#### We negate

#### Our sole Contention is Pak War.

#### Although tensions are extremely high between India and Pakistan, conflict has not occurred because of the UN. Singh of the University of Punjab writes that

Sandeep Singh 15, 3-1-2015, "Changing Equations Of India-Pakistan Relations: Unresolved Kashmir Dispute As A Decider Factor," Central University Of Punjab, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297645878\_Changing\_Equations\_of\_India-Pakistan\_Relations\_Unresolved\_Kashmir\_Dispute\_as\_a\_Decider\_Factor

Role of the United Nations in Resolving their Disputes: It is doubtless that United Nations has been playing a great role in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan since their partition. The UN adopted the resolution on January 5, 1949 in the wake of Indo-Pak war in 1947-48 and brokered cease-fire which ordered Pakistan to withdraw its regular/irregular forces and allowed India allowed India to preserve law and order in the state and maintain least amount of its forces. In this line, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was deployed for monitoring activities on the ceasefire line which is currently known as the Line of Control19. Thus, the UN played a decisive role to solve the conflict while following the international norms and the UN charter. The next Indo-Pak war took place in 1965 which is also called a second war over Kashmir after 1947, while following the Operation Gibraltar by Pakistan which was especially planned to penetrate Pakistani forces into the territory of Indian occupied Kashmir against the Indian rule. This war was also ended by the UN intervention while directing unconditional ceasefire orders and the subsequent decision taken on the occasion of Tashkent Declaration19.

#### This is because Mondal of Al Jazeera writes in 2019 that

Sudipto Mondal, 2-26-2019, "'India playing with fire': Pakistan-administered Kashmir leader," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/playing-fire-pakistan-administered-kashmir-leader-190226122309281.html, 3-5-2019, DJK

Whenever there's a crisis such as this, we [Pakistan] go[es] to the UN Security Council. It is routine, particularly when there are threats from India. It's UNSC's responsibility to maintain peace. That's the first destination of any country when there's a threat to peace and security. You say it is facile but I do not think so. I think they should step forward, broker peace and prevent a war, it's the least they can do. Both states are nuclear armed and any small-scale conflict can potentially escalate to the nuclear threshold. It has to be averted at all cost. Al Jazeera: What message would you like to send out to the international community? Masood Khan: Please try to get involved. Try to deescalate the situation and help the people of India and Pakistan. I also think India and Pakistan should reopen diplomatic channels to diffuse the crisis. This warmongering is not in the interest of India or Pakistan. To the international community, my appeal also is, first, to deescalate the situation and, second, to help us address the root cause of the Kashmir issue which is denial of the right to self-determination of the people. Let the international community get involved and help us find a fair, just and democratic solution to this dispute. Kashmiris have not accepted India's rule and that's why there's an indigenous and spontaneous movement. It is not sponsored or engineered by Pakistan. Pakistan and Kashmiri freedom fighters believe that we must go back to the UN or we should talk directly to the three parties in the dispute or we should involve a third party evolve a formula. Using unbridled state terrorism against Kashmiris will not resolve the problem. We believe that only a diplomatic solution will work.

#### For example, Global News writes in 2019 that

Global News 19, 2-23-2019, "Pakistan appeals to UN amid rising tensions with India following Kashmir bombing," Global News, <https://globalnews.ca/news/4991866/pakistan-india-kashmir-united-nations/>

Pakistan’s foreign minister has appealed to the UN Security Council to draw attention to Indian threats of force in the wake of the Pulwama suicide bombing that killed more than 40 Indian soldiers in disputed Kashmir. Shah Mahmood Qureshi in a letter to the Security Council on Friday warned that the security situation in the region is deteriorating as India threatens to use force against Pakistan. Pakistan has denied any involvement in the attack.

