St. Dootton Ranch

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NEG

General BRI

A2: Debt Trapping Aatreya (done)

1. Countries aren't dumb. The **Telegraph in 2019** writes that before a country accepts a BRI project, they check the feasibility, costs, profit, and asset liability before starting. There are two implications.
    a. BRI isn't the reason the projects run over on cost, there are probably other reasons why the debt increases such as project delays, insofar as the analysis is done before the project as far as costs go.
    b. These projects are probably cheaper because by getting a BRI offer they can compare it to internal cost, and FDI cost, and choose which is the cheapest.
2. Fears are extremely overblown. **Laura, internally citing the Rhodium Group**, found that of 40 external debt negotiations between China and BRI countries, there was only one case of asset forfeiture. Instead, China is inclined to just negotiate or write off the loans-- that's what happened with Cuba and Ethiopia.
    a. **The World Bank '19:** The median BRI investment amounted to 6% of GDP, which isn't that large especially when dispersed over many years.
3. Even if the fears weren't overblown -- China is shifting away from any debt policy, **Zhou 19** of South China Morning Post writes that international complaints about debt trapping has caused Xi to promise high financial standards under the initiative.
4. China has their own interest in not debt trapping countries - obviously they need to make their money back, especially with their debt as a nation rising pretty high. That's why **Gul of Voa**

News in 2019 writes that in CPEC, a key part of BRI, only 20% of the projects are funded with loans. The implication is that:

   a. Since CPEC is the most developed part of BRI thus far, it's a good indication of how China would finance BRI throughout the world, which means that the majority of projects will be funded by grants and direct investment. This means that countries are going to access the economic benefits of BRI without the strings attached, and thus would probably be able to still make a return on investment on the small part with loans.

5. **Elliot of the Guardian in 2016** writes that IMF loans force countries to reduce spending, cut salaries and benefits, and reduce bargaining and minimum wages. There are two key implications.
   a. Developing nations need flexibility in their loans because they don't have the capital to address small downturns in economic growth, CH loans, as the Laura ev above indicates, are much more flexible allowing for growth rather than trapping.
   b. IMF loans are more general, really just given to a government with no direct application on where to use it. With Chinese loans, they are for specific projects are actually improve the country's economic position, thus more likelier to produce a Return on investment and improve the economy. [http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/04/15/rethinking-the-imf-to-counterbalance-chinese-debt-traps/] maybe something here
6. **The PPDC '19** writes that most literature points to the conclusion that the BRI won't worsen debt problems. Indeed after analyzing 30 BRI countries, debt vulnerability only increased in 2 countries when taking into account the growth created from BRI projects.
   a. All their impact evidence is looking at debt in isolation, that's why you prefer this evidence because it does the comparative analysis with the economic benefits of the BRI.
   b. **[asset seizure]** The PPDC furthers that China actively engages in debt restructuring that favors other countries and rarely has an incentive to confiscate assets. This is because the act of infringing on country sovereignty would destroy any credibility that China would have through the BRI. Furthermore, they also write that loans to extremely risky countries would only be hurting china in the long term as well, which is why their incentive to make the loans they are talking about is very small.
7. Countries would take on debt even in a world without the BRI, it is inevitable. With the BRI projects you ensure you have a highly productive economic investment
   a. Meaning again the debt won't be a problem, you are getting enough money to check back interest.
   b. Even if in the short term debt becomes a problem, in the long term they can have economic stimulus to manage all future debt as well.
8. **Aiddata '18** analyzes chinese infrastructure investment over 15 years in over 138 countries and concludes that projects significantly reduce economic disparities by spreading economic activity to rural areas where there is active discrimination and neglect, for two reasons.
   a. More development and better resource allocation to underdeveloped areas means less people have to actually rely on austerity in the first place.

i. This at worst is T-D to their argument, because even if there are cuts to austerity people become less reliant anyways.
ii. At best this is a turn, as in the long term there is less fiscal strain as people leave the social safety net.

b. **The World Bank '14** finds that 78% of the world's poor people live in rural areas. This is crucial as the Aiddata goes onto find that chinese infrastructure would give these areas vital access to resources modernizing those regions.
   i. This means we actually affect the population in the developing world that actually needs the resources
   ii. The IMF furthers that rural poverty in the developing world creates urban flight which only exacerbates the problem of poverty in cities. In fact they find that much of urban poverty is created by the rural poor movement to city centers.
      1. This means we not only make the problem better for rural areas, but also make social safety nets a lot better in urban areas by stopping the mass migration that strains governmental resources.

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/12/for-up-to-800-million-rural-poor-a-strong-world-bank-commitment-to-agriculture

About 78 percent of the world's poor people— close to 800 million people at the time of writing - live in rural areas and rely largely on farming, livestock, aquaculture and other agricultural work to put food on their plates and make a living. One of them is Adekalie Kamara, a rice farmer in Sierra Leone who is counting on more productive farming methods to "give me hope of a good reward for my hard work." Meanwhile, Jan Agha, an Afghan farmer is improving his livestock business to help feed his eleven children. "We are learning better ways to feed, protect and clean our animals. We are getting richer, too." For Adekalie, Jan Agha, and millions of others, agriculture is the starting point for their pathway out of poverty. Long acknowledged as one of the most powerful tools for raising the incomes of very poor people, agriculture is integral to ending poverty and boosting shared prosperity for the world's poorest.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues26/

Rural poverty accounts for nearly 63 percent of poverty worldwide, reaching 90 percent in some countries like Bangladesh and between 65 and 90 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. (Exceptions to this pattern are several Latin American countries in which poverty is concentrated in urban areas.) In **almost all countries, the conditions—in terms of personal consumption and access to education, health care, potable water and sanitation, housing, transport, and communications—faced by the rural poor are far worse than those faced by the urban poor.** Persistently **high levels of rural poverty,** with or without overall economic growth, **have contributed to rapid population growth and migration to urban areas. In fact, much urban poverty is created by the rural poor's efforts to get out of poverty by moving to cities. Distorted government policies, such as penalizing the agriculture sector and neglecting rural (social and physical) infrastructure, have been major contributors to both rural and urban poverty.**

https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/2019/07/17/debt-trap-for-whom/

The shared conclusion from these reports is that BRI will not likely be plagued with widescale debt sustainability problems, even though it is also unlikely that the initiative will avoid any instances of debt problems among its participating countries. **A** more **recent** working **paper** published **by the World Bank** also attempted to **evaluate the long term debt dynamics impact of China's loans, taking BRI investment related growth into account**. Availability of credible data remains a constraint for these papers. Yet **of the 30 countries included in their long-term debt dynamic simulations, in only in 2 countries BRI debt financing would result in increasing debt vulnerability**. Worth noting, however, is that **debt relief and restructuring is both relatively common** (recorded instance of relief so far reach $9.8 billion) **and tends to favor the borrower country.** In this light, the "debt trap" might seem more of a "creditor trap" for China than for the borrowing countries, as Stephen Kaplan puts it when analyzing the case of Venezuela. Indeed, from a geopolitical perspective, it is strategic for China to hold leverage in security choke points in case of fundamental disruption of global stability or an outbreak of war. However, **financial leverages do not automatically translate into political leverages**. Venturing to **confiscate its debt-financed assets would mean risking all credibility and reputation for any other international engagement**. On the contrary, **China faces more risks giving** away **debts in financially vulnerable countries.** In cases of real financial distress such as Venezuela, China's debt renegotiation might come with more loans issued in the same country in the hope of generating revenue and recovering the previous loans. Deutsche Bank was recently reported to have confiscated 20 tons of gold that backed Venezuelan debt, but we don't see Chinese financial institutions making similar moves.

https://www.aiddata.org/blog/chinese-infrastructure-investments-reduce-inequalities-in-developing-countries

The findings from the study are encouraging: C**hinese development projects—in particular, "connective infrastructure" projects like roads and bridges—are found to create a more equal distribution of economic activity within the provinces and districts where they were located.** The study also measures the impact of Chinese development projects on economic inequality between provinces and districts, and here too the results provide grounds for optimism: **Chinese Government-financed projects appear to reduce, rather than widen, economic disparities between regions.** This analysis was made possible by a far-reaching effort at AidData to assign precise geographic coordinates to AidData's first global dataset of Chinese development projects, released last October. **The result of thousands of hours of geocoding by dozens of research assistants is a first-of-its-kind dataset that pinpoints the locations of 3,485 Chinese development projects worth USD $273.6 billion that were implemented in 6,184 locations in 138 countries over a fifteen-year period (2000-2014). Many of those 138 low- and middle-income countries suffer from high levels of spatial inequality, where** most e**conomic activity is concentrated in a few citie**s and **little economic activity exists in the rural towns and villages.** Therefore, **a significant implication of the study is that, by helping households and companies in rural areas access goods, services, and jobs in more distant markets, China's investments in connective infrastructure are spreading economic activity to rural areas that have historically suffered from benign neglect or active discrimination.** By reducing spatial inequality, Chinese development projects are also helping to address a root cause of global instability.

Cuba and Ethiopia example
Zhou, South China Morning Post
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3008326/why-chinas-belt-and-road-loans-may-not-be-debt-trap-other
One example it gave was Cuba, which had US$2.8 billion in debts written off in 2010, while last week Ethiopia announced that Beijing had forgiven interest owed on belt and road loans.
The publication of the research on Monday followed the end of the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on Saturday, where Chine**se President Xi Jinping attempted to allay growing international complaints that the plan was a "predatory debt trap" and promised to promote high financial and environmental standards under the initiative.**

Li Shipeng and Zheng Dongchao, 4-4-19, "The Belt and Road Initiative does not lay debt traps", The Telegraph
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/china-watch/business/belt-and-road-debt-trap/
Some Western think tanks and media outlets with anti-Chinese bias tend to view the BRI as China's strategy to challenge the existing world order and build a new one led by Beijing. By so doing, they reveal their Cold War mentality. And the zero-sum game they are indulging in is aimed at disrupting China's peaceful development.

The so-called experts who label the BRI a debt trap should know that **countries involved in the initiative carefully check the feasibility of a Belt and Road project, and evaluate its costs, profits and asset-liability ratio before finalising it. They should also know that China helps nations in need of infrastructure funds which some developed countries and international financial organisations refuse to provide because of the slow return on infrastructure projects.**

Laura Zhou, 4-30-19, "Why China's belt and road loans may not be the debt trap other countries fear", Rhodium Group, SCMP

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3008326/why-chinas-belt-and-road-loans-may-not-be-debt-trap-other

China is inclined to renegotiate or write off debts incurred by other countries for its belt and road infrastructure projects and only rarely seizes assets, a study by a New York consultancy has found.

The Rhodium Group's research looked at 40 cases of external debt renegotiation between 2007 and this year and found there was only one confirmed case of asset seizure – in Sri Lanka.

The conclusions, based on the studies of Chinese debt renegotiations with 24 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, **challenge claims that the Belt and Road Initiative will leave countries with debts they cannot repay and force them to hand over assets or natural resources to Beijing.**

The report concluded that Beijing had renegotiated about US$50 billion of loans and in most cases, debts had either been written off or payment was deferred.

Average debt not that large

"Belt and Road Economics." The World Bank. 2019//SSK

The BRI takes place in the context of rapidly rising public and corporate debt. Public debt in emerging market economies (EMEs) has been rising, reaching levels not seen since the 1980s. It has been accompanied by changes in public debt composition and by rising corporate debt in EMEs, now exceeding historic levels and adding to fiscal risks and vulnerabilities. Similarly, debt risks in low income developing countries (LIDCs) have risen substantially in recent years. The share of countries at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress has doubled since 2013—to about 40 percent. Expected BRI investments are very large for some countries. Some 66 percent of the total BRI investment is expected to accrue to seven countries, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation accounting for 50 percent of the total. **Scaled by 2017 GDP, the median BRI investment amounts to under 6 percent of GDP, an amount that is not large in relation to the investment needs of many countries, especially if disbursed over several years.** For example, median annual BRI financing in the WIND database would amount to slightly more than 1 percent of GDP if disbursed over the five years until 2023. But in some countries estimated investment surpasses 20 percent of 2017 GDP (figure 1.18).

Ayaz Gul, 4-8-2019, "China: BRI Investments Boost Pakistan Economic Structure," Voice of America,https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/china-bri-investments-boost-pakistan-economic-structure

"When you're showing up with a non-economic offer, whether that's through state-facilitated, below-market pricing or handing someone something knowing that you can foreclose on their nation shortly, so predatory lending practices, that's not straight and we are working diligently to make sure everyone in the world understands that threat," he said. This week, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang defended the corridor as "an important pilot program" under BRI, saying **it has created tens of thousands of local jobs in addition to meeting the power demand of nearly nine million households in Pakistan. "Of all current CPEC projects, only less than 20 percent are financed with Chinese loans, while the rest are all funded by direct investments or grants from China. Far from adding to Pakistan's burden, the CPEC actually strengthened the local economic structure**," Lu explained at his regular news conference in Beijing.

"Leveraging international financing to carry out major projects, as a common practice across the world, is an effective tool for developing countries in particular to overcome the funding bottleneck and boost growth," the Chinese spokesman stressed. CPEC will ultimately give landlocked western Chinese regions the shortest and a more secure route to international markets through Gwadar port. Islamabad acknowledges the corridor investment has improved transportation networks and effectively resolved years of crippling power crisis facing the country. Pakistani officials reject as misplaced concerns the current foreign debt crisis stems from the project. "CPEC is great opportunity for Pakistan. CPEC connects us to China which is one of the biggest markets ... and CPEC route will connect China and Pakistan located at strategic position of world," Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan told a recent international conference.

Elliot 16 Larry Elliott, 10-9-2016, "The World Bank and the IMF won't admit their policies are the problem," Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/09/the-world-bank-and-the-imf-wont-admit-their-po licies-are-the-problem//DF

The next big one could come from anywhere and it is good that the World Bank and IMF are aware of the risks. Even so, there was an air of unreality about the discussions in Washington last week. The reason was simple: there was not the slightest hint from the IMF or World Bank that the policies they advocated during the heyday of the so-called Washington consensus – austerity, privatisation and financial liberalisation – have contributed to weak and unequal growth, with all the political discontent that this has caused. Even worse, Lagarde and Kim seemed oblivious to the fact that the Washington consensus approach is alive and well within their organisations. **The IMF's remedy for Greece and Portugal during the eurozone crisis has been straight out of the structural adjustment playbook: reduce public spending, cut salaries and benefits, insist that state-owned enterprises return to the private sector, reduce minimum wages and restrict collective bargaining.Between them, the IMF and the European authorities are turning Greece into a developing country**. It would be fascinating to see what sort of response Lagarde would get if she tried talking about inclusive growth to homeless people huddled on the streets of Athens. The IMF is effectively two institutions. It has a research department that has broken with the Washington consensus and programme teams that operate in the field as if we were still in the 1990s. Lagarde sides with the research team, but the recent package prepared for Egypt was the familiar mix of subsidy reductions, the introduction of value added tax and cuts to red tape. There is not much evidence that those who put it together are on message

A2: Free Trade Bad Asher

A2: Health Silk Road Bad Anuraag

1. NU/Delink: **Schwartz 17'** writes that the WHO and China has signed agreements to execute the Health Silk Road together, as Linlin furthers that the WHO is cooperating with OBOR countries to improve practices.
    a. This means the HSR is going to expand regardless, they don't change squo trend.
    b. Its under international supervision, meaning that China won't be able to continue these bad practices going forward.
2. Delink: Doesn't make sense why China would do bad things in these host countries when they need them for trade. China historically has very good record on health outreach. **WHO 17'** writes that CH fought the Ebola crisis, donated medical supplies in Syria, and helped with Nepal's Earthquake.
    a. Delinks argument because China historically has been very good with its outreach.

    b. Will continue to do this health outreach even if BRI doesn't exist.
3. Turn: **<u>WHO 17'</u>** writes that China's medical teams are some of the first globally to pass WHO rigorous certification process, so through BRI they can spread good practices and help countries do medical stuff better.
4. Delink: Their evidence is probably not factoring in that these countries were corrupt before BRI came in. That's why **<u>Kotsadamn of the University of Gothenburg 16'</u>** concludes after comparing corruption before and after Chinese health projects in Africa, there is zero evidence that China project increase corruption.
    a. Pref on historical and metaanalysis.
5. **<u>Berquist 19'</u>** writes that collaborating with global countries is a giant prereq to stopping and slowing the spread of epidemics across poor countries, noting that the BRI is the best way to solve as cooperation and research will save 20.46 million lost life years through elimination of diseases.
    a. O/w literally any HSR Bad arg. **<u>Orbis of BIO in 2015</u>** writes that healthcare in developing nations lack access to knowledge, lack of medical practitioners, and lack of resources. Thus, if the status quo is worsening, then the only risk of solving is through affirming and joining BRI.
6. Historically the only way to truly develop a strong healthcare infrastructure is to have economic growth and developing economies where healthcare becomes a priority. Econ > Health
7. NGO's that focus entirely on health outreach also can use BRI for infrastructure to deliver medical goods.
    a. Means at worst impact is balanced out by good infra coming as well.
    b. NGOs would oversee Chinese medical outreach and call them out of they did anytthing dumb, also delinking argument.
8. Read BUILD ACT DISAD, WEST HELATH INFRA COMES TOO

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f9a0/cec6ed3a8bea50a5aaa7e1f385cab82aca61.pdf
<u>KOTSADAM</u>

Nevertheless, the extent to which Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption seems to vary across sectors. In the health sector (Columns 3-4)***, there is no evidence that*** neither ***Chinese*** nor World Bank ***projects fuel local corruption***

http://www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacentre/releases/2017/20170119-mr-president-xi-visit-to-WHO-HQ/en/ **<u>WHO</u>**

decades of successful partnership between China and the WHO in global health cooperation. This includes sending 1,200 medial workers in response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa, China's recent contribution to WHO efforts to distribute medical supplies in Syria, and the WHO Emergency Medical

Teams, a newly-established mechanism meant to ensure more flexible and rapid response to national outbreaks and disasters. China is a major contributor to the new initiative; one of its teams was already deployed to Nepal in supporting their earthquake response. In May 2016 the Chinese National EMT from Shanghai became one of the first EMTs globally to pass WHO's rigorous EMT classification process.

http://www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacentre/releases/2017/20170627-calling-chinas-champion-for-global-health/en/ **SCHWARTLANDER**

In January, President Xi met with the WHO director general in Geneva ***to sign an agreement to*** radically ***improve access to healthcare beyond China through the Belt and Road Initiative.***

http://www.wpro.who.int/china/mediacentre/releases/2017/20170119-mr-president-xi-visit-to-WHO-HQ/en/ **LINLIN**

WHO looks *forward* ***to working with member countries involved in the OBOR initiative to find ways to bring health considerations to their*** *economic growth strategies and* ***decision-making, and supporting expanded health services delivery and disease prevention and control capabilities.***

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6472722/ **BERQUIST**

Serious challenges oppose *current* ***efforts to stem and limit epidemics in these countries, requiring urgent collaboration with*** *adjacent and* ***global countries through shared experience, financial support, multisector intervention, professional healthcare delivery, and technical innovation.***

For example, ***cooperative actions could lead to regional elimination of lymphatic filariasis (LF) along the Maritime Silk Road while simultaneously having a significant impact on malaria, dengue, intestinal helminth infections, schistosomiasis, and TB.***

The infectious disease epidemics in countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road are mainly ***the same set of diseases, which together generate 20.46 million DALYs.***

ORB OF BIO
https://orbisbio.com/underdeveloped-healthcare-in-developing-nations/
Low- and middle-income countries bear 90% of the world's disease but compose only 12% of the world's health expenditures, according to a 2008 article in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. There is not only a correlation between poverty and lack of accessible healthcare, but also causation. Poverty can lead to a dearth of available healthcare, and ill health can

create cause poverty. Three deficiencies that factor into diminished access to healthcare in developing nations are lack of knowledge, lack of medical practitioners and lack of resources.

A2: Epidemics Andrew

1. **Delink**: Clearly, this isn't the case, because the BRI is already in 60+ countries globally, and there haven't been extreme epidemics all over. Make them prove that the EU signing on would change anything.
2. **Turn**: A pivotal aspect of the BRI is the Health Silk Road that China is continuing to expand. **Chen of the US National Library of Medicine 19** explains, "[China's] Health Silk Road concept establishes the importance of promoting cooperation among the related countries in the prevention and control of communicable diseases, medical system and policies, healthcare capacity building, staff training and exchange, traditional medicine, and health education as well as poverty reduction for health. In this way, building the contextual Health Silk Road would advance political commitment to mobilise all resources for better health in the world."
    a. This means, that as long as the BRI is expanding, the nations facing potential diseases will have all the resources and motivation to fight them. You can even implicate this as offense for us, because these nations gaining access to 60+ countries worth of medical information helps combat life threatening diseases that already exist.
    b. For example, Chen writes, "The implementation of the BRI is expected to facilitate progress in eliminating infectious diseases [like AIDS, HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria].
3. **Turn:** Overall, the BRI infrastructure plan is vital to stimulating the economy. This is key, as **Chen 19** argues "infectious diseases resulting from poverty disproportionately affect poor and marginalised communities, which remains a more serious hurdle". However, more jobs and infrastructure helps combat this. We would argue that this outweighs the spread of diseases to rich areas in Europe, because pulling people out of poverty will prevent generations of disease ridden families.
4. **Mitigate:** Even if there are some diseases that could be spread, it isn't as bad as they are trying to paint it to be. **The Scientific Development Organization** writes this year, "several of these diseases [on the BRI] have been eradicated, helped by strong economic development, massive reductions in the numbers of people living in extreme poverty, urbanisation, changes in agricultural practices, improved sanitation and extensive parasite control measures" Most of all, the authors of the study cite China's improved checks on truck drivers as a key to reducing disease spread.

