# MEPI AC

## WE AFFIRM

#### Merriam Webster defines significant as “having an effect”

#### Should is defined as indicating a “desirable state”

International Conflict- Increasingly, however, it also applies to inter-group conflicts within one country when one group is fighting for independence or increased social, political, or economic power (e.g., Sudan/South Sudan, Iraq (now that the US has largely left), and Syria.

# Inherency 3:10

#### The Obama administration is cutting funding for democracy, destroying any chance at creating lasting change in the region. The US is needed now.

#### Hamid & Mandaville 14

SHADI HAMID AND PETER MANDAVILLE “The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy—and That's a Mistake” Jan 7 2014 The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/the-us-is-giving-up-on-middle-east-democracy-and-thats-a-mistake/282890/

With the rise of al-Qaeda, increasingly repressive regimes, and weak, even collapsing states, the Arab Spring is looking more and more like a nightmare for U.S. security interests. Perhaps, then, it makes some sense that the Obama administration would increase security assistance to the Middle East, from 69 percent of the total budget request for 2014 to 80 percent. However, this also entails a significant reduction in [funding for] democracy assistance to the region, which will drop [by almost 40%] from $459.2 million to $298.3 million. Congress might further deepen these cuts. But to look at this as a security problem risks conflating cause and effect. Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration. That the U.S. is fundamentally limited in its ability to influence the internal politics of Arab states has been a consistent theme within the Obama administration as well as among analysts. No one denies that there are limits to what the U.S. can (or can’t) do; the question, however, is what those limits are. A growing academic literature points to the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions. During the “third wave” of democratization, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way write, “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.” Western democratization pressure will be less effective in the Middle East because of the more existential nature of ideological divides, but it is still important. In a new article in The Washington Quarterly, we argue that the various attempted revolutions of 2011 and 2012 demonstrate the important, even decisive, role of Western nations as well as regional actors, many of whom themselves are dependent on Western security provisions and other support. Ironically, three years after the uprisings began, the Obama administration has ended up embracing a narrow, security-focused approach to the Arab Spring, something that Obama often criticized his predecessors for doing. To be sure, many of the region’s continuing security problems, particularly in Iraq, are a result of the Bush administration’s disastrous policies. However, it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy. Those claims are no less relevant today. In the failure of peaceful politics and democracy, best exemplified by the military coup in Egypt and the ongoing civil war in Syria, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups have been given a gift. Their narrative—that violence is the only option that works—is stronger than ever. Facing this mounting challenge, Obama has now further de-prioritized democracy assistance. Outside of its commendable efforts to strike a deal with Iran and put forward a framework agreement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund—has yet to see the light of day and likely never will due to the convoluted way it was presented to Congress. We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.

#### Specifically, from 2014 to 2015, funding for MEPI declined by more than 45%.

#### Democratization is necessary for the region, the status quo is full of genocide, war, instability and poverty. It’s try or die for the aff.

#### Pollack & Byman 03

Daniel L. Byman is the Research Director of RAND'S Center for Middle East Public Policy. Kenneth M. Pollack is a Senior Research Professor at the National Defense University. “DEMOCRACY AS REALISM” Middle eastern democracy Is the middle east ill-suited to democracy? Can America impose it? Or are home-grown models already showing signs of life? Published in April 2003 issue of Prospect Magazine

