

# Resolved: The United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

## CASE CARDS

### Yemen

#### Sanctions

##### **Sanctions Don't Work**

Robert Pape, 1998, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Don't Work", U Chicago

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2539368.pdf?casa\\_token=pzjW0sgnTNsAAAAA:8Meu1iq1q9XqtCGTeAi62ZpxqnYGOE9Vh9mV8VHQ4zc5cONFD5ba-ywfrLCXiiYjhLj4xKg30MY7zlgSjGGWTK-U3t2UPfW83M6YqSWvirS9CUJyCY0](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2539368.pdf?casa_token=pzjW0sgnTNsAAAAA:8Meu1iq1q9XqtCGTeAi62ZpxqnYGOE9Vh9mV8VHQ4zc5cONFD5ba-ywfrLCXiiYjhLj4xKg30MY7zlgSjGGWTK-U3t2UPfW83M6YqSWvirS9CUJyCY0) (NK)

To resolve this question, this article performs two main tasks. First, it reexamines the HSE database to determine whether sanctions worked as often as its authors claim. Second, it challenges the causal logic of the theory of economic sanctions, especially whether the nature of modern nation-states provides grounds for today's optimism. The article concludes that economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals. The HSE study is seriously flawed. Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to examination. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. **Of HSE's 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately considered successes.** The deductive case that we should expect sanctions to be more effective in the future is also flawed, because it relies on the expectation that economic punishment can overwhelm a state's commitment to pursue important policy goals. **Most modern states, however, resist external pressure. Pervasive nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon what are seen as the interests of the nation, making even weak or disorganized states unwilling to bend to the demands of foreigners.** In addition, states that have modern administrative capabilities can usually mitigate the economic damage of sanctions through substitution and other techniques. Finally, even when such capabilities are lacking and ruling elites are unpopular, they can still often protect themselves and their supporters by shifting the economic burden of sanctions onto opponents or disenfranchised groups

##### **Arms embargoes are economic sanctions (Pempel - CFR)**

(Kacper Pempel, 8-7-2017, "What Are Economic Sanctions?," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions> (NK)

**Economic sanctions are defined as the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign and security policy purposes.** They may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country, like the long-standing U.S. embargo of Cuba, or they may be targeted, blocking transactions of and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals. Since 9/11, there has been a pronounced shift toward targeted or so-called "smart" sanctions, which aim to minimize the suffering of innocent civilians. **Sanctions take a variety of forms, including** travel bans, asset freezes, **arms embargoes,** capital restraints, foreign aid reductions, and trade restrictions. (General export controls, which are not punitive, are often excluded from sanctions discussions.)

##### **Historically don't work (Haas - Brookings)**

Richard N. Haass, 6-1-1998, "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/> (NK)

Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve desired results if the aims are large or time is short. **Sanctions**—even when comprehensive and enjoying almost universal international backing for nearly six months—**failed to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait**. In the end, it took Operation Desert Storm. Other sanctions have also fallen short. **The Iranian regime continues to support terrorism**, oppose the Middle East peace process, and press ahead with its nuclear weapons program. **Fidel Castro is still in place atop a largely authoritarian political and economic system. India and Pakistan were not deterred from testing nuclear weapons** by the threat of draconian penalties. Libya has refused to produce the two individuals accused of the destruction of Pan Am 103. **Sanctions could not persuade Haiti's junta to honor the results of an election. Nor could they dissuade Serbia and others to call off their military aggression**. And China continues to export sensitive technologies to selected countries and remains a society where human rights are violated.

**Sprague 06** Oliver Sprague, 2006, "UN arms embargoes: an overview of the last ten years," Control Arms Association, [https://www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/bn\\_armsembargoes.pdf](https://www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/bn_armsembargoes.pdf) //DF

Despite the fact that **every one of the 13 United Nations arms embargoes imposed in the last decade has been systematically violated**, only a handful of the many arms embargo breakers named in UN sanctions reports has been successfully prosecuted. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 1990 and 2001 there were 57 separate major armed conflicts raging around the globe, yet only eight of them were subject to UN arms embargoes. **Such embargoes are usually late and blunt instruments, and the UN Sanctions Committees, which oversee the embargoes, have to rely largely on Member States to monitor and implement them**. Therefore, **arms embargoes cannot be deployed effectively as an instrument by the UN to prevent illicit arms trafficking, without better national controls on international arms transfers**. These controls are woefully inadequate. In addition, the Sanctions Committees of the Security Council have to rely on UN investigative teams and UN peacekeeping missions to investigate violations of embargoes and report compliance. However, these bodies usually have inadequate resources and time to do that work thoroughly.

### **Unilateral sanctions are especially ineffective because the victim can just shift to alternate supply (ex. China or Russia)**

Richard N. Haass, 6-1-1998, "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/> (NK)

China appears to have shown some restraint in exporting nuclear and ballistic missile parts or technologies. **Unilateral sanctions are rarely effective. In a global economy, unilateral sanctions tend to impose greater costs on American firms than on the target, which can usually find substitute sources of supply and financing**. Secondary sanctions can make matters worse. Trying to compel others to join a sanctions effort by threatening secondary sanctions against third parties unwilling to sanction the target can cause serious harm to a variety of U.S. foreign policy interests. This is what happened when sanctions were introduced against overseas firms who violated the terms of U.S. legislation affecting Cuba, Iran, and Libya.

## R/T HSE Study

At closer scrutiny, only 5 of the 115 cases in the HSE study were examples of successful sanctions (Pape - Its use in international trade or investment negotiations is routine. Evidence from trade disputes says little, however, about whether sanctions can achieve more ambitious political goals, which is the question of the day. To resolve this question, this article performs two main tasks. First,

it reexamines the HSE database to determine whether sanctions worked as often as its authors claim. Second, it challenges the causal logic of the theory of economic sanctions, especially whether the nature of modern nation-states provides grounds for today's optimism. The article concludes that economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals. **The HSE study is seriously flawed. Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to examination. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. Of HSE's 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately con- sidered successes.** The deductive case that we should expect sanctions to be more effective in the future is also flawed, because it relies on the expectation that economic punishment can overwhelm a state's commitment to pursue important policy goals. Most modern states, however, resist external pressure. Pervasive nationalism often makes states and societies willing to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon what are seen as the interests of the nation, making even weak or disorganized states unwilling to bend to the demands of foreigners

### **Ceasefire Working (Sanchez - Telegraph)**

Raf Sanchez, Warsaw, Jan 13 2019, "Jeremy Hunt optimistic Yemen is on 'path to peace' if warring sides follow through on UN deal&nbsp;;," Telegraph, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/02/13/jeremy-hunt-optimistic-yemen-path-peace-warring-sides-follow/> (NK)

**Yemen may finally be "on the path to peace"** after nearly five years of war if the two sides follow through on agreements reached at UN-brokered talks last year, Jeremy Hunt has said. Speaking at the start of a Middle East summit in Poland, the Foreign Secretary offered an upbeat assessment of the prospect of ending the Yemen war and easing the world's worst humanitarian crisis. **"This is the best chance we've had for a very long time,"** Mr Hunt told The Telegraph. **"We are on the path to peace but there is still an absence of trust and that's why both sides need to hold their noses and keep going."** Yemen's government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, met its Houthi rebel enemies in Stockholm in December and the two sides agreed to preliminary steps like a prisoner exchange and a ceasefire in the key port of Hodeidah. Mr Hunt said **the Stockholm talks had been "a surprising success" and could help build the trust necessary for a final peace deal.** He said both sides understood the need for a power-sharing agreement in which the Houthis "play a part, but not a dominant part" in Yemen's government. **"What we have now is a commitment to peace, I think it's genuine, I think everyone wants to end this conflict,"** he said. "But we haven't yet seen the full implementation of what was agreed in Stockholm."

## **Link – Instability**

### **The immediate end of arms sales would cause instability in the region**

**Hurlburt 17** Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html> //DF

There is one last reason, regardless of who sits in the White House, for caution when thinking about changes to the relationship. **Rapid change in the Middle East — or anywhere, for that matter — raises the risks of violence, instability, and human suffering. Washington has been so deeply implicated in the region's arrangements for decades that it is just wrong to imagine we could dust our hands and walk away without any human cost following US.** Still, if Washington wants to disentangle itself, there are steps it can take. The fact that those would be slow and led by Congress might actually, given the risk of instability and violence, be just right. Congress can slow down the spigot of military aid and add stronger conditions to get serious about Yemen, where dozens of civilians are dying as horribly as Khashoggi every day. Congress can ease off the energy policies that

promote fossil fuels. Congress can limit the administration's gratuitous attempts to heighten tensions with Iran; there are plenty of real issues in Iranian behavior without creating non-issues. And Congress can insist that more information be released on what we knew, and when, about the plot to murder a journalist in a consulate, historically a place of refuge. Whether the current batch of lawmakers — or perhaps those elected in November — are willing to take any of those steps is another question. Z

## US withdrawal will cause regional destabilization

**Brands 18** Hal Brands, 10-9-2018, "How to Make the Middle East Even Worse? A U.S. Withdrawal," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-09/how-to-make-the-middle-east-even-worse-a-u-s-withdrawal> //DF

