

Noah and I negate, Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road Initiative.

The BRI is headed towards failure.

[Chandran '19 of CNBC](#) that the BRI is facing a funding gap of 500 billion dollars every year which has been created by a lack of private investors.

Indeed, [Scissors in '19](#) reports that, there's a shortage of hard currency used to make investments and finance construction, confirmed by the fact that new BRI projects dropped sharply by over 50 percent in the first half of 2019 when compared to the first half of the previous year.

[Ciurtin '17 of the ERI](#) concludes that the only way for projects to continue is with the addition of the European Union and their financial contributions. They conclude that without the EU it is improbable that any other nation would fill the gap due to their willingness to cooperate or inability to provide sufficient funding.

### **Contention 1: Throwing fuel on a dying Fire**

The current political climate is stifling coal companies in China, as [Hilton '19 of Yale University](#) writes that with the closing down of coal plants, environmental regulations, and the boom of green technologies, coal is on a downward spiral.

This allows for the renewable energy sector to grow, setting them on track to be the financially preferable option in the near future. [Dudley '19 of Forbes](#) notes that renewable energy is projected to become consistently cheaper than fossil fuels by 2020.

However, revitalizing the BRI creates opportunities for coal companies to export their plants elsewhere. [Tabuchi '17 of the New York Times](#) reports that a strong infrastructure demand in developing countries and a sharp fall in coal financing by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank had opened up the field for Chinese involvement.

These companies are noticeably on their last gasp, as [Hilton](#), furthers that these enterprises saw their best hopes of survival overseas, where they are involved in over 240 coal projects in 25 BRI countries, and [La Shier '18 of the Environmental and Energy Study Institute](#) finds that Chinese companies cheaply sell their low-efficiency coal technology abroad.

More Chinese funding would be even more damaging as [Yu of The Diplomat 19'](#) finds that, thanks to concerns, 100 financial institutions around the world have introduced policies restricting coal funding.

Sharing such unsustainable technologies could foster dependence on fossil fuels among a developing and increasingly energy-hungry world.

[Zadek '19 of the Brookings Institute](#) finds that carbon emissions are usually *locked in* at the contractual stage of an investment. Infrastructure development planning involves long lead times that predetermine technology choices, which in turn shape institutions, behavioral norms, and outcomes. That's why **Zadek** concludes that BRI projects could be the single largest source of growing carbon emissions over the next two decades.

There are two impacts.

### **First, global hunger**

In a 70 study meta-analysis, [Aton '17 of The Scientific American](#) quantifies that each degree Celsius of warming will decrease world food yields by "7.4 percent."

[Berrens of the GCG in 2018](#) concludes that any global temperature increase past the two degrees will force billions into starvation.

[The Institute of Ecolonomics 14'](#) furthers that hunger is the number one cause of death in the world.

### **Second, poverty**

[Davey of the Foundation of Life Institute 16'](#) explains that climate change acts as a threat multiplier, increasing the likelihood of existential threats. Increased carbon emissions have contributed to warmer temperatures, triggering extensive droughts, malnutrition, and significant increases in poverty.

[The World Bank 16'](#) finds that, in a pessimistic development scenario, climate change could drag more than 100 million people into poverty by 2030. This number can be reduced to fewer than 20 million, if climate-informed development occurs. The impacts of climate change on poverty by 2030 mostly depend on development choices.

### **Contention 2 is US retaliation**

[Weise\[i\] 19](#) writes that Trump's trade war with China's demonstrates that it is not economic but political consequences that decide the probability of tariffs. As such, [Amaro\[iii\] 19](#) writes that an EU-US trade war won't happen now because it's vastly unpopular with the US base, since Europe is viewed as an ally, whereas China is seen as a dangerous foe.

However, affirming would change this entirely

[Cavanna\[iiii\] 17](#) explains that the BRI represents China's rise, as it threatens US hegemony and European countries are increasingly attracted to the initiative. Specifically, [Barkin\[iv\] 19](#) explains that with diverging views on the majority of global issues, the EU's hardline stance against China is the last thing holding the EU-US alliance together. As such, European involvement in the BRI would trigger an overreaction from Trump and US officials because by aligning with China, the EU sides against the US

and as a result, [Trigkas\[v\] 18](#) writes that if an EU-Chinese infrastructure investment deal went through, it would push a trigger-happy Trump to place auto tariffs and launch an all-out trade war on the EU.

### **The impact is Global Recession**

[Bown\[vi\] 19](#) writes that the EU would retaliate with their own auto tariffs, as they have with aluminum before. Overall, [Market Insider\[vii\] 19](#) finds that such a tit for tat trade war would risk the coming of a global recession. [The Huffington Post cites The IMF\[viii\]](#) who concludes that the next economic shock would push 900 million people into poverty.