#### Thus, the Wilson Center writes in 2003 writes

Wilson Center, 5-8-2003, "The Kashmir Issue in Times of Uncertainty: A French View," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-kashmir-issue-times-uncertainty-french-view, 3-30-2019, DJK

One may wonder as well about the political willingness of the BJP to concede a measure of autonomy acceptable to the Kashmiris, who plead today for "peace with dignity," and acceptable as well by Pakistan as a face saving device. One may finally wonder about the willingness of the Pakistani military to move in a way which would not simply end the manipulation of Islamist forces having served for decades its regional strategy in Afghanistan as well as in Kashmir, but which would also change the prevailing security paradigm, and to weaken eventually the role of the Army itself, and hence to alter the very structure of power in the State. Quite a number of "ifs," indeed, after decades of troubles, wars and disillusions in Kashmir; decades of mistrust, repeated "talks on talks" for lack of (shared) political statesmanship, and failed dialogues. Pakistan believes that a mediator is a must. India insists that the problem is purely bilateral. Recently, the United States presented itself at the most as a "facilitator," with "no preferred solutions for Kashmir" but with a clear resolve to "prevent conflict throughout South Asia in order to avoid instability favorable to terrorist movements" (Christina Rocca). On April 18th, in Srinagar, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee called for restarting Indo-Pak dialogue, a move welcomed in Islamabad. The next day, he reiterated that "the time has come for a new beginning to be made," but underlined also that ending terrorism was necessary for creating the required atmosphere for talks. It is too early to decide if a new beginning will effectively materialize, or if, once again, an attempted dialogue will collapse. Past experiences call for caution. What is at stake, in any case, is decisive. First, for the Kashmiris, who deserve better than the tragedy they are stuck in, but also for India and for Pakistan. Recurrent tensions or enduring normalization, not to mention war and peace, could change not just the geopolitics of the region, but also the future of South Asia in the new globalized world order, for worst or for better.

#### Pakistan believes that the only nonbiased mediator in this issue is the UN, which is why Dominguez of DW writes in 2014 that

Gabriel Domínguez, 10-12-2014, "How could the UN help resolve the Kashmir dispute?," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/how-could-the-un-help-resolve-the-kashmir-dispute/a-18120254, 3-30-2019, DJK

Given the volatility of the region, why hasn't the UN engaged more actively over the past years? Actually, Kashmir has been relatively calm in recent years. The border incidents have continued, but until recent months the situation was relatively quiet. One can attribute this to various factors - from better relations between Pakistan and India to the likelihood that Pakistan was using its influence over its "strategic assets" to discourage non-state militant actors from stirring up trouble on the border. This relative calm likely diverted the UN's attention to other things, of which there have been many over the last few years. The UN has had a particularly heavy plate of foreign affairs issues - Iran's nuclear program, North Korea's nuclear program, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, natural catastrophes and other humanitarian disasters - and Kashmir simply didn't make it to the front burner. India and Pakistan have fought two of their three wars since independence in 1947 over Muslim-majority Kashmir How do you think the Indian and Pakistani governments will respond to this offer by the UN chief? Pakistan has long sought UN intervention, so it will likely at least be supportive of the idea. India is a different story. In its view, the Kashmir situation has been settled, and therefore any effort by Pakistan to bring attention to it - as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, likely instructed by the Pakistani military, did in his recent speech to the UN in New York - is to be opposed. The same reasoning guides India's sensitivities about an external actor - including the UN - trying to restart talks. I imagine India would need quite some dream incentives to get it talking about Kashmir. After all, it has repeatedly stated that it does not wish to "internationalize" the Kashmir problem

#### That’s why Perrigo 19 of Time Magazine writes that although

Billy Perrigo, 2-26-2019, "What to Know About Rising Tensions Between India and Pakistan," Time, http://time.com/5538756/india-pakistan-kashmir-tensions-airstrikes/, 4-12-2019, DJK