What are the alternatives to democracy? The status quo is a disaster. The region is economically and politically stagnant, with endemic poverty and little expectation of progress**. These** problems have led to mass emigration, [extremism] and terrorism, and conjure the spectre of revolution and civil war to come. What else is there? Communism? Nasserism? The Chinese model? The only real alternatives are greater democracy or greater Islamic fundamentalism. And what about Iraq itself? It is hardly ideal soil for democracy, but it is not as infertile as other places where democracy has taken root. Its people are literate, and the country's potential wealth is considerable. Those who support regime change but oppose building democracy in Iraq have offered two alternatives: an oligarchy that incorporates Iraq's leading communities, or a new, gentler **dictatorship. But** they are wrong in assuming that either **approach** could [cannot] offer a stable and desirable alternative to the long process of building democracy from the bottom up. One of the most common approaches being suggested for a post-Saddam Iraqi government would be one similar to the new Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Such a "consociational oligarchy" would bring together leading figures from all of Iraq's major ethnic, religious, tribal, geographic and functional groupings in a form of national unity government. Such a regime might not be pluralist but it would at least represent key elements of Iraqi society, and the various members could be expected to protect the basic interests of their co-religionists and ethnic kin. Such a government would, in reality, represent few Iraqis, creating the potential for instability down the road. Kurdish leaders could represent their population, but they would be the exception. The few Shi'ite clergy who have survived Saddam's purges could represent the Shi'ites who favour an Islamist form of government, but they reportedly constitute less than 15 per cent of the Shi'ite population. Shi'ite sheikhs could represent their small tribal constituencies, just as Sunni sheikhs could represent their followers. However, tribal Iraqis now probably make up less than 25 per cent of the population. On the other hand, 75 per cent of the population is urban, and even those city dwellers who retain links to their tribes reportedly do not want to be represented by unsophisticated rural sheikhs. So who would represent the mostly secular urban lower and middle classes that constitute the bulk of Iraq's population? Not the former magistrates of Iraq's cities, who are all Saddam appointees. In short, without a democratic process that allowed for the emergence of new leaders, there would be no way to give voice to the vast majority of Iraqis. Such an oligarchy would also be difficult to establish for the simple reason that Iraq today lacks potential oligarchs. Saddam has eliminated all the strong local leaders who posed any threat to him. Those that remain-in the armed forces, the Sunni tribes, some of the Shi'ite militias and religious figures-are political pygmies, lacking anything like the independent power needed to dominate the country. The armed forces retain the power to rule the country but a US invasion will decimate their ranks. This approach thus risks chaos, as local leaders would be strong enough to resist the weak central government (as in Afghanistan) but not strong enough to hold the country together. A form of warlordism would emerge which would include the "cleansing" of other tribal, ethnic, and religious groups as the warlords attempted to consolidate control of their territory. What about simply **installing** a new dictator**? Many scholars of the region contend this is the only realistic option. But this "hard-headed" approach has little to recommend it either. The problem is that the power brokers who will be left standing after Saddam's fall** will be too weak **to take or hold power themselves.** Each faction would **probably** reach out to foreign governments **such as Iran or Syria** for assistance **in defending** themselves and gaining control. The most likely outcome would be a "revolving door dictatorship" in which one weak autocrat is overthrown by the next but who is then himself too weak to hang on. The only way it seems probable that another dictator could hold on to power would be to become a new Saddam-replicating his predecessor's bloodthirsty tyranny and even pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Saddling another important middle eastern state with all of the same problems as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the rest is not an outcome the US should be striving for. Such an Iraq might also become a breeding ground for anti-US Islamic radicals. Democracy is not only right, it is realistic.

# Plan Text 2:40

**Plan Text: The United States Federal Government should significantly increase military spending to promote democracy in the Middle East via the Middle East Partnership Initiative, called MEPI from now on.**

**MEPI is funded by the State Department, which is part of the military budget and defense spending according to Kimberly Amadeo in 2016.**

#### Jeremy Sharp 06 clarifies

The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview Jeremy M. Sharp Middle East Policy Analyst Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

MEPI is a “partnership” with the Arab world and not an attempt to impose a set of values on the region. According to some outside observers, MEPI is an attempt to find a middle ground, where the United States can encourage reforms without challenging the legitimacy of the host Arab government.4 “Arab Human Development Report 2002 ,” The United Nations Development Program, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, 2002. enhance prospects for their children’s future.”2 P.L. 108-458, the FY2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, authorized MEPI (see section 7115) for the first time since its creation in FY2002. MEPI’s objectives are divided into four overarching categories: political reform, economic reform, educational reform, and women’s empowerment. In order to meet these goals, MEPI officials, in conjunction with Arab governments, invest funds in programs geared toward strengthening Arab civil society**,** encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting women’s rights.

**MEPI uses elements of soft power to promote Democracy. It is a way to encourage democracy without directly imposing American values, which means I link out of most imperialism and intervention arguments. This unique approach is key.**

# Solvency 1:55

**The MEPI is unique in that it takes into account cultural differences and tailors their strategy of promoting democracy to each individual country.  Wittes and Masloski** http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/democracy-promotion-wittes/05\_democracy\_promotion\_wittes.pdfTamara Cofman Wittes is a Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and directs the Project on Middle East Democracy and Development. Andrew Masloski is a former Senior Research Assistant at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings..