The desire to get more out of U.S. allies and partners is sensible enough, as is the notion that America cannot fight full-scale counterinsurgencies in the Middle East forever. Yet the idea that Washington can simply hand off the responsibility for the Mideast's regional order rests on a fatally flawed assumption: that these allies will behave as responsibly and competently as the U.S. wants them to behave after it has largely left the region. To see why this assumption is so flawed, just look at the recent behavior of Saudi Arabia. It is by far the richest state in the region with by far the largest military budget — third largest in the world by some estimates. It already plays an important role in Middle Eastern geopolitics; it could and probably would play a far larger role were the U.S. less involved in the region's affairs. Yet that prospect is not reassuring, because Saudi conduct since 2015 has been destabilizing in the extreme. In March of that year, the Saudis responded to a real but manageable security threat — the takeover of Yemen by Iranian-supported Houthi rebels — with a poorly planned and executed invasion. The war has had not only catastrophic humanitarian effects, but also led to increased Iranian influence in Yemen. In January 2016, the Saudis executed Nimr al-Nimr, a Shiite cleric with a large following in the kingdom's eastern provinces, inflaming sectarian tensions in much of the region. In June 2017, Riyadh engineered a diplomatic showdown with Qatar, meant to make that small country a vassal state. The showdown backfired, causing a rift with the State Department and Pentagon — if not the White House — and leading Qatar to deepen its ties to Iran and Turkey. That November, the Saudi government effectively kidnapped Lebanon's prime minister, Saad Hariri, in a dispute over Iranian influence in his country. That gambit, too, backfired, further destabilizing Lebanon and provoking international condemnation. And last week the Saudi security services reportedly detained — and allegedly murdered — Khashoggi, a fierce critic of the current government, led by Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. If the allegations are true, the Saudi regime carried out an extrajudicial killing of an internationally recognized figure in a way that is sure to infuriate Turkey, another regional power. If this is how one of America's closest friends in the Middle East is behaving, who needs enemies? Much of Saudi Arabia's recent behavior has been linked to the rise of MBS, who seems driven by a combination of ambition, arrogance and recklessness. Yet it is not a coincidence that Saudi misdeeds have accumulated at a time when the U.S. is widely seen to be drawing down in the Middle East. The Saudi invasion of Yemen, for instance, seems to have been motivated by a perception that the Obama administration was no longer committed to containing Iran, so the kingdom would have to do that job itself. The confrontation with Qatar came as the Trump administration — or at least the Trump family — signaled that it was giving Saudi Arabia free rein and retreating from the traditional U.S. role of suppressing, rather than encouraging, fights between its friends. As the U.S. has pulled back modestly, the Saudis have indeed rushed forward, with mostly lamentable results. It is not pleasing to imagine what a regional order in which Saudi Arabia is more empowered and independent would look like. This last point touches on one of the dirty secrets of America's role in the Middle East and other key regions. The U.S. maintains a presence not simply to deter competitors such as Iran, Russia and China. It also manages conflicts between allies — whether Japan and South Korea in East Asia, or Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors — and steers them away from dangerous behavior. Yet this approach only works if the U.S. is present and committed. If it retreats from the Middle East, it will lose whatever restraining leverage it once had over allies and competitors alike. It will leave behind not tranquility, but a more chaotic, rivalrous environment in which other nations feel forced to fend for themselves. In fairness, the problem in the Middle East goes well beyond Saudi Arabia. The Gulf monarchies have always feuded bitterly, but what security and diplomatic cooperation they have achieved has come largely because Washington has been there to tamp down competition and provide reassurance. And as

aggressive as Iran's behavior has been in recent years, its rulers still have had to operate in the shadow of American power. Take away that restraining influence, and the upshot will be behavior that is more provocative still. Americans would not be able, indefinitely, to insulate themselves from the resulting upheaval. As long as energy is traded on a global market and terrorism is an exportable commodity, Middle Eastern chaos will eventually reach out and touch the U.S. The U.S. is entering a period in which its national security resources will be stretched thin, and there will be continuing calls to withdraw from a region that has been the source of such trouble. But those who advocate retrenchment need to be honest about what will follow: a Middle East even more dangerous than the one we know now.

## Link – Lose Inhibitions

### **US relations with Saudi Arabia have stemmed some of the civilian deaths, and would be worse without the US**

**Rogan 18** Tom Rogan, 11-28-2018, "Ending US support for Saudi Arabia would make things much worse in Yemen," Washington Examiner,

<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ending-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-would-make-things-much-worse-in-yemen> //DF

And if you want to understand how a U.S. withdrawal of military support would affect the Saudi war effort, look no further than President Bashar Assad's Syria. The Saudi coalition has far more advanced weapons platforms than the Syrians, but it lacks the integrated command and control, intelligence, targeting, communications, and logistical skill to employ its military effectively. The U.S. has been absolutely critical in filling in the gaps in these areas. And although the Saudis are still too capricious with their use of force, American guidance has helped them target Houthi formations rather than entire city blocks with a few Houthis somewhere inside those blocks. Again, motivated by their historic, cultural, and theological blood feud with Iran, the Saudis would care little about killing thousands more civilians if they believed it might win the war. America is the only check on them at this moment. And, as demonstrated by the Saudi suspension of operations around the port of Hodeidah, that check has held. None of this is palatable for a democracy like ours. We want our world to be without wars. But reality sometimes sucks. And the simple reality of the Yemeni civil war is that it would be, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put it on Wednesday, "a hell of a lot worse" were the U.S. disengaged from it. Yes, Pompeo exaggerates the degree to which Saudi Arabia is a constructive, stable partner for the U.S. in the broader Middle East. Still, he is right on the fundamental issue: that the U.S. needs a Saudi Arabia that is modernizing and stable.

## Link – Russia and China

### **SA is in talks with Russia over defense systems that they aren't getting from the US, showing that they're interested and likely able to make the switch**

**Woody 18** Christopher Woody, 10-8-2018, "The Saudis still haven't locked in the massive arms deals Trump touted, and they're still talking to Russia about its advanced S-400 air defense system," Business Insider,

<https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-hasnt-signed-us-arms-deals-talking-to-russia-about-s-400-2018-10> //DF

President Donald Trump heralded Saudi Arabia's purchase of \$110 billion worth of US arms during a trip to the Middle East in mid-2017. In the weeks afterward, however, it was revealed that the blockbuster sale was in fact "a bunch of letters of interest or intent," according to Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution. Now it seems that some of those deals remain up in the air, and the Saudis have their eyes on a rival's wares.

According to The Washington Post, among the agreements still up in the air is the \$15 billion purchase of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System, made by US defense contractor Lockheed Martin. In a sign of Trump's continued emphasis on arms sales as a component of US foreign policy, White House senior adviser and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner personally intervened with Lockheed to secure a 20% discount for the air-defense system. Yet Riyadh let a September 30 deadline to wrap up that purchase come and go, according to The Post. A Saudi official told The Post that the kingdom was still "highly interested" in the deal. "Like any military purchase," the official added, "there are negotiations happening which we hope will conclude in the quickest means possible." But Trump administration officials told The Post they worried the THAAD price would now increase as US willingness to agree to co-production provisions Saudi Arabia has requested in the contract will decrease. Perhaps more concerning for US officials is Saudi Arabia's continued interest in the Russian-made advanced S-400 air-defense system. According to The Post, the Saudis have resisted US requests to disavow their interest buying the S-400 and have continued talks with Moscow. Saudi Arabia would be only the latest ally with interest in the Russian-made air-defense system. Turkey has already bought the S-400, earning rebuke from the US Congress and creating concerns within the NATO alliance. India also recently agreed to buy the air-defense system during a summit earlier this month — a deal that raises the prospect of US sanctions on New Delhi.

## **Russia and SAs relations are warming rapidly – they've already signed one arms deal – and both nations have deeply vested interests in selling to each other**

**Carroll 17** Oliver Carroll, 10-5-2017, "Russia and Saudi Arabia 'sign \$3bn arms deal' on King Salman visit," Independent,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-king-salman-visit-saudi-arabia-moscow-vladimir-putin-a7985161.html> //DF

A faulty golden aircraft escalator and anger from Moscow's elite about a 200-strong Saudi retinue taking over all the city's 5-star hotels failed to dampen the fanfare accompanying King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on his first state visit to Russia. Met with an honour guard of dignitaries and the Preobrazhensky military orchestra, the Saudi king was sped along on a highway specially lined with billboards advertising the visit and a week-long festival of Saudi culture. This was a big deal for Russia – with multi-billion energy and defence contracts in the balance – and it wanted King Salman to know. Ahead of the visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the event as "an historical moment". At the summit in the Kremlin on Thursday, Vladimir Putin agreed: This was a "landmark event" that would provide a "boost" to relations. And King Salman returned the compliments. Russia was "a friendly country," he said. According to the Kommersant newspaper, agreement has already been reached on a \$3bn (£2.2bn) deal to supply the Saudis with Russia's most advanced air defence missile system, the S400 Triumph. According to the publication, the deal will be signed off at a WTO meeting at the end of October. There may be other deals forthcoming on aircraft and helicopters – that depending on the success of talks. Defence is one of few technological sectors where Russia can still claim to be a world leader, with over a fifth of all arms deals in 2016. But **with China and India, Russia's biggest markets, looking to move towards military self-sufficiency, Russia is with increasing urgency looking to open new markets.** The Saudi partnership comes at the end of several years of courtship – and off the back of a tetchy relationship. Russia first announced that it had brokered a \$20m (£15m) deal back in 2012. But that deal had several strings attached, namely a demand that the Kremlin could not sell the C-300 missile system to Iran, the Saudis' major regional rivals. Then, President Putin looked the other way, signing off on a new arms contract with Tehran worth \$1bn (£762m). That move underlined the historical distrust between the two countries. The Saudis have been accused for supporting anti-Russian insurgency – whether in mujahedeens against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, or Wahhabist Islamic groups in Chechnya and Dagestan. The presence of Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya's rascal president and keen promoter of rival Sufism ideology, at talks in the Kremlin

served as a reminder of those differences. Most recently, Russian operations in Syria have put it in direct conflict with Saudi interests. The Saudis remain opposed to Bashar al-Assad, whose regime is being supported by Russian military power. The Gulf kingdom, on its part, is also believed to be funding rebel groups opposed to al-Assad. But while the sides remain some way from a common position, the Independent has learned negotiators believe progress on de-escalation zones may be made. **"The Saudis have lost interest and realise that Russia now owns the crisis,"** says Yuri Barmin, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. **"They see how the balance of power is changing in the region: how the US is pulling out and how Russia is now increasing its influence in the Middle East."** Russia's geopolitical march in the region has made a highly improbable state visit possible. But the timing of the talks has little to do with Syria. Instead, **King Salman is believed to be in Moscow to shore up international support for his son,** Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, next in line to the throne. **"King Salman wants Russia's backing for his son,"** says Mr Barmin. **"Bin Salman is poorly perceived at home over his role in the unpopular Yemen war and the blockade of Qatar."** **For Russia the stakes are even higher. Hamstrung by Western sanctions and uncompetitive industry, it hopes the new bonhomie will provide impetus to its struggling economy.** On Wednesday, President Putin hinted that there would likely be further cooperation to lift the oil price, the lifeblood of the Russian economy. Ministers also made it clear that they hope the Saudi delegation will deliver on investment from the kingdom's sovereign wealth funds. So far, the record on Saudi investment is poor. Of \$10bn (£7bn) promised to Russia in 2015, only \$1 billion has actually ever materialised.

