# Milly North SN Aff Cut Cards Case ToC 2019

## Contention 1- is Indian Infrastructure

#### [Rowley 18] Private investment is insufficient.

Antony Rowley, Anthony Rowley is a Tokyo-based journalist who has been covering the Japanese economy and politics since 1993. He is a former business editor and international finance editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, and a former Tokyo correspondent of the Singapore Business Times, 3-27-2018, "Only bigger public investment can ease Asia's infrastructure shortages", https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Only-bigger-public-investment-can-ease-Asia-s-infrastructure-shortages // CJ  
For more than 25 years many policymakers have been banging the drum for private investment in infrastructure. It is time they stopped for a moment -- and acknowledged that, while their efforts have produced some results, the public sector continues to finance the bulk of infrastructure -- and will do so for the foreseeable future. Nowhere is this more true than in Asia, where China has demonstrated the ability of state-dominated finance to make the world's biggest-ever infrastructure investments in everything from electricity to railways in record time. While private investment plays a not insignificant role in transport infrastructure in some countries of the region, including India, and in energy infrastructure in Japan, emerging Asian economies -- which face the greatest infrastructure needs in the coming years -- are mostly unlikely to meet their aims without overwhelming reliance on public finance. That this needs saying is testament to the power of the privatization rhetoric of the last three decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its centrally-planned economy fueled excessive faith in the victory of capitalism and the capacity of capitalists to solve any economic problem. But the experience after 1990 - not least in Asia -- put pressure on this theory even before the 2007 global financial crisis punctured faith in markets. As a study published earlier this year by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo says bluntly: "Governments were irrationally exuberant in their expectations of the private sector's ability to create infrastructure out of thin air." Asia faces an "infrastructure gap" between demand for and supply of the transport, energy and communications networks needed to keep the world's fastest-growing region on track for future growth and development. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) said in a report last year that the "developing Asia" region (excluding advanced nations such as Japan) will need to invest $1.5 trillion a year between now and 2030 (a total of $22.6 trillion) to beef up power, transport, communications and other infrastructure. This greatly exceeds the $880 billion actually being spent each year on infrastructure in 25 leading Asian countries. Asia's situation mirrors the globe's. According to consultants McKinsey, the world currently invests $2.5 trillion a year on infrastructure but needs to raise this to at least $3.3 trillion a year between now and 2030 to support economic growth and development. There is little argument (in Asia at least) on the role of infrastructure investment in boosting productivity and economic growth. As the ADBI says, "economic growth and investment in infrastructure go hand in hand. A growing economy needs constantly improved infrastructure to ensure that production and exchange of goods and services happens smoothly and efficiently." Likewise, Jin Liquin, president of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank says, "there is empirical evidence of a link between economic growth and infrastructure investment." Yet, for all this consensus, infrastructure remains greatly under-funded almost everywhere. The main exception is China where a Communist ideology and central planning has backed state investment in infrastructure running at 92% of total spending in recent decades, creating unprecedented growth in expressway, rail, energy and communications networks. Beijing's critics argue that this reflects bureaucratic excess rather than real demand for services. But China has become the world's second largest economy, growing at an annual rate of around 6% even after decades of strong expansion. In Asia generally, infrastructure investment has been running at 8% of gross domestic product annually since 2008 and 9% in China's case (twice the proportion in advanced economies). The public sector has been the big spender, accounting for 70% of total investment, while private investment accounted for some 20%. The balance comes from multilateral development banks and bilateral aid -- both also forms of public investment -- taking the de facto public share to around 80%. Chinese finance has been a strong factor behind this surge across the region. As David Dollar and John L. Thornton, note in a study for the Washington-based Brookings Institution: "China is a major funder of developing country infrastructure, lending $40 billion annually through policy banks," such as the China Exim Bank and others. The loudly-trumpeted Belt and Road Initiative, where Beijing is supporting transport links to China, is only part of the story. Yet, despite the fact that the state investment-led model adopted in China and in other parts of Asia has made the region better able to fund infrastructure than is the case elsewhere, Asia still faces a biginfrastructure funding gap. How is this gap to be closed? Free-market enthusiasts argue that Asia needs to develop its capital markets more quickly, so that private savings can flow into infrastructure, rather than predominantly through tax-funded government spending augmented by public borrowing. Yet experience in the US and Europe has shown that even in stable highly-developed economies private investors remain risk-averse when it comes to infrastructure, because of a large perceived gap between risk and reward. It was, in retrospect, naive to assume that private institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies (which hold a total $120 trillion of private savings, equal to more than one year's global annual GDP) would be eager to make long-term investments in infrastructure. The reality is that they either do not like the risk-reward ratio, even when they are not barred by their own rules from such investments. To make infrastructure investment more attractive to private investors, the ADBI suggests that part of the additional tax revenues generated by increased economic activity along the routes of new highways and railroads (so-called "industrial corridors") should be diverted into special funds designed to help fund new infrastructure projects. This, it is argued, would help to raise returns to private investors making them more attractive. Such ideas are useful. But they cannot make more than a marginal contribution. Increasing public sector debt might not be considered advisable at a time when globally debt has reached all-time-high levels, including in Asia where China has total debt exceeding 300% of GDP and where many other nations are also heavily borrowed in both the public and private sectors. Yet if, as is widely accepted in Asia, infrastructure investment raises economic growth that in turn should boost tax revenues along with the debt-servicing ability of borrowing governments. Private investors should be glad to buy dedicated "infrastructure bonds" issued by governments even though they are reluctant to invest directly in infrastructure projects. Governments can act as guarantors or "comfort blanket" intermediaries to attract private investment. So can multilateral lenders like the ADB. Experience shows that the liabilities governments incur in the process crystallize only in few cases. At least as far as infrastructure is concerned, there is more rather than less for the public sector to do. On this point, the record -- especially in Asia -- has proved the neo-liberal policymakers wrong.

#### [OCHA 19] India has benefitted from World Bank loans before, but its water crisis will get worse due to climate change and poor resource management.

The OCHA, 3-21-2019, "Helping India Manage its Complex Water Resources", ReliefWeb, https://reliefweb.int/report/india/helping-india-manage-its-complex-water-resources // CJ  
Story Highlights India is among the world’s most water-stressed countries. In 1950, India had 3,000–4,000 cubic meters of water per person. Today, this has fallen to around 1,000 cubic meters, largely due to population growth. China, by contrast, has twice the amount of water per person- about 2,000 cubic meters. Growing competition over finite water resources, compounded by climate change, will have serious implications for India’s food security, as well as for the livelihoods of its farmers and for the country’s economic development. India’s water resources are not evenly distributed. Half of India’s annual precipitation falls in just 15 rain-soaked days, making floods and droughts a fact of life in the country. India does not so much face a water crisis as a water management crisis, calling for a fundamental reassessment of the way the country manages water. Today is World Water Day and we take a closer look at six broad areas where the World Bank is supporting India’s efforts to better manage its water resources: 1. Providing Drinking Water to Rural Areas Historically, the government has been responsible for providing drinking water to 833 million rural people in some 640,000 villages across the country. Since 1991, however, it has sought to place communities in charge of their own water supply systems. To help bring this about, four generations of World Bank projects have worked with India to test various reform options and pioneered new models of service delivery. Village level governments are now being empowered to choose, construct and operate their own water supply systems, with government water institutions playing the role of facilitator. Since 2000, some $3.4 billion in World Bank support has helped 36 million people in 40,000 villages gain better access to drinking water. Strong community involvement has lowered the cost of infrastructure, curbed the leakage of funds, and led to huge savings for the state exchequer. 2. Groundwater Over the past few decades, groundwater extraction has risen exponentially across India. India is now the largest user of groundwater worldwide, pumping out 25% of all the groundwater extracted in the world. More than half of India’s districts are threatened by groundwater depletion or contamination. If current trends persist, 60 percent of India’s districts are likely to see groundwater tables fall to critical levels within two decades, placing at least 25% of the country’s agriculture at risk. Unlike surface water bodies, which are managed by government institutions, groundwater management lies primarily in the hands of millions of water users across the country. A [new World Bank supported project](http://projects.worldbank.org/P158119?lang=en) will soon introduce water conservation practices and help equip communities 78 districts in seven Indian states to manage groundwater.