Our analysis above reveals that **MEPI** has overcome most of these problems in the past three years, and **has developed a more coherent, deliberate strategy and** **more efficient implementation mechanisms**. On balance, the program has demonstrated clear benefits to locating democracy assistance within a regional bureau and close to the ground. In particular, MEPI can claim two significant impacts: 1) **MEPI has helped build a network of Arab democracy** **advocates and activists who welcome American democracy** **assistance, and created a positive “brand” for U.S. democracy** **promotion efforts** among this audience. In the region, MEPI has (largely through crossregional programs and through its two field offices) built up a network of Arab civil society activists with improved skills, and improved ties both to one another and to Washington. This network of activists—mostly English-literate, liberal, and avowedly pro-American in outlook and orientation—are the natural locus of any future U.S. effort to support progressive political change in the Arab world. Secular liberals are not, and will not be in the foreseeable future, the majority of the political opposition in the Middle East. But their voices are important, because they are the main transmitters and translators of democratic ideas into their home societies—and **their voices are stronger and** **more influential for having U.S. support.** The impact of this network, of course, is ultimately limited by the repressive environment facing local democracy advocates, and by American diplomacy’s limited ability to protect these activists from state retribution. But it is significant that Arab liberals continue to seek US political and financial support for their reform agenda. 2) **MEPI has improved the integration of democracy and human** **rights into daily U.S. diplomacy and has improved** theBureau of Near Eastern Affairs’ institutional capacity topursue a **human rights** agenda. MEPI’s grant-making, especially local grants, has given ambassadors new tools in their diplomacy and new incentives to work on democracy and human rights issues. MEPI’s regional offices have worked with U.S. ambassadors and their staffs to enhance their skills in advocating for democracy and human rights, and MEPI has worked with embassy staffs and desk officers to develop annual democracy strategies for each Middle Eastern country, translating the diffuse, long-term goal of democracy into measurable short-term goals for which diplomats can be held accountable.

Algeria: Intellectual Property Law

Bahrain: Company Law, Corporate Governance Code, Secured Lending Law, Electronic Commerce Law, Consumer Protection Law

Egypt: Electronic Commerce Law, Competition Law, Insurance Law

Morocco: Intellectual Property Law

Oman: Company Law, Electronic Commerce Law, Foreign Investment Law

Qatar: Company Law, Corporate Governance Code, Secured Lending Law, Foreign Investment Law

Tunisia: Intellectual Property Law UAE: Competition Law, Consumer Protection Law

Yemen: Government Procurement Law

**Specific examples include establishing intellectual property rights, government laws, and consumer protection laws across many different countries. Other examples include increasing transparency in governments by broadcasting legislative sessions and ensuring fair elections. Also, MEPI also has created universities, trained more than 3000 teachers, and supporting Arab entrepreneurs, and building professional networks for women in over 7 countries.**

# Contention 1- Economy 1:15

**Democracy increases economic growth, increasing development in poorer countries** Lynn-Jones 98 [(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University]

First, **democracies**-especially liberal democracies-**are more likely to have market economies, and market economies** tend to **produce economic** growth over the long run. Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the **countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population. A second recent study** confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has **found that countries classified as "free" had** annual 1980-1993 **real per capita** Gross Domestic Product **(GDP)** (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) **growth rates of 2.88%.** In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, **and in "repressed" countries -1.44%**.

Prefer Lynn-Jones over alternate neg studies on scope and magnitude, it has multiple studies of all the countries in the world over a 13 year period.

**Economic growth solves poverty. OECD** <http://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedkingdom/40700982.pdf>

**Research** that compares the experiences of a wide range of developing countries **finds** consistentlystrong evidence **that rapid and sustained growth is the** singlemost important **way to reduce poverty.** A typical estimate from these cross-country studies is that **a 10 per cent increase in a country’s average income will reduce the poverty rate by between 20 and 30 per cent**.1The central role of growth in driving the speed at which poverty declines is confirmed by research on individual countries and groups of countries. For example, a flagship study of 14 countries in the 1990s found that over the course of the decade, poverty fell in the 11 countries that experienced significant growth and rose in the three countries with low or stagnant growth. On average, a one per cent increase in per capita income reduced poverty by 1.7 per cent (see Figure 1).2 Among these 14 countries, the reduction in poverty was particularly spectacular in Vietnam, where poverty fell by 7.8 per cent a year between 1993 and 2002, halving the poverty rate from 58 per cent to 29 per cent. Other countries with impressive reductions over this period include El Salvador, Ghana, India, Tunisia and Uganda, each with declines in the poverty rate of between three and six per cent a year. Driving these overall reductions in poverty was the rebound in growth that began for most of the countries in the mid-1990s. The median GDP growth rate for the 14 countries was 2.4 per cent a year between 1996 and 2003.