SciDev - Disease Prevention

Scientific Dev Organization, SciDevNet, "China path to disease, the BRI", Feb 2019, https://www.scidev.net/global/disease/news/china-opens-path-to-disease-via-belt-and-road-trade-route.html
But several of these diseases have been eradicated, helped by strong economic development, massive reductions in the numbers of people living in extreme poverty, urbanisation, changes in agricultural practices, improved sanitation and extensive parasite control measures, say the authors of the study.

Chen - Health Silk Road Jin Chen, US National Library of Medicine, "Combating infectious disease epidemics through China's BRI", April 2019, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6472722/**Although the BRI is primarily economic, it also includes important health dimensions.** The Healthy China 2030 plan, promulgated in 2016, considers health as one of the national policy priorities, and the Memorandum of Understanding with the World Health Organization (WHO), signed in 2017, which promotes global health security and development along the terms of the initiative [5, 6]. Based on these agreements, the building of a Health Silk Road has become a core task leading to an extensive engagement in global health development [7, 8]. During the Belt and Road High-Level Meeting for Health Cooperation: Towards a Health Silk Road, held in August 2017 in Beijing, the Director-General of WHO, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, positively commented on the initiative, **saying that it may become the stimulus needed to drive our united activities towards universal health coverage (UHC) and that it contains the necessary fundamentals, such as infrastructure building, access to medicines, and human resources, needed to build a platform for sharing experience and promoting best practices [**5]. The Health Silk Road concept establishes the importance of promoting cooperation among the related countries in the prevention and control of communicable diseases, medical system and policies, healthcare capacity building, staff training and exchange, traditional medicine, and health education as well as disaster relief, aid, and poverty reduction for health [1]. In this way, building the contextual Health Silk Road would advance political commitment to mobilise all resources for better health in the world.

A2: Dev. World Worse Warrant

A2: Sand Usage Pranav

1. Sand Usage is non-unique. Mcintyre of MSN News reports in March of 2019 that Singapore recently purchased 823 million dollars worth of sand for their own infrastructure expansion projects. Even if BRI is failing, sand is still being used up elsewhere.
2. By this logic, infrastructure projects in general shouldn't be undertaken.
3. Racism argument

A2: Sand Mafia

1. The growth of the sand mafia is non-unique. Infrastructure projects are undertaken on a daily basis which is why the sand mafia is growing exponentially in the status quo.
2. The majority of sand mafia operations are in India, a country that isn't in the BRI. the implication here is that BRI projects just happen to be a minor portion of the mafia's profits but insofar as they operate mainly inside of a non-BRI nation, their link into the impact is really small.

3. The impact coming off the sand mafia is really nebulus insofar as the bad things they do like human trafficking and stuff like that are not impacts that stem from the actor itself. The implication here is that if you stop the sand mafia, it won't solve the actual problem and a different organization would just take their place because these illegal activities are super lucrative.

A2: Deforestation Pranav (done - add in RT camp blocks)

1. Howeden '12 of Common Dreams: Deforestation is inevitable since any expansion of economic activity, like agriculture, logging, and ranching, will cause deforestation, which is important since countries, especially developing ones, have an increasing economic imperative.
2. (If they run EU impact). AIDDATA '19: Chinese infrastructure projects empirically reduce deforestation in countries with strong forest protection rules.
3. (If they run EU impact). Losos '19 of the Brookings Institute: In economically developed and already deforested regions, there's barely any natural forest, so the BRI has little impact on Europe. If anything, more infrastructure and roads can attract more tree plantation around them.
4. Kaczan '17 of the World Bank: In India's less forested areas, road construction between 2000 to 2014 had a causal relationship with a 1.2 percent increase in coverage.
5. The EU has its own infrastructure plan called the Juncker Plan, meaning that infrastructure would still be built and leave places deforested. This means that they don't prove how much more deforestation will occur with the BRI.

Deforestation inevitable

Howden, 5-14-12, Daniel, Common Dreams, "Deforestation: The Hidden Cause of Global Warming," http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/05/14/1175,

Indonesia became the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world last week. Following close behind is Brazil. **Neither nation has heavy industry on a comparable scale with the EU, India or Russia and yet they comfortably outstrip all other countries**, except the United States and China. **What both countries do have in common is tropical forest that is being cut and burned with staggering swiftness**. Smoke stacks visible from space climb into the sky above both countries, while satellite images capture similar destruction from the Congo basin, across the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo. According to the latest audited figures from 2003, two billion tons of CO2 enters the atmosphere every year from deforestation. That destruction amounts to 50 million acres - or an area the size of England, Wales and Scotland felled annually. The remaining standing forest is calculated to contain 1,000 billion tons of carbon, or double what is already in the atmosphere. As the GCP's report concludes: "If we lose forests, we lose the fight against climate change." **Standing forest**

was not included in the original Kyoto protocols and stands outside the carbon markets that the report from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) pointed to this month as the best hope for halting catastrophic warming. The landmark Stern Report last year, and the influential McKinsey Report in January agreed that forests offer the "single largest opportunity for cost-effective and immediate reductions of carbon emissions". International demand has driven intensive agriculture, logging and ranching that has proved an inexorable force for deforestation; ***conservation has been no match for commerce***. The leading rainforest scientists are now calling for the immediate inclusion of standing forests in internationally regulated carbon markets that could provide cash incentives to halt this disastrous process. Forestry experts and policy makers have been meeting in Bonn, Germany, this week to try to put deforestation on top of the agenda for the UN climate summit in Bali, Indonesia, this year. Papua New Guinea, among the world's poorest nations, last year declared it would have ***no choice*** but to continue deforestation **unless it was given financial incentives to do otherwise.**

In less forested areas, BRI won't have a bad impact

Losos, Elizabeth. "The deforestation risks of China's Belt and Road Initiative." The Brookings Institute. 1/28/19//SSK

A cursory evaluation of the distribution of forest cover change within these corridors has provided a preliminary indication of areas most vulnerable to one of the most consequential environmental risks: deforestation. Because satellite data of forest cover are not that difficult to obtain, forest cover loss (deforestation) is commonly used as a proxy for a range of environmental impacts on biodiversity, carbon storage, water provision, and other eco-services. Map 1, created by our colleague Andrew Jacobson, shows the forest cover in the BRI's geographic realm.There are six main economic corridors of the belt component of the BRI (Map 2). Putting Maps 1 and 2 together indicates that deforestation risks are especially high in Southeast Asia. Looking more closely would reveal vulnerable areas along the other corridors as well. To assess deforestation risks along the BRI economic corridors, there are at least three landscape settings, which should be distinguished by their levels of prior development and prior forest loss: Landscape Setting 1: High deforestation and high prior economic development. **In the most economically developed and often deforested regions, little natural forest remains to be cleared. Hence, minimal forest impact is expected from BRI transport projects within these areas. It is even possible that lowered transport costs could lead to rural transformations that results in reforestation, such as through tree plantations.**

Roads increase trees empiric

Kaczan, David. "Can roads contribute to forest transitions?" The World Bank Group. 4/17/17//SSK

Consideration of institutional heterogeneity is not currently part of this analysis, although this omission should not threaten identification. Over the last 30 years, India's forest policies have featured devolution of state power through joint forest management, state-driven reforestation programs, and restitution of forest rights, among other large-scale initiatives (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2016; Kumar and Kerr, 2012; Mather, 2007). Road impacts are almost certainly modified by the legacy of differential implementation of these programs across regions. In addition, new roads likely facilitate policy implementation. Roads may allow for better enforcement of state property rights, or improved state support for local enforcement of community rights, through improved access for forest officers (Ghate et al., 2009). Alternatively, increased access could lead to conflict over previously isolated resources. The institutional setting, such as the tenure regime under which different forests are managed, is also likely to modify the road-forest relationship. Open-access forests face increasing pressure under higher forest products prices. Commonly-held forests face similar pressures but not necessarily the same outcome: improved collective action that conserves forest may be incentivized under these conditions (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997). Private property rights, meanwhile, should allow landowners to capitalize on increasing forest products prices, encouraging the protection of existing forests or the establishment of new plantations (Robinson et al., 2013). Some of these institutional considerations will be the focus of future analysis. **These empirics first suggest that** at least part of **the rise in India's tree cover, and thus India's forest transition, can be attributed to the construction of new roads in rural settings. I estimate a positive causal impact for India overall, on the order of 0.6 to 1.2 percent relative to baseline tree cover, above underlying trends across the study period (2000-14).** While previous studies provided indirect or theoretical support for the possibility of positive road impacts (Deng et al., 2011; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), this is the first direct evidence of such to my knowledge. While small in absolute terms, these estimates of positive tree cover outcomes from new roads apply to a relatively short period. Should trends continue the impact of the program would compound over time. I note, however, that countervailing general equilibrium effects could mitigate the long-term impact24 . Regardless of the specific magnitude, this positive average treatment effect runs contrary to the conventional wisdom that new roads drive deforestation. This is not to say that the previous understanding, based on substantial empirical evidence and well-developed theory, is erroneous, or that concern regarding the environmental impact of road construction (e.g. Caro et al., 2014; Laurance et al., 2014b) is unfounded. Nor does it mean that the net provision of environmental services must be positive from expanded tree cover, even in this study location25 . Instead, the results simply demonstrate that particular settings, which have not been the subject of much prior scholarship, can give rise to positive road impacts, raising the possibility that improved spatial targeting of roads can not only avoid environmental costs but also deliver environmental benefits. I present evidence regarding the nature of settings in which this occurs in my heterogeneity analysis. The fact that I observe negative road impacts in frontier-like settings helps reconcile my results with the broader deforestation literature, which has focused on frontier-like settings (primarily in central and South America). However, in India, where forest cover is rising overall, negative road impacts on frontier settings are outweighed by positive road impacts in other settings.

Decreases deforestation in places with strong protection rules

"INFRASTRUCTURE." AIDDATA. 2019//SSK

https://www.aiddata.org/infrastructure

AidData and its research collaborators have undertaken a series of geospatial impact evaluations (GIEs) to provide decision-makers with new insights regarding infrastructure projects and their effects on deforestation and biodiversity. One of these studies discovered that World Bank projects subjected to the organization's most stringent environmental safeguards do not damage local ecosystems. When mitigable environmental risks are identified at the project preparation stage, the study finds that World Bank projects can even reduce deforestation in nearby areas.

Another GIE measured the forest cover impacts of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Cambodia and Tanzania, finding that **while these investments accelerate deforestation in areas with weak forest protection rules, they actually slow deforestation in areas with strong forest protection rules.**

A2: 5G Bad Adriana

A2: China Control Warrant

A2: Authoritarianism Warrant (Pranav)

1. Turn: Griswold finds in 2006 that more globalized economies are significantly more likely to reinforce political freedoms and democratic principles for two reasons:
    a. The most globalized economies in the status quo like the United States and EU countries are democracies; more exposure to these trains of thought decrease the likelihood that a country plunges into authoritarianism.
    b. More fundamentally, trade and globalization mean that citizens of countries that are at a high risk of plunging into authoritarianism become less dependent on the authorities for their livelihood, decreasing the chance that authoritarianism a) is fostered and b) is maintained.
    c. The implication here is that by expanding the BRI, you increase the connectivity that the developing world has to more globalized and democratic societies, and you fundamentally decrease the probability of any authoritarian principles regardless of Chinese influence.
2. Link In: Willcox of the National Interest writes in 2017 that the health of the world's democracies is heavily reliant on the status of their economies because declining economies are a breeding ground for political volatility and party fragmentation. The reason this is true is because in times of economic turmoil, individuals seek for an entity to blame and an urgent solution. In these scenarios, radical forms of thought that stray from typical democratic practices look more appealing and gain traction, leading to the authoritarian institutions they mention in their case. The implication here is that if the aff can prove that there is even a marginal improvement in the economies of these developing countries, we are taking a step in the right direction and avoiding the creation of authoritarian dynamics to begin with.

3. Turn: The Spread of 5G itself actually spreads democracy. Keegan Wade of Georgia Tech finds in 2005 that just a 25% increase in internet penetration would increase the democracy score of a country by a significant amount while still accounting for regional and socio-economic development because allowing greater connectivity overall sparks political discourse and shapes the beginnings of a democracy. The implication here is that the spread of 5G, which inevitably means the spread of internet infrastructure, is actually the only hope for backwards countries to turn democratic because they are looped into more progressive thought processes in the developed world.

Daniel Griswold, 8-11-2006, "Globalization, Human Rights, and Democracy," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/globalization-human-rights-democracy

The connection between trade, development, and political reform is not just a throwaway line. **In theory and in practice, economic and political freedoms reinforce one another. Political philosophers from Aristotle to Samuel Huntington have noted that economic development and an expanding middle class can provide more fertile ground for democracy. Trade and globalization can spur political reform by expanding the freedom of people to exercise greater control over their daily lives. In less developed countries, the expansion of markets means they no longer need to bribe or beg government officials for permission to import a television set or spare parts for their tractor. Controls on foreign exchange no longer limit their freedom to travel abroad. They can more easily acquire tools of communication such as mobile phones, Internet access, satellite TV, and fax machines. As workers and producers, people in more open countries are less dependent on the authorities for their livelihoods. For example, in a more open, market-driven economy, the government can no longer deprive independent newspapers of newsprint if they should displease the ruling authorities**. In a more open economy and society, the "CNN effect" of global media and consumer attention exposes and discourages the abuse of workers. Multinational companies have even greater incentives to offer competitive benefits and wages in more globalized developing countries than in those that are closed. Economic freedom and rising incomes, in turn, help to nurture a more educated and politically aware middle class. A rising business class and wealthier civil society create leaders and centers of influence outside government. People who are economically free over time want and expect to exercise their political and civil rights as well. In contrast, a government that can seal its citizens off from the rest of the world can more easily control them and deprive them of the resources and information they could use to challenge its authority.

In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both are multiparty democracies with full

political and civil liberties. Other countries that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform include Chile, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania.

Jordan Willcox, 12-7-2017, "Economic Instability Endangers Democracy," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/economic-instability-endangers-democracy-23560

The real threat today, and the essential problem, stems from a single fact: the health of the world's democracies turns out to be crucially dependent on their economic growth rate. This is especially true of "consolidated democracies," countries that have established a stable precedent of peaceful power transfer over several or many electoral cycles. The world's leading consolidated democracies—wealthy and powerful nations to include the United States, the nations within the European Union, and other large U.S. allies, such as Japan, have seen rates of economic growth consistently and persistently decline over the past forty years. In the United States alone, GDP growth has averaged 1.79 percent per year since the year 2000, after averaging 3.35 percent between 1968 and 2000. Median household income, somewhat infamously, has shown negative net growth between 1999 and the present year, after generally growing between 1945 and 1999; work by McKinsey & Company generalizes this trend to the majority of high-income liberal democracies. Could poor economic performance shake the foundations of their stability or their commitment to the order? My work on a recent assessment suggests: Absolutely, it can; absolutely, it is; and by no means can we assume that the worst is over. Complex phenomena have complex causes, but economic stagnation is enough to produce exactly the institutional failures we're living through. And economic stagnation continues in the United States and beyond it. **To begin with, there is clear evidence that negative and declining economic growth leads to increased political volatility, including in democracies and in rich nations. Various studies have found a relationship between strong economic performance and the electoral survival of incumbent governments for both high-income countries and for developing countries. Other analyses suggest that global economic crises in European democracies generally increase electoral volatility and party fragmentation. Bertoa (2014) compared elections before and after several global economic crises in European democracies, and found that they generally increase electoral volatility and party fragmentation. That analyses included the 2008 financial crisis, which is where Bertoa found volatility and fragmentation to have risen in 80 percent of Western European countries**. A lot of what leads some scholars and studies astray on this topic is an overly short-term evaluation. The effects of economic hard times can vary in their immediate aftermath; shocks can give way to recoveries and ruin time-bounded correlations. It's not always the first election after the shock that unseats an incumbent. But when you scratch an example of drastic political volatility in a developed country, you often find a period of extended poor economic performance within the past ten to fifteen years. France's second election after the financial crisis represented higher political disruption than its first, which itself was three years into recession; Boris Yeltsin won reelection in 1996 despite terrible economic malfeasance. It is over multiple electoral cycles that a long-run period of economic hardship disrupts and discredits old political orders. Once it is established that economic decline creates political instability, it can then mutate into a dozen malign effects on domestic and international orders. High rates of political volatility are negatively correlated with international cooperation in such areas as respect for trade agreements and declining support for peacekeeping operations. Changes in the institutional structure of a state's political system, which can emerge in periods of volatile political conditions, correlate with the collapse of alliances. Declining economic growth is associated with increased hostility to immigrants, and an increase in civic violence towards them. In more severe cases, political instability and civic violence are associated with an increase in state repression.

Michael L. Best (Contact Author), 12-16-2005, "The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic Dud? by Michael L. Best, Keegan W. Wade :: SSRN," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=870080

We approached the question of how the Internet affects democracy from a quantitative standpoint. By means of various statistical analyses over an eleven year period (1992 to 2002) we strengthened previous evidence suggesting that the Internet has a positive effect on democracy (e.g., Kedzie, 1997; Richards, 2002). However, we also found evidence that this Internet-democracy relationship is not absolute; for instance, consider the variability amongst regional results. 21 In particular, our results show a significant correlation between Internet penetration (measured as the estimated number of Internet users per 1,000 people) and a common indicator of a nation's level of democratization provided by the Freedom House. With a multivariate linear regression model we show that this correlation maintains even when we control for a nation's geographic region, economic level (we use GDP per capita), and social development (we use literacy rate as a surrogate measure). **Our findings suggest that a 25% increase in Internet penetration corresponds to a one point jump on the 14 point democracy index while still accounting for region and socio-economic development**. Indeed, we find that Internet penetration explains more variation in level of democratic development within a country than does literacy rates and some of the geographic regions. We employed Lessig's framework of regulation to examine possible causes of these correlations. Lessig defines four classes of regulators, forces that control and define systems such as the Internet. They are markets, architectures, norms, and laws. We argue that a democratic regulator is such a force that serves to enhance civil or political liberties. And we argue by example that there are democratic (and, indeed, anti-democratic) regulators which control aspects of cyberspace.

A2: Displacement Pranav

1. Climate Change Adaptation Advantage; the negative implications of climate change displace more people than infrastructure projects.

2. If the infrastructure provided by the BRI increases the economic output of the BRI nations, then the government has more money to create social programs to solve back for internal displacement.
3. No contextualization - they never tell you how directly the infrastructure internally displaced people. According to the Denver Office of Economic Development, infrastructure can offer stronger wages meaning that people have a way to escape displacement.
4. They never explain specifically why the type of infrastructure in BRI causes internal displacement.
5. De-link - According to Russel '19 of the Asia Society Policy Institute, Various Chinese laws and regulations specifically stipulate social impact assessments for displacement be conducted for BRI projects, meaning financial institutions engaged in infrastructure projects must establish social risk control systems in consultation with local stakeholders and affected communities.
6. (Read dumping responses if that's the link)
7. We OW, the only impact people are reading are 150,000 potential people displaced. OW on magnitude bc you probably affect more people and probability bc the card literally says potentially displaced, they don't win the link.