## **Key card that says Russia and Saudi Arabia will fill gaps in US arms, meaning they will replace what we're not putting in**

**Carey 18** Glen Carey, 3-2-2018, "Saudis Want to Make Their Own Weapons. Russia Is Eager to Help," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/saudis-want-to-make-their-own-weapons-russia-is-eager-to-help> //DF

**Saudi Arabia aims to build a defense industry at breakneck speed, and it's ready to look beyond its traditional Western allies for help.** The oil-rich kingdom has long been a favorite customer of arms sellers, especially American ones. President Donald Trump announced \$110 billion in deals during his trip there last year. Now, 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants to make weapons at home, and he's set an ambitious goal: Half of Saudi procurement is supposed to be done locally by 2030, from about 2 percent today. Read more: Who is Mohammed bin Salman? -- a QuickTake profile Saudi Prince's Revamp Turns To Military And Companies See Deals AFED show in Riyadh. Photographer: Mohammed Almualemi/Bloomberg The Saudis will need partners -- which means opportunities for Western companies, who were energetically exploring them at an arms fair in Riyadh this week. But there's a potential catch. For joint ventures to work, **U.S. and European governments may have to sign off on transfers of technology.** 'Other Partners' **In case they're reluctant to do so, the Saudis are making it clear that they have other options. They're already planning to buy the Russian S-400 air-defense system,** under a deal that would let them manufacture related products at home. **The prospect of more such agreements is likely to alarm American policy makers, who worry about losing ground to Russia and China in the Middle East.** Saudi Prince's Revamp Turns To Military And Companies See Deals Andreas Schwer Photographer: Mohammed Almualemi/Bloomberg "We will very carefully evaluate what our partners can bring to the table," Andreas Schwer, head of Saudi Arabian Military Industries or SAMI, said in an interview Tuesday at the Riyadh fair. "We won't hesitate to go to second-tier suppliers or other potential partners, if they have full governmental support and no restrictions," said Schwer, previously an executive at German defense group Rheinmetall AG. Saudi Arabia "could end up with other partners," and with less U.S. involvement than some people would like, he said. Filling the Gaps One of those people just delivered a warning to Congress on precisely this issue. **Russia and China are seeking "to fill in perceived gaps in U.S. interest by increasing defense cooperation and sales of their equipment to our regional partners,"** General Joseph Votel, the head of U.S. Central Command, told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 27. Russia's influence in the Middle East has soared since 2015, when its military intervention in Syria swung the civil war in President Bashar al-Assad's favor. China's economic role in the region is expanding, as it signs deals with Iran and seeks to get involved in rebuilding Syria.

## **SA would absolutely shift towards buying arms from China and Russia if the US ended sales, nations which already have increasing economic and diplomatic ties**

**Turak 18** Natasha Turak, 6-14-2018, "Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/23/threats-of-us-sanctions-could-accelerate-a-saudi-shift-eastward.html> //DF

German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday announced a hold on arms sales to the kingdom for the time being, a move lauded by many in the international community. But some now fear that severing arms sales to the Saudis will simply push them to turn eastward. "If the U.S. and West in general move toward some meaningful sanctions of Saudi Arabia, we would be joking to imagine that the Saudis would just sit down and accept it," Ayham Kamel, head of Eurasia Group's Middle East and North Africa practice, told CNBC's "Squawk Box Europe" Monday. "The Saudis I think will begin to tilt — they were already doing that beforehand — they'll be doing more business with China and Russia. I doubt Mr. Putin would've given the Saudis much trouble with this crisis as Mr. Trump has." The scandal has prompted scores of ministers and CEOs to withdraw from a major international summit being held this week in Riyadh, aimed at showcasing Saudi Arabia's investment opportunities. But while U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has pulled out along with heavyweight American CEOs like Jamie Dimon and Larry Fink, the heads of Russia's direct investment fund (RDIF) will still be in attendance. Testing ties Khashoggi, a columnist for the Washington Post and frequent critic of the Saudi royal family, disappeared after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on October 2. Turkish officials allege he was murdered and dismembered by a Saudi hit squad. After initially insisting that Khashoggi left the consulate unharmed, the Saudi government last week said that he died in a "fistfight" while in the building, but provided few details and no evidence. Multiple investigations are underway. An opportunity for Russia and China? Saudi Arabia has already been increasing business with the Russians and the Chinese. In June, Vladimir Putin hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Kremlin, where the two agreed to "expand cooperation in oil and gas matters" after working together on output deals to stabilize markets amid fluctuating global crude prices. And October of last year saw the first-ever visit of a Saudi monarch — King Salman — to Russia, during which a \$1 billion joint investment fund was created and 15 cooperation agreements were signed in the areas of technology, defense and agriculture, including Moscow's readiness to sell Riyadh its S-400 missile defense system. China, meanwhile, is the kingdom's largest trading partner, with \$42 billion in bilateral trade in 2017. Last March, the two signed a raft of deals worth a reported \$65 billion in sectors ranging from energy to space technology. Some in Riyadh have also talked of trading oil in yuan instead of dollars as retaliation for potential U.S. sanctions. But as trade tensions with the U.S. continue to put strain on China's economy, it is likely to lay low at this stage to avoid further conflict with the U.S. administration. Additionally, China is far from able to match U.S. weapons production in terms of sophistication and capabilities, defense experts say. Beijing sold just \$20 million in arms to the Saudis last year, compared to \$3.4 billion in exports from the U.S., according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Maintaining stability Riyadh's increasing engagement with eastern power centers is not necessarily new, but this diplomatic crisis could spur its acceleration, according to Saman Vakil, a research fellow at U.K. think tank Chatham House and a professor at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies. "In Riyadh, diversification of relationships and not putting all their eggs in Washington's basket has been a longstanding policy," Vakil told CNBC, describing energy deals with China dating back to the 1990s. "And it could be in their continued interest, because if there are forthcoming sanctions from the EU or the U.S. on human rights issues, obviously China's policy of non-interference would make sense for them, strategically speaking."



## **SA would turn to Russia because it views the war in Yemen as of critical importance; the other Gulf states would likely follow, too**

**Svet 16** Oleg Svet, 9-26-2016, "Why Congress Supports Saudi Arms Sales," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-congress-supports-saudi-arms-sales-17840> //DF

Maintaining a robust security cooperation relationship with Saudi Arabia also helps America's defense industry in the region as a whole. Saudi Arabia is the most important member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes five other large purchasers of American defense articles: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are gradually creating a multinational, interoperable force that requires all of the countries to maintain similar weapons systems. When Saudi Arabia purchases U.S. defense articles, other countries in the Gulf follow suit. For example, a \$7 billion deal to sell three dozen F-15 jets to Qatar and twenty-eight Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to Kuwait is currently in the works. Furthermore, in the crucial period from 2011 to 2015 (when U.S. defense spending was especially under strain), the UAE was the second-largest importer of U.S. defense articles, after Saudi Arabia. In 2015, the United States sold \$33 billion in defense articles and services to the GCC countries. For large American defense companies, such exports are crucial. In recent years an estimated one-quarter of Raytheon's sales came from foreign purchases. A few years ago, the UAE's \$3.3 billion order enabled Raytheon to restart the Patriot production line and add new features. Such purchases save highly-skilled manufacturing jobs in the United States, and, by adding advanced capabilities, will help win new customers unless Congress blocks them from happening. If Senators Paul and Murphy would have succeeded in their measure, Riyadh would almost certainly have gone to another large military supplier, possibly **Russia. Saudi** and other GCC **officials fear that Iran, which is not only ideologically and theologically diametrically opposed to the Kingdom, but also has a population and territory several times the size of Saudi Arabia, poses an existential threat.** The uncomfortable truth is that Yemen is a proxy war in the Saudi-Iranian competition. **Riyadh feels that it must win in Yemen against the Houthi rebels (who the Saudis are convinced are sponsored by Iran), and the only way to win is through military power. Saudi Arabia does not have an indigenous military industry to support the war; it has to find military suppliers to sustain its war effort.** Had the sale been blocked and Saudi Arabia shifted to Russia, China, or other suppliers for military purchases, other Gulf States would have followed suit, putting in jeopardy an additional tens of billions of dollars in sales by American multinational companies and thousands of highly-skilled manufacturing jobs. Going forward, when considering whether to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia, therefore, Congress should not only worry about the particular sale in question. It should also consider the wider negative implications that a suspension would have on tens of thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs all across America, tens of billions of dollars in revenues for U.S. companies, and the wider defense industry.

## **There is historical precedent for Saudis going to other countries when the US doesn't give them what it wants, and Russia will sell SA weapons systems**

**Daniels 17** Jeff Daniels, 5-6-2017, "Russia tries to elbow its way into Saudi Arabia arms club," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html> //DF

Clearly, Moscow is unlikely to replace Washington as the kingdom's chief arms supplier. American defense firms still dominate when it comes to big-ticket arms sales to the Saudis. Even so, the Russians appear willing to sell advanced weapons systems that probably wouldn't get approved by the United States due to opposition from Israel and members in Congress. Indeed, the Saudis previously expressed interest in ballistic missiles from Russia, particularly the Iskander missile system. **Back in the 1980s, the Saudis turned to China for advanced ballistic missiles. "When the Saudis struck that arms deal with China, it was because the United States was not inclined at the time to provide that kind of capability to Saudi Arabia, so they went elsewhere,"** Dalton said. At the same time, it's also possible Russians could one day help the Saudis develop a homegrown ballistic missile capability, which is something Iran demonstrated last year when it tested a Zolfaqr solid-fuel missile. Iran previously threatened to use the tactical missile against its rival Israel. Russia helped Iran build

its first civilian nuclear power plant in 2011 and have teamed with them on a second plant. Moscow also offered assistance to the Saudis as they embarked on an ambitious \$80 billion plan to build more than a dozen nuclear power plants.

