#### Ben and I Negate, Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.

## Our Sole Contention is Sticks and Stones may break bones, but words can never hurt

With anti-missile systems deployed in South Korea for the last 23 years, tensions have only been rising. That’s why **Choe Sang-Hun** explains on July 7th that negotiations are in the best interest of both Koreas. **Fuchs** of the Guardian agrees, negotiations are the only way to ease tensions as the peninsula has trapped in conflict for years, if not decades.

Luckily, the time for negotiations is now, as **Hyun-Jin Kim** writes on August 16th, that South Korea’s President sees negotiations as of utmost importance. But it’s not just him, as **Reuters** reports last year, even North Korea has recently reached out for a peace treaty.

With both the North and South ready for peace, the only thing in their way is anti-missile systems. **Lee** of the Center for East-West Studies concludes that because of THAAD’s deployment, the two koreas have been put at a high risk of never recovering the positive potential of their relationship.

**Thus, there are 3 reasons why deploying anti-missile systems stops North Korea from ever coming to the negotiating table:**

**First, THAAD deployment requires treating North Korea as a threat**

According to **NBC News**, the reason North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles, is not to attack anyone, but to make sure no one attacks THEM. NBC furthers, Kim Jong Un doesn’t want to be like Saddam Hussein, who, after giving up his weapons, had his country invaded and regime shut down. Thus, Kim sees nuclear weapons as his key to survival because they threaten the US and make America hesitant to attack first. However, the US sees these weapons, not as a means of deterrence, but as a means of violence. **Gurtov** of the Asia-Pacific Journal writes, when the US deploys anti-missile systems, they treat North Korea as a threat instead of offering talks. Thus, we contend, if no anti-missile systems had ever been deployed, the United States would be working toward talks instead of treating North Korea as a threat, allowing for diplomatic efforts to actually happen and succeed.

**Second, THAAD ensures that US troops stay in South Korea.**

According​ ​to**​ ​Joshua​ ​Pollack**​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Center​ ​for​ ​International​ ​Studies,​ ​when​ ​the​ ​US​ ​first​ ​deployed anti-missile​ ​systems​ ​in​ ​South​ ​Korea,​they were meant to protect American assets, it’s just a coincidence that they also​ ​protect​ ​South​ ​Koreans.​ ​Likewise,​ **​Eric​ ​Gomez**​ ​of​ ​The​ ​National​ ​Interest​ ​writes, THAAD was​ ​deployed​ ​primarily​ ​because​ ​it​ ​better​ ​protects​ ​US​ ​troops​ ​there. That’s​ ​why​ **​Sarah​ ​Kim**​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Korean​ ​Daily​ ​concludes,​ ​without anti-missile systems, troops aren’t protected which is why Forbes writes that it would result in the U.S. withdrawal of troops.

The removal of troops is VERY good for negotiations because according to **Geoffery​ ​Fattig**​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Foreign​ ​Policy Magazine,​​ ​US​ ​troops​ ​stationed​ ​in​ ​South​ ​Korea​ ​cause​ ​friction​ ​with​ ​the​ ​North​ ​by​ ​their​ ​mere presence.​ ​The troops are​ ​a​ ​hurdle​ ​to​ ​peace​ ​as​ **​Fattig**​ ​furthers that they allow the North and South to not take responsibility for their issues. Luckily,​ ​Fattig finds that withdrawing U.S. troops would kick start the diplomatic process.

**Third and most importantly, North Korea sees THAAD as a threat.**

According to the **Institute for Security and Development Policy** in 2016, North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy THAAD as an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass systems like THAAD. **Khrustalev** of the Center for International Studies confirms, North Korea sees missile defense systems as a way to attack them. **Michael Maloof**, a former Pentagon official from Washington, writes in January that deploying THAAD is further escalation of an already dicey situation,” because “tensions are already very high and rather than trying to lower the threshold of military exercise, the US has adopted a policy, which has aggravated the situation.” However, **Lee** of the Center for East West Studies explains in 2016 that the South can pursue diplomatic efforts with the North, but only if the THAAD implementation process is halted.