Daniel R. Russel and Blake Berger, "Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative", JUNE 2019, ASIA SOCIETY POLICY INSTITUTE
https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Navigating%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_2.pdf

How would it work? Once a BRI project is approved and prior to construction, **China should require that an ESIA be conducted to examine at least the following areas: envi- ronmental risks; social risks and impacts, including gender, indigenous people, and cultural heritage considerations; land acqui- sition, land rights, resettlement, restrictions on land use, and displacement; security; community health and safety; stakeholder engagement and information disclosure; and labor issues, including labor supply and training, labor in ux and impacts, working conditions, and the risk of child labor, forced labor, discrimination, or other abuses.** e ESIA should be undertaken in consultation with local stakeholders and affected communi- ties throughout the process in an open and transparent manner. What would it accomplish or prevent? A rigorous, transparent, community-engaged, and publicly available ESIA would provide a key tool for BRI project managers and host government agencies to develop procedures to mitigate or avoid adverse environmental and social impacts during the project's life cycle. A good ESIA leads to better outcomes, reduced risk, and bene ts to both host countries and China. Having a reliable and comprehensive ESIA would provide project developers and local stake- holders the capacity and capability to avoid environmental and social "time bombs" that could result in protests, project delays, or cancellation. China's domestic and international development practices: Various Chinese laws and regulations specifically stipulate ESIAs or EIAs be conducted for domestic and overseas projects. The 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment Law as revised in 2016 stipulates that before construction commences on domestic projects with significant environmental impacts, the EIA documents must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate relevant departments.59 e CBRC's 2017 "Guide to Strengthen Risk Prevention and Control"60 encourages financial institutions engaged in infrastructure projects to learn from the Equator Principles and other international best practices, establish environmental and social risk control systems, conduct environmental and social assessments in evaluating the projects feasibility, and strengthen monitoring of social and environmental risks. e CBRC's 2012 "Green Credit Direc- tive" sets out mechanisms to ensure proper environmental and social risk due diligence, monitoring and supervision, and completion of an environmental and social risk report. Furthermore, the directive states that "banking institutions shall promise that appropriate international practices or international norms will be followed... so as to ensure alignment with good international practices."61 e NDRC, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and the Ministry of Foreign A airs (MFA) jointly issued the "Code of Conduct for Overseas Investment Operations by Private Enter- prises" in 2017, stating that before the construction of any overseas project, private enterprises involved should undertake environmental assessments of the proposed construction site.62 e China Export-Im- port Bank's 2007 "Guidelines for Environmental and Social Assessments" similarly explicitly calls for EIAs to be undertaken, and it details the speci c sectors and aspects that the assessments should cover.

Denver Office of Economic Development
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/690/Reports%20and%20Studies/BROCHURE%20052416.pdf
Displacement is less likely if household income grows along with the neighborhood's rising values. **Manufacturing, tech, and health are industries, among others, can offer stronger wages for workers having less than a four-year degree. Career-directed workforce training is key to helping people get the credentials they need to meet employers' needs.**

A2: Capital Flight Carter (done)

1. The issue is already being solved. **Yiu of the South China Morning Post** explains that Beijing has tightened down, restricting investments that would result in capital flight by only approving good investments.
2. They don't link in. **Investopedia** explains that capital flight occurs when financial assets from one country exit, in this case the Yuan leaving China. However, **Smith 15** explains that BRI transactions are still funded using the dollar.

Enoch **Yiu**, 4-4-**2017**, "Beijing's strict capital controls are delaying belt and road project approvals", **South China Morning Post,**
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2084738/beijings-strict-capital-controls-are-delaying-belt-and-road
China's strict capital controls are delaying the approval process for mainland companies to finance projects under the government's "One Belt, One Road" initiative, according to industry players. "**Mainland private companies now need at least three to six months to get approval from Beijing for them to get the money out of the country to finance many of the One Belt, One Road projects,**" said Clement Chan Kam-wing, managing director of accounting firm BDO. "**China has not banned such investment but the authorities have demanded more documentation and explanation as to how the money would be used, particularly for large amounts, above US$5 million."** He said that **before the government toughened its rules on capital flight,** it could take just two months to get the green light to

finance a simple project. “Beijing does not want companies using these types of investment as an excuse to bring money out of the country to hedge against the loss in the valuation of the yuan. This has naturally delayed the approval process and is likely to continue this year until China reviews its capital control policies.”

James **Chen,** 4-29-**2019**, “Capital Flight”, **Investopedia,**
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalflight.asp
What is Capital Flight?
Capital flight is a large-scale exodus of financial assets and capital from a nation due to events such as political or economic instability, currency devaluation or the imposition of capital controls. Capital flight may be legal, as is the case when foreign investors repatriate capital back to their home country, or illegal, which occurs in economies with capital controls that restrict the transfer of assets out of the country. Capital flight can impose a severe burden on poorer nations since the lack of capital impedes economic growth and may lead to lower living standards. Paradoxically, the most open economies are the least vulnerable to capital flight, since transparency and openness improve investors’ confidence in the long-term prospects for such economies.

Colby **Smith**, 18, (), "The Belt and Road's dollar problem", Financial Times, 12-18-2018, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/18/1545130791000/The-Belt-and-Road-s-dollar-problem/, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)
When China first unveiled its plans to connect more than 65 countries along a modern Silk Road in 2013, the project was met with great fanfare. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it was later renamed, was initially hailed as "the most ambitious economic and diplomatic program since the founding of the People's Republic". Beyond the pledge that it would help to turn China into a high-income economic powerhouse, Chinese officials also touted the BRI as a vehicle for transforming the country's currency into a global one. ***Five years on, the renminbi hasn't made much headway as an internationally-recognised unit of account, medium of exchange or store of value — the three functions a global currency must fulfil***. In fact***, the majority of BRI projects are not even funded this way. Like most global transactions, the dollar dominates, putting a natural cap on just how revolutionary the BRI can be.*** In recent years, Chinese officials have made a concerted effort to promote the renminbi's international use. Since 2009, China has signed more than 30 bilateral currency swap agreements with a wide range of countries from Argentina to Nigeria. This year, Chinese regulators have loosened rules for foreign commercial banks to conduct business on the mainland. And as recently as last week, they also extended more licenses to Western banks to underwrite renminbi-denominated bond sales by foreign companies.

A2: Chinese PMCs Asher (done)

1. **Yang of the United States Institute of Peace** reports that the majority of Chinese private security firms are in high-risk Middle Eastern countries like Iraq. The implication is that the entire contention is reverse causal -- Chinese PSCs do not cause instability -- instability causes the PSCs to come. This also takes out any harm of the contention because these places are high risk regardless so the impacts of terrorism for example will manifest either way, but with PSCs, there's at least some checkback.
2. Turn: **Legarda 18 of the East Asia Forum** writes that China is reluctant to deploy the People’s Liberation Army to accompany the PSCs because doing so would mean an official abandonment of China’s long-standing non-interference policy and it could lead to serious international backlash. As a result, Chinese private security companies have turned into a good alternative relative to their western counterparts, because they are less so focused on military intervention and more so on general security advising, meaning if anything the PSCs are good for stability.

3. **[The Asia Times](#)** writes that the reason why there was a massive expansion of China's PSCs abroad in 2016 was because more than 300 workers were evacuated from South Sudan due to instability, prompting widespread concern. The implication is that the BRI is not the primary reason why PSCs are expanding, but rather just general tensions.

A2: Trafficking Pranav

Europe

A2: Infrastructure increase Emissions Adriana (done)

1. Make them implicate their advocacy. This argument is essentially saying that we shouldn't allow developing nations to develop through infrastructure because it might marginally increase the temperature, even though these countries are predominantly affected by climate change impacts that developed nations have already caused. Chambers 10 explains that prioritizing vague impacts to climate change over tangible economic benefits is eco-imperialism, when energy or other growth projects are rejected to maintain a status quo of underdevelopment. This is super problematic, as he continues that development lets countries cope with climate change impacts since rural poor are hit hardest. He concludes that "limiting carbon emissions may be of benefit to the developed world, but [is] detrimental to the long-term ability of the poor to cope with climate change". Our opponents' advocacy is to trap the most vulnerable countries into poverty to make the path a little easier for developed ones.
    a. [SPIKE]. Don't let them kick out of this analysis by saying that it's specific to chinese infrastructure. For the majority of landlocked developing countries in central and southeast Asia, the BRI is the only possible path to developing and China is the only plausible investor.
2. Infrastructure is key to adapting developing countries. Two links.
    a. First, transportation infrastructure. For the BRI to build the belts and roads that connect the world, they undertake massive transportation infrastructure projects. This is critical, as the World Bank 19 estimates in the status quo, due to insufficient infrastructure, BRI nations undertrade by 30 percent, limiting their economic development, and the UN finding that 32 landlocked developing countries, or LLDCs, with more than 500 million people, are paralyzed by their geographical location and inability to facilitate efficient trade. Fortunately, the BRI solves, as **The World Bank** writes that a completed BRI would reduce travel times by 12% and thus increase trade by 10% for BRI corridor countries specifically, which are predominantly developing nations, lifting millions out of poverty. Critically, **Lamy of Wall Street Journal** in 2009 empirically concludes that no poor country has ever become wealthy without trade.

b. Second, energy infrastructure. The BRI is building the grid. [Cornell of the Atlantic Council in 2019] writes that a major part of the BRI has been expanding power grids in rural environments, as it carries a multiplier effect on development and economic connectivity. Importantly, Peng '17 of GEI explains that China's energy development abroad has shifted from coal to renewable technology because of global economic shifts and international pressure, more in line with the Paris Agreement. This leads to development, as Cornell furthers that BRI power grids would create 200 million jobs by 2050. Most importantly, these jobs go beyond the construction and management of new infrastructure, and into the new businesses and economic activities empowered from the new grids. Empirically, Yu '18 of China Daily finds that, in Brazil, the BRI infrastructure pulled 22 million people out of energy poverty.

c. [IG YOU WANT YOU COULD ADD HSR BUT SOMEONE ELSE WRITING THAT SHIT]

   i. READ THIS W ADAPTION OVER CC WEIGHING

World Bank 19 [2019, accessed 8-11-2019, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.pdf] AK

Countries that lie along the Belt and Road corridors are ill-served by existing infrastructure and by a variety of policy gaps. As a result, they undertrade by 30 percent and fall short of their potential FDI by 70 percent. **BRI transport corridors will help in two critical ways – lowering travel times and increasing trade and investment. Along economic corridors, we estimate that travel times will decline by up to 12 percent once completed.** Travel times with the rest of the world are estimated to decrease by an average of 3 percent, showing that non-BRI countries and regions will benefit as well. ¶ **Expanded trade and investment will increase growth and incomes in most corridor economies. Real income gains could increase by up to 3.4 percent** at the high end of our estimates, but these gains would largely differ across countries possibly leading some to incur welfare losses because of the large costs of infrastructure. BRI transport projects could help lift 7.6 million people from extreme poverty (those earning less than $1.90 a day) and 32 million people from moderate poverty (those earning less than $3.20 a day).

The trade effects of the BRI transport infrastructure predicted by the structural model tend to be larger (figure 2.3).**World export volumes increase by 6.3 percent. Corridor economies are expected to increase exports by almost 10 percent.** Similar to the CGE results, the increase in non-Belt and Road economies' exports is around a third of the increase for corridor economies. The information from the two models should be seen as providing a range of the potential trade effects of the BRI. Different from the CGE analysis, the structural model highlights the linkages through global value chains since it assumes strong complementarities between foreign and domestic inputs in production.9 As trade costs fall as a result of the denser network of transport infrastructure, the structural model predicts that firms will expand their use of imported inputs more, with larger effects on their productivity and exports. That boosts exports more for low income and upper middle income corridor economies.

UN. "ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THROUGH CONNECTIVITY AND TRADE FACILITATION". 5/17/18.

http://unohrlls.org/custom-content/uploads/2019/01/LLDCs_Kazakhstan_Ministerial_Meeting_Report_010319_Digital.pdf. Accessed 11 August 2019. // AK

The thirty-two Landlocked Developing Countries **(LLDCs) with a population of more than 500 million face unique challenges** resulting from their disadvantaged geographical location **which,** combined with critical infrastructure deficiencies and poor trade facilitation, **result in high transport and overall trade costs that erode their competitive edge and pose hurdles on their sustainable development pathway. Many LLDCs find themselves marginalized from the world economy, cut-off from the global flows of knowledge, technology, capital and innovations, and unable to benefit substantially from external trade.** This situation requires innovative and inclusive solutions.

Andrew Chambers 10 of the Guardian [4-1-2010, accessed 11 August 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cif-green/2010/apr/11/eco-imperialism-climate-change-carbon] AK

Last Thursday the World Bank approved a £2.4bn loan to build a huge new coal-fired power station in South Africa. **The issue has exposed the rift between two central international goals – alleviating poverty and preventing global warming.** South African ministers claimed that the project was essential for their country's **development**, while a concerted environmental campaign lobbied international governments to block the scheme. Amid concerns about global warming, this question of development versus environment may become one of the most contentious international issues over the next few years. Since the **1970**s the green movement has acquired ever-greater prominence in international development. **In the last decade, global warming concerns have refocused the emphasis of poverty reduction strategies away from development and towards the environment.** This is portrayed as a win-win situation – where the interests of the local people are perfectly aligned with the interests of environmental campaigners. Sustainable technologies like wind turbines and solar panels improve the lot of the recipients while keeping their carbon emissions to a minimum. **However, this approach has been criticised as a form of eco-imperialism – because western carbon considerations remain a limiting factor on developing world progress.** The Working Group on Climate Change and Development is a network of more than 20 NGOs including WWF, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Founded in 2004, its "central message is that solving poverty and tackling climate change are intimately linked and equally vital, not either/ors". The group's most recent report lists the overarching challenges as (1) how to stop and reverse further climate change, (2) how to live with the degree of climate change that cannot be stopped and (3) how to design a new model for human progress and development that is climate-friendly. The makes fascinating reading – and is illuminating as to the ideological backdrop to development policy. These environmental groups, while spanning quite a large spectrum, tend to demonstrate an affinity with the pro-rural socialist left. The report describes climate change as not just a threat but also an "opportunity" to re-think the entire global system. It challenges western notions of development and growth and, most starkly, concludes that "mere reform within the current global economic system will be insufficient" to tackle poverty in a carbon constrained future. **Indeed, members of these groups often seem to embrace rural village life as representing a pre-industrial idyll which should be preserved. Such romantic ideology therefore seeks to largely maintain the status quo – where the African poor are kept "traditional" and "indigenous".** It's hard to disagree with Lord May, former president of the Royal Society in his observation that "much of the green movement isn't a green movement at all, it's political". **With poverty redefined in terms of the environment and infused with pro-rural socialism, large-scale projects to industrialize or modernize are not the priority – indeed, western-style development and modernisation are seen as part of the problem. Instead there is a self-limiting bottom-up approach which subsidizes underdevelopment not as a transitionary phase but as an end goal. To effectively sideline the development strategy that every western country has undertaken in raising living standards is remarkable.** Indeed, while India and China have lifted at least 125m people out of slum poverty since 1990, over the same period 46 countries have actually got poorer – the large majority of them African states. It would be too simplistic to prescribe the industrialization and modernisation agenda pursued by India and China as a panacea for the problems of sub-Saharan Africa, and the Indian and Chinese policies have not been without adverse consequences. ***Nevertheless, it is a staggering achievement which demonstrates that poverty alleviation should be pursued through a developmental agenda.*** The truth is that African poverty is not a result of global warming. It is likely that the poor will be disproportionately affected by global changes in temperature **– but this is not a reason to limit development. It is development which will allow countries to better cope with the consequences of a changing climate.** For example, the Netherlands is better prepared to build dams to protect its coastline from rising sea levels than Bangladesh. ***Those that will be hardest hit by global changes to temperature will be those who are most exposed to the vagaries of the environment now – the rural poor. Environmental policies that seek to reinforce the rural status quo as a means of limiting carbon emissions may be of benefit to the developed world, but they are detrimental to the long-term ability of the poor to cope with climate change.*** The planned South African power plant at Limpopo exposes the collision between these different policy aims**.** With the country going to the World Bank for a £2.4bn loan, international governments have been forced to weigh up developmental advantage versus environmental damage. South Africa suffers major power shortages and insists that a new plant is essential to the country's economic progress. Environmentalists are horrified that the plant will emit 25m tonnes of carbon per annum, and point out that much of the new electricity will be used by heavy industry. Despite a concerted lobbying campaign from environmental groups, the loan was approved on Thursday – albeit with abstentions from Britain, America and the Netherlands. A US treasury spokesman explained that the abstention was due to an "incompatibility with the World Bank's commitment to be a leader in climate change mitigation and adaption". Considering that the World Bank's first affirmed purpose is to alleviate poverty, we can see how pervasive the reframing of poverty in terms of environment has become. ***It is up to the developed world to produce the technologies for cleaner energy and implement policies to significantly reduce carbon emissions. It is not acceptable to use global warming as a way of limiting growth in poor African countries when our own climate emissions continue to rise.*** Environmental movements certainly have a role to play in highlighting ecological degradation and its impact on local people, and in some cases the interests of protecting the environment will be perfectly aligned with the needs of the local community**.** However, it is unacceptable for poverty reduction in the developing world to become a staging post for ideological battles lost elsewhere. **We should embrace whatever methods provide the best outcome in alleviating poverty – whether that be new roads or airports, power stations or renewables.** To do otherwise is to be guilty of the worst kind of eco-imperialism – where the poor are held back for the benefit of the rich.

Cornell, Phillip. "Energy Governance and China's Bid for Global Grid Integration". 5/30/19. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/energy-governance-and-china-s-bid-for-global-grid-integration . Accessed 11 August 2019. // AK

Energy projects have always been a major part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure mega-plan for Eurasia. The enormity of that plan was on display at the BRI Forum last month, where an official report was released estimating that energy investments in BRI countries would add up to $27 trillion by 2050, with **$7 trillion alone going to power grid construction, and over 200 million new jobs created in the process.**

Long-distance interconnections can also facilitate efficiencies by linking big markets with different peak demand times (e.g., across time zones), or with big energy price disparities.**In poor rural environments, the expansion of power grids is also important for addressing energy access, with its multiplier effects on development and the provision of information and communications technology (ICT) services for economic connectivity.** In China's case, there is an economic argument rooted in its domestic development. With heavily concentrated demand along the populated coasts and traditional coal resources in more barren inland regions, long-distance energy transport has always been a source of insecurity. Bad winters that paralyzed the rail network could cause power shortages in distant cities.

Ren **Peng**. Global Environmental Institute. May 20**17**. http://www.geichina.org/_upload/file/report/China's_Involvement_in_Coal-fired_Power_Projects_OBOR_EN.pdf. Accessed 11 August 19. // AK

Since 2001, Chinese development of coal-red power projects in countries along the Belt and Road has fluctuated, slowing sharply in 2008, 2011 and 2016, and having peaked in 2010. Chinese involvement in Belt and Road coal-red power projects peaked in 2010. **This trend shows that China's participation in these projects is affected by global economic shifts, the policies of host countries, and restructuring toward cleaner energy. Research shows that since 2016, China's support for overseas coal-fired power plant development has slowed down again.** Further research is required to understand the detailed development trends and outlook. However, **this shift can be seen as in line with the consensus of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Some countries along the Belt and Road contributed to this change by reducing support for high emission projects like coal-red power plants and shifting toward renewable energy.** For example, the Indian government began to consider suspending the development of new coal-red power projects until the end of 2027 and committed to cutting carbon intensity 20% by 2020 and by 33% to 35% by 2030 from the 2005 level, according to India's Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). 6 Indonesia also began to focus on renewable energy development. The Indonesian government has increased the number of new geothermal and hydro power projects and promoted reliance on new small-scale power projects to solve the problem of low power coverage. 7 The Mongolian government also turned its attention to renewable energy and drafted a renewable energy development plan under the country's INDC.

Yu, Cheng. "State Grid records success in Belt and Road region". 3/15/18. China Daily http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/15/WS5aa9e967a3106e7dcc141d88.html. Accessed 11 August 2019. // AK

"Electricity infrastructure construction has become one of the most active sectors to promote the Belt and Road Initiative," he said. **Shu said the firm's ultra high-voltage project in Brazil has played an important role in Brazil's power connections and has helped 22 million local people access electricity.** According to Shu, the company's overseas projects have achieved a contract value of $40 billion and have enabled Chinese power equipment to be exported to more than 80 countries and regions.

A2: Pushes EU to Recession (Debt) Kevin

A2: Trump Tariffs Retaliation Anuraag (done)

1. **Indict.** The Trigkas evidence is trash - talks abt how EU-CH getting close to a econ deal triggers tariffs, arg is NU
2. **Delink.** Their ev just looks at US-EU exports and doesn't take into account the increase afterwards. **What the New York Times in 2018** writes is that if the US put a 10% tariff on literally

everything, which is more than they are asking for, because EU companies are adept at forging new markets, the EU would be left unharmed.

   a. This outweighs their case bc it looks at current US tariffs and bc Eu exports would just replace current US creators and EU exports are extremely specialized, the EU economy isn't facing harms in the squo.