## **There is also precedent for US allies switching to Russian arms**

**Carey 18** Glen Carey, 3-2-2018, "Saudis Want to Make Their Own Weapons. Russia Is Eager to Help," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/saudis-want-to-make-their-own-weapons-russia-is-eager-to-help> //DF

'Many Have Reconsidered' To be sure, Saudi-U.S. ties have deeper roots. They stretch back to before World War II. And Trump has assured Saudi leaders that he's keen to sign more defense deals. But close relations have been accompanied by skepticism on the American side about Saudi military capabilities. Doubts have been fueled by the kingdom's struggle to defeat poorly equipped rebels in Yemen, over three years of war that have taken a heavy civilian toll. Some members of Congress have opposed weapons deals with the Saudis, and transfers of nuclear technology. **One longtime U.S. ally in the neighborhood has already angered Washington by switching arms suppliers. NATO member Turkey is buying the S-400 from Russia.** During a visit last month, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made his opposition clear. America has been "advising countries around the world" that they could fall afoul of U.S. sanctions by going ahead with arms purchases from Russia, Tillerson said. "Many have reconsidered." 'Special Arrangements'

## **There are numerous examples of China and Russia acting quickly to sell arms to states the US has negged on**

**Benard 19** Alexander Benard, 7-1-2018, "America Needs to Sell More Weapons," WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-to-sell-more-weapons-1530477651> //DF

These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence, U.S. strategic interests must be given more weight. **Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world's second-largest weapons supplier,** comprising 22% of global sales from 2013-17. **Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40% from 2013-17** compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. **Neither Russia nor China has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators.** In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And **they are especially eager to peel off countries the U.S. has declined to arm.** Russia sells aircraft, submarines, antiaircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to U.S. security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese—such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms—cannot integrate effectively with U.S. technologies. The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the U.S. in the future, pushing a country further out of America's security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the U.S. needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China. Countries cut off by the U.S. will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the U.S. for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This eliminates a key lever for U.S. influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance. **Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from U.S. manufacturers, but was turned down** due to concerns around deteriorating governance. **Then in late 2017 it acquired a sophisticated missile-defense system from Russia for \$2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** **Vietnam's relations with the U.S. have been pleasantly thawing,** partly because of a common concern around China's aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. **The U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales** to sonars and radars. In addition the U.S. has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help

offset costs. As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia, which often subsidizes the transactions. Or consider Thailand, traditionally one of America's closest security partners in Asia. A 2014 coup caused concern about the country's trajectory and led the U.S. to limit some weapons sales. China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over \$1 billion of submarines to the Thai navy. In late 2017 Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval center with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment. There are more examples around the world. As the U.S. moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.

## **Turn: ending arms sales will just make Saudi Arabia more reckless and prompt them to buy from Russia, with whose weapons they will kill more civilians**

**Chollet 18** Derek Chollet, Ilan Goldenberg, 11-30-2018, "The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-given-a-choice-stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-consequences-mbs-khashoggi/> //DF

It might feel good for the United States to turn its back on the Saudis, but that won't enhance U.S. interests or save lives. The United States has leverage it must use, but that has to be carefully estimated. **A divorce will not cause the Saudis to walk away from the war in Yemen or make up with the Qataris. If anything, the end result will be the Saudis will be less restrained, because they will no longer feel the need to acquiesce to U.S. requests. They will certainly feel the loss of sophisticated American weaponry, but the Russians will step in and supply them with less accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in Yemen (for evidence of that, consider Syria).** The United States will no longer be complicit in problematic Saudi behavior, but that behavior won't stop. Moreover, there is some truth to the argument that Saudi cooperation on counterterrorism, countering Iran, managing oil prices, and investing in the U.S. economy are important benefits, even if they do not matter as much as Trump thinks they do.

**Mckernan 18** Bethan Mckernan, 7-25-2018, "Rise in civilian deaths in Syria caused by Russian airstrikes, report finds," Independent, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-rise-civilian-deaths-russian-bombing-a8463776.html> //DF

**The brutal toll of major Russian-backed Syrian government assaults on rebel-held parts of the country so far this year has been highlighted in a new report which found that Russian airstrikes have killed at least 2,882 civilians in 2018 so far. Research by Airwars, a UK-based not-for-profit tracking the cost of airstrikes on civilian populations in Syria, Iraq and Libya, found there had been a 34 per cent increase in incidents of civilian harm caused by Russia during the first six months of this year compared to 2017. Airwars documented a new total of 3,445 civilian casualties which can be directly linked to Russian aircraft, but noted that the actual number of deaths could be as high as 18,000.** To date, the Russian government has not acknowledged responsibility for any civilian casualties in its operations. The 2018 spike corresponds with huge offensives from Syrian president Bashar al Assad to retake eastern Ghouta in Damascus and southern Deraa province, two of the last rebel strongholds in the country. The Ghouta operation in April also saw the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government, which killed up to 85 people and led to retaliatory strikes on a Syrian military base by US President Donald Trump. "This huge jump is reflective of the aggressive campaigns Russia has been involved in this year," Airwars director Chris Woods told The Independent. "With every international belligerent in Syria we see very poor outcomes for civilians but we do not generally see deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure with the US coalition like we do with Russia.

## Link – Ceasefire

### **The ceasefire is holding – uniqueness is on con's side for a solution**

**Wintour 19** Patrick Wintour, 1-30-2019, "Yemen ceasefire looks dire but is holding, says UN envoy," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/30/yemen-ceasefire-is-holding-says-un-envoy> //DF

Yemen's fragile ceasefire is holding and Saudi Arabia remains intent on reaching a negotiated end to the four-year-old civil war, Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for the country, has said. Admitting the state of the ceasefire looked dire from the outside, he nevertheless said the key metric for the UN was the absence of offensive military operations to take territory and the end of Saudi airstrikes in the area. Griffiths has been in Yemen's capital, Sana'a, and the Red Sea port of Hodeidah this week to discuss blockages to agreements reached in UN-led talks in Stockholm in December. Yemen has been gripped by civil war between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed – and UN-recognised – Yemen government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi since 2015. Griffiths said the vital next steps were gaining access to grain in Hodeidah's mills, and a UN-sponsored meeting between the warring factions to start the process of redeploying Houthi troops. Speaking on BBC Radio 4, he said the UN world food programme needed access to the mills in which enough grain to feed nearly 4 million Yemenis for a month had remained since October. Houthis claimed on Wednesday they were fired on by government forces as they tried to de-mine the route to the mills. Griffiths also said he had plans for the UN-led redeployment co-ordination committee (RCC), bringing together the rival military leaderships, to restart its meetings within the next few days. The Houthis recently refused to attend the RCC meeting as it was due to be held in Yemen government-held territory. Griffiths refused to disclose the proposed venue or agenda for the next critical meeting but said: "It is the redeployments out of the port and out of the city which are the essential aim of the Stockholm agreement – to demilitarise the entire port and city area. If we don't, the ceasefire will inevitably fray and disappear." The Houthi forces are reluctant to withdraw from the city and port, and allow a new security force to take over. The nature of that security force is disputed and was not spelled out in the Stockholm agreement. Griffiths said: "The Saudis are incredibly helpful in trying to make these things work." He added: "At the political level we have the will – making this happen operationally on the ground – the first time ever these two sides have promised to disengage – is complicated and one bullet can change somebody's life. It is tricky, it's not perfect but we have to move forward." Some limited prisoner exchanges have started.

### **US support is the only thing enabling a move towards a ceasefire**

**Rogan 18** Tom Rogan, 11-28-2018, "Ending US support for Saudi Arabia would make things much worse in Yemen," Washington Examiner, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ending-us-support-for-saudi-arabia-would-make-things-much-worse-in-yemen> //DF

But the problem is that the senators are wrong. If the U.S. pulls its functional support for the Saudi alliance, two negative consequences will immediately follow. First, the Saudis will lose all the inhibitions about accurate targeting of Houthi formations that American intervention has forced. Second, Riyadh will lose interest in energetic efforts by Washington to reach a durable cease fire. Both of those developments will be disastrous for Yemeni civilians. For a start, the only reason the Saudis are now moving toward a cease fire is the Trump administration's pressure. Trump has earned Saudi trust and their corresponding deference on issues negatively affecting America: in this case, the human suffering of the Yemeni civil war. The Saudis have not suddenly woken up and realized that the war is causing too much suffering without adequate prospect of strategic gain. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sees Yemen as a defining battleground in an existential fight against Iran. With Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at Riyadh and helping assassinate erstwhile Saudi allies, it is ludicrous to think the prince would cease his war effort absent the present mix of major U.S. pressure

and resolute U.S. support. And if you want to understand how a U.S. withdrawal of military support would affect the Saudi war effort, look no further than President Bashar Assad's Syria. The Saudi coalition has far more advanced weapons platforms than the Syrians, but it lacks the integrated command and control, intelligence, targeting, communications, and logistical skill to employ its military effectively. The U.S. has been absolutely critical in filling in the gaps in these areas.

## Link – Empowering Iran

### **Ending arms sales would be a one-sided move that would just empower Iran and prolong the conflict**

**Posey 18** Madyson Hutchinson Posey, 1-22-2018, "Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/ending-us-military-support-saudi-arabia-yemen-would-trigger-dangerous> //DF

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah ("Supporters of Allah") movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missile strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants "Death to America" and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it. The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran's hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

## **Houthi fighting tactics are brutal and resulted in 7,000 dead even before SA entered the war**

**Alasarar 18** FATIMA ABO ALASRAR [Senior Analyst, The Arabia Foundation], 10-25-2018, "U.S. POLICY AND THE WAR IN YEMEN," The Brookings Institution,

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/fp\\_20181025\\_yemen\\_war\\_transcript.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/fp_20181025_yemen_war_transcript.pdf)

They have threatened, you know, political parties. They overthrew the government of Yemen, placed the entire cabinet under house arrest and ultimately in 2014 in September they took large amounts of land. The capital Sana'a fell, the sea port of Hudaydah on the west coast. There, you know, Taj was under siege. Aden was also seeing a lot of fights in the south and it was really a brutal warfare. And just to put things in perspective, within six months of the Houthi Saleh alliance that took place, about 7,000 people died and this was long before Saudi led coalition intervened. These statistics are local statistics from credible organizations in Yemen and usually the media doesn't report on them. Not because of lack of access or information but perhaps mostly because no one is really interested in telling that part of the story. So the Arab coalition intervention probably has been one of the most horrific or catastrophic for Yemen because it started in March 2015 and it was based on the government of Yemen's request from Saudi Arabia and others to remove the Houthi militia but it ended up being a quagmire as we all know and it was catastrophic because it also added another layer to the conflict on top of the local one. So now you have compounded conflicts in Yemen that are taking place and of course also no one really thought that the Houthi's were going to be intimidated by this. In fact Houthi's just really loved fighting. During their war with President Saleh they really made a mockery of Yemen's army. Kids that were, you know, six years old would put hand grenades in tanks in the battlefield and, you know, it was just -- it was dirty guerrilla warfare and they spared no ugly tactic in this war.