#### [Collier Research 18] India requires 4.5 trillion; its projections say it can meet around 3.9 trillion of that – it still requires 600 billion.

Collier Research, 1-29-2018, "India needs $ 4.5 trillion by 2040 to develop Infra: Eco Survey," Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/india-needs-4-5-trillion-by-2040-to-develop-infra-eco-survey/articleshow/62694945.cms // CJ  
NEW DELHI: India will need about USD 4.5 trillion in the next 25 years for [infrastructure](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/gmr-infrastructure-ltd/stocks/companyid-1428.cms) development, of which it will be able to garner about USD 3.9 trillion, the Economic Survey said. "The Global Infrastructure Outlook reflects that rising income levels and economic prosperity is likely to further drive demand for infrastructure investment in India over the next 25 years. "Around USD 4.5 trillion worth of investments are required by India till 2040 to develop infrastructure to improve economic growth and community well being," the Survey tabled by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley in Parliament today said. It said the current trend shows that India can meet around USD 3.9 trillion infrastructure investment out of USD 4.5 trillion. "The cumulative figure for India's infrastructure investment gap would be around USD 526 billion by 2040," it said ... The Global infrastructure outlook shows that the gap between required infrastructure investment and current trend of investment is expected to be widened over the year," it said. The Survey stressed the need to fill the infrastructure investment gap by financing from private investment, institutions dedicated for infrastructure financing like National Infrastructure Investment Bank (NIIB) and also global institutions like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank (erstwhile BRICS Bank). Stating that there was massive underinvestment in the sector, it attributed the causes behind this to "collapse of Public Private Partnership (PPP) especially in power and telecom projects; stressed balance sheet of private companies; issues related to land & forest clearances."

#### [Allen-Ebrahimian 17] Countries on the UNSC receive more loans from the World Bank because member countries gain diplomatic clout.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, 9-4-2017, "U.N. Security Council Members Are More Likely to Receive World Bank Loans", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/05/un-security-council-members-are-more-likely-to-receive-world-bank-loans-united-states-mexico/ // CJ  
And indeed, Christopher Kilby and Erasmus Kersting, both professors at Villanova University in Pennsylvania who study international aid and organizations, found evidence of such correlation in a 2016 [paper](http://repec.library.villanova.edu/workingpapers/VSBEcon30.pdf) and subsequent research. They analyzed World Bank loan data and found a clear correlation between U.N. Security Council membership and the disbursement of these supplemental loans. In fact, Kilby and Kersting’s analysis of 2015 data revealed that a full 10 percent of all supplemental lending was related to Security Council membership. Mexico, for example, has sat on the Security Council for 8.5 percent of its total time in the U.N., but during its tenure as a council member received 67.9 percent of the total amount of supplemental loans it has ever received from the World Bank, according to data provided by Kersting. If Security Council membership were unrelated to the disbursement of supplemental loans, those two numbers should be similar. Mexico served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council from 2009 to 2010. In 2010, it received a massive supplemental loan of $1.25 billion. Numerous other countries display the same pattern. Jordan has also sat on the Security Council for 8.5 percent of its total time in the U.N., but it received 60.2 percent of its supplemental loans during this period. For Uruguay, the numbers are 5.6 percent and 58.1 percent; for Rwanda, 5.6 percent and 41 percent. Other countries that show a similar correlation include Brazil, Senegal, Bolivia, Nigeria, Vietnam, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Togo. “By charter, the World Bank is supposed to be apolitical,” said Kilby in an interview with Foreign Policy. It’s difficult to know exactly what factors in each case influenced the disbursement of these loans, explained Kilby, which is why they have taken a statistical approach to look for correlation in the data. “The paper trail is quite hard to follow,” he said. Correlation between Security Council membership and World Bank supplemental loan disbursement also may not be an explicit quid pro quo. Countries that sit on the council may generally be viewed as more important, be mentioned more frequently, or have a louder megaphone with which to advertise their needs and, as a result, are more likely to receive loans. But there are documented cases of the United States exerting pressure on other international lending organizations to withhold funds for political reasons. In the late 1990s, the Inter-American Development Bank approved Haiti for several loan packages. But after the Haitian legislature ratified the packages in 2000, in the wake of a controversial election in which the United States had a stake, the funds were never released.

#### [Dreher 09] Membership on the U.N. Security Council increases access to World Bank loans by 73%.

Axel Dreher, 1-1-2009, "Development aid and international politics: does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?”, Bond University, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.2779&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf // CJ

Table 1 presents the results of the bivariate analysis under various statistical models. In all cases, the effect of UN Security Council membership on new World Bank projects is positive and significant at the one percent level. Columns 1 and 5 do not include additional control variables and therefore represent the situation as depicted in Figure 1. These estimates suggest that countries which are temporary member of the UNSC do on average receive 1.2 World Bank projects more per year than non-member countries. This implies a 73 percent increase, i.e., the associated incidence-rate ratio equals (exp(0.55)=) 1.73. Figure 2 highlighted that regional differences can be substantial. For that reason columns 2 and 6 include, besides fixed effects for each year, dummies for the following regions: South Asia, East Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. As with any complete set of dummy variables, one must be left out of the analysis. In Table 1, we omit Western Europe. So the significantly positive coefficients for the other regions indicate that these regions are more likely to get World Bank projects than Western European countries – not controlling for other determinants of participation like income and investment (as already suggested by Figure 2).

#### [Dreher 07] India received more loans while on the World Bank.

Axel Dreher, July 2007, "Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?", https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/43845/2007-10.pdf // CJ  
Turning to Africa, consider Ghana, which on average received two new World Bank projects per year from 1970 to 1985, with the highest number of new projects being five one year. Then Ghana was elected to serve on the UNSC in 1986-7. The number of new Bank projects jumped up to six in 1986 and nine in 1987. As another Cold War example, consider Zaire. From 1970 to 1981, Zaire received between one and three new projects each year. In 1982 and 1983 the country served on the UNSC, and the number of new projects went up to five and four, respectively. And Algeria received an average of less than two new World Bank projects per year from 1970 to 1987. In 1988, however, Algeria served on the UNSC, and the number of new projects went from three to six. There were four new projects in 1989, during the second year of the term. Yet, there was no similar bump up for Algeria when it served again after the Cold War had ended. When Algeria served on the UNSC in 2004, not one new project started. We see the pattern exists throughout Asia as well. As large country, India always has a lot of Bank projects in place. From 1970 to 2004, the average number of new projects was ten – when it is not serving on the UNSC. During the eight years during this period when it was serving on the UNSC, however, the average number of new projects was fourteen. Indonesia, another large country, received eight new projects in 1970, four in 1971, and seven in 1972. When it served on the UNSC in 1973, it nevertheless received a bump up in the number of new projects: eleven. Following the UNSC term, the number of new projects remained high, averaging ten new projects per year from 1975 to 1994. However, the record number of new projects in Indonesia is eighteen, which was also reached while it was serving the second year of a term on the UNSC in 1996. Bangladesh is a very poor country that typically has multiple World Bank programs in place regardless of international politics. Nevertheless the average number of new projects from 1970 to 2004 is less than five not counting the two years it served on the UNSC during the Cold War in 1979 and 1980.

