |
| Jennifer | A2 Saudi Prolif, Hurting SA Government Stability, Stopping Arms Race |
| Jacqueline | A2 Houthi Rebels bad |
| Brandon | A2 Arm Sales give us leverage |
| Nihar | A2 US Needed for Saudi Bombing |
| Saher | SA floods oil market, SA needed to counter Iran |
| Neha | A2 Airstrikes |
| Katie |  |
| Edison | A2 Arm Sales give us leverage |
| Anthony | A2 Houthi Rebels bad |
| Donovan | A2 Saudi Prolif |
| Yizhen | A2 Yemen |
| Noah R | A2 Aerial Refueling |
| Joy | A2 Arm Sales promote instability/Civil War |
| Conrad | A2 hurts Us Image |
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