## NEG BLOCKS

### AT: Deterrence

#### 1. Retrenchment won’t hurt deterrence – rather, our current overstretch creates real enemies

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 37-38) ESG

A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. “The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies,” Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses—the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. **There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran’s regional power.** Nato’s expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia’s ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States’ chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. **Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention.** Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. **The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.**

#### 2. Military buildup increases the chance of warfare

**Daniel Dolan, 2016** (Daniel Dolan, teaches Strategy & War with the Naval War College’s Distance Education program, and history as an adjunct professor at the University of Maine. November 23rd 2016. “Opinion: Trump’s Defense Increase Might Not Equal a Better Military,” *USNI News*, <https://news.usni.org/2016/11/23/opinion-trumps-defense-increase-might-not-equal-better-military>. Accessed Nov 28th 2016) ESG

The notion of being prepared in peacetime for any contingency has merit, and has been part of the U.S. military’s modus operandi since the end of World War II. But it should be noted that a lack of bombs, men or material was not the reason for the less-than-satisfactory state of affairs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reasons for the mixed results are far more complicated. **More worrisome is the knowledge of history that arms races can often be the catalyst for war.** One of the first instances of this is recorded by Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides wrote, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.” Also, **in the years leading up to World War I, Germany’s massive military buildup was one of the causal factors for the war. A final example of the risk of a military buildup came in 1940, when Japan knew the U.S. Navy authorized construction of new and powerful ships that would soon outnumber the Japanese fleet.** Imperial Japan opted to roll the dice and attack the U.S. fleet while the odds were still in their favor. It is noteworthy that the U.S. was laying keels and investing in new ships because they viewed a war with Japan as highly probable in the late 1930s. This gets back to the purpose of such a significant expansion of military power today and begs the question – for what purpose? **These historic examples show that a major military buildup in fact may increase the likelihood of war, rather than deter it. To spend trillions building up the military for no stated strategic reason, other than possibly the perception of increased deterrence, is strategically irrational.**

### AT: China Heg Bad

#### 1. If the US withdraws, China will assume hegemony and face the consequences

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

**Without the United States to ensure that its investments in areas such as Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa are protected, China, among other nations, will be required to increase its global presence and footprint. Since China lacks the moral hegemony of the U.S. these new commitments will have as their chief consequence the sapping of resources from other areas of Chinese national interest.** Like the U.S., who has found mounting military costs and other assorted expenditures to prove ultimately too burdensome, China will buckle under the newly assumed costs, assuring once again U.S. supremacy. **A brief period of apparent Chinese “hegemony” will do wonders for U.S. relations worldwide, as it hastens the process of forgetting past U.S. interventions while simultaneously providing a profoundly negative example of what hegemony will look like.** Any form of Chinese hegemony will inevitably prove more detrimental to other nations than U.S. hegemony due to the relative lack of clear moral purpose and the fact that domestically the Chinese government has proven itself willing to be authoritarian and ruthless in ways that the U.S. is not. **Mapped onto the international community, states will find Chinese “hegemony” to be even more burdensome and oppressive, leading them to direct their animosity, and hatred, against China rather than the U.S.**

### AT: Arctic Militarization

#### 1. Risk of conflict in the Arctic is unlikely

**Congressional Research Service November 2015** (The Congressional Research Service, incl. Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in Naval Affairs, Laura Comay, analyst in natural resources, Jane Leggett, specialist in energy and environmental policy, and more. November 25th 2015. “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service,* <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf>. Page 58-59) ESG

Similarly, Canadian academic Rob Huebert pointed out that in August 2010 the United States, Canada, and Denmark conducted in the Canadian Arctic their annual joint naval exercises involving several advanced and powerful warships. Huebert observed that “while defence officials are quick to point out they see no military threat to the region, it’s still interesting to see these three Arctic friends coming together to improve their naval combat capability in the Far North.”253 In varying degrees, the Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military presence in the high north.254 Although some have argued that terrorism and hijacking may constitute security concerns in the region, others maintain that such **threats are chimerical, given the challenges of distance and geography, and the difficulty of navigating in a polar environment. The Economist has asserted that “the risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, 95% of Arctic mineral resources are within agreed national boundaries.”**255 Other factors may also postpone energy exploration. For example, in the New York Times, three scholars noted that “the shale gas revolution is already delaying some Arctic energy projects.” In addition, some companies are reportedly “fearful of the financial and public relations risk of working in the pristine icy wilderness.”

#### 2. Russia isn’t trying to be threatening with its military in the Arctic, rather, it wants to strengthen cooperation and just aims to invest in infrastructure

**Jennifer Peters, 2015** (Jennifer Peters, contributor to *Vice News*. October 2nd 2015. “Russia Isn’t Trying to Start a War in the Arctic – It’s Just Keeping Out the Riffraff,” *Vice News*, <https://news.vice.com/article/russia-isnt-trying-to-start-a-war-in-the-arctic-its-just-keeping-out-the-riffraff>) ESG

The Arctic is heating up, and not just because of global warming. On Thursday, Norway's military chief announced plans to modernize and expand its forces to counter Russia's growing military presence in the Arctic, which has led to increased tensions in an already strained relationship. The announcement from Norway comes less than two weeks after Russia's Northern Fleet wrapped up a large-scale exercise in the Arctic that involved nearly 50 warships, more than 10 aircraft, and several hundred service members, which likely added to the pressure felt by Scandinavian neighbors. And the exercise was only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Russia's military strategy for the Arctic. Among Russia's plans are the reopening of numerous Cold War-era bases, the placement of surface-to-air missiles optimized for use in the region's freezing temperatures, and even the possible implementation of specially designed Arctic drones. There's also a big disparity in search-and-rescue capabilities — Russia has 41 icebreakers compared to America's two, and Russia is planning 10 new search-and-rescue stations. Finally, there is the fact that the US and its allies are dealing with ever-increasing tensions with Russia pretty much everywhere south of the Arctic Circle as well. Nevertheless, experts say that there's no need for igloo fallout shelters. Yet. **"The Russians have a right to protect the Arctic," said Lawson Brigham, a professor of Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. "Are they going to use that leverage to take over the place? I don't think so. And even if they wanted to, they couldn't."** Since 1996, Russia, along with the US and six other Arctic states, has been a member of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum that deals with economic and climate issues facing the Arctic states and the region's indigenous people. **Russia, for its part, has acted like a good neighbor during its time in the council**, working to prevent oil pollution and helping to promote scientific cooperation. **"One of our priorities in the Arctic is to keep balance between the economic activity and the preservation of the unique environment, respect for the culture, and traditional way of life of indigenous peoples," Russian President Vladimir Putin said last week at a meeting between Arctic Council members in Russia. "And, of course, we have consistently advocated the strengthening of cooperation with member states of the Arctic Council in all directions." A source familiar with Russia's role in the Arctic Council told VICE News that others in the region don't currently view the Russian military buildup as a threat. With its large Arctic population and long coastline, it simply makes sense that Russia would want to invest in infrastructure there, which would include military bases, ships, and weapons systems.** The Russian buildup may also be a show of power — not for Russia's Arctic neighbors, but for outside actors like China, who may be thinking about heading north.

#### 3. Arctic conflict is unlikely – militarization is only returning to former levels, and it must play nice to achieve its goals

**Elizabeth Buchanan, 2016** (Elizabeth Buchanan, Ph.D. candidate in the Centre for European Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. January 21st 2016. “Arctic Thaw,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-01-21/arctic-thaw>) ESG

By way of geography, Russia holds the largest stake in the Arctic. The nation shares a border with the Arctic that is over 4,000 miles long. And like the other Arctic Five powers (Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States), it maintains a strategy for the vast expanse that hinges on securing its border and modernizing its military installations. By the end of 2015, Russia will have secured military control of its entire Arctic border, although even this military presence will pale in comparison with military levels in the region during the Cold War. As it secures its borders, Russia will seek to upgrade Soviet-era military hardware. Its restoration of aging hardware and its plans to reopen existing military bases are necessary if it is to meet the needs of growing Arctic activity. In a sense, then, **discussions about an impending militarization of the Arctic have always been misleading, since the Arctic is merely returning to historical levels of military installations. Once Moscow secures its recognized Arctic borders, observers fear that it will inch northward. Here, the country’s annexation of Crimea and its sustained aggression toward Ukraine do not inspire trust. Yet the Arctic is simply a different beast. Russia’s Arctic strategy has a firm international legal foundation**—as its 2015 territorial claim confirms the geographic extension of Russia’s continental shelf toward the North Pole. But **Russia’s ambitions for the Arctic are far from expansionist, and so, the politics of the Arctic Circle must be isolated from broader global tensions.** Russia views its Arctic oil and gas as vital to its future economic prosperity, but it lacks the technological capacity to extract them without Western partners. That will curb Moscow’s ambitions, as **it will be forced to play nice in order to succeed.** Although it is not known exactly how large Arctic energy deposits are, a 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic holds 30 percent of the world’s remaining natural gas and 18 percent of the world’s remaining oil reserves. What’s more, the region is considered a treasure chest of rare earth mineral deposits in the form of iron ore and nickel. Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources claims the offshore Russian Arctic region possesses twice the volume of oil reserves held by Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the melting Arctic icecap will provide easier access to these vast resources. But **clashes over Arctic resources are not inevitable—in fact, they are unlikely. First, up to 80 percent of presumed Arctic resource wealth is actually located in uncontested areas of the Arctic, those territories that are well within preestablished boundaries.**

### AT: Heg Decline (Link Turn)

#### 1. A more isolationist military policy would save money while maintaining moral hegemony

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

What is clear, however, is that such expenditures are unsustainable given a national debt of over $15 trillion. As the country debates the potential for military action in the Middle East in both Syria and Iran the necessity of a levelheaded understanding of the costs of such interventions, and their potentially fatal consequences for American standing in the world, cannot be overstated. **Given the costs of large-scale foreign interventions, and the disproportionate share of the funding of organizations such as NATO and the United Nations that the United States carries, it is readily apparent that an isolationist foreign policy would present a prudent fiscal alternative to the current state of affairs.** Given the historical and ideological connotations associated with the term “isolationism” it is important to clarify its intended meaning here. By “isolationism” I am advocating for a steady devolvement from foreign commitments and military involvements while maintaining economic and diplomatic ties, as well as overall U.S. military might, in order to preserve the long-term future of American hegemony. **Here it might be argued that the concepts of isolationism and hegemony are antithetical.** It would appear impossible to be both isolationist and hegemonic. At the same time, however, **nothing could be further from the case.** Hegemony can be understood in a variety of ways, but is perhaps best explained as informal influence that one state enjoys over another. While it is often supposed that hegemony stems primarily from material influences, such as military, economic, or other coercive forms of power, **there are also nonmaterial bases of hegemonic power.** While an isolationist foreign policy might therefore contribute to an initial decrease in material hegemonic power, **it is still possible to wield nonmaterial hegemonic power through ideological clarity and moral integrity.** While there may be initial drawbacks to this new course in American foreign policy, over the long term they become limited to the point where they become irrelevant. **Furthermore an isolationist foreign policy does not require ceding claims to American exceptionalism or moral authority, one of the chief reasons given for an aggressive foreign policy in the first place.**

### AT: Heg Decline (Impact Turn)

#### 1. The US can pull back while still protecting its interests, thereby decreasing animosity and improving safety

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

When U.S. security is at stake it is not enough to depend on international institutions or the goodwill of other nations. **The clear path forward, therefore, lies with a slow yet steady devolvement from international affairs while maintaining a strong military capable of protecting the United States at its borders. The military should also be able to protect U.S. citizens and interests abroad, although in a restricted sense that moves away from current norms.** The benefits of an isolationist policy are clear: decreased costs and increased long-term security. Not only will the United States not have to pay for costly overseas bases and foreign aid that is of only dubious use to its own interests, but **it will also, through a reduction in the blowback effects caused by interventions, mean that there are less groups and individuals motivated to attack it. This lack of motivation will translate into increased security for U.S. interests both at home and abroad.** Detractors will invariably argue that such a scenario is hopelessly idealistic and naïve. It is impossible to undo hundreds of years of interventionist foreign policy simply through removing outward signs of the policy. Furthermore, deep-seated hatreds and animosities directed against the United States will not in and of themselves be swept away with such a bureaucratic maneuver. Certainly these criticisms are valid. Fundamentally realigning U.S. foreign policy towards an isolationist point of view will neither occur quickly, nor without costs.

### AT: Multilat Decline

#### 1. Retrenchment won’t hurt multilateralism; rather in the past it has helped relations

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 38) ESG

**Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington’s overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces’ repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul.** Calls for Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes**. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild.**

### AT: Russia is Mean

#### 1. Retrenchment from Europe could push Europe to improve its defense while saving the bduget

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 42) ESG

Although Russia continues to meddle in its near abroad and has employed oil and gas embargoes to coerce its immediate neighbors, **western Europe’s resources are more than sufficient to counter an assertive Russia.** A more autonomous Europe would take some time to develop a coherent security and defense policy and would not always see events through the same lens as Washington. **But reducing Europe’s dependence on the United States would create a strong incentive for European states to spend more on defense, modernize their forces, and better integrate their policies and capabilities. U.S. forces in the European theater could safely be reduced by 40–50 percent without compromising European security.**

#### 2. Europe can counterbalance Russia.

Ted Galen Carpenter, 2016 [Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute senior fellow and prolific author of books specializing in NATO. August 25th 2016. “NATO IS AN INSTITUTIONAL DINOSAUR” http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/nato-is-an-institutional-dinosaur/, accessed 12-15-16 TAP]

A striking feature of analysts who echo former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s contention that the United States is the “indispensable nation” is the bland assumption that America must take primary (and often exclusive) responsibility for the defense of other regions. One popular proposal is to reverse the post–Cold War drawdown of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. Advocates also typically want to pre-position large quantities of sophisticated weaponry in the Baltic republics and along other points on Russia’s western frontier so that the American military can ride to the rescue if Moscow engages in threatening behavior. The notion of the United States as the indispensable nation is a manifestation of national narcissism that is especially pernicious with respect to Europe. The European Union now has both a population and an economy larger than the United States. Equally pertinent, the European Union has three times the population and a gross domestic product (GDP) some ten times that of Russia — the principal security concern of those countries. Even post-Brexit, that impressive strength will be diminished just modestly. Clearly, the European Union is capable of building whatever defenses might be necessary to deter Russian aggression — even granting the questionable assumption that Moscow harbors large-scale expansionist ambitions instead of just seeking to preserve a limited security zone along its borders. The European nations have not done more to counter Russia because it has been easier for them to free-ride on America’s security efforts.

#### 3. The Russian threat is overblown

Barry Lowenkron and Mitchell Reiss 2016 [Barry Lowenkron, former US State Department assistant secretary of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and Mitchell Reiss, former State Department director of Policy Planning. September 11th 2016. “Pragmatic Primacy: How America Can Move Forward in a Changing World” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pragmatic-primacy-how-america-can-move-forward-changing-17652?page=show, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Does this mean that Russia presents an existential threat along the same lines as the Soviet Union? Hardly. To start, **Putin does not have the capacity to invade** western Europe. **Internally, Russia’s GDP has fallen 5 percent in the last few years**, taxes have been increased to compensate for lower rents from oil and natural gas exports, **inflation is approaching double digits, the business climate has eroded, and capital flight has accelerated. Overall, Russia’s population continues to shrink; it now has fewer people than Bangladesh.**

#### 4. The US just sent 4,000 troops to protect the Baltics and the troops are extremely capable

**Spark and Shubert 2017** (Laura Smith Spark and Atika Shubert, CNN reporters; 1/14/17; US troops in NATO show of force; CNN; DOA: 1/28/31; <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/14/europe/poland-us-troops-nato-welcome/>) AM

Speaking after the Polish leader, Paul Jones, the US ambassador to Poland, said **the troops arriving in Poland were "America's most capable force," embodying an "iron-clad commitment" to defend NATO allies**. Polish Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz said **the US troops would help ensure "freedom, independence and peace in Europe** and the whole world" and that **Poland was proud of "joint efforts that guarantee the security of Europe and of the eastern flanks of NATO.**" American soldiers "stand united on Polish soil to deter and defend," said Maj. Gen. Timothy McGuire, deputy commander of US Land Forces in Europe. He added that **the troops' arrival was a "concrete sign of the continued US commitment to** the defense of Poland and **the NATO alliance**." **The 3rd Armored Combat Brigade Team of the 4th Infantry Division "is a highly capable and ready force with the best equipment, leadership and training of any combat force in the world,"** he said. **To maintain combat readiness, the soldiers will conduct "realistic exercises" with allies in locations across Poland and Europe**, McGuire added. Commitment to European allies A convoy of US troops and military equipment crossed the border into Poland on Thursday, having arrived earlier in the week in Bremerhaven, Germany. Having assembled in Poland, the brigade combat team, deployed from Fort Carson, Colorado, will disperse across seven locations in Eastern Europe for training and exercises with European allies. **It** will serve as part of a rotation of American military assets in the region and **is part of an effort to demonstrate the US commitment to European allies in the wake of Russian President Vladimir Putin's intervention in Ukraine**, according to Lt. Gen. Tim Ray, deputy commander of US European Command. Deploying the troops and military hardware is the latest in a series of moves by the United States to ramp up its land, sea and air presence in Europe against a backdrop of concern over potential Russian aggression. Russia: 'A threat to us' Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told journalists on a conference call Thursday that Russia's response was a natural reaction to an increase in military strength by a neighbor. "We see it as a threat to us. This is an action that threatens our interests, our security; moreover, this is a third nation (apart from Russia and Poland) that is increasing its military presence near our borders in Europe, and it's not even a European nation. "One thousand or 10,000 -- we're talking about the increase of military presence. There's nothing to add." US President-elect Donald Trump has said that he would like to improve US relations with Russia. But Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski warned in an interview Friday with Poland's RMF radio that any warming of the US-Russia relationship should not come at his country's expense. Posting on Twitter, Waszczykowski said he had spoken with Trump's advisers in the United States. "Americans think about the world and relations with Russia much like we do. We have nothing to fear," he said. Poland and other NATO allies in the region are keen to show their support for the US deployment, which comes at a time of uncertainty over the incoming Trump administration's commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance. During the campaign, Trump repeatedly questioned the utility of NATO and its members' financial contributions to the alliance, which many see as a bulwark against Russia. However, his nominee for defense secretary, retired **Gen. James Mattis, a former supreme allied commander of NATO,** [**voiced unequivocal support for the alliance**](http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/12/politics/james-mattis-defense-confirmation/index.html) in confirmation hearings this week and said he had said as much to Trump. Joint exercises A significant portion of the 4,000-strong US force will be garrisoned at Polish military bases in Zagan, Boleslawiec, Swietoszow and Skwierzyna, the US Embassy in Poland said. While on a nine-month deployment, **the US troops will carry out training and exercises in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary**, the embassy said. "We're here to deter any aggression that would threaten peace and security in this region," said Col. Christopher R. Norrie, commander of the 3rd Armored Combat Brigade Team, 4th Infantry Division, in a statement. **Along with the troop increase, 2,400 pieces of military equipment including tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, trucks and containers have been deployed.** They were transported using three cargo ships, rail, commercial line-haul and a military convoy, US Army Europe said. The US troop deployment to Europe was agreed to following NATO summits in 2014 [and 2016](http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/europe/robertson-nato-analysis/index.html) dominated by deep concern over [Russia's increased assertiveness](http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/opinions/nato-summit-responds-to-russia-brzezinski/index.html) and military power. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war waged by pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine have particularly unnerved NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.

### AT: China is Mean

#### 1. Retrenchment from East Asia could prevent Chinese aggression using cheaper methods

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 42-43) ESG

Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. **Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States.** Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, **these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements**, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War. In the event that China becomes domineering, **U.S. allies on its borders will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses.** Yet such a state of affairs is hardly inevitable. **For now, there are many less expensive alternatives that can strengthen the current line of defense, such as technology transfers, arms sales, and diplomatic mediation.** Defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers currently stationed in each country. **Phasing out 20 percent of those forces while repositioning others to Guam or Hawaii would achieve the same results more efficiently.**

#### 2. US allies specifically bandwagon when it comes to China – a more restrained posture would create a stable regional balance of power.

**Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, 2016** [Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute defense and foreign policy studies analysts, 8-10-16, “EAST ASIA AND A STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT” http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/east-asia-and-a-strategy-of-restraint/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Yet U.S. allies have little incentive to continue more assertive policies if the United States increases its security commitments to the region. American policymakers should not continue increasing America’s military presence in East Asia. Rather, they should begin planning for long-term reductions in forward-deployed forces. This will provide allies with the necessary time to expand their defenses to provide a more sustainable deterrent. This restrained posture will be less costly and less dangerous than attempting to maintain U.S. military dominance in the region indefinitely.

#### 3. If the US withdraws, China will assume hegemony and face the consequences

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

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#### 4. Economic threats, if legitimate, are a better solvency mechanism for Chinese aggression

Fox 14(Heather Fox, graduate of USAF Academy MA Degrees in strategic intelligence and defense studies, Spring 2014, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “China: An Unlikely Economic Hegemon,” [http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring\_2014/fox.pdf DoA 1/11/17](http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/spring_2014/fox.pdf%20DoA%201/11/17)) CJV

Despite an apparent working relationship on the economic front, the same cannot be said for US military and diplomatic relations with China. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, its military buildup with opaque strategic intent, and cyber intrusions are just some concerns where the United States has recently tried to exert diplomatic and military power to clarify or change Chinese actions. Despite considerable effort and increased US military presence in Southeast Asia, the United States has had little to no success in altering these Chinese activities.100 On the other hand, the instances of fiscal pressure account for just a few examples of US economic power, and many more fiscal issues have been resolved through US pressure and threats of economic sanctions.101 Although these illustrations have far deeper complexities than presented here, they demonstrate the general trend of China bending to US pressure when that pressure is in the form of an economic rebuke rather than political or military threats.

#### 5. On the contrary, military aggression will beckon more aggression

Charlie Campbell, 2017 (Charlie Campbell, writer for Time magazine. January 12, 2017. “Chinese Media has told Rex Tillerson to ‘Prepare for a Military Clash,” *Time*, http://time.com/4634078/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-donald-trump/. DoA: January 21, 2017.) TG

Although a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman declined to answer a journalist’s question about possible responses to American naval incursions into the vital trade corridor, China’s notoriously strident state media pulled no punches.“Tillerson’s statements regarding the islands in the South China Sea are far from professional,” the Chinese Communist Party–linked Global Times declared in an editorial on Friday. **“If Trump’s diplomatic team shapes future Sino-U.S. ties as it is doing now, the two sides had better prepare for a military clash.” The state-backed China Daily described Tillerson’s remarks as “a mishmash of naivety, shortsightedness, worn-out prejudices, and unrealistic political fantasies. Should he act on them in the real world, it would be disastrous [and] set a course for devastating confrontation between China and the U.S.”**

### AT: South China Sea

#### 1. US power projection fails to deter China – China has increased aggressiveness – US military shifts will only risk spiraling conflict.

**Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, 2016** [Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute defense and foreign policy studies analysts, 8-10-16, “EAST ASIA AND A STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT” http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/east-asia-and-a-strategy-of-restraint/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

The Obama administration’s response to these challenges has been the “pivot” or rebalance to Asia. This is an attempt to shift security and diplomatic resources from a Middle East-centric policy toward Asia with the aim of preserving Washington’s traditional regional dominance. However, placing more military assets in the region and increasing American participation in regional institutions served to increase Chinese perceptions that the United States was seeking to contain China’s growing power. Beijing has pushed back against this perceived containment effort by increasing its own military power, which encourages Washington to demonstrate its resolve in turn, creating a dangerous spiral of tension. Instead of continuing the “pivot” or “rebalance” and bolstering American primacy, U.S. policymakers should focus on deterring armed conflict with China, encourage burden shifting and greater initiative by U.S. allies, and reform those alliances to keep pace with the changing security environment. There are a variety of potential flashpoints for conflict in the western Pacific that could bring China and the United States into military conflict. They include Taiwan, as well as territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. The Chinese military has fielded increasingly capable weapons systems designed to prevent U.S. forces from operating in these disputed areas, posing a major challenge to the dominant position of the U.S. military in the region. At the same time, the Chinese approach to these territorial disputes, particularly its island building in the South China Sea, has antagonized many Asian states, including nominally unaligned states like Vietnam as well as the Philippines and Japan, both of which are U.S. treaty allies. These disputes thus raise the potential for U.S. entanglement in military conflict with a well-armed and highly motivated adversary. Demonstrations of American resolve, such as the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, have not caused China to cease its confrontational activities.

#### 2. Further attempts will likely worsen this

Ryan Pickrell, 2015. (Ryan Pickrell, writer for The National Interest with a master’s degree in International Relations. October 26, 2015. “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?,” *The National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168>. DoA: 1/12/17) NB

In August of this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards.” The Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation” exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in order to force China to end its land reclamation activities. Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, “China mustn’t tolerate rampant US violations of China’s adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to Washington’s level of provocation.” The article further stated, “If the US encroaches on China’s core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it.” The article stated plainly, “If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach China’s bottom line, and China will not sit idly by.” Other reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers.

#### 3. **The Chinese media has amplified this risk – our action will be met with retaliation**

Charlie Campbell, 2017 (Charlie Campbell, writer for Time magazine. January 12, 2017. “Chinese Media has told Rex Tillerson to ‘Prepare for a Military Clash,” *Time*, http://time.com/4634078/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-donald-trump/. DoA: January 21, 2017.) TG

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#### 4. Retrenchment from East Asia could prevent Chinese aggression using cheaper methods

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 42-43) ESG

Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. **Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States.** Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, **these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements**, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War. In the event that China becomes domineering, **U.S. allies on its borders will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses.** Yet such a state of affairs is hardly inevitable. **For now, there are many less expensive alternatives that can strengthen the current line of defense, such as technology transfers, arms sales, and diplomatic mediation.** Defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers currently stationed in each country. **Phasing out 20 percent of those forces while repositioning others to Guam or Hawaii would achieve the same results more efficiently.**

#### 5. US allies specifically bandwagon when it comes to China – a more restrained posture would create a stable regional balance of power.

**Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, 2016** [Eric Gomez and Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute defense and foreign policy studies analysts, 8-10-16, “EAST ASIA AND A STRATEGY OF RESTRAINT” http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/east-asia-and-a-strategy-of-restraint/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Yet U.S. allies have little incentive to continue more assertive policies if the United States increases its security commitments to the region. American policymakers should not continue increasing America’s military presence in East Asia. Rather, they should begin planning for long-term reductions in forward-deployed forces. This will provide allies with the necessary time to expand their defenses to provide a more sustainable deterrent. This restrained posture will be less costly and less dangerous than attempting to maintain U.S. military dominance in the region indefinitely.

#### 6. If the US withdraws, China will assume hegemony and face the consequences

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

**Without the United States to ensure that its investments in areas such as Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa are protected, China, among other nations, will be required to increase its global presence and footprint. Since China lacks the moral hegemony of the U.S. these new commitments will have as their chief consequence the sapping of resources from other areas of Chinese national interest.** Like the U.S., who has found mounting military costs and other assorted expenditures to prove ultimately too burdensome, China will buckle under the newly assumed costs, assuring once again U.S. supremacy. **A brief period of apparent Chinese “hegemony” will do wonders for U.S. relations worldwide, as it hastens the process of forgetting past U.S. interventions while simultaneously providing a profoundly negative example of what hegemony will look like.** Any form of Chinese hegemony will inevitably prove more detrimental to other nations than U.S. hegemony due to the relative lack of clear moral purpose and the fact that domestically the Chinese government has proven itself willing to be authoritarian and ruthless in ways that the U.S. is not. **Mapped onto the international community, states will find Chinese “hegemony” to be even more burdensome and oppressive, leading them to direct their animosity, and hatred, against China rather than the U.S.**

### AT: Middle East Defense

#### 1. Small forces in the Middle East could still carry out goals while avoiding large risks

**Joseph Parent and Paul MacDonald 2011** (Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, and Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. November/December 2011. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2011-10-14/wisdom-retrenchment?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-112311-the_wisdom_of_retrenchment_2-112311>. Page 43-44) ESG

More broadly, the Pentagon should devote fewer resources to maintaining and developing its capabilities for engaging in peripheral conflicts, such as the war in Afghanistan. Nation building and counter - insurgency operations have a place in U.S. defense planning, but not a large one. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised the profile of counterinsurgency doctrine and brought prominence to its advocates and practitioners, such as David Petraeus, the retired general who is now director of the CIA. This is an understandable development, considering that the defense establishment was previously unprepared to wage a counterinsurgency war. But such conflicts require enormous commitments of blood and treasure over many years, rarely result in decisive victory, and seldom bring tangible rewards. **A retrenching United States would sidestep such high-risk, low-return endeavors, especially when counterterrorism and domestic law enforcement and security measures have proved to be effective alternatives.** Although they cannot solve every problem, **relatively small forces that do not require massive bases can nevertheless carry out significant strikes— as evidenced by the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.**

### AT: Space Militarization

#### 1. Weaponizing space hurts int’l relations and spurs more proliferation

**Michael Krepon, 2004** (Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. 2004. “Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,” *Arms Control Association*, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon>. Accessed December 5th 2016. Page 2) ESG

**Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hairtrigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan.** The Bush administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. **The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart** if the Bush administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.

#### 2. Space militarization promotes an arms race

**V.S. Vereshchetin, 2010** (V.S. Vereshchetin, Director of the International Institute of Space Law. April 2010. “THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE IN THE GENERAL LEGAL FIELD (COMMONALITY AND PARTICULARITIES),” *Revista Brasileira de Direito Aeronáutico e Espacial*, http://www.sbda.org.br/revista/1826.pdf. Accessed Dec 5 2016. Page 47) ESG

However, up to now outer space has remained free from weapons as such. **The situation would radically change should the plans for space-based weapons go ahead and trigger a new spiral in the arms race both in outer space and on earth. Even the deployment of “conventional” weapons in outer space**, which is not formally and specifically prohibited by any treaty in force, **could ultimately make of outer space a “fourth battlefield”.** The gloomy prospect of a war in outer space would be in no-one’s interest. It remains to be seen whether the pledge of President Barack Obama, during his election campaign, to seek a ban on space weapons will lead to a substantial change to this effect in the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy formulated by the Bush Administration. That policy was widely viewed as giving a green light to U.S. weapons in space and in the past was translated into the inexorable refusal of the American delegation in the Conference on Disarmament even to start negotiations on a treaty which would secure nonweaponization of outer space. Such negotiations were labelled “pointless and unneeded”.(26)

#### 3. Such a problem spurs Sino-Russian ties

**Michael Krepon, 2004** (Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs. 2004. “Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,” *Arms Control Association*, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon>. Accessed December 5th 2016. Page 7) ESG

**Even if space weapons are not used, their flight-testing or presence overhead, capable of impairing a country’s ability to see, hear, navigate, detect impending danger, and fight, would have profound implications for international relations.** The medium of space is not country-specific. **The placement of space weapons in low-Earth orbit will be of concern to any country over which the space weapon passes or could pass** with orbital adjustments. Washington policymakers do not talk often or publicly about space warfare, and China and Russia continue to seek improved ties to the United States. **There is, however, considerable awareness in Moscow and Beijing about the Pentagon’s plans and deep skepticism that the Pentagon’s interest in space warfare is directed solely at states such as North Korea and Iran.** Instead, the Air Force’s new counterspace doctrine is widely viewed in the broader context of the Bush administration’s endorsement of pre-emptive strikes and preventive wars, open-ended national missile defense deployments, and the integration of improved broad-area surveillance and conventional deep-strike capabilities alongside U.S. nuclear forces, which remain on high states of alert. **If U.S. counterspace programs proceed, Russia and China can be expected to forge closer ties, pursuing joint diplomatic initiatives to prevent the weaponization of space, alongside military research and development programs to counter U.S. military options.** Instead of engaging in a Cold War-like nuclear arms race with Washington, Moscow and Beijing will compete asymmetrically, using less elaborate and expensive techniques, such as by trailing expensive U.S. space weapons and satellites with cheap space mines.

#### 4. Space militarization increases proliferation on the ground too

**Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang, 2008** (Pavel Podvig, Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. 2008. “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” *American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf>. Accessed Dec 5 2016. Page v-vi) ESG

In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the programs laid out in its planning documents. This makes probable the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications for international security be? The American Academy called upon two scholars to further elucidate answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military plans for space. Pavel Podvig, a research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, discusses possible Russian responses, given their current capabilities and strategic outlook. Hui Zhang, a research associate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, considers Chinese responses. Each scholar suggests **that introducing weapons into space will have negative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security.** As Podvig points out, **Russia’s main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deployment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely.** Podvig writes, “Russia does not have many options for the development of its own weapon systems in space or for its reaction to the development of this capability by other countries. . . . However, this does not mean that there will be no reaction.” He suggests that **Russia will be more likely to undertake other countermeasures such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles, measures that are “the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons.”** Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. plans will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting current civilian and commercial initiatives, but focuses on a much greater concern among Chinese officials—that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. **China’s options for response**, as detailed by Zhang, **include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China’s commitments on arms control. Thus introducing weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international non-proliferation regime.** Zhang concludes, “U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country’s security interests.”

### AT: Renewables (Energy Independence Turns)

#### 1. The US’s withdrawal from the oil game allows China to fill the gaps, lifting it to the number one geopolitical force

**Matthew Hulbert, 2012.** (Matthew Hulbert, Lead Analyst for European Energy Review and consultant to numerous governments and institutional investors. August 19th 2012. “America Will Deeply Regret Its Fixation On Energy Independence,” *Forbes / Energy*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/19/why-america-will-deeply-regret-us-energy-independence/#1c8986006d82>) ESG

**The problem for America is that doubts over U.S. credibility are already creeping in from the energy independence hype.** No one expects the US to step back into Iraq to shore up supplies if things take a serious turn for the worse; nobody expects the U.S. to provide any serious state building measures in Sudan. Likewise strategic US interests in Central Asia now have more to do with American concerns over South Asia, rather than hydrocarbon provision. If Russia decided to re-exert its regional dominance over the Caucasus (circa 2008) the U.S. would be highly unlikely to take any assertive measures to the contrary. Such out-posts are seen as ‘nice to have’ assets for US geopolitical standing, not as crucial global oil interests for America to underwrite and secure. Under a ‘business as usual’ scenario, these gaps are only going to get wider from hereon in. **Logic therefore dictates that consumers need a U.S. plan B, and fast.** The good news is that **China already has one. It’s expanding its international energy footprint in the Middle East, Africa, Russia, Central Asia, and Asia-Pacific, reaching as far as the Americas and UK North Sea to secure its energy needs**, (and hedge price risk more effectively through equity stakes). As the second largest consumer of oil, and one of the most import dependent states, Beijing is well aware that it has to ensure its own security of supply over the next decade as the US winds down its hydrocarbon presence. **China will become the number one geopolitical force in the world over the next twenty years, and will do so for one, very simple reason: securing global hydrocarbon supplies.** Europe has been very slow to appreciate this, but is finally cottoning onto the idea that it’s useless merely talking to prospective suppliers adjacent to its borders. It needs to work hand in hand with consumers at the other end of the Eurasian pipeline – namely China – to ensure its own security of supply. As Beijing plays a more prominent energy role, European energy security will depend on its ability to exploit Chinese influence in Central Asia as a mutual ‘Beijing-Brussels’ hedge against Russia, while working towards a consumer driven market to enhance supplies from the Middle East & North Africa. Europe is far better served taking the scraps from China’s energy table rather than wishful thinking that the trans-Atlantic ‘energy relationship’ still holds good. **Like it or not, the logical conclusion of U.S. energy independence is fundamental demand side realignment where new players fill new geopolitical gaps.**

#### 2. Oil dependence helps keep peace

**Roger Howard, 2008** (Roger Howard,writer and broadcaster specializing in IR, **author of "The Oil Hunters: Exploration and Espionage in the Middle East,”** November 29th 2008, “An Ode to Oil”, Wall Street Journal, [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html)//AY](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html%29//AY)

**Oil can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability because many conflicts, in almost every part of the world**, can threaten a disruption of supply and instantly send crude prices spiraling. Despite the recent price falls, the market is still vulnerable to sudden supply shocks, and a sharp increase would massively affect the wider global economy. This would have potentially disastrous social and political results, just as in the summer many countries, including France, Nepal and Indonesia, were rocked by violent protests at dramatic price increases in gasoline. Haunted by the specter of higher oil prices at a time of such economic fragility, **many governments have a very strong incentive to use diplomacy, not force, to resolve their own disputes, and to help heal other people's. This is true not just of oil consumers but producers**, which would also be keen not to watch global demand stifled by such price spikes. Consider the events of last fall, **when the Ankara government was set to retaliate against the Iraq-based Kurdish guerrillas who had killed 17 Turkish soldiers and taken others prisoner in a cross-border raid** on Oct. 21, 2007. Even the mere prospect of such an attack sent the price of a barrel surging to a then record high of $85 because the markets knew that the insurgents could respond by damaging a key pipeline which moves 750,000 barrels of oil across Turkish territory every day. Not surprisingly, the Bush administration pushed very hard to prevent a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq -- State Department spokesman Sean McCormack aptly described the frenzy of diplomatic activity as a "full-court press" -- not just to avoid shattering the vestiges of Iraq's political structure but also to stabilize oil prices**. In the end it was American pressure that averted a major incursion, allowing crude prices to quickly ease**. And the Turks would also have been aware that any invasion could have prompted retaliatory damage on the oil pipeline, losing them vast transit fees. **In general, oil is such a vital commodity, for consumers, producers and intermediaries alike, that it represents a meeting point for all manner of different interests**. Sometimes **it offers an opportunity for competitors and rivals to resolve differences,** as in March 1995, when Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to break deadlock with Washington by offering a technically very demanding oil contract to Conoco. Today, the symbiotic energy requirements of Europe and Russia allows scope to improve mutual relations, not least if European governments act in unison to impose the rules of the European Union's energy charter on Moscow. **Oil also gives consumers a chance to penalize, or tempt, international miscreants,** just as U.S. sanctions are forcing the Tehran regime to reassess its cost-benefit analysis of building the bomb.

#### 3. Energy dependence keeps us safe, more energy secure

**Jason Bordoff, November 2015.** (Jason Bordoff, founding director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former energy advisor to President Obama. November 16th 2015. “Why the U.S. Should Not Want Energy Independence,” *The Wall Street Journal*,<http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/16/why-the-u-s-should-not-want-energy-independence/tab/print/>) ESG

**There are two problems, however, with this isolationist approach to energy independence that misunderstands today’s realities. First, it doesn’t reflect the highly integrated global energy market in which we now live.** Saudi Arabia, for example, from which the U.S. still imports 1.2 million barrels a day, couldn’t cut off oil supply to the U.S. even if it wanted to. Unlike in the 1970s, where a disruption in contracted shipments could result in a physical shortage for the buyer, today’s oil market is the largest and most liquid commodity market on earth. That means that if Saudi Arabia stopped sending oil to the U.S., companies would just buy it from other suppliers. **Second, and more important, we are more secure, not less, when energy markets are interdependent. When Hurricanes Rita and Katrina disrupted much of the Gulf Coast’s vast production and refining capacity, fuel shortages were averted by the ability to import supplies quickly from the global market.** When U.S. refiners lost access to large volumes of imports from Venezuela in 2002 and 2003 during a worker strike there, they replaced the disrupted supplies and avoided shortages with imports from other countries. In both cases, free trade in a highly integrated global energy market made us more secure. **During the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan was more energy secure because it could import other sources of fuel, like oil and gas, from the global market to meet electricity generation demand.** In that case, energy security was also improved by the ability to use multiple fuels to generate electricity. Such substitutability of fuels barely exists for oil in the transportation sector, however, creating added energy security vulnerabilities for oil use.

#### 4. Oil independence catalyzes illegal trades

**Gregory Miller, 2010** – (Gregory Miller, Lecturer in Political Science at Oklahoma State University and adjunct Professor of Liberal Studies at University of Oklahoma. April 2010. “The Security Costs of Energy Independence”, The Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf)//AY

**Historically, when states have been unable to generate revenue through normal trade channels, they sought other sources of wealth. As oil-exporting states experience economic turmoil, particularly if their governments feel they must generate wealth to maintain control** or to avoid some of the issues discussed above, **many will probably turn to the sale of illicit goods such as drugs and military hardware. There** are several examples of states engaging in such behavior when economic needs arise. For example, Ukraine’s lack of hard currency since its independence in 1991 has led it to become one of the most active suppliers of legal and illegal small arms. Although the Taliban in Afghanistan initially claimed to oppose drugs on religious grounds, they turned a blind eye to the cultivation of drugs when revenue coming into the country from any other sources dried up. **For other examples of states turning to illicit trade resulting from the loss of legitimate revenue, one need only examine the behavior of states following the imposition of trade sanctions. North Korea and Libya each developed networks for arms sales, including nuclear and missile technology.** North Korea continues to lack outlets for legal trade because of international sanctions and relies on several illicit ways of earning money. According to the Institute for Defense Analyses’ Andrew Coe: In the 1990s, North Korea engaged in considerable illegitimate trade, including large-scale narcotics trafficking, currency counterfeiting, ballistic missile sales, and industrial and sexual slavery. These new exports grew in parallel with the decline in legal exports. Missile technology and conventional weapons make up as much as 40 percent of North Korea’s total exports. The regime earns $1.5 billion from missile sales alone, representing 8.8 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Although this amount pales in comparison to the United States, which led the world in arms sales at $37.8 billion in 2008**, the risk is the potential growth in arms sales by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, much of which would go to trouble spots in the Middle East** and the rest of the developing world. **The danger here is not simply creating illicit trade networks but the link between such networks and various forms of political violence, both within states and across borders.** For example, several terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Euskadi ta Askatasuna in Spain, had links to narcotics as well as arms trafficking and were more active as a result of those connections. Therefore, rather than wait for illicit trade networks to develop and then spend the kind of money **the United States** has been spending in combating drugs in countries such as Colombia and Mexico, the West **should act now to prevent the growth of such networks in oil-exporting states.**

#### 5. Oil embargoes are bound to fail – they are not a risk

**Foundation for Economic Education, 2008.** (Foundation for Economic Education, American nonprofit educational organization dedicated to teaching American economic, ethical and legal principles. October 1st 2008. “Let’s Not Be Energy Independent,” *Foundation for Economic Education*, <http://fee.org/freeman/lets-not-be-energy-independent/>) ESG

It is true, and troublesome, that the world oil industry is largely a government-run industry with all the problems that accompany government enterprise—high cost, slow reaction times, little innovation, and so on. And it would be nice if governments in Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Britain, Norway, and Canada denationalized their oil supplies. But until that happens, it’s still better to pay the lower price that producers in the world market charge rather than the higher price that would result from “independence.” Some people worry that a government in a major oil-producing country—Saudi Arabia, for example—might get upset at the U.S. government and take it out on Americans by refusing to sell us oil. But such **a selective embargo is bound to fail. Imagine that Saudi Arabia cuts oil exports to the United States, but maintains total exports. Then it must sell these suddenly freed-up oil supplies somewhere else. Let’s say that it ships the additional oil to buyers in China. Then those buyers will want to buy that much less oil from their old suppliers.** Presto! **The American buyers’ problems are solved because they can get this oil. In short, when the government of one country tries to selectively target people in another country, but still wishes to maintain output, it cannot succeed. The selective “oil weapon” is a dud.** It’s like a game of musical chairs with the same number of chairs as players. The game would be awfully boring, which is why it is not played that way. But in the case of international trade, boring is good.

### AT: Renewables (Biofuel Good)

#### 1. Biofuel increases food prices and demand

**Robert Bryce, 2014** (Robert Bryce, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute writing for *Bloomberg View*. May 8th 2014. “Biofuels Are a Bad Idea,” *Bloomberg View*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-05-08/biofuels-are-a-bad-idea>. Accessed December 8th 2016) ESG

**Corn ethanol also makes food more expensive. A large increase in biofuels production in the U.S. and Europe was the most important reason that grain prices rose by 140 percent from January 2002 to February 2008**, according to the World Bank. **Since 2004, biofuels from crops have almost doubled the rate of growth in global demand for grain and sugar, according to a 2011 study.** From 2006 to 2011, global biofuels production doubled to 600 million barrels per year, or about 1.64 million barrels per day, according to Jean Ziegler, a former member of the Swiss parliament who was the United Nations special rapporteur on the right to food from 2000 to 2008. But ethanol contains only about two-thirds of the heat energy of oil. Therefore, the actual energy produced from biofuels in 2011 was closer to 1.2 million barrels of oil equivalent per day. Producing that volume of fuel, says Ziegler, required 100 million hectares (247 million acres) of land.

#### 2. Clearing land for biofuels *worsens* warming

**David Biello, 2008** (David Biello, associate editor at *Scientific American* who has covered energy for nearly a decade. February 7th 2008. “Biofuels Are Bad for Feeding People and Combating Climate Change,” *Scientific American*, [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biofuels-bad-for-people-and-climate/#](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biofuels-bad-for-people-and-climate/). Accessed 12/11/2016) ESG

Converting corn to ethanol in Iowa not only leads to clearing more of the Amazonian rainforest, researchers report in a pair of new studies in *Science*, but also would do little to slow global warming—and often make it worse. "Prior analyses made an accounting error," says one study's lead author, Tim Searchinger, an agricultural expert at Princeton University. "There is a huge imbalance between the carbon lost by plowing up a hectare [2.47 acres] of forest or grassland from the benefit you get from biofuels." Growing plants store carbon in their roots, shoots and leaves. As a result, the world's plants and the soil in which they grow contain nearly three times as much carbon as the entire atmosphere. "I know when I look at a tree that half the dry weight of it is carbon," says ecologist **David Tilman of the University of Minnesota**, coauthor of the other study which examined the "carbon debt" embedded in any biofuel. "That's going to end up as carbon dioxide in the atmosphere when you cut it down." By turning crops such as corn, sugarcane and palm oil into biofuels—whether ethanol, biodiesel, or something else—proponents hope to reap the benefits of the carbon soaked up as the plants grow to offset the carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted when the resulting fuel is burned. But whether biofuels emit more or less CO2 than gasoline depends on what the land they were grown on was previously used for, both studies show. Tilman **and his colleagues examined the overall CO2 released when land use changes occur. Converting the grasslands of the U.S. to grow corn results in excess greenhouse gas emissions of 134 metric tons of CO2 per hectare—a debt that would take 93 years to repay by replacing gasoline with corn-based ethanol. And converting jungles to palm plantations or tropical rainforest to soy fields would take centuries to pay back their carbon debts. "Any biofuel that causes land clearing is likely to increase global warming,"** says ecologist Joseph Fargione of The Nature Conservancy, lead author of the second study. "It takes decades to centuries to repay the carbon debt that is created from clearing land."

#### 3. The payoff is near nonexistent because biofuel and biodiesel require obscene amounts of land for very little power

**Robert Bryce, 2014** (Robert Bryce, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute writing for *Bloomberg View*. May 8th 2014. “Biofuels Are a Bad Idea,” *Bloomberg View*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-05-08/biofuels-are-a-bad-idea>. Accessed December 8th 2016) ESG

**Biofuels have**, in Kiefer's words, **"an anemic power density of only 0.3 watts per square meter."** For comparison, modern solar photovoltaic panels are about 6 watts per square meter, or 20 times more; an average oil well producing 10 barrels per day is 27 watts per square meter; and an average nuclear plant is more than 50 watts per square meter. **The low areal power density of biofuels cannot be overcome, because it's due to the limits of photosynthesis.** Chlorophyll is the preeminent converter of sunlight into energy, but it does so at its own pace. The low power density of biofuels means that vast expanses of land are needed to produce even small quantities of them. For example, Kiefer notes **that if we wanted to replace all of the oil used for transportation in the U.S. with corn-based ethanol, it would require about 700 million acres to be planted in nothing but corn. That would be 37 percent of the continental U.S., and more than "triple the current amount of annually harvested cropland."** Do you prefer biodiesel? Kiefer calculates that **relying on soy biodiesel to replace domestic oil would take 3.2 billion acres -- "one billion more than all U.S. territory including Alaska."**

### AT: Readiness

#### 1. There is no readiness crisis

**Travis Tritten 2016** [Travis Tritten, journalist at Stars and Stripes. September 18th 2016. “Military readiness crisis: Is it reality or just politics?” http://www.stripes.com/military-readiness-crisis-is-it-reality-or-just-politics-1.429773, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

The ongoing debate over whether the military is sufficiently ready to fight and defend the country was shaken up in August. Retired Army Gen. David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the nonprofit Brookings Institution think tank, said the readiness “crisis” being hammered home by Republicans in Congress is a myth. “While there are areas of concern, **there is no crisis in military readiness**,” Petraeus and O’Hanlon wrote in a joint column published by the Wall Street Journal in August. The claim runs contrary to the growing alarm among lawmakers, dire warnings from military brass testifying to Congress and recent media reports of Marines scavenging museum parts to keep aircraft flying. Petraeus and O’Hanlon argued defense spending is still comparable to Cold War-era spending, sufficient money is being spent on new hardware and the hardware the military already owns is in good shape. Furthermore, training is increasing and the all-volunteer force attracts high-quality troops. It was a striking departure from the GOP chairmen of the Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate. “What’s happened over the last few years is that budget cuts coupled with deployments, at a pace and a number that have not really declined very much, have caused a readiness crisis in all the services,” Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, said in July. In one of his last floor speeches before the summer recess, Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., said: “Each of our military services remains underfunded, undersized, and unready to meet current and future threats.” What is the truth? Budget experts are divided. “I think a lot of the discussion about readiness is just about politics, really,” said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget analysis at the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The readiness crisis is being used as a tool, if you will,to focus attention on the defense budget and as leverage to get an increase in the defense budget**.**” Thornberry has run point on a House budget plan that hikes defense spending by $18 billion, and McCain floated the same increase on the Senate floor in June but it was voted down. But accounts of strain in the services have also abounded as Congress puts together a budget. The Air Force, now at its smallest size in history, used the term “crisis” in August when it revealed it could be short 1,000 fighter pilots in the next few years. The Army is slashing its end strength and says only 30 percent of its brigade combat teams are ready to deploy. The number of Marine Corps aircraft that are ready to fly has plummeted and in some cases Marines must scour old planes for parts. “You either need to increase investment in the military at large or have a conversation about what we want the military to do on a daily basis,” said Justin Johnson, a senior policy analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation. The quality of readiness is also notoriously elusive. It depends on a wide spectrum of military factors and ultimately a judgment call on how they sum up. “Ready for what?” said Katherine Blakeley, a research fellow at the nonprofit Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Factors in readiness can include depot maintenance, hours of use of aircraft and Army full-spectrum training. Also, the types of battles the military must be ready to fight shifts, such as the Army refocusing on conflicts with major powers such as Russia and China. “We’re kind of widening our aperture of the kind of scenarios we’re facing,” Blakeley said.