3. **Non-unique.** The European Union is already doomed into a recession. The largest economy, Germany, is in a recession, and economists believe a domino effect will cause the EU's economy to fall into an existential crisis. **Ewing of the New York Times** crystallizes this, noting that "that there is little chance that the European Union can thrive when Germany is sickly".
4. **Non-unique**. There are several other events that will force the EU into a recession even if tariffs are not introduced. **Lachman of AEI** finds that both Brexit spillover and Italian sovereign debt are enough to pose an existential threat to the Eurozone.
5. **Non-unique**. Trump already wants to impose tariffs on the EU because he hates the trade deficit with them, which grew by 11% last year. **The SCMP** notes that even after Volkswagen promised to hire 1,000 workers, he moved ahead with plans to consider 25% tariffs, and **Murray of Financial Review** finds that Trump hinted in New Hampshire that the EU will be his next target.
6. Delink. They're miscalculating Trump's approach. CNBC writes that Trump views Car Tariffs as leverage over Europe, and used them to get a deal on Beef. He would never give up this leverage for no benefit in exchange.
7. **Turn. Gerry Brown 18'** finds every time countries have joined the BRI, instead of retaliating with tariffs, the US engages in competitive loaning, with **CSIS** writing that the US passed a 60 billion dollar act to compete with Chinese BRI investments. In practice this increases their aid to that country in an attempt to keep their loyalty. The US responded with competition rather than tariffs is more likely for three reasons.
   a. First, it has historical precedent. We read you evidence in case saying that the United States has historically responded to the BRI by funding infrastructure projects in developing countries in order to counteract Chinese influence, whereas multiple eu countries have joined Chinese BRI projects and banks and we haven't seen any tariffs happen yet.
   b. We also control the incentive structure for the Trump Administration insofar as tariffs nuke the US economy and he wouldn't want to risk political suicide before the election. He would rather check China without hurting his base; he does that through investments.
   c. Political support for actions, not only for supporting his actions insofar as it was bipartisan but also for the general election he needs wide support so an action like tariffs are gonna trigger true conservatives, los his base
8. **Delink.** Canada filling gap. **Freighways writes in 2019** that Canadian exports to EU increases 7%, probably because trade w the US had dec. The EU will always just find others to fill in gap.
9. **Turn.** Time Magazine in 2019 writes that if the Trading Relationship between the EU and the US gets worse the EU would be able to impose a Carbon Tax on the United States in the form of a tariff. This is crucial, as Vox EU in 2019 writes that a carbon tax on outside emissions would reduce nearly 2 billion tonnes of CO2, mitigating climate change heavily and thus linking into the

National Research Council who finds that just a one degree rise will leave 2.5 billion ppl who rely on crop yields to go into poverty.

DONT LET THEM SAY FED TAKES THE FALL

A2: The Fed would take the fall

New York Times columnist Ross Douthat recently argued that President Trump would pay a heavy political price if there were to be a recession in the next 12 months. That's probably correct. But if one sets in, it wouldn't be Trump's fault. In truth, presidents simply don't have much impact on the business cycle. Rather, it is the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, the control of the money supply and interest rates that determine the short-run ups and downs in the economy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/business/europe-us-tariffs-trade-war.html

As part of their study, which appears in the European Central Bank's monthly bulletin, Ms. Gunnella and Ms. Quaglietti also calculated what would happen **if the United States imposed 10 percent tariffs on imports from all countries, and if all of the countries hit by the tariffs retaliated in kind.** The United States economy would suffer the most damage in such a trade war because American products would become more expensive abroad, the central bank economists estimated. China would come out ahead. **In Europe, the damage to business confidence in the hypothetical trade war would largely be canceled out by increases in exports to countries other than the United States. European companies would be able to take market share from their American rivals in China.** There are already signs that **European manufacturers** of factory machinery, construction vehicles and other heavy equipment **are exploiting Mr. Trump's trade war with China.** Industrial machinery is Germany's second-biggest category of exports after cars, and an important sector in countries like the Netherlands and Italy.

In recent years, Chinese companies have become more skilled at producing sophisticated machinery and challenging the dominance of European rivals. But White House tariffs on Chinese products have given **the European companies at least a temporary price advantage.** The central bank's study, which comes as Europe and the United States prepare to begin high-level trade talks, reinforces other research showing that the **tariffs on European goods have, by themselves, not amounted to very much.** They have probably hurt the United States economy more than the intended targets. **One reason is that much of the steel that Europeans sell to the United States is specially formulated for specific uses,** like aircraft parts or oil drilling equipment. American companies cannot find domestic suppliers able to provide the same products, which often contain patented combinations of minerals or other metals. **So they simply wind up paying the tariffs of 10 percent on aluminum and 25 percent on steel and passing the extra cost on to American consumers.**

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1166013/EU-Angela-Merkel-news-Germany-recession-economy-eurozone-France-crisis

Merkel meltdown as **Germany's 'deep' recession to plummet EU into 'existential' crisis GERMANY could force the European Union to face "existential risks"** after latest reports showed the economy of the eurozone giant contract in the second quarter of the year.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/eu-economy-germany-recession.html

There is little chance that the European Union can thrive when Germany is sickly. "If the largest member state is affected," said Katharina Utermöhl, senior economist at the German insurer Allianz, "this will also start to weigh on the euro area as a whole because of the close economic relations."

http://www.aei.org/publication/high-wire-european-risks-u-s-economy-recession/

A more serious, albeit less imminent, **threat to the global economy is the risk of a new Italian sovereign debt crisis that would pose an existential threat to the euro's survival. Italy would be very much more difficult to save** than Greece, given that its economy is around 10 times the size of Greece's. Having the world's third-largest bond market, a serious Italian economic crisis is bound to reach our shores in much the same way as our 2008 Lehman crisis impacted the rest of the world.

scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/2182456/donald-trump-inclined-impose-tariffs-us-auto-imports-senator

US President Donald Trump is likely to move ahead with tariffs on imported vehicles, a move that could prompt the European Union to agree a new trade deal, US Senate finance committee chairman Charles Grassley said on Wednesday. **"I think the president is inclined to do it," the Republican senator said.** "I think Europe [is] very, very concerned about those tariffs ... It may be the instrument that gets Europe to negotiate." **US Commerce Department recommends Trump should impose tariffs of up to 25 per cent on imported cars and parts on national security grounds by mid-February.** A Commerce Department spokeswoman declined to comment.

https://www.afr.com/world/europe/donald-trump-suggests-europe-could-be-his-next-trade-war-target-20190819-p52ief

"The European Union is worse than China, just smaller. It treats us horribly: barriers, tariffs, taxes," he told a crowd Thursday in Manchester, New Hampshire, a city originally modelled after its industrial namesake in England. "They treat us really badly." It's hardly the first time he's gone there with the EU. But Eurostat numbers on Friday didn't help the continent's case with Trump, who sees a ledger with more exports than imports as winning. **The EU's trade surplus with the US stood** at almost 75 billion euros ($123 billion) in the first half of 2019, **up more than 11 per cent from a year earlier.** Germany's surplus is by far the largest in the bloc.

That **Trump isn't softening up his rhetoric on some of the biggest US allies in Europe** is important for a couple of reasons - both coming up fast, and both fuel for more trade war uncertainty. Among them:

http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS72_Building_Bridges_or_Breaking_Bonds--The_Belt_and_Road_Initiative_and_Foreign_Aid_Competition.pdf

The US has two avenues to respond to Chinese BRI flows. First, the US can engage directly via bilateral programs, such as the IDFC. However, Dreher et al. (2018b) have recently argued that the US has incentives to use international organizations to conduct its "dirty work" when using aid strategically. The logic of this behavior is that using these organizations will reduce audience costs in instances where the foreign aid intervention might be viewed unfavorably. As **many of the (potential) BRI countries are those to whom US domestic audiences might not be favorable, international organizations such as multilateral development banks become a useful instrument for countering the BRI.** And **indeed, the US has been shown as the "power behind the throne**" of a number of major multilateral development banks (MDBs), and, accordingly, Western MDBs are often seen as the agent of

https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-passed-whats-next

In sum, we will need to enable a "better offer" than what China puts on the table. With this notion in mind, in the short run, we need a fully functioning U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM). EXIM experienced a "lapse in authority" beginning in 2015, facing a severe shortage of leadership and capacity ever since. EXIM protects against buyer nonpayment, provides financing and export credit insurance, among other functions. U.S. competitors including China and Japan benefit from the strong support of their

Export-Import banks, which reinforces the notion that the United States must make use of all its tools to strengthen U.S. development finance. **The BUILD Act has promised $60 billion in funding for the USIDFC, but it is still a far cry from China's $60 billion pledged to Africa alone at the last Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in September 2018. We can have a better offer than China, and the new USIDFC is part of that better offer.**

https://www.freightwaves.com/news/canada-grows-eu-trade

Trudeau toured the port with European Council President Donald Tusk as part of a trade summit with EU officials that ended Thursday. The cordial summit with Canada's second-largest trading partner contrasted with the prickly relationship with its largest, **the United States, under tariff-prone President Donald Trump.**
Thanks to CETA, exports of goods to the EU increased by 7% in 2018 to CA$44.5 billion. (The Canadian dollar equals 76 cents U.S.) But the boost to the EU was greater — a 9% increase in goods exported to Canada to CA$60 billion.

https://time.com/5582034/carbon-tariff-tax-fee-europe-macron/
The threat in French President Emmanuel Macron's remarks last week was easy to miss. But if he follows through, its effects wouldn't be. More than 40 minutes into a meandering press conference, M**acron reiterated his goal to put fighting climate change at the center of his government's policies as well as those of the European Union, calling for a "carbon tax on borders" for the bloc.** "The success of this transition goes through our European commitment, our capacity to defend at the European level the need to achieve a carbon price," he said, according to a translation. Macron did not get into specifics, but S**uch a measure would likely mean a carbon tax in E.U. member countries coupled with a fee on imports from non-E.U. countries that don't have their own carbon tax** or another form of carbon pricing. There are a variety of ways Macron's policy could be structured, but **it would almost certainly leave U.S. companies vulnerable.** The U.S. is the only country that is not committed to implementing the Paris Agreement, one measure that could be used to determine which countries would face a tax on imports. More than 40 countries, including China, have some national form of carbon pricing, another potential tax determinant. "Putting this forward currently would single out the U.S." says Cécile Toubeau, a director at the European Federation for Transport & Environment, an environmental nonprofit. Leaders like McConnell may be reluctant to bet on the prospect of a hostile move like a European border carbon adjustment. Indeed, most countries have largely avoided dramatic retaliation against Trump's actions, but that doesn't mean they won't in the future. **Thus far such a policy has remained on the back burner as the key countries that could implement such a measure, namely European countries and Canada, have sought to mollify the U.S. and avoid an all-out trade war, but experts say that circumstances could change if relations with the U.S. diminish further.** "What this Administration has done is really eroded the unspoken bond that created multilateralism," says Aaron Cosbey, a development economist at the International Institute for Sustainable Development think tank. "When you erode those you've thrown open the door open for other countries to act similarly. And let's face it: border carbon adjustment is a rejection of multilateralism."

https://voxeu.org/article/why-eu-needs-border-tax-carbon

In a fully specified model (Gros 2009a), I show that indeed **there is a tariff that maximises global welfare** (under the assumption that the home country has a-cap and-trade system but the rest of the world does not). The optimal tariff is approximately equal to the externality in production abroad. Some rough, preliminary calculations suggest that **a carbon tariff by the EU** (or the US) c**ould be much higher than the average most favoured nation tariff rates of the EU** (on average about 3-4%). **Recent calculations** by Weber et al (2008) **suggest that the total CO2 embodied in Chinese 2005 exports was around 1,670 million tonnes of CO2**, or over 30% of all Chinese emissions (in jargon this is the so-called "embodied emissions in exports" measure). This percentage corresponds roughly to the share of exports in the Chinese economy (around 35%). Given total Chinese exports in 2005 of around $760 billion, **this implies an average carbon intensity of a little more than two tonnes of CO2 per $1,000 of exports.** Table 1 in Gros (2009b) provides further evidence on differences in carbon intensities, showing a similar order of magnitude for other countries, such as India and Russia. The final piece of information needed is the domestic carbon price. It is tempting to use the price under the present Emission Trading Scheme (around $20-25 per ton of CO2). However, this price refers only to the present Kyoto regime and cannot serve as a guide to what would result under the post-Kyoto regime. In the post-2012 period, the constraint will be likely to be much tighter. **The Kyoto commitment (of an 8% reduction compared to 1990 levels of emissions) did not represent a**

tight constraint for the EU15, since the industrial collapse of the former East Germany reduced emissions by 3-4% and **the switching of fuel from coal to gas in the UK** (as a result of electricity and gas market liberalisation) **also led to significant reductions.**

A2: FDI Bad (Europe Specific) Aatreya

A2: Rise of Populism in Europe Andrew (done)

1. **Nonunique**: Populism has been on the rise in Europe for decades. Henley of The Guardian writes in 2018, "the number of Europeans voting for populist parties in national votes has surged from 7% to more than 25% [over the past decade]." Overall, of nations in the European Union, 170 million people are under rule by populist governments. Chinese trade influxes will do nothing to change this trend.
2. **Delink**: Many parts of Europe are in desperate need of investment following the debt crisis and major recession. For example, Santora of the New York Times writes in 2019, "the economic benefits of trade with China have been hard to resist." With this in mind, countries like Italy and Greece are desperate for investment, while nations like Germany and France are increasingly open to China's plan.
    a. This means, that there will hardly be any rise of conservative critics because the countries that will be receiving Chinese goods are struggling and looking for a way out, which is the BRI.
3. **Turn**: If the root cause of rising populism is economic struggles, affirming is the solution. Forbes explains in 2017, economic downturns such as inequality and unemployment rates are at the heart of populist movements. Luckily, in the pro world, the Belt and Road Initiative solves for the root causes of the crisis. Look at our case, when we explain that thousands of jobs will be created through the BRI, and the economic boost from the job creation and the growth stimulated by the BRI would reduce any rise of populism.
4. **Turn:** More competition good?
5. **Mitigate:** If anything, the number of populist votes increasing would be minimal, because only a small portion of the population would be hurt by Chinese imports, while the rest are benefitted. For example, business owners are already conservative to maintain their business, and more competition would do nothing to prevent it.

[Analytics]

1. There are so many questions that they need to answer for this argument before you ever feel comfortable
    a. How much of the EU is controlled by the left
    b. How much of a rise in populism will get a right politician elected
    c. How many politicians must get elected to stop cc mitigation
    d. How much more can the EU do to stop climate change

At the end of the day, every legislative decision is binary so we don't really know what a x% increase in populism really means in terms of policy getting passed.

2. We would say there it balances out, sure some workers get displaced by chinese labor but a stronger economy results in less populism so we don't know how much they gain.

Forbes 17 - Populism rising

IESE Business School, Forbes, "Why Populism Is Rising And How To Combat It", Jan 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/iese/2017/01/24/why-populism-is-rising-and-how-to-combat-it/#372d29501d44

What is behind its rise? Economic downturns and the perception of crisis. Economic crises are characterized by inequality and unemployment rates, but also encompass other phenomena like globalization (the perception that foreigners are stealing our jobs), technology (which favors the wealthy and better educated pockets of population) and social welfare cuts, among others. Collective frustration and anxiety. This angst may be summed up as follows: We did everything right, we went to school, worked hard and now we're unemployed. We won't be able to collect retirement benefits and our kids won't come close to doing as well as our generation.

Santora - Desperate for Investment

Marc Santora, NY Times, "China Enlarges Circle", April 12 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/world/europe/china-enlarges-its-circle-in-europe-and-tries-to-convince-europeans-it-comes-in-peace.html

The 16 plus 1 Group was formed after Premier Wen Jiabao's historic visit to Poland in 2012. At the time, many countries in the region felt left out of Brussels' negotiations with China. The grouping was framed by Beijing as an opportunity to give them a greater voice. Skeptics immediately suspected that China had other intentions, **but the economic benefits of trade with China have been hard to resist. That has been so even for Germany and France, which have not formally signed on to Belt and Road, let alone Italy or Greece, which are desperate for investment.** China has already moved ahead with plans to make the Greek port of Piraeus the "dragon head" of its infrastructure push, and it has stepped up investment in Greece, which is still smarting from the austerity measures imposed by its European partners.

Henley - Populism 25%

Jon Henley, The Guardian, "How populism emerged as an electoral force in Europe", Nov 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral-force-in-europe

Now 72, there is not much in politics he has not seen. "Populism of a kind," he said, "has existed for as long as there have been politicians. It wins elections. But there's populism and populism. And some of the 'pure populism' we see now ... it didn't exist here even 10 years ago." At the turn of the century, populism was a blip on the horizon of European politics. Since then, the number of Europeans voting for populist parties in national votes has surged from 7% to more than 25%, according to groundbreaking research by the Guardian. Back in 1998, only two small European countries – Switzerland and Slovakia – had populists in government. Two decades later, another nine countries do. The number of Europeans ruled by a government with at least one populist in cabinet has increased from 12.5 million to 170 million. This has been blamed on everything from recession to migration, social media to globalisation.

China

A2: CH Space Dev

1. **Nonunique:** The biggest issue with this argument is that Europe and China ARE already cooperating. Lague of Reuters explains six years ago, in 2013, that China has launched their technology on European rockets already.
2. **Delink:** There is literally no way China ever uses space technology to gain military advantages, because they know that a space war is more devastating for them and are afraid of their own destruction. The US, acting as a police power, will never let them survive space war. Lambakis of Real Clear Defense corroborates this July, that "over the last few years the United States has taken steps to improve the resiliency of its space systems by adopting [tactics] such as protection, proliferation, and deception." The US's program is simply too large for China to ever stir up tensions anywhere.
3. **Turn:** The space satellite and imaging technology that China created is actually being used for good in space. Specifically, Xinhua explains in 2019 that the Chinese Academy of Sciences recently announced that there will be a Sino-European joint space mission by 2023. The goal of the mission is to study the impact of solar activity and study wind patterns. All of this information is key, because it is being used to evaluate the Earth's environment.
    a. You can implicate this as offense for us, because it demonstrates that China is using their technology for good. These satellite images and GPS systems could help scientists track global warming and combat climate change. For example, Space Daily details in 2019, "[the program] will achieve an overall imaging of large-scale structure of the Earth's space, which plays an important role in predicting and mitigating weather disasters", which are becoming more and more frequent. This is WAY more important than any potential military benefit, because the biggest war the world is fighting is one against climate change.
4. **Mitigate**: Even if, somehow, China gets their technology on European satellites, it isn't as big of a deal as they try to make it out to be. Lague of Reuters evaluates the Chinese technology that they plan to launch on European rockets, and writes in 2013, "[the satellite program] isn't only about national defense [... just] 40 percent of satellite applications would be for military use." The rest, is actually for creating compatible systems through phones and helping car navigation. At most, the system is used to help position ships or troops, never any offensive action.

Lambakis - Space Defense

Steve Lambakis, Real Clear Defense,

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/07/10/thinking_about_space_deterrence_and_china_114569.html

Over the last few years the United States has taken steps to improve the resiliency of its space systems by adopting passive defenses such as disaggregation, distribution, diversification, protection, proliferation, and deception. The United States is not able to respond militarily with agility to destructive space threats, at least not within the space environment, and it is not where it needs to be to have a truly responsive space reconstitution capability. Space deterrence depends on the sum of all U.S. military capabilities, because the United States will never simply fight a “space war.” Rather, it will fight a war that may escalate to involve the space domain. Today U.S. space control capabilities are very limited or at least not very public.[8] This is particularly true with the U.S. ability to incapacitate foreign satellites. Yet one does not need to be able to execute strikes in space in order to hold an adversary’s space assets at risk. There are non-kinetic counter-space means available, such a cyber-attack, as well as operationally available military land-, sea, and air forces to strike at space assets on the ground. Space situational awareness is critical to defensive and offensive counter-space operations and is essential to space deterrence strategy.

Daily - Used for good

Staff, Space Daily, "Sino-European joint space", Mar 2019,

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Sino_European_joint_space_mission_to_send_satellites_in_2023_999.html

Wang Chi, director of National Space Science Center under the CAS, said the SMILE program would create images of interaction between solar winds and the Earth's magnetosphere with innovative X-ray and ultraviolet technologies. It will achieve an overall imaging of large-scale structure of the Earth's space, which plays an important role in predicting and mitigating weather disasters, according to Wang.

Xinhua - Climate Change satellites

Xinhua, Xinhua Net, "Satellites in 2023", March 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/22/c_137915913.htm

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) announced that a Sino-European joint space mission known as SMILE was launched Friday. The Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer is a comprehensive collaboration between the CAS and the European Space Agency (ESA). Satellites will be launched by 2023 to study the impact of solar activity on the Earth's environment.

Lague - 40% Military

David Lague, Reuters, "Satellite Tech Race", December 2013,

https://www.reuters.com/article/breakout-beidou/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-china-hitched-a-ride-from-europe-idUSL4N0JJ0J320131222

Beidou isn’t only about national defense. Beijing sees it as a commercial coup for China’s fast growing market satellite navigation services for cars, mobile phones and other applications. Belgium’s Septentrio and other Western and Chinese companies hope to capitalize by making compatible gear for sale in China and abroad. The Chinese cabinet on Thursday approved a blueprint that envisioned Beidou capturing 60 percent of a projected 400 billion yuan ($65 billion) market for satellite navigation services in China, according to the English language China Daily. But the report also said that 40 percent of Beidou's satellite applications would be for military use.

