

Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

# OVERVIEWS

## BLOCKS

### R/T CPEC Good

**CPEC isn't key to China's Belt and Road Initiative. They can still develop elsewhere without Pakistan's support.**

**CPEC exacerbates tensions between large and small states within Pakistan over inequitable economic distribution and development, leading to economic ruin, increased insurgency, and environmental degradation.**

**Crisis Group 16, 11-13-2016**, transnational non-profit, non-governmental organization founded in 1995 that carries out field research on violent conflict and advances policies to prevent conflict.

"China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks,"

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/297-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-opportunities-and-risks> //EF

While it is too early to assess if **CPEC** can deliver the economic gains Islamabad promises, the project **risks inflaming longstanding tensions between the centre and smaller federal units and within provinces over inequitable economic development and resource distribution**. Less-developed federal units such as Balochistan and Sindh contend that the corridor's route, infrastructure and industrial projects will mostly benefit Punjab, already the country's wealthiest and politically powerful province. Yet, even in Punjab, locals could forcibly resist the state's acquisition of land for CPEC's agricultural projects.

In Balochistan, CPEC is exacerbating existing grievances among a population whose perceptions of exploitation and neglect by the centre, together with authorities' suppression of dissent, have long fuelled an insurgency. The province will receive no direct financial benefits from Gwadar port, a key CPEC project, which means local anger at Islamabad is likely to intensify. Instead of developing a sleepy fishing village into a bustling commercial hub as pledged by Islamabad and Beijing, the project is producing a heavily militarised zone, displacing locals and depriving them of economic lifelines. In Sindh's Tharparkar district, coal-based CPEC power projects are not only damaging the environment, but are also displacing locals from their homes and could destroy livelihoods.

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### **CPEC worsens tensions between terrorist groups in Pakistan and Chinese interests and leads to opportunities for attacks.**

**Wolf 16**, 16, 5-11-2016, Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf is a Senior Researcher at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, and Director of Research at South Asia Democratic Forum, a Brussels based think tank. "Pakistan and Terrorism: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as Critical Juncture?," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2016/05/11/pakistan-and-terrorism-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-as-critical-juncture/>

Besides several political, administrative, and environmental hurdles, there are **two major security challenges** towards the implementation of the CPEC: **The unrest in Balochistan province and Islamist militancy** in its domestic and global dimension. **Due to the fact that Gwadar port as the central piece of the CPEC is located in the province of Balochistan, the ongoing insurgency in the province determines the most crucial challenge for a successful implementation of the CPEC project**. Besides the Baloch insurgency, there is the fear that domestic terrorist groups (especially Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan/TTP), and **international Jihadi organisations** (al-Qaeda and Islamic State/IS), **might use the upcoming opportunities of the CPEC to carry out activities not only to damage the country's economy but also to intensify their attacks on Chinese development projects, companies, and workers on Pakistan's soil**. In this context, **one should be aware that joined the Islamic State, who declared Jihad against China, by condemning Beijing for its handling of its Uighur Muslim population**. Both organisations worship the fight against the Chinese as their "Islamic responsibility" describing them as "enemy of all Muslims".

### **Noah cut - needs tag and cite**

Above all, however, it allows China to lock in precious mineral resources and transform nations across the Eurasian land mass and Indian Ocean into long-term debtors. A leading credit rating agency recently warned that the **OBOR is "driven primarily by China's efforts to extend its global influence"**, where **"genuine infrastructure needs and commercial logic might be secondary to political motivations"**. **The result is what one observer aptly described as "debt-trap diplomacy", since some nations end up piling up unsustainable debts to China. This is particularly the case in small developing nations such as Sri Lanka, which has been forced to make huge economic and geopolitical concessions as it struggled to payback for Chinese projects**. Meanwhile, larger nations such as India have raised concerns over China's geopolitical intentions, since the project runs through the disputed Kashmir region. Other countries, from Indonesia to the Philippines and Nigeria, have raised concerns over the quality of Chinese infrastructure investments, their compliance with good governance and environmental regulations, and Beijing's tendency to employ not only Chinese technology and engineers, but also Chinese labourers for overseas projects. Ultimately, many are concerned about a "One Road, One Way" outcome, where China keeps on exporting,

while others are stuck as importers. Nonetheless, most developing nations have cautiously welcomed the modern Silk Road initiative, since, as one Asian diplomat bluntly put it, "Everyone wants to be China's friend now with Trump in office."

## R/T IMF Bad

### **1. These loans would only happen if India has no other way out and is forced to rely on these loans**

Iyer 19 Sriram Iyer, 1-5-2019, "Next global recession may be just two years away—and India should be worried," Business Insider,

<https://www.businessinsider.in/next-global-recession-may-be-just-two-years-away-and-india-should-be-worried/articleshow/67535452.cms> //DF

"One major risk in the coming year is the sharp drop-off in world trade growth, which fell from over 5% at the beginning of 2018 to nearly zero at the end. With anticipated escalation in trade conflicts, a contraction in world trade could drag down the global economy even more," the report said. Additionally, US President Donald Trump's trade war with China has already dented the global economy and is likely to cause more damage. Last week, the World Bank cut its estimate for global economic growth in 2019 to 2.9% from 3% in 2018. "Downside risks have become more acute and include the possibility of disorderly financial market movements and an escalation of trade disputes," the report said.

The problems could be aggravated by "the combined effects of rising interest rates and surging equity and commodity market volatility mean that financial conditions worldwide are tightening," according to the report. All three threats – global trade conflicts, rising interest rates, and volatile commodity markets – are likely to worsen this year. The chickens of the protectionist rhetoric – from US to Britain to China – may, in fact, come to roost only in 2020. "IHS Markit believes that the risks of damage from policy mistakes will rise in 2020 and beyond, as growth slows further," the WEF report said. Bad news for India The global trade conflict will hurt emerging countries the most as they depend a lot on exports for economic growth. The growth in emerging economies like Brazil, India, and Russia is expected to slow down to 4.6% in 2019.

**India will be one of the economies that will suffer from rising protectionism as well as rising interest rates in developed countries.** The country's exports have been ailing for a few years now and there seems to be no light at the end of a tunnel. **This will have severe implications for India's fragile economy vulnerable to global shocks** in the form of crude oil prices, the dollar exchange rate, and the foreign portfolio investors. India imports nearly 80% of all the crude oil it needs, and it means the import bill is uncomfortably high. The economy needs strong growth in exports to have adequate dollars to pay for the imports. This also means that India is extremely sensitive to sharp rise or fall in dollar exchange rate. And that is where the rise in US interest rates will hurt the South Asian economy. **Rising interest rates in US increase the value of dollar, as well as lead to outflow of foreign money from Indian stocks and other financial assets, leading to a vicious cycle that will weaken the rupee further.** The result will be a rise in the cost of imports and the Indian consumer will have to pay more for the same goods and services that he or she availed before. **In an increasingly shaky world, India will need a strong cache of reserves and a firm domestic economy** that can support the local economy if and **when the world enters the next recession.** The country's foreign exchange reserves jumped by \$2.68 billion -- one of the largest increases in recent months—to touch \$396.084 billion in the week ended January 4. The value of the gold reserves increased by \$465.5 million to \$21.689 billion in the reporting week, according to latest RBI data. The Indian central bank is famously among the most conservative in the world. However, amidst talks of another global recession, at a time when both the global and the local economy are far from buoyant, can one be ever too cautious?

**2. In that case, the alternative to loans would be default. Loans may not result in policy transformations but they would inject cash into the economy which is really what India needs (read evidence that aid is good)**

**1. IMF bailouts have been reformed; their evidence is old and doesn't take this into account**

**Masters and Chatzky 18** Jonathan Masters and Andrew Chatzky, 11-1-2018, "The IMF: The World's Controversial Financial Firefighter," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/imf-worlds-controversial-financial-firefighter//DF>

Meanwhile, for many observers, the verdict on the European bailout programs is still out. Critics point to the deep recessions and years of high unemployment in IMF loan recipient countries—most notably Greece and Spain, which have the highest youth unemployment rates in the European Union, at well over 30 percent. Greece's economy is still 25 percent smaller than it was before the crisis, and its debt load is nearly 180 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Supporters of the IMF programs counter that the target eurozone countries have all started to grow again and point to major success stories, such as Ireland, which has seen its GDP rise well above pre-crisis levels. Revival and Reform Since the European bailouts, the IMF has added to its firefighting arsenal. It has established a flexible credit line and a precautionary and liquidity line to give it more flexibility in lending to members in situations that might not otherwise qualify for assistance. In 2012, the fund announced roughly \$430 billion in new member commitments, nearly doubling the institution's capacity to lend. As of April 2018, its total lending power stands at roughly \$1 trillion. In recent decades, the fund has also developed several initiatives addressed at assuaging the criticisms of developing countries. In 2005, in an effort to help some nations reach the Millennium Development Goals—benchmarks set at the United Nations to raise basic standards of living for the poorest countries—the IMF announced a debt relief program for eligible countries. In 2009, it announced reforms to its lending conditions to low-income countries that would allow for greater country-specific tailoring and an "emphasis on poverty alleviation and growth."

