

Katherine and I negate.

**Contention One: the regime is the problem, not sanctions.**

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**Subpoint A) Venezuela was in crisis long before sanctions.**

[Rendon 19](#) writes that before sanctions, Venezuela's economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of necessary calories.

[Ulmer 18](#) reports that oil export revenue has been decreasing every year since 2012.

**Subpoint B) Maduro chooses not to distribute aid.**

United States sanctions against Venezuela exempt humanitarian aid, including food and medicine. The United States has provided \$368 million dollars to help the crisis, (which includes \$56 million dollars for immediate relief efforts inside Venezuela). However,

[DeYoung 19](#) writes that humanitarian aid to Venezuela has been slow, compared with the need, because of the intransigence of President Maduro. He has refused to allow anything beyond a trickle of assistance to enter Venezuela.

Trucks and warehouses filled with food, medicine and other supplies sit at several locations just outside Venezuela, and soldiers opened fire on civilians who tried to get the aid in.

Maduro only distributes aid when he finds it politically expedient.

[Dube 19](#) reports the Maduro administration uses food as a political tool. Despite his low approval rating, if you're not loyal, you don't eat. The government keeps track of voting and puts pressure on food recipients to support Maduro.

[Price 19](#) finds that 83 percent of Maduro's supporters receive benefits, as opposed to 14 percent of opposition.

**Subpoint C) Maduro uses revenue to prop his regime up.**

Maduro could choose to use government revenue to help his own people. Instead,

[Escobari 19](#) writes that Maduro uses Venezuela's dwindling resources to enrich a corrupt political elite and buy loyalty. He keeps himself in power at the expense of the suffering and hunger of his people.

[Rendon 19](#) states that because of Maduro's history of misusing funds, reversing sanctions and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis.

## **Contention Two: Sanctions are the solution.**

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United States sanctions specifically target the Maduro administration and their assets.

[Smolansky 19](#) writes that high level officials have fortunes in foreign banks and properties in foreign countries. Sanctions have debilitated their possibility to move around internationally as well as their financial possibilities abroad.

[Smith 19](#) writes that going after these elites' wealth is critical. Members of Maduro's inner circle have the real power to depose him or initiate negotiations with the opposition.

Deposing of Maduro can happen in two ways:

One: Initiating negotiations for an interim government.

[Rapoza 19](#) reports that sanctions create an opening among the military and administration officials to negotiate Maduro's resignation.

[The Miami Herald](#) reports in 2019 that Maduro's inner circle wants to see him step down. This is integral as

[Luhnaw 19](#) shows that talks between Maduro's inner circle and the opposition have already occurred.

Two: Encouraging Maduro to flee.

Undemocratic activities and human rights abuses are not cheap. Maduro needs money to finance activities like imprisoning political opposition and creating propaganda, and

[Price 19](#) corroborates that sanctions have limited Maduro's ability to do so. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping.

[BBC 19](#) reports that, at one point, Maduro was so close to fleeing that an airplane was prepared on a tarmac for his escape to Cuba.

The Latin American Risk Report quantifies that there is an 80% chance that Maduro will fall in 2020.

Marinov quantifies that, in any given year, sanctions increase the chance of a leader losing power by 28%.

Once one of these changes occurs, the International Monetary Fund, or IMF, can bailout Venezuela.

The IMF issues loans to countries who need access to capital to rebuild their economy, and is ready to lend to Venezuela. While an associate of Guaido has proposed that the IMF loan Venezuela \$60 billion over three years, Maduro has followed the lead of his predecessor Chavez and has shunned the IMF. [Forbes 19](#) finds that Maduro will never accept the reforms needed to access the funding, leading the [Financial Times](#) to write that Maduro is the biggest barrier to an IMF rescue.

[Americas Quarterly](#) reports two impacts:

One, restoring agricultural production. Aid and investment directed to short life cycle crops can yield a harvest within three to six months.

Two, restoring oil production. Unlike other oil producers in decline, Venezuela knows where much of its oil is and what it will take to get to it. Production could stabilize to pre-crisis conditions in six months.