# SV – TOC Aff [China + Soft Power]

## Contention 1 is Influence over China

#### Darshana Baruah indicates that:

Darshana M. Baruah, 8-21-2018, "India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

Beijing’s growing collaboration with India’s neighbors has created a sense of unease in New Delhi. Like any rising power with global ambitions, China is looking to expand its presence and increase its profile beyond its immediate neighborhood. Naturally, as China’s influence in South Asia grows, India is faced with the challenge of managing its relationship with its biggest neighbor and competing to maintain its prominence in the region. India has begun to view China’s commercial initiatives as a means to advance its strategic ambitions in ways that often are not conducive to India’s interests. Former Indian foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar noted in 2016 that the “interactive dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives – a universal proposition – is on particular display in our continent.”3 He went on to caution against countries using connectivity “as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.”4 The view that connectivity offers a set of tools to influence other countries’ foreign policy choices has become commonplace in analysis about the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI has garnered much attention, positive and negative, since its inception in 2013. It is one of the world’s biggest initiatives for promoting connectivity and providing funds to finance infrastructure development. In South Asia, the BRI underscores the growing Sino-Indian competition in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region. To best understand India’s concerns, it is helpful to examine four specific corridors that constitute major components of the BRI and run through India’s South Asian neighborhood: the CPEC, the BCIM Economic Corridor, the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor, and the MSR (see figure 1). These four corridors and the infrastructure projects associated with them have a direct bearing on India’s strategic interests. They run close to India’s continental and maritime borders and are affecting its security interests and strategic environment. China’s engagement with India’s immediate neighbors through these corridors threatens to alter existing power dynamics in the region. India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives. A primary concern for New Delhi is that Beijing will use its economic presence in the region to advance its strategic interests. One notable example is the strategically located port of Hambantota, which the Sri Lankan government was forced to lease to China for ninety-nine years in 2017. The port was built using Chinese loans but, due to the high interest rates, Sri Lanka was unable to repay and incurred a burgeoning debt burden.5By 2015, Beijing was aggressively pursuing a new role in the global order. In South Asia, the increasing degree of competition between China and India has raised the stakes. Until China’s BRI emerged, New Delhi did not sense a threat to its bilateral relationships with its neighbors, as India’s relationships with other leading infrastructure funders in South Asia, such as Japan, are not characterized by such a prevailing sense of competition. China’s rise highlights India’s underlying wariness that Beijing’s influence in the region comes at the expense of New Delhi’s standing as a regional leader. China’s diplomatic outreach in South Asia seems to be a result of its global ambitions to be a great power. Like the typical rising power, China questions the existing order and aims to create a structure more favorable to its interests. Such a shift, if advantageous to China, would profoundly affect New Delhi’s strategic and national interests

#### And Baruah concludes that:

Darshana M. Baruah, 8-21-2018, "India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

