

We negate.

Our first contention is Interventions.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the UN has systematically used its peacekeeping force to engage in conflict zones around the world. **Khan of the Naval Postgraduate School in 2015** writes that the UNSC plays a critical role here, using resolutions to demand ceasefires, mediation, and deployment of peacekeeping operations.

However, placing India on the security council precludes valuable UN interventions.

Makhija of the University of Leeds '18 explains that India fundamentally opposes the Right to Protect, or R2P, doctrine. The doctrine, according to the **UN**, allows an international body like the UN to enter a country without the express consent of the nation's government.

Importantly, **Avila from ICISS '01** analyzes that preservation of the R2P doctrine is crucial in allowing the UN to maintain peace, especially in regions where state governments have broken down. More importantly, the UNSC would be the sole body with sufficient capabilities to carry out a R2P intervention.

The impact is unchecked genocide.

Beauchamp of Vox News '14 reports that had R2P been in place during the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of lives could have been saved.

This is key as **Fortna of Columbia University in 2004** analyzes all peacekeeping operations since 1990 and finds that peacekeeping interventions lower the risk of future war in a conflict zone by 84%, especially in the long term.

Our second contention is the Indo-Pak Conflict.

Currently, [Perrigo of Time Magazine '19](#) reports that tensions between the two countries are at an all-time high. As a result, [Hundley of Vox '18](#) reports that both countries have begun to rapidly militarize, making a devastating war more likely.

Giving India a spot on the Security Council would inflame these tensions further. Indian veto power would guarantee that the United Nations would be unable to take action in a future Indo-Pak conflict, as India could veto or lobby against any interests. This would strip the UN of its current ability to deploy peacekeepers, negotiate ceasefires, or enable troop withdrawal.

This has two implications.

First, an Indian first strike.

Permanent UNSC membership gives India a blank check to participate in escalatory methods like ground skirmishes to defend and gain territory.

Rather, Tellis of RAND '19 explains that the main deterrent against Indian expansion into Kashmir is their inability to secure international leverage against Chinese influence.

However, she continues that India on the UNSC would render Beijing's efforts futile by elevating Indian interests and providing India with veto power, closing the diplomatic gap.

All of this leads her to conclude that, once on the UNSC, the Indian government would finally have the opportunity to engage in a full-fledged local battle in Kashmir, described as "unpredictable expansion." [1]

Second, a Pakistani use-it-or-lose-it response.

Even if India does not launch a preemptive strike, the act of becoming a permanent member is sufficient to trigger a Pakistani attack. As Tellis writes, Pakistan has based its military strategy on the assumption that in the event of an Indian conventional attack, the United Nations would intervene within a few days or weeks. [2]

Problematically, without confidence in a global response, Pakistan will be forced to militarize and lash out to project power in the region. Tellis furthers that the main driver of the 1999 Kargil War was Pakistan's loss of faith in the international community, pushing Pakistan to attack precisely because it perceived that it had no other choices exploding tensions on both sides. [3]

An increase in tensions between India and Pakistan has 3 impacts.

First is Conventional Warfare

Khan 15 notes that India's entry onto the Council would upset Pakistan's concerns and create a power imbalance, increasing the proliferation of regional conflicts.

Mizokami 19 explains that even if there's no nuclear war, tensions could endanger millions, as a crisis between the 2 could spiral into a full-scale conventional war.

Second is Social Spending Tradeoff

The Economic Times 18 writes that regional tensions have prompted increases in military spending.

Critically, Vadlamannati of UMich writes that military spending drains money from social programs, concluding that a 1% increase in military spending increases income inequality by 2%.

O'Grady 18 of The Independent finds that India's programs in the newest budget will lift hundreds of millions out of poverty. Diverting money away from these programs puts these people at risk.

Third is Terrorism

Farmer 19 of the Telegraph writes that Pakistan has begun their largest crackdown on terrorism in years.