A2: Fossil Fuels Aatreya

A2: Coal Plant Warrant

1. They'll lose the round on uniqueness. Like they say, renewables are becoming cheap. That's why Financial Times in 2019 writes that countries are literally rejecting Chinese projects in the squo, and that as time goes on, the BRI is going to have to adapt to the reality that renewables are going to become cheaper. China won't be able to send coal plants if the host countries don't accept them.
2. Proctor of the CPC in '18 finds that countries in the developing world have brought on record highs of renewables while at the same time significantly decreasing the amount of coal plants they brought online.
    a. The key implication of this is that the developing world has already made the decision calculus that green tech is more important than coal, they have to prove the incentive as to why they would shift back to coal.
3. Clemente of Forbes '18 finds that US exports of coal to Asia have doubled as they move to sell out our 360 year supply of coal.
    a. This means that even if the BRI collapses the US will still export their coal over to asian countries, and lock them into the cycle of dependency.
    b. In order to win any impact they have to prove a delineation over the coal the US is going to send to these countries and chinese coal.
4. Timper of Carbon Brief in '18 writes that current analysis don't take into account energy market trends, and that in future years China will adapt to the changing realty that renewables are cheaper, by championing renewables, concluding that while China is still investing in coal, they recognize that renewables are going to be the future and thus are increasing their investment in the status quo. This has two implications.
    a. The investment coming in the status quo to renewables is probably being pushed by BRI in the status quo, meaning BRI controls the internal link to pushing greentech.
    b. China wants to be the global leader in green tech, so there's no incentive for China to lock-in countries in coal insofar as it means they'll never buy the green tech china wants them to buy.
5. Mining Global 18' writes that coal demand is expected to stay the same over the next 30 years.
    a. Terminal defense; countries are always going to want coal so the plants are going to be built regardless
6. EU would never allow china to fund coal projects. 2 warrants
    a.
7. Dorcas Grids pre-req to renewables

a. Only RoS for further expansion
b. EIAS 18': Smart grids help efficenize coal meaning that its better in world w bri and smart grids than their world of coal either way

https://www.powermag.com/developing-nations-driving-clean-energy-investment/?pagenum=1

"It's been quite a turnaround. Just a few years ago, some argued that less-developed nations could not, or even should not, expand power generation with zero-carbon sources because these were too expensive," said Dario Traum, BNEF senior associate and Climatescope project manager. "**Today, these countries are leading the charge when it comes to deployment, investment, policy innovation and cost reductions." Developing nations added 114 GW of zero-carbon generating capacity of all types, including 94 GW of wind and solar generating capacity alone, both all-time records, according to the report. Those countries also brought online the smallest amount of new coal-fired generating capacity since at least 2006. The report said new coal generating capacity was at 48 GW, down 38% from 2016 and just less than half the level of new coal builds—97 GW—in 2015, the high-water mark for new coal-fired generation.**

https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2018/10/07/the-u-s-coal-export-boom-to-china/#47870eba3454

Globally, coal is even more alive. "Think the Big Banks Have Abandoned Coal? Think Again." Even a solar magazine admits: "China to add 259 GW of coal capacity, satellite imagery shows." For reference, 259 GW is more than twice the amount of power capacity that mighty Texas has FROM ALL SOURCES. **Now Asia - which accounts for close to 80% of total global coal usage - is increasingly turning to the U.S. to supply coal. We are still the world's third largest coal producer. The U.S. supplies both types, met coal to produce steel and steam coal to produce electricity. "U.S. coal exports increased by 61% in 2017 as exports to Asia more than doubled." The U.S. has a 360-year supply of coal to bolster our expanding export market. The trade war with the U.S. however, could have China looking to expand domestic supply, and the country's coal production caps have been found to be "technically infeasible."**

3: Mitigation: Smart grids permit reduce emissions

Stec 18: Turn: Smart grids permit a better matching of supply and demand such that fewer fossil fuels are burnt because they use sensors and advanced monitoring systems to ensure optimization of resources. Therefore the expansion of coal doesn't impact emissions significantly due to the simultaneous expansion of power grids so they can't access their impacts to global warming.

Grzegorz Stec, May 2018, European Institute For Asian Studies, http://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/EU_Asia_at_a_Glance_Stec_DSR_2018-1.pdf //CC

Finally, the DSR can also play a constructive role in ensuring infrastructure development remains sustainable. **Smart infrastructure uses sensors and advanced monitoring systems to ensure optimization of resources.** For example, **smart grids permit a better matching of supply and demand such that fewer fossil fuels are burnt**. A body named the "Digital Belt and Road" 19 has also been set up to help pioneer the usage of technological solutions to resolve environmental challenges along the Belt and Road. The USD 32 million programme 20 involves experts from 19 countries and 7 international organizations, and sets out to tackle such challenges as water security, natural disaster risks, climate change, and natural heritage protection.

A2: Green Tech

1. Cloete of EC in 2018 finds that mass scale deployment of green tech in the developing world, is extremely harmful as the huge expenses cause a diversion of money away from economic development. In fact, they empirically find that you lose $750 for every ton of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere
   a. Cloete does the weighing for you when he finds that the development tradeoff with green tech actually reduces the ability to create adaptability to climate change through things like better housing, sanitation, medical care, and general productivity. Thus he concludes that even if the C02 is released from more development of the economy it actually reduces climate impacts because it increases adaptability

Thirdly, forced deployment of these capital-heavy technologies at a scale that will actually make a difference will divert unacceptable amounts of capital away from other infrastructure investments capable of stimulating compounding economic development in the developing world. Such **development is critical to increase life expectancy and quality of life,** and impeding this development can have massive humanitarian costs (below). As a quantitative illustration, I previously e**stimated the net cost of this effect at $750/ton of CO2 avoided.** An **important omission from the enormous cost mentioned above is that rapid economic development directly shields people against the effects of climate change. Improved housing, sanitation, utilities, medical care, international trade connections and general productivity will all greatly reduce the impacts of a more hostile climate on the lives of developing world citizens. Ironically therefore, CO2 released to maximize the speed of this massive infrastructure buildout will actually lower the climate impacts experienced by the majority of global citizens.**

A2: Oil/Natural Gas Warrant

A2: Dumping Bad Pranav [needs more]

1. **Baschuk of Bloomberg finds in 2019** that the European Union already has anti-dumping regulations in place to prevent predatory economic practices like the ones that they say China will attempt. Their impact will never manifest.
2. **Arviem** finds that the majority of the goods that China sends over European markets are household products like shoes and socks. The implication here is that A) there are already other foreign suppliers of these goods in the European Union like South Asian companies so the economic detriments are non-unique and B) since the industries that manufacture these household objects don't contribute to a super significant amount of the EU's GDP, the economic shocks won't be that bad.
3. Turn: Chinese Dumping is good. **Greenwood of The Conversation finds in 2017** that EU anti-dumping policies and tariffs on China have only allowed multiple other nations like Iran, Ukraine, and Russia to assume their role and fill in the gap in imports. The implication here is that allowing Chinese dumping is good because it only keeps one player in the region which is a lot easier to regulate than a bunch of smaller countries; better for minimizing volatility.
4. There's some ev that says most of the BRI countries don't even have these industries so its a rlly good thing for these countries

Baschuk '19 - EU has anti-dumping regulations
Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-18/china-is-said-to-lose-market-economy-trade-case-in-eu-u-s-win Accessed 18 July 2019. //TP

The World Trade Organization decided that China didn't automatically qualify for market-economy status in 2016 as Beijing has asserted, according to two people with knowledge of the case, handing a major victory to the European Union and U.S. An interim WTO ruling will allow nations to have more scope to apply duties against low-cost -- or "dumped" -- Chinese products on a case-by-case basis, the two people said, who asked not to be identified because the decision is private. China could still settle the complaint before the judgment is made public. **The dispute already spurred the EU to overhaul its basic anti-dumping regulation in 2017 in order to eliminate the EU's previous presumption that exporters from China operate under non-market conditions. Under the EU's new anti-dumping regime the bloc permits higher anti-dumping duties on exports from countries where domestic prices are considered to be "significantly distorted" by state interference.**

Europe and China make different goods that don't compete with each other
https://translogconnect.eu/uploaded/BLOG/_Silk-Road_Arviem-White-Paper.pdf
https://translogconnect.eu/uploaded/BLOG/_Silk-Road_Arviem-White-Paper.pdf

Goods ferried on the China-Europe rail system

Eastbound Goods	Westbound Goods
Pharmaceuticals, soft drinks and scotch whiskey from the UK	Shoes and socks
Beer from Germany	Mechanical, electrical and chemical products
Ford spare parts	HP, Asus, Acer and Toshiba Laptops, iPads from Foxconn to Germany
Mechanical equipment	Automobile parts from Minsheng Logistics
Food and agricultural produce	Plants to Holland
Belarusian milk	Chongqing laptops destined for Germany
Fashion items	Mechanical and electric equipment, robots
Aircraft	Household products
Powder milk from Poland	Wallets, purses, and suitcases
Volvo cars	
Chemicals from Poland	
BMW, Mercedes and Land Rover cars	

Source: online research of publicly available information

Ian Greenwood, 6-14-2017, "Fact Check: is China dumping steel?," Conversation, http://theconversation.com/fact-check-is-china-dumping-steel-76916

This trend, replicated to differing degrees worldwide, has led to accusations in the US and elsewhere that China is selling its steel at a loss, or more accurately in this case, keeping costs artificially low so that other producers cannot compete, in a practice widely known as "dumping". **In the EU, tariffs have dented Chinese imports but it's a bit like plugging one leak only to find another. Chinese imports are replaced by products from places like Iran, Russia and Ukraine. Imports from Iran have increased almost tenfold since 2012.** The EU has numerous trade defence measures on other nations, and not just on a range of Chinese steel products. In the UK, imports are also on the up. According to UK trade association UK Steel, imports accounted for 60% of UK demand in 2015, up from 57% in 2012. Chinese steel imports accounted for 11% of 2015 UK steel demand, up from 2% in 2011. UK imports from the EU remain twice as high as from the rest of the world, but no one can escape downward pricing pressure from such a huge player.

WTO ruled China didn't qualify for market-econ status

Baschuk '19 - WTO already ruled against China, EU has anti-dumping regulations

Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-18/china-is-said-to-lose-market-economy-trade-case-in-eu-u-s-win Accessed 18 July 2019. //TP

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A2: CH funds Russia Arctic Kevin (DONE)

A2: General

1. **[Disad]** Power Grids.
2. **[Disad]** IoT.
3. **[Fattest impact turn EVER]** If we continue the status quo, methane hydrates, or large blocks of natural gas located underneath the Arctic will be destabilized due to rising temperatures. In fact, **Carana 13'** explains that if nothing is done, the natural release of methane from these methane hydrates will increase global temperatures by 10 degrees Celsius by 2040. Fortunately, if Russia extracts natural gas from these hydrates before they destabilize and leak naturally into the air, we can prevent this disaster. **Light 12'** explains that extraction of these hydrates can successfully depressurize them, stopping methane leaks. Empirically, **Schofield '12** notes that the U.S. was able to successfully extract a hydrate structure off the North Slope of Alaska.
    a. Thus, it is a TRY or DIE for the affirmative. Absent change, extinction is inevitable.
    b. This turn outweighs their case in 2 ways
        i. **Probability**. Companies are transitioning away from oil to natural gas in the squo. They would choose to drill for gas. **3 Warrants:**
            1. Mcfarlane of the Wall Street Journal explains that: Governments are seeking to reduce pollution by burning cleaner fuels. Natural gas plants emit ½ the CO_2 of oil ones making it the perfect investment.
            2. Demand is shifting. Mcfarlane continues, while the demand for oil is expected to stop within the next decade, she explains that natural gas will rise by 2% by 2040.
            3. Gas in the arctic is more profitable.
        ii. **Urgency**. Because the ice is melting, companies will be able to mine in the arctic making their case functionally non unique in the long term. However, if nothing is done about methane we will go extinct.
4. **[Non-unique]** Russia has already begun drilling. **Aleson of Arctic Today** explains that on June 13, Russia began drilling in an oil field with billions of barrels worth of oil. This has 2 implications
    a. Proves that Russia has already obtained the funding it needs.
    b. Russia can become self-reliant; so long as they are able to make significant economic gains by selling the oil, they can use that revenue and but it put into new projects.

5. **[Non-unique]** Even if Russia cannot fund development, it would just sign deals with foreign companies to grant them access to the Arctic. Empirically, **Atkins of the Arctic Institute** explains that Russia has expressed its willingness to collaborate with other states in energy extraction, as shown through its deal with Exxon Mobile back in 2013. Thus, drilling will happen regardless of whether or not Russia obtains the funding.
6. **[Severe Mitigation (Also just fucking absolutely and utterly true]** My opponents way oversimplify what is going on in the Arctic. __ explains that while the Arctic could offer some potential economic gains, the Arctic is no where close to China's top foreign policy priorities. This is why he concludes that despite decades of cooperation, China has only successfully sponsored 1 project. Beyond that, ___ explains that China also hates working with Russia bilaterally because of institutional barriers like x,y,z. Even if China has money, it is extremely unlikely they would put any large quantity in Arctic development.

CT, Sarah **Mcfarlane**, 8-9-2018, "Big Oil's bet on Natural Gas is a Slow Burn", **Wall Street Journal**, https://outline.com/GherAz

The case for gas also becomes more difficult, at least in the short term, when oil prices are high as they are again today, though **oil companies invest on a long-term horizon. Yet big oil has little choice but to double down on gas.** Companies have discovered fewer large new oil deposits than natural gas opportunities over the past decade. And **governments,** including China and many in Europe, **are seeking to reduce pollution by burning cleaner fuels for transport and electricity. A new natural-gas power plant emits around half as much carbon dioxide as a new coal or fuel-oil plant. Rising global demand also makes a compelling case for natural-gas investment. Oil consumption is expected to rise by just 0.5% a year out to 2040**, according to Wood Mackenzie, a substantial slowdown from previous decades. **Some forecasts anticipate demand will stop growing altogether within the next decade. Natural gas consumption, though, is expected to rise to 24% of the world's energy mix by 2040, from 22% in 2016**, according to the International Energy Agency. LNG's share of that market is set to rise to almost 40% in 2023, from around a third in 2017, the IEA forecast. "It's all a balancing act," said Brian Youngberg, senior energy analyst at brokerage Edward Jones. "At the end of the day, oil is the most profitable product they produce, but demand is going to slow so you need to start managing that transition." At the same time, oil companies are eyeing efforts to curb global warming that could make lower-carbon natural gas more competitive. Policies like a substantial price on carbon "moves the dial on gas," Mr. Wærness said. By 2025, both Shell and BP PLC will be producing more gas than oil. French oil giant Total SA's production is already a near 50-50 split. Exxon Mobil Corp. is also planning significant new investments in LNG. The companies are selling the shift as a smart strategic bet on a growing market. **"The good news is that the natural gas market will continue to grow, and this explains why we are aggressive, offensive and expanding,"** Total CEO Patrick Pouyanné told investors last month. "On the contrary, the oil market will stabilize and even decline." Investors have embraced the strategy, with some reservations. While big gas projects generate lower returns, they are profitable and provide much more stable long-term cash flow than most oil developments—very attractive characteristics for shareholders who want to know their dividends are secure. And internal rate of return is just one way to gauge attractiveness. Many big gas projects offer additional opportunities for profit-generation through trading and business integration. The n**atural-gas projects provide "very stable and consistent cash flow and this is something oil-and-gas companies have never really ha**d, and what has made them so cyclical," said Richard Hulf, a manager of the Global Energy Fund at Artemis Fund Managers. Companies are continuing to make significant oil investments, providing a balance to higher risk, higher reward projects that many investors like. Yet the dash for gas highlights broader risks for the sector in an age of lower-carbon energy and an eventual shift away from fossil fuels altogether to more renewable energy.

Carana 13'

http://www.evolveandascend.com/2016/01/02/the-most-important-essay-youll-ever-read-about-climate-change/

The importance of methane cannot be overstated. Increasingly, **evidence points to a methane burst underlying the Great Dying associated with the end-Permian extinction event**, as pointed out in the 31 March 2014 issue of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. As Malcolm Light reported on 14 July 2014: **"There are such massive reserves of methane in the subsea Arctic methane hydrates, that if only a few percent of them are released, they will lead to a jump in the average temperature of the Earth's atmosphere of 10 degrees C** and produce a 'Permian' style major extinction event which will kill us all. Apparently a 5 C rise in global-average temperature was responsible for the Great Dying, according to Michael Benton's book on the topic. In that case, the rise is temperature requires tens of thousands of years. **About 250 plumes of methane hydrates are escaping from the shallow Arctic seabed, likely as a result of a regional 1 C rise in temperature,** as reported in the 6 August 2009 issue of Geophysical Research Letters. **Methane bubbling out the Arctic Ocean**is further elucidated in Science in March 2010. As described in a subsequent paper in the June 2010 issue of Geophysical Research Letters, **a minor increase in temperature would cause the release of upwards of 16,000 metric tons of methane each year.** Storms accelerate the release, according to research published in the 24 November 2013 issue of Nature Geoscience The latter paper also concludes the East Siberian Arctic Shelf is venting at least 17 teragrams of the methane into the atmosphere each year, up from 0.5 teragrams just 7 years earlier (a teragram is equal to 1 million tons). According to NASA's CARVE project, these plumes were up to 150 kilometers across as of mid-July 2013. **Global-average temperature is expected to rise by more than 4 C by 2030 and 10 C by 2040 based solely on methane release from the Arctic Ocean, according to Sam Carana's research** (see especially Image 24).

Light 12'

http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2012/08/charting-mankinds-expressway-to-extinction.html

If left alone the subsea Arctic methane hydrates will explosively destabilize on their own due to global warming and produce a massive Arctic wide methane "blowout" that will lead to humanity's total extinction, probably before the middle of this century (Light 2012 a, b and c). AIRS atmospheric methane concentration data between 2008 and 2012 (Yurganov 2012) show that the Arctic has already entered the early stages of a subsea methane "blowout" so we need to step in as soon as we can (e.g. 2015) to prevent it escalating any further (Light 2012c). The Arctic Natural Gas Extraction, Liquefaction & Sales (ANGELS**) Proposal aims to reduce the threat of large, abrupt releases of methane in the Arctic, by extracting methane from Arctic methane hydrates prone to destabilization** (Light, 2012c). **After the Arctic sea ice has gone (probably around 2015) we propose that a large consortium of oil and gas companies/governments set up drilling platforms** near the regions of maximum subsea methane emissions **and drill** a whole series of shallow directional **production drill holes into the subsea subpermafrost "free methane" reservoir in order to depressurize it in a controlled manner** (Light 2012c). **This methane will be produced to the surface, liquefied, stored and transported on LNG tankers as a "green energy" source to all nations, totally replacing oil and coal as the major energy source . Unless immediate and concerted action is taken by governments and oil companies to depressurize the Arctic subsea methane reserves by extracting the methane, liquefying it and selling it as a green house gas energy source, rising sea levels will breach the Thames Barrier by 2029 flooding London.** The base of the Washington Monument (D.C.) will be inundated by 2031. Total global deglaciation will finally cause the sea level to rise up the lower 35% of the Washington Monument by 2051 (68.3 m or 224 feet above present sea level).

Schofield 12'

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Schofield-final.pdf

Gas hydrates offer an abundant potential energy resource, moreover, one that offers considerable merits as an alternative to "traditional" energy carriers.50 However, significant technical obstacles exist to the exploitation of gas hydrates, leading them to be generally considered the most difficult and expensive of all unconventional gas resources to recover.51 **It has also been suggested that as methane has between 10 and 22 times more impact than carbon dioxide in causing climate warming, the uncontrolled release of methane from gas hydrate structures (for instance from Arctic regions as a consequence of global warming) poses considerable environmental risks.**52 **Despite these challenges, there has been considerable interest in the development of gas hydrates** in recent years leading to efforts to overcome the technical issues associated with their commercial recovery. For example, **in May 2012 natural gas was successfully extracted from a methane hydrate structure located on the North Slope of Alaska and replaced with a mixture of carbon dioxide and nitrogen**.53 While this represented a small-scale "proof of concept" experiment, **it nonetheless suggests that the exploitation of gas hydrate resources may not be as far out of reach as has until recently generally been thought**. Should these or similar efforts prove to be successful, the hydrates located within national jurisdiction, both within and beyond the 200nm limit are likely to be a focus for future exploration efforts.

Atkins 18'

https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-strategy-energy-extraction-part-three/

One planned energy project involved American energy giant ExxonMobil's plan to partner with Rosneft to develop oil and gas fields in Russia and North America. In 2012, Rex Tillerson and Igor Sechin, the then chief executive officers of ExxonMobil and Rosneft respectively, signed a deal that was worth $500 billion. **The deal would have granted ExxonMobil access to the Russian Arctic** with exemption from export duties and property tax. It would have been one of the biggest energy extraction projects in history before the sanctions put the deal to a halt.13) After Rex Tillerson was appointed Secretary of State, there was speculation that the new US administration would reinstate the deal or reduce sanctions. However, **in April 2017 the US Treasury decided to not grant a waiver to ExxonMobil after they requested permission to drill in the Russian Arcti**c.14) **The attempted deal was nonetheless an indication of Russia's openness to cooperating with other states in energy extraction.**

A2: Oil

1. **[Delink]** The Arctic oil won't be profitable. In fact, **Eurasia 18'** explains that even when oil prices reached 110$ dollars, Arctic oil was still unprofitable. Prices will never go near that value for 2 reasons.
    a. First, there is too much supply. **Slojin 2017** explains that the supply of recoverable oil is so high that oil prices will never settle on an equilibrium price above 100 dollars. Thus, drilling will never happen.
    b. Second, demand is declining. **The World Bank** explains that oil demand will plateau as alternative sources of energy are becoming cheaper. They thus conclude that oil prices are not expected to rise in the future and will only be 70$ by 2030. Thus, if Russia doesn't drill now, they will never drill.