India has started to craft a policy response. In its strongest stance on the BRI to date, India marked its protest by not attending the Belt and Road Forum that China hosted in May 2017. In official statements, India questioned the initiative’s transparency and processes, and New Delhi opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) due to concerns about territorial sovereignty. As India calibrates its policy response, instead of perceiving the BRI as one project, it would be wise to look at the initiative as a culmination of various bilateral initiatives, many of them involving projects that were actually initiated before the BRI itself was formally launched. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor, for instance, was launched in the early 1990s. Similarly, China’s Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is a combination of bilateral infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean region that China has sought to present as a multilateral initiative. India will have to work with its partners in the region to offer alternative connectivity arrangements to its neighbors. To date, New Delhi has been slow in identifying, initiating, and implementing a coherent approach to connectivity in the region. Although India has identified countries such as Japan as key partners in formulating a response, there has been little progress on a plan of action. New Delhi urgently needs a structured framework for providing an alternative to Chinese-led connectivity initiatives to protect its strategic goals and remain a dominant power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Ultimately, India must be more proactive. While China is successfully implementing development projects hundreds of miles from its borders, India is still struggling to craft domestic development plans for its own border regions. New Delhi intends to prioritize development in its international engagement, but India will have to weave together its ad-hoc initiatives into one coherent road map to regional connectivity and infrastructure construction. Even as India must address infrastructure and development needs at home, it also needs to provide an alternative to China’s overtures to the region. To this end, India must not only respond to the changes Chinese engagement is prompting in its neighborhood but also collaborate with partners to further its vision of regional connectivity, while accounting for its own capacity and resource limitations. New Delhi must seek help from partners like Japan when necessary to build and upgrade its infrastructure and create an alternative to Chinese-led connectivity corridors and infrastructure projects.59 India must have a blueprint to identify specific projects, mechanisms, and goals for its connectivity initiatives. Other countries like Australia, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States are keen to see India play a leading role in the region. These nations have technical expertise and are already present in the region to some degree. New Delhi must identify the advantages each of these states offer and leverage them to collaborate in areas of common interest and pursue its strategic connectivity goals. Together, India and these countries can coordinate their use of resources to address common goals such as peace and security.

#### Granting India a permanent seat on the UN Security Council allows India to counter China’s aggressive behavior as Rajagopalan indicates:

Rajesh Rajagopalan, 9-14-2017, "India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108, Date Accessed 4-4-2019 // WS

The third strategic tool at India’s disposal is multilateral diplomacy. India could potentially use multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to undermine the legitimacy of and constrain any aggressive Chinese behavior in the international arena. In addition, although India is not a permanent UNSC member, New Delhi could conceivably garner support on issues it deems important from other states, especially more powerful ones like the United States, in so doing, attempt to isolate Beijing and deter China from acting against India’s interests. Admittedly, China could opt to veto such proceedings in the UNSC, but it would likely pay a diplomatic cost for doing so, and such veto power does not extend to the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in some situations, New Delhi could also conceivably partner with Beijing in such venues, in order to give China an incentive to be more accommodating of India’s interests.

#### Specifically, China will be forced to stop support of Pakistan as Sushant Sareen writes in 2018 that

Sushant Sareen, 11-3-2018, "For Pakistan, China is the new America," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-china-new-america-48305/, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

Even more importantly, China is still not in a position to bail out its ‘iron brother’ Pakistan out of trouble frequently, especially if the US is the source of trouble. Nor is China likely to go out on a limb for Pakistan every time it gets into crisis. Pakistan is an important client state, but not a state critical for China’s survival. And despite the fact that China has been doubling down in its support for Pakistan, there are some straws in the wind that suggest the beginning of a rethink in China on how much it should invest itself in Pakistan, which could turn out to be a poor investment ultimately. Consequently, India can use to force China to be more even-handed in its policy in South Asia, especially on issues like designating and sanctioning terrorists like the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Masood Azhar, who China has been protecting for years. Until the Pulwama suicide attack on the CRPF bus, this was an irritant in Sino-Indian relations. It is going to become a core issue from now onwards for New Delhi. What China will need to decide is whether the benefit it derives from its economic and strategic relationship with Pakistan is worth the economic and strategic cost of antagonising India and pushing it to a point where India reconsiders and revaluates its policy of strategic caution in pushing ahead with the Quad and other initiatives aimed at containing China. The fact that China makes more money out of India every year than it will out of its trade and investments in Pakistan is the economic side of things. India, instead of assuming that the depth of Sino-Pak ties is immutable, needs to leverage its economic relationship with China and force China to understand the economic and political consequences of its support for a notorious Pakistani terrorist state. India has cards to play that can pry open the Sino-Pak nexus, provided it is willing to stare down the Chinese while playing these cards which include an active and intensive involvement in strengthening the Quad and more specifically in strategically engaging the US.