**\*\*\*\*And, poverty impact outweighs. Poverty kills millions and is equivalent to an ongoing nuclear war on the poor.**Abu-Jamal James **Gilligan** (Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical and Director of the Center for the Study of Violence). “Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes,” p191-196

**The deadliest form of violence is poverty**.  --Ghandi    It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation.    Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence.    But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire.    We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes;    By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.)    This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes:  **Every fifteen years**, on the average, **as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war**that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period.This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

# Contention 2- Stability 0:45

**Democracies are key to long term stability.**

**Lynn-Jones 98** [(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University]

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal **democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations** (on average) **die annually in internal violence.** The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% **and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.**28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. **Democracies have** virtually **never massacred their own citizens on a large scale,** although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29 There are two reasonsfor the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: **(1) Democratic political systems**-especiallythose ofliberal democracies **constrain the power of governments**, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 **(2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed** openly **and have** regular **processes for the peaceful transfer of power.** If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31

#### Democracies are less likely to start wars—as democratic norms spread, even autocracies will become less violent

#### Kinsella and Rousseau 8

David Kinsella and David L. Rousseau. “Democracy and Conflict Resolution.” Chapter 24, SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. 2008. [Premier, Premier Debate Today, Sign-Up Now]

Democratic norms and conflict resolution Many explanations of democratic peace emphasize the socialization of political leaders within their domestic political environments (Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Huth and Allee 2002).

This argument has two parts. First, democratic political elites have risen to positions of leadership within a political system that emphasizes compromise and nonviolence. Conflicts of interest in democracies are usually resolved through negotiation and log-rolling. Losing a political battle does not result in the loss of political rights or exclusion from future political competition. Moreover, coercion and violence are not considered legitimate means for resolving conflicts. Conversely, political leaders in nondemocratic states are socialized in an environment in which politics is more akin to a zero-sum game in which rivals and those on the losing end of political struggles are regularly removed from the game. Coercion and violence are more widely accepted as legitimate means for resolving political conflicts. In general, political leaders in autocracies are more likely to impose decisions rather than compromise when dealing with the opposition. Second, the argument assumes that **domestic political norms are externalized by decision makers when they become embroiled in international disputes.** Presidents and prime ministers approach conflicts of interest in the international environment in much the same way they approach conflicts in the domestic environment, and with conflict-resolution skills honed by their domestic political experiences. Compared to their counterparts in authoritarian regimes, democratic leaders are more likely to seek negotiation, mediation, or arbitration (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994). Their approach to international conflict resolution **[which] reduces the likelihood that an international dispute will escalate into a militarized crisis and war.** The strong version of the norms argument holds that democratic leaders externalize peaceful practices of conflict resolution in their interactions with all types of regimes. In contrast to this monadic claim, those who emphasize the dyadic nature of democratic peace argue that although all decision makers are inclined to externalize domestic practices of dispute resolution when dealing with interstate conflicts, this externalization is conditional for democratic decision makers. Democratic leaders externalize their domestic norms only if they expect similar behavior from their foreign counterparts. Because democratic decision makers expect that choices by other democratic leaders are also shaped by norms of peaceful conflict resolution, there is little risk in an attempting to resolve their conflict in accordance with these shared norms. Conversely, because democracies expect nondemocratic states to externalize coercive and uncompromising norms of conflict resolution, they adopt similar strategies when dealing with these opponents. The argument therefore assumes that a democratic state’s behavior is conditioned upon the expected behavior of its opponent and that the opponent’s regime type informs this expectation. A related argument highlights the importance of identity formation. Some have suggested that peace between democracies is a function of a common social identity (Risse-Kappen 1995; Hopf 1998, 2002; Kahl 1998/99). Social identities are bundles of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles that are used to draw boundaries between in-group and out-groups. Members of one’s own group are viewed as less threatening than members of other groups. If democratic polities use democratic values and norms to define the in-group, the actions and capabilities of other democracies are then viewed as less threatening. Their shared identity will reduce the likelihood that either party will resort to violence to resolve a political dispute. Although realists discount the importance of ideational factors in world politics, liberals and constructivists have long maintained that a shared sense of identity partly accounts for lower levels of international conflict. While liberals tend to focus on a shared liberal identity, constructivists believe that many types of shared identity may reduce interstate conflict. Risse-Kappen (1995), for example, argues that a shared sense of identity among democratic states, and not simply their concern with the balance of power, explains decision making within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Laboratory experiments have also demonstrated that shared cultural beliefs and experiences can decrease intersubjective threat perceptions (Mintz and Geva 1993; Rousseau 2006). Explanations for both the monadic and dyadic versions of democratic peace imply that as the number of democracies in the international system increase, the number of interstate wars will fall. However, the literature also identifies causal processes operating at the systemic level. **As democratic practices spread globally—that is, as they become internalized by more societies and are reflected** in public policymaking—the international system is increasingly “saturated” with democratic culture and norms of peaceful conflict resolution. In an international society in which democratic practice is so commonly viewed as legitimate and effective**, the methods of conflict resolution employed by democratic states have a greater probability of being reflected in the behavior of nondemocratic states as well.** When viewing the international system as a whole, then, we should observe fewer interstate conflicts. Testing arguments operating at the systemic level of analysis is difficult; a correlation between two variables at the systemic level (e.g. number of wars and the percentage of nondemocracies) may be expected even if the causal relationships are limited to those hypothesized for the monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace (Rousseau and Kim 2005; Gartzke and Weisiger 2006). Problems of inference notwithstanding, statistical analyses of the systemic normative argument have provided some support for the system-level claim