With tit-for-tat airstrikes across a cease-fire line in late February, tensions between India and Pakistan rose to their highest point in years. The two nuclear-armed states have long clashed over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, which each claims as its own. But the situation deteriorated there after a Feb. 14 bombing by a Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, killed 40 Indian paramilitaries in the Pulwama district of Kashmir. It was the deadliest attack in the insurgency that has raged for 30 years in the contested Himalayan region that borders the two countries. Twelve days later, on Tuesday, India sent jets into Pakistani airspace for the first time since 1971, and bombed what it said was a training camp for Jaish-e-Mohammed for the Feb. 14 attack. (Pakistan denied any such sites were hit.) India and Pakistan last went to war over Kashmir back in 1999, and now, with Indian elections approaching in April and May, India’s retaliation threatens to escalate tensions even further. The situation is more fraught than it has been for decades, analysts say, though both sides have kept open the possibility of de-escalation. At least 40 incidents of violence against Kashmiris were recorded across India in the days following the Feb. 14 attack. Here’s what to know.

#### Affirming would rip this safety net that has kept us safe for so long. Jamil of the Daily Observer writes in 2017 that

Mohammad Jamil, 3-11-2017, "Pakistan’s stance on UNSC reforms," Daily Observer,https://pakobserver.net/pakistans-stance-on-unsc-reforms/, 3-1-2019, DJK

Former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama wanted India to be included in UNSC. Pakistan had always stressed the point that India did not qualify to become a full member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), given its record of violations of UN resolutions, particularly pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir. Germany, Japan, Brazil and India have been lobbying to get permanent membership of the UNSC with veto power. In various meetings, Pakistan had taken the position that non-permanent members’ representation be increased and be given to several other regions, which would help democratise the UN. Fact of the matter is that India has ignominious record of showing utter disregard to the UN and its resolutions, apart from violation of human rights. Therefore, Pakistan and other South Asian countries would not feel comfortable if India is provided an opportunity to further its interests and designs. There is a general perception that prospects of world peace could be further obscured if the veto power was given to the new permanent members of the Security Council, as the misuse of the veto power in the past by the permanent members was the reason for the Security Council’s inability to maintain international peace. The glaring example was the use of veto-power on various resolutions on Kashmir and Palestine by former Soviet Russia and the US respectively. During the Cold War era, the veto power was used for advancing interests of the super-power to the detriment of a nation like Pakistan. The resolutions passed by the Security Council could not be implemented because super powers were not serious enough due to India’s size and population. Therefore, even if the permanent membership of Security Council is to be increased, no country should be given the veto power.

#### Farooq of the World Times in 2015 spells out the story:

Mian Azmat Farooq, 6-15-2015, "India & the Security Council," World Times, http://jworldtimes.com/jwt2015/css-exclusive/css-special/india-the-security-council/, 3-1-2019, DJK

For Pakistan, India’s permanent membership of the UNSC means permanently receding to a strategic disadvantage against India — a scenario that would never be acceptable to Pakistan. At present, whenever any dispute flashes between both the countries, they can balance out each other’s influence by reaching out to their friends especially within the P5 (for Pakistan it is China). Once India gets the Veto power, it will become virtually impossible for Pakistan to neutralize India’s hegemony. Nothing short of itself becoming a permanent member with the Veto power would suffice. In case India is granted a permanent seat in the UNSC, Pakistan may face the following repercussions:

1. India will never resolve its conflicts with its neighbors because it will be too powerful to accept any coercion or incentive to work.
2. Let alone Kashmir, Pakistan may not be able to seek resolution of any other dispute like Sir Creek, Siachen, Baglihar Dam/water issues, on the basis of equality and justice.
3. The Kashmir issue may never be resolved through the UN. The situation will not be much different than the issue of Palestine, where America vetoes every resolution against Israel. Now just imagine if Israel gets the Veto power itself, then what would be the fate of Palestine?
4. It will be futile to expect from India that it will allow Pakistan to become economically and politically a strong and progressive state.