**R2R**

We negate, resolved: the United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Our sole contention is that ending arms sales will destabilize an already fragile situation in Yemen.

The Current ceasefire that has been established in Yemen has been the longest and most successful yet. Just yesterday, British Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt Announced: Yemen may finally be “on the path to peace” “This is the best chance we’ve had for a very long time,” the recent talks in Stockholm talks had been “a surprising success” and could help build the trust necessary for a final peace deal.. ”

Such progress has only been possible because of the US relationship with Saudi Arabia. Tom Rogan writes in the Washington Examiner in 2018: the only reason the Saudis are now moving toward a cease fire is the Trump administration's pressure. Trump has earned Saudi trust and their corresponding deference on the Yemeni civil war. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sees Yemen as a defining battleground in an existential fight against Iran. With Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at Riyadh and helping assassinate erstwhile Saudi allies, it is ludicrous to think the prince would cease his war effort absent the present mix of major U.S. pressure and resolute U.S. support.

Ending arms sales, what amounts to a US sanction on Saudi Arabia, will destroy this balance and plunge Yemen back into the throes of chaos for two reasons.

1. The Saudis would buy weapons that would kill even more civilians.

Arms embargoes fail because the target countries always find other suppliers. For example, Oliver Sprague at the Control Arms association finds in 2006: every one of the 13 United Nations arms embargoes imposed in the last decade has been systematically violated.

If Saudi Arabia can't buy weapons from the US, they'll simply turn to other countries. Natasha Turak explains in CNBC in 2018: If the U.S. moves toward some meaningful sanctions of Saudi Arabia, we would be joking to imagine that the Saudis would just sit down and accept it. The Saudis will begin to tilt to China and Russia.

Saudi Arabia has already made moves toward Russia in anticipation of less US arms sales. Oliver Carroll writes in the Independent in 2017: agreement has already been reached on a deal to supply the Saudis with Russia's most advanced air defence missile system. The Saudis see how the balance of power is changing in the region: how the US is pulling out and how Russia is now increasing its influence in the Middle East.

Not only will buying weapons from Russia and China enable Saudi Arabia to continue the conflict, but it will result in more civilian deaths. Derek Chollet writes in Foreign Policy magazine in 2018: the Russians will step in and supply Saudi Arabia with less accurate weapons that will likely just kill more in Yemen (for evidence of that, consider Syria).

In Syria, Bethan Mckernan reports in the Independent in 2018: there had been a 34 per cent increase in incidents of civilian harm caused by Russian airstrikes compared to 2017, with civilian casualties which can be directly linked to Russian aircraft.

2. The Saudis would become reckless and less constrained by the US.

The US alliance with Saudi Arabia is imperfect, but it is worlds better than not having any check on their actions. Hal Brands at Bloomberg writes in 2018: it is not a coincidence that Saudi misdeeds have accumulated at a time when the U.S. is widely seen to be drawing down in the Middle East. The Saudi invasion of Yemen, seems to have been motivated by a perception that the Obama administration was no longer committed to containing Iran, so the kingdom would have to do that job itself.. If it retreats from the Middle East, it will lose whatever restraining leverage it once had over allies and competitors alike. It will leave behind not tranquility, but a more chaotic, rivalrous environment in which other nations feel forced to fend for themselves.

US relations with Saudi Arabia have prevented many civilian deaths. Tom Rogan writes in the Washington Examiner in 2018: although the Saudis are still too capricious with their use of force, American guidance has helped them target Houthi formations rather than entire city blocks with a few Houthis somewhere inside those blocks. Motivated by their historic, cultural, and theological blood feud with Iran, the Saudis would care little about killing thousands more civilians if they believed it might win the war. America is the only check on them at this moment. And, as demonstrated by the Saudi suspension of operations around the port of Hodeidah, that check has held.



**Friedman 18** Thomas L. Friedman, 10-16-2018, "America's Dilemma: Censuring M.B.S. and Not Halting Saudi Reforms," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/opinion/jamal-khashoggi-saudi-mohammed-bin-salman.html>

//DF

For starters, I believe that the promise of M.B.S., however much you did or did not think he could bring social, economic and religious reform, is finished. He's made himself radioactive — absent a credible, independent exoneration for Jamal's disappearance and apparent murder. M.B.S. may be able to hold onto power in Saudi Arabia, but his whole reform program required direct foreign investment — and money has been flowing out of Saudi Arabia for months, not in. Now it will get worse. Yes, I covered the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre. I know that money has a short memory. But Saudi Arabia is not China. There has been just way too much craziness coming out of the M.B.S. government for many investors to want to make long-term bets there today, which is too bad. It will weaken any hopes of future reform. And here's one more complication. Even if M.B.S. were pushed aside, if you think there are a 100 Saudi royals with the steel, cunning and ruthlessness he had to push through women driving, removing the Islamic police from the streets and reopening cinemas, you are wrong. There are not. All of these reforms had intense conservative opponents. This is not Denmark, and yet, without sweeping social, economic and religious reforms, Saudi Arabia could well become a huge failed state. Remember, one of ISIS' biggest sources of young recruits was Saudi Arabia. And by the way, if you think M.B.S. had a dark side, you ought to look under some rocks in the kingdom. You will find some people there with long beards who don't speak English who believe the most crazy stuff about Shiites, Jews, Christians, Hindus, America and the West. And right now, trust me, they are applauding Jamal's assumed murder. So, once again, what do we do? I don't have a simple answer. It's a mess. All I know is that we have to find some way to censure M.B.S. for this — without seeming to attack the whole Saudi people and destabilize the country. And we have to make sure that the social/religious reform process in Saudi Arabia proceeds — whoever is in charge there. Because that is a vital U.S. interest.

US sanctions on Iran empowered Iranian hardliners

“Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift eastward”

“Forthcoming Us sanctions sound death knell for Rouhani Administration”

Robert Pape and David Baldwin “Evaluating Economic Sanctions”

These qualify as an arms embargo or weapons sanction b/c its the refusal to trade in order to get political concessions

4. Saudis may stop bombing, but would turn to a formal invasion or sponsor more paramilitaries, which would result in more civilian deaths. Tradeoffs

5. It will empower Iran

1. Khashoggi wants mil and econ success; if sanctions tank econ, shift more to mil

# FRONTLINES

## Russia & China

R/T RUS is Iran ally

**They will always put their security interests above (ex. US sells weapons to both India and Pakistan)**

**SA is realizing that as the US pulls out of the region, Russia will become the power player and they want to get in on the action**

**Carroll 17** Oliver Carroll, 10-5-2017, "Russia and Saudi Arabia 'sign \$3bn arms deal' on King Salman visit," Independent,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-king-salman-visit-saudi-arabia-moscow-vladimir-putin-a7985161.html> //DF

A faulty golden aircraft escalator and anger from Moscow's elite about a 200-strong Saudi retinue taking over all the city's 5-star hotels failed to dampen the fanfare accompanying King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on his first state visit to Russia. Met with an honour guard of dignitaries and the Preobrazhensky military orchestra, the Saudi king was sped along on a highway specially lined with billboards advertising the visit and a week-long festival of Saudi culture. This was a big deal for Russia – with multi-billion energy and defence contracts in the balance – and it wanted King Salman to know. Ahead of the visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the event as “an historical moment”. At the summit in the Kremlin on Thursday, Vladimir Putin agreed: This was a “landmark event” that would provide a “boost” to relations. And King Salman returned the compliments. Russia was “a friendly country,” he said. According to the Kommersant newspaper, agreement has already been reached on a \$3bn (£2.2bn) deal to supply the Saudis with Russia's most advanced air defence missile system, the S400 Triumph. According to the publication, the deal will be signed off at a WTO meeting at the end of October. There may be other deals forthcoming on aircraft and helicopters – that depending on the success of talks. Defence is one of few technological sectors where Russia can still claim to be a world leader, with over a fifth of all arms deals in 2016. But with China and India, Russia's biggest markets, looking to move towards military self-sufficiency, Russia is with increasing urgency looking to open new markets. The Saudi partnership comes at the end of several years of courtship – and off the back of a tetchy relationship. Russia first announced that it had brokered a \$20m (£15m) deal back in 2012. But that deal had several strings attached, namely a demand that the Kremlin could not sell the C-300 missile system to Iran, the Saudis' major regional rivals. Then, President Putin looked the other way, signing off on a new arms contract with Tehran worth \$1bn (£762m). That move underlined the historical distrust between the two countries. The Saudis have been accused for supporting anti-Russian insurgency – whether in mujahedeens against Soviet troops in Afghanistan, or Wahhabist Islamic groups in Chechnya and Dagestan. The presence of Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya's rascal president and keen promoter of rival Sufism ideology, at talks in the Kremlin served as a reminder of those differences. Most recently, Russian operations in Syria have put it in direct conflict with Saudi interests. The Saudis remain opposed to Bashar al-Assad, whose regime is being supported by Russian military power. The gulf kingdom, on its part, is also believed to be funding rebel groups opposed to al-Assad. But while the sides remain some way from a common position, the Independent has learned negotiators believe progress on de-escalation zones may be made. “The

**Saudis have lost interest and realise that Russia now owns the crisis,**” says Yuri Barmin, an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council. **“They see how the balance of power is changing in the region: how the US is pulling out and how Russia is now increasing its influence in the Middle East.”** Russia’s geopolitical march in the region has made a highly improbable state visit possible. But the timing of the talks has little to do with Syria. Instead, **King Salman is believed to be in Moscow to shore up international support for his son,** Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, next in line to the throne. **“King Salman wants Russia’s backing for his son,”** says Mr Barmin. **“Bin Salman is poorly perceived at home over his role in the unpopular Yemen war and the blockade of Qatar.”** For Russia the stakes are even higher. **Hamstrung by Western sanctions and uncompetitive industry, it hopes the new bonhomie will provide impetus to its struggling economy.** On Wednesday, President Putin hinted that there would likely be further cooperation to lift the oil price, the lifeblood of the Russian economy. Ministers also made it clear that they hope the Saudi delegation will deliver on investment from the kingdom’s sovereign wealth funds. So far, the record on Saudi investment is poor. Of \$10bn (£7bn) promised to Russia in 2015, only \$1billion has actually ever materialised.