#### [Kant 18] 200,000 die per year.

Amitabh Kant, CEO, NITI Aayog, "Composite Water Management Index”, June 2018, http://pibphoto.nic.in/documents/rlink/2018/jun/p201861401.pdf,//CJ  
Droughts are becoming more frequent, creating severe problems for India’s rain-dependent farmers (~53% of agriculture in India is rainfed17). When water is available, it is likely to be contaminated (up to 70% of our water supply), resulting in nearly 200,000 deaths each year18. Interstate disagreements are on the rise, with seven major disputes currently raging, pointing to the fact that limited frameworks and institutions are in place for national water governance19 .

#### [Kant 18] 600 million people face high water stress, 3/4ths of households don’t have drinking water.

Amitabh Kant, CEO, NITI Aayog, "Composite Water Management Index”, June 2018, http://pibphoto.nic.in/documents/rlink/2018/jun/p201861401.pdf,//CJ  
It is my firm belief that the objective of Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas can be fully achieved once the benefits of the interventions reach the last mile. In this context, the renewed emphasis of the Government on outcomes has proved to be a potential tool and the same is also being included as part of the Union Budget. As a step beyond the measurement of outcomes, NITI Aayog has come out with various indices that not only fulfill its mandate of cooperative and competitive federalism but also challenge States and Union Territories (UTs) to meet the aspirations of the new India. NITI Aayog has recently launched an Index of Health that seeks to capture the annual progress of States/ UTs on a variety of health indicators. As a major leap in this direction, NITI Aayog has come out with a Composite Water Management Index as a useful tool to assess and improve the performance in efficient management of water resources. It’s a matter of concern that 600 million people in India face high to extreme water stress in the country. About three-fourth of the households in the country do not have drinking water at their premise. With nearly 70% of water being contaminated, India is placed at 120th amongst 122 countries in the water quality index. It’s a fact that water is a State subject and its optimal utilization and management lies predominantly within the domain of the States. This index is an attempt to budge States and UTs towards efficient and optimal utilization of water and recycling thereof with a sense of urgency. In view of limitations on availability of water resources and rising demand for water, sustainable management of water resources has acquired critical importance. The index would provide useful information for the States and also for the concerned Central Ministries/Departments, enabling them to formulate and implement suitable strategies for better management of water resources. It has been finalized after an elaborate exercise including seeking feedback from the States and consultation with reputed experts.

[…]

But, food security is at risk However, the country faces significant risks as the low performers on the Water Index are home to ~50% of the country’s population and its agricultural baskets. The low performers are, worryingly, comprised of the populous northern states of UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, Haryana, and others, and are home to over 600 million people8 . The poor performance of these states on the Index highlights a significant water management risk for the country going forward. Further, these states also account for 20-30% of India’s agricultural output9 . Given the combination of rapidly declining groundwater levels and limited policy action (as indicated by the low Index score), this is also likely to be a significant food security risk for the country going forward.

## Contention 2- is Checking China

### India on the Security Council would be uniquely positioned to check China in 3 ways:

### First- Perception

#### [Freedman ‘9 of the Journal for Asian Security] China views another Asian power as a threat to their influence, and that Indian positioning on the Security Council would dilute the Chinese stranglehold on influence.

Amy Freedman,5-28-2009, Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia, Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799850902885114, //CJ

The Kunming Initiative is a Chinese project aiming to develop the Mekong river area, and to include Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, as well as India's beleaguered northeastern provinces in its sphere of cooperation. Determined not to let China become the sole promoter of multilateralism in the region, India unveiled its own project for Mekong–Ganga Cooperation or MGC in 2000, which included India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China. Involving exactly the same states as the Kunming Initiative, the MGC had simply replaced China by India at the head of the project, in a symbolic gesture of defiance that did not go unnoticed by the Chinese. 28 28. Mohan Malik, “India and China,” p. 142. View all notes On a global level, whereas Jawaharlal Nehru once actively campaigned for China's permanent seat at the UN, the Chinese have refused to reciprocate the gesture 50 years later by openly supporting India's bid. Beijing has not formally voiced its rejection of India's claims, but neither has it come out in India's support, despite constant Indian urgings to do so. Instead, China has endeavored to mollify Indian concerns by playing with semantics, claiming that it would be happy to “see India play a greater role at the UN.” 29 29. “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century.” Retrieved February 2008 from http://www.meaindia.nic.in/. View all notes **China may not be actively lobbying against India's bid, as it is doing vis-à-vis Japan's, but it is clear that it has no desire to see a change in the status quo. For the time being, China is the only voice at the UNSC for Asia and the “developing world,” and it has no inclination whatsoever to see its influence “diluted” in any way by the integration of [India]** another Asian state, and, what is more, by a state with which it has often had conflictual relations in the past.

#### [Funiaonale ’15 of the CSIS] explains that any reduction in Chinese influence would force them to cut their losses and sign a legally binding Code of Conduct that would force Beijing to peacefully settle its disputes.

https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\_files/files/publication/151116\_Glaser\_Funaiole\_Geopolitical.pdf, //CJ

Overinvestment in economic initiatives leaves Beijing susceptible to the same vulnerabilities that threaten the Chinese economy. Should the Chinese economy stumble, aspects of the AIIB and OBOR will need to be scaled back. The knock-on effects of an economic slowdown could diminish China’s future role in the region. **The smaller countries of Asia have tolerated Chinese assertiveness in exchange for economic gains and because they fear that challenging China could cause Beijing to punish them economically. If China is no longer able to afford those benefits, many smaller countries may** be less willing to show deference and **more willing to push back against Chinese threats to their interests.** In the South China Sea, where in recent years China has incrementally altered the status quo in its favor, such a development could have a positive effect. Myriad steps taken by some of the other claimants to the disputed land features, as well as by the United States, Japan, and other concerned members of the international community, have not persuaded Beijing to moderate its assertiveness and seek cooperative solutions to the extant territorial disputes. **Any reduction in Chinese influence may diminish the disincentives that smaller claimant states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) face vis-à-vis China. Firmer and coordinated policies among Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, combined with greater unity among all the ASEAN member countries, might induce Beijing to conclude a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea that ensures disputes are managed peacefully and in accordance with international law.**

### Second- Location

#### [Valente ’18 of the East West Center] As India is the only country set to outpace China’s economic and population growth, India is more capable than any other regional actor to check China.

[https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf //ON](https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf%20/ON)

#### India presents itself as a natural counterbalance to China for several reasons and is positioned uniquely to play this role. As the only major economy poised to outpace China’s economic and demographic growth and having relatively low levels of government debt compared to the United States and China, India is more capable than its neighbors of playing a sustained balancing role in Asia.

#### [Valente 2] India’s *unique* positioning in the Indian Ocean gives them geopolitical leverage against China that *no other country can utilize.*

[https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf //ON](https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf%20/ON)

**India is positioned amid China’s BRI, and the Indian Ocean is central to several of China’s essential trade and investment routes. Thus, there are areas in which India holds geographical leverage that the United States does not**. Unlike other influential regional players like Russia and Saudi Arabia, India is an attractive and realistic partner for Washington in balancing China, because India’s liberal democratic values create an alignment of interests (in areas such as counterpiracy, counterterrorism, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief) as well as bureaucratic similarities (such as the coordination between the military and civilian ministries).3

### Third- Forging New Alliances

#### [Valente 3] Other countries in Asia simply do not trust the US in a counterbalancing scenario, as is rooted in a history of animosity, and suspect foreign policy.