**Members of the Security council have less conditions for IMF loans - an effect that that would be compounded by PERMANENT membership which isn't even taken into account (Sturm - Georgetown)**

Sturm, 2009, "Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council " Georgetown, [http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jrv24/unsc\\_imf.pdf](http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jrv24/unsc_imf.pdf) (NK)

We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) **using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs.** IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.

**2. Turn: regardless of how IMF bailouts perform elsewhere, they have been effective in India.**

**3. India joining the Security Council would also give them better conditions.**

**Dreher 18** Axel Dreher [Valentin Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland], 11-24-2018, "Buying votes at the UN Security Council," Vox EU,

<https://voxeu.org/article/buying-votes-un-security-council> //DF

Several years earlier, the first Bush administration famously pressured governments to vote in favour of the Security Council resolution approving Operation Desert Storm. When Yemen voted 'no', James Baker, the Secretary of State, reportedly told colleagues, "[t]hat's the most expensive vote they ever cast." The US subsequently cut \$70 million in foreign aid. These anecdotes reflect a systematic pattern. In previous research, we and others have found that **countries that serve on the UN Security Council get financial favours.**

**They receive more US aid and more loans from international institutions** in which the US commands a powerful voice, **including the IMF**, the World Bank, and UN aid agencies. **Countries also receive softer IMF conditionality**

**during their two years of temporary membership** (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Vreeland and Dreher 2014, Dreher et al.

2015). Linking voting behaviour to favours In recent research (Dreher et al. 2018) we asked whether these favours are linked to voting behaviour in the Security Council, what the rewards might be for voting with the US, and the method by which the US could 'buy' agreement, given that it would be frowned upon if done openly. To answer the questions, we used an original dataset that comprehensively records Security Council voting data.

**Dreher 13** Axel Dreher [Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany], 2013, "Politics and IMF Conditionality, Journal of Conflict Resolution,

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.912.5737&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //DF

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that **politically important countries face rather weak stringency**. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the UN Security Council and analyze a newly available data set on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992–2008 period. We find a negative relationship: **Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.**

## R/T R2P Bad

### Link – R/T India will veto

**India would not likely have veto power were it on the security council because most members oppose it and want to keep power**

**Malik 05** J. Mohan Malik [professor of Asian Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii], 2005, "Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto," World Policy Journal, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40209946.pdf> //DF

In their talks with Indian leaders, both Tang and Li have reportedly made it clear that **China's support for India's seat would come "with strings attached."** According to diplomats privy to bilateral negotiations, the Chinese have listed three preconditions: India must oust the Dalai Lama; it must not support Japan's bid for a permanent seat; and New Delhi should be sensitive to Beijing's security concerns in building its relations with China's East Asian neighbors.<sup>16</sup> Two weeks after the release of the high-level panel's report, Li Wei, a Chinese analyst from an influential think tank, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), spoke of new benchmarks: "One, India should ensure stability in South Asia [translation: resolve the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan's satisfaction]; two, it should have friendly relations with its neighbours [translation: abandon great power hegemonic ambitions] and three, it should contribute towards world

peace [translation: cease development of nuclear weapons].<sup>17</sup> These benchmarks are so broad that no government in New Delhi would be willing to accept them as the price for Beijing's support.<sup>18</sup> Were it to do so, any signs of deterioration in India-Pakistan relations, for example, could be exploited to question India's suitability for membership. At any rate, **Beijing's conditional support for India's inclusion comes only if the new entrants are not given the right of veto.** Commenting on the Indian foreign minister's statement after the release of the panel's report that New Delhi would not accept a seat without a right of veto, Li Shaoxian, vice president of the CICIR said: "If India sticks to this position, I don't see India becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council any time soon."

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Fourth, the issue of "whether the newly elected permanent members shall be granted the power of veto" will be determined by "discussion and consensus among the present five permanent members." Ironically, **the Chinese advocate limiting the right to veto to the P-5 indefinitely on "historical grounds":** "Since the status of permanent membership is deeply rooted in the historical background in the early days of the founding of the U.N. and is in the fundamental interests of the U.N., it is well reasoned that **the veto mechanism should remain as it is. No more countries should be granted the power of veto, which is conducive to efficient and smooth running of the Security Council itself as well.**"<sup>31</sup> This demand for keeping "the veto mechanism... as it is" because it "is in the fundamental interests of the U.N." is not only a false claim but undermines the very rationale for reform. Obviously, **Beijing wants to have its cake and eat it too.** It seems ridiculous for a country like China to suggest that the history of the Second World War alone should continue to be the criterion of veto-wielding power, since Beijing has all along been critical of the machinations of the Western powers, and has shown contempt for accords concluded in the pre-1949 era. For Beijing, history appears to matter only when it serves China's interests. Such a stance not only pours cold water on Japanese and Indian aspirations but is inconsistent with the views of U.N. members who have long insisted that the veto power has been abused by the P-5. Among other things, the veto has prevented the Security Council from meaningfully addressing the situation on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.<sup>32</sup> The normative view that the P-5 veto places power above law is certainly more valid in the post-Cold War unipolar world than in the era of bipolarity. It ought to be replaced by a simple majority or two-thirds majority of all members in true democratic fashion. How can the goal of "a just, rational and equitable new international political and economic order," which China espouses, be achieved so long as any one of the P-5 can block the will of the majority of nations without giving more countries a voice, not just representation, on the council?

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Convincing China (and the United States) to support the bids of aspirants to permanent council seats will be a monumental diplomatic task. And **new permanent members are unlikely to have veto power because a majority of the U.N. member states are opposed to the creation of a new privileged class of states.** As one European diplomat put it, "In essence there has been no shift in the core position of the U.S. and China since the debate kicked off a decade or more ago. This position is that additional Council seats should only be awarded if they do not enjoy the same veto rights as the P-5."<sup>35</sup> Moreover, a "second-tier-permanent-members-minus-veto" proposal has already been rejected by Japan, India, and Germany.<sup>36</sup>

## **R/T Pakistan War**

### **Link Turns**

UQ: read a card saying that China and Pakistan's relationship is tenuous and mostly based on economics.

Link: Read card that says a rising India will push China and Pakistan closer to each other, deterring India

## Link – R/T Tripwire

Although **the international community** has intervened in many conflicts since 1991, and even declared a responsibility to do so, it **has typically lacked the political will to halt the violence until many civilians have already been victimized**. Even in the midst of intervention, **political will often disintegrates when intervention forces are confronted with casualties**. In Bosnia, for example, the UN deployed peacekeepers in 1992, but did not authorize or equip them to end the violence until 1995, by which time some 100,000 Bosnians had died.<sup>6</sup> In Somalia, the UN and the US did not deploy a significant military intervention until late 1992, after tens of thousands of civilians already had died from conflict-related famine. These forces then were withdrawn prematurely after 18 US soldiers were killed in October 1993.<sup>7</sup> **In Rwanda, when the genocide started in 1994, the UN quickly voted to withdraw most of its peacekeepers because ten of them had been killed on the first day**.<sup>8</sup> In Sierra Leone, British peacekeepers intervened successfully in 2000 to end a civil war, but only after less robust regional and UN interventions had failed to prevent gruesome atrocities and tens of thousands of killings over the previous nine years.<sup>9</sup> Likewise, in Liberia, US Marines and regional peacekeepers led a successful intervention to end civil war in 2003, but only after previous regional interventions had failed to avert tens of thousands of killings during the previous 13 years of civil war.<sup>10</sup> The Darfur region of northwest Sudan has witnessed the same pattern since 2003. Violence raged most intensely from mid-2003 to mid-2004, as state-supported Janjaweed Arab militias perpetrated a scorched-earth counter-insurgency against 20 Although the international community has intervened in many conflicts since 1991, and even declared a responsibility to do so, it has typically lacked the political will to halt the violence until many civilians have already been victimized. RETHINKING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT Winter/Spring 2009 villages suspected of supporting African rebels, displacing approximately 2 million people within Sudan and as refugees to neighboring Chad, while killing thousands more. During this bloodiest phase, the international community failed to muster the political will for any military intervention, instead providing only humanitarian aid to the small portion of the affected population it could reach.<sup>11</sup> Not until August 2004 did the African Union deploy 132 military observers and approximately 300 peacekeepers, but without the mandate or equipment to protect civilians. Over the next year, the AU force increased to nearly 7,000 peacekeepers and police, but still lacked materiel and logistical support, such as helicopters and fuel, for effective reconnaissance and rapid reaction. In many areas, the peacekeepers could neither escort humanitarian aid convoys nor protect camps for internally displaced persons, let alone protect villages.<sup>12</sup> In 2007, the United Nations authorized a larger, joint UNAMID force (UNAMID) of 26,000 personnel, including nearly 20,000 troops. But as of late 2008, the deployment had yet to reach half that size and still awaited the requested helicopters.<sup>13</sup> Western states have repeatedly proved reluctant to deploy forces to Darfur, partly in fear of sparking a violent Islamist opposition against the occupying troops, as already confronts such troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Link – R/T IMF bailout