However, regional tensions reverse this progress as Khan 18 of the CATO Institute finds that Pakistan's feelings of regional insecurity help drive its policy of militant sponsorship. Critically, The Economist 19 finds that 60,000 Pakistani citizens have died from militant attacks, a number that only rises if Pakistan increases funding.

Thus, we are so very proud to negate

An Indo-Pak war would be devastating. According to a report from [Oxford University in 2018](#), any ground war between India and Pakistan would threaten major population centers in addition to destroying key civilian infrastructure, with casualties numbering in the tens of millions.

Even if war never happens, [Tellis](#) furthers that increased tensions resulting from Indian accession would lead to rapid militarization, setting off a security dilemma which raises the risk of miscalculation on both sides.

Ultimately, [Iqbar of Dawn '18](#) finds that constant cycles of military escalation on both sides of the conflict have condemned millions of Indian and Pakistani citizens into poverty, by stripping billions of dollars from critical programs that promote food security, health, and education.

Negate.

Frontlines

F2: Regional Actors

1. Realize the UN is a trailblazer if they don't go in other organizations KNOW its too dangerous and usually won't intervene.
 - a. That's why they tend to work in large alliances with each other (NATO and EU)
 - b. That's why you see so many more UN peacekeeping missions compared to those of other actors.
2. **Avial of the ICISS in 2001** finds that the UN is the only organization UNSC would be the sole body with sufficient capabilities to carry out an intervention
3. Resource-starved organizations like the AU can't do enough good alone, need other multilateral organization to work with them.

F2: R2P requires sovereignty

1. R2P is specifically used on grounds of a humanitarian intervention, in which the UN finds specifically when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities'
2. The Global Center for R2P in 2018 finds that R2P can supersede sovereignty because countries, by signing onto the UN Charter, accede some form of sovereignty to R2P.

F2: India does follow R2P

1. Even if they say that India has national interest to follow R2P. The **OPR in 2013** finds that due to India is scared of R2P because of its threats to India's own sovereignty and autonomy, especially in Kashmir.
2. **Bommakanti of the ORF in 2017** India is ambiguous on R2P because of its lack of legitimacy and fears of seeming deviant from the international norm.
3. India has not recently used R2P, all the examples they can give you are from the 1980s or earlier. In fact **OPR in 2013** finds the last time India involked a similar doctrine to R2P was in 1987 in Timor.

F2: China doesn't follow R2P

1. **The United States Institute of Peace in 2016** finds that Initially opposed to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), China has become a consistent advocate of the principle, endorsing its application in multiple countries while urging a constrained, multilateral approach to the use of force.
2. The UN evidence in case is very clear that China has already approved over 65 R2P interventions since 2006.

F2: Russia Doesn't follow R2P

1. They're imperialist and have used R2P in the past to justify their own actions. Principle in 2008 finds that the Russian government used R2P to justify their interventions in Georgia.

F2: War won't happen

F2: Economic ties

1. PARTIAL – even if it's not all-out war, there's plenty of precedent for two nations to do things like escalate tensions and engage in an arms race. Look to Russia v. US as an example.

F2: China will stop Pakistan

1. Our second subpoint is about a forced reaction by Pakistan when they perceive the international community as ditching them. Remember that Pakistan would have no other choice.
2. There are also 3 reasons why China doesn't matter
 - a. China doesn't want to enter in a war against a nuclear power
 - b. **Rajagoplan of Carnegie India in 2018** finds that India has sufficient military capabilities to counter this threat—even when one accounts for China's assistance to Pakistan which means India would not consider china in impact calc.
 - c. China and Pakistan relationship is strained. Pakistan has demonstrated that it prioritizes its domestic issues over China's interest. Chaudhury '19 of the Economic Times

reports that Pakistan was recently caught diverting funds from China away from the Belt Road Initiative towards other projects. Chaudhury explains that Prime Minister Kahn is attempting to appease his own lawmakers.

F2: Exercise restraint in the past

1. They never showed restraint reason why $\frac{2}{3}$ last three wars, Pakistan was the aggressor.
2. Even if you buy they would “restrain” realize our case Pakistan only restrained b/c it knew the UN was coming to help. That changes in a pro world.