#### 2. The US has the top military in the world – there is no readiness crisis.

**David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon 2016** [David Petraeus, former CIA director, and Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution senior fellow, 8-9-16, “The Myth of a U.S. Military ‘Readiness’ Crisis: Sequestration cuts have presented challenges. But America’s fighting forces remain second to none.” http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myth-of-a-u-s-military-readiness-crisis-1470783221, accessed 2-14-16, TAP]

U.S. military readiness is again a hot issue in the presidential election, but unfortunately the current debate glosses over some of the most important facts. While Congress’s sequestration-mandated cuts to military spending have hurt preparedness, America’s fighting forces remain ready for battle. They have extensive combat experience across multiple theaters since 9/11, a tremendous high-tech defense industry supplying advanced weaponry, and support from an extraordinary intelligence community. For those concerned that America’s military is in decline or somehow not up to the next challenge, we offer a few reassuring facts: • The current national defense budget of over $600 billion a year far exceeds the Cold War average of about $525 billion (in inflation-adjusted 2016 dollars) and the $400 billion spent in 2001, according to official Pentagon and Office of Management and Budget data. The national defense budget, which doesn’t include Veterans Affairs or the Department of Homeland Security, constitutes 35% of global military spending and is more than that of the next eight countries—including China and Russia—combined. Spending has been reduced from the levels of the late Bush and early Obama years, but that isn’t unreasonable in light of scaled-down combat operations abroad and fiscal pressures at home. • Assuming no return to sequestration, as occurred in 2013, Pentagon budgets to buy equipment now exceed $100 billion a year, a healthy and sustainable level. The so-called “procurement holiday” of the 1990s and early 2000s is over. • While some categories of aircraft and other key weapons are aging and will need replacement or major refurbishment soon, most equipment remains in fairly good shape. According to our sources in the military, Army equipment has, on average, mission-capable rates today exceeding 90%—a historically high level. Marine Corps aviation is an exception and urgently needs to be addressed. • Training for full-spectrum operations is resuming after over a decade of appropriate focus on counterinsurgency. By 2017 the Army plans to rotate nearly 20 brigades—about a third of its force—through national training centers each year. The Marine Corps plans to put 12 infantry battalions—about half its force—through large training exercises. The Air Force is funding its training and readiness programs at 80%-98% of what it considers fully resourced levels. This situation isn’t perfect, but it has improved—and while the military is still engaged in combat operations across the world. • The men and women of today’s all-volunteer military continue to be outstanding and committed to protecting America. Typical scores of new recruits on the armed forces qualification test are now significantly better than in the Reagan years or the immediate pre-9/11 period, two useful benchmarks. The average time in service, a reflection of the experience of the force, is now about 80 months in the enlisted ranks, according to Defense Department data. That is not quite as good as in the 1990s, when the average was 85-90 months, but is better than the 75-month norm of the 1980s. While there are areas of concern, **there is no crisis in military readiness**. But that doesn’t mean the U.S. is good enough—especially in a world of rapidly changing technology, new threats emerging across several regions, and a constantly evolving strategic landscape. Here are some of the most pressing issues:

#### 3. The military can do more with less – less spending has empirically not hurt readiness.

Gordon Adams 2013 [Gordon Adams, American University foreign policy professor, 7-27-16, “Have You Heard the One About the Pentagon’s Budget? They're all fat jokes. And that needs to change.” http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/27/have-you-heard-the-one-about-the-pentagons-budget/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

One could describe DOD as a "Department of Government" (as a friend at the State Department once did to me) — reproducing virtually every function the government does in large and small ways: personnel management, financial systems, health care insurance and delivery, education systems, counseling, recreation facilities. Over the past decade or so, the costs of providing these services has basically doubled per active-duty troop. And while the civil service has grown more than the active-duty military over the past decade, the core problem is not in the headquarters staff — it is in the 70 percent of DOD overhead that is in the military services, according to the DBB. Too many defense spokespersons want to avoid this problem. The secretary told Senators Carl Levin and James Inhofe on July 11 that sequester-level cuts to Operations and Management (O&M) next year (even with flexibility to move the cuts around) would cripple readiness. And, indeed, **the Pentagon response to the sequester cuts this year, which largely hit O&M, was to make visible, dramatic, but, in the end, hardly crippling cuts to training, flying, sailing, and equipment maintenance**. (Congress approved a reprogramming that already reversed these cuts for the Air Force.) The politics of readiness are a form of resistance. There is no doubt that the O&M budget funds training, flying, sailing, and equipment maintenance. But, **as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has said for 20 years, using virtually the same language every time, DOD cannot tell you what the link is between O&M spending and any specific measure of the readiness of military units. The CBO thinks that more than half of O&M spending is going for things other than readiness**, like recruiting, administration, base operations, financial and personnel management, virtually all of the salaries paid to the civil servants, and the contracts for all those "ghost workers" from the private sector.

### AT: Naval Spending

#### 1. The Navy doesn’t need more money – it is bloated.

Benjamin Friedman, 2016 [Benjamin Friedman, Cato Institute defense and homeland security studies research fellow. September 7th 2016. “RESTRAINED STRATEGY, LOWER MILITARY BUDGETS” http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/restrained-strategy-lower-military-budgets/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

A strategy of restraint would take advantage of America’s geographic advantages and give the Navy a larger share of the Pentagon’s budget. Ships and submarines have access to most of the earth’s surface without needing basing rights. With gains in range and massive increases in missile and bomb accuracy, aircraft can deliver firepower to most targets, even against states with considerable ability to defend their coastlines. The Navy would operate as a surge force that deploys to attack shorelines or open sea lanes, rather than constantly patrolling peaceful areas in the name of presence. Divested of presence-driven requirements, the navy could reduce the number of carriers and associated air groups it operates to eight or nine, retire several amphibious assault ships, cancel the littoral combat ship while developing a cheaper frigate alternative, replace the floundering F-35 with F-18s, and accelerate the shrinkage of the attack submarine force.

### AT: Ground Force Spending

#### 1. Ground forces provide little to the US’s needs

Benjamin Friedman, 2016 [Benjamin Friedman, Cato Institute defense and homeland security studies research fellow. September 7th 2016. “RESTRAINED STRATEGY, LOWER MILITARY BUDGETS” http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/restrained-strategy-lower-military-budgets/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Restraint recommends cuts to ground forces for two reasons. First, the dearth of conventional wars where the United States might play a leading role. In the event of a conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf region, or even in Eastern Europe, wealthy U.S. allies should man their frontlines. No modern Wehrmacht is poised to overcome them, and there is time to adjust if circumstances change. Second, counterterrorism is not best served by manpower-intensive occupational wars, which struggle to produce stability, let alone democracy. Air forces and raids cannot reorder fractious states, but they can deny haven to terrorists and aid local allies, as we see today in the war against the Islamic State. U.S. policymakers should cut the end strength of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps. Because restraint requires less frequent deployments and reduces the emphasis on deployment speed, it would cut a smaller portion of reserve and National Guard forces. Reduced demand for military-to-military training and fewer U.S. wars would allow substantial cuts to the size and budget of Special Operations Command.

#### 2. Ground forces strong.

Michael O’Hanlon, 12-28-16 [Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute. December 28th 2016. “Right-sizing the Trump defense buildup,” *Brookings Institute*, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/28/right-sizing-the-trump-defense-buildup/?utm\_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm\_source=hs\_email&utm\_medium=email&utm\_content=39856018, accessed 1-5-16, TAP]

Training is still recovering from the stresses and strains of recent years. The ground forces in particular, after so many years conducting counterinsurgency, are gradually restoring their abilities for large-scale maneuver warfare of the type vital to deter Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, among others. About two more years will be needed to complete the task. But the recovery path is now well charted and well funded.

### AT: Air Force Spending

#### 1. Air power superiority is unrivaled.

Benjamin Friedman, 2016 [Benjamin Friedman, Cato Institute defense and homeland security studies research fellow. September 7th 2016. “RESTRAINED STRATEGY, LOWER MILITARY BUDGETS” http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/restrained-strategy-lower-military-budgets/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Restraint also implies cutting the Air Force’s air wings across active and reserve forces. Few enemies today challenge U.S. air superiority. This is why so many missions fall to drones and non-stealth aircraft with limited ability to fend off rival aircraft or surface-to-air missiles. Recent advances in aircraft’s ability to communicate, surveille targets, and strike them precisely with laser guidance and GPS have made each aircraft and sortie vastly more capable of destroying targets. Naval aviation, which also benefits from these gains, can bear most of the remaining airpower load.

### AT: Gotta Fund NATO

#### 1. NATO does not solve conflict – it only reduces US security.

Ted Galen Garpenter, 2016 [Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute senior fellow and prolific author of books specializing in NATO. August 25th 2016. “NATO IS AN INSTITUTIONAL DINOSAUR” http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/nato-is-an-institutional-dinosaur/, accessed 12-15-16 TAP]

Policymakers need to take a hard look at NATO for two other reasons. First, allies are supposed to enhance America’s security, but recent additions to NATO have done the opposite. Most of the newer members fall into two categories — the irrelevant and the dangerous. In the former category are countries like Montenegro, with a tiny population and economy and a minuscule military. How Montenegro is supposed to help the United States in the event of a military crisis is truly a mystery. But at least Montenegro has few enemies and no great power enemies. The same cannot be said of the three Baltic republics, which are on bad terms with Russia. The only thing worse than committing the United States to defend a small, weak, largely useless ally is doing so when that ally is highly vulnerable to another major power. Yet that is what Washington has foolishly done with the Baltic republics. RAND analysts conclude that a concerted Russian attack would overrun the Baltic states in about 60 hours. That would leave the United States (as NATO’s leader) with an ugly choice between a humiliating capitulation or a perilous escalation.

### AT: Genocide Prevention

#### 1. Diplomacy is key to human rights – hard power fails.

Sarah Trister, 2013 [Sarah Trister, Freedom House Congressional Affairs manager. 7-22-13. “Investing in Freedom: Democracy Support in the U.S. Budget” https://freedomhouse.org/article/investing-freedom-democracy-support-us-budget, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

Since the days of the Marshall Plan, the United States has used assistance, diplomacy, and policy to encourage the development of democratic allies and promote the protection of human rights in countries around the world. Activists face severe repression in many countries; programs to support them are often difficult or dangerous, and may be outright opposed by foreign governments. The United States continues these programs because there is a strong demand by people of various nationalities, religions, genders, and ethnicities to receive U.S. support for their efforts to exercise their fundamental human rights, live free of persecution, and participate in democratic processes. However funding alone, though necessary, is not enough. **Assistance must be matched by smart policy and diplomacy**.

#### That’s important because hard power can detract from soft power

Giulio Gallarotti 2011 (Giulio M. Gallarotti, Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University, January 20th 2011, Wesleyan University WesScholar, “Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used,” <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs> DoA 12/15/16) CJV

As much as each kind of power can reinforce the other, it is also the case, of course, that the use of one kind of power may also detract from the other kind. Hard power carries obvious disadvantages for image if it is manifest in an aggressive-unilateralist style: invasion, imperialism, economic sanctions, and threats. But actions that enhance soft power can be perhaps even equally costly in terms of sacrificing hard power. This is the position that many American unilateralists take in their distaste for the entangling limitations on individual actions created by international agreements: e.g., global warming agreements will stunt American economic growth, Law of the Sea will limit access to important resources, the ICC may compromise the effectiveness of military operations overseas.

#### 2. Intervention increases genocidal violence.

**Dr. Alan Kuperman, 2009.** (Alan Kuperman, Senior Fellow at Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Winter/Spring 2009. (“Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” [http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/Kuperman%20%20Rethinking%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect.pdf](http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/Kuperman%20-%20Rethinking%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect.pdf)) ESG

**The most counter-intuitive aspect of the Responsibility to Protect is that it sometimes contributes to the tragedies that it intends to prevent. The root of the problem is that genocide and ethnic cleansing often represent state retaliation against a sub-state group for rebellion, or armed secession**, by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising hopes of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and raising its likelihood of success. **Intervention** does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but it **is usually too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence.** It creates a moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect these groups against the backlash. **The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur.**

#### Refer to the example of Libya.

**Dr. Alan Kuperman, 2015.** (Dr. Alan Kuperman, Senior Fellow at Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. March/April 2015. “Obama’s Libya Debacle,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143044/alan-j-kuperman/obamas-libya-debacle>. *Foreign Affairs*. Page 4) ESG

Claims of the number killed during the war have varied wildly. At a closed-door conference in November 2011 organized by the Brookings Institution, one U.S. official characterized the final death toll as “around 8,000.” By contrast, the rebels’ health minister asserted in September 2011, before the war was even over, that 30,000 Libyans had already died. However, the postwar government’s Ministry of Martyrs and Missing Persons sharply reduced that figure to 4,700 civilians and rebels, plus an equal or lesser number of regime forces, and 2,100 people missing on both sides—for a high-end death estimate of 11,500. Aggregate casualty statistics were not compiled during the subsequent two years of persistent low-level conflict, but reports did emerge of several significant skirmishes, such as a March 2012 fight between rival tribes in the southern city of Sabha that left 147 dead. In light of such figures, it is reasonable to estimate that **the conflict killed at least 500 people a year in 2012 and 2013. Better data are available for the renewed civil war of 2014. The website Libya Body Count, which documents casualties daily, reports that the total number of Libyans killed last year was more than 2,750.** Moreover, unlike Qaddafi’s forces in 2011, the militias fighting in Libya today do use force indiscriminately. In August 2014, for example, the Tripoli Medical Center reported that of the 100 killed in recent violence, 40 were women and at least nine were children. The following month, in a blatant war crime, militants fired a multiple-rocket launcher at a medical facility. **This grim math leads to a depressing but unavoidable conclusion. Before NATO’s intervention, Libya’s civil war was on the verge of ending, at the cost of barely 1,000 lives. Since then, however, Libya has suffered at least 10,000 additional deaths from conflict. In other words, NATO’s intervention appears to have increased the violent death toll more than tenfold.**

#### 3. Military operations exacerbate civil conflict

Ross Harrison 2013 (Ross Harrison, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Fall 2014**,** “Towards a Regional Strategy Contra ISIS,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Autumn\_2014/7\_HarrisonRoss\_Towards%20a%20Regional%20Strategy%20Contra%20ISIS.pdf)

Other unique aspects of ISIS could bedevil the United States and its coalition partners. First, US-led military operations against ISIS are taking place against the backdrop of civil wars in Syria and Iraq, with the additional complication that ISIS has conflated these conflicts by essentially erasing many of the border areas separating these countries**.** Military operations taking place within the context of two civil wars are likely to be fraught with unprecedented degrees of complexity. Unfortunately, military operations cannot be sealed off completely from the civil wars; and unintended consequences from these operations could exacerbate the conflicts and inadvertently strengthen opponents the United States has vowed to undermine. For example, the air battle now raging against ISIS in Syria in support of the Kurds could very well reinforce the Assad regime which President Obama claimed in 2011 must be replaced.2

### AT: Drones

#### 1. Responding to a catalyst for conflict is not responding to an international conflict – that means preventing terrorism does not constitute responding to international conflict.

Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011

[Janusz, Working Session II, Presentation for the 2011 Annual Security Review Conference, “Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and postconflict rehabilitation: lessons learned and way ahead” http://www.osce.org/cio/80530?download=true, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

It is important to define and classify conflict and crisis, as this is key for devising any credible and effective multinational response. Conflict is commonly of three basic varieties: intra-state, inter-state, and trans-state, and its differing formats and permutations will continue to challenge governments and multi-national institutions over the coming decade. Let me outline some of its components. Intra-State Conflicts: These include civil conflicts precipitated by deepening political cleavages, economic distress, and growing inequalities, which in worst case scenarios can lead to the erosion of government legitimacy, a breakdown of law and order, and escalating ungovernability. State weakness can spawn the creation of armed criminal gangs and armed vigilante groups, provoke inter-ethnic conflicts, anti-immigrant pogroms, separatist movements, and significant refugee outflows. Such developments will also stimulate the growth of organized crime and smuggling operations transcending national borders. Inter-State Conflicts: These may include conflicts over the status of disputed territories and the treatment of ethnic kindred in which intra-state conflicts can pull neighboring powers into the fray. They can also involve energy conflicts and other resource disputes stemming from the short and long-term impact of climate change. For example, the melting of the northern polar ice enables greater access to the region’s abundant oil and gas reserves, whose location could be a source of territorial disputes between Arctic littoral states leading to the region’s militarization. Trans-State Conflicts: These could include international terrorism, economic sabotage, and cyber attacks that precipitate state paralysis, undermine national security, or provoke international conflicts with sponsoring states. International terrorism remains a threat to civilian life, but its impact is most telling in mass phobia, in uses of terrorist stereotyping which can exacerbate Islamophobia, and in assertive government responses, including attacks on suspected sponsoring governments or insurgent movements. Global energy supplies may also be increasingly exposed to disruption through acts of sabotage. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, organized, and costly in the damage inflicted on government operations, business, and national infrastructure while all countries increasingly rely on vital communications and transit routes for trade, investment, and energy security. Cyber attacks can be conducted by individuals, global networks, or government agencies and may provoke retaliation and international conflict. Natural Crises: Crises can be instigated by all three conflict types, but they can also be precipitated by natural disasters such as drastic climate change, floods, droughts, food and water shortages, epidemics, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, or rising sea levels. The impact could range from immediate humanitarian crises to an increasingly conflictive scramble for scarce and shrinking resources. Analysts predict that by 2015 almost half of the world’s population will have less than the minimal amount of water necessary to maintain acceptable living standards. Water could become a major catalyst for conflict. Droughts also have a significant impact on economic development. Problems related to drought and desertification are expected to exacerbate in parts of Eurasia, while poor harvests will have an impact on food prices, consumption, and social turmoil that can be translated into political, ethnic, religious, and other forms of conflict.

#### 2. Drones spur cooperation between splinter groups

**James Igoe Walsh, 2013** (James Igoe Walsh, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. September 2013. “THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRONE STRIKES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAMPAIGNS,” *United States Army War College Press*, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1167.pdf>. Accessed Dec 17 2016. Page 39) ESG

\*\*\*Note: study cited is by James Igoe Walsh and John Szmer, “They Must All Be Militants: Targeted Killings, Drone Strikes, and Insurgent Violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 2012.

One example is a working paper focused on the influence of fragmentation.59 This paper discusses how the organization of insurgency mediates the response to drone strikes. It suggests that **drone strikes are unlikely to have much of an effect on large, cohesive insurgencies** such as the Taliban operations in Afghanistan. **Drone strikes are likely to incite more cooperation among, and violence by, more fragmented insurgencies, such as those operating in Pakistan.** Furthermore, the authors hypothesize that drones are sufficiently capable of distinguishing militants from civilians so that strikes that kill civilians should be small in number and thus not lead, as many claim, to more support for political violence committed by insurgent organizations. To evaluate these propositions, the paper also uses WITS data on the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. The key independent variables are the occurrence of drone strikes, the number of militants killed by drones, and the number of civilian victims of drones. Consistent with the work of Jaeger and Siddique, the authors find that none of these measures of drone strikes have any statistical relationship to terrorist violence in Afghanistan. This study reinforces the conclusion that drones have little effect, positive or negative, on the security situation in Afghanistan. **It also finds a strong, positive relationship between drone strikes and subsequent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, suggesting that drones help fuel political violence in the country.**

#### 3. Almost all drone strike deaths are civilian

**Marina Fang 2015** (Marina Fang, associate politics editor at *The Huffington Post*. October 20th 2015. “Nearly 90 Percent Of People Killed In Recent Drone Strikes Were Not The Target,” *The Huffington Post*, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/civilian-deaths-drone-strikes_us_561fafe2e4b028dd7ea6c4ff>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

According to a new report from The Intercept, **nearly 90 percent of people killed in recent drone strikes** in Afghanistan **“were not the intended targets” of the attacks.** Documents detailing a special operations campaign in northeastern Afghanistan, Operation Haymaker, show that between January 2012 and February 2013, U.S. special operations airstrikes killed more than 200 people. Of those, only 35 were the intended targets. During one five-month period of the operation, according to the documents, nearly 90 percent of the people killed in airstrikes were not the intended targets. In Yemen and Somalia, where the U.S. has far more limited intelligence capabilities to confirm the people killed are the intended targets, the equivalent ratios may well be much worse. The report, compiled from classified documents released by a source in the intelligence community, corroborates the many news accounts of civilian deaths caused by drone strikes. **U.S. drone strikes have killed scores of civilians in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia since 2009.** In December 2013, a drone strike in Yemen killed 14 people returning from a wedding. Government officials mistook their vehicles for those of al Qaeda militants. Parents in Pakistan have reported taking their children out of school to protect them from possible strikes. The U.S. government has implemented targeted killings since the Sept. 11 attacks as a counterterrorism measure and as retribution against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Under the Obama administration, many of these targeted killings have been carried out using unmanned drones. Despite the high number of civilian casualties and criticism that the program lacks transparency, President Barack Obama has repeatedly defended the strikes.

#### 4. Drones kill astronomically more people than conventional airstrikes

**Spencer Ackerman, 2013** (Spencer Ackerman, national security editor for Guardian US. July 2nd 2013. “US drone strikes more deadly to Afghan civilians than manned aircraft – adviser,” *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/us-drone-strikes-afghan-civilians>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

**A study conducted by a US military adviser has found that drone strikes** in Afghanistan **during a year of the protracted conflict caused 10 times more civilian casualties than strikes by manned fighter aircraft.** The new study, referred to in an official US military journal, contradicts claims by US officials that the robotic planes are more precise than their manned counterparts. It appears to undermine the claim made by President Obama in a May speech that "conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage". **Drone strikes** in Afghanistan, **the study found, according to its unclassified executive summary, were "an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement."** Advertisement Larry Lewis, a principal research scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses, a research group with close ties to the US military, studied air strikes in Afghanistan from mid-2010 to mid-2011, using classified military data on the strikes and the civilian casualties they caused. Lewis told the Guardian he found that the missile strikes conducted by remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as drones, were 10 times more deadly to Afghan civilians than those performed by fighter jets.

### AT: Bases Good

#### 1. Bases increase the likelihood of war

**David Vine, 2016** (David Vine, assistant professor of Anthropology at American University. September 13th 2016. “How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Undermine National Security and Harm Us All,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-bases-abroad_b_8131402.html>. Accessed Dec 17 2016) ESG

It is also not at all clear that bases enhance national security and global peace in any way. In the absence of a superpower enemy, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from U.S. shores are necessary to defend the United States — or even its allies — is a hard argument to make. On the contrary, **the global collection of bases has generally enabled the launching of military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice that have resulted in repeated disasters, costing millions of lives and untold destruction from Vietnam to Iraq.** **By making it easier to wage foreign wars, bases overseas have ensured that military action is an ever more attractive option — often the only imaginable option — for U.S. policymakers.** As the anthropologist Catherine Lutz has said, when all you have in your foreign policy toolbox is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. **Ultimately, bases abroad have frequently made war more likely rather than less.** Proponents of the long-outdated forward strategy will reply that overseas bases “deter” enemies and help keep the global peace. As supporters of the status quo, they have been proclaiming such security benefits as self-evident truths for decades. Few have provided anything of substance to support their claims. While there is some evidence that military forces can indeed deter imminent threats, little if any research suggests that overseas bases are an effective form of long-term deterrence. Studies by both the Bush administration and the RAND Corporation — not exactly left-wing peaceniks — indicate that advances in transportation technology have largely erased the advantage of stationing troops abroad. In the case of a legitimate defensive war or peacekeeping operation, the military could generally deploy troops just as quickly from domestic bases as from most bases abroad. Rapid sealift and airlift capabilities coupled with agreements allowing the use of bases in allied nations and, potentially, pre-positioned supplies are a dramatically less expensive and less inflammatory alternative to maintaining permanent bases overseas.

#### 2. Military presence contributes to radicalism

**Bradley Bowman, 2008** (Bradley Bowman, Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow. Spring 2008. “After Iraq: Future U.S. Military Posture in the Middle East,” *The Washington Quarterly*, <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq08springbowman.pdf>. Accessed 12/17/2016. Page 85) ESG

**The** 2006 **U.S. “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” largely neglects the role of the U.S. military presence in al Qaeda’s emergence or in the continuing radicalization that fuels terrorism**, pointing instead to social, political, and ideological maladies endemic to the Arab world, as well as past U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.32 Admittedly, there is rarely a single explanation for any phenomenon, and it would be extremely difficult to definitively and quantifiably rank the causes for al Qaeda’s emergence and its attacks on the United States. Yet, **for purposes of developing the future U.S. strategy and force posture** in the region, **one only needs to establish that the U.S. military presence was and continues to be one of a handful of major catalysts for anti-Americanism and radicalization.** Both the private words and the public actions of al Qaeda support this less sweeping yet equally important assertion. In July 2005, U.S. forces in Iraq intercepted a confidential letter from Zawahiri to Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. In this private letter presumably not intended for public dissemination, Zawahiri wrote, “The Muslim masses … do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American.”33 Analysis of al Qaeda–connected terrorist attacks corroborates this revealing insight provided by al Qaeda’s second-most senior leader. According to one study, the 71 al Qaeda operatives who committed suicide terrorism between 1995 and 2003 were 10 times more likely to come from Muslim countries where a U.S. military presence for combat operations existed than from other Muslim countries. **Furthermore, when the U.S. military presence occupies a country with a larger proportion of** Islamist **radicals, al Qaeda suicide terrorists are 20 times more likely to come from that country.**34 Although this evidence does not irrefutably demonstrate that the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is the leading source of radicalization, it suggests **a U.S. military presence is strongly correlated with the recruitment and motivation of al Qaeda’s most radicalized members.**

#### 3. Bases create displacement

**Matt Peppe 2015** (Matt Peppe, writes about politics, U.S. foreign policy and Latin America for *CounterPunch.* November 25th 2015. “Bad Policy, Bad Ethics: U.S. Military Bases Abroad,” *CounterPunch*, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/25/bad-policy-bad-ethics-u-s-military-bases-abroad/>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

Displacement **Creating outposts for the U.S. military in every corner of the globe makes displacement inevitable. The problem is exacerbated by the belief that foreign lands do not actually belong to the people who inhabit them, but to the United States, which is free to exploit them as it pleases.** The story of the ethnic cleansing of the Chagossians is most demonstrative of this ethos. In the late 1960s, U.S. Navy officials planned to remove all 2,000 inhabitants of the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia, part of the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean. After construction on Diego began in 1971, the Navy’s top admiral said the Chagossians “absolutely must go.” The entire Chagossian population was forcibly evicted from their island and moved 1,200 miles away without any financial assistance. Vine’s account of the ethnic cleansing of the Chagossians is horrifying: “With the help of U.S. Navy Seabees, British agents began the deportation process by rounding up the islanders’ pet dogs. They gassed and burned them in sealed cargo sheds as Chagossians watched in horror. Then the authorities ordered the remaining Chagossians onto overcrowded cargo ships. During the deportations, which took place in stages until May 1973, most of the Chagossians slept in the ship’s hold atop guano – bird shit. Horses stayed on deck. By the end of the five-day journey, vomit, urine, and excrement were everywhere. At least one woman miscarried. Some compare conditions to those on slave ships.” This was far from an isolated case. “**Around the world, often on islands and in other isolated locations, the U.S. military long displaced indigenous groups to create bases. In most cases the displaced populations have ended up deeply impoverished**, like the Chagossians and Bikinians,” Vine writes. From Panama to Guam to Puerto Rico to Okinawa to dozens of other locations across the world, the military has taken valuable land from local populations, often pushing out indigenous people in the process, without their consent and without reparations. They are enabled by the political subjugation of native peoples. “From the military’s perspective, ongoing colonial relationships have allowed officials to ‘do what we want’ without many of the restrictions faced in the fifty states or in fully independent nations,” Vine writes.

