**Wayland Negates;**

**Our sole contention is destabilizing the Middle East.**

For years, the majority-Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the home of Shia Islam, Iran, have been locked in a war for geopolitical, economic and sectarian influence—with devastating effects on the region.

This conflict has manifested in a handful of proxy wars between pro-Saudi forces and Iran-backed militias, in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, Bahrain, and Yemen. [**Posey Gurdian ‘17**](https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/here-are-4-ways-iran-destabilizing-the-middle-east)explains that "Iran is increasingly destabilizing the Middle East [through proxy wars and terrorism]." She furthers that "[failure to contain Iran allows it] to [further] negatively influence and destabilize the Middle East." In Yemen alone, the [**UN ‘17**](https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen) explains 22.2 million people in Yemen need some kind of humanitarian or protection assistance. Iran often instigates these conflicts

Fortunately, US arms sales keep these conflicts in check by creating a strategic balance. As [**Jerome**](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea)  CFR explains “[arms sales] presents a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Iran’s current arsenal that can cope with the latest [US military hardware]”

This strategic balance reduces the duration of conflict, because when one country enjoys an unbreakable advantage over another, *both* are more likely to recognize that additional fighting won’t change the war’s final outcome, and thus come to the negotiating table to avert unnecessary suffering.

This is already being seen, as [**Sanchez ‘19 Telegraph reports**](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/13/jeremy-hunt-optimistic-yemen-path-peace-warring-sides-follow/) “Yemen may finally be “on the path to peace” after nearly five years of war [because of] UN-brokered talks last year” [**Bloomberg**](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-14/yemen-ceasefire-is-welcome-saudi-arabia-and-iran-must-do-more) **in 2018** writes the “the deal would not have been possible without the American coercion of Saudi Arabia.” As a result of this peace, [**Anderson** BBC **‘19**](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47033909)  writes that this will allow the "breathing space" to distribute food in areas which were prevously impossible to reach during the fighting” and **Fanack** reports just 2 days ago that “With 70 per cent of goods entering Yemen through Hodeidah, the ceasefire effectively prevented 22 million people from starving.”

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Even in the absence of a peace process, Saudi Arabia’s position of strength ensures that the war ends swiftly and decisively, rather than devolving into a painful war of attrition with no clear end in sight. That’s why [**Fortna Columbia‘08**](http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF) concludes that “The [chances] for another war drops by about 70–90% when there is decisive military outcome.” Furthermore, “ The presence of international personnel tends to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer.”

Consequently, ending US arms sales would break this strategic balance and destabilize the Middle East.

 [**Ostovar Foreign Policy. ‘18**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/07/the-first-saudi-iranian-war-will-be-an-even-fight/) explains, “the possible involvement of the United States would be the [most important variable] in any potential conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.” While this dynamic deters Iran in the status quo, absent US support, Iran and Saudi Arabia are virtually evenly matched, creating the opportunity to gain an advantage through military advances. As a result, [**Brands Bloomberg ‘18**](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-09/how-to-make-the-middle-east-even-worse-a-u-s-withdrawal)writes that as aggressive as Iran’s behavior has been in recent years, it has still had to operate in the shadow of American power. Take away that restraining influence, and Iran will become more provocative.

Furthermore, It’s in Iran’s interest to fill America’s void. As [**Perwaiz Inquierer‘07**](http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1294/2/discerning-iran-exploring-the-motives-for-iranian-foreign-policy) explains “when the Iranian regime stands up to the US in foreign policy issues, the regime puts itself at the helm of nationalism. As long as the regime can align itself with nationalism, the Irnian people are less inclined to move against it.”

The way Iran would escalate conflicts is by increasing its support of regional Shia militias. [**Burchfield National Interest ‘18**](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/iran-relies-foreign-militias-and-young-shia-muslims-fight-its-war-syria-34807) finds that these militias are fueling Iran’s regional ambitions, [engaging in] destabilizing activity.”

Crucially, as Iran increases its aggression, any hope of a peace deal is destroyed. Instead, Saudi Arabia would be forced to militarize in response, resulting in a devastating arms race. [**Roubini Guardian ‘17**](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/03/donald-trump-america-first-global-conflict-nouriel-roubini) explains “if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue.”

The impact is perpetual warfare.

[**O’Conner**](https://www.newsweek.com/next-middle-east-war-most-likely-start-these-places-according-new-report-998544) **explains in 2018** that “[there are]currently nine flashpoints [for conflict to break out] across the Middle East” Worse, [**Rider**](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713_Just_Part_of_the_Game_Arms_Races_Rivalry_and_War) **explains in 2010** that “an arms race increases the probability of war by 331%.”