## C2 Cards

---

[i] Zia Weise, 9-29-2019, "Europe braces for Trump trade war," POLITICO,  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-braces-for-trump-trade-war/>

"Putting tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts would have a very negative impact on the U.S. economy, which is why the U.S. auto sector is united in opposition," said Marjorie Chorlins, vice president of European affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. "The auto manufacturers don't want it. The auto partmakers don't want. And consumers certainly don't want to pay more for cars," she said, adding: "**Senior officials would certainly gauge this economic harm as well as the potential political consequences before delivering this kind of blow to the economy in November**, just weeks before the presidential primaries get underway." Republican Senate finance committee chair Chuck Grassley has expressed "serious questions about the legitimacy" of the possible car tariffs and introduced legislation that could curb the president's power to unilaterally impose them. Jürgen Matthes from the German Economy Institute said, however, that **Trump's trade war with China demonstrated that "when in doubt, Trump goes the way of confrontation." "Economic calculation is not very present," he added. "This thus increases the probability of car tariffs."**

**[ii] Amaro '19// EU US trade war won't happen now because it's unpopular- the reason it's unpopular is because Europe is viewed as an ally**

Silvia Amaro, 04-16-2019, "A trade war between the US and Europe is unlikely to happen. Here's why," CNBC,  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/16/analysts-say-why-a-us-eu-trade-war-is-unlikely-to-happen.html>

Trump has challenged China over trade since taking power as well, imposing increasing rounds of tariffs on the country. At the moment, however, media reports and comments from the U.S. and Chinese administrations suggest they could be close to a trade agreement. According to Schmieding, a deal between Beijing and Washington would make an agreement with Brussels even more likely. "**After all, the EU is no geostrategic rival of the U.S.**," he said. Both **analysts are also confident that the U.S. and Europe will avoid a trade war because political support in the United States for a trade war with the EU is much weaker than backing for a tough stance on China.**

**[iii] Cavanna '17// the BRI poses a challenge to US hegemony**

Thomas P. Cavanna, The Diplomat, 4-28-2017, "What Does China's Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?," Diplomat,  
<https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/>, accessed 9-11-2019

The United States' response to a rising China has largely focused on bolstering military capabilities, doctrines, and partnerships in the [Asia-Pacific](#) (or, more recently, the [Indo-Pacific](#)). This approach

misconstrues the problem: it overstates the security threat and understates (or ignores) the economic challenge. To maintain its dominant position globally in the long-term, the United States must reckon with the ambitious geoeconomic endeavor Beijing has launched to project strategic influence across the Eurasian continent, which hosts most of the world's economic centers and natural resources. **The nascent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) illustrates the transformative geopolitical implications of China's rise.** Despite its changing contours and the fact that it partly recycles preexisting plans, this series of major infrastructure and development projects designed to connect Eurasian regions together is a coherent enterprise of unprecedented scale: \$4 trillion of promised investments in 65 countries representing 70 percent of the world's population, 55 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy reserves. The BRI aims to stabilize China's western peripheries, rekindle its economy, propel non-Western international economic institutions, gain influence in other countries, and diversify trade suppliers/routes while circumventing the U.S. pivot to Asia. Of course, the BRI's prospects of success are subject to many unknowns, including the possibility of foreign resistance, China's domestic economic travails, political turbulence, aging population, and environmental problems. On the other hand, the U.S. still possesses enormous assets to maintain its predominance, including military primacy, multiple alliances, powerful Western-led international organizations, and an unmatched soft power. Yet **over time the BRI could threaten the very foundations of Washington's post-WWII hegemony.** A similar phenomenon is visible in Europe. For all of the United States' efforts NATO's post-Cold War expansion to former countries of the Soviet bloc and the launching of the global war on terror did not substitute for the foundational Soviet security threat that once undergirded the transatlantic alliance. The European states' reluctance to increase military budgets and to participate in misguided U.S.-led interventions caused tensions, especially following the invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile China made important strides. Its regional trade and investments skyrocketed. Beijing acquired strategic assets to amass local advanced technologies and know-how, using Europe's economic distress in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the EU's political divisions and lack of an investment vetting process, and the mesmerizing appeal of China's national market. Chinese leaders use their growing geoeconomic leverage to discipline their new partners and cultivate local proxies. The United States has tried to counter these efforts, as illustrated by the unsuccessful negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and continuous attempts to harness European militaries and defense industries to U.S. strategic goals. Yet Beijing's rise has started to corrode the depth and scope of transatlantic relations. **Despite frustrations with its economic practices, European countries have been willing to develop bilateral ties further and further.** Moreover, they have only very timidly endorsed the U.S. position that China's growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific poses a major threat to the international order. Trump's rejection of the Iran nuclear deal, economic multilateralism, and the Paris climate agreement make things worse, but the problems are deeper.