**Because negotiations only happen in a world without missile defense, we negate.**

## Cards

#### Sang-Hun 17

[Choe Sang-Hun, 7-7-2017. "Moon Keeps Door Open to North after ICBM Test." Honolulu Star. https://www.pressreader.com/usa/honolulu-star-advertiser/20170707/281621010366902] //BH

He added “If the North doesn’t stop its nuclear pursuit, there is no option but to enforce even stronger sanctions and pressure.” But Moon also reiterated that he was willing to meet Kim Jong-Un, the North Korean leader, “at any time and any place” if the circumstances were right and if he saw an opportunity to reverse the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula. He said North Korea should return to the negotiating table to discuss a “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” If the North chooses that path, he said, great benefits wait for it: security guarantees like a peace treaty for Kim’s regime, as well as joint economic projects and other projects that would help rebuild the North Korean economy. Moon said that the need for dialogue with the North was stronger than ever, given a dangerous escalation of tensions on the peninsula in recent weeks. As one of the first steps toward easing tensions, Moon said that the two Koreas should start Red Cross talks to arrange temporary reunions of relatives in the North and South who have not seen each other since they were separated during the chaos of the 1950-53 Korean War.

#### Fuchs 17

[Michael H Fuchs, 9-5-2017. "The US must talk to North Korea – not threaten war." Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/05/america-north-korea-diplomacy-negotiation] //BB

Despite continuing provocations and saber-rattling, **the United States must continue to work with allies to strengthen deterrence and ramp up the pressure on North Korea – but it must also push for diplomacy. Negotiations are the only hope for easing tensions. The United States and North Korea are locked in a**[**dangerous cycle of escalation**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/south-korea-minister-redeploying-us-nuclear-weapons-tensions-with-north)**, but one that’s not new: North Korea tests a nuclear weapon; the United States responds with sanctions and military exercises. Eventually, tensions ease, and diplomacy appears possible, only to be scuttled by another North Korean provocative act. Rinse and repeat.** The newest variable is the reckless rhetoric coming from the Trump administration – such as a threat of “[fire and fury](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html?mcubz=3&_r=0)” and a claim that North Korea is “[begging for war](http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/04/politics/haley-north-korea-united-nations/index.html)” – which damages alliances and raises the risk of conflict. While the threat from North Korea is clearly growing, the United States knows how to keep its citizens safe and to ensure peace and stability in the region. For decades, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have deterred North Korea from starting a new war, and contained the North Korean threat.

#### Kim 17

[Hyun-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, 8-16-2017. "Moon Jae-In: Not be Another War on the Korean Peninsula." Time. http://time.com/4904148/south-korea-moon-jae-in-north-korea/] //BH

The alternative would have been both catastrophic and unacceptable!" Trump wrote. Next week's start of annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises that enrage the North each year could make diplomacy even more difficult. Moon said he believes dialogue with North Korea can happen when North Korea halts missile and nuclear tests. Moon was elected in May after a near-decade of conservative rule that saw animosity deepen between the rival Koreas. Moon wants to engage the North. But his efforts have so far been met with a string of threats and missile tests as the North works to build nuclear-armed missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland. "A dialogue between South and North Korea must resume. But we don't need to be impatient," Moon said. "I think lots of effort and time could be necessary to overcome a decade of severed ties and to reopen a dialogue." Moon said Washington and Seoul are closely communicating over the North Korean nuclear problem and share the view that strong sanctions and pressure are needed against Pyongyang to stop its provocations and force it into negotiations to give up its nukes. Moon said he thinks Trump's belligerent words are intended to show a strong resolve for pressuring the North and don't necessarily display the willingness for military strikes.

#### Reuters 16

Reuters Staff, 2/21/16, “U.S. rejected North Korea peace talks offer before last nuclear test: State Department”, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear/u-s-rejected-north-korea-peace-talks-offer-before-last-nuclear-test-state-department-idUSKCN0VU0XE> //BB

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States rejected a North Korean proposal to discuss a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War because it did not address denuclearization on the peninsula, the State Department said on Sunday. State Department spokesman John Kirby made the comment in response to a Wall Street Journal report that the White House secretly agreed to peace talks just before Pyongyang’s latest nuclear bomb test. The newspaper, citing U.S. officials familiar with the events, said the Obama administration dropped its condition that Pyongyang take steps to curtail its nuclear arsenal before any peace talks take place, instead calling for North Korea’s atomic weapons program to be just one part of the discussion. Pyongyang declined the proposal, and its Jan. 6 nuclear test ended the diplomatic plans, the newspaper reported. “‎To be clear, it was the North Koreans who proposed discussing a peace treaty,” Kirby said in an emailed statement. “We carefully considered their proposal, and made clear that denuclearization had to be part of any such discussion. The North rejected our response,” he said. “Our response to the NK proposal was consistent with our longstanding focus on denuclearization.”