### **China will bail Pakistan out if the IMF does not**

**Runde 18** Daniel F. Runde [Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development], 10-31-2018, "An Economic Crisis in Pakistan Again: What's Different This Time?," Center for Strategic and International Studies,

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-crisis-pakistan-again-whats-different-time> //DF

Q5: **What are the consequences if there is no IMF package?** A5: **It is likely that China will provide even more assistance to broaden Pakistan's dependency**. Chinese banks and SOEs have already invested heavily into Pakistan, so much so that state bank loans have not been fully disclosed to the global community. In fact, Pakistan's Status Report for July 2017 through June 2018 shows that Chinese commercial banks hold 53 percent of Pakistan's outstanding commercial debt. However, that percentage may be even higher than the report depicts. While China and Pakistan have agreed to make all CPEC projects readily available to the public, the information is scattered and often left blank on essential financial reports (see July-June 2017 document), and so it is difficult to obtain a full sense of the degree of Pakistan's indebtedness to China. Again, much of the loan information provided by the Pakistani government, especially concerning China, is not entirely transparent. **If China chooses to follow through and become the "point person" for an assistance package, the pressure will be taken off the IMF**. But, **if the United States does not support an IMF package, it will forego major geopolitical potential in the region to its main competitor,**

China. Pakistan represents a litmus test of all future cases in which the IMF, United States, China, and any emerging market country are all involved. Depending on how Beijing chooses to navigate Pakistan's financial crisis, China may soon find itself responsible for rectifying the debt burdens of Zambia and many other BRI countries.

**1. Pakistan's economy will stabilize and they will not attack India**

**2. China's interests in Pakistan will become deeper and thus they'll have more of a reason to prevent conflict**

## IL – R/T Pakistani Terrorism

**Terrorism has already increased by 177% in the last 4 years**

**Economist 19 2-15-2019**, "The beginning of a spiral: A deadly bombing provokes a crisis between India and Pakistan," Economist,

<https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/02/15/a-deadly-bombing-provokes-a-crisis-between-india-and-pakistan> //DF

A HUGE CAR bomb struck a convoy of paramilitary police in Indian-administered Kashmir on February 14th, killing at least 40 paramilitary police. The suicide attack, claimed by a Pakistan-based Islamist terror group, was the deadliest single blow to Indian security forces since the start of unrest in Kashmir 30 years ago. Amid public outrage in India, and with national elections approaching in April, Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, has promised a "jaw-breaking response". Having boosted his nationalist credentials by ordering retaliatory "surgical strikes" across the Pakistani border following a similar attack in 2016, Mr Modi will be pressed to react even more harshly this time. **Chronically tense relations between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states, appear headed towards a dangerous**

**showdown.** Indian officials were quick to underline Pakistan's links to Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), the group that claimed responsibility for the attack. Its leader, Masood Azhar, "has been given full freedom by the government of Pakistan...to carry out attacks in India and elsewhere with impunity," declared a statement from India's foreign ministry. Many Indians have also expressed anger with China, which has repeatedly blocked Indian efforts to get Mr Azhar included on the UN Security Council's list of designated terrorists. Pakistan, a close ally of China, condemned the attack but in the same breath rejected "insinuations" of any link to the Pakistani state. Those links are not hard to find, however. Mr Azhar has a long history of involvement in terrorism. His group has been particularly active in Kashmir, a territory that ended up divided following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, but which both countries claim. Freed from an Indian prison in a hostage swap that ended a hijacking in 1999, Mr Azhar soon after addressed a crowd of 10,000 people in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Although JeM has often struck just when Indo-Pakistani relations were improving—as in its attacks in 2001 on India's parliament building and in 2016 on two Indian military bases—Pakistani authorities have repeatedly released Mr Azhar after brief spells in detention. In 2014 he publicly announced a "resumption of jihad" in Kashmir, and in 2016 he inaugurated a grand new headquarters in his hometown of Bahawalpur, from where he last year announced a speaking tour around Pakistan. Indian police say that although JeM had been virtually wiped out in Kashmir by 2015, it has recently rebuilt its network and overtaken two rival Pakistan-backed groups,

Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in the pace of its attacks. This week's car bombing marked a significant escalation. Estimates put the size of the bomb at a hefty 350kg, enough to leave nothing except tangled undercarriages of the SUV carrying the device and its objective, a bus that was part of a lumbering 78-vehicle military convoy ferrying some 2,500 conscripts from the Central Reserve Police Force. The bomber was identified in a video as a 22-year-old youth from a nearby village. All this indicates that despite India's heavy security presence, and a fierce campaign against militants that has left 20 dead so far this year, JeM was able to recruit locally and to construct and deploy a sophisticated bomb, as well as to plan and execute a deadly attack on an obvious target. Although initial responses in India have focused on grief for the fallen and anger with Pakistan, some have pointed to intelligence lapses, as well as policy choices that have failed to address the underlying problems of Kashmir. Violence has ebbed and



flowed in the densely populated Kashmir Valley, a Muslim-majority region of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, since Pakistani-backed separatist militants took up arms in 1988. Massive deployments of Indian forces and pressure on Pakistan, plus efforts to woo the valley back into mainstream politics, had slowly dampened tensions. By 2012 the number of people killed each year had fallen from more than 4,000 at its peak to below 150. But since the election of Mr Modi in 2014, his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has pursued a get-tough policy that, far from calming the region, has provoked rising unrest. The annual number of “terror-related incidents” in the state rose by 177% between 2014 and 2018, according to police statistics. The death toll of security forces increased by 94%, to 91 last year. Perhaps more tellingly, police estimates of the number of active insurgents in the area have also risen, despite the killing of more than 800 of them over the past five years, and despite the fact that infiltration from Pakistan has slowed. The rise in local recruitment, say analysts, in part reflects resentment against harsh policing methods. Police routinely quell stone-throwing crowds with shotguns. Although the pellets these fire are usually not lethal, they have left hundreds with impaired eyesight and other with severe injuries. Kashmiri resentment also reflects disillusionment with Indian politics. Last year Mr Modi’s BJP pulled out of a coalition to topple the elected state government, and then imposed direct rule from Delhi. Adding to unhappiness in the Kashmir Valley, freezing temperatures this winter have been accompanied by lengthy power cuts—in a state that exports hydro-electricity to the rest of India. Wiser heads would argue that winning hearts and minds in Kashmir is just as important as getting tough with Pakistan. But the vast majority of Indians have little time for nuance just now.

## IL – R/T Pakistan strikes first

### **1. Pakistan needs help from other countries to fix its broken economy and cannot go to war**

Adnan Aamir, 3-2-2019, "Why India and Pakistan will not go to war any time soon," South China Morning Post, [//BW](https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time)

Adnan Aamir is a journalist and columnist based in Quetta, Pakistan.

The Indian government authorised raids inside Pakistani territory based on claims that Pakistan sponsored the Pulwama attack on February 14. Perhaps the Indian side miscalculated Pakistan’s response, which further exacerbated the conflict. It is likely that had the Pulwama attack taken place at a time when elections in India were not around the corner, the Indian government would have never gone to the extent of conducting a raid inside Pakistani territory. Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a severe economic crisis – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports. After assistance from China, Pakistan has now turned to Saudi Arabia to keep its economy functioning. Therefore, on the eve of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to India, Pakistan has no incentive to sanction an attack against Indian paramilitary forces. Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India due to its economic woes. Meanwhile, the ongoing confrontation between the South Asian neighbours has had wider global repercussions. Hundreds of flights were disrupted and thousands of people were stranded at airports after Pakistan closed its airspace to pre-empt another Indian attack.

### **Khan has said that he doesn’t want a war**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, 4-10-2019 “Economy in Tatters, Pakistan’s Premier Calls for End to Armed Militias,” NYT, [//DF](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html)

Mr. Khan promised that this new crackdown would go far deeper than previous ones criticized as cosmetic. The government, for instance, plans to send 200,000 teachers to religious schools across the country to teach secular subjects like English and math. The intention, Mr. Khan’s aides said, was to deradicalize students. His government sees the stakes as high. An international watchdog group, the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, is on the brink of blacklisting and sanctioning Pakistan. If that happened,

Pakistan would face greater difficulties in obtaining the financial bailouts and loans it has sought. “We can’t afford to be blacklisted,” he said on Tuesday. But Mr. Khan has also won praise for his seemingly coolheaded and statesmanlike behavior during the recent crisis with India, which he helped de-escalate by releasing a captured Indian pilot and emphasizing peace. He seemed quite cognizant that the last thing Pakistan needed was a war. On Feb. 26, around 3:30 a.m., Mr. Khan said he was awakened by a phone call. A top military official told him that Indian warplanes had just crossed the border and conducted airstrikes on Pakistani soil.