[https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf //ON](https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf%20/ON)

#### To the extent that China has both actively and passively challenged international norms and sovereignty claims in its neighborhood, it represents one of the most real and persistent challenges to the status quo in the region. As the most recent US National Security Strategy enunciates, the Pacific Rim is not the only area of importance within Asia; rather, the strategy encompasses the entire Indo-Pacific region. The areas linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean—including the South China Sea, Malacca Straits, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands—are of vital strategic importance to all the major regional players, as more than a quarter of all global trade and energy transportation passes through these waterways. The United States, China, and India are all beholden to each other to the extent that each exerts a distinct influence over these routes. For this reason, China’s effective annexation of parts on the South China Sea is particularly dangerous. The United States cannot respond to this type of threat unilaterally; and beyond Japan and South Korea, US willingness to come to the defense of its other Asian allies is viewed as questionable. In many ways, India represents a natural counterbalance in a region where China’s strength, leadership, and boldness are increasing. While US strategy does not preclude the peaceful rise of China, the South China Sea sets a dangerous precedent, and cooperation with India may provide an opportunity to discourage this type of behavior in the future. This report provides an analysis of the spaces in which the United States may find success working with India to counterbalance China’s challenge to the status quo—as well as an assessment of the potential hurdles in attempts to do so—both in general and through an examination of specific lessons from the South China Sea.

#### [Valente 4] India’s participation in any counterbalancing scheme would add strength to any Code of Conduct scenario as well add a legitimate guarantee to the rule of law for the Indo-Pacific region.

[https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf //ON](https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Tiger-and-the-Dragon.pdf%20/ON)

Falling back on institutions of international law—notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—did to some extent serve the purpose of delegitimizing China’s claims, but this benefit was overshadowed when the Philippines agreed to treat the Scarborough Shoal issue bilaterally (effectively letting China off the hook) rather than sticking to the international body’s ruling. This is a prime example of the importance of building diplomatic ties to influence security realities and is an area where India’s participation could lend more strength than any of the Southeast Asian states could. **A future Indo-Pacific COC concerning movement and interaction of military and civilian assets might be more effective in the Indian Ocean if it has the weight of India behind it. The weakness of the preexisting framework in Southeast Asia allowed China to deal with the Philippines in isolation and to neutralize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization by exerting economic influence over individual members like Cambodia and Laos.**

#### None of these will matter if India does not obtain a seat on the Security Council. [The Monthly Review] India will only be emboldened to counter China if it sees itself as a great power.

Research Unit For Political Economy,3-1-2006, Monthly Review, Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2006/03/01/why-the-united-states-promotes-indias-great-power-ambitions/?fbclid=IwAR3eVjxO67ACsBPJcgyWhaQfdg4qGuYuAt2iPRvG55QQk3tTYKjFhnRsFJU, //CJ

The U.S. War College study spells out the benefits of an **“Asian NATO”**: What’s in it for the United States? For one, the proposed security system is principally an in-region solution for dealing with two of the biggest international security threats—an over-ambitious China and the spread of Talibanised Islam. Second, this scheme being entirely indigenous, there is none of the odium that attends on US troops deployed locally as in South Korea and Japan….And, finally, it in no way precludes the presence in the extended region of the US armed forces or limits US military initiatives. **However—and this is crucial—the entire scheme will fall apart if India does not nurse great power ambitions. Only if India sees itself as a great power, a “counterpoise to China in the region,” will it want to promote a broad anti-China alliance. And so the United States must push India to pursue its “manifest destiny”: But crucial to making this system work is India’s being convinced of its ‘manifest destiny’ and for it to act forcefully. It will require in the main that New Delhi think geostrategically and give up its diffidence when it comes to advancing the country’s vital national interests and its almost knee-jerk bias to appease friends and foes alike.** The corrective lies in the Indian government expressly defining its strategic interests and focus and, at a minimum, proceeding expeditiously towards obtaining a nuclear force with a proven and tested thermonuclear and an ICBM reach. Nothing less will persuade the putative Asian allies that India can be an effective counterpoise to China in the region, or compel respect for India in Washington. India’s great-power ambitions, then, are crucial to the success of U.S. plans for Asia. Indeed, the further Indian foreign policy is subordinated to U.S. strategic designs, the better India’s chances of winning U.S. backing at last for its single-minded drive to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. While admitting that the United States had not supported India’s claim to UNSC membership, Manmohan Singh told Parliament that “when the time comes, I have reason to believe that we will not be ignored.”

#### [Dabhade ’17 of Rising Powers Quarterly] explains that India views membership as the last step to great power status, in fact, a seat at the high table would give it the ability, and leverage to expand its geopolitical clout, as a security threat to its immediate neighborhood and beyond.

Manish S. Dabhade, School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, August 2017, "India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms", Rising Powers Quarterly, http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/indias-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/ // CJ  
India’s newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in May 1998 also makes India a natural claimant as a permanent member similar to the existing permanent members who are all Nuclear Weapon States. Tough India has not been accorded a de’ jure recognition of this by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, India now stands recognized as a de’ facto NWS due to the nuclear deal signed by India and the United States in 2005 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 to nuclear transfers for India despite not being a NPT signatory. On the negative side, it is argued by critics that India has still not signed the NPT, had rejected the CTBT in 1996 and in fact, was the target of unanimous Security Council Resolution 1172 after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998. But, India’s nuclear diplomacy after the May 1998 tests successfully turned India from a pariah state to being increasingly a part of the non-proliferation regime. India’s Great Power Ambitions: Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalized big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much-needed leverage to expand its geo-political and geo-economic clout glob- 70 Manish S. Dabhade ally. It would serve as **an equalizer to China, its rival and** an emerging hegemon in Asia and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China in a leadership role in Asia. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of international hierarchy of states. As India’s international profle and capabilities rises due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas like politics, development, economics, and culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). Te Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfed with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules and wants now to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests. In conclusion, and most signifcantly, Indian hopes signifcantly rest on an acknowledgement by UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to Te Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kof Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”

### Impact- War

#### [Bloom ’18 of Foreign Policy] China has provided armed escorts for its fishing fleets in the South China Sea, and assertively enforcing Chinese law on non-Chinese

Kate Higgins-Bloom,9-12-2018, Fish Wars are Coming, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/food-fight-illegal-fishing-conflict/, //CJ

**For years, China has subsidized and provided armed escorts for forays by its fishing fleet into its neighbors’ EEZs and assertively enforced Chinese law on non-Chinese fishermen operating in contested waters. Since the 1990s, China has unilaterally** declared large swaths of the South China Sea closed to fishermen for months at a time. **This closure is enforced by armed China Coast Guard vessels, which have been involved in a series of violent confrontations with foreign fishermen.** This heavy-handed approach would be relatively unremarkable if the closed area was actually recognized Chinese territory. In this case, however, China is acting in international water or in the EEZs of other countries. The situation is roughly analogous to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service using deadly force to stop Canadian deer hunters from shooting a doe out of season in Vancouver.

#### [Bloom 2] Not only does continued expansion run the risk of a violent exchange, but fish depletion by 2050 will create an intense pressure to ensure a steady supply of fish to their people, leading to more resource expansion and seizing control of weaker states resources.

Kate Higgins-Bloom,9-12-2018, Fish Wars are Coming, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/food-fight-illegal-fishing-conflict/, //CJ

Future resource scarcity could also trigger a fish-related conflict. **If global fish stocks collapse around 2050, as current trends suggest they will, national governments are going to feel intense pressure to ensure a regular food supply for their populations. This pressure could lead more powerful countries to try to grab the resources of smaller or vulnerable neighbors.**

**A crowded and hungry world means that battles over resources are a real possibility. The initial skirmishes will occur between relatively small ships within eyeshot of each other. But however modest their beginnings, the world’s coming conflicts over fish have the potential to escalate into protracted, resource-draining disputes.**

#### [Johnson ’16 of Foreign Policy] Unfortunately, these clashes over fishing not only occur on a daily basis, but also poses the greatest risk of triggering a full-fledged armed conflict in the South China Sea.