#### Lee 16

[Kun Min Tayler’ Lee, September-December 2016. " THAAD: Missile Defense or Diplomatic Challenge?." Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. http://www.international-relations.com/CM2016/5-THAAD-Missile-Defense.pdf] //BH

In another analysis, forwarded by Hyeon-Jun Jeon from the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), the deployment of THAAD is viewed as having a negative impact on China’s military power, upon which North Korea depends for its protection. (DailyNK, 2015) This can be very dangerous, as the North would lose the relationship with China, becoming completely isolated and alienated from the global society. This would increase the chance of an invasion of the South, and the war could even include use of nuclear weapons. Irrespective of whether a war would occur, the heightened expectation of an invasion would impact on South Korea’s political and economic stability with foreign investors reluctant to commit to a country in such peril.It is also important to highlight how this would impact the unification of the two Koreas. It has commonly been argued that unification would result in a Unified Korea becoming a huge military power, and although there would be an economic burden to the South, associated with unification at the initial stage. However, Rolf Mafael, Germany’s Ambassador to South Korea noted the economic potential of a reunified Korea: a market of more than 75 million people and complementary economic factors, which will clearly exceed the initial costs (Dominguez, 2014). So by deploying the THAAD now, the two Koreas will be at high risk of never recovering the positive potential of their relationship. This would be devastating for Koreans as they would miss out on the significant benefits arising from unification. Conclusion The announcement of THAAD’s deployment created regional shockwaves as it was viewed as Washington’s direct challenge to Beijing in shifting the Asian power balance more decisively towards itself. There is a Korean saying, ‘When whales fight, the innocent shrimp are hurt’, and this applies directly to the situation that South Korea finds itself in today. By deploying THAAD, Seoul risks losing its valuable relationship with China and this will affect Koreans greatly in terms of economy as China is the largest trading partner of the South. Although Beijing cannot directly stop the trade due to Korea-China FTA, there are many other ways for China to torment South Korea and the results could be devastating. Also it is important to assess the actual necessity and the effectiveness of THAAD once again, as currently many are challenging this (see Lee, J. Oct 2016). If it is found to be ‘unnecessary’, South Korea needs to assert itself against its big ally, in pursuit of its national interests.

### Warrant 1:

#### **NBC News 17**

Alexander Smith, 7/5/17, “After North Korea Missile Test, What Does Kim Jong Un Really Want?”, NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korea-after-icbm-test-what-does-it-really-want-n779636> //BB

But for all its apocalyptic bluster, the country's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program — including its first intercontinental ballistic missile launch Tuesday — is based on what it believes are a rational set of goals. The most important of these is self-preservation. The country says it wants a nuclear bomb because it saw what happened when Iraq and Libya surrendered their weapons of mass destruction: their regimes were toppled by Western-backed interventions. It wants to stop others, namely the administration of President Donald Trump, from [the] toppling its totalitarian regime. "They learned their lesson from Libya and Iraq that the sure-fire way to prevent an attack is to have weapons of mass destruction, rather than just bragging about it," said John Nilsson-Wright, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, a London-based think tank. In January of last year, North Korea acknowledged that Iraq and Libya were a principal reason for the ramped-up arms program. "History proves that powerful nuclear deterrence serves as the strongest treasured sword for frustrating outsiders' aggression," according to an editorial by the official KCNA news agency. "The Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the [Muammar] Gaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord." Meanwhile, the regime knows that Trump's team has not ruled out a military response to the North Korean problem. In a departure from President Barack Obama's policy of strategic patience, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson revealed in March that military action was "on the table." If the threat of a regional conflict confined to Northeast Asia would not be enough to deter a U.S. attack, then the possibility of North Korea striking the West Coast of the United States might be. In this sense, developing an intercontinental ballistic missile "is a predictable and rational step for North Korea's military programs," according to Andrea Berger, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, in California. "Pyongyang believes that holding continental U.S. targets at risk is essential for deterring the United States from initiating regime change, or from joining a conflict that starts in other ways," she said.

#### Gurtov 17

Mel Gurtov, 3/15/17, “Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and the Two Koreas”, The Asia- Pacific Journal, <http://apjjf.org/-Mel-Gurtov/5020/article.pdf> //BB