#### 4. Bases increase risks to host countries

**David Vine, 2016** (David Vine, assistant professor of Anthropology at American University. September 13th 2016. “How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Undermine National Security and Harm Us All,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-bases-abroad_b_8131402.html>. Accessed Dec 17 2016) ESG

**It is also questionable whether such bases actually increase the security of host nations. The presence of U.S. bases can turn a country into an explicit target for foreign powers or militants — just as U.S. installations have endangered Americans overseas. Similarly, rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, foreign bases frequently heighten military tensions and discourage diplomatic solutions to conflicts.** Placing U.S. bases near the borders of countries like China, Russia, and Iran, for example, increases threats to their security and encourages them to respond by boosting their own military spending and activity. Imagine how U.S. leaders would respond if China were to build even a single small base in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean. Notably, the most dangerous moment during the Cold War — the 1962 Cuban missile crisis — revolved around the construction of Soviet nuclear missile facilities in Cuba, roughly 90 miles from the U.S. border.

### †††††AT: Cybersec

#### 1. Cyberattacks are inevitable because of reliance on the internet.

**Greg Corombos 2015** [Greg Corombos, writer for World Net Daily. June 22nd 2015. “'MORE CYBER ATTACKS' TO BLITZ U.S.” http://www.wnd.com/2015/06/more-cyber-attacks-to-blitz-u-s/, accessed 12-20-15, TAP]

Walters said the greatest hacking threats come from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. He said they have different specialties. China is focused on securing information on as many people as possible. Iran and North Korea prioritize the shutting down of websites. He said Russia is the best at not leaving any digital footprints. The threat is only going to get worse, he said. Walters said it's a product of the insatiable demand for more data. "Over the past several years, we've just seen more reliance on big data and the Internet," he said. "So obviously there's a correlation with the increasing number of cyber attacks."

#### 2. No impact– minimal damage and no escalation to conflict.

**Franz-Stefan Gady, 2015.** [Franz-Stefan Gady, senior fellow at the East West Institute. March 3rd 2015. “Russia Tops China as Principal Cyber Threat to US” http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/russia-tops-china-as-principal-cyber-threat-to-us/, accessed 12-20-15, TAP]

“While I can’t go into detail here, the Russian cyber threat is more severe than we had previously assessed,” the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee during the 2015 presentation of the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The report lists sophisticated cyberattacks as the principle national security threat facing the United States. “Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact,” the assessment notes. Russia is singled out as one of the most sophisticated nation-state actors in cyberspace. The report notes that Russia’s Ministry of Defense is establishing its own cyber command, responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities (similar to the United States Cyber Command). The report says that Russia’s cyber command will also be responsible, again similar to its U.S. counterpart, for attacking enemy command and control systems and conducting cyber propaganda operations. Furthermore, “unspecified Russian cyber actors” have developed the capability to target industrial control systems and thereby attack electric power grids, air-traffic control, and oil and gas distribution networks. However, the report points out that the United States will not have to fear debilitating strategic cyberattacks on a large scale: “Rather than a ‘Cyber Armageddon’ scenario that debilitates the entire U.S. infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security.” The assessment also provided a hint that we may see an increase in “naming and shaming” campaigns, similar to the cyber espionage charges against five Chinese military officials accused of hacking into U.S. companies back in May 2014. The report argues that “the muted response by most victims to cyber attacks has created a permissive environment in which low-level attacks can be used as a coercive tool short of war, with relatively low risk of retaliation.”

#### 3. Cyber threats are hype.

**Micah Zenko and Michael Cohen, 2012.** (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation. 2012. “Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks,” *Foreign Affairs*,

Foreign Affairs. New York: Mar/Apr 2012. Vol. 91, Iss. 2; pg. 79, 15 pgs)

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent "cyber-Pearl Harbor" or "cyber-9/11." In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that "bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs." And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an "existential" threat that "actually can bring us to our knees."¶ Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen's life. Reports of "kinetic-like" cyber- attacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.

#### 4. Russia and China aren’t morons

**James Andrew Lewis 2013** (James Andrew Lewis, a senior vice president and program director at Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 10th 2013. “Truly damaging cyberattacks are rare,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/truly-damaging-cyberattacks-are-rare/2013/10/09/ae628656-2d00-11e3-b139-029811dbb57f_story.html?utm_term=.f8dbce3eb6db>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

There have been only a handful of true cyberattacks. **Russia and China** are hyperactive in cyber-espionage, but **are cautious about offensive use and avoid actions that could trigger a violent response.** Iran and North Korea are more aggressive and are improving their cyber-capabilities. Iran attacked Saudi Aramco, destroying data on 30,000 hard drives. North Korea did something similar to South Korean banks. The worry is that either country will miscalculate in its use of cyberattacks and stumble into a larger conflict.

#### 5. The U.S. is completely stable in cybersecurity. Russia and China aren’t concerns

**Jon R. Lindsay 2015** (Jon R. Lindsay has a PHD in political science from M.I.T. May 2015. “Exaggerating the Chinese Cyber Threat,” Belfer Research Center of Harvard University. <http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/25321/exaggerating_the_chinese_cyber_threat.html> DOA: 20/1/17) CDY

The secrecy regarding the cyber capabilities and activities of the United States and China creates difficulty in estimating the relative balance of cyber power across the Pacific. Nevertheless, **the United States appears to be gaining an increasing advantage. For every type of purported Chinese cyber threat, there are also serious Chinese vulnerabilities and growing Western strengths. Much of the international cyber insecurity that China generates reflects internal security concerns.** China exploits foreign media and digital infrastructure to target political dissidents and minority populations. The use of national censorship architecture (the Great Firewall of China) to redirect inbound internet traffic to attack sites such as GreatFire.org and GitHub in March 2015 is just the latest example of this worrisome trend. Yet prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense also damages China's own cybersecurity. Lax law enforcement and poor cyber defenses leave the country vulnerable to both cybercriminals and foreign spies. The fragmented and notoriously competitive nature of the Communist Party state further complicates coordination across military, police, and regulatory entities. **There is strong evidence that China continues to engage in aggressive cyber espionage campaigns against Western interests. Yet it struggles to convert even legitimately obtained foreign data into competitive advantage, let alone make sense of petabytes of stolen data.** Absorption is especially challenging at the most sophisticated end of the value chain (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft), which is dominated by the United States. At the same time, the United States conducts its own cyber espionage against China , as the Edward Snowden leaks dramatized, which can indirectly aid U.S. firms (e.g., in government trade negotiations). China's uneven industrial development, fragmented cyber defenses, erratic cyber tradecraft, and the market dominance of U.S. technology firms provide considerable advantages to the United States. Despite high levels of Chinese political harassment and espionage, there is little evidence of skill or subtlety in China's military cyber operations. Although Chinese strategists describe cyberspace as a highly asymmetric and decisive domain of warfare, China's military cyber capacity does not live up to its doctrinal aspirations. A disruptive attack on physical infrastructure requires careful testing, painstaking planning, and sophisticated intelligence. Even experienced U.S. cyber operators struggle with these challenges. By contrast, the Chinese military is rigidly hierarchical and has no wartime experience with complex information systems. Further, China's pursuit of military "informatization" (i.e., emulation of the U.S. network-centric style of operations) increases its dependence on vulnerable networks and exposure to foreign cyberattack. To be sure, China engages in aggressive cyber campaigns, especially against nongovernmental organizations and firms less equipped to defend themselves than government entities. These activities, however, do not constitute major military threats against the United States, and they do nothing to defend China from the considerable intelligence and military advantages of the United States.**Outmatched by the West in direct cyber confrontation yet eager to maintain the global connectivity supporting economic growth, China (together with Russia** and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) **advocate**s **for internet governance reform**. These changes, predicated on so-called internet sovereignty, would replace the current multistakeholder system and its liberal norms of internet openness with a formal international regulator, such as the United Nations' International Telecommunication Union, and strong norms of noninterference with sovereign networks. Chinese complaints of U.S. internet hegemony are not completely unfounded: the internet reinforces U.S. dominance, but it does so through a light regulatory touch that relies on the self-interest of stakeholders—academic scientists, commercial engineers, government representatives, and civil society organizations. The internet expands in a self-organized fashion because adopters have incentives to pursue increasing returns to interconnection. The profit-driven expansion of networks and markets through more reliable and voluminous transactions and more innovative products (e.g., cloud services, mobile computing, and embedded computing) tends to reinforce the economic competitiveness of the United States and its leading information technology firms. Many Western observers fear that cyber reform based on the principle of internet sovereignty might legitimize authoritarian control and undermine the cosmopolitan promise of the multistakeholder system. China, however, benefits too much from the current system to pose a credible alternative. Tussles around internet governance are more likely to result in minor change at the margins of the existing system, not a major reorganization that shifts technical protocols and operational regulation to the United Nations. Yet this is not a foregone conclusion, as China moves to exclude U.S. firms such as IBM, Oracle, EMC, and Microsoft from its domestic markets and attempts to persuade other states to support governance reforms at odds with U.S. values and interests. **CONCLUSION** Information technology has generated tremendous wealth and innovation for millions, underwriting the United States' preponderance as well as China's meteoric rise**. The costs of cyber espionage and harassment pale beside the mutual benefits of an interdependent, globalized economy. The inevitable frictions of cyberspace are not a harbinger of catastrophe to come, but rather a sign that the states inflicting them lack incentives to cause any real harm**. Exaggerated fears of cyberwarfare or an erosion of the United States' competitive advantage must not be allowed to undermine the institutions and architectures that make the digital commons so productive.

#### 6. Hence why the risks of cyberattacks are complete baloney

**James Andrew Lewis 2013** (James Andrew Lewis, a senior vice president and program director at Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 10th 2013. “Truly damaging cyberattacks are rare,” *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/postlive/truly-damaging-cyberattacks-are-rare/2013/10/09/ae628656-2d00-11e3-b139-029811dbb57f_story.html?utm_term=.f8dbce3eb6db>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

Cyberattacks can disrupt data and services to sow confusion, cripple networks and computers (including those embedded in weapons systems) and in some instances, destroy machinery. **The risks are** real, but **easily exaggerated**, as when a group of defense advisers intoned in a recent report that cyberattacks have “potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War.” **Just as early air-power enthusiasts ascribed miraculous qualities to air attacks, expecting them to produce intolerable destruction and rapid victory, the discussion of cyberattacks too easily veers into the realm of science fiction**, what one senior Navy officer calls “fairy dust.” Sprinkle a little cyber fairy dust on your military problem and it will disappear. There is no fairy dust when it comes to offensive cyber-capabilities. In the movies, a hacker types wildly on a laptop for a few seconds and turns off a city’s lights. In fact, a serious attack can take months to plan, probing the target network and developing code tailored to damage, disrupt or destroy. Attacks have several stages: conducting reconnaissance to identify the target’s vulnerabilities, breaking in, delivering the software “payload” and then “triggering” it — all without being detected. The most damaging cyberattacks — such as Stuxnet, which destroyed centrifuges used by the Iranian nuclear program — are still a high art. Only the United States, Britain, China, Russia and Israel possess the necessary skills, but many others want them.

#### 7. Cyberspace spending under Trump would be a disaster

**Franz-Stefan Gady, 2017** (Franz-Stefan Gady, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy Innovation Blog. January 16th 2017. “Trump and Offensive Cyber Warfare,” *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/trump-and-offensive-cyber-warfare/>. Accessed 26 January 2017) ESG

What will be President-elect Donald Trump’s policy on the use of offensive cyber weapons? If you analyze past statements of Mr. Trump and his team, two prospects stand out. **It is conceivable that he may adopt a more aggressive cyber position, with the subsequent risk of an accelerated cyber arms race.** At the same time there is reason to believe he may loosen cyber alliances and abandon the quest for norms of state behavior in cyberspace. Both prospects could potentially make cyberspace more dangerous for the United States. First, **his administration is likely to more aggressively pursue the development of offensive cyber capabilities than the Obama administration, having already signaled a greater willingness to employ them.** During his campaign, Mr. Trump repeatedly vowed to expand United States offensive cyber capabilities. “I will make certain that our military is the best in the world in both cyber offense and defense,” Trump said in a campaign speech on Oct. 3, 2016. “As a deterrent against attacks on our critical resources, the United States must possess the unquestioned capacity to launch crippling cyber counter-attacks.” He added, “America’s dominance in this arena must be unquestioned.” Yet to date, the president-elect has not shared details as to what he precisely means by offensive cyber capabilities. His public statements suggest adopting the interpretation revealed in the leaked Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-20 that defines offensive cyber capabilities as ranging from subtle to severely damaging attacks that could include loss of life, significant damage to property, and serious economic impact on a country. The concern is that while **a more aggressive U.S. cyber policy** may deter some adversaries, it **can also backfire and accelerate the emerging cyber-arms race.** Given the fact that cyber-weapons-programs originate from the world of intelligence and are cloaked in secrecy, their capabilities are largely unknown, thus fostering greater uncertainty for policy makers. **This would be further accentuated should Mr. Trump choose to disregard continuing U.S. government efforts to help shape international norms of behavior in cyberspace and develop confidence building measures to de-escalate cyberspace tensions with countries like China and Russia, the United States’ most capable cyber adversaries.** For example, the U.S. would be well served to maintain its leadership role in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Failing to promote a level of cooperation and foster globally acceptable norms may in turn compel nations to build up their cyber weapons arsenals even further. Second, Trump’s rhetoric during his presidential campaign has left many allies concerned about the United States’ overall defense commitment. At present, United States’ allies can no longer take for granted that they will be shielded under the U.S. “cyber umbrella,” i.e. U.S. support in defending their networks paired with the threat of retaliatory U.S. cyber strikes. This is accentuated by Trump’s statements that underscore a lack of faith in alliances, with demands that allies pay a greater share of the costs associated with security, paired with the president-elect’s overall isolationist tendencies. Countries like Japan, the second most advanced ICT country after the United States, which until now, have chosen not to develop their own offensive cyber capabilities, will have to rethink their stance. Moreover, Mr. Trump’s current ambiguity over U.S. defense commitments may in turn impact ongoing global cooperation on offensive cyber capabilities, such as the “five-eyes” and intelligence partners, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. The level of interconnectivity in today’s world effectively demands a certain level of cooperation and knowledge share. Should the president-elect decide to reduce cooperation with current allies, it may diminish not only the cyber deterrence capabilities of the United States, but also that of its closest intelligence partners, which can hardly be in anyone’s national interest. In addition, if the new administration decides to abandon its leading role in trying to formulate norms of state behavior (the word “norms” has thus far never been mentioned by Mr. Trump in the context of cybersecurity), while simultaneously accelerating the buildup of offensive cyber capabilities, the result could be a more militarized cyberspace with fewer rules. While the world is carefully watching what path the new administration will adopt, offensive cyber capabilities will continue to expand. However, the United States runs the risk of accelerating this cyber weapons race before adequate norms for their use are established. **Unpredictability paired with bellicosity is always a dangerous mix in global politics, but even more troublesome in an increasingly militarized cyberspace.**

### AT: Hegemony Good

#### 1. Unipolarity is destroying the bipartisan compact needed to sustain support for multilateralism—makes our policies erratic and incoherent.

Kupchan, Georgetown University International Affairs Professor, and Trubowitz, University of Texas at Austin Government Professor, 2007

[Charles, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2007, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States” http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3202\_pp007-044\_Kupchan\_Trubowitz.pdf, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nation's politics. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives [End Page 8] for Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. "Red" and "Blue" America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological extremism.¶ The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power and cooperation. Instead of adhering to the vital center, the country's elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch. Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the assertive use of U.S. power. As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the political center is dying out, and support for liberal internationalism is dying with it. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in the 2006 midterm elections, "[The United States'] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular time."5¶ Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton, "For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach." Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: "It seems that concern about Washington's divisiveness and capability to meet today's challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need [End Page 9] new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies."7¶ These exhortations are in vain. The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the political foundations of U.S. statecraft will continue to disintegrate, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation's commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful.

#### 2. Stats prove heg doesn’t solve war.

**Nuno Monteiro 2012** [Nuno P. Monteiro, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, International Security, volume 36, issue 3, Winter 2011/2012, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21648/unrest\_assured.htm**l**, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful ac- count for the arst two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these peri- ods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evi- dence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

#### 3. Military power fails to translate to desired outcomes.

Richard Maher 2011 [Richard Maher, Brown University political science Ph.D. candidate. Winter 2011. “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Science Direct, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemi- sphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not auto- matically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather American *predo- minance*. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subser- vient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics.

### AT: OCO

#### 1. The OCO *is* military spending

**Kimberly Amadeo, 2016** (Kimberly Amadeo, writer for *The Balance* with 20 years senior-level experience in economic analysis and business strategy working for major international corporations. “U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth,” *The Balance*, <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>. Accessed 26 January 2017) ESG

The U.S. military budget is $773.5 billion. That's the budget for Fiscal Year 2017 (October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017). There are four components. First is the Department of Defense (DoD) base budget ($523.9 billion). Second is the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for DoD to fight ISIS ($58.8 billion). But **there's more to military spending than the Department of Defense. Many other agencies are involved with protecting our nation**. These expenses total $175.9 billion. They include the Department of Veterans Affairs ($75.1 billion), the State Department ($37.8 billion), Homeland Security ($40.6 billion), FBI and Cybersecurity in the Department of Justice ($9.5 billion), and the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy ($12.9 billion). **There is also $14.9 billion in OCO funds for the State Department and Homeland Security to fight ISIS.** (Source: "Mid-Session Review Fiscal Year 2017, Table S-10." "2017 Budget, Summary Tables, Table S-11," Office of Management and Budget.)

#### 2. We’re already shorting the OCO – increased spending is not key

**Joe Gould, 2016** (Joe Gould, senior reporter covering the US Congress for Defense News. May 17th 2016. “House Panel OKs Spending Bill That Shorts OCO,” *Defense News*, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/05/17/house-panel-oks-spending-bill-shorts-oco/84493474/>. Accessed January 23rd 2017) ESG

Bucking objections from the White House, the Pentagon and leading Democrats in Congress, **the House Appropriations Committee** on Tuesday **approved its 2017 Pentagon-funding bill, which would shift billions from the war account to pay for base budget needs.** The bill proposes $517.1 billion in discretionary funding for the Defense Department’s base budget needs, an amount $3 billion above the fiscal 2016 enacted spending level and $587 million below President Barack Obama's request. The bill also provides $59 billion in wartime overseas contingency operations funding, $16 billion of which would go to base budget items. Mirroring an approach taken by the House Armed Services Committee and endorsed by House Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis. — just with different numbers — the shorting of OCO is a gambit to force the next president to ask Congress for supplemental defense spending. In the House defense policy bill, OCO would expire April 30, 2017.

#### 3. Even before this fiscal year, the OCO had begun to be slashed

**Ryan Alexander, 2016** (Ryan Alexander, president of Taxpayers for Common Sense. February 16th 2016. “A War Budget, Off-Budget,” *US News*, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2016/02/16/overseas-contingency-operations-serves-as-off-budget-pentagon-slush-fund>. Accessed January 23rd 2017) ESG

Last Tuesday was the day the Obama administration submitted its last budget request to Congress. The budget again included both the "base" budget for the Pentagon of $524 billion as well as a "war" budget, officially referred to as the Overseas Contingency Operations account. **This extra war account has dropped from an all-time high of $187 billion in fiscal year 2008** (albeit not on a straight downward trajectory) **to a request of just under $59 billion this year.** There is a fair amount of pressure from Congress to keep this special budget in existence.

#### 4. Money increased in the defense budget will NOT be cut from the OCO

**Mark Cancian, 2016** (Mark Cancian, defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. October 20th 2016. “Two Cheers for OCO: Grease for Budget Wheels,” *Breaking Defense*, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/two-cheers-for-oco-grease-for-budget-wheels/>) ESG

Moving OCO into the base would not be easy politically. **It looks like a simple accounting transaction: cut OCO by the amount of the enduring activities, say $33 billion, and add $33 billion to the base budget.** There is no net change to spending or authorities, just more discipline and accountability, right? **Well, there are very practical problems. First, the White House will not want to give up the flexibility that OCO provides.** Politicians are happy to restrict someone else’s flexibility, but not their own. **Second, the Pentagon and defense hawks will demand that every dollar moved out of OCO be put into the base without reductions. That will lock in current activities, which some will object to. More importantly, Democrats in Congress will balk.** Obama and **the Democrats in Congress have been adamant that any increase in defense spending must be matched, dollar-for-dollar, by an increase in domestic spending.** Liberal commentators will argue that the move from OCO-to-base constitutes an increase to the defense budget, because it is permanent. Many Democrats will therefore demand a similar increase in the domestic budget. That may not be reasonable from an accounting perspective, but it will be the perception. The White House could overcome the opposition, but **that takes political capital it would prefer to spend elsewhere.**

### AT: Arms!!!

#### 1. There are no studies that are actually talking about this because the DOD doesn’t disclose how they spend their foreign aid to the public.

Ohlbaum, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network accountability working group co-chair, and Goodman, Center for International Policy security assistance monitor director, 3-15-16

[Diana and Colby, “The black hole of Pentagon foreign aid” http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/273011-the-black-hole-of-pentagon-foreign-aid, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

The problem is that most of these Pentagon aid programs, while intended to bolster the capacity of foreign militaries to protect and serve their own people, are mostly opaque — both to the American taxpayers who fund them and to the local populations who are supposed to benefit from them. Unlike civilian programs funded through the State Department and foreign operations budget, military-run foreign aid programs are not fully reported either to the foreign assistance "Dashboard" — a public website of all U.S. foreign aid funding — or to Congress. Although there are some efforts to improve this reporting, DOD has consistently scored poorly on Publish What You Fund's "Aid Transparency Index," which in a 2015 review called the DOD a "big disappointment" and rated it "off track" and "moving in the wrong direction" on aid transparency. Whereas the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees receive annual "Congressional Budget Justifications" that detail past and proposed foreign aid spending on a country-by-country basis (and are made available online to the public), neither those committees nor the Armed Services Committees receive a clear and complete picture of Pentagon-funded security cooperation programs. In a December 2015 report on "Building Partner Capacity," the Congressional Research Service found it impossible to determine how much the DOD spends on strengthening foreign security forces. This is a particular problem because some DOD-funded programs overlap with what the State Department and USAID are doing. In 2013, an official advisory panel found that the Pentagon-funded nearly twice as much assistance to foreign police, military and other security forces as did the State Department. For fiscal year 2012, the DOD provided $16.2 billion in equipment, training and weaponry through eight different programs, compared to $8.8 billion in military and police assistance funded by civilian agencies. Providing details about non-classified security cooperation programs is not merely a matter of the public's right to know. It's a matter of ensuring that taxpayer dollars are well-spent by eliminating waste and duplication, focusing resources on the countries that are the most important and the programs that have the best track records, learning lessons from rigorous evaluation and aligning goals with resources. If Pentagon leaders don't have this information at their fingertips, it is difficult for them to make evidence-based decisions and ensure that strategic priorities are being respected. And if they do have this information, but are declining to share it with Congress, then we have a much bigger problem. Regrettably, past efforts to compel the DOD to provide comprehensive data on its security cooperation programs have been unsuccessful. A legislative requirement that the DOD submit country-by-country reporting of prior-year assistance was rebuffed, with the Defense Department failing to provide this information by the date established in law, and unlikely to do so before Congress begins consideration of next year's defense budget.

### AT: PMCs Bad (Need moar troops)

#### 1. PMCs are simply cheaper

**Nikola Zadzorova, 2015** (Nikola Zadzorova, author for *E-International Relations.* September 20th 2015. “Private Military Companies: An Efficient Way of Meeting the Demand for Security?” *E-International Relations*, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/09/20/private-military-companies-an-efficient-way-of-meeting-the-demand-for-security/>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

**Financial benefits of using services of PMCs**, rather than soldiers from various states who form the temporary UN force, **have been proven. A notable example of real costs of PMCs’ services is the EO’s performance in Sierra Leone, resulting in a military defeat of the enemy for approximately 35 million dollars.**[26] Brooks in his article manifested EO’s cost-efficiency by making a comparison which showed that its almost two year mission cost significantly less than one month of the UN peacemaking in the country.[27] The financial gap is even more striking when the case of EO in Sierra Leone is compared to the UN missions in other states, where for instance, in case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which was launched few years later, the UN spent more than one billion dollars per year.[28] **As a consequence, EO as one of the PMCs has shown that PMCs are capable of** doing what the UN troops can do – **cease violence and end the conflict – but at significantly lower expenditures.**

#### You’ll literally just see more of bad shit

### AT: R&D

#### 1. Spending gets re-entrenched to the already powerful areas. AT hyper specific advocacy.

MICHAEL E. FLYNN Binghamton University 2014

I find evidence that military leaders occupying key positions influence defense spending priorities in favor of their respective branches. The analysis also suggests the influence of military leaders has changed over time and is conditional upon the institutions governing the relations between civilian policymakers and military leaders. Generally, I find that controlling a greater share of key military leadership positions is positively correlated with the amount of money that a branch receives, but that this relationship is most robust for the post-GoldwaterNichols period. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also appears to have had the opposite effect when looking at specific positions, like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Holding this position in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols period is positively correlated with branch spending, but it is negatively correlated with spending in the post-Goldwater period. These findings shed new light on the role played by, and influence of, lower-ranking officials in the foreign policy-making process. Additionally, these findings suggest that preferences and perceptions concerning national security and defense force posture are viewed, at least in part, through the lens of organizational interests. Finally, these results also speak to the subjectivity of national security concerns. The notion that military leaders will use their control of the military’s organizational hierarchy to benefit their particular branch need not be interpreted as something nefarious, but this suggests something important about the degree to which national security and foreign policy can be conceptualized in terms of shared strategic interests. Although the idea of divergent preferences over national security policy is not new, this study underscores this concept by providing some empirical evidence of the parochial nature of America’s military leadership. If even those individuals charged with the planning and execution of the state’s defense are inclined to pursue more narrow interests, then it seems all the more likely that politicians may be prone to significantly varied conceptualizations of just what constitutes the “national interest.” The existence of similar variation among military leaders suggests that the processes shaping preferences over national security issues may be far more complex than we might expect.

#### 2. US R&D is at a historically high – but it results in little returns.

Subrata Ghoshroy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology science technology and society program research affiliate, 2011

[Subrata, 12-20-11, “Restructuring defense R&D” http://thebulletin.org/restructuring-defense-rd, accessed 12-18-16, TAP]

There is irony here, and reason for reappraisal and restructuring. In 2011 the United States spent $76 billion annually on defense research and development, an amount that exceeds the total defense outlays -- not just for R&D, but for all defense purposes -- of every other country in the world except China. In the mid-1980s, as the Reagan administration pursued its Strategic Defense Initiative, the military R&D budget reached its previous high level of less than $70 billion in constant 2010 dollars. Now, two decades after the end of the Cold War, the US spends $6 billion more than that on R&D that often produces little of military or other value. Most of the US casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been caused by improvised explosive devices, which require little in the way of technology beyond the mobile phones used to detonate them. The United States' high-technology, high-price, and high-maintenance weaponry is of relatively little value in such conflicts.