## **2. Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan isn’t controlled by the military and he has the authority to stop the conflict**

**Dutt 18** Barkha Dutt, 12-3-2018, “Imran Khan is close to Pakistan’s army. Here’s why that’s good for India.” Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/04/imran-khan-is-close-pakistan-army-heres-why-thats-good-india/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.1544a6475c7c](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/04/imran-khan-is-close-pakistan-army-heres-why-thats-good-india/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1544a6475c7c) //DF

Imran Khan, Pakistan’s prime minister, seems transformed by the burden of his post. I met him in Islamabad on the day he completed his 100th day in office. He appeared so much more reserved, circumspect and formal than I remember him. I came away with the impression that there is no chance for any immediate breakthrough for India and Pakistan. But if there is to be even incremental progress between the two nuclear-armed nations that have fought four wars, Khan is presently India’s best bet. I was among 22 Indian journalists in Pakistan (at the invitation of Khan’s government) to report on the opening of a visa-free corridor for Sikh pilgrims in the border village of Kartarpur. This is the site where Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith, is said to have spent his last years. This should have been a joyous celebration of anti-imperialism. At the time of partition, the British drew a line to carve out Pakistan from India, uprooting people from their homes and places of worship. It was one of the most violent displacements in history. The lasting legacy of partition meant that Sikh devotees in Indian Punjab could only look at the last abode of their guru through binoculars placed at the international border. A corridor for the free movement of pilgrims into Pakistan should have been a brief moment of reconciliation in a severely damaged relationship. Unfortunately, controversial statements on both sides of the border led to a downward spiral. At the Kartarpur opening, Khan mentioned Kashmir, an obvious irritant for India, which has time and again brought up Pakistan’s patronage of terrorism both in Kashmir and elsewhere in India. Then, Khan’s foreign minister added to the friction by boasting that India had been played. On the Indian side, both the Narendra Modi government and the opposition Congress party that governs in Punjab spoke in mixed messages. India sent two (Sikh) federal ministers to attend the ceremony. Congress Minister Navjot Singh Sidhu (whom Khan knows from his cricketing past) was also present. In Pakistan, the Indian ministers likened opening the pilgrimage route to the fall of the Berlin Wall, while in Delhi, the foreign minister ruled out any resumption of dialogue. To make matters worse, Kartarpur was inaugurated the same week as the 10th anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in which 166 people, including six Americans, were killed. The United States announced a \$5 million bounty on the terrorists — the third such offer of a reward for justice. (The U.S. move is unlikely to work. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, who heads the terror group responsible for the attacks — and on whom the Americans had previously declared a \$10 million bounty — continues to operate with impunity in Pakistan; he even fielded proxy candidates in the recent elections. India can’t move forward unless a serious crackdown takes place on the terrorism infrastructure long used by the Pakistani security establishment as a weapon of asymmetric warfare against India.) Long story short, the threads of Kartarpur unraveled before they could be used to weave together any shared histories. So why do I still call Khan someone India can do business with? My liberal friends in Pakistan (who argue that Khan is a product of the army’s patronage) are furious with me for saying so. But Khan has two things going for him that his civilian predecessors did not. One, the very fact of his closeness to the Pakistani military is an advantage for India. For too long, Indian bureaucrats have been locked in a stale, formulaic dialogue template with Pakistani counterparts who have no authority to take any independent decisions. Called the “composite dialogue,” this structure of talks goes back to 1997 and places terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, water-sharing and drug-smuggling all in the same basket of issues on the talks table. It has been tried and tested — and it has failed. The India-Pakistan relationship cannot be run by bureaucratic tinkering any more, nor can it be steered by unempowered civilian politicians in Pakistan who are at odds with their own military — as was the case with ousted prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Imran Khan made it a point to tell us he wouldn’t be “one of those Pakistani politicians who will say, ‘I want to do this, but my Army won’t let me.’” His dig was at Sharif, and he was driving home the point that there was complete convergence between him and the army. If India can’t talk directly to the Pakistani military ( and I think that channel should be opened as well), why not tap into the proximity Khan enjoys to those who really pull the levers of power in Pakistan? The other significant yet underreported

statement by Khan in his conversation with us was a reference to what policy wonks call the Musharraf-Manmohan Four Point Formula for Kashmir. It is now known that India and Pakistan almost reached a Kashmir settlement when Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former army chief was also the country's president — and Manmohan Singh was the Indian prime minister. At the heart of their draft agreement was an acceptance of the status quo and “no redrawing of borders.” Since raiders invaded Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, Pakistan has held parts of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan that India's Parliament unanimously recognizes as illegally occupied. In reverse, Pakistan has repeatedly tried to lay claims to Kashmir on the Indian side. Musharraf-Manmohan were close to a historic settlement, but subsequent Pakistani governments have disowned the formula or any knowledge of it. Khan's reiteration of the template and his description of Kashmir as “solvable” (in conversation with us) is intriguing and needs closer attention. Especially given his closeness to the Pakistani military. Whether under pressure from China (or as an overture to the Americans who have announced the withdrawal of \$300 million in aid), Khan and Pakistan's army chief both seem to be sending some intriguing smoke signals.

## Impact – R/T Nuke War

### **1. Mutually assured destruction has and will prevent an Indo-Pak war**

**Ganguly 19** Sumit Ganguly [distinguished professor of political science and Rabindranath Tagore chair in Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University Bloomington], 4-9-2019, "Peace and Politics in South Asia," Council on Foreign Relations,

[//DF](https://www.cfr.org/conference-calls/peace-and-politics-south-asia)

FASKIANOS: Sumit, while we wait for more questions to queue up, or comments, in your March 5 essay for ForeignAffairs.com that we circulated as advance reading for this call, you sustained that the nuclear war between India and Pakistan is unlikely. Can you talk about your thesis there? And what does history teach about past conflicts? GANGULY: Right. I think a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is unlikely because both sides understand the sheer destructive powers of nuclear weapons and the inability to control events once one crosses a certain threshold, that even a small nuclear detonation may not remain—it would not remain confined but could quickly escalate to a much higher level. And consequently, both sides are—or will exercise a certain degree of caution to go over the brink; that while they may peer into the abyss, they will also step back from the abyss because neither side has a particularly sanguine view about the ability to control events in the event—if they push beyond the envelope that far and actually precipitate a nuclear war. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question. OPERATOR: And we now have a question from Ghalib Victor Begg. BEGG: Yes. My question so far to your excellent presentation is about the influence of the Hindu Americans on the Indian elections. As I understand, there is big-time support from—and they have a strong lobbying presence in Washington, D.C., and BJP has many connections in America. So how are Hindu Americans supporting this nationalistic government of Narendra Modi?

### **India and Pakistan's tit-for-tat moves in Kashmir have always been carefully calculated, as they were in February following the Pulwama attack**

**Ganguly and Menon 19** Sumit Ganguly [Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and also holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Culture and Civilization] and Rajan Menon [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York/City University of New York, and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University], 3-7-2019, "What the India-Pakistan Crisis Taught China," National Interest, [//DF](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-india-pakistan-crisis-taught-china-46377)

Though Pakistanis rejoiced at the Indian pilot's capture, within a few days their leaders released him. That was a deft and wise decision. Any prolonged detention of the Indian officer, especially one accompanied by mistreatment and extended public humiliation, would have put India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who has diligently cultivated a tough-guy persona, under immense pressure to up the ante. This is also particularly because, in April, Modi's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will face its resurgent rival, the Congress Party, which has

governed India for most of the years since India's independence in 1947. **Contrary to the fears expressed in some of the more breathless commentaries during the crisis, complete with scenarios of nuclear war, both sides acted cautiously**—precisely because they understood that escalation could prove uncontrollable and catastrophic. Their air strikes were limited, calibrated and controlled. Like Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, **India and Pakistan comprehend the iron logic of nuclear deterrence.** In considerable part, **the airstrikes were sops to particular constituencies.** In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, his eyes on the pre-election polls, felt compelled to demonstrate his resolve after the Pulwama attack, which killed forty Indian paramilitary troops. His Pakistani counterpart, Imran Khan, much beholden to Pakistan's military establishment, had little choice but to approve a retaliatory airstrike. Events were in the saddle—but happily, not for long. Though the crisis ended quickly, it revealed chinks in the armor of both countries' militaries. Indian fighter-bombers penetrated fifty miles beyond the Line of Control, highlighting weaknesses in Pakistan's air defenses and radar surveillance. As for India, the fact that a forward air base—in Srinagar in Indian Kashmir—felt compelled to scramble decades-old MiG-21 Bisons to tackle F-16s laid bare the weaknesses of the Indian air force.