[iv] Barkin '19// hardline EU stance is holding together US-EU alliance, and US hegemony competition with China hinges on "what happens in Europe"

Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle With China," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/>, accessed 9-11-2019

At the meeting in **Washington, D.C.**, they **pressed their allies to sign on to a joint statement condemning the Chinese plan. But it soon became clear that neither the Europeans nor a small group of other countries from Asia and Latin America were ready to fall in line.** "No one was willing to go along with it," one European diplomat familiar with the details of the meeting, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, told me. "We may agree that China is a strategic threat, but you can't just put them in a corner." For the Europeans, the meeting at the State Department was another sign of what they see as the White House's misguided zero-sum approach to dealing with China, and its mistaken belief that it can employ an à la carte approach with its partners, denouncing them publicly on some issues while expecting cooperation on others. For the Americans, **the talks were the latest sign of Europe's reluctance to stand up to China. "Europe," one person close to the Trump administration who declined to be named told me, "is almost on a different planet." After two years of escalating tensions between the United States and Europe over issues ranging from trade and Iran to defense spending** and Russian gas pipelines, **China should be the issue that unites the[m] two sides**, or at least eases some of the transatlantic strain. **The European Union**—with Germany and France leading the way—**has adopted a much tougher stance on China over the past year, introducing new rules allowing for closer scrutiny of Chinese investments in European countries**, exploring changes to the EU's industrial, competition, and procurement policies to ensure Beijing is not unfairly advantaged, and, after years of avoiding clashes with Beijing, declaring China a "strategic rival." This shift mirrors the harder line adopted by Washington under President Donald **Trump, who has dialed up his two-year confrontation with Beijing** several notches over the past month **by raising tariffs on Chinese goods and putting the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei** and scores of its affiliates **on an export blacklist that could severely restrict their access to vital U.S. technology.** But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—many of whom requested anonymity to talk about **[on] diplomatic [cy] and intelligence** issues—suggest that **instead of coming together, Europe and the U.S. might be in the early stages of a damaging divergence on the China challenge. Trump's latest moves, which raise the specter of a prolonged economic Cold War between Washington and Beijing, are likely to deepen the divide, taking the U.S. down a path that is unpalatable for even the hardest of European hard-liners. "If you listen to the people in the Trump administration, who view China as an existential threat, they are not in a place most Europeans can get to,"** says Evan Feigenbaum, who held senior Asia-focused roles in the State Department during George W. Bush's presidency and is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. **The dissonance raises the prospect of a Western split on what both sides agree is likely to be the biggest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century—responding to the rise of an authoritarian China.** A series of meetings in recent months, and the disparate ways in which they were interpreted by either side, illustrate the widening chasm. The European diplomat who discussed the April meeting likened Washington's uncompromising stance on Belt and Road to its position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a few years prior. Back then, the United States, under President Barack Obama, failed to convince allies to join a boycott of the new China-led development bank, leaving the Americans embarrassed and isolated. U.S. officials, by contrast, point to talks months before the meeting in Foggy Bottom, when Washington was pushing for a joint declaration denouncing human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, the western Chinese region where more than a million members of the Muslim minority have been detained in reeducation camps. That effort was also abandoned after what U.S. officials described as an exasperating back-and-forth with the European Union and individual member states. **Among the American officials I spoke with, there was an air of what felt like panic—over what they saw as the global spread of Chinese influence through Xi's Belt and Road initiative** the lack of an American alternative to Huawei, and the persistent failure of the World Trade Organization to tackle China's unfair trade practices. One senior administration official **likened discussions of China policy to the period after the 9/11 attacks. Inevitably, this person said, there will be an "overreaction" from Washington, with "collateral damage" for other countries, before U.S. policy settles down.** In Brussels, senior officials are comparing the Trump administration's China policy to Brexit. Both, they say, are based on the deluded notion that a fading great power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. The **irony is that senior U.S. administration officials acknowledge in private that American success in its competition with China might ultimately hinge on what happens in Europe.** Yet many **U.S. officials have no patience, at least in the highest ranks of the Trump administration, when it comes to working with European allies.** Nor do they have much appreciation for the steps Europe has taken over the past year to push back against China. Several U.S. officials described the EU's recent measures as baby steps that fall far short of what is needed. "The Americans are out to beat, contain, confront China," a senior EU official who asked not to be identified told me. "They have a much more belligerent attitude. We believe they will waste a lot of energy and not be