Eurasia 18'

https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/02/22/what-has-frozen-russian-projects-in-the-arctic-sanctions-or-oil-prices

"Have the sanctions stopped the work in the Arctic? I would say that this is a big exaggeration. The only operating Prirazlomnoye field was put into operation before the sanctions, and work is still continuing on it. **At the time of imposing the sanctions, seismic survey operations were carried out on the rest of the projects, and even then, even at $ 110 per barrel of oil, they were unprofitable for the development,"** senior analyst of the National Energy Security Fund Igor Yushkov said. "The idea was that oil prices would rise to $120-130 within 70 years, and the development of technologies would reduce the cost price. When oil prices fell to $40, there was no question of active development of the Arctic at all. Now the companies, if they even do the work, but minimal, and only within the framework of the existing license agreements. No wonder they asked the Ministry of Natural Resources to postpone active work for a later period."

Slojin 2017

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-oil-prices-will-never-return-to-100-a-barrel-in-one-chart-2017-02-22

Why oil prices will never return to $100 a barrel, in one chart. A persistent global glut of oil that has dogged markets for around two years may never truly subside, says one industry expert. According to Spencer Dale, chief economist at oil giant BP PLC UK:BP BP, -1.26% the global oil market suffers from an abundance of oil that's going to add pressure on the industry for decades. **As this chart shows, BP estimates that there are about 2.5 trillion barrels of technically recoverable oil resources left in the world, enough to cover the world's entire oil demand out to 2050—twice.**

The World Bank

https://www.livemint.com/opinion/columns/opinion-a-deal-that-shows-the-end-of-an-oil-and-gas-super-cycle-1565802761097.html

Since then, though, oil prices have dropped off sharply and, despite recent correction, are not expected to rise. According to World Bank projections, **benchmark oil prices will be around $70 per barrel in 2030, as energy demand now begins to find alternative sources, rendering fresh investments in traditional sources such as coal, gas and petroleum unattractive.** Oil experts haven't missed the true import of the alarming decline in vehicle sales, a trend that first showed up on the books of auto companies nearly two years ago. Sales of passenger vehicles in India crashed by 31% this July, while those of commercial vehicles crashed by 26%. Overall auto sales during the month slumped 19% over July last year. This has obvious implications for fuel demand. **Vehicle fuels account for around half of all oil-product demand**. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Bloomberg's primary research service, "electrification of passenger cars and increased uptake of alternative drive-train technologies for commercial vehicles (such as liquefied natural gas and hydrogen) poses a risk to the demand outlook for gasoline and diesel. **We expect this trend to have a growing impact on refined product demand over the next 10-20 years, forcing refiners to reduce fuel yields." Global oil demand for passenger vehicles is expected to plateau over the next five years with demand for oil consumed for transportation already waning in certain markets and market segments** Thus, **electric buses are rapidly replacing traditional vehicles** in countries like China, and the tipping point for electric vehicles may not be too far. When it comes, the fall for petrol vehicles will be precipitous.

A2: Natural Gas

1. **[Non-unique]** China is funding Arctic drilling without anyone's help. **Rosen of the National Interest** explains that in June 2019, China signed over 20 billion dollars in loans to help fund

things like energy in Russia. In fact, **[Rosen]** furthers that the success of the Yamal LNG ensures that China will continue financing gas in the Arctic for the foreseeable future.

2. **[Non-unique]** Other countries will fund development. **Nikki of Asian Review** explains that Japan, Saudi Arabia, and even Italy plan on funding future projects.
3. **[Non-unique]** Due to severe disagreements on conditionality and profitability, **Klimenko 17'** explains that even if funding for the project exists, the 2nd planned gas project after Yamal is likely to stay on paper for 10-15 more years. By then, US sanctions on Russia will probably be lifted, especially once Trump gets out of office. Thus, Russia will be able to drill either way.

Rosen of the National Interest

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-china-freeze-america-out-arctic-73511

Analysts are also increasingly leery of the much increased economic and political cooperation between Russia and China in Arctic development because it helps further drive a wedge between the United States and Russia; the two Arctic countries with the largest reserves of oil and gas. **The success of the jointly owned Yamal LNG project (which assures China a reliable supply of natural gas)** is an example of how increased Chinese investment in Russian oil companies **appears to be paying off for both sides** (since Russia needs inbound capital and China needs raw materials/energy). **This bilateral economic activity is almost certain to continue given that 20 percent of Russia's GDP is derived from Arctic economic activity and China has ongoing needs for energy and raw materials that can move by sea.** The Arctic is a growing market for bilateral economic activity but worldwide trade is growing rapidly between Russia and China. **In June 2019, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed deals valued at US $20 billion in various sectors including nuclear power, hi-technology, e-commerce, 5G communications, etc.** This came on the heels of a more than 20 percent increase in bilateral trade in 2018 and projections by **the Chinese Commerce Ministry assert that bilateral trade will increase to over US $200 billion per year. A large portion of that increase will almost certainly involve Arctic natural resources.**

Nikki of Asian Review

https://outline.com/hnMT8C

Russia's push for Japanese participation in an Arctic energy project comes as the world's largest natural gas exporter, faced with the rise of the U.S. as a rival, looks to Asia to diversify. Russian gas company Novatek's Arctic-2 liquefied natural gas project is located on the Yamal Peninsula, where conditions are remarkably harsh even for the natural gas industry, which is known for plopping down work sites in jungles and deserts. The peninsula, whose name means "end of the land" in the indigenous Nenets language, boasts rich gas reserves. But with temperatures approaching minus 60 C at times, extracting it requires dealing with permafrost, and icebreaker ships are needed to transport it. **Novatek's first project there began operating in 2017. The company has asked Japanese trading houses Mitsubishi Corp. and Mitsui & Co. to participate in the second -- something the Japanese government has welcomed as an opportunity to encourage progress on a long-running territorial dispute with Moscow.** Complicating matters further is Russia's relationship with Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter of crude oil, which has also been hit by the shale revolution. **Moscow and Riyadh have teamed up to oppose rising shale oil production and to cut output in an effort to stabilize prices. Their cooperation may not stop there. Saudi Arabia is looking to become an international energy player, focusing initially on building a "global gas" business**, Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih told The Financial Times. **The Russian Arctic-2 project is a potential candidate for this effort, and al-Falih has indicated that Riyadh is interested in buying a 30% interest from Novatek.**

Italy Interested in Yamal-2

https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-novatek-lng-saipem/italys-saipem-to-sign-deal-this-week-for-russian-lng-work-sources-idUSL8N1YN253

This week, Novatek issued tenders to build an airport for Arctic LNG 2 and to recruit its personnel. **Two sources close to the talks said Saipem and Novatek planned to sign a firm deal in Italy this week for the construction of gravity-based structure (GBS) platforms that will stand on the seabed to support the LNG processing units.** One of the sources said **Italian export credit agency SACE planned to issue guarantees to support development of the Arctic LNG 2 project. The Saipem-Novatek deal had an estimated value of about 2.5 billion euros ($2.9 billion), the source said.**

Kleminco 17'

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/emerging-chinese-russian-cooperation-arctic.pdf

Despite this impressive track record of cooperation on Yamal LNG, two things need to be mentioned. First, Novatek had serious difficulties in securing Chinese finance for the project. The deal was concluded only after numerous delays and negotiation. This shows that**, despite the fact that China is interested in energy projects in the Arctic and Russia is eager to obtain Chinese partnerships, there are a lot of difficulties ahead. Chinese companies will work on projects that they are interested in only under conditions that they find acceptable.** 134 Thus, Russia is no longer a gatekeeper for the Chinese; it has to offer good conditions to actually attract the Chinese and develop Russian–Chinese energy cooperation. Facing sanctions and increasing international isolation, Russia has needed to prove that it had technological and investment alternatives for Russian oil and gas companies. One of the immediate results of this has been the final conclusion of the gas deal. **In May 2014 Gazprom and the CNPC signed a 30-year contract for the supply of natural gas on the eastern route through the Power of Siberia pipeline**. As reported by Gazprom, delivery can begin in 2018 at an amount of 5 billion cubic metres per year, and will later be brought up to 38 billion cubic metres per year. The contract is estimated to be worth $400 billion. The Power of Siberia pipeline is planned to be built within four to six years. In November 2014 Gazprom and the CNPC signed a framework agreement on delivery through the western route via the Altai pipeline of 30 billion cubic metres of gas per year, with a potential increase up to 100 billion cubic metres.112 **However, this relatively optimistic breakthrough soon revealed significant challenges ahead. Despite the flamboyant signing of the second gas deal, there is still no progress on finalizing it, and the project will very likely remain on paper for another 10 to 15 years.** In addition, there are reported construction delays on the Power of Siberia pipeline, the launch of which has been postponed by at least two years.113 The question remains to what extent the gas deal is even profitable to either side in the aftermath of the fall in energy prices.114 **It has also been observed that Chinese companies have not invested in Russian upstream gas projects.115**

A2: EU will fund Arctic

1. **[Delink]** The EU literally has sanctions on Russian Arctic drilling. **Wemer 19'** explains that despite economic harms, EU countries understood the importance of countering Russian aggression. Thus, they wouldn't sponsor development even if you affirm.
2. **[Delink]** The EU can't even legally give loans. **Ambrose of the Guardian** explains that the European Investment Bank will end all loans for gas and oil by 2020.
3. **[Delink]** The EU is shifting its dependence on Russia oil to the US. **Elliot of CNBC** explains that the EU is beginning to import more and more US natural gas in order to wane off its dependence on Russia. Thus, the EU will not fund additional natural gas projects with Russia.
4. **[Delink]** A2: Funding

Wemer 19'

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congressional-russia-sanction-push-needs-to-maximize-cooperation-with-allies

Vicini worries that certain provisions could have "unintended consequences" for European companies. She offered the example of the US sanctions on Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and his aluminum company RUSAL, which "threatened to wipe out the whole aluminum sector in Europe" before the US Treasury Department lifted the sanctions against RUSAL and its holding company EN+ in January. **Fried explained that the commitment of European Union member states to maintain sanctions with the United States immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine "is why the sanctions were actually strong." The economic effects for Europe were real,** Vicini added, as European trade with Russia has dropped by nearly 50 percent since 2014. Despite the cost, Fried said, "the European countries most exposed to Russia and most vulnerable to unintended impact of sanctions on their own economies**—the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland—took great hits and they were also staunch in maintaining sanctions. They didn't ask for special breaks." These countries endured this,** he added, **"because they thought the overall effort was important. It is important to resist Kremlin aggression."**

Ambrose of the Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/26/eib-plans-to-cut-all-funding-for-fossil-fuel-projects-by-2020

The European Investment Bank has vowed to end its multibillion euro financing for fossil fuel projects by the end of next year in order to align its strategy with climate targets. **The EU's lending arm has drafted plans, seen by the Guardian, which propose cutting support for energy infrastructure projects which rely on oil, gas or coal by barring companies from applying for loans beyond the end of 2020.** The EIB said its focus on long-term investments means that it must align with the Paris Agreement which aims to cap global heating at 1.5C above 1990 levels by cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Sign up to the Green Light email to get the planet's most important stories Read more "This transition will be profound. Solidarity is required to ensure that potentially vulnerable groups or regions are supported," the EIB report said. The lender said it will set up an energy transitions fund to support projects which help EU member states to transition to a cleaner economy. In the past the EIB has funded fossil fuel projects including the Trans Adriatic gas pipeline and oil storage facilities in Cyprus.

Elliot of CNBC

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/08/russia-and-the-us-battling-over-europes-gas-market.html

With 28 countries and a combined population of around 512 million people, the European Union is something of a prized market — and political battleground — for the world's largest energy exporters, particularly when it comes to natural gas. **Russia has long been the dominant source and supplier of natural gas to Europe's mass market but the U.S. is looking to challenge Russia by stepping up its imports of U.S. liquefied natural ga**s (LNG) — gas which is super-cooled to liquid form — making it easier and safer to store and transport. **Europe certainly appears keen to wean itself off Russian gas, and all the geopolitical implications that reliance entails, while making overtures to the U.S.** Last July, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and **President Donald Trump agreed to strengthen U.S.-EU strategic cooperation with respect to energy and the EU said it would import more LNG from the U.S. "to diversify and render its energy supply more secure." Twenty-four percent of U.S. LNG went to the EU in October 2018**, a month which saw the largest volume ever of EU-U.S. trade in LNG of almost 0.6 billion cubic meters. In the whole of 2017, only 10 percent of U.S. LNG exports went to the EU. The Commission, the EU's executive arm, **expects U.S. gas exports to the region could double by 2022** and has vaunted the construction of LNG terminals across Europe.

A2: BRI is a framework for cooperation, enables tech transfers

1. **[Non-unique]** The BRI is unnecessary. The EU can already operate under the framework of the Arctic Council, which includes Russia and China.
2. **[Non-unique]** **Liu 18'** explains that Nordic countries and every finland are already able to cooperate with China regarding the Arctic through the AIIB.
3. **[Non-unique]** Even if the EU gives tech transfers, China is already developing its own technology. **Eurasia 18'** explains that Chinese drilling tech could be as good as western tech in the next 5 years.
4. **[Delink]** The EU literally has sanctions on Russian Arctic drilling. **Wemer 19'** explains that despite economic harms, EU countries understood the importance of countering Russian aggression. Thus, they wouldn't use the BRI as a framework even if you affirm.
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Liu 18'

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/reel.12238

Furthermore, **Nordic countries have also expressed interest in cooperating with China in the Arctic.** For example, in 2013 the **China–Nordic Research Center (CNARC) was established in Shanghai by four Chinese and six Nordic institutes, which all have substantial capacities to conduct Arctic research.**51 **Although Nordic countries are not included in the BRI geographically, they are members of the AIIB, as mentioned above. They are therefore able to collaborate with China's BRI through this platform.** For example, **Finland and China agreed that the two countries will intensify economic and technological cooperation in the fields of Arctic marine industry, Arctic geology, marine and polar research (including polar weather and sea ice monitoring and forecast), environmental protection technology, shipping and maritime safety, including vessel monitoring and reporting,** information technology and tourism.52 After the normalization of bilateral relations between Norway and China,53 **it is expected that the two countries' Arctic cooperation will grow significantly as well.54**

Eurasia 18'

https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/02/22/what-has-frozen-russian-projects-in-the-arctic-sanctions-or-oil-prices

"Have the sanctions stopped the work in the Arctic? I would say that this is a big exaggeration. The only operating Prirazlomnoye field was put into operation before the sanctions, and work is still continuing on it. At the time of imposing the sanctions, seismic survey operations were carried out on the rest of the projects, and even then, even at $ 110 per barrel of oil, they were unprofitable for the development," senior analyst of the National Energy Security Fund Igor Yushkov said. "The idea was that oil prices would rise to $120-130 within 70 years, and the development of technologies would reduce the cost price. When oil prices fell to $40, there was no question of active development of the Arctic at all. Now the companies, if they even do the work, but minimal, and only within the framework of the existing license agreements. No wonder they asked the Ministry of Natural Resources to postpone active work for a later period." The expert believes that the low oil prices have suspended the work of Russian companies in the Arctic. "As for technology, equipment manufacturing and respective competencies are rapidly spreading around the world. **Yes, indeed, Norwegian technologies are unrivaled all over the world, (by the way Norway is not part of the EU), but the Chinese are catching up with them. An example is a Chinese drill rig for Rosneft and Statoil in the Sea of Okhotsk. And in five-year time, it is quite possible that they will be able to compete quite freely with the West," said the expert.**

Wemer 19'

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/congressional-russia-sanction-push-needs-to-maximize-cooperation-with-allies

Vicini worries that certain provisions could have "unintended consequences" for European companies. She offered the example of the US sanctions on Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and his aluminum company RUSAL, which "threatened to wipe out the whole aluminum sector in Europe" before the US Treasury Department lifted the sanctions against RUSAL and its holding company EN+ in January. **Fried explained that the commitment of European Union member states to maintain sanctions with the United States immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine "is why the sanctions were actually strong." The economic effects for Europe were real,** Vicini added, as European trade with Russia has dropped by nearly 50 percent since 2014. Despite the cost, Fried said, "the European countries most exposed to Russia and most vulnerable to unintended impact of sanctions on their own economies**—the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland—took great hits and they were also staunch in maintaining sanctions. They didn't ask for special breaks." These countries endured this,** he added, **"because they thought the overall effort was important. It is important to resist Kremlin aggression."**

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A2: Chinese investors don't invest because scared of repercussions

1. **[???]** Draw huge question marks here. There is literally no explanation of what repercussions Chinese private banks fear. Don't let them give examples of repercussions later in round, it should have been in case.
2. **[Non-unique]** Call the evidence. It is specific to how China is scared of working with Russia on drilling because the EU has sanctions on Russian drilling. Thing is, it's not like affirming will lift Russian sanctions which means that any fear from investors will still exist.
3. **[Delink]** France literally worked on a Russian Arctic project with China through a loophole in EU sanctions on Russia and there were absolutely 0 repercussions. This means investors know there won't be any backlash as evidenced by France's cooperation.

A2: Oil Spills

1. [Terminal Mitigation] Due to better technology and more awareness, **Edwardson 18'** explains that even under the assumption of Arctic projects operating at full capacity, there will be exactly 1 single oil spill over the 80 years. Their impact is so miniscule.
    a. Also, the study classifies a 'major oil spill' as a 1000 barrels of oil. That is really nothing in terms of scope.
2. [Turn] The terminal impact of oil spills is hurting indegenious communities. However, **Edwardson 18'** actually explains that in places like Alaska, 90% of all revenue for government programs that help protect the people are funded by selling oil.

Edwardson 18'

https://www.frontiersman.com/opinions/arctic-oil-drilling-vital-to-survival-of-alaska-s-indigenous/article_c0f88d22-8dda-11e6-a101-1ff7870591f0.html

Alaska relies on the oil and gas industry for nearly 90 percent of its unrestricted revenue. Directly inland of the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, the North Slope Borough is almost entirely reliant upon oil and gas taxation to provide essential services to its rural communities. With critically low throughput into the trans-Alaska pipeline system, declining onshore production and low oil prices, the state is suffering from a multi-billion dollar budget deficit that has led to substantial layoffs across the state. Should the Obama administration decide to remove all or part of the Arctic from the next five-year oil and gas leasing plan, it would mean there would be no prospect of even exploring for offshore reserves until at least 2023 and, with long lead times, production could be delayed until the 2030s or beyond. This reality threatens not only the economic well being of Alaska, but also the sustainability of our Arctic communities, the Native The environmental activists argue that the industry cannot operate safely in Arctic waters. To drive home the point, The Wilderness Society and other ENGO's claim that "**a supplemental environmental impact statement for one Arctic Ocean sale estimated that there is a 75 percent chance of one** or more major **spills.**" The government agency they cite is the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and **this is what they actually found.Using a hypothetical scenario involving eight platforms and more than 500 wells producing 4.3 billion barrels of oil over the course of 77 years – the most likely number of spills is one. While the effects of an oil spill in the Arctic should not be minimized, this is hardly the doom and gloom picture offshore opponents are painting.**

A2: C02 Emissions

1. Call the evidence. Absolutely terrible. It explains that if we were to burn every single last drop of Arctic oil, then we would see a 10% increase in C02 emissions. 2 implications
    a. **Their impact takes so long to happen.** To contextualize, Russia right now, given all its hundreds of oil projects, only produces 4 billion barrels of oil per year. Even if we were to suddenly assume that Russia would be able to extract **4 billion barrels annually**, which is completely unrealistic, from the Arctic, it would still take over 22 years for their full impact to be realized. The reason why this is important is that we give you multiple reasons why Arctic drilling will be replaced by green tech in the long term which means it's unlikely that Russia will get even close to burning all of the oil in the Arctic.
    b. **Cordia University** explains that releasing a trillion tonnes of C02 results in a 1.7 celsius degree rise in temperatures. To put it into perspective, a 10% increase in C02 is equal to 3 billion tonnes of C02. This a huge mitigation on their impact because it means they only link into a tiny tiny fraction of their impact.
2. Not specific to Arctic oil. It's just about oil production in general. If the money doesn't go to Russia, it'll probably end up funding some other oil production

4 billion barrels annually
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-oil-output/russian-oil-output-reaches-record-high-in-2018-idUSKCN1OW0NJ
MOSCOW (Reuters) - **Russian oil production rose to a post-Soviet record high of 11.16 million barrels per day (bpd) last year on an annual average basis**, data from its energy ministry showed on Wednesday.