This is empirically verified. Democracies suffer less internal violence and government repression than other forms of Government.

**Long-term stability outweighs any potential short term harms. Means winning brink defense on extinction scenarios is sufficient to take out your disads.**

# Advantage 3- Terrorism

**Democracy solves for terrorism, Cheney 7**

Liz Cheney (attorney and specialist in the areas of U.S. Middle East policy and reform in the Arab world. She served most recently as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (2005-2006). Her responsibilities included designing and managing U.S. government programs to promote democracy in the Arab world. Cheney served previously as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (2002-2004), at U.S. AID (1989-1993), and as an attorney in private practice and at the International Finance Corporation). “Why America Must Promote Democracy in the Middle East.” ABC News. September 17th, 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=3611675

America is a good and a great nation, founded on values of freedom, liberty and individual rights. It is right that we should use our position as the world's only superpower to spread freedom, democracy and economic opportunity. Promoting democracy in the Middle East is also one of the best ways to ensure our victory in the war on terror. America is at war with enemies driven by a radical ideological hatred to destroy us and all we stand for. These terrorists weren't created by U.S. policy. They are religious zealots who will stop at nothing to further their aim of establishing a global caliphate in which individual lives have no value, women are oppressed and the only legitimate faith is a perverted version of Islam. The leaders of al Qaeda can't prevail alone. Their cause depends upon recruits. They must convince young men and women that they have no hope for a better future here on Earth. They must convince them to strap on bombs and kill as many innocents as possible. For decades, **terror leaders have been feeding on young people living in despair under authoritarian regimes** with closed and decaying economic systems and schools that teach hatred and intolerance. America must work with the forces of freedom and moderation in today's Middle East to change this deadly status quo. To win the war on terror, America must defeat today's terrorists and prevent the recruitment of tomorrow's. **One of the best ways to prevent recruitment is to make clear that life holds real opportunity. Young people in the Arab world as elsewhere yearn for the freedom to be heard, to stand for something larger than self**, to control their own destinies **and to choose their own leaders. Only democracy can fulfill these aspirations**. Al Qaeda's worst enemy is a democratically elected government giving voice to its people's hopes and dreams. They know that people don't choose to be ruled by al Qaeda. **One** need **only [needs to] read the captured writings of former al Qaeda** in Iraq **chief** Abu Musab al Zarqawi **to understand the fear democracy strikes into the hearts of terrorists.**

#### Hamid 11 concurs and writes that

Shadi Hamid (contributing writer for The Atlantic, a fellow at the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution's Center for Middle East Policy). “Reviving Bush’s Best Unfulfilled Idea: Democracy Promotion.” The Atlantic. September 13th, 2011. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/reviving-bushs-best-unfulfilled-idea-democracy-promotion/244935