#### Backed into a corner, Pakistan would start to run out of options to defend Kashmir. Unfortunately, Rogan 19 of the Washington Examiner writes that

Tom Rogan, 4-12-2019, "Why India and Pakistan are edging closer to war," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/why-india-and-pakistan-are-edging-closer-to-war, 4-12-2019, DJK

While it's true that India's retaliation was restrained and intending to avoid escalation, Pakistan is rarely predisposed towards compromise with India. In the hours since the attack, Pakistani politicians have been lining up to offer harsh retaliatory threats against their nemesis. Take opposition leader Shahbaz Sharif, for example, who warned that, "If India initiates a war, Pakistan's flag will wave over New Delhi." Imran Khan's temptation to lash out is also fostered by his populist-Islamic extremist power base. Those interests despise India. So what happens next? The U.S. will likely cajole India into avoiding more strikes. At the same time, Pakistan's primary economic patron, China, will push Islamabad to avoid its own escalation. Again, however, the central problem is the same: powerful Pakistani interests believe they can out-escalate India without suffering major costs. Other Pakistani officials continue to assist Jaish-e-Mohammed in plotting new attacks. In turn, if Pakistan now lashes out at India, or if another terrorist attack against India occurs in the coming weeks, Modi will face immense pressure to respond harshly.

#### Vira of the CSIS writes in 2012 that even

(Varun Vira writes on Middle Eastern and South Asian security affairs. Most recently, he coauthored Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability with Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pg online @ <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/escalating-from-terrorism-to-nuclear-war-on-the-asian-subcontinent>//um-ef)

Hostilities escalate into full-scale conventional war. Large military formations are fielded and Indian maneuvers actively aggress on Pakistan’s sovereignty, whether invasion to seize territory, create a buffer zone, or blockade territory. Nuclear weapons would certainly be placed on ready alert and the potential for escalation to nuclear war becomes a real possibility. This scenario is unlikely but war has an escalation potential of its own, and in the charged atmosphere of Indo-Pak hostility, one side could quite easily choose the next step up the escalation ladder instead of accept defeat. If at any stage of the conflict, India chooses (or is perceived) to aggress on Pakistan’s territorial integrity, the conflict is likely to escalate to a new level. Pakistan’s depends on being able to deter an Indian invasion; its asymmetric escalation posture forward deploys its nuclear forces and credibly threatens first use on Indian troop formations, or even Indian strategic or civilian centers. Irrationality in this sense is rational; the more Pakistan can convey that it is a ‘mad-dog adversary’ whose reactions cannot be predicted, the more it is able to constrain Indian reaction. India on the other hand appears to be tired of being constrained. Its desire for cross-border strikes has been detailed above, but India has also unveiled aspirational doctrines it believes will break the status quo. The most notable example is “Cold Start,” a complete inversion of strategic restraint that envisions the capability to rapidly mobilize “division-sized… integrated battle groups” from a ‘cold start’ to “advance into Pakistan and hold territory to use as leverage.” As yet, India lacks the capability for such action; in India’s three strike corps took over three months to assemble and travel to the border from their staging locations in Central India, but even just the philosophy is a watershed in Indian strategic thinking. In wartime, nuclear weapons will play a key role at all phases of conflict, to threaten and in the worst case to use. If Indian forces cross the border in force, they do so without precedent, and there is no guarantee on how Pakistan will react. If Pakistan reacts as it has