F2: If India doesn't strike, Pak won't strike

1. The threat of India attacking is enough to put Pakistan into a security dilemma, in which they either wait and be caught off-guard by an Indian strike, or strike first and guarantee the upper hand. Just the threat of an attack forces them to choose the latter.

F2: Diplomacy would occur

1. The status quo talks are not solving. Lammon '19 of the National Interest explains that no progress has been made between the two parties in addressing the ethno-religious and political frictions that keep bringing India and Pakistan to blows. This is important because no steps are being taken to address one of the key root causes of the conflict.

Cards

Global Center for R2P, 2018, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/FAQ.pdf>

No. **R2P does not detract from the overall attributes of state sovereignty at the core of UN**

Charter Article 2(7), but instead R2P adds an essential dimension to it: respect for human rights as specified in the obligation to avoid mass atrocities. In the period since the end of World War II, states have accepted many curbs on untrammelled action; the signing of the UN Charter, with its prohibition on state aggression save for purposes of self-defense, constituted one such limit on sovereign action.

Others include the many human rights compacts that states have signed to restrict their powers over their own citizens; and the establishment of tribunals like the International Criminal Court means that nationals can be tried in an international forum. The responsibility to protect falls squarely within this growing acceptance of doctrines that place the state at the service of the individual— “sovereignty as responsibility,” in the term coined by scholars and practitioners Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen. Indeed, R2P rests on a fundamental reformulation of sovereignty as a form of obligation rather than merely of power. And if sovereignty is understood as responsibility, then R2P, which requires the international community to help states at risk of mass atrocities, bolsters sovereignty by bolstering state capacity.

The goal of R2P is to make the kind of unilateral action which occurred in Kosovo unnecessary by ensuring that the United Nations itself will be able to effectively respond. **The objective is not to create alternatives to the Security Council but to make it work better.** By gaining consent to the principle of collective responsibility, and then by providing a set of responses leading up to the use of force, R2P may make the Security Council more willing to act.

UN, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>

The challenge was taken by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government, which at the end of 2001 issued a report entitled [The Responsibility to Protect](#). The concept of the responsibility to protect drew inspiration of Francis Deng's idea of "State sovereignty as a responsibility" and affirmed the notion that sovereignty is not just protection from outside interference – rather is a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their population's welfare, and to assist each other. **Consequently, the primary responsibility for the protection of its people rested first and foremost with the State itself. However, a 'residual responsibility' also lied with the broader community of states, which was 'activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities'**

UNSC Key to resolving global conflicts

Khan, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

The role played by the UNSC has gone a long way in authorizing military missions to avoid hostilities, prevent recurrences of conflicts, and maintain peace and security in the world. Since its formation in 1945, **the UNSC has played an active and meaningful role in helping to resolve disputes between states, managing conflicts, and ending fighting among states. The conflict resolution among states has been achieved through a wide range of policy tools such as UNSC resolutions demanding cease-fires, negotiated settlements through mediation, diplomatic contacts, and deployment of peacekeeping forces and observer missions.** Since its formation, the UNSC has authorized more than sixty missions.⁶⁶

UNSC Responsibility to maintain peace

Khan, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

The UNSC prevents illegitimate use of force against member states by another member state; however, the UNSC has the legitimate power to use force to prevent threats to peace and security in the world.⁵² The UNSC's membership, structured around permanent and nonpermanent members, affords a central role to the permanent members in the council's work, and therefore, **these permanent members are held responsible for the success or failure of the UNSC.**⁵³ **The nonpermanent members have a minimal role in the important debates pertaining to the use of force; therefore non-permanent members do not take responsibility for the council's failure in maintaining peace and security.**

Beauchamp, Vox News, 2014,

<https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/5590646/rwanda-genocide-anniversary>

In hindsight, there's a good chance the UN could have done something. General Dallaire believes that, with an extra 5,000 troops and **a stronger UN mandate, he could have saved "hundreds of thousands."** The failure to intervene, which Bill Clinton calls one of the greatest regrets of his

presidency, catalyzed the modern movement in favor of humanitarian military intervention to prevent genocide.