Keith Johnson, Dan De Luce,4-7-2016, Fishing Disputes Could Spark a South China Sea Crisis, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/fishing-disputes-could-spark-a-south-china-sea-crisis/, //CJ

The latest evidence came Tuesday, when Indonesia blew up 23 fishing boats from Vietnam and Malaysia that it said were poaching in Indonesian waters. It wasn’t the first time Indonesia’s flamboyant, chain-smoking fisheries minister, Susi Pudjiastuti, has literally dynamited her way to international headlines: The country demolished 27 fishing boats in February and has scuttled more than 170 in the last two years. But the move is significant all the same, because it underscores how central **fishing** **is [central]** to **the simmering territorial disputes that are turning the South China Sea into a potential global flash point — and how far countries are willing to go to defend their turf, or at least what they claim is theirs.**

Although not the root cause of disputes over sovereignty in the region, **the clashes over fishing rights — which occur almost on a daily basis** and often go unreported **— pose the greatest potential risk of triggering a full-fledged crisis or even an armed conflict in the South China Sea.** “They are the most likely factor to cause an escalation that nobody intended,” Gregory Poling, an Asia maritime expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Foreign Policy.

#### [Mulligan ’16 of the Diplomat] explains that doing nothing is not an option, as this invites China to further provacate, which only increases the risk of a serious conflict.

Aurelia George Mulgan, The Diplomat,3-9-2016, China’s Rise as a Predator State, Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-rise-as-a-predator-state/, //CJ

Third, predator states are not democracies where there exist checks and balances and other moderating influences that negate the potential for predation against other states. Predator states have authoritarian governments with low levels of accountability. Political leaders are only answerable to other power cliques and display a willingness to engage in political repression, including imprisonment and even murder of their opponents. In such states, there is no real separation of the executive from the judiciary and, in that sense, no rule of law. Levels of domestic lawlessness are matched by international lawlessness. **Predator states do not respond to appeals to international laws or norms because they are inherently lawless themselves – they understand and respect only power in international affairs. China’s actions in the South China Sea clearly demonstrate that it does not support a rules-based regional or global order; nor does it believe that you can fight power with rules as other states are attempting to do in dealing with this issue**. Finally, predator states show a predisposition to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Multilateral cooperation is entertained only where it fits with the long-term strategic interests of the state. Moreover, there is little willingness to trade off state interests for larger collective interests in the international community. In that sense, predator states are not interested in providing international public goods and should not be considered as potentially benign hegemons. How should other states deal effectively with predator states? First of all, they need to recognize what they are dealing with and react accordingly. **Predator states demand tough responses starting with vigilance, deterrence and containment. At the very least there must be reinforcement of surveillance regimes, the formation of counterbalancing coalitions, and a willingness to act across a whole range of spheres – military, economic, financial, trade and diplomatic – so that predator states’ actions are not cost-free. Other states must also accept that doing nothing is not an option. This only invites further provocation, which increases the risk of serious conflict.**

#### [Talmadge ’18 of Foreign Affairs] in the face of a war with china, regional allies to the United States would draw the US in, in which Talmadge indicates that if this were to happen China would look to its nuclear weapons as the only option.

Caitlyn Talmadge ,-12-15-2018, Beijing’s Nuclear Option, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option, //CJ

But better communication can only do so much for a problem that ultimately stems from military doctrine and grand strategy. Given that the United States’ standard wartime playbook is likely to back China into a nuclear corner, it would be logical for Washington to consider alternative strategies that would leave China’s nuclear capabilities untouched. For example, some analysts have proposed coercing China through a distant naval blockade, and others have suggested confining any U.S. campaign to air and naval operations off China’s coast. The goal in both cases would be to avoid attacks on the Chinese mainland, where the bulk of Chinese nuclear forces reside. The problem with these alternatives is that the mainland is also where the bulk of Chinese conventional capabilities are located. The United States is unlikely to voluntarily leave these capabilities intact, given its predilection for reducing its own casualties and rapidly destroying enemy forces**. If China is using its mainland bases to lob ballistic missiles at U.S. troops and allies, it is hard to imagine a U.S. president ordering the military to hold back in the interest of de-escalation. U.S. allies are particularly unlikely to accept a cautious approach, as they will be more exposed to Chinese military power the longer it is left intact. No one wants a U.S.-Chinese war to go nuclear, but a U.S. campaign that avoids escalation while letting China’s conventional forces turn Taiwan—not to mention Japan or South Korea—into a smoking ruin would not seem like much of a victory either.**

The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift **China’s** assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might **see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict**. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. **If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise.** In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. If nuclear escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. **Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.**

#### [Bressen ’17 of Forbes] tragically this could kill billions of people and disrupt the food supply for even more.

David Bressan,8-12-2017, Even A Small Nuclear War Would Still Have Effects On Global Scale, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbressan/2017/08/12/even-a-small-nuclear-war-would-still-have-effects-on-global-scale/#23e59223507d, //CJ

**A local**, land-based **nuclear war**, including the hypothetical use of 50 to 100 such tactical bombs, **would send five to 6 million tons of dust, ash and soot from the fires into the atmosphere. Rising into higher layers, this smoke would effectively reduce solar radiation on Earth, causing an "atomic autumn." Temperatures would slightly drop for a quarter of a century, reducing the growing season of plants by between 10 to 40 days. Reduce crop production could lead to widespread famine in an already struggling world**. Changes in temperatures also cause a shift in weather patterns. The precipitation during the monsoon, providing rain for millions of people in Asia, could decrease as much as 20% to 80%. As such large circulation patterns as the monsoon have global effects, also Africa, Australia and the Americas could become drier. **Estimated 1 to 2 billion people could face starvation, as much victims as a global nuclear war would claim. Unrest quickly would spread, followed by further conflicts over the limited resources.**

# Frontlines: Contention 1

### AT Aid bad (Dreher)

#### Swaroop 00 of the Journal of Public Economics explains that aid just goes where the government would put it anyways, which is why the ORF finds international investment in India’s infrastructure has been empirically successful.

[Swaroop 00] Aid in India goes toward the planned purposes in government; it just softens budget constraints.

Swaroop, V., Jha, S., & Sunil Rajkumar, A. (2000). Fiscal effects of foreign aid in a federal system of governance. Journal of Public Economics, 77(3), 307–330. doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00070-0, [http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272700000700 //](http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272700000700%20//) JJ  
In this paper we model two dimensions of foreign aid fungibility, one at the federal level and the other at the inter-governmental level. We use the model to test whether foreign aid to India, a federal country, is being spent for purposes intended by the donor agencies. This involves asking the question: what would have happened to the government budget in the absence of donor financing? Our empirical results suggest that the central government converts most foreign funds, including those earmarked for state governments, into fungible monies; and spends on activities that would have been undertaken anyway. Foreign aid merely softens its budget constraint. What are the implications of these results? The finding that foreign aid does not influence the internally determined pattern of resource allocation would be good news for policymakers in India. For the donors, however, the fungibility results indicate that what one sees is not always what happens. If aid is fungible, it simply does not matter what donors finance – be it feeder roads or power plants or family planning clinics – and how well their projects perform. A better approach to make aid effective in terms of the overall development impact is to link aid with an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors. Indeed, this is the main message of the paper.