#### 3. A significant increase in military spending equals $55 billion per year.

Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 9-22-16

[“Promises and Price Tags: An Update” http://crfb.org/papers/promises-and-price-tags-preliminary-update, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

Increase Military Spending by Repealing the Defense Sequester (-$450 billion). Since our previous report, Trump has proposed a significant increase in military spending. Specifically, he proposed to increase the number of active Army troops from 475,000 to 540,000, the number of Marine battalions from 24 to 36, the number of Navy ships from a planned 280 to 350, and the number of Air Force fighter aircraft to at least 1,200. He also proposed to modernize missile defense and cyber security and to instruct U.S. generals to present a plan to defeat ISIS. These expansions could not be paid for under the current defense discretionary spending caps. In part, Trump would pay for them by requiring other countries (including Japan, Germany, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and members of NATO) to take more responsibility for their own defense needs or reimburse the U.S. for some of the defense provided. At the same time, he would increase the current defense caps by repealing the “defense sequester,” which reduced the caps by about $55 billion per year. Read more about Trump’s defense plan.

#### Defense R&D is worth billions – unlikely any increase needs to meet the “significant increase” threshold

**Peter Woit, 2013** (Peter Woit, theoretical physicist and Senior Lecturer in the Mathematics department at Columbia University. March 28th 2013. “Are they wrong? US research funding,” *Not Even Wrong*, <http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=5703>. Accessed 12/18/2016) ESG

On overall US federal spending levels, Alberts compares a level of .87% of GDP in 2013 to a level of 1.25% of GDP in 1985. He’s getting his data from here, but those numbers do tell a more complicated story. Measured in constant (2012) dollars, non-defense R&D/year went from $32 billion in 1985 to a maximum of $67 billion in 2004, and has been relatively flat since then, with $64 billion projected for 2013. **Defense R&D went from $65 billion in 1984 to a maximum of $90.5 billion in 2008,** has dropped significantly in recent years to **$76 billion for 2013**. Another set of overall numbers from the same source are for the NSF budget, which went from $4.6 billion in 1998 to $7.25 billion in 2013.

#### 4. R&D won’t get cut – that would be politically impossible – but the money is misspent toward failed projects.

Subrata Ghoshroy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology science technology and society program research affiliate, 2011

[Subrata, 12-20-11, “Restructuring defense R&D” http://thebulletin.org/restructuring-defense-rd, accessed 12-18-16, TAP]

The military's R&D budget has escaped detailed scrutiny largely because it is politically safe for members of Congress to support research -- and politically dangerous not to. Any talk of cutting the R&D budget routinely results in push-back from the top universities and defense contractors, accompanied by a barrage of negative press coverage. No one, it seems, wants to be seen as opposing scientific research to bolster the "technological edge" that gave America its military superiority over the Soviet Union and continues to provide enormous advantages. But much of what transpires in the name of military research and development is not research in the sense that it produces scientific and technical knowledge widely applicable inside and outside the Defense Department. A large part of defense R&D activity revolves around building very expensive gadgets that are often based on unsound technology and frequently fail to perform as required.

#### 5. R&D in the military is sketch

**Peter Woit, 2013** (Peter Woit, theoretical physicist and Senior Lecturer in the Mathematics department at Columbia University. March 28th 2013. “Are they wrong? US research funding,” *Not Even Wrong*, <http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=5703>. Accessed 12/18/2016) ESG

In the contrarian spirit of this blog, I want to suggest that the situation is actually quite a bit more complicated, and the story of research funding is not completely a one-sided one of the oppression and impoverishment of scientists. Also in the spirit of this blog, I want to avoid topics I don’t know much about, which in this case includes the vast majority of scientific research and how it is funded, especially outside the US. **The biggest component of R&D funding in the US is the military**, and I have no idea what this money is going towards and whether it is being well-spent. I’ve also heard that **there are increasingly vast sums being spent by the US on classified research, not necessarily accounted for and showing up in obvious places in the budget, but I have not idea whether this is even true or what the size of this is.** While ignorant about what military R&D spending is going to, I confess to a general prejudice that **it seems to me to be huge and if I knew more I’d probably be strongly in favor of there being less of it.** The next biggest component of R&D spending is biomedical, and again, I’m woefully ignorant. Unlike spending money to find better ways to kill people, biomedical research is inherently something worthwhile, so more of it undoubtedly is better. But whether it is now being spent well, or whether taking away from some other priority to spend more in this area would be a good idea, I haven’t a clue.

#### 6. That’s not where current Pentagon R&D is going

**John Horgan, 2012** (John Horgan, Director of the Center for Science Writings at Stevens Institute of Technology. November 12th 2012. “Should Scientists and Engineers Resist Taking Military Money?” *Scientific American*, <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/should-scientists-and-engineers-resist-taking-military-money/>. Accessed 12/18/2016) ESG

Another speaker I brought to Stevens, the bioethicist Jonathan Moreno of the University of Pennsylvania, raised questions about the militarization of neuroscience. In his 2006 book Mind Wars, Moreno reported that **the Pentagon is funding research on a wide variety of "neuroweapons" that can boost or degrade the capacities of combatants.** Potential neuroweapons include transcranial magnetic stimulators, devices that stimulate the brain to help soldiers stay alert; gases that confuse or knock out enemies; and even brain-scanning technologies that can read prisoners' minds. Perhaps the most disturbing line of research examined by Moreno involves neural prostheses, electronic devices that communicate directly with neural tissue via implanted electrodes. The most successful neural prosthesis is the artificial cochlea, which restores hearing in deaf people by feeding signals from a microphone into the auditory nerve. Researchers are now trying to produce prostheses that can restore vision, motor control and even memory to people suffering from nervous-system damage. Officials at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which supports neural-prosthesis research, say they want to help soldiers who have suffered injuries to their brains or spinal cords. But **the Pentagon may also want to create bionic soldiers whose abilities are enhanced by neural implants.** A Darpa official once acknowledged as much to me when I interviewed him for an article on the neural code. "Implanting electrodes into healthy people is not something we're going to do anytime soon," he said, "but 20 years ago, no one thought we'd put a laser in the eye [to improve vision]. This agency leaves the door open to what's possible."

### AT: Robo Dolphins

#### 1. The budget for this program is tiny, we don’t need to significantly increase spending to fund it

Associated Press 2012 (The Associated Press, December 3rd 2012, “US Navy’s mine-hunting dolphins will be replaced by robots in 2017,” [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/02/us-military-replace-dolphins-robots DoA 1/23/17](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/02/us-military-replace-dolphins-robots%20DoA%201/23/17)) CJV

The military said the machines can do some of the same mine-hunting duties as the sea creatures. And they can be manufactured quickly, unlike the seven years it takes to train a dolphin. But the dolphins won't be relieved of duty. They'll be used along with sea lions for port security and retrieving objects from the sea floor, the newspaper reported. The navy's $28m marine-mammal program dates back to the late 1950s and once included killer whales and sharks. Based in San Diego, it currently uses 80 bottle-nosed dolphins and 40 [California](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/california) sea lions. In recent years, dolphins have been deployed to Iraq and Bahrain to patrol for enemy divers and mark the locations of mines. Using their innate sonar, the mammals find and mark mines in shallow water, in deep water when tethers are used, and on the bottom where sediment cover and plant growth can hide the devices. Dolphins are carried aboard navy ships in large movable pools, about 20ft (six metres) in diameter. [Dolphins](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/dolphins) traveled on the amphibious ship Gunston Hall in 2003 for the Iraq war.

#### 2. Budget is already tiny, and they’re moving to robots because it’s even CHEAPER

Weinberger 2014 (Sharon Weinberger, American journalist focused on defense and security issues, November 18th 2014, BBC News, “Robots replace costly US Navy mine-clearance dolphins,” [http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20121108-final-dive-for-us-navy-dolphins DoA 1/23/17](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20121108-final-dive-for-us-navy-dolphins%20DoA%201/23/17)) CJV

Of course, previous efforts to replace military service animals have proved hard, at least when it comes to dogs. For years, scientists have been trying to develop a chemical nose that mimics the capabilities of a canine, but still admit that when it comes to detecting explosives, dogs beat technology hands down. Similarly, the Navy already admits there may still be some specialised missions where sea mammals are needed past 2017. But what is driving the desire to replace dolphins and sea lions is not their capability, but cost. A dog might deploy with just a handler and food, but when the sea mammals are sent on long trips, they must be transported aboard naval vessels where they are kept in custom enclosures and accompanied by handlers and a portable veterinary clinic with staff. The costs don’t end there: while a bomb dog typically goes to live with its handler when it retires, dolphins require specialised care. “The Navy is very humane about the way they treat these animals,” says Linkous. “Essentially, these animals have a pension – they are cared for the rest of their lives.”

### AT: Job Creation

#### 1. Pentagon spending is one of the worst ways to create jobs with most of the money going to service contractors, arms industry executives and defense consultants while underwriting smaller firms

**Hartung 2016.** (William Hartung, director, Arms and Security Project, Center for International Policy. DOA: November 28, 2016. November 22, 2016. “How the Trump Presidency Presidency is Killer News for the Military-Industrial Complex,” Alternet. <http://www.alternet.org/election-2016/how-trump-presidency-killer-news-military-industrial-complex>) EL

Nor will Trump’s incipient infatuation with Pentagon spending do much for members of his working class base who have been left behind economically as traditional manufacturing employment has waned. In fact, **Pentagon spending is one of the worst possible ways of creating jobs. Much of the money goes to service contractors, arms industry executives, and defense consultants (also known as “Beltway bandits”), and what does go into the actual building of weapons systems underwrites a relatively small number of manufactured items**, at least when compared to mass production industries like automobiles or steel.

#### 2. The jobs supposedly created as a result of spending are lost elsewhere

**Andrew Beattie 2015** (Andrew Beattie, writer for *Investopedia*. July 21st 2015. “How Military Spending Affects the Economy,” <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/072115/how-military-spending-affects-economy.asp>. Accessed December 1st 2016) ESG

**Jobs are a big part of the economic impact of military spending.** Of course there are the active troops, but there is also a considerable infrastructure built up around them that requires contractors, trades, consultants, and so on to support the military. Then there are the private businesses that spring up as a result of the military spending, including everything from weapons manufacturers to the restaurants that pop up near military bases. Here again, the free market economists point out that **the public dollars going to support those jobs directly or indirectly are actually sucking the equivalent number of jobs—or more—out of the private economy due to the taxation needed to create them.** It really comes down to whether or not you believe a standing military is a necessity. If it is, then some jobs will need to be sacrificed in the private sector to make that happen. Of course, people will still argue about what size that standing military should be. That’s as much a political question as an economic one.

### AT: Troop Morale/Retention/Etc

#### 1. Delink – not the reason

**Ross Douthat 2007** (Ross Douthat, from the Atlantic; 9/28/16; Reihan: Why Private Military Contractora Are a Good Thing; The Atlantic; DOA: 12/17/16; <http://www.theatlantic.com/personal/archive/2007/09/reihan-why-private-military-contractors-are-a-good-thing/54843/>) AM

A debate has erupted over US reliance on private military contractors in Iraq and elsewhere. My sense is that the brilliant and decidedly uneven Robert Young Pelton, a staunch critic of PMCs, has set the tone for the debate. My own view is different. We do depend on PMCs, we're likely to depend on them even more over time, and this is a very good thing. Consider John Robb's thoughts on the subject. The defining fact of our time, as John Mueller has argued, is the decline of war.This, of couse, contradicts the Colin Gray view and I can see how it might seem strange given the bloody conflicts that dominate the headlines. But this doesn't change the normative shift that has taken place over the last century, from a time when military aggression was seen as both inevitable and acceptable to the present, when it is seen as an offense against all things good and decent. A similar normative shift was behind the decline of enslavement in the West, which began long before the vile practice became economically impracticable. Ideology matters. **The kind of conflicts we're seeing and are likely to see are far more like crime, pervasive and opportunistic, than like conventional interstate warfare. The patriotic sentiments that motivated volunteer armies in the past are harder to apply to campaigns designed to strengthen vulnerable foreign states**, or to limit the extent of bunkering and other criminal activities that have no obvious ideological valence. And so we will need to rely on skilled professionals to help police the world. To be sure, there are legitimate concerns about abuses committed by PMCs. That is a failure of the US and Iraqi governments, but not of PMCs as a matter of principle.

#### 2. Nonunique – soldiers get paid significantly more than their civilian counterparts

**Ryan McMaken, 2015** (Ryan McMaken, writer for the Mises Institute and economist for the Colorado Division of Housing from 2009 to 2014. October 29th 2015. “US Soliders Are Paid Significantly More than Civilians with Similar Skills and Education,” <https://mises.org/blog/us-soldiers-are-paid-significantly-more-civilians-similar-skills-and-education>. DOA 1/7/2017) ESG

**In fact, the DoD reports military compensation is even more generous than thought** when we look beyond Regular Military Compensation (RMC): Military Annual Compensation package for both enlisted personnel and officers compares to approximately the 80th percentile of compensation for civilians, as compared to the 70th percentile when using only RMC as the point of comparison... In fact, **the average enlisted member earned approximately $5,400 more in 2006 than his or her civilian counterpart when comparing cash compensation, but $10,600 more when selected benefits are included in the comparison.** The typical officer received an average of $6,000 more than civilians with comparable education and experience based on traditional cash comparisons, but $17,800 more with benefits included. But that was in 2007. **Since then, military pay has outpaced civilian work even more: DoD recently updated that analysis**, finding that average RMC in 2009 had risen relative to the civilian wage distribution. **The average RMC for enlisted personnel reached the 90th percentile relative to the combined comparison group consisting of civilians with high school diplomas, those with some college, and those with two-year degrees; the average RMC for officers reached the 83rd percentile relative to the combined group of civilians with bachelor’s degrees and those with a master’s degree or higher.** Moreover, military pay increases have grown faster than civilian pay increases over the past decades: [B]y 2005, out-of-pocket expenses for the average military family had been eliminated. DoD reports that, as a result of those and other actions between January 2002 and January 2010, basic pay for the average service member increased by 42 percent (in nominal dollars), housing allowances increased by 83 percent, and the subsistence allowance increased by 40 percent. CBO estimates that cash compensation increased by 52 percent overall during that period, whereas private-sector wages and salaries rose by 24 percent.

#### 3. Force quality is sufficiently high.

Michael O’Hanlon, 12-28-16 [Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute. December 28th 2016. “Right-sizing the Trump defense buildup,” *Brookings Institute*, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/12/28/right-sizing-the-trump-defense-buildup/?utm\_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm\_source=hs\_email&utm\_medium=email&utm\_content=39856018, accessed 1-5-16, TAP]

The men and women of the U.S. military, though tired and strained, have never been finer. That is not a simple statement of patriotism. The data back it up. For example, today’s typical serviceman or servicewomen has even more experience in uniform than those of Reagan’s day. Military pay is solid, compared with jobs in the civilian economy. For example, the latest quadrennial review of military compensation calculated that the typical soldier, sailor, airman, airwoman or Marine earns more than about 85 percent of his or her civilian cohorts with comparable age, education and experience in overall compensation

#### 4. Rejections are from alternative causes as well

Military.com, the largest veteran membership organization in 2014 (Military.com, the largest veteran membership organization. May 14, 2014. “80% of Military Recruitments Turned Down,” Military.com <http://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/2014/05/14/80-of-military-recruitments-turned-down.html> DOA: 21/1/17) CDY

According to an article by [NBC](http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Army-Raises-Bar-on-Recruitment-Standards--211154521.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), another cause of **the rise in rejections is that joining the military is simply becoming more competitive**. Sgt. 1st Class Richard Teunis, a recruiter for the Army, claims that "instead of being able to talk to 90-percent of the population, you could only talk to 50 percent or maybe less than that." **The caliber of each applicant has increased, and a GED is no longer enough to enter the military. If individuals do not have a high school diploma, they are encouraged to obtain about a semester's-worth of college credits before reapplying. However, the overall most common cause for rejection is simple: obesity.** According to a 2009 report from [Mission: Readiness](http://cdn.missionreadiness.org/MR-Ready-Willing-Unable.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), "27 percent of young Americans are too overweight to join the military." Not all of them have attempted to join of course, **but the pool from which the military may draw upon for recruits is nearly 30% smaller due to obesity**. Air Force Brigadier General Jeff Lawson commented on the issue: "I know people who spent an extra six weeks in basic training while we ran them through a fat farm to lose the weight. Those don't exist anymore. You're either qualified to come in or you're not. We do not rehabilitate people anymore."

### AT: Nuclear Modernization

#### 1. The US is not actually behind on modernization – we don’t need to update for years

**Lara Seligman 2016** (Lara Seligman, military reporter covering the Pentagon at *Aviation Week*. October 10th 2016. “Opinion: Why Trump Is Wrong On U.S. Nuclear Modernization,” *Aviation Week*, <http://aviationweek.com/blog/opinion-why-trump-wrong-us-nuclear-modernization>. DOA 1/9/2017) ESG

Though Trump’s claim that the U.S. “has fallen way behind” in terms of nuclear modernization doesn’t hold up under scrutiny, he is correct that **Russia is farther along in its upgrade program than the U.S. However, that is simply because the U.S. and Russia have different cycles of modernization for their nuclear arsenals, and those cycles don’t happen in the same time period, according to Hans Kristensen, director of the Federal of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project. The U.S. last modernized its nuclear triad in the late 1980s, so there is no need to replace the arsenal until the 2020s or 2030s**, Kristensen said. **By contrast, Russia’s warheads and delivery systems aren’t designed to last as long.** “This just shows that he misunderstands the issue, because it’s not about what you are building when, it’s about are the ones that you have ready to be used or credible?” said Kristensen. “I don’t think there’s anyone in the U.S. military who would say sure, let’s swap.” Most recently, the Air Force kicked off two multibillion-dollar competitions to upgrade the nuclear arsenal, issuing requests for proposals in July for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), a replacement for the aging AGM-86B ALCMs, and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), the replacement for the 1960s-era Minuteman III ICBMs. LRSO will be the primary standoff weapon for Northrop Grumman’s next-generation B-21 and existing B-2 stealth bombers, and is expected to be fielded by 2030. Meanwhile, GBSD will replace some 450 Minuteman IIIs around the country, and could cost as much as $85 billion.

#### 2. Russia will take modernization as a threat – it will only escalate problems

**Eugene Miasnikov, 2015** (Eugene Miasnikov, director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies in Dolgoprudny, Russia. January 7th 2015. “Modernization and “zero”: Compatible tendencies?” *The Bulletin*, <http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881>. Accessed 1/9/2017) ESG

In the United States, many people still recognize that the US arsenal is too large. President Obama, for example, announced in a 2013 Berlin speech that he would "seek further negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures." This proposal seems to have a strong pragmatic goal—to reduce the costs of future modernizations by cutting excess forces. In Russia, however, a number of current trends don't encourage similar viewpoints. In particular, **many Russians perceive the unconstrained development of US ballistic missile defense and precision guided munitions as new threats that require a response.** Often, these perceptions are influenced too much by emotion. Nonetheless, Russia's industrial and financial resources are limited. Moscow has no ability to influence the qualitative development of US arms. **In such a situation, further US development of missile defense and precision guided munitions makes Russia less interested in pursuing the bilateral negotiation process and more inclined to reduce the transparency of its nuclear arsenal.** In the best-case scenario going forward, US modernization programs will have a minor negative impact on bilateral relations. In the worst case, they will become an additional irritant in an already complex relationship. But it is unlikely that bilateral negotiations toward further cuts can begin unless US-Russia relations improve radically. Even when prerequisites are met for further dialogue on nuclear arms reductions, ballistic missile defense and conventional strategic arms will remain crucial obstacles. **Therefore it's important that the United States limit development of such weapons**—or direct their development in such a way that other states won't have cause to worry about the survivability of the smaller nuclear arsenals that would result from agreed arms reductions.

#### 3. Nuclear modernization is likely to create more danger than it averts

**Adam Mount, 2015** (Adam Mount, Postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. February 9th 2015. “The Real Danger in Nuclear Weapons,” *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-real-danger-in-nuclear-modernization/>. DOA 1/9/2017) ESG

**There is little evidence that Russia and China are looking to exceed the American advantage in these areas, or that they could if they wanted to. Instead, many of the modernization programs in these countries are the predictable result of previous American decisions.** The new Russian Sarmat heavy ICBM, the shift toward multiple warheads, and the Chinese submarine programs are expected reactions to U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. Meanwhile, the trend in both countries toward mobile missiles is a response to American conventional superiority and military doctrines that seek to defeat sophisticated defenses and gain access to defended targets. U.S. strategists put these policies in place with full knowledge that they would provoke reactions of this sort. **It would be foolish to now attribute sinister motives to expected responses. Given the stability and sophistication of the U.S. arsenal and the vulnerabilities in Russian and Chinese systems, current plans for aggressive nuclear modernization may cause more problems than they solve. It is vitally in the American interest that nuclear weapons are never again used in war.** The likeliest path to nuclear use in the coming decades is not that an enemy suddenly launches a surprise attack on the continental United States with superior delivery systems. **The greater concern is that a crisis could lead Russia or China to feel that they had been backed into a corner by U.S. conventional superiority and that utilizing a nuclear weapon could, in Moscow’s words, “de-escalate” the crisis. Nuclear forces that could provoke this scenario are destabilizing and could inadvertently lead to nuclear use.** The most important steps the United States can take to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again are those that support a condition of mutual nuclear deterrence and not those that seek to overcome it. The United States is in the enviable position of moving second in this round of modernization. **The U.S. should use its position of technological and diplomatic strength to ensure strategic stability at the nuclear level, rather than destabilizing the world in a vain search for a useless supremacy.** There has always been an element in American strategic circles that is unwilling to accept the mutual vulnerability that underwrites nuclear deterrence. There will be calls to refuse mutual deterrence with China and to attempt to transcend the condition with Russia as punishment for bad behavior. **The United States should resist this urge and instead build nuclear forces that are modest, affordable, and stabilizing. The real danger in U.S. nuclear modernization may not be too little, but too much.**

#### 4. Large arsenals are counterproductive to disarmament – a small stockpile is enough for deterrence

**Lu Yin 2015** (Lu Yin, visiting scholar at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm. February 25th 2015. “Balancing modernization and disarmament,” *The Bulletin*, <http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881>. DOA Jan 11 2017) ESG

Against this backdrop, some pessimism is justifiable regarding the long-term goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world. But regarding the nearer-term goal of establishing smaller nuclear arsenals, cautious optimism is appropriate. **Huge nuclear arsenals have become redundant in the post–Cold War security environment. Nuclear modernization and maintenance are very expensive. For the two nuclear superpowers, reducing arsenal size would simply be a practical choice. Even with smaller stockpiles of weapons, Washington and Moscow would retain their deterrence capability. They would also, at least partially, satisfy the disarmament expectations of the international community.** Nations with smaller nuclear arsenals must also join arms control and disarmament processes in the long run. In the meantime, they must be careful not to impede bilateral reductions. The complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons may be a long-term dream at this point, but the longest journey begins with a single step. A practical path toward disarmament can be set if all nuclear-armed nations take concrete actions such as dealing cooperatively with common security challenges, instituting or enhancing confidence-building measures, making careful plans for crisis management, and seeking to avoid miscalculations. In addition, nuclear-armed countries should seriously consider establishing a treaty that would, among signatories, ban the first use of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would also prohibit using nuclear weapons, or threatening to use them, against non-nuclear weapon states at any time and under any conditions. National positions on such a treaty might constitute a litmus test as to whether countries are truly serious about nuclear disarmament.

#### Our non-cooperation could spur an arms race

**Lu Yin 2015** (Lu Yin, visiting scholar at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm. February 25th 2015. “Balancing modernization and disarmament,” *The Bulletin*, <http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881>. DOA Jan 11 2017) ESG

This roundtable, which began as a discussion about nuclear modernizations, has in fact highlighted the enormous challenges that surround efforts toward nuclear arms control and disarmament. Eugene Miasnikov has discussed Russia's nuclear posture and policies in light of the security concerns that Moscow perceives to emanate from the United States, and Matthew Kroenig has done likewise from a US perspective. Kroenig, for example, devoting much attention to Russia's activities in Ukraine, has written that "the United States should field the nuclear arsenal that is necessary to deter present threats to international peace and security." Miasnikov has expressed dissatisfaction about NATO's eastward expansion, writing that when Moscow withdrew its nuclear forces from Eastern Europe and territories of the former Soviet Union, "it did not expect that the West would seek to extend its military alliance closer to Russia's borders." One can see from Miasnikov and Kroenig's essays that sentiment in favor of developing and deploying nuclear weapons still runs strong, even decades after the Cold War ended. Severe challenges surround efforts toward nuclear arms control and disarmament. Responsibility for addressing those challenges starts with the United States and Russia, which maintain huge nuclear arsenals, far out of proportion to their actual needs. These two countries can set a positive example for other nuclear-armed countries—or, by overemphasizing the need to upgrade nuclear arsenals and by failing to make deep cuts, they can risk setting off a nuclear chain reaction. **Countries such as China, with limited nuclear arsenals, are concerned about the insufficient disarmament progress displayed by Washington** and Moscow. **China and other nuclear weapon states will hesitate to join a multilateral disarmament process if the United States** and Russia **fail to pursue deep cuts. Non-nuclear weapon states might be tempted to pursue nuclear capabilities. Increased proliferation could lead to nuclear terrorism.**

#### 5. Nuclear modernization unnecessary – nuclear submarines are untraceable.

Benjamin Friedman, 2016 [Benjamin Friedman, Cato Institute defense and homeland security studies research fellow. September 7th 2016. “RESTRAINED STRATEGY, LOWER MILITARY BUDGETS” http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/restrained-strategy-lower-military-budgets/, accessed 12-15-16, TAP]

Precision also allows massive savings in the nuclear weapons budget. A credible nuclear deterrent does not require nearly 1,538 deployed nuclear weapons nor a triad of redundant delivery vehicles — bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). No enemy can reliably track U.S. ballistic missile submarines, let alone do so with the sort of reliability required to attempt a preemptive strike against all of them. Even if extended deterrence requires the ability to preempt enemy nuclear forces, which is doubtful, a monad-only nuclear force can achieve it. They would have the help of conventional missiles, which are now accurate enough to destroy hardened silos. Doing without the ICBM and bomber legs would save much of the $18 billion that the Pentagon plans to spend annually starting in 2021 on improving nuclear delivery systems, including a new bomber-launched cruise missile or upgrading B-2 bombers, Minuteman ICBMs, and their warheads.