#### Without granting membership, Indian power continues to decrease. This leads to two impacts. First, Chinese encirclement makes India-Pakistan conflict inevitable. Baruah argues that China’s:

Darshana M. Baruah, 8-21-2018, "India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

Some of India’s neighbors were among the countries that thronged the forum. Not only did China gain Nepal’s support just a day before the forum, but it also signed fresh agreements with six of India’s neighbors: Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Afghanistan. The leadership from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal made speeches congratulating President Xi Jinping for his regional leadership and welcomed Chinese investments in their respective countries. The fact that China was able to garner such an impressive response from India’s neighbors without New Delhi’s participation signifies a number of things. One, it exposes India’s inability to offer substantial development assistance to its smaller neighbors. Two, it highlights that the smaller countries welcome the presence of another rising power and are willing to accommodate the competition that follows such a change in power dynamics. Three, this development underlines India’s lack of strategic engagement with its neighborhood, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Neighborhood First policy is a step toward correcting this neglect. Yet despite these potential benefits, Indian opposition to the BRI appears to have ultimately won out. India’s misgivings about Chinese-funded projects through the BRI ultimately come down to a few key concerns. New Delhi is worried that Chinese-funded infrastructure projects may: 1) run afoul of accepted international standards and norms; 2) undermine Indian sovereignty claims on disputed border territories and other security interests, especially vis-a-vis China and Pakistan; and 3) grant China greater geopolitical influence and undue economic and diplomatic leverage over the policymaking decisions of India’s neighbors in ways that disadvantage India. India is increasingly concerned about China using regional connectivity projects to alter the narratives surrounding disputed territories in its favor. The Indian government’s May 2017 statement claims that China has exhibited a disregard for territorial integrity, particularly with respect to the CPEC, which runs through the disputed territory of Kashmir. According to India, this is a violation of its sovereignty, and participating in the BRI would undermine New Delhi’s position on the dispute, as Beijing supports Islamabad’s view of the dispute. The CPEC and certain other aspects of the BRI more broadly tend to disregard India’s concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity. On India’s eastern border, China claims Arunachal Pradesh in its entirety and Ladakh in the north, states under Indian jurisdiction. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought over Arunachal and Ladakh, a fact that makes many Indians more suspicious of Beijing’s motives for building infrastructure projects in border regions and in disputed areas. Moreover, India is very wary of China’s efforts to build projects in countries neighboring India (such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan), projects that might afford Beijing an added strategic advantage in its rivalry with India. Given the border tensions between India and China, Beijing must demonstrate respect for territorial integrity for India to view the BRI in a positive light.

#### That’s problematic as David Barno indicates in 2015:

David Barno, 11-5-2015, "A nuclear war between India and Pakistan is a very real possibility," Quartz India, <https://qz.com/india/541502/a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-is-a-very-real-possibility/>, Date Accessed 4-3-19 // MN

These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called [Cold Start](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf), a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armoured assaults into Pakistan and [rapidly securing limited objectives](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19889/pakistans_nuclear_posture.html) that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to [mobilise half a million troops in less than 72 hours](http://archive.defencenews.in/defence-news-internal.aspx?get=&id=H3gVhgw0WhI=). The problem is, unlike its neighbours India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have [stated](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-india-pakistan-ready-use-nuclear-weapons-13284) that they [may have to use nuclear weapons](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-tests-missile-that-could-carry-nuclear-warhead-to-every-part-of-india/2015/03/09/920f4f42-c65c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html) first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to [counter Cold Start](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-wants-battlefield-nukes-use-against-indian-troops-12200) and help to [offset](http://tribune.com.pk/story/858106/pakistan-needs-short-range-tactical-nuclear-weapons-to-deter-india/) India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons programme—and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers now judge this nuclear programme to be the [fastest growing](http://defence.pk/threads/pak-nuclear-program-is-worlds-fastest-growing.170204/) in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build [more than 200 nuclear warheads](http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/strategic-stability-second-nuclear-age/p33809)—more than the UK plans to have by that time. It is not simply the pace of the build-up that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range [tactical nuclear weapons](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/McCausland.pdf) is a game changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons—on its own soil if necessary—[to counter Cold Start’s plan](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-wants-battlefield-nukes-use-against-indian-troops-12200) for sudden Indian armoured thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers and increases the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons programme also brings a wide array of other [destabilising characteristics](http://fpif.org/threshold-nuclear-war-pakistan-india-keeps-dropping/) to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signalling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralised control of the weapons—a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armoured offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spin-offs of the current arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the US and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill [agree](http://tribune.com.pk/story/834475/modi-likely-to-use-military-force-if-terror-attack-traced-to-pakistan-former-us-diplomat/) that if there were another Mumbai, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states—last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was [cancelled](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/world/asia/pakistan-cancels-talks-with-india-citing-restrictions.html) after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.