### AT Indian banks >

1 - **Sinha 19** of the **Financial Times** finds that in the past few years, Indian banks have withdrawn from funding infrastructure because of financial concerns, regulatory loopholes, and corruption. However, even if they were to get back into infrastructure, **Sinha** furthers that would be dangerous as infrastructure deposits from Indian banks are problematic as they create imbalances by offering loans which last less than one year to finance projects that last over 5 years, meaning the funding is pulled out.

Shilpy Sinha, 1-23-2019, "IRDAI: The key that can give India access to infra funds worth $4.5 trillion," Economic Times, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/infrastructure/india-needs-4-5-trillion-for-infrastructure-developments-in-the-next-25-years-but-who-can-supply/articleshow/67651453.cms?from=mdr> // RM

**India needs infrastructure to grow, but there’s hardly anyone to fund it. Over the years, banks — the largest financial intermediaries — have slowly begun to withdraw from the segment after poorly structured financing, corruption, regulatory loopholes and judicial interventions inflicted losses that have held them back for nearly five years.**  Alternative mode of finance — **the bond market — is shallow and is yet to evolve, making it difficult for anyone with an idea to build a port or a power plant to find the financial resources.**  That has led to the contraction of investments’ contribution in the gross domestic product growth to 29.2% in the second quarter ended September 2018, from 38.69% in 2012-13, when the growth engine was kept humming with huge credit from the banking sector. The outstanding bank credit to the infrastructure sector which was at Rs 9.85 lakh crore in March 2016, after compounding an annual 39% for 15 years, fell to Rs 8.9 lakh crore in last fiscal as banks turned averse to infrastructure lending. “Form a CASA (current account savings account) perspective, **if infrastructure becomes a large part of a bank’s exposure, there are chances of asset-liability mismatch**,” says Ramraj Pai, president at Crisil, a unit of Standard & Poor’s. **Asset-liability mismatch arises if banks take oneyear deposits to lend for five years. One of the reasons for banks’ infrastructure loans turning bad was that they mobilise one-year, or even shorter-term deposits for building power and road projects that took five years to build. This kind of funding became unviable for the projects and unjustifiable for banks.**

### AT India doesn’t need it

1. Our inherency in case answers this, fool - Even though the economy is growing the infrastructure is destitute and the government has stopped allocating funds for it.

### AT Politically motivated aid bad

1. That is referring to aid from countries to India - this is aid from the World Bank. The UNSC has power over getting the World Bank to give more or less, but not over the type of aid. We know India needs more aid and we know the type of aid the World Bank gives helps them - sounds like a recipe for success!

### AT NUQ - India is already getting aid

1. It’s not enough. The World Bank just approved a $30billion aid package, yet the **India Times 18** writes that in order to fully modernize its infrastructure, India needs $4.5 trillion by 2040.

### AT India spent it on a space program before

1. That was blank check aid from England. The reason World Bank loans have been empirically so successful in countries like India is because they force India to spend on specific sectors like infrastructure. The **World Bank 19** explains that its aid is specific and targeted, starting projects designed to work specifically with things like infrastructure or womxn in the workplace.

**World Bank**, 3-5-**2019**, "World Bank and Government of India Sign $250 million Agreement to Boost Rural Incomes Across 13 States in India," World Bank, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/03/05/usd250-million-agreement-signed-to-boost-rural-incomes-across-13-states-in-india> // RM

New Delhi, March 5, 2019 - **The World Bank and the Government of India today signed a $250 million agreement for the National Rural Economic Transformation Project (NRETP) which will help women in rural households shift to a new generation of economic initiatives by developing viable enterprises for farm and non-farm products. . The National Rural Economic Transformation Project (NRETP) is an additional financing to the $500 million National Rural Livelihoods Project (NRLP) approved by the World Bank in July 2011. The NRLP which is currently being implemented across 13 states[1], 162 districts and 575 blocks, has so far mobilized more than 8.8 million women from poor rural households into 750,000 self-help groups (SHGs). These SHGs have been further federated into 48,700 Village Organizations and 2900 Cluster/Gram Panchayat-level Federations. .**

# Frontlines: Contention 2

### AT Nationalism Controls FOPO/ India Cant Check

1. Even if they make the argument that nationalism prevents concessions, this does not matter because **Shullman ‘19 of the Brookings Institute** explains that the CCP’s legitimacy is entirely based upon the health of the economy, critically, **Mizokami ‘17** explains that India has the capability to cut of trade from the Western world to China which would force China to comply with any requests.

David Shullman,1-22-2019, Protect the Party: China’s growing influence in the developing world, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/, //CJ

While the Party’s primary focus remains on domestic issues such as corruption deemed central to its legitimacy, Chinese leaders have sharpened their focus on those aspects of developing country relationships deemed likely to bolster the Party’s fortunes amid this turbulence.[4] Two significant areas in which the CCP has stepped up influence efforts to benefit Party control are the economic and information domains.[5] First, Beijing wants to mitigate mounting economic challenges and slowing growth in China through overseas investment and the creation of markets abroad for Chinese goods and materials. **The [CCP’s]** Party’s **legitimacy depends on the health of China’s economy.[**6] Access to resources needed to feed China’s growing economy has long driven its engagement with the developing world, but China’s economy is now struggling. Chinese leaders are therefore looking to further boost overseas investment and trade, which have been growing for years but have been partially rebranded under the BRI. As part of its broader economic development strategy, Beijing is using BRI to export massive quantities of steel and aluminum, find new markets for Chinese products, and help keep indebted state-owned enterprises (SOEs) afloat.[7] BRI projects, many of which are implemented through provincial governments eager to capitalize, facilitate the expansion of Chinese companies’ international footprint.[8] These efforts are viewed as critical to propping up growth and employment as China endures an uncertain transition from a manufacturing focus to services and consumption, including potential reforms likely to result in layoffs

Kyle Mizokami,5-27-2017, If 2.6 Billion People Go To War: India vs. China, National Interest,https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-26-billion-people-go-war-india-vs-china-20875,//CJ

The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, **India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy**, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships **could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa**. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. **87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa.** China’s strategic petroleum reserves, once completed sometime in the 2020s, **could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible.**

### AT Containment Bad

1. **Cole ‘15 of the University of Nottingham** explains that China only listens to deterrence, countries who give in to Chinese aggression perpetuate the problem, as China has no respect those that give in to pressure which just “feeds the beast”.
2. **Smith ‘15 of the AFPC** notes that the best response to Chinese expansion must be a more overt balancing posturing to prevent further aggression.
3. **Glaser ‘15 of George Washington University** explains that while in the past China had attempted to maintain stability, recent actions have unraveled that and created an existential threat for the Philippines and Vietnam, unfortunately, china places low priority on avoiding provoking smaller states.