## **2. Other countries will step in and stop a war because they have significant interests in doing so**

**Aamir 19** Adnan Aamir, 3-2-2019, "Why India and Pakistan will not go to war any time soon," South China Morning Post,

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time> //BW

Meanwhile, the ongoing confrontation between the South Asian neighbours has had wider global repercussions. Hundreds of flights were disrupted and thousands of people were stranded at airports after Pakistan closed its airspace to pre-empt another Indian attack. **The tension between India and Pakistan also threatens the Afghan peace process, in which Pakistan is playing a leading role. China's current and Saudi Arabia's potential investments will be at risk if the current conflict escalates. Therefore, a concerted effort is being made by the global community to force both India and Pakistan to stand down.** Pakistan partially reopens airspace amid easing tensions with India Pakistan's release of the Indian pilot in its custody has put the ball in India's court. There is likely to be more pressure from the global community for India to reciprocate the peaceful overtures of the Pakistani government. **If India digs its heels in, it may face further pressure from the global community and will be not be able to maintain an aggressive military stance.** China and the US have remained neutral in the ongoing conflict, but both countries have huge stakes in Pakistan. **The US wants Pakistan to facilitate the end of 18-year-long "war on terror" in Afghanistan,** which would enable the US to pull its troops out of that country. Meanwhile, **Pakistan is home to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship project under China's Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, China and the US will use all their influence on both countries to prevent any further escalation of the conflict.**

## **Pressure from the international community made India back down in February**

**Mir 19** Asfandiyar Mir, 3-7-2019, "Why India and Pakistan are fighting again -- and the risks that remain," Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/07/india-pakistan-tensions-escalated-last-week-this-is-why/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.428c65fb9da2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/07/india-pakistan-tensions-escalated-last-week-this-is-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.428c65fb9da2) //DF

Has India turned back from the precipice? **After Pakistan hit back at India, India had the option to go to the next step of the escalation ladder with a major attack. Three factors seem to have prevented India from**

doing so. First, **[In February] the international community stepped in.** Following his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, President Trump stated that **the United States was trying to mediate a de-escalation between the nuclear-armed rivals. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also worked to mitigate the crisis.** Second, Pakistan seemed to send multiple signals that it was preparing its **nuclear weapons**, in case the crisis exacerbated. In a news conference following the Indian raid, a Pakistani military spokesman said that the government was activating the body responsible for deploying and using nuclear weapons. Anonymous leaks claimed Pakistan also sent a private message to India that its response to an Indian attack would push the region to a “point of no return” — a hint at the possibility of escalation to a nuclear war. **A third factor was the Pakistani prime minister’s release of the captured Indian pilot. This introduced a humanizing moment in a tense standoff between the nuclear-armed nations,** cooling temperatures for a while. 3. But South Asia remains at risk of conflict. South Asia remains tense. A number of specific risks threaten a return to hostilities — and further escalation.

## **Impact – R/T India starts conventional war**

### **1. India’s fear of a nuclear response by Pakistan restricts it to low-level attacks**

**James 19** Kevin R. James, 4-1-2019, "India and Pakistan: making the stability/instability paradox go one way," Strategist,

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-pakistan-making-the-stability-instability-paradox-go-one-way/> //DF

Exploiting Kashmiri disaffection and the transnational jihadist movement, Pakistan is waging a deadly guerrilla war against India in Kashmir. Usually, of course, sponsoring an insurgency in a more powerful neighbouring country would provoke a very costly response (eliminating the incentive to sponsor the insurgency in the first place). In the case of Kashmir, however, **Pakistan has cleverly combined its conventional and nuclear capabilities in a way that makes it impossible for India to impose such a penalty at a price that India is willing to pay.** That’s because **Pakistan’s conventional strength is sufficient to eliminate India’s ability to impose significant costs with a low-intensity conventional response, and Pakistan has drawn its nuclear use red lines such that any high-intensity conventional response will lead to the risk of a nuclear war.** In short, Pakistan has found a way to make the stability/instability paradox go one way. Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy leaves India with two unpalatable options: live with the insurgency and terrorism that Pakistan promotes; or retaliate in a manner that crosses Pakistan’s nuclear red lines (as currently defined). **Given the state of India’s military forces, India now has no choice but to live with the insurgency.** But it’s no surprise to find that India is making a considerable effort to develop the counterforce and anti-ballistic-missile capabilities required to put option 2 on the table. It follows that the next crisis could play out very differently from the current one. Kashmir is a quagmire for India because Pakistan can intervene in ways that keep the conflict going essentially for free. Pakistan’s civilian and military/security institutions are as one in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir, and the combination of the transnational jihadist network and the Kashmiri independence movement ensures that there’s no shortage of insurgents to support. That support doesn’t require any significant economic investment on Pakistan’s part, and the death and destruction that the insurgency produces don’t fall on groups that create political costs in Pakistan. So, Pakistan will continue its ideological and material support for the Kashmiri insurgency (to India’s considerable detriment) unless India can devise some way to impose a significant cost on Pakistan for doing so. A realistic evaluation of **India’s response to the 14 February suicide bombing** that triggered the current crisis shows that India has simply not been able to impose such a cost. The response **consisted of border clashes and a small number of airstrikes.** **But Pakistan’s forces along the border have easily been able to match the low-intensity Indian initiatives such as limited artillery barrages, and so these tit-for-tat exchanges haven’t led to any Indian advantage.** And while the Indian Air Force has been a bit more aggressive, it’s clear that the Pakistan Air Force is more than capable of dealing with low-intensity Indian air operations. **India does have the capability to mount a high-intensity conventional response that would enable it to impose substantial costs on Pakistan.** For example, India could mobilise its more powerful land forces and destroy a significant proportion of the Pakistani army; use its more powerful air force to achieve air superiority over

Pakistan and mount a sustained campaign on the jihadist infrastructure; and/or use its more powerful navy to put in place a blockade that would have devastating consequences for the Pakistani economy. However, each of these high-intensity actions (or anything similar) would cross one of Pakistan's red lines and so trigger a risk of a nuclear response. Due to the current state of the India–Pakistan nuclear balance, India is unwilling to run that risk. Consequently, it has no effective response to Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir. To change the game that India is otherwise destined to lose, India must find a way to limit Pakistan's nuclear threat. The way to limit this threat is to achieve nuclear superiority (which may not require an explicit change to Indian nuclear strategy). India is now striving to do just that.

## India can't attack Pakistan conventionally because its military sucks

**Abi-Habib 19** Maria Abi-Habib, 3-3-2019, "After India Loses Dogfight to Pakistan, Questions Arise About Its 'Vintage' Military," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/world/asia/india-military-united-states-china.html> //DF

The aerial clash, the first by the South Asian rivals in nearly five decades, was a rare test for the Indian military — and it left observers a bit dumbfounded. While the challenges faced by the India's armed forces are no secret, its loss of a plane last week to a country whose military is about half the size and receives a quarter of the funding was still telling. India's armed forces are in alarming shape. If intense warfare broke out tomorrow, India could supply its troops with only 10 days of ammunition,

according to government estimates. And 68 percent of the army's equipment is so old, it is officially considered

"vintage." "Our troops lack modern equipment, but they have to conduct 21st-century military operations," said Gaurav Gogoi, a lawmaker

and member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense. American officials tasked with strengthening the alliance talk about their mission with frustration: a swollen bureaucracy makes arms sales and joint training exercises cumbersome; Indian forces are vastly underfunded; and the country's navy, army and air force tend to compete rather than work together. Whatever the problems, the United States is determined to make the country a key ally in the coming years to hedge against China's growing regional ambition. Last year, when Defense Secretary Jim Mattis announced that the Pentagon was renaming its Pacific Command — to Indo-Pacific — he emphasized India's importance in a shifting world order. "It is our primary combatant command," said Mr. Mattis, who left the Pentagon at the end of the year. "It's standing watch and intimately engaged with over half of the earth's surface and its diverse populations, from Hollywood to Bollywood."

The American military began prioritizing its alliance with India as its close relationship with Pakistan soured over the last two decades. United States officials are concerned that Pakistan is not doing enough to fight terrorism, a charge the country denies. In just a decade, United States arms sales to India have gone from nearly zero to \$15 billion. But Pakistan can still draw on a powerful American-supplied arsenal. Indian officials say Pakistan used one of its F-16 fighter jets to down its MiG-21 last week. Islamabad rejected the claim, but on Sunday the American Embassy in Islamabad said the United States was looking into the report. The offensive use of an F-16 warplane against its neighbor might have been a violation of the sales agreement. "We are aware of these reports and are seeking more information," the embassy said in a statement. "We take all allegations of misuse of defense articles very seriously." However troubled its military, India holds an obvious strategic appeal to the United States by virtue of both its location and its size. India will soon become the world's most populous country, on track to surpass China by 2024. It shares a long border with southern and western China and controls important territorial waters Beijing needs for its maritime trade routes. All that can help the United States try to box in its rival. "India's sheer demographics, its long-term military potential, its geographic expanse — it makes India worth waiting for," said Jeff Smith, a research fellow for South Asia at the Heritage Foundation in Washington and the author of "Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century." "As China rises and the United States fights to keep its dominance, it will need a swing state to tip the balance of power in the 21st century," Mr. Smith said. "And that swing state is India. The United States knows this and is willing to be patient."

For India's military, funding remains the biggest challenge. In 2018, India announced a military budget of some \$45 billion. By comparison, China's military budget that year was \$175 billion. Last month, Delhi announced another \$45 billion budget. It is not just a question of how much India spends on its military, but how it spends it. The majority of the money goes to salaries for its 1.2 million active duty troops, as well as pensions. Only \$14 billion will be used to buy new hardware. "At a time when modern armies are investing hugely on upgrading their intelligence and technical capabilities, we need to be doing the same," said Mr. Gogoi, the Parliament member. Unlike China, where an authoritarian government is free to set military policy as it wishes, India is a democracy, with all the messiness that can entail. Cutting troop levels so that the military can spend the money on buying modern equipment is not so simple. India's military has long been a source of jobs for a country struggling with chronic underemployment. That is likely to be a big issue in elections scheduled for later this spring. Prime Minister Narendra Modi won elections in 2014 promising to reform the economy and provide the one million jobs needed each month to satisfy its growing work force. But with elections around the corner, Mr. Modi has shelved promises of economic reform and embraced the usual populist measures.