#### The impact is huge as the Telegraph writes:

The Teleagraph, 12-10-2013, "India-Pakistan nuclear war could 'end human civilisation'," Telegraph.co.uk, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html, Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that could kill two billion people and effectively end human civilization, a study said Tuesday. Even if limited in scope, a conflict with nuclear weapons would wreak havoc in the atmosphere and devastate crop yields, with the effects multiplied as global food markets went into turmoil, the report said. The Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility released an initial peer-reviewed study in April 2012 that predicted a nuclear famine could kill more than a billion people.

#### Second is expansion in the Indian Ocean Region. Baruah writes in 2018 that

Darshana M. Baruah, 8-21-2018, "India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071, Date Accessed 4-22-2019 // WS

The MSR is the vast sea-based component of the larger BRI. It began in 2013 with a focus on strengthening China’s maritime ties with its neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Beijing later gradually expanded the initiative to include other coastal countries with the aim of connecting China to potential economic partners in Europe, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. In addition to boosting regional connectivity, the initiative traces the historical and cultural linkages between China and other countries along the region’s ancient Silk Road–affiliated sea routes. The MSR encompasses a variety of infrastructure projects, including ports, highways, airports, roads, and bridges. Unlike the competition along the Himalayas, interactions at sea between India and China have been limited, although India still harbors reservations. New Delhi is concerned that China will establish a foothold in the Indian Ocean region and challenge India’s advantageous maritime position there. Concerns about Chinese attempts to strategically encircle India gained traction at the turn of the millennium. Although many observers dismissed the notion that China is seeking military bases in the Indian Ocean as fanciful, India has seen its worst fears of Chinese power projection become reality in the last decade. As China internally debates the need for foreign military bases, New Delhi has had to come to terms with the intensity and frequency of Chinese naval forays into the Indian Ocean. Chinese submarines have even docked in Sri Lankan and Pakistani ports. China’s military diplomacy in the region is increasingly geared toward establishing special political relationships and arrangements with island states that could result in favorable naval access. When Beijing officially established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in the summer of 2017, New Delhi’s concerns grew considerably.52 As with its dealings with neighbors on India’s northern borders, China is aggressively pursuing India’s maritime neighbors and offering unmatched commercial investments. The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is the newest concern. The strategic location of the port and Sri Lanka’s geography in relation to key sea lines of communication strengthens India’s perception that Beijing is building infrastructure for its own strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. China’s control of Hambantota and access to Gwadar, its other investments in the Maldives and Mauritius, and its base in Djibouti are only the beginning of Beijing’s apparent efforts to secure a maritime military edge.53 One March 2018 study showed that the BRI has heightened debt risks among at least some borrowing countries due to poor lending practices, a conclusion that gives greater credence to India’s view that China is using unsustainable debt burdens for its own strategic gains. The steps that India is taking have a direct bearing on Beijing’s suspected maritime ambitions in the region. Given that the bulk of global trading is seaborne, the ability to protect energy supply lines is extremely crucial for a rising power like China. For Beijing to become a global power, it will have to establish itself as a key player in the Indian Ocean region in terms of protecting its supply lines and securing international waters. Yet it will be difficult for China to maintain the naval presence required to achieve these objectives without access to ports and bases for its military assets in the Indian Ocean. India’s chief concern about the MSR is that Beijing is building these ports for dual military and commercial purposes. If that is the case, when needed, these commercial ports could serve as military facilities for the Chinese navy to help mitigate Beijing’s geographical disadvantages in the region.