Michael Cole,5-7-2015, If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825, //CJ

To start with, Mr. White’s response to my piece hinges on a misreading of the assumptions that underlie my argument. I do not, as he claims, subscribe to the “widely held assumption” that the United States is “willing [to] go to war with China to prevent Taiwan being forcibly united with the mainland.” In fact, given the unwillingness or inability of the international community to stand up to Russia over tensions in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, I fear that the United States and its Asian allies may not be inclined to take action to prevent the forced annexation of Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act notwithstanding. On my most optimistic days, I am agnostic on the matter. But I do maintain, however, that **the international community should be willing to stand up to China and signal that commitment accordingly. Nothing would be more dangerous than for Beijing to conclude that aggression would go unpunished and that the United States and a coterie of key allies do not have the will or the capacity to intervene.** Another flaw in White’s argument is that it only provides binary options—capitulation, or the descent into major (perhaps nuclear) war and the collapse of the global economy. He leaves no room for other (and in my opinion, far more plausible) scenarios. The key to the continued existence of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as a free, democratic and independent state lies not in the ability of the island and its security guarantors to defeat China in a major war, but rather in the strength of its deterrent, a concept that is inexplicably ignored by White. Everybody agrees that major war in the Taiwan Strait, especially one that drags the United States and perhaps Japan into hostilities, would be as devastating as it is undesirable. But the answer to that reality isn’t the abandonment of one’s principles (not to mention that of 23 million people), but instead a firm commitment to war avoidance. As I argued in a previous article, a multifaceted deterrent strategy involving both military and nonmilitary components (sanctions, naval embargo and so on), combined with clear red lines based upon international law, would lower the risk that China—export reliant and beholden to foreign energy sources—would miscalculate and choose the military option to resolve the Taiwan “issue” once and for all. Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a “core issue,” it is in my view unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal over the matter of Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble China’s economy over Taiwan by launching major military operations—all the more so if there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe it—and Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to do—as winning without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.) If, however, Beijing were committed to a nuclear policy and willing to cause and suffer millions of deaths to annex Taiwan, a country that is 1/267th the size of China, then I would say that **we have all the reasons in the world to oppose it, as giving in to its blackmail would unleash upon the world a beast of unmitigated evil.** White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation. Abandoning Taiwan to its inevitable fate due to **China’s strength (and** nuclear **blackmail) would also undermine existing security alliances and discredit the agreements, legal and tacit, that have helped maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific over the decades. Such signaling would in turn encourage states in China’s neighborhood to do the necessary to protect themselves should the day come when they, too, are left to fend for themselves.** It would indicate that good behavior and peaceful democratization—two qualities that apply to Taiwan—are of no intrinsic value to mankind and therefore not worth defending. And it would also prove that even medium powers (with a population of 23 million people and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy, Taiwan is not exactly a gnat) are not immune to the desires of greater powers. Lastly, as I pointed out in my previous piece, there is absolutely no guarantee that after acquiring Taiwan (on a silver platter or at the end of a rifle), **China’s appetite would be sated. In fact, much like imperialism, territorial expansionism has its own internal dynamics: the more territory one controls, the greater the incentive to push outwards to protect newly acquired** real estate. Should Taiwan become part of Chinese territory, Beijing would likely seek to protect the island from neighboring countries (Japan, the Philippines) and U.S. forces in Guam, all of whom would likely have adjusted their military postures due to the proximity of an expanded China to their territories. **The vicious circle that this would risk engendering isn’t too difficult to imagine. As discussed in this article, there are several steps that the international community and Taiwan itself can take to reduce the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait, chief among them a strong and concerted deterrent strategy.** Surrendering to blackmail by powerful states—White’s prescription—would turn back the clock. In fact, **doing so would deny those in China who seek alternatives to belligerence and repression the chance to play a leading role in shaping a new international system. By keeping the aggressors in check, deterrence can buy us time and facilitate the emergence of a leadership in Beijing that is more liberal and perhaps less inclined to throw its weight around. Conversely, give in to coercion and you feed the beast.**

Smith, 15 - Jeff M. Smith is the Director for Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council (“RIP: America's "Engagement" Strategy towards China?” 8/3, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-americas-china-strategy-should-be-13473?page=show

As the Obama administration considers the merits of new strategies to cope with China’s rise, it would benefit from focusing on the one silver lining produced by China’s flirtation with neonationalism. **A key component of any effective U.S. “balancing” strategy lies in nurturing a balancing coalition of like-minded regional partners.** Once an insurmountable task, mounting regional fears over Chinese aggression have arguably rendered the Asian landscape more conducive to such an endeavor than ever before. A decade ago, a handful of Asian “Middle Powers” with little history of collaboration began flirting with new avenues of defense cooperation. What began as tentative steps broke into an open sprint the last two years, largely driven by anxiety over China’s rise. As each has strengthened its ties with Washington, new relationships have blossomed among Japan, India, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and others. China’s neighbors, it seems, are reevaluating their own “engagement” strategies and concluding tha**t a more overt balancing posture offers the best insurance against Chinese aggression. While the initial tangible impact may appear modest, the strategic calculus in these capitals is rapidly changing.**

Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00199

Around the same time, China’s policies in the South China and East China Seas started generating growing concern that China’s goals are more extensive than previously believed and that Beijing places greater value on achieving them. Careful analysis through 2011 finds that many of these fears were exaggerated: although China was acting more assertively, it had not expanded its maritime claims; and much of China’s policy was in reaction to more assertive policies adopted by other claimants. Less reassuring, China’s behavior did reflect its growing military capabilities and its leaders’ sensitivity to nationalist pressures.46 China’s more recent policies provide grounds for greater concern. Reacting to the purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government in 2012, China launched a series of persistent and increasingly risky operations against the islands, which are under Japanese administrative control. Perhaps more significant, China appears to have redefined the nature of its interests in the Diaoyu Islands, stating for the first time that they are among its core interests.47 China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone over part of the East China Sea in 2013 has further fueled tensions.48 **China’s policy has** also arguably **become more assertive in the South China Sea.** For example, in 2012 China used patrol ships to prevail over the Philippines in a dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.49 More recently, a serious crisis ensued when a Chinese-controlled oil company installed a large oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam.50 Although none of these territorial claims is new, China’s changing definition of its interests and its more assertive behavior are causes for concern. First, if China’s changing policies simply reflect its increased military capabilities, then its actions are a reminder of the obvious—as its improved military capabilities increase the probability of success or reduce the costs of conflict, or both, China will become more willing to use, and threaten to use, force in pursuit its goals.51 Second, and probably more worrisome, China’s actions could reflect an increase in the value that its leadership places on achieving its goals. The shift in China’s framing of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute implies a reduced willingness to compromise on this issue. Although this could simply reflect the reduced risks of fighting, it could also result from an increase in the value that China places on prevailing**. China appears to have largely abandoned its “peaceful rise” strategy, which was intended to avoid scaring neighboring countries and, in turn, to avoid generating military buildups and the formation and deepening of opposing alliances.52 China’s recent actions suggest that it now places lower priority on avoiding provoking other states.**

### AT India = China ^ Aggression

1. **Funaiole ‘15 of the CSIS** explains that any reduction of influence for China would force it to conclude a binding, Code of Conduct that would force disputes to be settled peacefully and in accordance with International Law this is because it would mean China has less leverage over smaller countries ultimately solving the SCS conflict.

Matthew Funaiole,11-16-2015, No Publication, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\_files/files/publication/151116\_Glaser\_Funaiole\_Geopolitical.pdf, //CJ

Overinvestment in economic initiatives leaves Beijing susceptible to the same vulnerabilities that threaten the Chinese economy. Should the Chinese economy stumble, aspects of the AIIB and OBOR will need to be scaled back. The knock-on effects of an economic slowdown could diminish China’s future role in the region. **The smaller countries of Asia have tolerated Chinese assertiveness in exchange for economic gains and because they fear that challenging China could cause Beijing to punish them economically. If China is no longer able to afford those benefits, many smaller countries may** be less willing to show deference and **more willing to push back against Chinese threats to their interests.** In the South China Sea, where in recent years China has incrementally altered the status quo in its favor, such a development could have a positive effect. Myriad steps taken by some of the other claimants to the disputed land features, as well as by the United States, Japan, and other concerned members of the international community, have not persuaded Beijing to moderate its assertiveness and seek cooperative solutions to the extant territorial disputes. **Any reduction in Chinese influence may diminish the disincentives that smaller claimant states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) face vis-à-vis China. Firmer and coordinated policies among Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, combined with greater unity among all the ASEAN member countries, might induce Beijing to conclude a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea that ensures disputes are managed peacefully and in accordance with international law.**