### AT: Peacekeepers Good

#### 1. The UN has been consistently ineffectual – it is unlikely they have much impact regardless

**Edith Lederer, 2015.** (Edith M. Lederer, reporter for the Associated Press, 2008 winner of International Women's Media Foundation Lifetime Achievement Award. September 24th 2015. “Patronage and paralysis: UN marks 70 years of ineffectiveness,” *The Times of Israel*, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/patronage-and-paralysis-the-un-marks-70-years-of-ineffectiveness/>) ESG

The worsening war in Syria, allegations of child sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers and the mishandling of the Ebola epidemic cast a spotlight on the inadequacies of the United Nations in a globalized world, operating with a power structure that hasn’t changed since 1945. **With age, the organization has grown bloated, say many who know it well. It is also underfunded and overwhelmed by the tasks it faces.** The world body is trying to deal with almost 60 million global refugees, displaced people and asylum seekers — the greatest number since World War II. It is seeking to provide emergency supplies to keep 100 million people alive but has received less than 30 percent of the $20 billion it needs this year. Beyond Syria, where more than 250,000 people have been killed since 2011, conflicts escalate from Yemen and Iraq to South Sudan and Mali, forcing tens of thousands to flee hoping for a better life in Europe. Since the UN was born after World War II, it has grown from 51 members to 193. As it celebrates its 70th anniversary this year, **the UN is hobbled by bureaucracy, politics and an inability among its five most powerful members to agree on much**, including how to end Syria’s conflict. Its problems were spotlighted in a series of reports on the UN health agency’s performance in last year’s Ebola epidemic that blamed incompetent leadership, political considerations and economic concerns for the delay in declaring the outbreak an international health emergency — the equivalent of an SOS signal. Documents and conference call recordings recently obtained by The Associated Press show that even after the alarm was raised, the World Health Organization and others struggled to respond decisively. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a news conference last week that he is conscious of criticism about the UN’s effectiveness, accountability, transparency and even its relevance. Were there no United Nations, however, where countries could sit down to discuss the major issues of the day, “I’m afraid to tell you that the world might have been much bloodier, much more tragic,” Ban said. The paralysis shows in the debate over what the UN should be. **Nearly every nation agrees that the 15-member Security Council — the UN’s most powerful body — must better address threats to international peace and security. Yet every reform proposal over several decades has been rejected. National interests and regional rivalries trumped the common good.**

#### 2. Intervention invokes retaliation, increasing genocidal violence

**Alan Kuperman 2009** (Dr. Alan Kuperman, Senior Fellow at Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Winter/Spring 2009. “Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” *Journal of Diplomacy*, <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/Kuperman%20-%20Rethinking%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect.pdf>)

**The most counter-intuitive aspect of the Responsibility to Protect is that it sometimes contributes to the tragedies that it intends to prevent. The root of the problem is that genocide and ethnic cleansing often represent state retaliation against a sub-state group for rebellion, or armed secession**, by some of its members. The emerging norm, by raising hopes of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and raising its likelihood of success. **Intervention** does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but it **is usually too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence.** It creates a moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect these groups against the backlash. **The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur.**

#### 3. Hence why UN peacekeeping has been historically awful

**Chris McGreal 2015** (Chris McGreal, senior writer for The Guardian US. September 17, 2015. “What's the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep the peace?,” The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/un-united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia> DOA: January 9, 2017. ) EL

**Within days, the UN command decided there was more important work for Lemaire and his men than protecting Tutsis**. The peacekeepers were ordered to abandon the school in order to escort foreigners to the airport and out of Rwanda. **As the soldiers left, Tutsis begged to be shot rather than left to the militia’s machetes**. Within hours, the [2,000 people at the school were murdered by gun, grenade and blade](https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/19/theobserver3). Lemaire’s contingent kept a sporadic video diary of the wretched events. At one point a shaky camera captures a sandbagged machine-gun post and a pickup truck of Hutu militiamen sweeping by. The video then focuses on the soldiers’ log. It reads: “New York didn’t agree to change the rules of engagement.” The peacekeepers were not to be permitted to save Tutsis. The camera’s microphone picks up an anonymous voice: “There are killings and New York doesn’t give a damn.” **The betrayal of the Tutsis in Rwanda was a low point for UN peacekeeping but not an isolated one. A year later, Dutch peacekeepers failed to stop the** [**massacre of 8,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/1995/jul/12/warcrimes.balkans)**, a supposedly UN “safe area”, the most notorious mass killing by the Serbs in Bosnia.**

#### 4. Recent missions, too, are flops – see, for example, South Sudan

**Matt Wells 2016** (Matt Wells, senior adviser on peacekeeping at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CVIC). June 24, 2016. “How UN peacekeepers failed South Sudan,” CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/24/opinions/south-sudan-peacekeeping-failures-matt-wells/> DOA: January 9, 2017.) EL

**The heart of most U.N. peacekeepers' mission includes the protection of civilians** -- and it's a mandate that, in light of recent events, the United Nations must do better at fulfilling. This week, the Security Council received briefings on two investigations into violence that occurred in February in Malakal, South Sudan, at a U.N. base that housed 47,000 displaced people. What did they learn? **That despite the heavy presence of U.N. peacekeepers, armed men, including soldiers in military uniforms, were able to enter the camp and attack civilians -- killing at least 30 people and setting ablaze several thousand shelters.**

### AT: BMDs

#### 1. There is no need for a ballistic missile defense system – no threat of a nuclear attack looms. Iran will not proliferate for decades because of the deal if it ever does, and even if they do, both Iran and armed other states will still not strike first under mutually assured destruction

#### 2. Furthermore, it is actions like these that spur actual proliferation – the more our missiles encroach, the more nations get nervous and ratchet up their own armament efforts.

#### 3. US development over BMDs angers both Russia and China, spurring their cooperation

**Brenda Goh, 2017** (Brenda Goh, Shanghai correspondent at Thomson Reuters. January 12th 2017. “China, Russia agree on more ‘countermeasures’ against U.S. anti-missile system: Xinhua,” *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-russia-idUSKBN14X00J>. Accessed January 19th 2017) ESG

**China and Russia have agreed to take further unspecified "countermeasures" in response to a U.S. plan to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea**, state news agency Xinhua reported on Friday. The countermeasures "will be aimed at safeguarding interests of China and Russia and the strategic balance in the region", Xinhua said, citing a statement released after a China-Russia security meeting. **China and Russia held a joint anti-missile drill last May after Washington and Seoul began discussions over installing the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system** to counter any North Korean threats. THAAD is now due to be deployed on a South Korean golf course, unsettling Moscow and Beijing, which worry that the system's powerful radar will compromise their security and do nothing to lower tensions on the Korean peninsula. **China and Russia said in October they would hold a second drill this year.** "China and Russia urged the United States and South Korea to address their security concerns and stop the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula," Xinhua quoted the statement as saying. North Korea's drive to develop nuclear weapons capability has angered China, Pyongyang's sole major diplomatic and economic supporter. However, Beijing fears THAAD and its radar have a range that would extend into China. On Thursday, South Korea's trade minister said the South might complain to China about actions perceived to have been taken in retaliation for its decision to deploy the U.S. anti-missile system.

#### 4. This is not an empty threat – Russia has doubled down in response to BMDs in the past

**Robin Emmott, 2016** (Robin Emmott, Reuters diplomatic correspondent in Brussels, covering the European Union's foreign and security affairs and NATO. May 12th 2016. “U.S. activates Romanian missile defense site, angering Russia,” *Reuters,* <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX>.Accessed January 19th 2017) ESG

The readying of the shield also comes as NATO prepares a new deterrent in Poland and the Baltics following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea. **In response, Russia is reinforcing its western and southern flanks with three new divisions. Poland is concerned Russia may retaliate further by announcing the deployment of nuclear weapons to its enclave of Kaliningrad**, located between Poland and Lithuania. **Russia has stationed anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles there, able to cover huge areas and complicate NATO's ability to move around.** The Kremlin says the shield's aim is to neutralize Moscow's nuclear arsenal long enough for the United States to strike Russia in the event of war. Washington and NATO deny that.

#### 5. US encroachment with BMDs doesn’t just result in military retaliation – it results in economic retaliation against our allies, too

**Jesse Johnson, 2017** (Jesse Johnson, staff writer for *The Japan Times*. January 13th 2017. “China, Russia take aim at U.S. anti-missile system planned for deployment in South Korea,” *The Japan Times*, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/13/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/china-russia-agree-countermeasures-u-s-anti-missile-system-xinhua/#.WIESTLYrLGK>. Accessed January 19th 2017) ESG

**As for the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea, Seoul has recently complained that China appears to be tightening its economic vice on the country over the move. Experts say this, along with the joint Chinese-Russian statement, is likely an attempt by Beijing and Moscow to push Seoul to abolish the plan amid the uncertainty currently roiling the country in the wake of President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and ensuing Constitutional Court proceedings.** “I think the joint statement is an attempt by Beijing and Moscow to shape the domestic opinion in South Korea toward rejecting the THAAD deployment,” said Tetsuo Kotani, a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo. “Even if the ROK rethinks the deployment, that would have less impact on Japanese consideration of the missile defense system,” he added, using the acronym for the Republic of Korea, the South’s official name.

#### 6. The system is an ineffective waste of money anyways

**David Willman, 2016** (David Willman, Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist for *the LA Times*. July 14th 2016. “U.S. missile defense system is ‘simply unable to protect the public,’ report says,” *The LA Times*, <http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense-failings/>. Accessed January 19th 2017) ESG

**The report, to be released Thursday by the Union of Concerned Scientists**, recommends that the Obama administration halt the expansion of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, known as GMD, until its technical problems have been solved. “The story of this system is a cautionary tale about how the lack of appropriate oversight of a politically charged missile defense program has led to a system in tatters,” **said** the report, written by three physicists with expertise in missile defense. **“Despite more than a decade of development and a bill of $40 billion, the GMD system is simply unable to protect the U.S. public,’’** the authors wrote. The GMD system is intended to thwart a “limited” nuclear strike by a non-superpower adversary, such as North Korea or Iran. In the event of an attack, rocket interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara County and Ft. Greely, Alaska, would be launched from underground silos. Once in space, the interceptors would separate from their booster rockets and attempt to slam into and “kill” enemy warheads. The report notes that **in “heavily scripted” flight tests that are “set up for success,” GMD interceptors have often failed to hit mock enemy warheads. In the seven most recent tests, interceptors destroyed their targets just three times**, the report says — a finding consistent with conclusions of the Pentagon’s operational test and evaluation office. **Personnel conducting the tests know the speed, location and trajectory of the target ahead of time, as well as when it will be launched – information they would not have in a real attack.**

### AT: Military Translators

#### 1. It’s hard to find people to be translators because in the areas we are fighting the people who speak that language don’t want to work for the US military

**Abdulrahim 2010** (Raja Abdulrahim, reporter for Los Angeles Times; 11/26/10; "Army translators tough to find"; Los Angeles Times; doa: 1/23/16; <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/26/local/la-me-afghan-linguist-20101126>) AM

The day after President Barack Obama declared an end to the combat mission in Iraq, Aman Zamani walked the main thoroughfare of Little Persia to recruit soldiers for the country's other war. He strolled down Westwood Boulevard, passing an Iranian music store and young men in Armani jeans, and walked into Saffron & Rose Ice Cream. He chatted with the owner in Farsi and ordered white rose ice cream with milk, fulfilling a cultural obligation to make a purchase from a shopkeeper before talking business. A map of ancient Persia hung on a wall by the door. Zamani knew the shop was popular with young Afghans and Iranians, so he'd brought along a thick stack of business cards. But today, the shop was empty. He finished his ice cream and left. "It is a hard job to find the right person to recruit for the Army," he said. As the United States continues its military shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, the recruitment of Army translators and interpreters has followed, and Zamani, a contractor who recruits for the Army, is among those who have fanned out to Afghan and Persian communities and shopping districts looking for potential linguists to help fight the war. The recruitment trail can be challenging. **The pool of candidates who speak Dari, Pashto or Farsi is far thinner than the Arabic speakers the military sought out during the Iraq war. And many in the communities have reservations about the war.** The Army has been able to sign up only nine Los Angeles-area recruits for the language program in the last year, far short of the goal of 48 local enlistees and just a fraction of the 250 signed nationwide. "It's a much smaller population.... We're involved in a lot of community liaison activities and I expect this year to do more than in years past," said Lt. Col. Frank Demith, assistant deputy for foreign language and culture for the Army. "It's much harder to recruit." The Army's projected shortage of translators comes at a time when the need is most crucial -- as the U.S. ramps up preparing an Afghan police, army and justice system and meeting with local councils in preparation for an eventual U.S. withdrawal. Last weekend, NATO leaders set a goal of 2014 to transfer security responsibilities to the Afghan government -- a longer timeline than initially thought -- as alliance forces increasingly focus on training, advising and logistics, areas in which specialized linguists are critical. "You're not simply looking for language, you're looking for expertise, you're looking for people who can operate in combat zones, you're looking for people who can work with local officials," said Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Once enlisted, recruits go through basic training, though when deployed their names are not stitched onto their uniforms for security reasons. Some are quickly shipped to Afghanistan; others -- especially women -- remain stateside to train soldiers preparing to deploy. On the front lines, translators often accompany commanders and high-level officials to meetings with Afghan governors and leaders. Sometimes their value goes beyond simple translations. One soldier, who asked not to be identified because of security risks, recounted interceding when he saw U.S. soldiers shooting toward a mountain pass in Afghanistan during target practice. The soldier, who had grown up in the area, knew there was a village on the other side of the mountains and believes he probably prevented casualties. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz authorized the recruitment of soldiers with special language and cultural skills in 2003 after the U.S. invaded Iraq. At the time, the main focus was on Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish. "Our mission mirrored our presence overseas," Demith said. Although military action began first in Afghanistan, Iraq was viewed as the longer commitment and Arabic remained the military's main focus until troop deployment to Afghanistan began to spike. The Arab population in the U.S. is three times larger than the Afghan and Persian population, and winning recruits in those communities is complicated because military contractors compete for the same pool of applicants, offering better pay. Zamani, born in Kabul and a U.S. resident since 1981, began with the Los Angeles Army battalion in April but recently quit the assignment because of the long drive from his home in south Orange County. He now works for private firms that recruit for the Army. During his six-month stint with the Army, Zamani met with potential recruits to explain the program and test their native language skills. It was a less-than-exhaustive examination. "Can you tell me in Pashto, 'I want to go to Afghanistan to work for the people?' " he asked a man who had been brought by a recruiter to the battalion in Encino. The man, whose long black hair fell to his chin, repeated the sentence in Pashto.

#### 2. Even right after it experienced exponential growth the amount we spent on translators wasn’t even 2bi—you can double the budget without significantly increasing military budget

**David Isenberg 2011** (David Isenberg, from the Straus Military Reform Project; May 25, 2011; Translating for Dollars; Huffington Post; doa: 1/23/17; <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/translating-for-dollars_b_735752.html>) AM

Federal government agencies spent a total of US$4.5 billion on translation and interpreting services from 1990 through 2009. However the bulk of that is clearly attributable to what happened after 9/11. The massive amount of spending on language services by the U.S. government is a relatively recent phenomenon - 92 percent of this expenditure (US$4.2 billion) took place in the past decade alone, from 2000 to 2009. In fact, 47 percent of this money (US$2.1 billion) was paid out to language service providers in the past two years. In 2001, **the amount spent on language services** more than doubled from the previous year, from US$67.6 million to US$160.51 million. Language services contracts continued to grow - in size and number - in the years that followed. Another dramatic increase took place in 2008, when total federal spending on language services doubled yet again, from US$453.69 million in 2007 to US **$1.96 billion in 2008**.

#### 3. The military misuses its translators – increasing the number does nothing

**Max Rosenthal, 2011** (Max Rosenthal, former Sergeant in the U.S. Army who served as an Arabic linguist from 2006 to 2011. August 25th 2011. “Lost in Translation: How the Army Wastes Linguists Like Me,” *Wired*, <https://www.wired.com/2011/08/lost-in-translation-how-the-army-wastes-linguists-like-me/>. Accessed 25 January 2017) ESG

Problems like that were common to all deploying units that my fellow linguists and I knew of. **Whether assigned to military intelligence units or attached to infantry brigades, linguists found themselves in any capacity but their own.** Often, we waited for something to go wrong with our expensive communications-collections gear, and called the guy whose job it was to maintain the equipment if a glitch required more than flipping a reset switch. (Which it mostly didn’t.) If that’s the way the Army wants it, maybe linguists like me shouldn’t actually deploy at all. Those of us who don’t go to war zones mostly work at intelligence centers like Maryland’s Fort Meade, home of the National Security Agency. Unlike their counterparts overseas, these soldiers routinely work with their adoptive languages while still directly supporting deployed units from afar, like writing reports on collected communications and feeding databases. Their missions continue every day, allowing them to maintain language proficiency. Some defense companies are even working on techie ways to remotely connect linguists far from the front lines with combat troops who need quick translation help. Meanwhile**, linguists who actually go to war zones spend their time at home in a routine of garrison duties and unrelated training, no different from the rest of Big Army. Honing language skills falls far down the priority list. Many end up failing their yearly re-certification exams.**

### AT: Solves Terrorism

#### 1. Primacy cause terrorism and counterbalancing that makes primacy unsustainable.

Barry Posen, MIT Political Science Professor, Security Studies Program Member, December 2007, "The Case for Restraint," http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331, accessed 1-25-17, TAP

Whatever else it may achieve, U.S. activism is bound to discomfit other states. The great preponderance of U.S. power makes direct opposition to the United States difficult and dangerous, but other states are doing what they can to put themselves in a better position. Some fear U.S. freedom of action, worry about the possibility of being drawn into policies inimical to their interests, and so wish to distance themselves from the United States—even as they free-ride within the broader U.S. security umbrella. The European Union has gradually strengthened its military capabilities so that it can get along without the United States if it must. Others fear that U.S. policies will harm their interests indirectly, and look for ways to concert their power, as Russia and China have done in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Still others expect U.S. attentions to be directed straight at them, and so they seek to improve their abilities to deter U.S. military action or fight the United States directly if they must. North Korea and Iran pursue nuclear weapons for those purposes. Iran also has developed a conventional capability to inflict costs on U.S. forces in the Gulf and has been implicated in inflicting such costs in Iraq. To the extent that the United States continues its current activist policy path, these reactions will continue and will slowly increase the costs of future U.S. activism. They will also reduce the propensity of others to share these costs.¶ American activism also interacts with globalization to provoke negative reactions to the United States. Insofar as the U.S. economy is the largest and most dynamic in the world, the forces associated with globalization—trade, global supply chains, investment, travel and communications—are often associated with the United States by those experiencing the downside consequences. Not only does an activist foreign and security policy make the United States the most obvious unkind face of globalization, political entrepreneurs in the developing world will find it expedient to attribute the difficulties experienced by their target populations to the actions of the United States. When U.S. activism turns to direct military intervention in the affairs of other countries, local political leaders can rely on the most elemental of forces: nationalism.¶ Increased opportunities for travel and communications have enabled transnational groups, particularly al-Qaeda, to organize against the United States. They can mobilize people politically without one-to-one contact. Given populations of hundreds of millions, these organizations do not need a high conversion rate to sustain themselves. They need only produce sympathy on a large enough scale to provide an environment from which relatively modest material and human resources can be collected.¶ Al-Qaeda and other similar, but less ambitious, groups have also professionalized the training of their soldiers and terrorist operatives. They learn from one another, adapt to local circumstances, and profit from the more general availability of weaponry. The ease of international travel and trade allows human and material resources to be shifted rapidly from place to place. This turns U.S. interventions into opportunities for transnational anti-system groups like al-Qaeda to assist local resistance movements and to harness the power of nationalism and politicized religion to their more diffuse but still distinctly anti-American agenda.¶ The activist U.S. grand strategy currently preferred by the national security establishment in both parties thus has a classically tragic quality about it. Enabled by its great power, and fearful of the negative energies and possibilities engendered by globalization, the United States has tried to get its arms around the problem: It has essentially sought more control. But the very act of seeking more control injects negative energy into global politics as quickly as it finds enemies to vanquish. It prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can, and it prompts peoples to imagine that the United States is the source of all their troubles.¶ Iraq should therefore be seen not as a singular debacle, but as a harbinger of costs to come. There is enough capacity and motivation out in the world to increase significantly the costs of any U.S. effort to manage global politics directly. Public support for this policy may wane before profligacy so diminishes U.S. power that it becomes unsustainable. But it would be unwise to count on it.

#### 2. Primacy makes terrorist attacks against the US inevitable.

Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 69-70, accessed 1-25-17, TAP

Terrorism: When Over There Becomes Over Here 9/11 was not a random act of violence visited upon the United States. The United States was the target of al Qaeda’s terrorist strikes because that group harbored specific political grievances against the United States. If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, put it, “In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of al Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism...meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals 50Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman says, is “about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change.”5’ As Clausewitz himself observed, “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object.”52 Terrorism really is a form of asymmetric warfare waged against the United States by groups that lack the military wherewithal to slug it out with the United States toe-to-toe. 9/11 was a violent counterreaction to America’s geopolitical—and cultural—primacy. As Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article, “It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.” U.S. primacy fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of ”blowback” against America’s preponderance and its world role.54 As long as the United States uses its global primacy [end page 69] to impose its imperial sway on regions like the Persian Gulf, it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like at Qaeda.

#### 3. The US can pull back while still protecting its interests, thereby decreasing animosity and improving safety

**Alex Verschoor-Kirss 2012** (Alex Verschoor-Kirss, writer for the International Policy Digest. April 23rd 2012. “Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>. Accessed Dec 4 2016) ESG

When U.S. security is at stake it is not enough to depend on international institutions or the goodwill of other nations. **The clear path forward, therefore, lies with a slow yet steady devolvement from international affairs while maintaining a strong military capable of protecting the United States at its borders. The military should also be able to protect U.S. citizens and interests abroad, although in a restricted sense that moves away from current norms.** The benefits of an isolationist policy are clear: decreased costs and increased long-term security. Not only will the United States not have to pay for costly overseas bases and foreign aid that is of only dubious use to its own interests, but **it will also, through a reduction in the blowback effects caused by interventions, mean that there are less groups and individuals motivated to attack it. This lack of motivation will translate into increased security for U.S. interests both at home and abroad.** Detractors will invariably argue that such a scenario is hopelessly idealistic and naïve. It is impossible to undo hundreds of years of interventionist foreign policy simply through removing outward signs of the policy. Furthermore, deep-seated hatreds and animosities directed against the United States will not in and of themselves be swept away with such a bureaucratic maneuver. Certainly these criticisms are valid. Fundamentally realigning U.S. foreign policy towards an isolationist point of view will neither occur quickly, nor without costs.

### AT: MOBs

#### 1. Bases increase the likelihood of war

**David Vine, 2016** (David Vine, assistant professor of Anthropology at American University. September 13th 2016. “How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Undermine National Security and Harm Us All,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-bases-abroad_b_8131402.html>. Accessed Dec 17 2016) ESG

It is also not at all clear that bases enhance national security and global peace in any way. In the absence of a superpower enemy, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from U.S. shores are necessary to defend the United States — or even its allies — is a hard argument to make. On the contrary, **the global collection of bases has generally enabled the launching of military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice that have resulted in repeated disasters, costing millions of lives and untold destruction from Vietnam to Iraq.** **By making it easier to wage foreign wars, bases overseas have ensured that military action is an ever more attractive option — often the only imaginable option — for U.S. policymakers.** As the anthropologist Catherine Lutz has said, when all you have in your foreign policy toolbox is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. **Ultimately, bases abroad have frequently made war more likely rather than less.** Proponents of the long-outdated forward strategy will reply that overseas bases “deter” enemies and help keep the global peace. As supporters of the status quo, they have been proclaiming such security benefits as self-evident truths for decades. Few have provided anything of substance to support their claims. While there is some evidence that military forces can indeed deter imminent threats, little if any research suggests that overseas bases are an effective form of long-term deterrence. Studies by both the Bush administration and the RAND Corporation — not exactly left-wing peaceniks — indicate that advances in transportation technology have largely erased the advantage of stationing troops abroad. In the case of a legitimate defensive war or peacekeeping operation, the military could generally deploy troops just as quickly from domestic bases as from most bases abroad. Rapid sealift and airlift capabilities coupled with agreements allowing the use of bases in allied nations and, potentially, pre-positioned supplies are a dramatically less expensive and less inflammatory alternative to maintaining permanent bases overseas.