#### This expansion inevitably leads to conflict as Vivek Mishra writes in 2018 that

Vivek Mishra, 4-14-2018, "China Is Moving into the Indian Ocean," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href=<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-moving-the-indian-ocean-25380>, Date Accessed 4-23-2019 // WS

In the past few years, the Maldives has quintessentially exemplified the shortcomings of India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. But there is a larger geopolitical premonition that could be anticipated from the recent [crisis](https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-maldives-crisis-will-india-intervene/) in the Indian Ocean islands of the Maldives, one that points to the immediacy with which China and India are approaching towards a conflict in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). At the heart of this potential conflict lies slipping away of one of India’s important influence centers to the advantage of China. Since the current Yameen government took office, the Maldives has done a volte-face from an ‘India First’ policy, to openly ignoring India’s concerns and to embracing China. India’s readiness in countering China seems to be barely holding its neck above the water, with minimal functional capabilities. India currently has only one each functional aircraft carrier and submarine. However, India’s contestation with China in the Indian Ocean is not just a possibility of the conventional equipment-war, but an ongoing war of leverage. The most effective tool in this war is strategic hedging and for now China seems to be using it more deftly. In this regard, the recent trends have been an eye-opener for India. The Maldives, traditionally India’s sphere of influence, has already signed up for Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road initiative; Sri Lanka’s strategic Hambantota port is on lease with China for 99 years, China has considerably enhanced its above and sub-surface presence in parts of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea along with increasing Chinese sway with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. The recent functional Chinese base at Djibouti at the strategic Horn of Africa in the Indian Ocean has only compounded the overarching dilemma for India.

#### This conflict would be disastrous as Kyle Mizokami writes in 2018 that

Kyle Mizokami, 6-12-2018, "Why a War Between China and India Is Not Unthinkable (And Would Be a Total Horror Show)," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-between-china-india-not-unthinkable-would-be-total-26238", Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia.[and] A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory. India and China border one another in two locations, northern India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with [territorial disputes in both areas](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm). China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.

## Contention 2 is Influence to Democratize

#### Currently Indian soft power is declining ad John Mcclory writes earlier this month that India is experiencing

Jonathan Mcclory, 4-14-2019, "Until 2016, India was on course to break into soft power group of 30 nations. Then it fell," ThePrint, https://theprint.in/opinion/until-2016-india-was-on-course-to-break-into-soft-power-group-of-30-nations-then-it-fell/221298/, Date Accessed 4-25-2019 // JM