The thrust of this government is to focus more on economic development, which has to precede military strength," said Amit Cowshish, a former defense ministry financial adviser for military acquisitions. "That was what China did —

they focused on developing their economy and then focused on acquiring their current military stature. The difference is that China started 20 or 30 years ahead of us in terms of economic liberalization." Government officials in New Delhi say they are struggling to improve the lives of their citizens in the most basic of ways — dealing with high illiteracy rates and poor sanitation infrastructure, as just two examples — making it hard to funnel more money toward the military at a time when China is making incursions into India's backyard by land and sea. China has significantly outpaced its rival, creating a robust and taxable middle class. China's economic boom has allowed it to invest aggressively in buying top military hardware and producing it at home. As the world's conflicts are increasingly fought with state-of-the-art weaponry rather than the large invading armies of the past, India is falling behind. Despite being the fifth-largest military spender, only about a quarter of its military budget this year will purchase new equipment. Although the purchase of military hardware is a slow-moving process in most countries, in India it moves even more sluggishly amid a swollen bureaucracy. There are also concerns about corruption. Mr. Modi is currently being grilled by the opposition over a murky \$8.9 billion deal to buy 36 Rafale fighter planes from France. His political opponents have cast the agreement as corrupt in an effort to discredit him ahead of elections.

## 2. China has significant economic and personal interests in Pakistan and will deter India from attacking

**Haegeland 18** Hannah Haegeland [an analyst in the Stimson Center's South Asia Program], 12-4-2018, "Who Will Prevent the Next India-Pakistan War?," Defense One,

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/who-will-prevent-next-india-pakistan-war/153236/> //DF

Historically, the United States has been the sole major third-party crisis manager in South Asia. Particularly since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States has taken a hands-on approach, pressing both sides to de-escalate. China's interests and involvement have historically been much more limited. However, in a book chapter published by the Stimson Center earlier this year, I demonstrate that China's role as a third-party crisis manager in South Asia has gradually grown. Unlike the U.S. approach, China's role has been mostly bilateral and limited to quiet, backroom diplomacy. Diplomatic initiatives by China to encourage de-escalation in the 1999 Kargil War and 2001-2002 "Twin Peaks" crisis, for example, focused largely on Pakistan. But by 2008, when the terrorists struck Mumbai, China had begun playing a third-party role more like that of a great-power broker. It engaged in public bilateral "shuttle diplomacy" with both India and Pakistan, sending high-ranking, political and military officials to both New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as bringing their Indian and Pakistani counterparts to Beijing. Since then, nuclear and conventional arms buildup in the region has raised the potential costs of escalation. The possibility of a future India-Pakistan crisis remains high—all against a backdrop of heightened firing across the Line of Control, growing fissile material stockpiles, evolving strategic doctrines, and developments in nuclear delivery systems. Meanwhile, U.S. leverage in Pakistan is in decline, and both the preparedness and inclination of the Trump administration to play the traditional U.S. third-party crisis manager role in a future India-Pakistan standoff is uncertain. China's considerable incentives to ensure stability between India and Pakistan are further bolstered by its current and planned investment in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative. BRI's flagship is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, representing an investment of more than \$50 billion. Beyond that, the number of Chinese nationals living in Pakistan to work on these mega projects is multiplying quickly—from 2007 estimates at 5,000, to 2017 estimates at **30,000**, to a 2023 forecast of 500,000 for Gwadar port residents alone. This Chinese diaspora introduces a new escalation risk. Consider the potential costs if India were to take retaliatory action against Pakistan for a Mumbai-like attack that inadvertently resulted in the death of Chinese nationals or destruction of Chinese investments in Pakistan. Analysts disagree on just what circumstances could turn Beijing into a supporter of Islamabad rather than a third-party crisis manager, but at least some envision it as a possibility. Beyond stakes and exposure in Pakistan itself, China is increasingly investing economic and political capital throughout South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The costs of an India-Pakistan crisis spinning out of control would be lasting and widespread, hurting Chinese economic and geostrategic plans for the region.

### As US influence wanes, China is stepping in as a 3rd party mediator (Haegeland - Defense One)

Hannah Haegeland, 12-4-2018, "Who Will Prevent the Next India-Pakistan War?," Defense One,

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/who-will-prevent-next-india-pakistan-war/153236/> (NK)

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Warrants a) belt and Road B) 500k chinese nationals in Pakistan

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## India will consider China's reaction before striking

**Keck 19** Zachary Keck [formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues], 2-15-2019, "Billions Dead: That's What Could Happen if India and Pakistan Wage a Nuclear War," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/billions-dead-thats-what-could-happen-if-india-and-pakistan-wage-nuclear-war-44682> //DF

With nuclear weapons introduced, Delhi's no-first-use doctrine no longer applies. Indian leaders, knowing they'd face incredible domestic pressure to respond, would also have no guarantee that Pakistani leaders didn't intend to follow the tactical use of nuclear weapons with strategic strikes against Indian cities. Armed with what they believe is reasonable intelligence about the locations of Pakistan's strategic forces, highly accurate missiles and MIRVs to target them, and a missile defense that has a shot at cleaning up any Pakistani missiles that survived the first strike, Indian leaders might be tempted to launch a counterforce first strike. As former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon wrote in his memoirs (which Narang first drew people's attention to at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in March): "India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan."

**One factor Indian leaders would be forced to consider is how** the other third of Asian nuclear triangle, **China, would react.** Although the Stimson Center event focused primarily on India and Pakistan, China has always been the primary focus of India's nuclear program. **Beijing is also a staunch if informal ally of Pakistan, with a growing economic stake in the country.** It is this multipolarity that is the hallmark of the second nuclear age.



## IL – R/T UN Mediator

### **The UN is hamstrung by having to take a neutral position on the dispute; it can't do anything because it doesn't want to be seen as taking sides**

**Maattanenen 18** Linnea Määttänen, 2018, "Peacekeeping: a choice between stability and peace?" Lund University Student Papers, <https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8942568> //DF

There has been several third party mediation attempts during the course of the conflict, most notably the UN in the beginning of the conflict resulting in the Karachi agreement and by the US and Soviet during the cold war in the Tashkent declaration ending the 1965 war (Narasimha,2009,10-11). Both India and Pakistan have sought to ally themselves with third parties, India primarily with the Soviet during the cold war and Pakistan with China and the US (Cohen,2002,44). This demonstrates that major power have interests in the conflict (Kapur,2005,134-137) Pakistani aim has been to make third parties pressure India into negotiations while India has sought to deal with the conflict bilaterally (Vasquez,2005,72;Wirsing,1998,191). Bilateralism has been the trend after the Bangladesh war (Misra,2007,508). India seeks to avoid major power or international involvement, especially US involvement, since it seeks to balance Indian power in the region (Kapur,2005,149-154). The US has had interests in the conflict even after Simla but involves itself only when it deems necessary, for example when nuclear tensions rose during the Kargil war. Pakistan calculated that the risk of nuclear war could make US intervene and maybe force India to negotiate on Kashmir (Sridharan,2005,107). An urgency compelling third party mediation has been most evident during wars since both agreements ending the first and second Kashmir war where mediated by third parties (Diehl,et al,2005,46). However the peace process has been characterized by bilateralism. Most of the success achieved, the confidence building measures (CBM) in reducing nuclear tension, where negotiated bilaterally (Misra,2007,507,517-518;Hussain,2006,413). The mediation from third parties has been evident recently mostly when there exists a threat of nuclear war (Better World Campaign, 2018). UNMOGIP has had the effect of keeping UN tied to the conflict although at a powerless position. One example of UN mediation was the Karachi agreement that brought the first Kashmir war to an end and lead to the establishment of UNCIP that would evolve into UNMOGIP (Wirsing,1998,62-68) India seeks to deal bilaterally with Pakistan and resents UN involvement since it serves as a remainder of its promise for plebiscite (Wirsing,1998,75). **The UN faces serious limitations in its power to act. It can't withdraw UNMOGIP since it would be seen as acting in favor of India. If it were to make UNMOGIP more functional by enlarging it, this would signal support for Pakistan** (Wirsing,1998,193). Even though after the first India-Pakistan war UN has served a very limited role, UNMOGIP has still kept the UN bound to the conflict.