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If China continues its striking economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to act in accordance with the logic of offensive realism, which is to say it will attempt to imitate the United States. Specifically, it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will do so primarily because such domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. In addition, China is involved in various territorial disputes and the more powerful it is, the better able it will be to settle those disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Furthermore, like the United States, a powerful China is sure to have security interests around the globe, which will prompt it to develop the capability to project military power into regions far beyond Asia. The Persian Gulf will rank high on the new superpower’s list of strategically important areas, but so will the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, C**hina will have a vested interest in creating security problems for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, so as to limit the American military’s freedom to roam into other regions, especially Asia. Let us consider these matters in greater detail. Chinese Realpolitik If my theory is correct, China will seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors, especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it.** It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. One major difference between China and the United States is that America started out as a rather small and weak country located along the Atlantic coastline that had to expand westward in order to become a large and powerful state that could dominate the Western Hemisphere. For the United States, conquest and expansion were necessary to establish regional hegemony. China, in contrast, is already a huge country and does not need to conquer more territory to establish itself as a regional hegemon on a par with the United States. Of course, it is always possible in particular circumstances that **Chinese leaders will conclude that it is imperative to attack another country to achieve regional hegemony. It is more likely, however, that China will seek to grow its economy and become so powerful that it can dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, and make it clear they will pay a substantial price if they do not follow the rules.** After all, this is what the United States has done in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in 1962, the Kennedy administration let both Cuba and the Soviet Union know that it would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba. And in 1970, the Nixon administration told those same two countries that building a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos was unacceptable. Furthermore, Washington has intervened in the domestic politics of numerous Latin American countries either to prevent the rise of leaders who were perceived to be anti-American or to overthrow them if they had gained power. In short, the United States has wielded a heavy hand in the Western Hemisphere. **A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own.** China also objected in July 2010 when the United States planned to conduct naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, which is located between China and the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the U.S. Navy planned to send the aircraft carrier USS George Washington into the Yellow Sea. Those maneuvers were not directed at China; they were aimed instead at North Korea, which was believed to have sunk a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, in the Yellow Sea. However, vigorous protests from China forced the Obama administration to move the exercises out of the Yellow Sea and farther east into the Sea of Japan. Sounding a lot like President Monroe, a Chinese spokesperson succinctly summed up Beijing’s thinking: “We firmly oppose foreign military vessels or planes entering the Yellow Sea and other waters adjacent to China to engage in activities that would impact on its security and interests.” More generally, there is considerable evidence that Chinese leaders would like to develop the capability to push the U.S. Navy beyond the “first island chain,” which is usually taken to include the Greater Sunda Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. If this were to happen, China would be able to seal off the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, and it would be almost impossible for the U.S. Navy to reach Korea in the event of war. There is even talk in China about eventually pushing the U.S. Navy beyond the “second island chain,” which runs from the eastern coast of Japan to Guam and then down to the Moluccan Islands. It would also include the small island groups like the Bonin, Caroline, and Marianas Islands. If the Chinese were successful, Japan and the Philippines would be cut off from American naval support.

### AT Interdependence prevents escalation

This rhetoric enables the very things that cause war in the first place 4 responses.

1. **Mershimer ‘14 of UChicago** explains that states always prioritize security over economic prosperity, this is because if you dont survive you cannot prosper economically. History confirms, as before WW1 there was immense economic interdependence yet war still happened.
2. **Mershimer ‘14 of UChicago** explains that Nationalism and Cultural factors are placed above economic ones, this is why Chinese leaders have stressed they would go to war with Taiwan if independence was declared knowing the economic implications because it is “sacred territory”.
3. Economic interdependence isn’t permanent, war might be more profitable. **Mershimer ‘14 of UChicago** highlights that geopolitical factors, as well as global ones could cause economic problems and put states in a position where they have very little to lose economically and something to gain from going to war. **Mershimer** furthers that in the case of the SCS states would be willing to start wars with the expectation that any victory would bring them substantial economic and strategic benefits, and that those benefits would outweigh the loss of economic interdependence.
4. War does not shut down trade- **Mershimer ‘14 of UChicago** explains that there is an abundance of evidence that shows states do not break off economic relations in the event of war as both states believe they have a lot to gain .

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It would be wrong to argue that economic interdependence does not matter at all for the fostering of peace. Leaders do care greatly about their country’s prosperity, and in certain circumstances that concern will help dampen any enthusiasm they might have for war. The key question, however, is whether such calculations are likely to decisively influence policymakers in a wide variety of circumstances. In other words, will the impact of economic interdependence be weighty enough to serve as a firm basis for peace between China and its potential rivals over a long period of time? I **believe there are good reasons to doubt that concerns about mutual prosperity will keep Asia peaceful as China grows more powerful. At the most basic level, political calculations often trump economic ones when they come into conflict. This is certainly true regarding matters of national security, because concerns about survival are invariably at stake in the security real**m, and they are more important than worries about prosperity. As emphasized, **if you do not survive, you cannot prosper. It is worth noting in this regard that there was substantial economic interdependence and prosperity among the European great powers before 1914. Nevertheless, World War I happened.** Germany, which was principally responsible for causing that conflict, was bent on preventing Russia from growing more powerful while at the same time trying to become a hegemon in Europe. Politics overwhelmed economics in this important case.

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Politics also tends to win out over concerns about prosperity when nationalism affects the issue at stake. Consider Beijing’s position on Taiwan. C**hinese leaders have stressed that they will go to war if Taiwan declares its independence, even though they believe the ensuing conflict would damage China’s economy. Of course, nationalism is at the core of Chinese thinking on Taiwan; that island is considered sacred territory**. One might also note that history is littered with civil wars, and in almost every case there was substantial economic interdependence between the combatants before the fighting broke out. But political calculations proved to be more influential in the end.

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**There are three other reasons to doubt the claim that economic interdependence can sustain peace in Asia in the face of an increasingly powerful China.** The theory depends on permanent prosperity to work, but there is no guarantee there will not be a trade war or a major economic crisis that undermines that assumption. Consider, for example, how the ongoing euro crisis is doing serious damage to the economies of many European countries. Bu**t even in the absence of a severe global economic downturn, a particular state might be having significant economic problems, which could put it in a position where it had little to lose economically, and maybe even something to gain, by starting a war.** For instance, a key reason Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990—despite their close economic ties—is that Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC oil production quotas and driving down Iraq’s oil profits, which its economy could ill afford.

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**Another reason to question economic-interdependence theory is that states sometimes start wars in the expectation that victory will bring them substantial economic and strategic benefits and that those prospective benefits will be greater than the prosperity lost from damaged inter-dependence**. For example, it is widely believed there are abundant natural resources on the floor of the South China Sea. However, China and its neighbors disagree significantly over who controls that large body of water. Although it is unlikely, one can imagine a more powerful China using military force to gain control over the South China Sea so that it can exploit its seabed and fuel Chinese economic growth.

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Furthermore, there is abundant evidence that states at war with each other often do not break off economic relations. In other words, states trade with the enemy in wartime, mainly because each side believes it benefits from the intercourse. Jack Levy and Katherine Barbieri, two of the leading experts on this subject, write, “It is clear that trading with the enemy occurs frequently enough to contradict the conventional wisdom that war will systematically and significantly disrupt trade between adversaries.” They add that “trading with the enemy occurs during all-out wars fought for national independence or global dominance as well as during more limited military encounters.” In short, it is possible for a country to fight a war against a rival with which it is economically interdependent, and not threaten its own prosperity.