Heena Makhija, "India's stand on the Responsibility to Protect: The UN Security Council and the Libya crisis » Responsibility to Protect Student Journal", No Publication, xx-xx-xxxx, 4-26-2019, <http://r2pstudentjournal.leeds.ac.uk/issues/volume-3-issue-no-1/indias-stand-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-the-un-security-council-and-the-libya-crisis/>. AG

India approached the principle of R2P with suspicion and caution. Given the international climate that favoured a decisive policy to curtail domestic atrocities, India did not resist the first two pillars of R2P as they were in coherence with India's foreign policy. India favoured a 'soft' approach where policy-makers supported measures such as diplomatic missions and unarmed ceasefire monitoring missions (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 31). However, **India rendered strong opposition to the third pillar of R2P, describing it as an unnecessary interference in domestic concerns of a state and a tool of powerful nations to topple over existing regimes and threaten the state sovereignty.** Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations until 2009, openly voiced his criticism of the R2P principle in UN meetings and portrayed it as military humanism and re-emergence of humanitarian intervention in a new facet (Teitt, 2012, p. 200).

Avila, ICISS, Sep 2001,

<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/b15937bf-451e-45a6-9623-8fdbdc60ae17.pdf>

According to the arguments of the ICISS Report, there would be undeniable benefits in applying the R2P theory in the humanitarian intervention field, since the interests of the population would be protected without any loss of state sovereignty. This is because sovereignty would be exercised by the people in their own right, and not by the ruler who had it usurped. The consolidation of this theory would also prevent other States interests prevailing over the protection of the population, as the intervention would be legitimized by the action of human rights and humanitarian law defenders, which would facilitate its acceptance by international society (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001, p. 39). Regarding the theory scope, the ICISS Report stipulated the three types of responsibility for R2P: prevent, react and rebuild. Prevention is considered the most important one, because it would embrace the causes of conflict and the ability to anticipate and combat attacks. The second concerns the responsibility to react, applied in the case of failure of prevention, where it would be necessary to make an approximate intervention of the so called humanitarian intervention. Finally, the responsibility of rebuilding would be directed towards peace and development (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001, p. 12).

Another definition of R2P in the report is related to the use of military force, which would only be liable in two situations: if there is the possibility of many victims, both real or foreseeable, with or without genocidal intent, as a consequence of deliberate action by a State, caused by its negligence, incapacity to act, or its collapse; or in the case of ethnic cleansing which has a chance to occur on a large scale situation, real or expected to happen through killing, forced expulsion or act of terror or rape. **However, the UNSC would be the sole body responsible for the approval or veto of a possible military intervention because, according to the ICISS, it has sufficient powers to maintain and restore peace, besides ensuring international security.** (INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 2001, p. 12).

Billy Perrigo, 02-28-2019, "What to Know About Rising Tensions Between India and Pakistan," Time, <http://time.com/5538756/india-pakistan-kashmir-tensions-airstrikes/>

With tit-for-tat airstrikes across a cease-fire line in late February, tensions between India and Pakistan rose to their highest point in years.

The two nuclear-armed states have long clashed over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, which each claims as its own. But the situation deteriorated there after a Feb. 14 bombing by a Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, killed 40 Indian paramilitaries in the Pulwama district of Kashmir. It was the deadliest attack in the insurgency that has raged for 30 years in the contested Himalayan region that borders the two countries. Twelve days later, on Tuesday, India sent jets into Pakistani airspace for the first time since 1971, and bombed what it said was a training camp for Jaish-e-Mohammed for the Feb. 14 attack. (Pakistan denied any such sites were hit.) India and Pakistan last went to war over Kashmir back in 1999, and now, with Indian elections approaching in April and May, India's retaliation threatens to escalate tensions even further.