### **The UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir has failed to prevent or even record violence**

**Maattanenen 18** Linnea Määttänen, 2018, "Peacekeeping: a choice between stability and peace?" Lund University Student Papers, <https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8942568> //DF

Has UNMOGIP been able to limit violence between India and Pakistan? There does not exist any accurate numbers on ceasefire violations and levels of violence along the LOC of the whole duration of the conflict. However the general picture derived from various sources points towards that **during the 70 years UNMOGIP has been operational, it has failed multiple times to prevent hostilities and violence on the border and to maintain the ceasefire** (Wirsing,1998,189-190;Blixt,1994,50;Diehl. et alt,2005,45;ACLEd,2016,13;Jacob,2017,131). The levels of violence have been high not only along the LOC. This is evident from the four wars fought during that period and frequent firing and shelling across and around the border (Shucksmith&White,2015,135- 140;Khan,2005,163). In table made by Vasquez is his chapter in the book The India-Pakistan 16 Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, shows 36 instances when at least one of the parties have either: 1:displayed use of force, 2:actually used force or 3:used force that leads to war, during the period 1942-1996 (Vasquez,2005,64). There were some calmer periods in the 50's but again in 60's and escalating during 90's levels of violence rose (Blixt,1994,20-22,41). UNMOGIP's mandate was never to enforce the ceasefire, but there was hope this would to some extent encourage the parties to respect the ceasefire (Blixt,1994,15). Its ability to do so has been questioned by many who have studied the conflict (Diehl,mf,2005,45;Blixt,1994,50;Wirsing,1998,74) (Shucksmith&White,2015,140). However some see that it has had some

limiting effect on the parties (Lourie,1955,30;Jacob,2017,5). Has UNMOGIP been able to monitor the ceasefire and could this have had a limiting effect on violence? UNMOGIP's main task has been to observe, report and investigate in cooperation with local authorities ceasefire violations and bring them to the attention of UN security council (Better World Campaign,2018). However since the Simla agreement after 1971 war, its ability to fulfill its mandate has been crippled. Simla agreement is a purely bilateral agreement with no mention of UNMOGIP, leaving its position uncertain. India interprets the mandate given by Karachi agreement as no longer in force. UNMOGIP has become unable to fulfill its mandate on the Indian side of the LOC. After 1972 India has not brought any ceasefire violations to UNMOGIP's attention. Pakistan interprets UNMOGIP's mandate as still in force and has continued to cooperate with the mission, however in recent years it has only reported ceasefire violations it considers serious (Wirsing,1998,68-73;Blix,1994,29-30). India no longer cooperates and even obstructs the mission (Blix,1994,38-40) while Pakistan tolerates the mission, since it validates Pakistani argument of Kashmir as disputed territory (Wirsing,1998,75). This could point towards lack of respect and even weaker influence of UNMOGIP on the parties. In conclusion UNMOGIP's ability to limit violence was from the beginning only limited since its mandate allowed only for an observer role, not being able to enforce the ceasefire (Shucksmith&White,2015,141). Some have seen even an observer role as serving a function limiting the escalation of the conflict, since it has brought UN attention to conflict (UN information center Islamabad,2016). Most scholarly publications before Simla considered the operation a success (Wirsing,1998,74;Lourine,1955,30). However since 1972 this limited function has been crippled when India no longer cooperates and Pakistan sometimes uses the operation to serve its own purposes. For example there have been incidents of Pakistan using peacekeepers presence as cover for bringing arms to positions on the LOC (Blix,1994,37). Similarly they have scheduled the visits of UNMOGIP after firing at Indian positions, so that Indian retaliation end up on the ceasefire report (Jacob,2017,14). Their work is further obstructed by limited amount of observers and resources at its disposal to monitor a 740km LOC (Shucksmith&White,2015,139). Hence the reports sent to New York hardly give an accurate picture of the ceasefire violations. Other evidence supporting this is that in 2011 authorities found mass graves suggesting massive human right violations the peacekeeping force had been unable to discover (Shucksmith&White,2015,141). In conclusion the level of violence and CFV has been high and UNMOGIP has been unable to stop them or even record them sufficiently.

## The UN hasn't been a mediator for a while

**Kugelman 14** Gabriel Domínguez interviewing Michael Kugelman [senior program associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars], 10-12-2014, "How could the UN help resolve the Kashmir dispute?," DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/how-could-the-un-help-resolve-the-kashmir-dispute/a-18120254> //DF Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, says in a DW interview that any UN involvement to resolve the dispute would need to take place behind-the-scenes. The efforts should focus first on getting the two sides to the table, and then urging them to talk, he adds. DW: What role has the UN played in the Kashmir dispute over the past decades? Its role has been very limited in recent decades. The UN was most active in the Kashmir dispute in the very first months of India's and Pakistan's existence, when the two countries were at war. The UN Security Council passed resolutions calling for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of security forces, and an internationally supervised plebiscite for Kashmiris to decide whether they join India or Pakistan. The cease-fire resolution was implemented, but the other two were not. Ever since, the UN has not done very much at all on the Kashmir issue, other than at times urging the two sides to come to the negotiating table. It made a particularly big pitch for this in 1998, after both countries staged nuclear weapons tests. Given that both sides seem unwilling to compromise, what role could the UN Secretary General play in resolving the issue? The UN could play the role of a truly neutral mediator. This is a role that the US has sometimes sought to play, but with little success - particularly because there is mistrust in its relationship with both Islamabad and New Delhi. There really is no country that could be taken seriously as a credible mediator, given that few countries have deep, trusted relationships with both India and Pakistan.

## **Actors like the US have played very important roles in reducing the risk of conflict**

**Leghari and Moorthy 17** Farooque Ahmed Leghari [Ph.D. Candidate, History, Politics & Security Research Center, Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia] and Ravichandran Moorthy [Faculty, History, Politics & Security Research Center, Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia], 2017, "NUCLEAR DETERRENCE OR DIPLOMACY: MANAGING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES," Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, ISSN: 1823-884x //DF

India and Pakistan fought three wars in the initial period of 25 years but after acquiring nuclear weapons they had fought only one limited war at Kargil in 1999 and other four major crises between 1986 and 2008—though threatening to erupt into war ended up in routine clashes. The nuclear deterrence was not successful to a greater extent to reduce the tensions between the two countries. It was diplomacy and not the nuclear deterrence which reduced tension between the two countries in all the crises between 1986 and 2008. The role of international community is very appreciable as it played a very important role in reducing the tensions between the two states in times of crises. The United States must be credited more than any other state for its role in reducing the tension between India and Pakistan. Chari, Cohen and Chema, (2007) state that the previous four crises from 1986-87 to 2002 have global implications. First, South Asia became the nuclear flash point; second, the Indo-Pakistan crises contradicted several important theories of the field of International Relations. Third, the Indian intention to become a world power and Pakistan's intention to have a strong defense are going to have importance in their future relationship with each other. Finally, these crises offered important doctrinal and strategic lessons not only to these South Asian nuclear powers but also to other states of the world. They further maintain that the crisis in 1990 became a major focal point as there was great anxiety that South Asia had become a hot spot and any war between India and Pakistan could generate into a nuclear conflict as both these nations had nuclear capabilities, and the United States, Russian, Japanese and European analysts agreed on that point. That nuclear deterrence has enabled if shuttle diplomacy had not played a vital role in reducing tension, it would have been difficult to avert war between the two states. And any conventional war between India and Pakistan meant a nuclear exchange between the two immature nuclear states. These two immature nuclear weapon states threaten each other of using nuclear weapons and bringing extreme destruction to the opposite side.

## **The other major powers are mediators and have interests in preventing a conflict; that's what happened after the February attacks**

**Mir 19** Asfandiyar Mir, 3-7-2019, "Why India and Pakistan are fighting again -- and the risks that remain," Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/07/india-pakistan-tensions-escalated-last-week-this-is-why/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.428c65fb9da2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/07/india-pakistan-tensions-escalated-last-week-this-is-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.428c65fb9da2) //DF

Has India turned back from the precipice? After Pakistan hit back at India, India had the option to go to the next step of the escalation ladder with a major attack. Three factors seem to have prevented India from doing so. First, the international community stepped in. Following his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi, President Trump stated that the United States was trying to mediate a de-escalation between the nuclear-armed rivals. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also worked to mitigate the crisis. Second, Pakistan seemed to send multiple signals that it was preparing its nuclear weapons, in case the crisis exacerbated. In a news conference following the Indian raid, a Pakistani military spokesman said that the government was activating the body responsible for deploying and using nuclear weapons. Anonymous leaks claimed Pakistan also sent a private message to India that its response to an Indian attack would push the region to a "point of no return" — a hint at the possibility of escalation to a nuclear war. A third factor was the Pakistani prime minister's release of the captured Indian pilot. This introduced a humanizing moment in a tense standoff between the nuclear-armed nations, cooling temperatures for a while. 3. But South Asia remains at risk of conflict. South Asia remains tense. A number of specific risks threaten a return to hostilities — and further escalation.