One of the most common criticisms of the annual Soft Power 30 study is the conspicuous absence of India in the rankings. Admittedly, India’s non-appearance in the top 30 countries does give one pause. So much so, it is worth exploring why this is the case, looking ahead to see when India might expect to break into the top 30, and understanding what changes the government might need to usher in to do so. For those unfamiliar with The Soft Power 30, it is an annual study produced by Portland, a strategic communications consultancy, and the University of Southern California’s Centre on Public Diplomacy. The annual report is built around a composite index that assesses the soft power resources of the world’s leading countries through a combination of objective metrics and international polling data. The index – developed around Joseph Nye’s argument that the sources of soft power are based primarily on political values, culture, and foreign policy – is designed to give a comparative snap-shot of countries based on their soft power assets. It is not a measure of absolute influence, but more the potential for influence. Objective metrics are structured into six sub- indices: Culture, Digital, Education, Enterprise, Government, and Global Engagement. International polling data is drawn from nationally representative surveys of 11,000 people in 25 countries, covering every region of the world. Survey respondents rate countries based on a set of factors that are most likely to drive perceptions of a foreign country. These factors include foreign policy, culture, liveability, and technology exports, among others. While the study only publishes a list of top 30 countries, there are a total of 60 countries included in the study, of which India is of course one. The Soft Power 30 has been produced annually since 2015, but it draws on the earlier work of the Institute for Government Soft Power Index which was [published](https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/The%20new%20persuaders_0.pdf) in collaboration with Monocle Magazine from 2010 to 2014. The 2016 edition of The Soft Power 30 report identified India as ‘a country to watch’, arguing that an [upward lift](https://portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2016.pdf) in its ranking (from 2015 to 2016) was likely the start of a trend that would see it break into the top 30 in the near future. Surprisingly, this prediction has failed to materialise. Not only has India not built on its earlier momentum, its overall ranking has actually fallen since 2016. So, what happened and how can India reverse the trend? There are several factors at play driving what feels like an underperformance in the Soft Power 30 index for India. The first is that we need to recognise there is at least some element of Western bias to the concept of soft power, as [developed](https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/joe_nye_wielding_soft_power.pdf) by Joseph Nye. As conceived, and as borne out in some (but not all) of the Soft Power 30 metrics, developed-economy countries do enjoy an advantage. This, in turn, puts India at a relative disadvantage. The other aspect of the index to bear in mind is that it is a composite measure, aggregating data across a diverse range of soft power metrics to produce a single score for each country. Thus, an especially poor performance in several of The Soft Power 30 sub-indices drags down a country’s total score. But this does not mean that such a country will not have clear strengths and useful tools in its array of soft power assets. Bearing those caveats in mind, a breakdown of India’s performance across The Soft Power 30 can provide insights into both the factors dragging down India’s overall ranking, as well as the country’s soft power strengths that can serve India’s foreign policy priorities if used effectively. India’s biggest challenge, in terms of soft power assets – as assessed by The Soft Power 30 index – stem from the ‘harder’ elements of soft power. Said differently, it is systemic issues like corruption, poverty, inequality, gender inequality, and pollution that weigh on global perceptions of India[n], and thus its soft power. Often the most commonly covered topics on India in international media focus on these more negative stories. Subsequently, these issues have an outsized impact on international views of India, and not in a positive way. Table 1 below provides India’s relative ranking and scores for each of the objective data sub-indices.

#### Thankfully the UNSC is key to boost Indian soft power as Mcclory concludes that

Jonathan Mcclory, 4-14-2019, "Until 2016, India was on course to break into soft power group of 30 nations. Then it fell," ThePrint, https://theprint.in/opinion/until-2016-india-was-on-course-to-break-into-soft-power-group-of-30-nations-then-it-fell/221298/, Date Accessed 4-25-2019 // JM

In the absence of immediate solutions, it would be wise to focus on what the Indian government can control in the more short term. One action that would immediately benefit India’s soft power is an expansion of its diplomatic network, as well as the number of international cultural missions of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. India would benefit significantly from more international platforms to engage global audiences and communicate not only what India has to offer the world in terms of its wider cultural offer, but also articulate its values, aspirations, and a clear vision for India’s positive role in the world. Extrapolating from the international polling data on perceptions of India’s foreign policy – where it ranks 42nd out of 60 countries – there seems to be a lack of understanding around what India wants from the world, and what it stands to contribute. Again, a larger diplomatic network with expanded platforms for articulating India’s aspirations and vision would be a boon for Indian soft power. With greater understanding and more familiarity, international publics are likely to increase their trust in India and see it as a potential partner. In combining India’s excellent digital reach with a greater international diplomatic presence, India will be better able to explain itself and its aims to the world, as well as leverage new platforms to engage international audiences with its formidable cultural assets. Results would not come overnight, but if resources could be mobilised, the returns on investment for India’s influence abroad would be significant.