**Thus, we negate.**

**Extension**

Right now, Saudi Arabia is the leader in the Middle East, but Iran wants to replace them. However, due to Saudi Arabia’s insurmountable military advantage due to US arms sales, Iran does not aggress to its full capabilities because it knows that it can’t win. Crippling Saudi Arabia and making it so that they can’t stand up to Iran in proxy conflicts would cause Iran to aggress even more so that Iran can try to take control, turning the nine flashpoints in the middle east into war zones.

Furthermore, theres a working ceasefire in Yemen right now with aid getting through as of just 2 days ago, meaning we solve for the Yemen conflict. Their card is from October saying people were going to starve, our card is from 2 days ago, prefer our more recent evidence

**A2: Yemen**

As an overview to this contention: we concede that in the very short-term, you are going to see a decrease in Saudi Arabia’s military capacity, but this won’t eliminate their strength overnight. Instead, the Ostovar evidence in case explains that with the United States, Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly strong over Iran, but without the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran are effectively equal.

This is crucial. In the status quo, because of Saudi Arabia’s overwhelming strength, neither side believes they can change the outcome through further fighting, which means a) the war is more likely to end through a peace deal, and b) if the peace process fails, a decisive victory will end the war sooner.

Our link about Iran also links into the war in Yemen, as the Carafano evidence in case finds that in response to declining Saudi power, Iran would double-down on its support for the Houthis and worsen the Yemen war. The only reason the Houthis are willing to negotiate right now is because they’re in a position of weakness, but affirming irreversibly changes their calculus. This is sufficient to negate on their case for 3 reasons:

1. It delinks their impact. Even if Saudi Arabia comes to the table, if Iran walks away, no peace deal happens and the war continues.
2. Iran winning the war is comparatively worse, because they have a unique incentive to destabilize the region. Because the US is aligned with most of the governments in the Middle East, Iran benefits when states are destabilized, whereas the US benefits when states are stable. We know this is true right now, as Kyle Matthews of the National Post ‘18 writes that the Houthis are a far more violent group than the Saudis, intent on purging Yemen of its religious and cultural diversity through the systematic oppression and genocide of others. The [Gulf News](https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/al-houthis-looted-65-of-yemen-humanitarian-aid-1.61270369) furthers that the Houthis have stolen 65% of humanitarian aid sent to Yemen, disproportionately contributing to the humanitarian crisis.
3. It turns their link. If we win that Iran turns to aggression in the aff world, the Roubini evidence in case Saudi Arabia will have no choice to escalate response. This is key, as while the Saudis are weakened in the short term, in the long run, **both sides militarize simultaneously**, resulting in a violent war of attrition with no end in sight.

Thus, in the long run, Saudi Arabia would escalate in response in 3 ways:

1. New alliances. Turak of CNBC ‘18 explains that if Saudi Arabia no longer had American military support, it would just shift to countries like Russia, China and Brazil for its military needs.
2. Domestic production. [Bavier ‘18](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-saudi-defence-exclusive/exclusive-saudis-seek-wide-ranging-deals-with-south-african-arms-firms-idUSKCN1ME180) finds that Saudi Arabia has spent billions of dollars on developing their own domestic defense industry to reduce reliance on foreign arms, and will be fully independent by 2030.
3. Funding militias. [Mourad of the MPN ‘18](https://www.mintpressnews.com/saudi-arabia-relies-on-mercenaries-militias-and-the-us-to-win-wars/244751/) explains Saudi Arabia heavily finances local militias to fight in Yemen and other proxy wars, meaning arms aren’t the problem, they just need money. Crucially, these militias use conventional weapons and brute force

They’re going to argue that making this transition will take time, but while Saudi Arabia makes this transition, [Jerome of the Council on Foreign Relations](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea) ‘18 finds that the Saudis have massive weapons stockpiles held over from the Obama administration, leaving them with the resources to continue fighting for decades. They’ll say logistical support is necessary, but [Turbeville of the MPN](https://www.mintpressnews.com/blackwateracademi-mercenaries-procured-united-arab-emirates-now-fighting-yemen/216869/) ‘18 finds that Saudi Arabia specifically depends on private military contractors for this technology, and [McFate of the Atlantic](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/iraq-afghanistan-contractor-pentagon-obama/495731/) ‘18 furthers that these contractors are unaffected by Congressional restrictions, as they aren’t considered boots on the ground and often establish themselves worldwide through subsidiaries.