R/T RUS won’t sell

**Russia isn’t a treaty ally w/ Iran, they just have warm relations. Countries fund both sides of conflicts all the time. RUS also only w/ Iran to balance the US, so they’d be happy to sell to SA**

**Russia has three key interests in selling SA arms.**

**1. With Russia’s largest arms purchasers, China and India, becoming self-sufficient, Russia needs a new arms market. The Saudis provide that perfect opportunity because they buy so many arms (Carroll 17)**

**2. Hamstrung by Western sanctions and uncompetitive industry, it hopes the new bonhomie will provide impetus to its struggling economy (Carroll 17)**

**3. Russia and China are seeking “to fill in perceived gaps in U.S. interest by increasing defense cooperation and sales of their equipment to our regional partners (Carey 18)**

**Carroll 17** Oliver Carroll,10-5-2017, "Russia and Saudi Arabia 'sign \$3bn arms deal' on King Salman visit," Independent,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-king-salman-visit-saudi-arabia-moscow-vladimir-putin-a7985161.html> //DF

A faulty golden aircraft escalator and anger from Moscow’s elite about a 200-strong Saudi retinue taking over all the city’s 5-star hotels failed to dampen the fanfare accompanying King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on his first state visit to Russia. Met with an honour guard of dignitaries and the Preobrazhensky military orchestra, the Saudi king was sped along on a highway specially lined with billboards advertising the visit and a week-long festival of Saudi culture. This was a big deal for Russia – with multi-billion energy and defence contracts in the balance – and it wanted King Salman to know. Ahead of the visit, **Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the event as “an historical moment”.** At the summit in the Kremlin on Thursday, Vladimir Putin agreed: **This was a “landmark event” that would provide a “boost” to relations. And King Salman returned the compliments. Russia was “a friendly country,”** he said. According to the Kommersant newspaper, **agreement has**

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**Carey 18** Glen Carey, 3-2-2018, "Saudis Want to Make Their Own Weapons. Russia Is Eager to Help," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/saudis-want-to-make-their-own-weapons-russia-is-eager-to-help> //DF

**Saudi Arabia aims to build a defense industry at breakneck speed, and it's ready to look beyond its traditional Western allies for help.** The oil-rich kingdom has long been a favorite customer of arms sellers, especially American ones. President Donald Trump announced \$110 billion in deals during his trip there last year. Now, 32 year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman wants to make weapons at home, and he's set an ambitious goal: Half of Saudi procurement is supposed to be done locally by 2030, from about 2 percent today. Read more: Who is Mohammed bin Salman? -- a QuickTake profile Saudi Prince's Revamp Turns To Military And Companies See Deals AFED show in Riyadh. Photographer: Mohammed Almualemi/Bloomberg The Saudis will need partners -- which means opportunities for Western companies, who were energetically exploring them at an arms fair in Riyadh this week. But there's a potential catch. For joint ventures to work, **U.S. and European governments may have to sign off on transfers of technology.** 'Other Partners' **In case they're reluctant to do so, the Saudis are making it clear that they have other options. They're already planning to buy the Russian S-400 air-defense system,** under a deal that would let them manufacture related products at home. **The prospect of more such agreements is likely to alarm American policy makers, who worry about losing ground to Russia and China in the Middle East.** Saudi Prince's Revamp Turns To Military And Companies See Deals Andreas Schwer Photographer: Mohammed Almualemi/Bloomberg "We will very carefully evaluate what our partners can bring to the table," Andreas Schwer, head of Saudi Arabian Military Industries or SAMI, said in an interview Tuesday at the

Riyadh fair. "We won't hesitate to go to second-tier suppliers or other potential partners, if they have full governmental support and no restrictions," said Schwer, previously an executive at German defense group Rheinmetall AG. Saudi Arabia "could end up with other partners," and with less U.S. involvement than some people would like, he said. Filling the Gaps One of those people just delivered a warning to Congress on precisely this issue. **Russia and China are seeking "to fill in perceived gaps in U.S. interest by increasing defense cooperation and sales of their equipment to our regional partners,"** General Joseph Votel, the head of U.S. Central Command, told the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 27. Russia's influence in the Middle East has soared since 2015, when its military intervention in Syria swung the civil war in President Bashar al-Assad's favor. China's economic role in the region is expanding, as it signs deals with Iran and seeks to get involved in rebuilding Syria.

## R/T Interoperability

**1. They will subsume economic costs in order to keep the war going because it matters so much to them. They are a \$2 trillion economy, the 19th largest GDP in the world. The idea that they would stop their campaign because we end the flow of parts is hubris on our behalf.**

**2. Even if the US systems are too pricey, they'll buy ballistic missiles. Many other options for SA. If they don't have planes, they have soldiers**

**There is historical precedent for Saudis going to other countries when the US doesn't give them what it wants, and Russia will sell SA weapons systems**

**Daniels 17** Jeff Daniels, 5-6-2017, "Russia tries to elbow its way into Saudi Arabia arms club," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html> //DF Clearly, Moscow is unlikely to replace Washington as the kingdom's chief arms supplier. American defense firms still dominate when it comes to big-ticket arms sales to the Saudis. Even so, **the Russians appear willing to sell advanced weapons systems** that probably wouldn't get approved by the United States due to opposition from Israel and members in Congress. Indeed, **the Saudis previously expressed interest in ballistic missiles from Russia**, particularly the Iskander missile system. **Back in the 1980s, the Saudis turned to China for advanced ballistic missiles. "When the Saudis struck that arms deal with China, it was because the United States was not inclined at the time to provide that kind of capability to Saudi Arabia, so they went elsewhere,"** Dalton said. At the same time, **it's also possible Russians could one day help the Saudis develop a homegrown ballistic missile capability**, which is something Iran demonstrated last year when it tested a Zolfaqar solid-fuel missile. Iran previously threatened to use the tactical missile against its rival Israel. Russia helped Iran build its first civilian nuclear power plant in 2011 and have teamed with them on a second plant. Moscow also offered assistance to the Saudis as they embarked on an ambitious \$80 billion plan to build more than a dozen nuclear power plants.

**There is also precedent for US allies switching to Russian arms**

**Carey 18** Glen Carey, 3-2-2018, "Saudis Want to Make Their Own Weapons. Russia Is Eager to Help," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/saudis-want-to-make-their-own-weapons-russia-is-eager-to-help> //DF

'Many Have Reconsidered' To be sure, Saudi-U.S. ties have deeper roots. They stretch back to before World War II. And Trump has assured Saudi leaders that he's keen to sign more defense deals. But close relations have been accompanied by skepticism on the American side about

Saudi military capabilities. Doubts have been fueled by the kingdom's struggle to defeat poorly equipped rebels in Yemen, over three years of war that have taken a heavy civilian toll. Some members of Congress have opposed weapons deals with the Saudis, and transfers of nuclear technology. **One longtime U.S. ally in the neighborhood has already angered Washington by switching arms suppliers. NATO member Turkey is buying the S-400 from Russia.** During a visit last month, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made his opposition clear. America has been "advising countries around the world" that they could fall afoul of U.S. sanctions by going ahead with arms purchases from Russia, Tillerson said. "Many have reconsidered." 'Special Arrangements'

## **There are numerous examples of China and Russia acting quickly to sell arms to states the US has negged on**

**Benard 19** Alexander Benard, 7-1-2018, "America Needs to Sell More Weapons," WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-to-sell-more-weapons-1530477651> //DF

These are valid concerns. But as Russia and China actively pursue weapons sales as part of an aggressive strategy to expand their spheres of influence, U.S. strategic interests must be given more weight. **Over the past decade, Russia has easily maintained its position as the world's second-largest weapons supplier,** comprising 22% of global sales from 2013-17. **Chinese arms exports increased by nearly 40% from 2013-17** compared with the previous four years, the largest increase for any large exporter country except Israel, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. **Neither Russia nor China has qualms about selling weapons to even brazen human-rights violators.** In fact they often provide the technologies authoritarian governments use to surveil and repress their citizens. And **they are especially eager to peel off countries the U.S. has declined to arm.** Russia sells aircraft, submarines, antiaircraft systems and missiles. China has made strides in advanced missile systems as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. The sale of these sophisticated weapons poses a direct threat to U.S. security interests. It also creates challenges around interoperability. Technologies developed by the Russians and Chinese—such as advanced radars, sonars, sensors and communications platforms—cannot integrate effectively with U.S. technologies. The more a country purchases from Russia or China, the less able it is to purchase from the U.S. in the future, pushing a country further out of America's security orbit. The lack of interoperability would also present major obstacles if the U.S. needed to fight a war alongside an ally whose advanced military equipment had been sourced from Russia or China. Countries cut off by the U.S. will still be able to purchase advanced systems. Worse, they will be able to do so without depending on the U.S. for maintenance, ammunition or spare parts. This eliminates a key lever for U.S. influence in the event that human-rights abuses occur, for instance. **Take Turkey. In 2016 and 2017 it had been attempting to purchase helicopters and other technology from U.S. manufacturers, but was turned down** due to concerns around deteriorating governance. **Then in late 2017 it acquired a sophisticated missile-defense system from Russia for \$2.5 billion, an unprecedented move for a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** **Vietnam's relations with the U.S. have been pleasantly thawing,** partly because of a common concern around China's aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. **The U.S. lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam in 2016, but residual concerns about human rights have largely limited sales** to sonars and radars. In addition the U.S. has not provided meaningful military assistance to Vietnam to help offset costs. **As a result, Vietnam continues to purchase much of its military equipment from Russia,** which often subsidizes the transactions. Or **d China took immediate advantage, signing a deal to sell over \$1 billion of submarines to the Thai navy.** In late 2017 Bangkok announced plans to establish a joint naval center with Beijing to service those submarines, as well as a joint arms factory to produce and maintain other military equipment. There are more examples around the world. As the U.S. moves into a phase of more intense competition with Russia and especially China, its approach to arms transfers must change. If not, its global security partnerships will be steadily eroded by more assertive and less scrupulous rivals.