#### 2. MOBs are garbage

**Paul Nagy, 2001** (Paul Nagy, reserve surface warfare officer. August 2001. “Setting the Record Straight on Mobile Offshore Bases,” *National Defense Magazine*, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2001/August/Pages/Setting_the6984.aspx>. Accessed 27 January 2017) ESG

**An MOB would have to be located close to the battlefield** for it to have any operational or tactical utility. **Yet, such proximity to the battlefield also would place the slow, fairly non-maneuverable platform well within range of land-based threats, making them tempting, accessible targets to potential adversaries.** MOBs would require far more defensive assets than a carrier because of their lack of maneuverability. **These characteristics even make them potentially vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Perhaps the greatest uncertainty regarding MOBs is their ability to withstand damage.** While the Navy has experience at designing large ships for survivability, the unprecedented size of an MOB makes it an unusual case and many of the common analytical and design practices for survivability used for aircraft carriers and other large combatants are not applicable to MOBs. For example, the technology and construction techniques used by offshore oilrigs are said to be applicable to potential MOB designs. Yet, the inherent vulnerability of such platforms was graphically demonstrated when the world’s largest offshore oil platform sank off the coast of Brazil in March. A single explosion—blamed on a gas leak—reportedly knocked the platform off one of its air-filled supporting pillars. The real question is not whether an MOB could be built, but whether it could satisfy U.S. military requirements for presence, crisis response, transition to war and actual combat. Applications for MOBs range from tactical airfield to logistics pre-positioning, so their contribution to any particular mission depends on circumstances and on the concept of operations—where it is deployed, how it is employed and which missions have higher priority. A key issue, largely overlooked by MOB proponents, is the concept of operations. Attempting to use a single MOB to conduct multiple simultaneous or sequential missions would require performance-limiting trade-offs. For example, if an MOB had a heavy Army brigade of equipment aboard, it is likely that little space would be available for other missions, such as storing parts and equipment to support tactical air operations. According to the IDA report, in a dedicated logistics role, an MOB would not be capable of effectively replacing conventional sealift. **MOBs are significantly slower than the ships currently used or planned for the pre-positioning of equipment and munitions. Even if an MOB happened to be in the region at the start of a crisis or conflict, it would be too large to enter a port for cargo delivery.** MOBs would require significant numbers of barges, lighters, landing craft, helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft to move cargo to the shore. The time required to discharge cargo depends on a number of factors, such as distance to the shore, weather and sea state and an adversary’s attempt to disrupt that flow of cargo to the shore. In addition, conventional sealift ships will be able to use the Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) system of crane ships and causeways to offload conventional sealift ships directly over the beach. While an MOB and JLOTS both require a secure area ashore, IDA’s analysis indicates that an MOB provides an inferior delivery capability to JLOTS. An MOB would be the largest floating offshore structure ever conceived by maritime engineers**. Because of its novel configuration and unprecedented size, there are potential modes of damage and failure that have never been considered before for a marine structure.** IDA’s conclusion about MOBs sums it up. The alternatives to the MOB, such as carriers or large sealift ships, are more effective and less costly.

#### 3. The military has too many bases—we should be closing them not adding to the waste

**Kheel 2016** (Rebecca Kheel, reporter for The Hill; 4/15/16; Pentagon says 22 percent of military bases will be excess by 2019; The Hill; DOA: 1/27/16; <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/276528-pentagon-22-percent-of-bases-to-be-surplus-by-2019>) AM

**More than 20 percent of the Defense Department’s bases will be considered excess by 2019, according to a Pentagon report to Congress** made public Friday. **The report**, which was accompanied by a letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, **is meant to convince Congress of the need for Base** Realignment and **Closure** (BRAC) authorization, a politically unpopular process to close installations. “**As Department of Defense leadership has repeatedly testified, spending resources on excess infrastructure does not make sense**,” Work wrote. “Therefore, we urge Congress to provide the department authorization for another round of BRAC.” The last round of BRAC was in 2005. Lawmakers have repeatedly shot down requests for another round because closures can have damaging economic effects on communities that have built up around military bases, making the prospect politically unpopular. According to the report, the Pentagon will have 22 percent of excess capacity by 2019**. When looking at each service individually, it's 33 percent for the Army, 7 percent for the Navy, 32 percent for the Air Force and 12 percent for the Defense Logistics Agency.** Past rounds of BRAC in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 2005 and European infrastructure consolidation in 2015 have saved the Pentagon a total of $14.1 billion, when adjusted for inflation.

### AT: Environment ☹

#### 1. The military is bad for the environment particularly host communities and service men and women

**Brown University's Watson Institute 2015** (Brown University's Watson Institute on international and public affairs; april 2015; Environmental costs; doa: 1/27/16; <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment>) AM

The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have had a serious impact on the natural environments of these countries. **Military vehicles consume petroleum-based fuels at an extremely high rate, with the vehicles used in the war zones having produced many hundreds of thousands of tons of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and sulfur dioxide in addition to CO2. Air pollution from military vehicles and weaponry has adversely affected public health among civilians in the war zones and US service members.** Heavy military vehicles have raised more dust than usual, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, and service members’ exposures to inhaled toxins from that dust have correlated with respiratory disorders that often prevent them from continuing to serve and performing everyday activities such as exercise. **The water supply in the war zones has been contaminated by oil from military vehicles and depleted uranium from ammunition.** Along with the degradation of the natural resources in these countries and a radical destruction of forest cover, the animal and bird populations have also been adversely affected. **Iraqi medical doctors and health researchers have called for more research on war-related environmental pollution as a potential contributor to the country’s poor health conditions and high rates of infections and diseases.** Key Findings Destruction of military base garbage in burn pits and other **military operations have exposed soldiers and civilians to dangerous levels of pollutants.** Deforestation in Afghanistan as a result of illegal logging, particularly by warlords, has destroyed wildlife habitat. In Iraq, increases in cancer, birth defects, and other conditions have been associated with war-related environmental damage and toxins.

#### 2. TURN: Climate change and natural disasters are *caused* by the US military

**Patricia Hynes 2015** (Patricia Haynes, a former professor of environmental health at the Boston University School of Public Health; 2/8/15; Climate and Capitalism; 1/27/17; <http://climateandcapitalism.com/2015/02/08/pentagon-pollution-7-military-assault-global-climate/>) AM

**The U.S. military is the single greatest institutional contributor to the growing natural disasters intensified by global climate change.** By every measure, **the Pentagon is the largest** institutional **user of petroleum products and energy** … **Yet, the Pentagon has a blanket exemption in all international climate agreements** … Any talk of climate change which does not include the military is nothing but hot air, according to Sara Flounders. It’s a loophole [in the Kyoto Convention on Climate Change] big enough to drive a tank through, according to the report A Climate of War. In 1940, the US military consumed one percent of the country’s total energy usage; by the end of World War II, the military’s share rose to 29 percent.(1) Oil is indispensable for war. **Correspondingly, militarism is the most oil-exhaustive activity on the planet, growing more so with faster, bigger, more fuel-guzzling planes, tanks and naval vessels employed in more intensive air and ground wars.** At the outset of the Iraq war in March 2003, the Army estimated it would need more than 40 million gallons of gasoline for three weeks of combat, exceeding the total quantity used by all Allied forces in the four years of World War 1. Among the Army’s armamentarium were 2,000 staunch M-1 Abrams tanks fired up for the war and burning 250 gallons of fuel per hour.(2) **The US Air Force (USAF) is the single largest consumer of jet fuel in the world**. Fathom, if you can, the astronomical fuel usage of USAF fighter planes: the F-4 Phantom Fighter burns more than 1,600 gallons of jet fuel per hour and peaks at 14,400 gallons per hour at supersonic speeds. The B-52 Stratocruiser, with eight jet engines, guzzles 500 gallons per minute; ten minutes of flight uses as much fuel as the average driver does in one year of driving! A quarter of the world’s jet fuel feeds the USAF fleet of flying killing machines; in 2006, they consumed as much fuel as US planes did during the Second World War (1941-1945) — an astounding 2.6 billion gallons.(3) Barry Sanders observes with a load of tragic irony that, while many of us assiduously reduce our carbon footprint through simpler living, eating locally, recycling and reusing, energy conservation, taking public transportation, installing solar panels, and so on, **the single largest** institutional **polluter and contributor to global warming — the US military** — is immune to climate change concerns. The military reports no climate change emissions to any national or international body, thanks to US arm-twisting during the 1997 negotiations of the first international accord to limit global warming emissions, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. **To protect the military from any curbs on their activities, the United States demanded and won exemption from emission limits on “bunker” fuels (dense, heavy fuel oil for naval vessels) and all greenhouse gas emissions from military operations worldwide,** including wars. Adding insult to injury, George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol as one of the first acts of his presidency, alleging it would straitjacket the US economy with too costly greenhouse emissions controls. Next, the White House began a neo-Luddite campaign against the science of climate change. In researching The Green Zone: The Environmental Costs of Militarism, Sanders found that getting war casualty statistics out of the Department of Defense (DoD) is easier than getting fuel usage data. Only recently has the momentous issue of military fuel use and its massive, yet concealed role in global climate change come to the foreground, thanks to a handful of perspicacious researchers. Liska and Perrin contend that, in addition to tailpipe emissions, immense “hidden” greenhouse gas pollution stems from our use of gasoline. This impact on climate change should be calculated into the full lifecycle analysis of gasoline. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compares gasoline and biofuels for their respective atmospheric pollution, the greenhouse gas emissions calculated for gasoline should include the military activities related to securing foreign crude oil, from which gasoline is derived. (But they do not, thanks to the Kyoto Accords military exemption.) Oil security comprises both military protection against sabotage to pipelines and tankers and also US-led wars in oil-rich regions to assure long-term access. Nearly 1,000 US military bases trace an arc from the Andes to North Africa across the Middle East to Indonesia, the Philippines and North Korea, sweeping over all major oil resources — all related, in part, to projecting force for the sake of energy security. **Further, the “upstream emissions” of greenhouse gases from the manufacture of military equipment, infrastructure, vehicles and munitions used in oil supply protection and oil-driven wars should also be included in the overall environmental impact** of using gasoline. Adding these factors into their calculations, the authors conclude that about “20 percent of the conventional DoD budget … is attributable to the objective of oil security.” A corresponding analysis by researchers at Oil Change International quantifies the greenhouse gas emissions of the Iraq war and the opportunity costs involved in fighting the war, rather than investing in clean technology, during the years 2003-2007. **Their key findings are unambiguous about the vast climate pollution of war and the lockstep bipartisan policy of forfeiting future global health for present day militarism.** The projected full costs of the Iraq war (estimated $3 trillion) would cover “all of the global investments in renewable power generation” needed between now and 2030 to reverse global warming trends. Between 2003-2007, the war generated at least 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)(4), more each year of the war than 139 of the world’s countries release annually.(5) **Rebuilding Iraqi schools, homes, businesses, bridges, roads and hospitals pulverized by the war, and new security walls and barriers will require millions of tons of cement, one of the largest industrial sources of greenhouse gas emissions.**

#### 3. Nah fam

**Rebecca Leber 2014** (Rebecca Leber, reporter for the New Republic; 4/23/14; Republicans Always Listen to the Pentagon—Except When It Says Climate Change Is Real; doa: 1/27/16; <https://newrepublic.com/article/118830/pentagon-tell-republicans-climate-change-hurting-military>) AM

So far, **the GOP remains unconvinced. When the House of Representatives passed the Pentagon’s budget in June, it included an amendment, passed mostly along partly lines, [barring the department](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/23/pentagon-climate-change_n_5382067.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) from implementing its climate change initiatives.** On Tuesday, [The Hill](http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/213027-climate-change-hits-all-pentagon-operations-official-says%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) reported that Republican Senator John Barasso called the military’s efforts to combat climate change “wasteful and irresponsible at best, especially as our friends and allies struggle with violent, deadly crises that have real implications for our security."

### AT: Disaster Relief

#### 1. The military is bad for the environment particularly host communities and service men and women

**Brown University's Watson Institute 2015** (Brown University's Watson Institute on international and public affairs; april 2015; Environmental costs; doa: 1/27/16; <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment>) AM

The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have had a serious impact on the natural environments of these countries. **Military vehicles consume petroleum-based fuels at an extremely high rate, with the vehicles used in the war zones having produced many hundreds of thousands of tons of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and sulfur dioxide in addition to CO2. Air pollution from military vehicles and weaponry has adversely affected public health among civilians in the war zones and US service members.** Heavy military vehicles have raised more dust than usual, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, and service members’ exposures to inhaled toxins from that dust have correlated with respiratory disorders that often prevent them from continuing to serve and performing everyday activities such as exercise. **The water supply in the war zones has been contaminated by oil from military vehicles and depleted uranium from ammunition.** Along with the degradation of the natural resources in these countries and a radical destruction of forest cover, the animal and bird populations have also been adversely affected. **Iraqi medical doctors and health researchers have called for more research on war-related environmental pollution as a potential contributor to the country’s poor health conditions and high rates of infections and diseases.** Key Findings Destruction of military base garbage in burn pits and other **military operations have exposed soldiers and civilians to dangerous levels of pollutants.** Deforestation in Afghanistan as a result of illegal logging, particularly by warlords, has destroyed wildlife habitat. In Iraq, increases in cancer, birth defects, and other conditions have been associated with war-related environmental damage and toxins.

#### 2. The military oft undermines natural disaster relief

**Ajay Madiwale and Kudrat Virk, 2011** (Ajay Madiwale, Humanitarian Policy Advisor at the British Red Cross, and Kudrat Virk, researcher with a DPhil in International Relations. December 2011. “Civil–military relations in natural disasters: a case study of the 2010 Pakistan floods,” *International Review of the Red Cross*, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-madiwale-virk.pdf>. Accessed 27 Jan 2017. Page 1086-1087) ESG

The international humanitarian community by and large recognizes that the military can play a vital role in disaster response. It can provide, among other things, a search and rescue capacity unmatched by the humanitarian community; logistical support; expertise and material resources for infrastructure projects; trained manpower; and, on occasion, security for relief workers. At the same time, there is serious concern that **the involvement of military personnel and assets poses a** **potential threat to the core principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence that underpin the work of humanitarian agencies. This in turn can threaten the security and operations of these civilian humanitarian agencies.** Humanitarian and military approaches to security often diverge, creating tensions between the two types of actor despite shared goals in disaster response. Military approaches to security tend to focus on deterrence, or on physical (kinetic) security, which can lead to fortified compounds and the presence of arms at distribution points. On the other hand, humanitarians, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, tend to rely on acceptance-based security, which seeks to gain the consent of all stakeholders in an operational area, and proscribes the presence of arms at distribution points. **The question** of whether civil–military relations can undermine security management and humanitarian principles **is more contentious in conflict settings, where association with the military often carries the risk of loss of acceptance, access, and legitimacy for humanitarian actors, as well as increased security risks.** Further, as militaries are instruments of states, there are concerns that, **when militaries are deployed to respond to natural disasters, political and security considerations may at times override humanitarian considerations, undermining humanitarian assistance based on need. For instance, humanitarians worry that the methods used by military authorities to undertake assessments and consultations with local communities may challenge their ability to provide assistance to the most vulnerable in an accountable and impartial way. There are also concerns that the short-term nature of their response to natural disasters – usually no more than six weeks – leads militaries to employ response strategies focused on immediate effect, which may undermine the longer-term ‘do no harm’ strategies of humanitarian agencies.**

#### 3. This creates more conflict.

Marcos Ferreiro 2012 (Marcos Ferreiro, a Barrié de la Maza fellow and Harvard graduate in Public Administration in International Development. Blurring of Lines in Complex Emergencies: Consequences for the Humanitarian Community. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, Field experience and current research on humanitarian action and policy. <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1625>) ESM

The aid industry has experienced impressive growth in the last decade, almost tripling its budget in the interval 2000-2010. Globally, this may be the main reason for the surge in violence. However, not only the absolute figures of violence but also the attack rates have significantly increased in the three most violent settings – Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan – which together account for half of the incidents and killings accumulated worldwide in the last 15 years. Thus, in these three countries, the growth of aid alone does not justify the rise in incidents. To explain this surge, many point at a growing politicization of attacks due to the ‘blurring of agendas,’ with aid workers “increasingly being targeted by militants for their association with Western military and political campaigns.”

#### 4. International response will always be too slow – if the military is necessary it must be LOCAL

**Elizabeth Ferris, 2012** (Elizabeth Ferris, senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and Research Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. May 2012. “Future directions in civil-military responses to natural disasters,” *Australian Civil Military Centre*, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05-civ-mil-disasters-ferris.pdf>. Accessed 27 January 2017. Page 5) ESG

**International actors, military or civilian, simply are not—and perhaps cannot be—fast enough in immediate response** There is often a perception that the military can move more quickly in responding to a natural disaster than civilian humanitarian actors because the military has standing forces. In the case of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the Chinese Government reported that it mobilised troops within 14 minutes of the disaster.32 Search and rescue teams, for example, operate under a protocol of rapid response, both nationally and internationally.33 It does, however, take time to mobilise an international response, whether by civilian organisations or military forces, which means that local responders will always be on the front line. Most of the lives saved are the result of local efforts, often by communities themselves rather than government, the military or non-government organisations. **Indeed, Malish et al. report that most military emergency relief team deployments do not arrive until one to six weeks after the event. For example, the US naval hospital ship Mercy did not arrive on site in the Indian Ocean until five weeks after the 2004 tsunami**; the US Army 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital was not operational in Pakistan until day 17 after the 2005 earthquake34, and of 13 international teams deployed to assist with the 2004 earthquake in Bam, Iran, none arrived as early as day 2 of the disaster. With respect to their experience with a mobile surgical team responding to the 2007 earthquake in Peru, **Malish et al. concluded that ‘arriving within 48 hours isn’t quick enough to make a major contribution to the provision of acute surgical care’. This leads to an emphasis on the importance of building local capacity in disaster response**, including building the capacity of local and national military and police forces. It also leads to recognition of the importance of response—both civilian and military—in the regions where disasters occur and the importance of strengthening regional response mechanisms. Efforts to strengthen regional disaster response mechanisms are under way in most regions.

### AT: Climate Hardening

#### 1. Bars solvency – Ikenberry

#### 2. The military acts as a multiplier on climate harms

**Brown University's Watson Institute 2015** (Brown University's Watson Institute on international and public affairs; april 2015; Environmental costs; doa: 1/27/16; <http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/environment>) AM

The wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have had a serious impact on the natural environments of these countries. **Military vehicles consume petroleum-based fuels at an extremely high rate, with the vehicles used in the war zones having produced many hundreds of thousands of tons of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and sulfur dioxide in addition to CO2. Air pollution from military vehicles and weaponry has adversely affected public health among civilians in the war zones and US service members.** Heavy military vehicles have raised more dust than usual, particularly in Iraq and Kuwait, and service members’ exposures to inhaled toxins from that dust have correlated with respiratory disorders that often prevent them from continuing to serve and performing everyday activities such as exercise. **The water supply in the war zones has been contaminated by oil from military vehicles and depleted uranium from ammunition.** Along with the degradation of the natural resources in these countries and a radical destruction of forest cover, the animal and bird populations have also been adversely affected. **Iraqi medical doctors and health researchers have called for more research on war-related environmental pollution as a potential contributor to the country’s poor health conditions and high rates of infections and diseases.** Key Findings Destruction of military base garbage in burn pits and other **military operations have exposed soldiers and civilians to dangerous levels of pollutants.** Deforestation in Afghanistan as a result of illegal logging, particularly by warlords, has destroyed wildlife habitat. In Iraq, increases in cancer, birth defects, and other conditions have been associated with war-related environmental damage and toxins.

#### 3. TURN: Climate change and natural disasters are *caused* by the US military

**Hynes 2015** (Patricia Haynes, a former professor of environmental health at the Boston University School of Public Health; 2/8/15; Climate and Capitalism; 1/27/17; <http://climateandcapitalism.com/2015/02/08/pentagon-pollution-7-military-assault-global-climate/>) AM

**The U.S. military is the single greatest institutional contributor to the growing natural disasters intensified by global climate change.** By every measure, **the Pentagon is the largest** institutional **user of petroleum products and energy** … **Yet, the Pentagon has a blanket exemption in all international climate agreements** … Any talk of climate change which does not include the military is nothing but hot air, according to Sara Flounders. It’s a loophole [in the Kyoto Convention on Climate Change] big enough to drive a tank through, according to the report A Climate of War. In 1940, the US military consumed one percent of the country’s total energy usage; by the end of World War II, the military’s share rose to 29 percent.(1) Oil is indispensable for war. **Correspondingly, militarism is the most oil-exhaustive activity on the planet, growing more so with faster, bigger, more fuel-guzzling planes, tanks and naval vessels employed in more intensive air and ground wars.** At the outset of the Iraq war in March 2003, the Army estimated it would need more than 40 million gallons of gasoline for three weeks of combat, exceeding the total quantity used by all Allied forces in the four years of World War 1. Among the Army’s armamentarium were 2,000 staunch M-1 Abrams tanks fired up for the war and burning 250 gallons of fuel per hour.(2) **The US Air Force (USAF) is the single largest consumer of jet fuel in the world**. Fathom, if you can, the astronomical fuel usage of USAF fighter planes: the F-4 Phantom Fighter burns more than 1,600 gallons of jet fuel per hour and peaks at 14,400 gallons per hour at supersonic speeds. The B-52 Stratocruiser, with eight jet engines, guzzles 500 gallons per minute; ten minutes of flight uses as much fuel as the average driver does in one year of driving! A quarter of the world’s jet fuel feeds the USAF fleet of flying killing machines; in 2006, they consumed as much fuel as US planes did during the Second World War (1941-1945) — an astounding 2.6 billion gallons.(3) Barry Sanders observes with a load of tragic irony that, while many of us assiduously reduce our carbon footprint through simpler living, eating locally, recycling and reusing, energy conservation, taking public transportation, installing solar panels, and so on, **the single largest** institutional **polluter and contributor to global warming — the US military** — is immune to climate change concerns. The military reports no climate change emissions to any national or international body, thanks to US arm-twisting during the 1997 negotiations of the first international accord to limit global warming emissions, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. **To protect the military from any curbs on their activities, the United States demanded and won exemption from emission limits on “bunker” fuels (dense, heavy fuel oil for naval vessels) and all greenhouse gas emissions from military operations worldwide,** including wars. Adding insult to injury, George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol as one of the first acts of his presidency, alleging it would straitjacket the US economy with too costly greenhouse emissions controls. Next, the White House began a neo-Luddite campaign against the science of climate change. In researching The Green Zone: The Environmental Costs of Militarism, Sanders found that getting war casualty statistics out of the Department of Defense (DoD) is easier than getting fuel usage data. Only recently has the momentous issue of military fuel use and its massive, yet concealed role in global climate change come to the foreground, thanks to a handful of perspicacious researchers. Liska and Perrin contend that, in addition to tailpipe emissions, immense “hidden” greenhouse gas pollution stems from our use of gasoline. This impact on climate change should be calculated into the full lifecycle analysis of gasoline. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) compares gasoline and biofuels for their respective atmospheric pollution, the greenhouse gas emissions calculated for gasoline should include the military activities related to securing foreign crude oil, from which gasoline is derived. (But they do not, thanks to the Kyoto Accords military exemption.) Oil security comprises both military protection against sabotage to pipelines and tankers and also US-led wars in oil-rich regions to assure long-term access. Nearly 1,000 US military bases trace an arc from the Andes to North Africa across the Middle East to Indonesia, the Philippines and North Korea, sweeping over all major oil resources — all related, in part, to projecting force for the sake of energy security. **Further, the “upstream emissions” of greenhouse gases from the manufacture of military equipment, infrastructure, vehicles and munitions used in oil supply protection and oil-driven wars should also be included in the overall environmental impact** of using gasoline. Adding these factors into their calculations, the authors conclude that about “20 percent of the conventional DoD budget … is attributable to the objective of oil security.” A corresponding analysis by researchers at Oil Change International quantifies the greenhouse gas emissions of the Iraq war and the opportunity costs involved in fighting the war, rather than investing in clean technology, during the years 2003-2007. **Their key findings are unambiguous about the vast climate pollution of war and the lockstep bipartisan policy of forfeiting future global health for present day militarism.** The projected full costs of the Iraq war (estimated $3 trillion) would cover “all of the global investments in renewable power generation” needed between now and 2030 to reverse global warming trends. Between 2003-2007, the war generated at least 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)(4), more each year of the war than 139 of the world’s countries release annually.(5) **Rebuilding Iraqi schools, homes, businesses, bridges, roads and hospitals pulverized by the war, and new security walls and barriers will require millions of tons of cement, one of the largest industrial sources of greenhouse gas emissions.**

#### 4. Not gon happen

**Rebecca Leber 2014** (Rebecca Leber, reporter for the New Republic; 4/23/14; Republicans Always Listen to the Pentagon—Except When It Says Climate Change Is Real; doa: 1/27/16; <https://newrepublic.com/article/118830/pentagon-tell-republicans-climate-change-hurting-military>) AM

So far, **the GOP remains unconvinced. When the House of Representatives passed the Pentagon’s budget in June, it included an amendment, passed mostly along partly lines, [barring the department](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/23/pentagon-climate-change_n_5382067.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) from implementing its climate change initiatives.** On Tuesday, [The Hill](http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/213027-climate-change-hits-all-pentagon-operations-official-says%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) reported that Republican Senator John Barasso called the military’s efforts to combat climate change “wasteful and irresponsible at best, especially as our friends and allies struggle with violent, deadly crises that have real implications for our security."

### AT: Welfare Thing

#### 1. Foreign Policy Budget is Zero-Sum – Each Dollar trades-off with other efforts

Myra Sessions 2006 (Myra Sessions, Center for Global Development program coordinator. 2006. “The PMI Turns One - How Will We Measure Success?,” pg online @ <http://www.cgdev.org/blog/pmi-turns-one-how-will-we-measure-success>)

Thanks for the comment and question, Michael. I have not done the analysis of the data to see if the PMI is having a negative impact on the funding levels of other health initiatives-- and given all of the other changes in the US foreign assistance budget I am not sure it would ever be possible to isolate the impact of the PMI. However, during a recent CGD event, Congressman Kolbe talked at length about the future challenges in maintaining foreign assistance funding levels in light of increasing domestic federal expenditures. Mark Lippert, the Director of Foreign Policy for Senator Barak Obama also touched on this key issue at an April CGD event about the future of MCA. The message from each of these speakers was that funding levels for any particular initiative or priority should be looked at in the broader context-- and that the appropriations process is essentially a zero-sum game full of trade-offs. In today's tight budget climate, I think that there is no doubt that funding for the PMI and other new intiatives will detract from real or potential funding for other areas of the foreign aid budget-- and that the appropriations process is essentially a zero-sum game full of trade-offs. In today's tight budget climate, I think that there is no doubt that funding for the PMI and other new intiatives will detract from real or potential funding for other areas of the foreign aid budget-- and that that reality should be a part of the conversation about the successes and opportunities of the initiatives.

