

We negate.

### **Our first contention is paralyzing peace.**

India represents a new set of interests to critical P5 negotiations. For example, India has opposed intervention. [Malone in 2013](#) writes that India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention, speaking out against operations in Libya and the Ivory Coast. Indeed, [Gardiner in 2005](#) finds that, despite popular belief, India only votes with the US 20% of the time.

India's veto power would thus complicate the negotiating table, increase gridlock in the UN, and delay crucial interventions. [Dobson in 2018](#) explains there is not a shortage of examples where time-sensitive decisions were delayed at the whim of a permanent member. For example, Russia delayed the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria during the height of their civil war.

More holistically, [Paris in 2014](#) explains that delays may lead to outside actors missing the window of opportunity to stop mass atrocities because victims are killed at a rate that makes a late response pointless.

This has happened historically, as [Power in 2001](#) explains that the US quibbled over insignificant parts of a proposal to intervene in Rwanda for two weeks, and by the time the US acceded to the plan, most of the Tutsis had died.

Time is valuable in responding to a mass atrocity, as [Krain in 2005](#) finds that in only 100 days, almost 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda.

### **Our second contention is regional disaster.**

[Domínguez in 2014](#) explains, the political relationship between India and Pakistan has recently become dangerously toxic again, as the nationalist government in India is susceptible to taking orders from civilian leaders to establish a hardline stance against Islamabad. In the meantime, Pakistan's government is controlled by military hawks.

[Mussarat in 2010](#) explains that a major source of tensions is the territorial dispute over Kashmir, a region fraught with violence between Islamic and Hindu nationalist sects.

The Kashmir situation is especially fragile now, as [Chacko in 2019](#) notes, India ignored calls for de-escalation and launched airstrikes on Pakistan earlier last month, and ceasefire violations have caused numerous civilian casualties.

Granting India a permanent seat would undermine this fragile situation in two ways.

### **First, emboldening India.**

Recognizing India as one of the world's major powers signals to its leaders that the country can get away with more aggressive behavior. [Nawas in 2018](#) writes, a permanent seat on the Council would legitimize India's regional participation in conflicts and confrontations, whether wrong or right.

Indeed, [Kim in 2012](#) explains that one major reason India has refrained from escalating the situation in Kashmir to full-scale war is that it wants to minimize opposition to its bid for a permanent seat in the status quo.

Conversely, [Kamal in 1998](#) reports that the Security Council's failure to condemn proliferation emboldened India to take aggressive actions in the 1998 Kargil War.

### **Second, provoking Pakistan.**

Pakistan will view India's ascension to the Security Council as a threat to its regional hegemony, and fear losing its footing in regional disputes. [Perkovich in 1996](#) explains that the leaders of India and Pakistan have always viewed the relationship as zero-sum, seeing gains for one country necessarily as losses for another.

As a result, according to [The Express Tribune in 2010](#), Pakistan said that any endorsement of India's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council would have serious negative implications on security in South Asia.

Historically, Pakistan has responded to growing Indian influence with aggression. [Pariona in 2017](#) reports that when India regained control of a Muslim-majority region in Gujarat in 1968, Pakistan reacted with a full-scale invasion, starting the second war between the countries.

A similar situation may occur again. [Talmadge in 2019](#) explains that if Pakistan becomes wary of a potential Indian preemptive strike, it would have an incentive to strike first to gain an upper hand.

There are two impacts to an increase in insecurity.

### **First, poverty.**

As tensions rise, nations respond by increasing military spending. The [Economic Times](#) confirms, when tensions with India soared in 2017 over the Line of Control in Kashmir, Pakistan increased military expenditures by 7%.

However, defense spending trades off with poverty alleviation efforts. [Hussain in 2014](#) finds that a 1% increase in Pakistani military spending increases poverty by 58%, which is critical as [40%](#) of all Pakistanis don't have access to their basic needs.

### **Second, war.**

According to [Clara in 2012](#), any act of aggression on either side risks counter-escalation, which could spiral into a full-scale war. Even if one side does not intend to initiate, [The Economist in 2019](#) explains that the possibility of a miscalculation is at its highest since the devastating war in 1971.

The [Peace Research Institute](#) finds that, even in only two weeks of fighting, 11,000 soldiers were killed in the 1971 Second Kashmir War.

Additionally, [Wellen in 2014](#) finds that, because of the conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan, Pakistan would rely on nuclear weapons to compensate. He continues that a nuclear war would directly lead to 20 million deaths.

**Please negate.**