## R/T Security Guarantee

- 1. Ends the security guarantee**
- 2. Even if we can reach a new understanding, it becomes non-credible b/c it becomes heavily conditional and questions if the US will ever come to SA aid. Breaks the deal that is arms for security guarantee. This is the way that we convince our allies that we're credible (ex. Ukraine)**
- 3. Ending the war means he hands Houthis and Iran a win, which is a bigger deal**
- 4. Ending arms sales immediately destabilizes talks and negotiations**

## R/T No Ground Troops

**SA will always trade lives for blood (ex. Soviet Russia in WWII). Countries always care about security over political considerations (Ex. US sending in ground invasion to Afghanistan, despite massive casualties)**

**Kirkpatrick 18** David D. Kirkpatrick, 12-28-2018, "On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html> //DF

The United Nations has called the war in Yemen the world's worst humanitarian crisis. An intermittent blockade by the Saudis and their partners in the United Arab Emirates has pushed as many as 12 million people to the brink of starvation, killing some 85,000 children, according to aid groups. Led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudis say they are battling to rescue Yemen from a hostile faction backed by Iran. But to do it, the Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to outsource the war, mainly by hiring what Sudanese soldiers say are tens of thousands of desperate survivors of the conflict in Darfur to fight, many of them children. At any time for nearly four years as many as 14,000 Sudanese militiamen have been fighting in Yemen in tandem with the local militia aligned with the Saudis, according to several Sudanese fighters who have returned and Sudanese lawmakers who are attempting to track it. Hundreds, at least, have died there. Almost all the Sudanese fighters appear to come from the battle-scarred and impoverished region of Darfur, where some 300,000 people were killed and 1.2 million displaced during a dozen years of conflict over diminishing arable land and other scarce resources. Most belong to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, a tribal militia previously known as the Janjaweed. They were blamed for the systematic rape of women and girls, indiscriminate killing and other war crimes during Darfur's conflict, and veterans involved in those horrors are now leading their deployment to Yemen — albeit in a more formal and structured campaign.

# Oil Dependence Good

## R/T US is Energy Independent

**We would never be independent because other sectors of our economy would still rely on foreign oil**

**Gallager 18** Leigh Gallagher, 9-12-2018, "Why American Energy Independence Is Overhyped," Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2018/09/12/why-american-energy-independence-is-overhyped/> //DF

There are a few reasons. One is that the industry, as a whole, has yet to make money. There are a bunch of reasons, from low interest rates to a belief that returns lie ahead, why Wall Street has continued to throw capital at fracking companies. But you can't be sure that will continue forever. It's unclear how much oil and gas companies would produce if they could only reinvest their own cash flow, let alone if they had to produce a decent return for shareholders. The second reason is that the whole notion of "energy independence" is very fraught. There's this idea that if we don't need energy from the Middle East, we'll somehow be able to ignore the Middle East. But in a global economy, that's absurd. For instance, I cite some analysis showing what percentage of the components our technology industry needs are made in Asia – which in turn is dependent on oil from, you guessed it, the Middle East. The idea that we'd be able to tell Saudi Arabia to go to hell if we didn't need their oil is pretty silly once you drill (no pun intended) into it. Lastly, I was really struck by conversations I had with several private equity players. They are all trying to figure out when we'll be able to see the end of the oil age, because as soon as that happens, the price of oil will go into secular decline (as it did with coal.) Other countries, namely China, are frantically investing in renewables. For us to crow about our oil wealth, and not focus on renewables, is for us to miss the opportunity to be leaders in the world as it's going to be.

**Even if the US itself achieved energy independence, our connection to the global economy means shocks would still affect us**

**Lynch 18** Michael Lynch, 5-4-2018, "As American Energy Independence Grows, Global Impact Remains Limited," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelylynch/2018/07/06/our-energy-dependence-lessens-but-global-impact-is-limited/#30696e486cab> //DF

Many point out that Richard Nixon proposed to make America energy independent, but few seem to recall that the report of Project Independence concluded that such independence had little value. Making the country free of energy imports would be extremely expensive, we would still feel an obligation to our allies to protect the world's energy supplies, and given our extensive ties to the world economy, the U.S. would remain vulnerable to an oil shock, as such would probably trigger a global recession. Like energy independence, the value of energy dominance is much exaggerated. Russian natural gas exports to the Ukraine (and much of Europe) have not availed it much in its dispute over the Crimea, and certainly did not deter the application of economic sanctions against it. Similarly, the large role of Saudi Arabia in world oil markets has not prevented, for example, the Trump Administration from moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, among many other pro-Israeli moves by U.S. presidents. MORE FROM FORBES In terms of markets, the Saudis have the greatest influence on oil prices of any nation, but can only pressure other producers with (threats of) a price war, and consumers tend to have more power over the long-term price of oil. U.S. oil exports are to be applauded because they are profitable and efficient; otherwise industry wouldn't make them. And U.S. shale oil producers, by choosing whether or not to invest, do influence prices over the longer term, this is hardly dominance. The one area where the U.S. might prove to be a decisive factor is the trade in global natural gas. It has long been dominated by the use of oil price-indexed contracts, keeping natural gas prices at uncompetitive levels and reducing displacement of oil and coal in industry and power generation in many parts of the world. There is no economic justification for setting oil and gas prices at equivalent levels, based on heat content, any more than coffee and tea prices should



equivalent based on caffeine content. Because U.S. LNG exporters are more competitive-minded (or have more animal spirits perhaps) than most of those involved in the trade (think Gazprom), they might break down this long-standing but ill-advised contract practice, which could have a beneficial effect on the global economy and environment.

## EXTRAS

### Oil Dependence Good

#### **The stability of foreign oil markets is important to the US economy**

**Cordesman 10** Anthony H. Cordesman [Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

The United States shares critical strategic interests with Saudi Arabia that shape the proposed Saudi arms sale. First, for all the talk of energy independence over the last four decades, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the United States will be as strategically dependent on imported oil through 2035 as it is today. These projections do not even take account of our indirect imports of oil in the form of manufactured goods, or our dependence on the health of a global economy that requires stable supply- and market-driven prices. The stability of Gulf energy exports is critical to our economy and every job in the United States Second, U.S. military power is finite, and both the United States and Saudi Arabia face rapidly changing threats. The United States needs allies that have interoperable forces that can both fight effectively alongside the United States and ease the U.S. burden by defending themselves. Iran already poses a massive asymmetric naval-air-assault force threat to the Gulf states. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has left Iraqi forces a decade away from being a counterbalance to Iran; Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful regional power to work with. Additionally, al-Qaeda in the peninsula is based in Yemen, and the threat of terrorism and outside infiltration means highly mobile Saudi forces are critical to the security of Saudi energy and civil facilities. Helping Saudi Arabia create a combination of effective air and naval power also helps ensure the security of tanker and other shipping in the Gulf of Oman and a steadily more unstable Red Sea.

#### **US is uniquely vulnerable to Saudi oil shocks because it's lost its supply from Iran**

**Baker Institute 18** Baker Institute, 10-16-2018, "Trump Climbdown Shows That Saudis Hold The Cards," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2018/10/16/trump-climbdown-shows-that-saudis-hold-the-cards-and-the-oil/#54b2df711550> //DF

Trump's climbdowns are the evidence. After dispatching his secretary of state for a private meeting with King Salman, Trump suggested Khashoggi met his fate via "rogue killers." A new, more palatable version of the grisly events was emerging. Why would Trump back away from confronting Saudi Arabia? Arms sales is Trump's answer. A stronger possibility is evident in numerous presidential Tweets: Trump needs Saudi Arabia to get moving on crude oil production, far beyond Saudi Aramco's modest increases to date. And why might Trump need more Saudi oil? Because of his decision in May to pull America out of the Iranian nuclear pact and re-impose US sanctions. US sanctions are attempting to remove 1.5 million barrels per day – or more – of Iranian oil from global markets by the deadline of Nov. 4, just two days before Americans head to the polls on Election Day. The increase in Saudi production since June must strike the Trump administration as frustratingly small: from 10.4 million barrels per day in June, Saudi production actually fell to 10.3 million barrels per day in July, before rising to almost 10.5 in September, according to MEES. The Saudi oil minister says the kingdom will hit 10.7 m b/d by the end of October, and plans another increase in November. Meanwhile, Iran's exports have fallen at least 1m b/d/year-on-year.

The 300,000 b/d Saudi increase is nowhere near to covering the sanctions shortfall. Normally, sucker-punching Iran carries few political risks for American politicians, as long as Saudi Arabia swings into action and insulates the US motorist from the costs. And why shouldn't the Saudis go along, if they can? After all, the kingdom welcomed Trump's re-imposition of the Iran sanctions, which align with Saudi aims in the region. Handing Iran's oil market share to Saudi Arabia is another gift, since Iran's lost revenues could reach \$160 million per day at current prices. But if the Saudis balk – even for a few weeks – Trump's get-tough-on-Iran posture could backfire by forcing up global oil prices and, shortly thereafter, American gasoline prices. Despite being embattled over the Khashoggi affair, Saudi Arabia still has a strong hand, since the kingdom reaps an increase in oil revenues whether Trump gets tough or goes soft. Until now, the Saudis could be counted on to play along with US Mideast policy. The US sanctions playbook has always ensured Riyadh was on board ahead of American intervention against any oil-exporting country. Over the years, the Saudis have stepped in to replace exports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and others. In effect, the Saudis helped protect the American motorist—and global markets—from American foreign policy. In return, Washington provided hard security and weapons sales. This time Saudis have made clear that if Trump chooses the path of confrontation, the kingdom's commitment to covering lost Iranian oil exports could falter. "If President Trump was angered by \$80 oil, nobody should rule out the price jumping to \$100 and \$200 a barrel or maybe double that figure," wrote Turki al-Dakhil, an ally of the Royal Court and director of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news network. The Saudi oil minister and embassy in Washington played down al-Dakhil's comments, no doubt understanding how devastating a politicized Saudi production cut would be to the kingdom's international stature. Still, the outburst served its purpose. The grim specter of the 1973 embargo's quadrupling of oil prices was not lost on the Trump administration. Regardless, the decision to soft-pedal the Saudis plays well with the Trump administration's worldview, where international norms mean little; even less when cheap Election Day gasoline is on the line.