#### The impact is massive as India’s Soft power is critical to democracy promotion. Larry Diamond explains in 2007 that

Larry Diamond, 12-13-2007, Times of India, "India, Take the Lead," <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Editorial/LEADER_ARTICLE_India_Take_The_Lead/articleshow/2617945.cm>, Date Accessed 4-25-2019 // AS

Whether it wants to be so or not, whether it is ready for this role or not, India is becoming a global power. In the years to come, India will have to decide what kind of global power it wants to be. With its economic might, its military power, and its "soft power" all increasing steadily, India will find it increasingly difficult to continue its traditional foreign policy of non-alignment and non-intervention. Americans are in an awkward position to appeal to another rising power to promote democracy, as our own engagement for demo-cracy abroad over time has contained more than a little neocolonialism, unilateralism and hypocrisy. However, in the last three decades, this has been partially supplanted by increasingly effective efforts (especially when multilateral, practical and soft-spoken) to assist democratic development around the world. One must also acknowledge the serious problems with India's own democracy: tenacious poverty and inequality, troubling levels of political violence and criminality in some states, and a fragmented political party system that makes it difficult to take decisions. In the face of acute challenges, it is understandable for India to want to be able to focus on its own problems. Yet the established democracies of the world share a strong common interest in trying to bring about a more democratic world, and India's help is sorely needed in this cause. The global balance of power, of economic energy, and of moral authority is tilting from North to South. And the global environment for democracy is less favourable than at any time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as an oil-rich Russia turns its back on Europe and democracy, a booming authoritarian China casts a lengthening shadow over Asia and now Africa as well, and democracy gasps for life in such crucially important countries as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, Nigeria and Venezuela. There are still a lot more democracies in the world than there were in 1989, but the momentum is reversing, and many democracies are in danger. There are several reasons why India should care. First, India's own democracy could be affected by what happens regionally and globally. Recall that emergency rule fell upon India at a low-point for democracy in Asia and the world. Democracies thrive in regions where they enjoy the reinforcing legitimacy and mutual security of other democracies. Second, by engaging other democracies around the world, India will also draw solidarity and some lessons that could be useful for its own democratic reform. All democracies in the world today are imperfect, and we all need to learn from one another. Third, a more democratic world will be a more secure world for us all. Democracies do not go to war against one another. And they do a much better job of advancing human well-being and protecting the environment. Moreover, terrorism emanates disproportionately from authoritarian soil. We are threatened in common with a global crisis of climate change that dwarfs anything human civilisation has ever confronted. And the pathologies of badly governed states - terrorism, crime, corruption, environmental stress, infectious disease - spill across borders more quickly and vengefully than ever before. India does not need a radical reorientation of its foreign policy in order to make a difference to democracy in the world. It has an exceptionally rich history of democratic practice and experience to share with other developing democracies. Some of the obvious realms of experience that India has to share include: the evolution and functioning of federalism, the management of ethnic and religious conflict, the constitutional court, state and local government, electoral administration, the independent mass media and civil society. A very useful first step would be to bring practitioners and scholars from emerging democracies to India for periods of time to study how democracy works and has developed here. New institutions could be established and existing Indian think tanks and organisations could be supported to host such visits. Of course the United States does quite a bit of this. But how relevant is the highly expensive and decentralised American (or even European) model of democracy for Asia and Africa? We would all be better off sending more democrats to countries like India and South Africa. And conducting these exchanges would be an excellent and also ethical way for India to extend its soft power at a time when China is doing so for much more brazenly commercial and strategic ends. If India were to establish an institution to coordinate and organise exchanges with democrats around the world, richer democracies in the world would want to join with it and help to fund it. And in the near term, we have a ready potential vehicle. The UN Democracy Fund has recently been established, with a substantial budget that includes sizable contributions from India and the United States. It is a natural candidate to provide early support for such a new initiative. India should join the worldwide movement for democracy because doing so is in India's own national interest, not because the West asks it. But the democratic West has obligations to India that it must fulfil in the process. If we are asking India to play more of a leader-ship role on the world stage, than we must make room for that leadership. This should include India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council and its inclusion in global agenda-setting dialogues, such as the G8.