At the end of the round, here’s why we outweigh:

1. We solve conflict better with an overwhelming victory. Fortna of Columbia University concludes that decisive interventions reduce the duration of conflict by 70 to 90%.
2. We impact to all nine flashpoints that Saudi Arabia and Iran are involved in, including Yemen, while they only impact to one.
3. When both parties militarize at once, the risk of a miscalculation increases, threatening a **direct war** instead of a proxy war, which would have exponentially more damage.

We link in w/ Iran. If we prove that Iran increases its aggression in response, that wrecks any chance of a peace deal.

Reasons Iran will escalate:

1.

Saudi Arabia is always going to have the intent to fight the Yemen war unless their is an actor stopping them - Caywood of The National Interest in 2018 explains the crown prince of Saudi Arabia has tied the conflict to his credibility as a leader.

That being said, ending arm sales won’t decrease Saudi Arabia’s military power for five reasons:

1. Turak of CNBC ‘18 explains that if Saudi Arabia no longer had American military support, it would just shift to a variety of other actors willing to send them weapons - Russia, China, France, Britain, and Canada, all have the capability and will to replace any American void in arm sales.

1. Knights of the Washington Institute ‘18 explains that in anticipation of America ending arm sales, Saudi Arabia has been stocking up on a ton of weaponry and held a constant dribble of replacements, which is why even if we completely stopped selling them arms, they would still have enough American weapons to fight the Yemen war for years on end.
2. Marks of Tech Time ‘17 finds that Saudi Arabia has spent billions of dollars on developing their own domestic defense industry to reduce reliance on foreign arms - in fact, 50% of their weapons will be produced domestically by 2030.
3. Mourad of the MPN in 2018 explains Saudi Arabia heavily finances local militias to fight in Yemen, meaning arms aren’t a problem, they just need money. Absent American arms sales, the Saudi government would just increase reliance on these rogue forces.
4. [Turbeville of the MPN](https://www.mintpressnews.com/blackwateracademi-mercenaries-procured-united-arab-emirates-now-fighting-yemen/216869/) ‘18 finds that private military contractors, or PMCs, play an integral role in Saudi Arabia’s strategy in Yemen. Importantly, ending arm sales wouldn’t stop private military contractors, as McFate of the Atlantic ‘18 explains that private military contractors do not report to Congress, as they aren’t considered as boots on the ground, allowing them to get around Congressional restrictions.

With that, there’s a few reasons you can turn the argument:

1. The US uses leverage to prevent Saudi Arabia from making rash decisions. [Sanchez of the Telegraph](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/13/jeremy-hunt-optimistic-yemen-path-peace-warring-sides-follow/) a few hours ago finds that arms sales gave the United States strategic leverage to push Saudi Arabia and Yemen into the Stockholm peace deal, and that it has been a success, enabling communications between the Houthis and the US, building trust necessary for a final peace deal and ensuring both sides are committed to a peace sharing deal.
	1. But, even if the peace deal fails, [Snyder of the PRI](https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-10-20/why-broken-ceasefires-are-not-all-bad) ‘16 finds that every ceasefire is better than the last because A. groundwork becomes more concrete and B. hardliners become marginalized. That’s why, while there have been ceasefires in the past, Al Jazeera finds that the most recent one has come the furthest.
2. [Kalin of Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-aid-saudi/saudi-led-coalition-to-give-1-5-billion-in-yemen-aid-expand-port-capacity-idUSKBN1FB00K) in 2018 confirms that the US involvement in Saudi Arabia was instrumental in pressuring them to send over 3.5 billion dollars worth of aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Crucially, [ArabNews](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1446511/saudi-arabia) less than a week ago reported that aid from Saudi Arabia has helped over 2.5 million Yemenis gain access to basic necessities.
3. Ending arm sales would embolden Iran, making them far more aggressive. Carafano of the Heritage Foundation ‘18 explains that ending US military support to Saudi Arabia would make them seem far weaker and abandoned, emboldening Iran to double-down on expanding the war while increasing their support to the Houthi rebels. Without our mitigating presence, the carnage of the war would only increase.
4. Ending arm sales would worsen the famine - Knights of the Washington Institute ‘18 explains that the US-Saudi partnership is built on American military support in exchange for Saudi oil, so ending arm sales would cause Saudi Arabia to roll back oil production. Moreover, Alkhalisi of CNN ‘13 explains that just a rhetorical threat to withhold supplies would drive speculation and uncertainty, ultimately increasing prices.
	1. Importantly, the World Bank in 2013 confirms that changes in oil prices are responsible for nearly two-thirds of changes in food prices.