Crises have a way of provoking interesting, occasionally useful intellectual debates. September 11 was no exception, forcing foreign policy analysts and policymakers to grapple with bigger ideas. Oddly enough, it was some in the Republican Party who made perhaps the most radical argument, that the attacks that day were, in fact, a direct result of Middle East's democratic deficit. In the absence of freedom, Arabs lacked legitimate outlets to express their political grievances, making them more likely to resort to political violence and terrorism. This formed the intellectual justification for the Bush administration's rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion and for what would later become the "forward strategy for freedom." As President George W. Bush and senior officials like Condoleezza Rice were fond of saying, "the status quo is untenable." The status quo was untenable. But to draw a link between Bush's policies and the Arab revolts -- as some neoconservatives insist on doing -- makes little sense. In Arab eyes, Iraq became a model not of what to do, but what to avoid. That said, actions have unintended consequences. Would the Arab spring have happened without September 11? With so many variables at play, it is a difficult counterfactual to entertain. What we do know, though, is that the 2000s, alongside Bush's democracy promotion program, were a breakthrough for democracy in the region. December 12, 2004 saw Egypt's first explicitly anti-Mubarak protest. Soon, protests became a routine sight in the streets of Cairo. The numbers were rarely overwhelming but a precedent, at least, had been set. Across the region, elections, however fraudulent, offered a semblance of competition. There was something to fight for. Whatever its faults, and whatever its intent, the Bush administration had helped inject democracy and democracy promotion into Arab public discourse. The story then took a tragic turn. By 2006, the Bush administration had backed away from democracy promotion, reverting to the "stability paradigm" of previous decades. Autocratic regimes were as emboldened as ever. They -- sometimes with brute repression, sometimes with a dash of subtlety -- cracked down on the opposition. In Egypt, the period between 2006 and 2010 was likely the worst since the 1960s. In Jordan, another close U.S. ally, the regime presided over what were arguably the most fraudulent elections in the country's modern history. The Bush administration didn't act on its own ideas. But the ideas were there. **In the long run, democracy promotion remains the best and most effective way to fight terrorism.** That such a notion came to be associated with such an unpopular president made it easy to dismiss. The academic literature, however, appears to lend it support. Drawing on considerable empirical data, Alan Kruger -- who is now, interestingly, President Barack Obama's pick to head the Council of Economic Advisers -- found that "terrorists are more likely to come from countries that suppress political and civil rights." Reviewing the evidence, Steven Brooke and I made the argument for a causal link between lack of democracy and the incidence of terrorism in this 2010 Policy Review article. As Egypt and Libya -- formerly two of the more flagrant exporters of terrorists -- democratize, scholars will be better able to test the hypothesis. But, with or without the data, what we see right in front of us tells a powerful story. The triumph of democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia can do what all the "hard" counter-terrorism measures can't -- discredit al-Qaeda's narrative that political change can come only through violence. So, yes, the advent of democracy is likely to contain the spread of violent extremis m. But it is, of course, no panacea. Democracy, more often than we like to think, empowers radical and illiberal forces. Even the best established democracies struggle with this reality. In countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, far-right populists are the second or third largest parties in parliament. The United States has its own particular Tea Party variant. The Arab world will prove no exception. But if there are going to be radicals -- and there almost always will -- then better to incorporate them in the democratic process. There, they can promote their illiberalism through peaceful means within the confines of a credible political system. It's not perfect. At times, it can even be dangerous. But it's better than the alternative.

**And stopping terror is key because of WMDs. Mowatt-Larssen 10** Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? A Timeline of Terrorists' Efforts to Acquire WMD, Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs January 2010

Several **terrorist groups have actively sought weapons of mass destruction** (WMD) of one kind or another. In particular, the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda **and** its associates -- notably the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya and Lashkar al Tayyib -- figure most prominently among the groups that **have manifested** some degree of intent, experimentation, and programmatic efforts **to acquire nuclear**, biological and chemical**weapons**. To date, however, al Qaeda is the only group known to be **pursuing a** long-term, persistent and systematic **approach to developing weapons to be used in mass casualty attacks.** Osama **bin Ladin's assertion** in 1998 **that it was his Islamic duty to acquire [WMDs]**weapons of mass destruction**ensured that**the fulfillment of**this intent would become a top priority for his lieutenants in the ensuing years**. In an effort to explain his thinking to his followers, and to help guide their efforts, the al Qaeda leader has offered a number of statements that provide a need and rationale for using weapons of mass destruction as a means of achieving the group's concrete and ambitious goals. Most recently, he promised in a 2007 video release to "escalate the killing and fighting against you (Americans)" -- on grounds of destroying an international conspiracy to control the world -- adding, "The capitalist system seeks to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to protect democracy."

Terrorism is the most likely existential crisis, experts confirmRhodes 09**,** Richard, Visiting Scholar at MIT and Harvard and affiliate of Center of International Security and Coop at Stanford, 2009, Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to [is] 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. **The** group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.