sometimes stated, it could launch preemptive nuclear strikes on Indian troops, but even if does not immediately act, miscalculations can easily lead to inadvertent uncontrolled escalation. Clausewitz is worth quoting; “The commander of an immense whole finds himself in a maelstrom of false and true information, of mistakes made through fear, negligence, pre-occupation, contravention of his authority, from either mistakes or correct motives, from ill-will, true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of accident which no Man could have forseen.” Put more plainly, in the “fog of war” reactions cannot easily be predicted, and the Indian assumption that a war can be fought and won without crossing the nuclear threshold cannot be taken for granted. Neither can it guarantee that China will not mount an intervention of its own – there is a reason why Cold Start is a component of India’s ‘two-front war’ strategy. In real fact, there is no clear understanding of what the nuclear threshold actually is. Pakistan has deliberately ambiguous red lines, and Indian war aims are similarly nebulous. To successfully manage the conflict, there needs to be some mutual understanding on the acceptable bounds of conflict; whether in the weapons used, the geographic limits of the warzone, a time limit or an upper bound on the level of damage allowed before nuclear escalation. The last may be especially important as Pakistani generals place their institutional interests ahead of those of the country, and damage to the Army may be conflated in importance. Poor transparency and command and control arrangements compound the risks of miscalculation, and neither side appears to have a good understanding of the others’ red lines. During the 2002 mobilization, several Indian generals were questioned on whether they knew exactly what would trigger a Pakistani nuclear response; “All but one expressed confidence that they did. But they all laid out different red lines.” Current crisis management mechanisms are also insufficient. One well-known US-Soviet policy of “hot-lines” between senior military commanders is in place but in 2002 those same hotlines went unanswered in times of crisis, and in 2008, such tools failed to prevent the Mumbai attack from derailing the peace process. Pakistan’s need to react to Cold Start has already increased the risks of miscalculation or mistake. A good example is the newly unveiled Hatf XI 60-km short-range “battlefield nuke,” which Pakistan has stated it will use against Indian formations crossing the LoC. Such a system, by logic of its deployment close to the border, and its need to empower battlefield commanders raises “hair-rising issues of command and control.” This is particularly worrying when factoring in the wild-card of terrorists who have now mounted several attacks close to nuclear centers and have in some high-profile attacks displayed very capable operational art. Such dangerous brinksmanship is only likely to improve as Pakistan sees its nuclear advantage eroding, and in open conflict, Pakistan will likely desperately maneuver to avoid setting a precedent that could permanently embolden India. This is by far the worst option for US interests. If hostilities advance to this stage, both sides are almost totally reliant on outside forces to prevent uncontrolled escalation. Historically the two sides have used the US as a balancer and a face-saving channel rather than communicate bilaterally, but with declining US leverage, its ability to manage tensions at this level is in question. Its relationship with Pakistan is at its worst point ever, and its warming ties with India have eroded its impartial image and raised Indian expectations that the US will take a pro-India stance on the terrorism issue. This severely complicates diplomacy from the start, and could have very dangerous implications. One hopes by the time this conflict materializes, bilateral Indo-Pakistani communication and conflict management mechanisms have improved dramatically, for the level of external intervention they expect quite simply may not exist.