## **Saudi would retaliate by spiking oil prices**

**Noueihed 18** Lin Noueihed,Zainab Fattah,Anthony Dipaola,Mark Niquette, 10-15-2018, "Oil, Debt and Iran: Weapons in Any U.S.-Saudi Fight Over Khashoggi," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/oil-debt-and-iran-weapons-in-any-u-s-saudi-ro-w-over-khashoggi> //DF

President Donald Trump threatened his most important Arab ally with "severe punishment" if it was shown to have killed a top regime critic. Saudi Arabia hit back with a not-so-veiled threat of its own to weaponize its vast oil exports. The disappearance of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi after he stepped inside the Saudi consulate on Oct. 2 began as a tussle between regional heavyweights Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But it spread rapidly to threaten Trump's Middle East policy that's built around ever closer ties with the kingdom's autocratic rulers. With Saudi Arabia shifting away from its flat-out denials of involvement to announce an internal investigation, and Trump floating the theory of "rogue killers," efforts to lower tensions appear to be underway. If they fail, what actions could the two sides take and what factors may hold them back? Saudi Arabia 1. The Oil Weapon The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are two of the world's top oil producers. Saudi Arabia's more than 7 million barrels a day of crude exports -- the most in the world -- give the kingdom a key role in balancing global energy markets. Trump has urged Saudi Arabia to put more crude on the market to pull prices back from near four-year highs above \$80 a barrel. He is also leaning on Saudi Arabia, a key ally in his stand-off with Iran, to replace barrels that will come off the market when sanctions on the Islamic Republic take effect next month. Were the Saudis to back away from signals they are willing to meet global demand, prices could spike to \$100 a barrel, just as Trump wants lower gas prices going into midterm elections that could help determine the rest of his presidency. It might also make it harder for U.S. sanctions to take as much Iranian oil off the market as he seeks. The Saudis, meanwhile, would collect the profits. If they cut output, oil prices could rise more sharply, but that would risk angering customers and harming the global economy. Saudi Arabia last used its petroleum wealth as a political weapon in 1973-74, when it led an Arab oil embargo during a war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. 2. U.S. Bond Holdings

## **Oil price spikes weaken demand and historically have pushed potential recessions over the edge**

**Denning 18** Liam Denning, 4-19-2018, "The Last Temptation of Saudi Arabia," Bloomberg, [//DF](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-19/-100-oil-price-the-last-temptation-of-saudi-arabia)

This is where the problem starts, however. The \$100 oil price assumption in that valuation is a long-term one. If you launch an oil-major IPO amid triple-digit prices, then animal spirits may prevail. But a serious valuation would involve taking a view on prices not just today, but years into the future -- especially when that oil major sits on a notional six decades' worth of proved reserves. Recent history suggests \$100 oil has a limited shelf life. To date, Brent has averaged about \$100 in just five years 1 : The 2008 spike put the seal on the U.S. recession and accelerated a decline in domestic gasoline consumption that began the year before. Meanwhile, the second bout of triple-digit prices, resulting partly from the turmoil of the Arab Spring, fed the U.S. shale boom that helped spark the subsequent crash. Think of what it has taken to get to today's level of roughly \$70. Saudi Arabia has had to cozy up to Russia (currently allied with Riyadh's arch-enemy Iran in Syria); the Iran nuclear deal appears to be on death row; and economic collapse has led to Venezuela "involuntarily" cutting way more supply than it agreed to cut. Meanwhile, \$70 oil has sparked a revival in non-OPEC supply, especially U.S. shale production. Triple-digit oil would supercharge the latter, especially, raising the longer-term cost for petro-states in terms of market share (see this). The other side of the equation is demand. This is strong today, helped by economic growth and the low energy prices of recent years. Now consider what \$100 oil might mean for this. U.S. gasoline demand finally regained its 2007 peak only in late 2016 2 -- helped in large part by the price crash. Having bottomed out at less than \$1.90 a gallon in February 2016, the national average pump price is now around \$2.86. Of that, 47 cents goes to your friendly state and federal tax collectors, according to the Energy Information Administration. Another 74 cents goes to refiners, shippers and marketers, using average data for the 12 months through February. The residual, \$1.65, is the cost of crude oil: an implied \$69.50 a barrel, around where oil trades today. Plug in \$100 a barrel and, all else equal, it equates to about \$3.60 a gallon at the pump (and probably north of \$4.50 in California). That would be almost a dollar higher than today and the highest level since that unsuspecting summer of 2014: The recovery in U.S. gasoline demand has mostly flattened out since the fall of 2016, which coincides with when pump prices began rising again. While U.S. economic growth is strong, we are late in the cycle of one of the longest economic expansions on record, at more than 100 months. The unemployment rate is low already, and the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates, albeit cautiously. Hiking oil and gasoline prices in that environment would provide a short-term windfall but ultimately curb demand (not just in the U.S., either). And unlike a decade ago, internal combustion engines face a credible and expanding competitive threat from electric and hybrid vehicles, whose manufacturers would relish \$3-plus gasoline. Tempting as it is for Saudi Arabia to push for further gains, it risks repeating the mistakes of the past, undermining demand and ceding market share to rivals. It is perhaps the curse of petro-states that, even as they talk the language of stability and long-term planning, immediate appetites are ever the priority.

## **Counterbalancing Iran**

**The US needs to work with Saudi Arabia to counterbalance Iran; they are the only nation strong enough to stand up to Iran and US extended deterrence guarantees through arms sales are critical to stopping a regional nuclear arms race**

**Cordesman 10** Anthony H. Cordesman [Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, [//DF](https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea)

Second, U.S. military power is finite, and both the United States and Saudi Arabia face rapidly changing threats. The United States needs allies that have interoperable forces that can both fight effectively alongside the United States and ease the U.S. burden by defending themselves. Iran already poses a massive asymmetric naval-air-assault force threat to the Gulf states. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has left Iraqi forces a decade away from being a counterbalance to Iran; Saudi Arabia is the only meaningful regional power to work with. Additionally, al-Qaeda in the peninsula is based in Yemen, and the threat of terrorism and outside infiltration means highly mobile Saudi forces are critical to the security of Saudi energy and civil facilities. Helping Saudi Arabia create a combination of effective air and naval power also helps ensure the security of tanker and other shipping in the Gulf of Oman and a steadily more unstable Red Sea. Third, Iran already poses a missile and chemical weapons threat and may pose a nuclear one within the next three to five years. Upgrades of the Saudi Patriots create a base for an integrated approach to air and missile defense. They lay the groundwork for follow-on sales of advanced missile defense systems like THAAD, and an emphasis on defense (not Saudi purchases of missiles or nuclear systems). Coupled with recent U.S. offers of "extended regional deterrence" and the creation of a Saudi Air Force that is more of a threat to Iran than Iran's conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia, they offer the best hope of both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping a nuclear arms race in the region.

## **US arms sales mean that Saudi Arabia stays one step ahead of Iran in terms of weapons tech, creating a deterrent**

**Thompson 10** Loren Thompson [Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

For Iran, though, the transaction presents a powerful deterrent since there is nothing in Tehran's current arsenal that can cope with the latest versions of the F-15 fighter or the AH-64 attack helicopter. The radical Shiite regime in Iran constitutes the most serious military threat to Saudi Arabia, so I expect that the pending arms sale will be followed by additional agreements to modernize the Saudi Eastern Fleet in the Gulf and upgrade missile defenses. If Congress delays or modifies the proposed transaction, the Saudi government will probably move to purchase modern weapons from other sources such as Britain or France. The kingdom needs to replace its aging Cold War arsenal, and it is surrounded by nations potentially posing a threat to its security. Little purpose would be served by declining to assist Saudi Arabia in meeting its legitimate defensive needs. Whatever the differences may be between our governments and cultures, the Saudis have been reliable allies of America for decades and have exercised a moderating influence on the behavior of other oil-producing states. Helping them means helping ourselves.

## **The arms sales also have the important symbolic effect of standing up to Iran, which will make more nations side with Saudi Arabia**

**Gause 10** F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence. If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular

reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes." Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.

## Stops Proliferation

### **US arms sales to Saudi Arabia create a perception of confidence that prevents proliferation**

**Gause 10** F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence. If the arms sale could destabilize the Saudi regime, that would be a reason not to do it. Many think that U.S. arms sales to the Shah [of Iran] in the 1970s helped to bring him down, but arms were part of the larger strategic relationship, to which many Iranians objected; the arms themselves did not cause the relationship or the popular reaction against it. The Saudis and the United States are similarly tied together in the eyes of Saudi citizens and others in the region. But this arms sale would not change that perception. The larger issue is whether we are selling arms to a stable regime in Riyadh. The short answer is "yes." Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And if Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight. In the end, the Saudis are going to buy weapons. If we do not sell them, Moscow, London, Paris, and Beijing will.

## US Leverage over Saudi Arabia

### **Arms sales give the US government a powerful source of leverage to influence Saudi policy**

**Cordesman 10** Anthony H. Cordesman [Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF Fourth, the proposed arms sale[s] package creates a level of interdependence that gives both the current Saudi government as well as Saudi governments for the next fifteen to twenty years a strong incentive to work

with the United States. Saudi Arabia will need continuing support from the United States during the entire lifecycle of every major system sold, and no future Saudi government can ignore this fact. Moreover, the sales are large in dollar terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive build-up. Saudi Arabia had an air force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it now has only 219. The Saudi F-15 buy will not even restore the force to 2000 numbers. It will take some three to five years to deliver and put fully in service, replace some eighty-seven obsolete F-5A/Bs and F-5E/Es that were in service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits on 107 aging Tornados still in service.