Cordia University
https://phys.org/news/2016-01-temperature-co2-emissions.html
Globally, the researchers saw an average temperature increase of 1.7 ±0.4°C per trillion tonnes of carbon in CO_2 emissions (TtC), which is consistent with reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. But the scientists went beyond these globally averaged temperature rises, to calculate climate change at a local scale. At a glance, here are the average increases per trillion tonnes of carbon that we emit, separated geographically:

A2: Methane Leaks

1. Tech is solving back. In fact, **Process Magazine** quantifies that new technology has helped reduce methane leaks during natural gas extraction by over 97%.

Process Magazine
https://www.processingmagazine.com/methane-capturing-equipment-at-drilling-sites-cuts-emissions-by-97/
METHANE-CAPTURING EQUIPMENT AT DRILLING SITES CUTS EMISSIONS BY 97% The U.S. oil and gas industry has made significant progress in reducing the amounts of methane leaking from natural gas wells into the atmosphere, a new study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, has revealed. A **team of researchers examined 190 drilling sites and concluded that methane-capturing equipment,** used on fracking sites, **has reduced methane releases by 97 percent compared with 2011 levels**, based on estimates from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However, the

researchers at the University of Texas at Austin's Cockrell School of Engineering also warned drilling companies that methane leaks from valve controllers and other equipment are larger than previously thought.

A2: Black Carbon/Methane

1. [Delink] **Ghosal of the Atlantic** explains that China agreed not to break the ice in the Arctic
2. [Delink] **Euronews 18'** explains that the EU agreed to ban arctic drilling in areas that still have ice.
3. [Non-unique] Because offshore drilling is much more expensive, **Bellona 18'** explains that Russia will drill on-shore, not offshore. This means that Russia will not need to break any ice, taking out their link.
4. [Non-unique] This argument doesn't make sense. Russia is only going to drill in the area's with no ice because its way cheaper to extract the oil that way.
5. [Non-unique] **Union 19'** explains that by 2030, almost all Arctic Ice will melt. 2 implications
    a. Their impact is completely non-unique
    b. Prefer helping developing nations adapts to the harms of climate change instead.

Euronews 18'

https://www.euronews.com/2017/03/17/eu-parliament-rejects-total-ban-on-arctic-oil-drilling

European Parliament lawmakers voted against a non-binding motion to prohibit oil and gas exploration in the Arctic. Although a symbolic vote, the motion's rejection could set the tone for Brussels' future appetite in regulating and protecting the environmentally sensitive, but highly coveted region, which estimates say holds more hydrocarbon reserves than the world's leading oil producer — Saudi Arabia. Had lawmakers approved the motion, the European Commission would have had the task of coordinating efforts among European Union nations to impose a "future total ban on the extraction of Arctic oil and gas." **Although the measure was voted down 414 to 180, MEPs did endorse a plan to ban drilling in the Arctic's "icy" waters.** The vote was called for by Estonian liberal MEP Urmas Paet and Finnish centre-right MEP Sirpa Pietikainen. The move comes as Norway has accelerated plans to strike black gold in the Arctic. Norway on Monday March 13 revealed it wants to open up a record 102 blocks in Arctic waters for hydrocarbon exploration by the fourth quarter of 2017.

Bellona 18'

https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2019-04-for-all-of-russias-talk-about-oil-drilling-in-the-arctic-most-arctic-oil-will-likely-go-untouched

"Some 47 percent of Gazrpom's reserves haven't even been put into production," Grigoriev told the forum. "At its current capacity, Gazprom has the resources to boost annual production to 200 billion cubic meters per year — why would it need the Arctic shelf now?" **As for oil, Grigoriev forecasts that by 2035, Russia will still only have one platform operating in the Arctic shelf — the Prirazlomnoye. The rest of Russia's hydrocarbon activities will be, then as now, on land.** Further, said Grigoriev, the geological obligations companies have when exploring for oil are skewed. Under current regulations, those companies who have licensed plot are required to drill merely two exploration wells before moving on. This doesn't yield much knowledge about the reserves, however, when the plots are roughly twice the size of Belgium.

Union 19'

https://phys.org/news/2019-02-ice-free-arctic-summers-earlier-side.html

The Arctic Ocean could become ice-free in the summer in the next 20 years due to a natural, long-term warming phase in the tropical Pacific that adds to human-caused warming, according to a new study. Computer models predict climate change will cause the Arctic to be nearly free of sea ice during the summer by the middle of this century, unless human greenhouse gas emissions are greatly reduced. But a closer examination of long-term temperature cycles in the tropical Pacific points towards an ice-free Arctic in September, the month with the least sea ice, on the earlier side of forecasts, according to a new study in the AGU journal Geophysical Research Letters. "The trajectory is towards becoming ice-free in the summer but there is uncertainty as to when that's going to occur," said James Screen, an associate professor in climate science at the University of Exeter in the U.K. and the lead author of the new study. There are different climate models used by researchers to predict when the first ice-free Arctic September will occur. Most models project there will fewer than 1 million square kilometers of sea ice around the middle of this century, but projections of when that will occur vary within 20-year windows due to natural climate fluctuations. **The climate model used in the new study predicts an ice-free Arctic summer sometime between 2030 and 2050, if greenhouse gases continue to rise. By accounting for a long-term warming phase in the tropical Pacific, the new research shows an ice-free Arctic is more likely to occur on the earlier side of that window, closer to 2030 than 2050.**

A2: Climate Change Impact

1. Inevitable; within next 50 years 13-18 F rise

A2: Russian Militarization Impact

A2: Yuan Heg Carter (done)

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CNkdwIhy0P3m0CjaD8Z5LeLkfUEmEEX5MOmyw_HF5_g/edit?usp=sharing
More responses ^

1. Uniqueness overwhelms the link: Richter 18 writes RMB is literally 1.39% of foreign reserves whereas the US is about 61%, despite efforts to increase its usage. This means that even if they prove that investors use the yuan, they have too far of a way to go.
2. DL: If China is out of money and EU banks are funding the BRI, loans literally wont be done in yuans anymore.
3. Delink: Smith 18 writes the majority of BRI projects aren't funded by the yuan, they're funded by the dollar because contractors want to receive dollars for their work, which is why Smith concludes the yuan hasn't made significant headway in recent years.
4. Delink: Unseating the dollar is impossible. **Constable 2018** writes that because the dollar controls bond, commodity, and foreign-exchange markets it makes it against countries interest to not use the dollar. Its this institutional reliance which makes it impossible to unseat the dollar. That's why he concludes that it literally took 2 world wars and the great depression to unseat the last reserve currency.
5. Eu would just use euro (SOMEONE CUT THE EV)
6. Yuan transactions decreasing as bri gaining traction (SOMEONE CUT THE EV)
7. Impact Turn: **Al Jazeera 18** writes that a stronger dollar makes it harder for developing countries to make interest payments. This exacerbates the impact of high debt in these countries. **Shabbir 15** furthers a 1 percent increase in debt servicing is likely to compel the government to cut down

its o its development spending by 4.1 percent, and its spending on the social sector by 0.25 percent

8. Impact Turn: **[La Monica of CNN 18](#)** ex[1] plains the majority of US companies suffer financial consequences as a result of a stronger dollar, as it's difficult to make sufficient profit conducting international trade if one currency has such a stronghold over the other by making products from other countries cheaper and US goods more expensive on international markets or do u want me to.

Weighing

Timeframe: Even if you take them at their best, it will take decades to dethrone the dollar.

Cnnmoney, 18, (), "The dollar is really strong. That could hurt the economy", Hartford Business Journal, 11-6**-2018,**
https://www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/the-dollar-is-really-strong-that-could-hurt-the-economy, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)

Continued dollar strength could wind up leading to more volatility in the stock market. The stronger dollar is a problem for many large American companies, because it reduces the value of their international sales and profits. Hasbro (HAS), Harley-Davidson (HOG), Huggies maker Kimberly-Clark (KMB) and Gillette owner Procter & Gamble (PG) have all warned that the dollar is hurting their results. So have industrial companies 3M (MMM) and Caterpillar (CAT) and Big Pharma giant Pfizer (PFE). The stronger dollar can also cause trouble for large American firms at home, because it helps make products from overseas cheaper. On the flip side, **US goods are now more expensive in international markets because of the stronger dollar. That's a particular worry for giant tech hardware companies like Apple** (AAPL). "These big tech companies are global businesses that rely on international markets. If interest rates are rising and the dollar is following suit, that reduces the purchasing power of their foreign customers," said Jonathan Curtis, portfolio manager with the Franklin Technology fund. JJ Kinahan, chief market strategist for TD Ameritrade, conceded that a stronger dollar is a problem. But he thinks the benefits of less expensive imports for American consumers and retailers may offset the profit hit that multinational companies have to take. A healthier US consumer could keep the economy afloat.

Shabbir, Summer 2015, "Implications of Public External Debt for Social Spending: A Case Study of Selected Asian Developing Countries",
http://www.lahoreschoolofeconomics.edu.pk/EconomicsJournal/Journals/Volume%2020/Issue%201/03%20Shabbir%20and%20Yasin%20ED%20ttc%20FIGURES%20NEED%20WORK.pdf

Based on the analysis above, the results obtained using GMM indicate that both the debt burden and debt servicing have a negative impact on overall government spending, development spending, and social spending (on education and health). **A 1 percent increase in debt servicing is likely to compel the government to cut down its overall spending by 0.89 percent, its development spending by 4.1 percent, and its spending on the social sector by 0.25 percent.** The results also suggest that GMM is best suited to analyzing the impact of debt servicing on public spending for panel data. All the results discussed above confirm the findings of previous studies carried out for other developing countries.

Unseating a reserve currency is impossible

Constable 18 *(Simon Constable, I'm a fellow at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise, 5-23-2018, "Why China's Yuan Is No Imminent Threat To The Dollar," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/05/23/no-china-isnt-going-to-unseat-the-might-dollar-anytime-soon/ DOA 1/14/19) MDS*

That inertia in the habits of business means that it takes an awful lot to unseat the doiminant reserve currency. "It would take a seismic-sized shock to unseat the U.S. dollar," *says Robert Wright, professor of political economy at Augustana University in Sioux Falls Sout Dakota, and also an economic historian.* ***We don't have a lot of history of currency regimes changing.*** *But there is some evidence from when the British pound sterling got unseated by the U.S. dollar. Even during the late 19th century, the U.S. economy was clearly rivaling that of the United Kingdom (not including its colonies and possessions.)* ***However, size wasn;t enough. It took until 1944 for the U.S. dollar to unseat the pound, and it did indeed involve some cataclysmic shocks.*** *To begin with, there was* ***WWI of 1914-1918 in which Britain lost up to 100,000 men a month.*** *Not only was a huge portion of a generation of men killed, but there was a* ***vast financial cost to the country also.*** *Following that, in the 1920s, an attempt was made by Britain to peg its currency back to gold at the same rate it had been before the war. The result was massive industrial action.* ***Then came the Great Depression and after that WWII*** *with all the associated destruction and death. In short,* ***there was a lot of economic and geopolitical upheaval necessary in order to unseat the pound from its role of King of currencies.*** *I have written similar commentary in the past, but somehow some people just aren't getting the message. The dollar will be with us for long time yet.*

Warrant

Constable 18 *(Simon Constable, I'm a fellow at the Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise, 5-23-2018, "Why China's Yuan Is No Imminent Threat To The Dollar," Forbes,* ***https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/05/23/no-china-isnt-going-to-unseat-the-might-dollar-anytime-soon/ DOA 1/14/19) MDS***

The reserve currency is part of an ecosystem of financial systems. The dollar is the paper money that we all know. But ***there is also the bond market, the commodity market, and the foreign-exchange markets. All of these markets work together to the benefit of anyone using dollars as opposed to any other currency.*** *Imagine you are an oil trader. You buy your oil in dollars (because all commodities are priced in dollars) load it onto a tanker that you purchased with dollars, and then you financed both the ship and the cargo with a loan denominated in dollars. Finally, when you deliver the oil to the customer you get paid in dollars. Of course, the first response would be to say that* ***if you can do that with dollars then surely you can do that with another currency, such as the yuan. Theoretically yes. But in practicality, no you can't. "There is simply not enough liquidity in all the other currencies combined to switch away from the dollar,"*** *says Jeff Christian, veteran financial markets expert and founder of New York-based commodities consulting firm CPM Group. Consider these financial markets statistics.* ***The debt market is dominated by*** *securities denominated in* ***dollars****. More than half (51%) of the liabilities are in dollars with 28% in euros. The remainder of the total comprises all other currencies combined, according to data from the Bank of International Settlements.* ***The Chinese yuan doesn't get an individual mention. The market for interest rate derivatives is dominated by the dollar.*** *Around 70% of the transaction volume is in dollars, with all other currencies combined making up the remainder, according to BIS data.* ***The foreign exchange market is dominated by the dollar*** *with almost half of all transactions (44%) by volume involving the dollar, according to the latest (2016) triennial survey from the BIS. The data shows 88% but the total of all currencies comes to 200%.* ***The dollar's dominance in all these subsector markets means there is more liquidity and hence more efficiency in each of the markets. That efficiency means there is little financial reason to look elsewhere for loans or derivatives.*** *If nothing else, the mantra of business has long been, "if it ain't broke don't fix it." Chief financial officers know that the dollar market is the biggest and most efficient, so that is what they use. Self-fulling maybe, but that is a fact of life. There's little reason for them to change.*

Al Jazeera, 7-23-**2018**, "Emerging debt: Why a strong dollar troubles developing countries", https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/2018/06/emerging-debt-strong-dollar-troubles-developing-countries-180622194200677.html

At a central bank conference in Portugal this week, the US Federal Reserve chairman said the case remains strong for more US rate increases - which means trouble ahead for those countries borrowing in dollars. After the end of the global financial crisis, r**ecord low interest**

rates in the US meant many developing nations borrowed in dollars. And as the dollar rises, it's now costing those developing countries a lot more to repay their debts. So, is the dollar to strengthen further? And how big an issue is it for emerging market economies? Timothy Ash, a senior emerging markets sovereign strategist with London-based BlueBay Asset Management, explains why, for some economists, it's raising alarm bells. "I think the consensus is beginning to emerge that the dollar will probably end up being a winner from the trade wars ... helped also by the assumption of weakness in the eurozone ... It does look like the dollar is on an appreciating trend," says Ash.

Kimberly **Amadeo**, 8-19-**2019**, "Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency", **The Balance**, https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931

A global currency is one that is accepted for trade throughout the world. Some of the world's currencies are accepted for most international transactions. The most popular are the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the yen. Another name for a global currency is the reserve currency. According to the International Monetary Fund, the **U.S. dollar is the most popular. As of the first quarter of 2019, it makes up 61% of all known central bank foreign exchange reserves.** That makes it the de facto global currency, even though it doesn't hold an official title. The next closest reserve currency is the euro. It makes up 20% of known central bank foreign currency reserves. The chance of the euro becoming a world currency was damaged by the eurozone crisis. It revealed the difficulties of a monetary union that's guided by separate political entities.

Wolf **Richter**, 18, (), "Here's why efforts to reduce the dollar's dominance won't work anytime soon", Business Insider, 7-2-2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-dollar-heres-why-it-will-remain-dominant-around-the-world-2018-7, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)

Over the decades, there have been major efforts to undermine the dollar's hegemony as a global reserve currency, which it has maintained since World War II. The creation of the euro was the most successful such effort. The plan was that the euro would eventually reach "parity" with the dollar on the hegemony scale. Before the euro, global exchange reserves included the individual currencies of today's Eurozone members, particularly the Deutsche mark. After the euro came about, it replaced all those. And its share edged up for a while until the euro debt crisis spooked central banks and derailed those dreams. ***And now there are efforts underway to elevate the Chinese renminbi to a global reserve currency.*** This became official on October 1, 2016, when the IMF added it to its currency basket, the Special Drawing Rights. ***But watching grass grow is breathtakingly exciting compared to watching the RMB gain status as a reserve currency***. The RMB is the thin red sliver in the pie chart below with a share of just 1.39% of allocated foreign exchange reserves. Minuscule as it is, it is the highest share ever, up from 1.2% in Q4 2017. In other words, ***its inclusion in the SDR basket hasn't exactly performed miracles as central banks seem to remain leery of it and have not yet displayed any kind of eagerness to hold RMB-denominated assets.***

Colby **Smith**, 18, (), "The Belt and Road's dollar problem", Financial Times, 12-18-2018, https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/18/1545130791000/The-Belt-and-Road-s-dollar-problem/, DOA-7-18-2019 (MO)

When China first unveiled its plans to connect more than 65 countries along a modern Silk Road in 2013, the project was met with great fanfare. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as it was later renamed, was initially hailed as "the most ambitious economic and diplomatic program since the founding of the People's Republic". Beyond the pledge that it would help to turn China into a high-income economic powerhouse, Chinese officials also touted the BRI as a vehicle for transforming the country's currency into a global one. ***Five years on, the renminbi hasn't made much headway as an internationally-recognised unit of account, medium of exchange or store of value — the three functions a global currency must fulfil***. In fact***, the majority of BRI projects are not even funded this way. Like most global transactions, the dollar dominates, putting a natural cap on just how revolutionary the BRI can be.*** But despite these strides, the renminbi's international reach has not budged in recent years. By some measures, it has even declined. **In August 2015, the renminbi stood as the world's fifth most-active currency for domestic and international payments, with a 2.8 per cent share according to SWIFT. By 2016, it had slipped a slot to 1.67 per cent**. As of October, it remains in sixth place, with a 1.70 per cent share. **The dollar, on the other hand, has maintained its commanding share of domestic and international payments at roughly 40 per cent: Even in China, the use of the renminbi to settle trade has declined. Today, just 13 per cent is renminbi-denominated. Three years ago, it was about double that. And when it comes to international bond issuance, China's currency has also lost its lustre**. Here's a chart from Citi's David Lubin showing the decline since 2015. **Now, less than $8bn worth of renminbi-denominated bonds are issued each quarter, or roughly $30bn per year: This poses quite a problem for the BRI. Given the renminbi's limited scope as a global currency, contractors have typically preferred dollars in exchange for their work building the roads, bridges, ports and more of the initiative. To meet this demand, China has drawn billions from its massive $3tn-plus stock of foreign reserves to shore up the coffers of its "policy banks," which then help to finance various BRI projects.** But China only has so many dollars. And without an "infinite supply," warns Citi's Lubin, the country "lacks an infinite capacity to meet its goals." What this means is that there is an imposed limit to what China can achieve with the BRI. If the renminbi was a global currency and BRI could be wholly funded in the currency, the government could technically print renminbi as it saw fit. Instead, the BRI is tethered to something Beijing does not directly control.

A2: China Heg Bad Anuraag

1. This is NU, they gaining clout regardless
2. US has huge military advantage that is growing, BRI can't close gap
3. 5 warrants CH heg good

A2: US War Scenario Kevin

A2: Trade Routes Warrant

A2: South China Sea General Tensions Warrant

Finally, most regional leaders are perceiving a "precipitous decline" in America's influence.186 According to the Rand Corporation's U.S.-China Military Scorecard, "trend lines are moving against [Washington] across a broad spectrum." Beijing's technological progress and ability to deploy assets in more and more massive numbers threaten to overwhelm the United States' local advantages and could compromise its resolve to fight.187 Such assessments might even underestimate the damage caused by initial Chinese missile strikes, the degree to which America's submarines are stretched thin across the Pacific Ocean, and China's mine warfare capabilities.

Cut this as a NU: CH going to take over region regardless

A2: Vietnam Warrant

A2: US War Impact

A2: Uyghur Oppression Anuraag

1. Squo solves, ch acting
2. Gonna continue regardless, outside pressures to do so
3. T: BRI invites outside pressure to stay involved
4. Trade and development for normally ignored population outweighs

A2: CPEC (General) Pranav (GET CPEC PREPOUT FROM AR)

1. DELINK - Pakistan doesn't want CPEC. Shams 19 of DW finds that CPEC projects right now have literally been put on the backburner because the government doesn't care. That means that chinese funding aside, if the government never pushes to accelerate these projects through which they aren't in the status quo, nothing will ever change.

Deutsche Welle (Www.Dw, xx-xx-xxxx, "Belt and Road Forum: Is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor failing?," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/belt-and-road-forum-is-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-failing/a-48473486

DW: What is the current situation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)?
Nadeem Akhtar: **Some CPEC projects have been put on a backburner, and some are moving very slowly. In my opinion, the main reason behind this is the incumbent government's lack of interest in the project.**
To understand this, we have to recall Imran Khan's opposition to CPEC before coming to power. In 2014, his protest against then PM Nawaz Sharif, and the blockade of Islamabad, resulted in the cancellation of Chinese President Xi Jinping's official visit to Pakistan

A2: Indo-Pak War Pranav (GET INDOPAK PREPOUT FROM AR)

MOST SPECIFIC TO MISCALC BUT SOME CAN BE USED WITH INTENTIONAL WARFARE

1) The establishment of a robust nuclear hotline in 2004 between India and Pakistan has eliminated the possibility of nuclear escalation. According to Suri of Foreign Policy, both India and Pakistan use the hotline to make sure that there are secure communications between their respective foreign secretaries on nuclear issues. This hotline has empirically facilitated numerous instances of crisis de-escalation and will prevent against any strategic miscalculation.
    a) For example, India and Pakistan use the hotline to notify each other of every nuclear missile test that they plan on launching.
2) Both countries will moderate their behavior in conflict to prevent miscalculation. Tepperman of Newsweek explains that the only time in which India and Pakistan engaged in war as nuclear powers was in the 1999 Kargil War, where both countries were careful to keep skirmishes limited and avoid threatening each other's vital interests. Tepperman empirically concludes that policymakers and officials moderated their countries' behavior in this way for fear of nuclear escalation. Prefer this analysis because
    a) It is the only evidence that is empirically specific to the way that Indian and Pakistani policymakers have behaved as nuclear powers in the past.
    b) It pre-empts their story about miscalculation, because our argument is that an Indo-Pak conventional conflict would be limited to mere skirmishes, and would therefore never even reach the point of tensions where nuclear miscalculation would be relevant.