successful." This does not mean that transatlantic channels of communication on China have broken down. A group of hawkish pragmatists including Matt Pottinger, who oversees Asia policy at the National Security Council, and Randall Schriver, a senior Pentagon official, have been trying to reach out to Europe for months, U.S. and European officials confirm. Last year, discussions focused on measures to protect against Chinese acquisitions. More recently, they have shifted to talks on next-generation 5G mobile networks, as well as joint responses to Belt and Road, an issue about which Washington and Brussels agreed last month to hold quarterly coordination meetings, according to EU officials. And last month, an American delegation traveled to Berlin for talks with German officials on China as part of a biannual get-together that began under the Obama administration and has continued, without a hitch, under Trump. Other changes are under way too: Last year, according to U.S. and European officials, the State Department appointed China point people in many of their European embassies, with **officials estimating that roughly 150 U.S. diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic now spend at least part of their time focusing on China in Europe**, at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Washington in late March, China was on the agenda for the first time; and Belt and Road could be a discussion point when France hosts a G7 summit in Biarritz in August, European officials have suggested.

**[v] Trigkas '18// if China-EU make a bilateral investment deal the US will launch a trade war against the EU**

Vasilis Trigkas, July 6, 2018, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post,  
<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance>, accessed 9-11-2019

In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese on trade but caution is always a wise counsellor. **According to reports from the meeting of the vice-president of the European Commission, Jyrki Katainen, and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He in June, the two sides are ready to present their detailed market access conditions by mid-July and reboot the dormant discussions on a bilateral investment treaty. If negotiations accelerate and China and the EU reach a final accord** by the end of the year or early 2019, this would complicate US efforts to rebalance its economic relations with China. **It could push trigger-happy Trump to unleash tariffs against European exporters at a moment when the EU has just found its economic pace. Any benefits from a bilateral investment treaty with China may be undone by a full-scale transatlantic trade war and an utterly divided West.**

**[vi] Bown '19// auto tariffs from the US would definitively cause a European retaliation**

More From, 6-26-2019, "Transatlantic Policy Impacts of the US-EU Trade Conflict," PIIE,  
<https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/transatlantic-policy-impacts-us-eu-trade-conflict>

Three reasons demonstrate why **imposing trade restrictions on European automobiles and parts would disrupt the American economy**. First, American consumers would be hit by price hikes. Fiats, Volkswagens, and Volvos, among other brands, would become more expensive. The reduced competition would inevitably raise prices of all cars, regardless of the make and model. Second, the American manufacturing base would lose access to imported auto parts it needs to produce cars for both domestic consumption and export. Imported parts are vital for American-based auto plants to keep costs low for high-quality cars made in states like Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina. The facilities in these and other states make some of America's most successful exports. Restricting trade in parts

would hurt these factories and their workers. Third, **Europe will retaliate. The European Union has announced it would impose counter tariffs on US exports—a credible threat because it did so last year when President Trump imposed tariffs on their exports of steel and aluminum, also under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.**

[vii] Heeb, Gina. "Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says." Markets Insider. 2/21/19

<https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273>

While that could benefit some American automakers and reduce bilateral trade deficits, it would also risk adding thousands of dollars to the price of vehicles, and raises the threat of retaliatory duties that could worsen global trade tensions. "In a worst case scenario, **fullblown titfortat auto tariffs could trigger a global recession,**" analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in a research note out this week, adding they would expect growth in the world economy to fall nearly a percentage point to 1.2%. **By increasing the price of vehicles and imported materials, they could threaten jobs, consumer spending, and investment.** The analysts estimated that they would add \$2,000 to \$7,000 to price tags of both imported and American-made vehicles, posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year.

[viii] Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">[https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock\\_n\\_3022420](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420)</span>

Hundreds of millions of people worldwide are on the brink of poverty. **A recent study by the International Monetary Fund warns that as many as 900 million people could fall back into poverty in the event of an economic shock like the Great Recession.** That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population. According to the World Bank, 1.2 billion people are currently living on less than \$1.25 a day. While the report acknowledges that progress has been made to reduce global poverty and strengthen the world economy following the financial crisis, the world is still in a vulnerable situation. Global unemployment, for example, is the highest it's been in two decades with 40 percent of the world's population out of work, according to the report. And things could get much worse in the event of a macroeconomic shock, of which the Europe and U.S. are dangerously close. The recent bailout of Cyprus threw the eurozone into chaos, igniting fears that the situation could lead to the next financial crisis. Here in the U.S., a series of automatic spending cuts know as the sequester could cost the economy hundreds of thousands of jobs. The cuts have already threatened the stability of safety nets designed to aid the nation's poorest..

**Scissors '18** of the AEI finds that China funds over 95% of the BRI.

### **First, Promoting Carbon Captialism Abroad**

In a 70 study meta-analysis, **Aton '17 of The Scientific American** quantifies that each degree Celsius of warming will decrease world food yields by "7.4 percent."

**Berrens of the GCG in 2018** concludes that any global temperature increase past the two degrees will force billions into starvation.

**The Institute of Ecolonomics 14'** furthers that, hunger is the number one cause of death in the world.