Instead, “I can tell you we’re not ruling out anything, and we’re considering every option,” Haley said.6 So who is not being rational? Constantly talking up the North Korean threat and using it to justify ever more sophisticated and expensive antimissile technologies to defend against it is foolish and self-defeating. Diplomacy with North Korea is much more cost-effective. If Washington were in more experienced hands, it would indefinitely delay full deployment of THAAD or, if requested by a new South Korean president, decide not to operationalize it. Secretary Tillerson might, as a result of discussions with ROK leaders, announce on his current trip that future USROK exercises would depend on the security situation on the peninsula—a half-step toward Wang Yi’s proposal. These moves would not resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea or turn around contentious relations with China. But sidelining THAAD would reassure China—it might even provide a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese weapons deployments in the South China Sea. It would certainly remove a volatile issue from South Korean politics at a time of a national leadership crisis. If a new decision on THAAD were accompanied by revival of talks with North Korea, which a Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul is likely to initiate and which the Trump administration should support, it might put a brake on the drift toward confrontation. Unless the Trump administration starts paying attention to THAAD’s liabilities, it will face a cold-war style crisis at the same time that the United States and Europe are in the midst of another cold war standoff with Russia over Ukraine. The multiple security issues in Northeast Asia are precisely why a regional multilateral security dialogue mechanism is essential, such as I’ve suggested in these pages. It would provide a venue for addressing common- security issues such as climate change, public health and economic development in North Korea, sustainable energy, and a peace treaty ending the Korean War guaranteed by the major powers.

### Warrant 2:

#### Pollack 11

Joshua Pollack, 2011, “Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat”, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/Paper%204%20-%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Defense%20in%20South%20Korea.pdf

South Korea has faced a threat from hundreds of North Korean theater ballistic missiles since roughly the late 1980s. Seoul’s concern about the threat grew after a series of North Korean ballistic missile flight-tests on May 29, 1993, florid threats from Pyongyang during the nuclear crisis of June 1994, and the start of USFK’s deployment of Patriot batteries to protect its own facilities.9 These events may have contributed to the start of serious discussions within the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), no later than fall 1995, about launching a new air and missile defense program. This undertaking was justified in terms of the need to replace South Korea’s aging fleet of U.S.-supplied Nike-Hercules air-defense missiles.10 One path for the acquisition of a BMD system might have been to acquire new, up-to-date systems from a single supplier.

#### Gomez 17

Eric Gomez, 5/15/17, “THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea”, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665> //BB

Before THAAD, a disarming blow was incredibly risky because of the damage that just a few surviving nuclear-armed missiles could do to U.S. forces in South Korea. The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but THAAD does reduce them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike. Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive. The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.

#### Sarah Kim 17

Sarah Kim, 6/27/17, “THAAD is elephant in room at U.S. summit”, Korea Joongang Daily, <http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=3035101> //BB

“Holding an environmental impact assessment could essentially be seen as a means to earn time,” said Sejong Institute’s Chung. “It can signify that depending on the result, Thaad can be withdrawn. And during this time, the variable is that the Korean Peninsula is a volatile region where anything can happen. The Moon government may, for example, determine that the Thaad deployment is not needed if inter-Korean relations improve.” Security expert Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation, a California-based think tank, argues for the[United States’] necessity of installing the remaining four launchers to protect U.S. troops and South Koreans in case of a North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile attack. “There were many issues leading to the deployment of Thaad in Seongju,” Bennett said. “Probably the leading issue was that in a wartime situation with North Korea, over time tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel would deploy to Korea largely through the Busan area,” which is the site of the U.S. Naval Forces Korea headquarters. “The United States concluded that it would be irresponsible if it did not protect those personnel against the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons threat.” The Thaad interceptors have a range of 200 kilometers (124 miles), meaning the south of the country is defended but not the Seoul area.

#### Forbes 17

Scott Snyder, “6/11/17”, “South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks”, Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#47dfe64a429a> //BB

The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk.

#### Fattig 13

Geoffrey Fattig, 2/4/13, “Korea: The Case for Withdrawal”, Foreign Policy in Focus, <http://fpif.org/korea_the_case_for_withdrawal/> //BB

Despite showing support for a tougher line against the North at the UN, the situation will likely persist as long as the political calculus for Chinese leaders remains the same. Meanwhile, the United States’ main source of leverage against the North is the military option, which both sides are fully aware is off the table except as a defense mechanism in the case of an attack on the South. Because of this, the 28,500 American troops stationed in Korea are in the unique position of causing friction by their mere presence, even as the probability of them being deployed is quite low. The U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces agreement, whereby the United States commands both the American and ROK military forces, was helpful in preserving the status quo on the Korean Peninsula in the decades following the Korean War, but more recently has become an impediment to any progress for peace. Apart from discouraging more proactive involvement on the part of the Chinese government, it also allows the North to blame the United States for all of the problems of the peninsula and absolves South Korean leaders from having to make tough choices about their security situation. This creates a kind of inertia where all sides are discouraged from taking any real action that could alter the security dynamic of the region. Given these factors, it is time for the Obama administration to start withdrawing the American military from Korean soil.