Unpredictable Expansion [1]

India forced to majorly scale back aggression because reliant on others for institutional support

Tellis, "", RAND, 4-12-2019, xx-xx-xxxx

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch3.pdf

M. P. Bhandara, a columnist for The Dawn, wrote one of the more thorough discussions of an **NSC** and its presumed role in assessing an operation like Kargil.¹⁴ In Bhandara's formulation, the Foreign Office would argue that Kargil **would enable India to "expose Pakistan as an aggressor and a fundamentalist state," allowing India to regain much of the diplomatic clout it forfeited with its nuclear tests.** Indeed, Kargil would be a boon to India, as **New Delhi would easily make use of the crisis to position itself as a front-line state against Islamist terrorism. The Finance Ministry would argue that Kargil would precipitate a cutoff by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the G-8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the opportunity to assess realistically a local battle in Kashmir, considering the possibility of an unpredictable expansion.** The main function of such a body would be to assess the costs and benefits of such adventurism in terms of its economic, political, military, international, and regional consequences. The author lucidly concludes: "The downside price paid by Pakistan at Kargil would have been rated [by the NSC] as simply too high in the context of any possible upside scenario."¹⁵

Tellis, "", RAND, 4-12-2019, xx-xx-xxxx [2]

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch3.pdf

Pakistan's strategic objectives in prosecuting the Kargil operation were explicated by retired army officers, political leadership, and analysts. One strategic objective **was the internationalization of the Kashmir issue.** By reminding the international community that Kashmir is a potential nuclear flashpoint, **Pakistan hoped to rouse the comity of nations—particularly the United States and China—to force a peace process in Kashmir.** A second strategic goal was the interdiction of the National Highway-1 to disrupt India's supply

lines to Siachen. (Some interlocutors suggested that this was to retaliate against India for its repeated shelling of the Neelum Valley road, a problem that has forced Pakistan to develop an alternate route to the region.) Some informants also conjectured that Pakistan assumed that India, with its weakened government, would not likely respond.¹⁰ Pakistan radically misread the political resolve of Vajpayee and the political pressure put on him to respond in light of the forthcoming elections and the popular outrage in India precipitated by the occupation in the post-Lahore environment. Several interlocutors speculated that **the government assumed that the international community would intervene within a few days or weeks (as had been the case in previous India-Pakistan conflicts) in the possible event that India perceived the operation as an act of war and reacted conventionally.** A third goal was to give a fillip to the diminished morale among the mujahideen in the valley and to demonstrate that Pakistan's recently confirmed nuclear capabilities did have strategic benefits in that they allowed Islamabad to undertake more-active military operations in support of the Kashmiri cause without inordinate fear of Indian reprisals.

Tellis, "", RAND, 4-12-2019, xx-xx-xxxx [3]

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch3.pdf

A retired general offered a different—but important—interpretation of what has often been understood as **Pakistan's seemingly astrategic prosecution of Kargil.** He argued that **Pakistan understood very well the risks but felt compelled to take a calculated gamble in an attempt to alter the status quo—precisely because it perceived that it had no other choices.**¹² By this logic, if Pakistan always acted according to the anticipated end game, it would never do anything to secure its interests, because all the strategic options available to Islamabad are invariably unattractive.¹³ This view has serious strategic consequences: it implies that **Pakistan may be in many ways like prewar Japan—a country that has few good choices but is nonetheless constrained to act in what may appear to be an inexplicable way because it finds itself in a position where the bad option is, from its perspective, the best of the poor alternatives available.** The implications nahof this logic for Pakistani decisionmaking in the nuclear age are entirely unsettling.