Suri, Garrett, Walt and Zenko (2019). What's a Nuclear Hotline Good For Anyway?. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/09/whats-a-nuclear-hotline-good-for-anyway/ [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018].

These links have received far less attention than the initial Soviet-American connection, but they are considered essential for clarifying intentions and maintaining stability in the many rivalries surrounding the Chinese mainland. Two hotlines that have helped manage explosive rivalries, often on the edge of war, run between India and Pakistan and between the two Koreas. Modeled on the Soviet-American link, and encouraged by Washington, **the India-Pakistan link provides secure communications between the two nations' foreign secretaries "to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues." The India-Pakistan hotline has operated since 2004, and it has facilitated numerous moments of crisis de-escalation, assuring both sides that war is not imminent. The United States has facilitated the maintenance of this connection.** The same is true for the two Koreas, where the Red Cross (with American assistance), installed the first system in the early 1970s to assist with delivering aid and defusing recurring crises. The Korean hotline has kept the two governments talking, even in moments of acute conflict. It provides voice connections for military leaders on both sides, who otherwise have no method for exchanging messages directly.

Jonathan Tepperman, 8-28-2009, "How Nuclear Weapons Can Keep You Safe," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/how-nuclear-weapons-can-keep-you-safe-78907

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, **in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests.** Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that **on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of**

war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

A2: Pakistan Emboldened Warrant

1. Choi 19 SCMP: China urged restraint after pulwama and did not issue a condemnation of India which was shocking to pakistan who expected their ally to take their side, that's really important because Bana 19 explains that Pakistan will NEVER go to war without the full backing of China. China's message to pakistan is clear, we will support you but not if you go to war.
2. India has a nuclear Triad which means that they have an assured second-strike capability-- even if Pakistan is able to take out all of India's land and air-based missiles, it's extremely unlikely that they would be able to take out their nuclear submarines.
    a) This is terminal defense to the impact because there is NO situation in which Pakistan would be willing to nuke India since they would face guaranteed retaliation/destruction.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2187802/china-calls-india-and-pakistan-exercise-restraint-after-air. Martin Choi. South China Morning Post. February 26, 2019.

Beijing called on New Delhi and Islamabad to "exercise restraint" and avoid further provocations after India said its warplanes attacked a militant camp of Pakistan-backed fighters, adding to tensions between the arch-rivals. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said tackling terrorism was "a global issue" that required cooperation and for nations to maintain good relations. **"We hope that both India and Pakistan can exercise restraint and adopt actions that will help stabilise the situation in the region and improve mutual relations**," Lu said in a daily press briefing on Tuesday.

A2: India Encirclement Warrant

1. India will never abandon its no-first-use policy.
    a. A long succession of Prime Ministers, even more aggressive figures like Modi, have all affirmed the NFU policy → unlikely that they would revise in the face of all this history.
        i. Kazi of the Stimson Center explains that while Pakistan has made 16 explicit nuclear threats against India between 1993 and 2000, India never wavered in its commitment to NFU and deterrence always prevailed.
    b. India's NFU policy is key to demonstrating to the international community that they are a responsible nuclear power that is capable of exercising great restraint.
        i. Revoking NFU would tank India's international reputation as a benevolent and reluctant power, straining its alliances with other liberal democratic states
        ii. Revoking NFU would undermine India's soft power because its participation in certain multilateral organizations (like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG) is contingent on maintaining a NFU.

c. India is committed a simple policy of nuclear deterrence that they know will prevent escalation-- both sides know that any Pakistani nuclear attack would be met with massive, overwhelming nuclear retaliation from India, and this retaliatory threat is sufficient to create permanent nuclear deterrence.

Kazi, R., Mitra, J., Mishra, V. and Amin, P. (2019). SAV Review: India's No-First-Use Doctrine is Here to Stay. [online] South Asian Voices. Available at: https://southasianvoices.org/sav-review-indias-no-first-use-doctrine-is-here-to-stay/ [Accessed 25 Apr. 2019].

Experts have emphasized the efficacy of NFU's strategic restraint. Manpreet Sethi's "No First Use of NW: Sane Logic, Sound Doctrine," assesses NFU strategy as "far more credible and useful in the contemporary context." She argues in favor of India's NFU posture and combats the logic of first-use. After all, a first-strike cannot guarantee that a subsequent attack would be deterred. A strategic offensive posture provides no comfort that having resorted to a first-use, the adversary will have the stomach for nuclear retaliation and then claim it has come out better. As pointed out by Sethi, **despite India having faced the threat of 16 times between 1991 and 2000, there has been no breakdown of deterrence. Evidently, this substantiates India's commitment to the NFU, which rests on the basic edifice of a posture of strategic restraint.**

India's NFU policy confers on India the status of a responsible nuclear power. It signifies India's commitment to nonproliferation and the universal nuclear disarmament that harmonizes with the fundamental principles of humanitarian law. However, the authors interrogate "how India would reconcile a shift in its policy with the diplomatic image it has cultivated," concluding that such an image could, in fact, allow for first-use "should the circumstances arise and the relevant policy makers decide to launch such an attack."Ignoring the cynicism, as I have argued elsewhere, India's conventional strength and its Cold Start doctrine is sufficient to neutralize any Pakistani conventional aggression. Moreover, India's strategic culture is embedded in the philosophy of being reluctant nuclear state and a status-quo power bereft of any belligerent posture. The NFU policy as advocated by its early proponents has served as a diplomatic tool by removing ambiguity surrounding India's responsibility as a nuclear-armed state, especially in contrast to Pakistan. This position has been clarified and reiterated by its diplomats in the United Nations. The authors recognize that NFU had "become a standard part of India's nuclear thinking even prior to the 1998 nuclear tests." Moreover, **it is unlikely that India would permit a scenario in which New Delhi uses nuclear weapons to arise given that the NFU doctrine's diplomatic appeal has been a cardinal factor in** the implementation of the India-U.S. nuclear deal in 2005 and **the international community's** (sans China and a handful of nations) **convincing support for India's NSG membership.** Thus, the authors' appeal that NFU has more bark than bite can be contradicted.

A2: SOEs Adriana (done)

EXPLANATION OF ARG FOR IDIOTS LIKE ME: SOEs going away rn --> bri = more investment into SOE's --> SOE's inefficent and crowd out private investment, thus decreasing growth--> recession (1=SOE's inc rn, NU), (2=bri also means private firms generate profit, on net no harm), (3=SOe's good and inc econ growth bc of recent reforms, T)

1. [Uniqueness Delink]. Their uniqueness is wrong. The Economist explains in 2018 that SOEs have started to profit while private companies suffer. They find that through 2018, SOE profits grew

by 17% while private companies fell by 19%. Their argument, that SOEs are going away in the status quo while private businesses thrive, is fundamentally wrong.

2. [Delink]. The idea that BRI projects can only go to SOEs is counterfactual to reality. Deloitte '18 writes that the BRI was originally based on energy and infrastructure, it has broadened to trade and manufacturing, allowing multinational corporations, or MNCs, to win more deals, shifting the initiative to private firms. Yu '19 of the Telegraph explains that of the 10,000 Chinese companies doing BRI projects in Africa, 90% employ private firms.
3. [Impact Delink]. SOE inefficiency is being solved for in the status quo.
    a. The internal link to SOEs being inefficient is that they aren't profit driven, meaning they can abuse the benefits they receive from the government to drive out private competition without ever having to innovate. Fortunately, the status quo is solving. Guluzade '19 of the World Economic Forum explains that the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, formed in 2003, is currently concentrating on restructuring SOEs into modern profit-oriented companies. Specifically with the BRI, Deloitte '18 explains that the Chinese government literally forces companies to ensure proper returns before undertaking a project.
    b. Lee '19 of the SCMP writes that state firms have enacted cost cutting and efficiency measures to improve economic growth. For example, Guluzade '19 of the World Economic Forum writes that China has begun introducing mixed ownership with state enterprises, forcing firms to focus on generating equity returns and, thus, making them more efficient.
    c. Thus, Lee '19 ultimately concludes that as a whole state owned enterprises revenues and profits are at historic highs.

"China's private sector faces an advance by the state", The Economist, 12/8/18 https://www.economist.com/business/2018/12/08/chinas-private-sector-faces-an-advance-by-the-state . Accessed 10 August 2019. // AK

Why so uneasy? The success of the private sector in China is undisputed. Its most innovative and global technology stars are all privately run, including the "bat" firmament of Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. The non-state sector contributes close to two-thirds of China's gdp growth and eight-tenths of all new jobs. The proportion of private ownership in industry continues to rise as that of the state recedes. This is for good reason: soes' return on assets is half that of privately held ones. Many state firms are propped up by the cheap capital they enjoy from state-owned banks (which are averse to lending to riskier private firms). A different storyline is now unfolding. **Between January and October profits at soes grew by 17% compared with the same ten months last year; those at private companies fell by 19%.** Most of the 11,000-odd businesses that went bankrupt between 2016 and the first half of 2018 were privately owned, according to an estimate by China Merchants Bank, a lender. Many have been disproportionately hurt by cuts to excess capacity in steel and coal, because of higher industrial prices—from which state-owned producers have in turn profited.
"Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018." Deloitte Insights, www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html. Accessed 10 August 2019. //AK

A common complaint is that BRI has mainly benefited China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). That is largely true and, given the long investment horizon associated with infrastructure projects, will remain a feature of BRI.2 **However, changes are afoot. BRI's initial focus was on energy and infrastructure; it is now widening to trade, manufacturing, the Internet and tourism (figure 1). Multinational corporations (MNCs) with competitive advantages are winning BRI-related deals, and we predict more will do so in the near future.** In addition, geopolitical and financial risk considerations mean China will need to ensure more widespread participation in projects.3 If we were to draw an analogy, it would be this: BRI is a journey, one with opportunities and risks, and one that—four years in—is still closer to its start than its end. That means investors need to take a longer view of projects than they are accustomed to doing. And while we do not downplay the risks, we believe they are less severe than many assume.

Yu, Cheng. "Private sector set for bigger Belt and Road role", Telegraph, 3/27/19. '19 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/china-watch/business/private-sector-belt-and-road-role/. Accessed 10 August 2019. // AK

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to realise more benefits in foreign and domestic markets, according to industry experts Nan Cunhui, chairman of Chint Group, China's leading industrial electrical equipment and new-energy enterprise, said the BRI **is bringing "huge" opportunities in foreign markets "Currently, more than 10,000 Chinese companies are doing business in Africa. Among them, 90 per cent are private ones,"** said Nan.

Guluzade, Amir, and Ahmadoff & Co. "Explained, the Role of China's State-Owned Companies." *World Economic Forum*. 2019. www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/. Accessed 10 August 2019 // AK

Despite the above-mentioned factors, the Chinese government is still keen on supporting SOEs and is committed to making them bigger, stronger and more efficient**. This is particularly relevant to certain strategic sectors where government oversight is essential - specifically in defense, energy, telecom, aviation and railway systems**. **Conversely the state is encouraged to divest from other industries by decreasing its ownership. The State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is making great strides in implementing the government's 'zhuada fangxiao' (grasp the big, release the small) policy, which has greatly reduced the number of SOEs through privatisation, asset sales, and mergers and acquisitions. The Commission, which was established in 2003, is currently concentrating on restructuring the remaining SOEs into modern profit-oriented corporations.** Practically all of the entities overseen by SASAC are structured as corporations and are legally separate from the government with their own boards of directors, effectively delegating more authority to the executives.

"Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018." Deloitte Insights, www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html. Accessed 10 August 2019. //AK

There are other risks too—from reputational, legislative and environmental to those surrounding interest rates, foreign exchange rates, remittances and financial uncertainty. One could also add issues over tax regulations, how well local talent can run project areas, and other economic and even natural disaster risks. Given that the most likely way for an MNC to access a BRI project is by partnering with an SOE (as we shall see later), the risk exposure of SOEs is central to this discussion. **That is another reason project risks are lower: The Chinese government insists SOEs make their investment decisions with consideration of commercial benefit, which means they need to ensure a proper return.** To achieve that, SOEs must address risks that could undermine that return before they can invest. **That includes carrying out due diligence on joint venture partners.**

Lee, Amanda. "Chinese State Firms Had Best Year in 2018 Even as Economy Slumped." *South China Morning Post*, 17 Jan. 2019. www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2182552/chinas-state-owned-companies-enjoy-record-profits-even-private?fbclid=IwAR1kszZHTnpJ4pClYPr9xBJKhSr-QJppmZw1fjazlNj5GTCxI19y97B1E64. Accessed 11 August 2019 // AK

> **Revenues and profits at China's state-owned enterprises hit historic highs last year,** even as the country's private firms fought for their survival amid the slowest period for economic growth in a decade. Last year, firms owned by the central government booked revenues of 29.1 trillion yuan (about US$4.3 trillion), up 10.1 per cent from 2017, while net profits reached 1.2 trillion yuan, a rise of 15.7 per cent from the previous year, according to figures released by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) on Thursday. **State-owned firms were able to achieve record high revenues and profits because of relatively stable growth in the domestic economy and supporting measures enacted by the government**, according to Peng Huagaung, a spokesman for the state asset oversight agency. **State firms also benefited from cost cutting as well as better efficiency and risk management amid the slowdown in economic growth.**

Guluzade, Amir, and Ahmadoff & Co. "Explained, the Role of China's State-Owned Companies." *World Economic Forum*. www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/. Accessed 10 August 2019 // AK

There is also substantial work being done to improve SOEs through reorganisation, restructuring and enhancing their internal governance standards. T**he government went as far as introducing mixed ownership in telecoms company China Unicom, by selling shares worth around $11 billion to 14 private investors. This was done as a step towards making China Unicom more accountable and more focused on generating returns on equity, while retaining state control.** T**hese efforts to make SOEs competitive** while holding absolute control over their final decision-making reasserts the Chinese government's commitment to consolidating state control while **simultaneously allowing the market to be the ultimate resource allocator**. In other words, the government wants to keep a close eye on market forces while reserving the 'intervention option' in critical situations.

A2: Debt Take-on General Aatreya

A2: China Ports Military Control Andrew

Developing World

A2: General Infra Bad(Infra Econ Harms) Anuraag (DONE)

1. GO TO ADRIANA"S EU INFRA BLOCKS

A2: China sends nuke plants everywhere

1. [Read a2 funding]
    a. Diplo writes that china has 30 nuke plants planned
2. Diplomat 18'; UK signed deals for BRI nuke plant
    a. NU, bri already in EU
    b. Other reasosn why coutnries arent' accepting, they don't solve
3. Non Unique. The Guardian in 2019 writes that Russia is exporting Nuclear plants and tech to developing nations in areas such as Asia and Africa.
4. China companies have a profit incentive to keep expanding, its non unique
5. CNBC 19' finds a couple things:
    a. SK/FR are also exporting Nuclear, won't buy CH and impact is NU
    b. US is starting to ramp up its exports, its NU

A2: Investment diverts to EU Kevin

1. [Turn] EU will finance investment into developing nations.
2. [Turn] BRI infra in EU will help EU grow. This means the EU will contribute more to developing nations
    1. EU infrastructure is better than Chinese infrastructure cuz more transparency.
3. [Turn] China will make returns on loans from the EU, which they can use to invest back into Africa

4. [Turn] EU globalization helps solve back for African and South East Asian Countries
5. [Disad] Infrastructure leads to FDI. Which is bad for LLDCs.
    1. This cannot be framed as a turn to the EU though because the EU has good FDI regulation.
6. [Delink/Turn] BRI investment into Africa and South East Asia are failing/is bad for development
7. [Delink] 16 countries in EU already signed on. Africa already getting no investment if their warrants are true
8. [Delink] China is not at the brink where trade-offs occur
9. [Prereq] Chinese recession dooms African investment. 2 warrants
    1. Global recessions means any private investment leaves these LLDCs.
    2. Chinese recession = China will fund domestic industries and not fund African Development bc it is inherently too risky in nature.

A2: Economic Warrant

10. [Delink] China sees Africa as a potential market place. They won't leave.

A2: Geopolitical Warrant

11. [Delink] China invests in Africa because of geopolitical reasons (compete w/ US)
12. [Delink] EU hates the US so much atm that they will turn to China anyways

A2: FDI Bad

United States

A2: NATO Collapse Adriana (kinda done but i'm going to bed.)

A2: Ports Warrant

1. [????]. This argument makes no sense. China can only seize ports that it builds, it has no jurisdiction over pre-existing EU ports. This means that all China can do is
    a. send trade through pre-existing ports, meaning there are no military implications, or
    b. build new ports with the EU having full jurisdiction over when/where they are built, meaning they won't let China build where they'd be in direct conflict with US military operations.

A2: Trump Warrant

1. Trump could *never* unilaterally pull out of NATO. Mallin 18 explains that Trump would at the very least need Congress on his side which would never happen. Even then, uniqueness overwhelms the link - on the verge of the 2020 elections, unilaterally withdrawing would be loading the Democrats up with political ammunition. To win this link, they have to prove both

a. that Congress would support it, and
b. that Trump would be willing to risk it right before the elections.

A2: China Econ Leverage Warrant

1. [N/U]. Fracturing has already occurred. Sawhney '18 writes that with Eastern European NATO member states already participating in the BRI and the Quad (including the US), acting as an "alternative alliance", unity could weaken, as the BRI creates a conflict of both military and economic interest within member states.

Trump Cannot Unilaterally Pull the US out of NATO because this would ruin Trump politically

Alexander Mallin, ABC News, "Lawmakers, experts doubt Trump could unilaterally pull US from NATO", July 12, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lawmakers-experts-doubt-trump-unilaterally-pull-us-nato/story?id=56552444 . Accessed 11 August 2019. // AK

While Trump also said he believed it would be "unnecessary" to withdraw due to what he said were new commitments from allies to raise their defense spending levels, **lawmakers on Thursday appeared largely united in their belief that the president should not try to unilaterally withdraw from NATO. "No. He would need Congress with him, certainly,"** Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., told ABC. **"The United States would essentially have to legally inform itself and give a one year notice that it's going to withdraw,"** Damon said. "That's a legal provision. **The reality is President Trump would have a revolt on his hands – you have this U.S. Senate and even the next US Senate that would not accept that." In a move that underscores the extent of Senate support for NATO, earlier this week the body passed, 97-2, a nonbinding measure that urged negotiators over the annual defense policy bill to reaffirm the United States' commitment to NATO and its obligations of mutual self-defense as enumerated in Article 5.** The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also unilaterally approved a separate provision, also nonbinding, expressing support for the strategic importance of NATO to the United States. "A strong NATO, especially given a level of aggression from Russia not seen since the Cold War, remains essential for maintaining the rules-based international order," the committee chairman, Republican Bob Corker, said after his panel approved the resolution.

Sawhney, Simran. "The Belt and Road Initiative: What Does It Mean for NATO?" NAOC. July 16 2018. http://natoassociation.ca/the-belt-and-road-initiative-what-does-it-mean-for-nato/ . Accessed 11 August 19. // AK

The most significant concern for the West is the complicated history of many of the participating states that makes them politically vulnerable. Many of the participating Eastern European countries are former Soviet satellite states that turned towards democracy, the rule of law, and integration into the global economy following the collapse of the USSR. Most of the 16 states joined the EU and NATO during a time when they sought protection from Russian influence and access to stronger Western markets, particularly after four decades of poor social and economic conditions. Today, these states still face high unemployment and slow economic growth and as such, are more likely to welcome the BRI as an opportunity to achieve sustained growth. Consequently, the 16+1 format has weakened cohesion and unity amongst EU and NATO member states by offering an economic partnership with China that excludes the US, a traditional ally, and better serves Chinese interests. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel warned that "if we don't develop a [European] strategy regarding China, then China will succeed in dividing Europe." Chancellor Merkel echoed similar concerns, stressing that Europe must "speak with one voice," while French President Macron warned that the BRI "cannot be one-way." The BRI, while currently an ambitious economic project, could develop into a long-term alliance**.** **With Eastern European NATO member states enthusiastically participating in the BRI and, on**

the other hand, the Quad acting as an "alternative" alliance against the BRI that deliberately excludes China, unity between NATO member states could weaken, as the BRI could provoke a conflict of interest between economic commitments and military commitments of member states.