#### Fattig (3)

Geoffrey Fattig, 2/4/13, “Korea: The Case for Withdrawal”, Foreign Policy in Focus, <http://fpif.org/korea_the_case_for_withdrawal/> //BB

Withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula could kickstart diplomatic progress in Northeast Asia–and save billions of dollars to boot. For a country that is often portrayed in Western media as unpredictable, the North Korean regime has actually proven to operate on a quite limited, if rather provocative, cycle. On the heels of December’s successful missile test, the recalcitrant nation is now preparing for a third test of its nuclear weapons program.

#### Brady 17

Michael Brady, 7/17/17, “The case for a phased US withdrawal from South Korea”, Asia Times, <http://www.atimes.com/hold-ds-case-phased-us-withdrawal-south-korea/> //BB

However, a phased withdrawal from the peninsula might persuade Pyongyang and Beijing to reconsider Kim’s nuclear ambitions. The United States must consider a phased withdrawal over the next 10 to 15 years. Doing so might actually achieve results on the Korean Peninsula, something that has not occurred since 1953. Misguided foreign-policy thinking and a cold-war mentality will result in increased tension between Pyongyang and Washington, further increasing the risks of a strategic miscalculation.

### Warrant 3:

#### ISDP 16

November 2016, Institute for Security & Development Policy, “THAAD in the Korean Peninsula”, <http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf> //BB

Impact on the Region: North Korea’s Response: North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM.41 This was followed by three shortrange missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.42 North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a “physical response.”4 The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD’s abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.44 So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory.45 Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.46 The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.

#### Krustalev 17

Vladimir Khrustalev (Center of International Studies), Special To Rbth, Russia Beyond The Headlines, 4-17-2017, ["How North Korea may respond to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea," https://www.rbth.com/opinion/2017/04/17/how-north-korea-may-respond-to-the-deployment-of-thaad-in-south-korea\_744041, 9-4-2017] //BB

It is obvious that Pyongyang does not see Washington’s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea as a defensive measure. The North Koreans strongly believe that the American missile defense system could be used to attack them. It means that Pyongyang’s response will be, in the first place, military, and will take into account the weaknesses of the THAAD. North Korean military planners know that defense missile system is not able to cover the whole territory of South Korea

#### Maloof 17

[No Author, 1-14-2017. "PressTV-‘US THAAD deployment escalating tensions’." No Publication. http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/01/14/506116/US-THAAD-South-Korea-Maloof-Sinnott] //BH

The United States’ planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) in South Korea has infuriated not only the neighboring North, but Russia and China as well. Moscow and Beijing consider the move as a provocation meant to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and trigger an arms race in the region. South Korean people have also held protest rallies against THAAD deployment. Press TV has sought the opinions of two experts on what has prompted Russia, China, North Korea and even a segment of the South Korean society to oppose the deployment. Michael Maloof, a former Pentagon official from Washington, said that the United States pursues the deployment of the THAAD system as a provocative act to push China and Russia to pressure North Korea. The deployment of the THAAD system “is further escalation of an already dicey situation,” because “tensions are already very high and rather than trying to lower the threshold of military exercise, the US has adopted a policy, which has aggravated the situation,” Maloof told Press TV’s “The Debate” program. Instead of trying to calm down North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, the United States has angered China and Russia through its enhanced military buildup on the Korean Peninsula, he added. The radar system, he stated, “could be used as a bargaining chip by the United States to get the Chinese to put more pressure on Kim Jong-un to be a little more reasonable in terms of talks.”

#### Lee 16

[Kun Min Tayler’ Lee, September-December 2016. " THAAD: Missile Defense or Diplomatic Challenge?." Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. http://www.international-relations.com/CM2016/5-THAAD-Missile-Defense.pdf] //BH

More importantly, the Korean peninsula is at high risk of war once again from this deployment and, as matters stand, the chances of unification look dimmer than ever. The South Korean government must not ignore the benefits arising from unification and needs find the way to alleviate tension with the North. Otherwise, having to go through the tragic event of war once again could result in ‘Korea’ not simply divided but disappearing from the map. The more measured approach would be “a conditional withdrawal” of plans for THAAD deployment. Inje University professor Kim Yeon-cheol said at a policy debate at the National Assembly Members’ Hall on 21 October 2016: “What we need is an ‘exit scenario,’ where we make diplomatic efforts - including a resumption of the Six-Party Talks - and immediately halt the THAAD deployment if progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue. . . But we need to temporarily halt the THAAD implementation process while diplomatic efforts are being pursued” (quoted in Lee, October 2016). Diplomacy is better than military solutions, especially since K0orea does not want to be sacrificed as someone else’s battleground.