#### As a result, Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School writes that

Aanur Khan, Decemer 2015, "UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf.

India’s entry into the elite club would greatly upset Pakistan’s security and economic concerns and would create an imbalance in the region. India’s permanent membership of the UNSC would cause further proliferation of disputes in the region, especially between India and Pakistan. To qualify for the permanent membership of the UNSC, India must solve main disputes such as Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek. Pakistan, as a key regional country, must continue to work closely with members of the Ufc group to argue in favor of increase of non-permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC to block India’s entry as a permanent member. Pakistan and the Ufc members must try to capitalize on the differences between the G4 and the AU to prevent G4 states from achieving the required two-thirds majority at the UNGA.

#### The impacts are clear. Gurung of the Economic Times writes in 2018 that

Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, 7-14-2018, "Military failure could push Pakistan to initiate nuclear attack against India," Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/military-failure-could-push-pakistan-to-initiate-nuclear-attack-against-india/articleshow/54479254.cms?from=mdr, 4-22-2019, DJK

NEW DELHI: On September 18, four heavily armed terrorists belonging to Pakistan-based terrorist outfit Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked an Indian Army administrative base in Uri. Eighteen soldiers were killed, most of them burnt alive due to the incendiary ammunition fired by the terrorists, and 32 others were seriously injured. From diplomatic isolation to surgical strikes, a number of retaliatory measures have been put on the table for consideration. The army’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh after the attack stated that the army reserves the right to respond to any act of the adversary at a time and place of its own choosing. But Pakistan is a nuclear state, and a majority of its arsenal has been acquired keeping a threat from India in mind. In an interview to Pakistan's GeoNews last week, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja M Asif said the country would not hesitate using nuclear weapons if its security was under threat. A Threat Assessment Brief of the Arms Control Association says Pakistan mainly has nuclear weapons to compensate for the growing conventional military superiority of India. SIPRI also confirms this statement. "Pakistan is the Asian state expanding its fissile material production most rapidly," the report says. Defence experts say war with Pakistan will always be with a nuclear backdrop. And India’s endeavour, in case it initiates war, will always be to keep it below the level of nuclear threshold. "But then war is dynamic. If the Indian forces are getting success everywhere, and if you threaten Pakistan’s major cities, there may come a time when Pakistan will be forced to use the nuclear option,” said a defence expert. But given the kind of global reaction that will come against the use of nuclear weapons, Pakistan will also like to restrict their use of nuclear weapons to the tactical battlefield, meaning smaller warheads and of short range. “If Pakistan has developed the Nasr, then it means against their immediate adversary, India. If they are developing such low-yield weapons it has to be against India,” said another defence expert. Defence experts believe that Pakistani tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons like Nasr will be used on its own soil against Indian armed forces as a last resort, preferably in instances with minimum collateral damage to them. “Pakistan will use tactical nuclear weapons where they will not have radiation effects, so that it does not affect their own troops,” said a defence expert. While Pakistan has pledged in its nuclear doctrine that it will not initiate use against non-nuclear weapons states, it has not ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons against India, as per the Arms Control Association. On the other hand, India’s nuclear forces have much higher range than those of Pakistan, giving them the ability to target cities and heartlands of Pakistan. However, reports predict that use of Indian nuclear force will always be a reaction, never a first strike itself. “Due to technical realities and doctrinal inclinations, India’s nuclear forces will remain an inherently second-strike system against China and Pakistan for the foreseeable future – even if it is perceived otherwise in Islamabad," says the Arms Control Association. The Association reveals that India wields its nuclear weapons to gain leverage to become a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to seek a Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver to commence civilian nuclear trade. India sees its nuclear stockpile to maintain a “credible minimum deterrent” and such weapons will only be used to retaliate against a nuclear attack. It measures its own nuclear profile with that of China. In case, the two countries decide to use nuclear weapons against each other, millions would be affected in both countries during the attack, and in the aftermath of the attack. As per a National Resources Defense Council study in 2001, a "limited" nuclear exchange involving detonation of only ten Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons over ten major cities in India and Pakistan would kill or severely injure well over four million people. "According to an updated study by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in 2013, an exchange of 100 weapons (less than half of the existing Indian and Pakistani arsenals) would not only kill 20 million people within one week, but also ultimately put some two billion people at risk worldwide due to starvation brought on by the climatic effects of nuclear use," reads the report. Defence experts assess that Indian cities would be targeted by Pakistani nuclear weapons in case the tactical or small range nuclear warheads fail to have the desired effect on attack on military columns. India doesn’t face the threat of a nuclear attack by Pakistan alone. Pakistan is expected to use Chinese help to turn the table in its favour, creating severe instability in the Asian Subcontinent. "Pakistan’s introduction of the Nasr ballistic missile is probably the most destabilizing technological development in the nuclear arsenals of the subcontinent. The Nasr is designed for tactical use, possibly on Pakistani territory in the event of an Indian conventional attack," reveals a US Arms Control Association report. US-based Arms Control Association reveals that there are nine nuclear armed countries in the world, equipped with about 15,500 nuclear warheads. Pakistan has 120 nuclear warheads, 10 more than India’s 110. The Association says Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country.