#### **2.** Military aid is being disproportionately spent over developmental aid

**James Kennedy, 2014** (James Kennedy, program assistant at the Open Society Foundations and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. March 4th 2014. “U.S. Foreign Assistance: More Guns than Butter,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, <http://fpif.org/u-s-foreign-assistance-guns-butter/>. Accessed 28 January 2017) ESG

Two facts should give us pause**. First, the United States is now providing essentially equal parts “guns” and “butter” in its foreign assistance. Second, this money is being spent with little congressional oversight, and it is often unclear where the money is going and whether it is effective. These developments** suggest skewed national priorities. They also **reinforce a negative U.S. image overseas as a country more committed to pumping up militaries than building up economies.** In this year’s budget, Congress authorized the Pentagon and the State Department to spend almost the same amount on foreign military and police assistance ($19.1 billion) as it did for State and USAID to use for non-security purposes such as health, education, and food security programs ($21.5 billion). While the Pentagon’s spending is difficult to track because of its opaque reporting process, it is possible to isolate several troubling trends. Believe it or not, the spending imbalance is even more pronounced if temporary spending for the war in Afghanistan—which includes a sizable non-security component—is removed from the equation. The United States would still be spending much more on security assistance than on other programs. **And even State itself would be spending more on security assistance than on global health programs, which at $8.44 billion is the largest single category of non-security foreign aid spending. Under the current budget, the State Department will spend $8.51 billion in military and security assistance in 2014. In 2004, State spent $2 billion less, and that was during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.**

### AT: Deep Water Ports

#### 1. The port would be used by Shell

**Associated Press 2015** (Associated Press;10/27/15; Army Corps putting work on deep-water port in Arctic on hold; doa: 1/28/16; <http://www.newsminer.com/news/alaska_news/army-corps-putting-work-on-deep-water-port-in-arctic/article_e014302e-7cc6-11e5-971a-27bda61d91c9.html>) AM

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP) - **The Army Corps of Engineers suspended its study into building the first deep-water port for large oil and gas support ships in the Arctic Ocean** after Royal Dutch Shell ended its exploratory drilling off Alaska's northern coast. Shell's decision last month to halt offshore drilling in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas raised questions about the need for the port project aimed primarily at reducing travel costs for oil and gas support vessels, the Corps said in a statement Monday. It said it would put the study on hold for a year instead of canceling it because the industry could change and interest is high in improved Arctic marine infrastructure. "During the next 12 months, the Corps and its partners will monitor Arctic activities to determine if there may be the potential for federal interest in continuing the study," the Corps said in a statement. The Corps began working with Alaska in 2011 to examine the possibility of creating a port for large oil and gas ships at Nome Harbor, which is 550 miles northwest of Anchorage, by expanding it and deepening it to 28 feet. The plan figured three exploratory wells would be developed in the Chukchi Sea by 2020 and the site would help vessels cut down on travel. **Shell was the only company actively exploring in U.S. Arctic waters,** spending upward of $7 billion on offshore development**. It announced Sept. 28 that it would stop Arctic drilling, citing** disappointing results from a well in the Chukchi Sea and the **unpredictable federal regulatory environment.** After the company's move, the federal government said it was canceling petroleum lease sales in U.S. Arctic waters scheduled for 2016 and 2017. Beaufort Sea leases are set to expire in 2017, and Chukchi Sea leases, in 2020. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, told the Alaska Dispatch News (<http://bit.ly/1ibzznV> ) that it's "disheartening to see the negative impacts of Shell's decision continue to ripple throughout Alaska." She said she is hopeful the Corps will decide to move forward with the project in the coming year. Joy Baker, Nome port director, also was disappointed but said the city is glad the Corps is not ending its work altogether. A draft study was close to being completed by the Corps' office in Alaska, she said. "The city is fully intending to pursue project authorization based on broader justifications of national security, life and safety, protection of the environment," Baker told the newspaper. "We believe there's a broader purpose for the facility than just the economic benefit of the oil and gas industry."

#### 2. Stopping drilling is critical because as long as the drilling occurs, oil spills are inevitable

**World Wildlife Fund, 2010** (The World Wildlife Fund, leading organization in wildlife conservation and endangered species. 2010. “Drilling for Oil in the Arctic: Too Soon, Too Risky,”<http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/393/files/original/Drilling_for_Oil_in_the_Arctic_Too_Soon_Too_Risky.pdf>. Page 4) ESG

As the world’s supply of easily accessible oil and gas reserves begins to run dry, even as demand for energy grows, major energy companies have invested heavily in the development of new technologies to tap reserves previously considered physically inaccessible or economically impractical to recover. Unfortunately, this effort by companies to extend the reach of their drill bits into deeper waters, and into ever more remote regions of the planet, has not been matched by a similar level of investment in the technology needed to contain and clean up oil spills occurring under these more challenging conditions. Indeed, while there have been some promising (but still largely unproven) advances in the development of new response technologies, the basic tool kit for cleaning up an oil spill—booms, skimmers and chemical dispersants—hasn’t changed significantly in 20 years.1 This imbalance between the technology to drill in more risk-prone environments and the means to deal with the consequences when something goes wrong has been largely dismissed by the oil industry, which contends that improved safeguards make the likelihood of catastrophic spills a receding possibility. It is true that major oil spills from tankers traveling through U.S. waters have dropped dramatically since Congress, in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster, tightened legal requirements on shipping with passage of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act. But over the same time period, the number of spills from offshore rigs and pipelines in U.S. waters actually increased more than fivefold, from an average of four spills a year in the 1990s to an average of 22 spills annually over the past five years. From 2000 through 2009, BP had the highest number of spills (23), while Shell was a close second with 21.2 **The bottom line is that where there is offshore drilling, there is the risk—in time, even the inevitability—of an oil spill. There is no technology that is truly fail-safe—especially when mechanical failure is compounded by human error, lack of proper oversight or the temptation to cut operational corners for profit’s sake.** Prior to April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig was touted as one of the most technologically advanced drilling platforms in the world. Yet, from the alarms that didn’t go off to the blowout preventer that malfunctioned, one by one, all its fail-safe devices failed.

#### 3. Arctic oil spills would destroy biodiversity

**Karl Magnus Eger, 2010** (Karl Magnus Eger for ARCTIS, a gateway for business, governments and educational communities to learn about shipping, transportation, logistics and resources in the Arctic. 2010. “Effects of Oil Spills in Arctic Waters,” *ARCTIS Database,* [http://www.arctis-search.com/tiki-index.php?page=Effects+of+Oil+Spills+in+Arctic+Waters#124](http://www.arctis-search.com/tiki-index.php?page=Effects+of+Oil+Spills+in+Arctic+Waters%23124)) ESG

Oil in the Arctic marine ecosystem originates mainly from two sources: drilling activity and oil spills during transportation. Drilling activity causes long-term exposure and thus chronic effects on Arctic marine ecosystems, such as changes in species composition, dominance and biomass, while oil spill effects are acute and can cause severe damage locally . However, the **oil** products, **whether it originates from shipping activities or drilling activity, destroy all aspects of the environmental integrity of the marine ecosystems including fisheries, marine mammals, corals, ocean and shore birds, and the coastal wildlife and thus lead to changes in e.g. behaviour (feeding, activity and motility, avoidance reactions etc.), growth, and reproduction.** Oil spills in ice are more complicated to address than oil spills in open waters. Should this occur at the wrong place at the wrong time, for example in the marginal ice zone, in polynyas, during the high production period, the impacts could be serious. Shallow waters are the most sensitive to such pollution, and these areas are important to organisms of all levels of the Arctic food chain. Apart from the normally long distances from existing infrastructure, the oil is less accessible in ice-covered waters.

#### 4. Ships going through the arctic will spread invasive species and destroy ecosystems

**Lisa Palmer 2013** (Lisa Palmer, reporter for the Scientific American; 3/6/13; Melting Arctic Ice Will Make Way for More Ships--and More Species Invasions; doa: 1/28/17; <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/melting-arctic-sea-ice-means-more-shipping-and-more-invasive-species/>) AM

**Ships** traveling regularly in the Northwest Passage, beyond the Northern Sea Route and **through the** central **Arctic** Ocean, **will likely bring new invaders to the Arctic as well as to northern ports. Mosquitoes and forest beetles are expected to survive hidden in cargo, for example.** Hearty marine organisms, such as mussels and barnacles, will likely tag along as larvae in ballast tanks or in niche areas on vessel hulls. **When new species flourish in a new environment they can become harmful, damaging local ecosystems and threatening native plants and animals**, much as the Japanese vine known as kudzu has overrun the southern **U.S. Economic costs associated with new pests have been significant—for example, the influx of zebra mussels into the Great Lakes has been estimated at $1 billion annually.**

### AT: Offensive Alliances

#### 1. Definition of an “offensive” alliance

Black’s Law Dictionary, N.D

The relation or union between persons or families contracted by [intermarriage](http://thelawdictionary.org/intermarriage/). [In international law](http://thelawdictionary.org/in-international-law/). A union or [association](http://thelawdictionary.org/association/) of two or more states or nations, formed by league or treaty, for the joint [prosecution](http://thelawdictionary.org/prosecution/) of a war, or for their mutual assistance and protection in repelling hostile attacks. The league or treaty by which the association is formed. The act of confederating, by league or treaty, for the purposes mentioned. If the alliance is formed for the purpose of mutual aid in the prosecution of a war against a common enemy, it is called an "offensive" alliance. If it contemplates only the rendition of aid and protection in resisting the assault of a hostile power, it is called a "defensive" alliance. If it combines both these features, it is denominated an alliance "offensive and defensive."

By the definition, these alliances that are taking place aren’t offensive. Japan isn’t backing Australia if Australia launches a war with Vietnam or the Philippines. Rather it’s a defensive agreement for each country to back each other in the face of Chinese military aggression.

#### 2. All of these alliances are focused on DEFENSE. The pro is playing a dangerous rhetorical game to encourage war buildup

Medcalf 14(Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute International Security Program Director, July 31st 2014, Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions,” [https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-indo-pacific-rivalry-australia-india-and-middle-power-coalitions DoA 1/29/17](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-indo-pacific-rivalry-australia-india-and-middle-power-coalitions%20DoA%201/29/17)) CJV

Together Australia and India could draw on their distinct and complementary strengths to initiate the construction of multiple, overlapping minilateral arrangements. They could be the Indo-Pacific core, not so much of one formal coalition, but of several flexible coalitions. These two powers have their own substantial capabilities, the benefits of their strategic geography, and most importantly the potential to engage and mobilise a wide range of partners between them: a mix of US allies and notionally non-aligned states. In all of this, India and Australia would be seeking to engage other regional states as equals, rather than insisting that others accept their formal ‘leadership’. They would be leaders only in the sense of being well positioned to get the coalition process underway. Between them, India and Australia would stand a good chance of involving Indonesia in a three-way security dialogue, and perhaps eventually a maritime surveillance regime focused on the approaches to the strategically vital Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar straits. India could use its ties with Vietnam, and Australia its long-standing defence links with Singapore and Malaysia, to encourage those states towards a more region-wide approach to security cooperation. Australia could for instance encourage the long-standing Five Power Defence Arrangements (involving Singapore, Malaysia, Britain and New Zealand) to work more closely with India or other regional states in exercises and training.

#### 3. Turn - This alliance would actually lead to more stability in the region

Medcalf 14(Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute International Security Program Director, July 31st 2014, Lowy Institute for International Policy, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions,” [https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-indo-pacific-rivalry-australia-india-and-middle-power-coalitions DoA 1/29/17](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-indo-pacific-rivalry-australia-india-and-middle-power-coalitions%20DoA%201/29/17)) CJV

Where could and should this lead? Mutual assistance among the Indo-Pacific’s middle players should expand, and should not be limited to bilateral cooperation. A logical extension of this would be the creation of Indo-Pacific ‘middle power coalitions’: informal arrangements where the powers in the middle make it a priority to strengthen and help one another, working in self-selecting groups, or ‘minilateral’ arrangements that do not include China or the United States. Areas of cooperation could include security dialogues, intelligence exchanges, military capacity building, technology sharing, agenda setting for regional forums, and coordinated diplomatic initiatives to influence both US and Chinese strategic calculations. This would build regional resilience against the vagaries of the US-China relationship, including against the extremes either of conflict or collaboration. It would also reinforce the multipolar quality of the emerging Indo-Pacific order, encouraging continued US engagement without unduly provoking China by creating the impression of US-led encirclement.

Prefer the con. We lead to stability in the region WITHOUT triggering war with China. The pro can’t guarantee that

### AT: Military Intelligence

### AT: General Modernization

### AT: Power Vacuums

## NEG EXTENSIONS

### EXT: Heg Bad

#### 1. Hegemony incites a Russian-China alliance – causes nuclear war

**Paul Roberts 2007** (Paul Craig Roberts,Senior Research Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, William E. Simon Chairin Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 2007. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance,” [http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html](http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

This week the **Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles.** The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. **Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to** neoconservative delusions about **US hegemony.** Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. **Russia and China have now witnessed enough** of the Bush administration's **unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously.** As **the US** has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it **most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict.**

### EXT: Goes Back to Same Stuff

#### 1. Spending gets re-entrenched to the already powerful areas. AT hyper specific advocacy.

MICHAEL E. FLYNN Binghamton University 2014

I find evidence that military leaders occupying key positions influence defense spending priorities in favor of their respective branches. The analysis also suggests the influence of military leaders has changed over time and is conditional upon the institutions governing the relations between civilian policymakers and military leaders. Generally, I find that controlling a greater share of key military leadership positions is positively correlated with the amount of money that a branch receives, but that this relationship is most robust for the post-GoldwaterNichols period. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also appears to have had the opposite effect when looking at specific positions, like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Holding this position in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols period is positively correlated with branch spending, but it is negatively correlated with spending in the post-Goldwater period. These findings shed new light on the role played by, and influence of, lower-ranking officials in the foreign policy-making process. Additionally, these findings suggest that preferences and perceptions concerning national security and defense force posture are viewed, at least in part, through the lens of organizational interests. **Finally, these results also speak to the subjectivity of national security concerns. The notion that military leaders will use their control of the military’s organizational hierarchy to benefit their particular branch need not be interpreted as something nefarious, but this suggests something important about the degree to which national security and foreign policy can be conceptualized in terms of shared strategic interests.** Although the idea of divergent preferences over national security policy is not new, this study underscores this concept by providing some empirical evidence of the parochial nature of America’s military leadership. If even those individuals charged with the planning and execution of the state’s defense are inclined to pursue more narrow interests, then it seems all the more likely that politicians may be prone to significantly varied conceptualizations of just what constitutes the “national interest.” **The existence of similar variation among military leaders suggests that the processes shaping preferences over national security issues may be far more complex than we might expect.**

### EXT: Spending = Bad Mean Stuff

#### 1. Increased military capability makes use of force more likely

**Benjamin Fordham, 2004** (Benjamin Fordham, Professor of Political Science at SUNY Binghamton, 2004.“A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to Use Force”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, October 2004, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4149813.pdf>) KSB

**The evidence presented here supports the argument that the possession of greater military capability has made American decision makers more likely to use force. The possession of a very sharp sword indeed appears to have been a source of temptation. This relationship is not an accident of a single measure of military capability but rather one that holds across several indicators**. There is little evidence that this relationship stems from policy makers' endogenous anticipation of their choices about the use of force when procuring military capabilities. The use of force-capabilities relationship does not run entirely in one direction, however. Although policy makers' ability to pre- dict the future is limited, they can and do consider past experience when constructing future capabilities. **Although this evidence that greater military capabilities increase the propensity to use force will not settle the debate over whether arms races lead to war, it nevertheless supports a claim implied but not tested in a substantial body of international relations research. It also illuminates an important feature of the policy-making process. The notion that military capabilities, including those ostensibly acquired for defense, make a state more aggressive suggests that the security dilemma may be rooted in more than the misoerceotion of other states' intentions. Greater military capability might itself lead a state to resort to force more often**. Normatively, if military force should be used only for defense, or at least only as a last resort-the outlook behind Colin Powell's response to Madeleine Albright-then that being prepared to use force lowers the threshold for doing so is troubling. Analogously, many of those who own a gun to guard their home would find it disturbing to imagine that they might be tempted to use it for other purposes, such as making a point in an argument with the neighbors. Just as Colin Powell and Caspar Weinberger sought to establish guidelines to limit the use of American military forces, the National Rifle Association promulgates strict rules about gun safety and for many of the same reasons. Additional military capabilities are usually thought to provide a margin of safety against potential threats. From this perspective, other things being equal, greater mili- tary strength is always a good thing. Other things are not always equal, however. Inter- national relations theorists have long noted that **the reactions of other states can cancel out the potential security benefits of a military buildup. These results point to another potential danger. Military capabilities are inputs into an imperfect decision-making process and may encourage risk taking. In extreme cases, as the opening quotation from Walt Rostow suggests, these capabilities may provide decision makers with just enough rope to hang themselves.**

### EXT: Neg Helps Decrease Terror

#### 1. **Offshore balancing allocates more resources for home, puts less lives at risk, and reduces the risk of terrorism**

Mearsheimer and Walt 2016 (JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International A airs at the Harvard Kennedy School July/August 2016 “The Case for Offshore Balancing” from FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOA: 1/20/17 PDF P.74) ESM

Off shore balancing has many virtues. By limiting the areas the U.S. military was committed to defending and forcing other states to pull their own weight, it would reduce the resources Washington must devote to defense, allow for greater investment and consump- tion at home, and put fewer American lives in harm’s way. Today, allies routinely free-ride on American protection, a problem that has only grown since the Cold War ended. Within NATO, for example, the United States accounts for 46 percent of the alliance’s aggregate GDP yet contributes about 75 percent of its military spending. As the political scientist Barry Posen has quipped, “This is welfare for the rich.” Off shore balancing would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Liberal hegemony commits the United States to spreading democracy in unfamiliar places, which sometimes requires military occupation and always involves interfering with local political arrangements. Such e orts invariably foster nationalist resentment, and because the opponents are too weak to confront the United States directly, they sometimes turn to terrorism. (It is worth remembering that Osama bin Laden was motivated in good part by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi Arabia.) In addition to inspiring terrorists, liberal hegemony facilitates their operations: using regime change to spread American values undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned spaces where violent extremists can flourish. Off shore balancing would alleviate this problem by eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States’ military foot- print. U.S. troops would be stationed on foreign soil only when a country was in a vital region and threatened by a would-be hegemon. In that case, the potential victim would view the United States as a savior rather than an occupier. And once the threat had been dealt with, U.S. military forces could go back over the horizon and not stay behind to meddle in local politics. By respecting the sovereignty of other states, o shore balancing would be less likely to foster anti- American terrorism.

### EXT: Neg Examples

#### 1. The Iran nuclear deal was part of the larger policy of retrenchment and diplomatic engagement

**Michael Doran 2016** (Michael Doran, from the Hudson Institution--testifying in front of the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform, US House of Representatives; White House Narratives on the Iran Nuclear Deal; Hudson Institute; doa: 1/28/17; <https://hudson.org/research/12498-white-house-narratives-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal>) AM

**The Iran nuclear deal,** we can now see, **was** but the most visible piece of **a much larger policy—namely, rapprochement with Iran** as a means of furthering American disengagement from the Middle East. That **President Obama has always been dedicated to pulling the United States back from the region** is hardly a secret; no serious observer ever doubted for a moment that the president was pursuing a policy of retrenchment. But many well-informed people failed to see just how far his strategy deviated from mainstream foreign policy thinking—from “the Blob,” as Ben Rhodes calls it. Attitudes on this question began to shift considerably after the publication of the April 2016 issue of The Atlantic, in which journalist Jeffrey Goldberg revealed the disdain that President Obama harbors not just for the foreign policy elite in Washington but also for America’s traditional allies in the Middle East and in Europe. Yet the Goldberg article still obscured **the vital connection between Obama’s Middle East retrenchment,** generally speaking, **and**, in particular, the **nuclear negotiations with Iran**. Enter The New York Times Magazine. Thanks to David Samuel’s extremely illuminating profile of Rhodes, **that connection is** now starting to come **clear**ly into view.

### EXT: Diplo Solves

#### 1. ASEAN can resolve the South China Sea conflict if the U.S. backs down

Global Times 2017 (“Enhanced China-ASEAN security cooperation builds on long-term progress” The Global Times, Jan. 3rd 2017 [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1026863.shtml)](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1026863.shtml%29) FRF

As people are debating over whether "Dutertism" will set off a chain reaction in Southeast Asia in recent months, China made new progress in its security cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Some scholars believe that China will take this opportunity to promote its agenda in Southeast Asia, change the regional security framework and play the role of a security provider. They consider this an inevitable result of China's economic development. The argument, which apparently hints at a China threat, cannot truly reflect the China-ASEAN security relationship. The improvement in China's security relations with ASEAN countries is directly associated with the efforts China has made within the regional security framework and each small progress comes from the security cooperation of all sides. Since the beginning of the 1990s, China and ASEAN countries have been involved in exchanges and cooperation over safeguarding the security of the South China Sea and maintaining dialogues over the disputes. With the ASEAN Regional Forum as the primary platform, they have also made long-term dialogues and cooperation over setting up and maintaining a regional security mechanism led by ASEAN. China and ASEAN have similar understandings of security. The proposition of the "new security concept" is the exact result of bilateral security exchanges and dialogues. Thus, reinforcement of security cooperation between China and ASEAN countries is fundamentally a general trend. The reasons behind the recent progress in China's security cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand can be found in these Southeast Asian countries themselves. In recent years, the security situation in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region has changed tremendously, featuring an increasingly fierce rivalry between China and the US over the South China Sea. For Southeast Asian countries, as the regional security situation deteriorates, they become "kidnapped" by the China-US rivalry and their power of discourse over regional security affairs has been reduced, which, fundamentally, is not in the interest of ASEAN countries. The Philippines' former tactic of serving as a vanguard in the South China Sea and a pawn in the US' rivalry with China failed to gain any substantive benefits. Instead, the country entrapped itself in the rivalry. For countries in the South China Sea, the China-US rivalry will continue to have a profound impact on regional security. But before they are forced to choose a side, they have to realize that the best choice is a pragmatic backswing in major-power diplomacy and a "rebalance" of the influences of China and the US in the region. Only in this way can ASEAN countries gain the most benefits and maintain their dominant positions. Moreover, there are also contingent reasons for the recent decisions by the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to purchase arms from and enhance security cooperation with China. Leaders of these countries find it frustrating that the US keeps pointing fingers at them recently over their domestic affairs. Thus, the improvement of China's security relations with ASEAN countries is a natural progression, but not without any contingency. However, the China-ASEAN security relationship is still far from being a relationship of mutual assistance in security that China advocated when it proposed the idea of "China-ASEAN community with a shared destiny." As early as in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping noted that China and ASEAN countries should stick to the principle of mutual assistance in security, saying that the cold-war mentality should be discarded and a new concept featuring comprehensive security, mutual security and security cooperation should be advocated to mutually safeguard peace and stability in the region. Due to factors in history, reality and ideology, some ASEAN countries always see China as a "rising giant," which deeply affects their judgment of China's development. Increasing reliance on China in economy and security is very likely to aggravate their misgivings. The only way to face up to the misgivings and promote mutual trust is to enhance interactions, dialogues and cooperation. Now, China is enhancing substantive cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in security, which not only marks a new stage for the security dialogues between China and ASEAN countries, but also manifests China's determination to develop a relationship of mutual assistance with ASEAN countries.

#### 2. US influence in the SCS hurts ASEAN credibility

Edwards 2016 (Scott Edwards, doctoral researcher with ICCS (Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security) at the University of Birmingham. “How the push to unite South-East Asia against Chinese expansionism could backfire” The Conversation, May 3rd 2016.

After years of rising anxiety, China’s push for dominance in the South China Sea is still rattling nerves among its neighbors, and in the world beyond. Beijing’s territorial claims and its military assertiveness have inflamed tensions with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, all of whom lay claim to territory on which China is now planting its flag. The US, for its part, has openly accused the Chinese of militarising the region, pointing to satellite images showing that artificial islands China has constructed are now host to radar stations, air strips, and anti-aircraft missiles. Washington is pushing back on Chinese influence with Freedom of Navigation patrols and an increased military presence, and recently announced that a carrier group would begin operating in the contested area. The US is also seeking to strengthen its defence ties with allies in the region. Obama has made commitments to bolstering Philippine defence through an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. The US’s relationship with Vietnam has also grown through a Joint Vision Statement on future military co-operation. But above all, the US has one particular diplomatic ally in mind: the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which it sees as the crucial diplomatic force that can help take the heat out of the crisis. But the Obama administration’s attempts to get the organisation working as an effective bloc have yet to show much promise. Despite Washington’s best efforts, the ASEAN states are increasingly divided over how to deal with the conflict. At a major US-ASEAN summit at the start of 2016, Obama called for ASEAN to present a united stance on the South China Sea, but the talks ultimately yielded only a vague declaration on shared commitments that skirted around China’s behaviour. This failure to reach a consensus on how to deal with China’s military expansionism shows just how divided the ASEAN member states are – and that bodes ill for the US’s approach to the trouble brewing in the region. Eye-to-eye These countries' core interests do not always match, and their relationships with China all have their own complexities. This disunity has been sapping ASEAN’s potential for some time: back in 2012, the ASEAN failed for the first time to agree on a joint statement. By contrast, China has this year declared a consensus with ASEAN members Brunei, Cambodia and Laos, opposing any attempt to “unilaterally impose” an agenda on other countries – a clear rebuke to the US-ASEAN relationship. The world beyond South-East Asia is deeply disappointed. After the US-ASEAN summit turned out to be a damp squib, there were calls for ASEAN to look beyond national interests for the good of the region. When China announced the 2016 consensus, worried international onlookers fretted that ASEAN’s faultlines are being exploited to curb its influence. Tempers fray in the Philippines. Francis R. Malasig The ASEAN countries seem condemned to choose between striving for a unified outlook where one does not exist, or relying on alliances and bilateral relations outside of the ASEAN framework. The first option is often the one that observers, especially in the West, seem to prefer, apparently convinced that a strong, united ASEAN would be the best counterweight to China. But accepting ASEAN’s weakness might be much wiser. Whatever its utility in the South China Sea dispute, ASEAN is still a crucial mechanism for building trust, something vitally important in a region with an array of issues to deal with beyond the South China Sea. Forcing it to hammer out a consensus where none exists would greatly disrupt that function, and could send shockwaves through delicate relationships on other sensitive issues. A delicate balance A little restraint from the US and the West could still leave ASEAN a vital part to play. It has been building confidence among its members ever since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which declared a commitment to dialogue with China and to finding peaceful means of dispute resolution. This was strengthened in 2003, when China signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The hope was that inviting China to abide by the same rules as ASEAN would help build confidence and consensus among the group’s members. So far, the ASEAN states have generally stuck to these principles. If they turn their backs on them, the organisation’s chances of playing a serious diplomatic role will be greatly diminished. The hope is that ASEAN will continue to facilitate discussion with China, creating a snowball effect of co-operation rather than choosing sides explicitly. This path makes more sense than forcing ASEAN’s members into lockstep, as the US seems inclined to do. If ASEAN becomes the main focus of efforts against Chinese expansion in the South China Sea, the weak links of trust and co-operation between its divided members could quickly start to fray.