## R/T Khan and Dabhade

### **Khan 15 is literally a college student writing a paper**

### **Dabhade plagiarized his thesis and lacks academic credibility**

**Dasgupta 18** Piyasree Dasgupta, 4-13-2018, "Fresh Allegations Of Plagiarism Haunt Professors Appointed By JNU's VC," HuffPost India,

[https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2018/04/13/in-jnu-at-least-five-new-appointees-and-two-other-professors-are-being-accused-of-plagiarism\\_a\\_23408282/](https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2018/04/13/in-jnu-at-least-five-new-appointees-and-two-other-professors-are-being-accused-of-plagiarism_a_23408282/) //DF

Speaking to HuffPost, Kumar denied the allegations of plagiarism. He said, "At that time I was doing my MPhil. If I had written something, I had given reference." Another professor, Manish Dabhade, who has been teaching in the university since 2008 is facing similar allegations regarding his MPhil dissertation. The assistant professor in the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, however, vehemently denied the allegations saying everything that belongs to a secondary source has been attributed via either a footnote or has been mentioned in the bibliography. Dabhade's paper, titled 'India and China: Reconciling Cultural Differences in Security Negotiations' has some passages that are worded the same way parts of Jing-Dong Yuan's 'Culture matters: Chinese approaches to arms control and disarmament' is. Following is an extract from Yuan's paper, published in 1998. And here's a passage from Dabhade's paper, submitted to JNU for his MPhil in 2000. We sent the same screenshots to Dabhade for clarification and asked why these passages don't carry footnotes or aren't within quotes like some other passages in the same paper. "Have cited and referred to authors I have used either in footnotes and/or bibliography at the end. And MPhil dissertations are largely secondary source driven writing unlike PhD," he said. He mentioned that Yuan has been mentioned in another place as a footnote. He also said that he had rigorously followed the citation practices taught in JNU in 1998 and in year 2000 'no tools available or taught to detect n remove inadvertant/accidental minor errors'.

## R/T Election DA

### R/T Link

### **1. Modi won't win because he's lost the support of minority groups who have faced attacks during his tenure**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

Another problem for Mr. Modi is dissatisfaction among Dalits. India's centuries-old caste hierarchy — with Dalits at the bottom, Brahmins at the top and many groups layered in between — still dominates life in many areas, especially rural ones. Lower castes still face horrendous abuse, and Dalits — who represent close to 100 million votes — have long distrusted Mr. Modi and his party, which is rooted in a Hindu nationalist worldview that favors upper castes and emphasizes India's Hinduness. But in the last election, in 2014, Mr. Modi played up his humble origins — the son of a tea seller from a relatively low caste. Analysts said that 24 percent of Dalits voted for his party, double the percentage from the previous election. This time around might still be very different, even with a bump from the showdown with Pakistan. Under Mr. Modi, hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims, who make up a sizable minority in India, have exploded. Dalits have been killed for such things as riding a horse or skinning a cow. Mr. Modi himself has not made disparaging remarks about minorities, but in the wake of this kind of violence, he is often silent. Many officials in his party, including ministers, have taken

what are widely considered extremist positions when it comes to protecting cows, a sacred animal in Hinduism, or siding with vigilantes who target Muslim or low-caste butchers. Hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims have exploded during Mr. Modi's tenure. While many conservative Hindus see Mr. Modi as an unwavering defender of some of their most deeply felt values, many Dalits and Muslims are frightened of their own government. Despite Mr. Modi's pledges to unify India — he often repeats his slogan, “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas,” or “All together, development for all” — many observers say India has become more polarized along caste and religious lines during his time in power. Chandra Bhan Prasad, a well-known political commentator and a Dalit, said **few Dalits would change their mind on Mr. Modi because of the action on Pakistan. “He's totally lost the Dalit vote,”** Mr. Prasad said. **“Dalits will still vote for any party that can defeat the B.J.P.” If true, that could mean the loss of millions of votes.** Farmers were another concern for Mr. Modi, but here, the action on Pakistan could make a difference.

## **2. Affirming won't tip the scales in favor of Modi because Indian voters care the most about the economy, not the UNSC.**

Hindu Editorial, December 12 2018 "Northern comfort: on Congress's win in Hindi heartland," The Hindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/northern-comfort/article25720333.ece> (NK)

As for the BJP, the results are an opportunity to introspect. Not just on the performance of its governments in the State, but also the performance of the Narendra Modi government at the Centre. To reduce the results of the Hindi-speaking States to the intangible anti-incumbency sentiment would be a mistake. After all, both Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh and Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan survived two elections as incumbents. **A potent mix of rural distress and urban angst seem to have contributed to the erosion in the BJP's support base. Farmers suffered disproportionately and for longer following demonetisation, and small traders in urban areas have felt handicapped by the straitjacket of the Goods and Services Tax.** It may be tempting to think that aggressive cow vigilantism and the Ram temple will influence voter behavior, but **these elections underline it is livelihood concerns that really influence voter behaviour.** The BJP will need to tackle issues of employment and development with better intent if it is to arrest the slide. The first term of a Prime Minister is won on a promise, but the second term will have to be won on performance. Not even Narendra Modi is an exception to this

## **R/T Veto**

**India is against the veto for permanent members of UNSC and would be reticent to use it**

**Dabhade 17** Manish S. Dabhade [Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India], 12-2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms," ORF Occasional Paper, [https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF\\_Occasional\\_Paper\\_131\\_UNSC\\_Dabhade.pdf](https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf) //DF

India supports increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership of UN Security Council. Making a case that there is an imbalance of influence between the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, India has called for a “balanced enlargement in both categories.” Herein, India has highlighted the need of Africa to be represented in both categories. This directly challenges the proposed “so called” intermediate models wherein a longer term and immediate reelection are seen as compensations for a permanent membership. India,

citing the deliberations held in 1945, pointed out that these models were rejected by an overwhelming majority. India identified a number of ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 INDIA'S PURSUIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 131 DECEMBER 2017 15 reasons for its opposition to an increase in non-permanent category only. First, the issues raised by the current imbalance between permanent and non-permanent members are not addressed due to lack of checks or balances. Second, the African continent and other developing countries would still not be represented fully in the Council. Importantly, it would mean a new category of members and the addition of new members that fails to make the Council more effective and accountable. According to India, only the addition of elected, new permanent members, which are subject to "stringent review" could provide such an accountability. Siding with the small states, India supported their contention that the chances of the small states to serve at the Council would be reduced as the proposed intermediate models surely enhanced the chances of more resourceful middle powers to contest in both the traditional non-permanent category seat and the "so called long-term seats." On the most important question of veto, India's position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto and till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, which should have all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category, including the right of veto. (March 2016) The Indian position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing restrictions. India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle. It is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is taken during a review process. c. Regional representation On the question of regional representation, India has forcefully argued for an equitable geographical representation and the urgent need for mitigating the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. Making the case, India has pointed to the increase in the number of states to the current 193 from 51 when the UN was founded, and the untenability of whole continents not being represented at all in the permanent category. The Council in its existence of 70 years also does not represent the geo-political and economic realities. The Security Council, for India, needs to reflect contemporary realities and provide adequate representation to all regions of the world. India sees the growing clamor for regional representation as "a cry of frustration and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs." The demand for regional representation has been made on multiple grounds including historical injustice, entire regions not equitably represented or even unrepresented in a key category, and hope of moving beyond the nation state as the primary actor on international affairs. In Indian eyes, it is an "anachronistic" situation that the UN has three of the five permanent members from one region alone while the regions of Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean states and the Small Island developing states remain excluded from the functioning of the Security Council. On the role of regional groupings in the selection of new members, India favored the current practice, viz., each regional grouping would endorse its candidate, to be followed by the need to contest an election on the floor of the General Assembly for occupying a seat at the Security Council.

## R/T Moral Hazard

**Moral Hazard will happen either way; all there needs to be is a risk of the UN intervening, which exists now because the risk is inherent to the R2P**

Peter Beaumont 4 May 2013 The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene>  
 Jennifer Walsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University who has studied the development of R2P, agrees with Evans's analysis. But she also identifies a **"moral hazard" inherent in R2P – that it can create a perception in conflicts that a rebel force may be only a regime-sponsored atrocity away from international interveners coming to its aid.** The incentive for rebels to find a negotiated solution is thus reduced. As Walsh points out, the suspicion that recent interventions have been too easily dominated by the agenda of the US, Britain and France has led to a push-back, led by Brazil.

Alan J. Kuperman (Global Governance)

<https://www.istor.org/stable/pdf/27800703.pdf?refregid=excelsior%3A0258e707e729c0b73173fe19b8630e14>

In economics, **the solution to moral hazard is not usually to eliminate insurance, which can serve important social needs by protecting the insured against risk.** Rather, we reform insurance to reduce its tendency to promote excessive risk taking while partially preserving its safety net, thereby minimizing human suffering. Analogously, human intervention can serve the important social needs of protecting innocent civilians from harm. **Simply addressing moral hazard by eliminating intervention could actually increase genocidal violence.** Instead, we should reform the practice of

intervention to reduce moral hazard and thereby minimize such violence. As in economics, **moral hazard does not require protection to be guaranteed but merely probable. Just as prospective IMF bailouts create moral hazard, despite being merely likely rather than guaranteed, so the Responsibility to Protect creates moral hazard even though it does not absolutely ensure humanitarian intervention.** Obviously, the prospect of intervention is not a cause of every rebellion, let alone of all genocidal violence. Likewise, the dole is not responsible for all unemployment, yet we still strive for reforms to mitigate its perverse contribution to the very problem that it was intended to solve. Analogously, even though moral hazard may not contribute to all genocidal violence, we should explore reforms of humanitarian intervention to minimize its unintentional contribution to such violence. Finally, it should be underscored that nothing in this analysis exculpates the perpetrators of genocidal violence from ultimate responsibility for their criminal acts