# Extra Cards

#### This increased trust allows India to increase democratic engagement with the region – Nikolas Emmanuel argues in 2016 that:

Nikolas Emmanuel, 3-28-2016, "The Impacts and Limits of India’s Soft Power," Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/the-impacts-and-limits-of-indias-soft-power, Date Accessed 4-26-2019 // JM

While hard power resources are necessary for India’s defense and development, India should also preserve its rich heritage of soft power resources, which was conceived more as an alternative to hard power than as a supplement. Many of India’s non-alignment objectives – including an egalitarian economic order, universal disarmament, discourse on sovereignty in the context of human rights issues, and the democratic spread of knowledge and technology – remain unfulfilled. The Nehruvian vision of a peaceful and democratic world should remain an inspiration for India, with the promotion of a peaceful regional order serving as a stepping stone to this vision. While India’s engagement with major economic and military powers has improved disproportionately in relation to its regional engagement, it should ensure moving forward that it engages its neighbors on favorable terms so as to make a concerted effort to assuage their perceptions of India as a threat.

# Weighing AFF – China

## Pakistan

### Link/Internal Link

#### We control the internal link here. Our ev says the only reason a war will happen is when China is emboldening Pakistan and backing there efforts to encroach on Kashmir. Only countering china has the risk of advoiding war bc it ends China’s support of Pakistan which leaves them vulnerable and forced to back away.

### Miscalc

#### The only risk of miscalc is a world where the Kashmir boarder is being pressured on both sides. Pakistan’s presence goes down when you vote aff because China is no longer supporting Pakistan. This lowers the risk of miscalc

## China War

### Link

#### We both agree on the link but our internal link is more probable. They say China will be pressured to war. This will never happen bc of Mad and economic interdependence but the more likely scenario is where China responds to India’s multilateral approach with diplomacy and by backing off their aggression. This is empirically proven.

### Impact

## Human Rights

### Link

### Impact

## Peacekeeping

### Link

#### First we outweigh on probability. India vetoing PKOs has no impact bc of Russia and the US already vetoing and the fact that India is on of the largest supporters of PKOs now. China being countered by a multilateral approach leaf by India on the SC is much more prob bc China is a direct threat to India now

### Impact

#### Our impact outweighs on magnitude. The risk of a India Pakistan war that would kill millions only exist in a world where China is supporting Pakistan, while their impact is super vague and has such a low probability

## R2P

#### First we outweigh on probability, they have to win that India vetoes all R2P missions. This makes no sense

#### Second our impact outweighs. Their missions have been responsible for disease outbreaks, corruption and sexual exploitation that have been responsible for killing and exploiting thousands and have proved to do little benefit while preventing a miscalc in Kashmir would save millions

## IMF Restrictions

#### First our link outweighs on probability bc they have to win a reason why permanent members get these benefits while all of their ev is about non-perm. Our link is extremely probable bc China historically will respond to multilateral diplomacy

### Poverty

#### The risk of miscalc between India and Pakistan outweighs their case on magnitude because those that do survive the initial war would be put into poverty due to the destruction of economic and health infrastructure that is key the economy

### Disease

#### We outweigh on TF. India’s project for malaria prevention isn’t set to go into place until 2030 while as log as China is backing Pakistan there is always a risk of miscalc

#### Second we ow on magnitude because those that do survive the initial war would be exposed to mass disease due to terrible conditions and the destruction of health infrastructure

## Foreign Aid

#### Our case outweighs on magnitude bc in the event of a war – millions will be killed