**Fortna**

Virginia Page Fortna, Columbia University, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War” 2004

<http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF>

Tables 6–9 also tell us something about when peace will be harder or easier to maintain, **whether or not the international community intervenes**. As we would expect, peace tends to be quite stable after wars that end in a victory. **The hazard for another war drops by about 70–90% when there is such a decisive military outcome.**

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 **The presence of international personnel** is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guarantee lasting peace in every case, but it **does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer.** Despite a number of well-publicized peacekeeping fiascoes in the early and mid-1990s, peacekeeping is an effective conflict management tool. The efforts of the international community to help war-torn states avoid a slide back to civil war are well worth it

**Sohaib Perwaiz. “Discerning Iran: Exploring the Motives for Iranian Foreign Policy.” Cornell International Affairs Review. 2007. http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1294/2/discerning-iran-exploring-the-motives-for-iranian-foreign-policy**

Liberal IR Theory rests on the assumption that a state isn’t an autonomous actor but a representative institution for “fundamental actors” or interest groups within it, who draw support from a political selectorate, a network of broader political coalitions, within the societal framework, and are constrained to act within differential societal influence. This model fits the Iranian political system well because the Iranian state is dominated by a particular group of “fundamental actors,” the elite clergy, who have institutionalized their dominant position within the state.1 Iran has two levels of government. **There is a democratic government and president which works under the constitutional purview of a supervisory religious leader with the title “the just jurist” or faqih (a clerical figure who rules for life) and a Council of Guardians (also mostly comprised of clerical elite), a body of twelve chosen directly or indirectly by the faqih to act as religious monitors of legislature and executive policy.** These clerics are the final authority in Iranian politics and can veto legislature, judicial decisions, and policy set by any other departments of government.2 As Liberal Theory would assume, t**he faqih and his Council of Guardians act based on self-interest and self-preservation, and are constrained by domestic political realities, such as falling support for their monopoly on power. Moreover, since these clerical elites have institutionalized their hegemony through the Islamic Republic’s constitution, the Iranian state has become a representative of their interests.** We will soon see that Iran’s aggressive foreign policy is a strategy used by the Iranian regime through the state. In better understanding this strategy, we must now look to the Iranian regime’s position on its home front. Moreover, the working class is growing frustrated at the painfully slow rate of economic development. Economic growth in Iran, even with the influx of oil revenue, is well below expectations. GDP growth rate averaged at 2.5% from 1998 to 2001 compared to the government goal of 6%. Inflation is exceptionally high and ran at an average 15.55% from 1997 to 2001. Unemployment is currently at 16.1% and, due to increasing number of educated entrants into the labor market, is expected to hit 25% by end of decade. **Demands for change in the economic and political situation of this large working class resulted in a momentous reform movement, which even in its failure, would provide a decisive blow to the already diminishing legitimacy of the clerical regime. Returning to our Liberal Theory model, we see how the primary interest group in Iranian politics, the clergy in government, have struggled to maintain their hold on power, primarily by fighting off reformist moves to cordon their influence and changing the social status quo which keeps them securely above the rest in Iranian society. Indeed, rather than dealing with these structural problems, which they cannot deal with from within the current system, they seek out problems that they can deal with. As it turns out, the regime’s strategy in dealing with its lack of legitimacy involves an astute manipulation of nationalism and uncertainty, political forces that are well-ingrained in Iranian society.** Let us now explore these Iranian perceptions and attitudes towards the U.S, and more importantly how they can be used to the regime’s advantage. Therefore, **when the clerical regime stands up to the US in foreign policy issues, may it be in mocking Israel, supporting insurgents in Iraq, or pursuing a nuclear energy program, the regime puts itself at the helm of one thing that all Iranians, from reformists to minorities stand behind, and that is nationalism. As long as the regime can align itself with the powerful forces of Iranian nationalism, the Iranian people are less inclined to move against it.** A potent example of how the government has been using nationalism for its own ends is by blaming most of its ethnic tensions on foreigners. Abbas Samii tells us in his article on ethnic tensions in Iran, “The central government typically reacts to ethnic unrest with a combination of repression and scapegoating.”10 He goes on to describe how two men involved in an anti-government bombing were forced to confess links with American and British security forces, even though they had committed the crimes under the flag of an ethnic rebel group.11 By linking local troubles to foreigners, the regime is trying to appeal to the broader nationalism of all Iranians (including minorities) who would more easily accept government brutality if it is to fight off foreign foes. **As long as an aggressive foreign policy against the US, or any other “Western” nation for that matter, provides legitimacy to the Iranian government at home, it will continue to pursue it. In fact foreign policy, for lack of legitimacy at home, will continue to be the raison d’être of the Iranian regime.**