United States Institute of Peace, 6-8-2016, "China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy,"

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy>

Initially opposed to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), China has become a consistent advocate of the principle, endorsing its application in multiple countries while urging a constrained, multilateral approach to the use of force. This brief examines the trajectory and significance of China's support for R2P. Given the country's rising role in shaping the rules of global governance, continuing to gain its buy-in will be crucial in achieving the principle's mandate. China has traditionally held a hard conception of sovereignty and shown a reluctance to further the liberal order.⁴ Yet its position on the Responsibility to Protect has continued to evolve. Despite China's initial outright opposition to the principle, and predictions that it would at best adopt a cautious approach,⁵ China now firmly advocates building state capacities for the prevention of mass atrocities consistent with R2P pillars one and two. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China has endorsed the principle's application in multiple countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi (2006);

Darfur (2006); Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, and Yemen (2011); Mali (2012); Somalia (2013); and Syria (2014). However, it has also vetoed use of the principle, including in Myanmar, following its refusal of aid after Cyclone Nargis in 2007.

Principle, 08-31-2008, "Russia and the 'Responsibility to Protect'," Crisis Group,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/russianorth-caucasus/russia-and-responsibility-protect>

The Russian government has argued that its recent military operations in Georgia were justified by the principle of "responsibility to protect" (colloquially known as R2P). This is the approach to dealing with mass-atrocity crimes that was embraced by 150 member states at the 2005 U.N. World Summit.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin have described Georgia's initial actions against the local population in the breakaway republic of South Ossetia as "genocide." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that Russia's use of force in response was an exercise of the "responsibility to protect," which applied not only "in the U.N. system when people see some trouble in Africa" but also under the Russian Constitution when its own citizens were at risk.

Kartik Bommakanti, 12-18-2017, "India's evolving views on responsibility to protect (R2P) and humanitarian interventions: The significance of legitimacy," ORF, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-evolving-views-responsibility-protect-r2p-humanitarian-interventions-the-significance-of-legitimacy/>

Let us begin with institutional legitimacy, which implies that institutions are durable, bind actors to a set of rules that prescribe acceptable rules of conduct, roles, constrain activity and shape expectations. Compliance with an international norm can be a function of coercion, self-interest or legitimacy.

The scholarship on the first two mechanisms is thorough, yet in regards to legitimacy, the work done thus far is still under-researched, most particularly from an empirical standpoint. Legitimacy by definition, as Ian Hurd puts it, means "...the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institutions ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution and defined by the 'actor's perception of the institution' irrespective of interests and coercion (Hurd 2007a, p. 7) (Hurd 1999b, p 381). This perception moulds an actor's conduct. Formal global institutions include the United Nations, and its apex political decision-making body, the Security Council, is vested with the authorising power for the use and non-use of military force in response to humanitarian emergencies. Power and legitimacy need not be binary, but can complement each other. Legitimacy is often confused with legality and sometimes exclusively morality. Even legality and morality taken together might not sufficiently define legitimacy (Claude Jr. 1966, p. 369). Instead, legitimacy must include a "political dimension" in that "...the process of legitimisation is ultimately a political phenomenon, a crystallisation of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles" (Claude Jr. 1966, pp. 369-370). The "function of legitimisation," as Claude Jr. observed, "...in the international realm is...conferred upon international political institutions" and this institutional function will be performed most prominently through the political role of the United Nations. **This is simply because political leaders are as much concerned about the approval of other states as they are about foreign policy choices that they make independently of external influence** (Claude Jr. 1966 p. 375).

Most of the Indian debates, particularly non-official on R2P, centre on the motives of the intervening state or states as opposed to the outcome of the intervention, and this is most evident in its application against Libya. At an official level, there is greater attention paid to both the means and ends of HIs. It reveals the ambivalence of India's attitude to R2P. On the one hand, it extended reluctant support to R2P due to the massive support. **Legitimacy has always been a constant and core test for India in HIs. India's emphasis has often been on consensus, and deliberation, and not the alacrity with which the proponents push for the application of R2P.**

OpenGlobalRights, 10-21-2013, "R2P,"

<https://www.openglobalrights.org/r2p-perspectives-from-india/>

India's own record of interventions shows why the Indian Government is hesitant about R2P. India used a concept similar to R2P in the past, before the current R2P doctrine was accepted by the UN in 2005. For example, India intervened to assist in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, justifying it in the name of stopping genocide. India also intervened in Sri Lanka with the Jaffna Food Drop. **In the first week of June 1987, Tamil militants were cornered in Jaffna and Sri Lanka's Jayawardane government stopped essential supplies from reaching ordinary citizens. India sent unarmed bombers to airdrop relief supplies to starving civilians in the north.**