#### Other estimates suggest worse. Turco of UCLA writes in2 008 that

Jeff Masters, 3/1/2019, "Nuclear Winter From an India-Pakistan War Could Kill 2 Billion," Weather Channel, https://weather.com/en-IN/india/news/news/2019-03-01-nuclear-winter-from-an-india-pakistan-war-could-kill-2-billion, 3-4-2019, DJK

As nuclear-armed India and Pakistan engage in military clashes over the disputed Kashmir region, consider that a “limited” nuclear war between them is capable of causing a catastrophic global nuclear winter that could kill two billion people. The inevitable wars and diseases that would break out could kill hundreds of millions more. A 2008 paper by Brian Toon of the University of Colorado, Alan Robock of Rutgers University, and Rich Turco of UCLA, "Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War", concluded that a war between India and Pakistan using fifty Hiroshima-sized weapons with 15-kiloton yield on each country, exploded on cities, would immediately kill or injure about forty-five million people. However, the final toll would be global and astronomically higher, according to recent research. The most recent study of the environmental aftermath of a nuclear conflict, Mills et al. 2014, Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict, used an Earth system climate model including atmospheric chemistry, ocean dynamics, and interactive sea ice and land components, to investigate a limited nuclear war where each side detonates fifty 15-kiloton weapons over urban areas—less than half of the existing arsenals of the approximately 140 warheads each that India and Pakistan have. These urban explosions were assumed to start 100 firestorms. Firestorms are self-feeding fires that suck air into themselves and generate immense columns of rising smoke which lofts into the stratosphere, where it spreads globally. The model predicted the smoke would block enough sunlight for the Earth to experience the coldest temperatures since the last ice age, thousands of years ago. Since it does not rain in the stratosphere, the smoke would stay aloft for years, and surface temperatures would stay depressed for more than twenty-five years, due to thermal inertia from the cooled ocean waters and to extra reflection of sunlight back to space by expanded sea ice. The effects would be similar to what happened after the greatest volcanic eruption in historic times, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia. This cooling from this eruption triggered the infamous Year Without a Summer in 1816 in the Northern Hemisphere, when killing frosts disrupted agriculture every month of the summer in New England, creating terrible hardship. Exceptionally cold and wet weather in Europe triggered widespread harvest failures, resulting in famine and economic collapse. However, the cooling effect of that eruption only lasted about a year. Cooling from a limited nuclear exchange would cause 5 - 10 consecutive "Years Without a Summer", and more than a decade of significantly reduced crop yields. Killing frosts would reduce growing seasons by ten to forty days per year for five years at mid-latitudes. Global precipitation would fall 6% during the first five years, and be reduced by 4.5% ten years later, resulting in a crippling increase in regional droughts. Over the Asian monsoon region, including the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia, annual rainfall would fall by 20% - 80%, so that even the “winner” of the nuclear war between India and Pakistan would experience devasting famine due to the failure of the life-giving monsoon rains.

#### Although there is a hotline, Suri of Foreign Policy writes in 2018 that

Jeremi Suri, 1-3-2018, "What’s a Nuclear Hotline Good For Anyway?," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/09/whats-a-nuclear-hotline-good-for-anyway/, 3-4-2019, DJK

 In the last decade, they have begun to use cell connections in addition to landlines. Mobile technology, coupled with secure long-distance capabilities, facilitates reliable voice communications as never before. For leaders in Washington, the notion of a hotline has become more diffuse — there are many “hotlines.” They remain essential for clarifying motives and actions during terrorist attacks, civil wars, and invasions — as well as a growing list of economic, health, and climactic crises. They also ensure confidential dialogue, free from the public posturing that makes crisis de-escalation difficult. Leaders must trust the sincerity of one another’s words for these connections to be meaningful, but their very existence deepens trust among those who use them. Despite a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia and the United States, the leaders of the two countries continue to speak directly in moments of high tension, as Kennedy and Khrushchev could not during the Cuban missile crisis. Meanwhile, other countries have developed their own hotline technologies, modeled on the Soviet-American Cold War link. France and the United Kingdom built direct connections to Moscow in the late 1960s. In 1998, China established hotlines with Russia and the United States, followed by similar links with South Korea, India, and Vietnam after 2008. These links have received far less attention than the initial Soviet-American connection, but they are considered essential for clarifying intentions and maintaining stability in the many rivalries surrounding the Chinese mainland. Two hotlines that have helped manage explosive rivalries, often on the edge of war, run between India and Pakistan and between the two Koreas. Modeled on the Soviet-American link, and encouraged by Washington, the India-Pakistan link provides secure communications between the two nations’ foreign secretaries “to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues.” The India-Pakistan hotline has operated since 2004, and it has facilitated numerous moments of crisis de-escalation, assuring both sides that war is not imminent. The United States has facilitated the maintenance of this connection. The same is true for the two Koreas, where the Red Cross (with American assistance), installed the first system in the early 1970s to assist with delivering aid and defusing recurring crises. The Korean hotline has kept the two governments talking, even in moments of acute conflict. It provides voice connections for military leaders on both sides, who otherwise have no method for exchanging messages directly.