Against this background, another aspect of the Indian state's ambiguity as regards R2P arises from its perception of its own vulnerability, and its place in the international order. **The fear of R2P being used to justify interventionism by the western states is based also in future, even if hypothetical, threats to India's own sovereignty and autonomy (think Kashmir.) In this sense then, the national interest guides both India's use and support of the R2P rationale in situations where its own vital interests are involved, and its opposition to the present-day use of R2P at the global level.** The fundamental flaw in the R2P doctrine lies in the assumption that those who invoke it to justify the use of force will do so in the wider interest of humanity and not be driven by their particular political considerations.

Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India's Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia", Carnegie India, 4-11-2019, 9-14-2017

<https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asi-a-pub-73108>

Even if it constitutes a more immediate threat, Pakistan is far weaker than India by most measures, save nuclear weapons. Its gross domestic product (GDP), for example, is approximately 13 percent of India's.⁵ Pakistan's inclination to resort to nuclear threats and asymmetric warfare is a reflection of weakness, not strength. **India has sufficient military capabilities to counter this threat—even when one accounts for China's assistance to Pakistan—and Delhi would require little help from others to do so.**⁶ India's army is roughly twice as large as Pakistan's, while India's navy has almost three times as many major warships and its air force has nearly twice as many combat aircraft.⁷ India also has greater influence and support in the diplomatic arena. In short, India's inability to deal with Pakistan up until now speaks to the failure of Indian strategy, not to inadequate material capacities. By comparison, **China is a far greater strategic challenge because of the large power imbalance between it and India, which will likely continue to widen. The strategic choices that India faces with regard to China are thus far more consequential.**

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, 4-1-2019, "Pakistan diverts CPEC corridor funds; China ties under pressure," Economic Times,

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-diverts-bri-funds-china-ties-under-pressure/articleshow/68663216.cms>

New Delhi: A controversy has erupted over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) ahead of the second Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit in Beijing following allegations that the Pakistani government has diverted Rs 2,400 crore (around \$171.6 million) meant for joint infrastructure development projects with China under BRI to other projects. China had given the money as part of the \$62-billion infrastructure funding to build the CPEC. However, Pakistan's planning and development ministry issued an order diverting Rs 2,400 crore to projects to be

identified by local legislators under the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals programme, according to sources. **The move could be part**

of Prime Minister Imran Khan's party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's efforts to appease lawmakers by allowing them to make decisions on development projects.

<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/FAQ.pdf>

No. **R2P does not detract from the overall attributes of state sovereignty at the core of UN Charter Article 2(7), but instead R2P adds an essential dimension to it: respect for human rights as specified in the obligation to avoid mass atrocities. In the period since the end of World War II, states have accepted many curbs on untrammelled action; the signing of the UN Charter, with its prohibition on state aggression save for purposes of self-defense, constituted one such limit on sovereign action.**

Others include the many human rights compacts that states have signed to restrict their powers over their own citizens; and the establishment of tribunals like the International Criminal Court means that nationals can be tried in an international forum. The responsibility to protect falls squarely within this growing acceptance of doctrines that place the state at the service of the individual—“sovereignty as responsibility,” in the term coined by scholars and practitioners Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen. Indeed, R2P rests on a fundamental reformulation of sovereignty as a form of obligation rather than merely of power. And if sovereignty is understood as responsibility, then R2P, which requires the international community to help states at risk of mass atrocities, bolsters sovereignty by bolstering state capacity.

The goal of R2P is to make the kind of unilateral action which occurred in Kosovo unnecessary by ensuring that the United Nations itself will be able to effectively respond. **The objective is not to create alternatives to the Security Council but to make it work better.** By gaining consent to the principle of collective responsibility, and then by providing a set of responses leading up to the use of force, R2P may make the Security Council more willing to act.