#### But, Vira of the CSIS in 2012 says that

(Varun Vira writes on Middle Eastern and South Asian security affairs. Most recently, he coauthored Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability with Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), pg online @ <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/escalating-from-terrorism-to-nuclear-war-on-the-asian-subcontinent>//um-ef)

Put more plainly, in the “fog of war” reactions cannot easily be predicted, and the Indian assumption that a war can be fought and won without crossing the nuclear threshold cannot be taken for granted. Neither can it guarantee that China will not mount an intervention of its own – there is a reason why Cold Start is a component of India’s ‘two-front war’ strategy. In real fact, there is no clear understanding of what the nuclear threshold actually is. Pakistan has deliberately ambiguous red lines, and Indian war aims are similarly nebulous. To successfully manage the conflict, there needs to be some mutual understanding on the acceptable bounds of conflict; whether in the weapons used, the geographic limits of the warzone, a time limit or an upper bound on the level of damage allowed before nuclear escalation. The last may be especially important as Pakistani generals place their institutional interests ahead of those of the country, and damage to the Army may be conflated in importance. Poor transparency and command and control arrangements compound the risks of miscalculation, and neither side appears to have a good understanding of the others’ red lines. During the 2002 mobilization, several Indian generals were questioned on whether they knew exactly what would trigger a Pakistani nuclear response; “All but one expressed confidence that they did. But they all laid out different red lines.” Current crisis management mechanisms are also insufficient. One well-known US-Soviet policy of “hot-lines” between senior military commanders is in place but in 2002 those same hotlines went unanswered in times of crisis, and in 2008, such tools failed to prevent the Mumbai attack from derailing the peace process. Pakistan’s need to react to Cold Start has already increased the risks of miscalculation or mistake. A good example is the newly unveiled Hatf XI 60-km short-range “battlefield nuke,” which Pakistan has stated it will use against Indian formations crossing the LoC. Such a system, by logic of its deployment close to the border, and its need to empower battlefield commanders raises “hair-rising issues of command and control.” This is particularly worrying when factoring in the wild-card of terrorists who have now mounted several attacks close to nuclear centers and have in some high-profile attacks displayed very capable operational art. Such dangerous brinksmanship is only likely to improve as Pakistan sees its nuclear advantage eroding, and in open conflict, Pakistan will likely desperately maneuver to avoid setting a precedent that could permanently embolden India. This is by far the worst option for US interests. If hostilities advance to this stage, both sides are almost totally reliant on outside forces to prevent uncontrolled escalation. Historically the two sides have used the US as a balancer and a face-saving channel rather than communicate bilaterally, but with declining US leverage, its ability to manage tensions at this level is in question. Its relationship with Pakistan is at its worst point ever, and its warming ties with India have eroded its impartial image and raised Indian expectations that the US will take a pro-India stance on the terrorism issue. This severely complicates diplomacy from the start, and could have very dangerous implications. One hopes by the time this conflict materializes, bilateral Indo-Pakistani communication and conflict management mechanisms have improved dramatically, for