

We affirm; resolved: NATO should strengthen its relationship with Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression.

Observation One: There is a distinction between 'should' and 'would.' While 'would' can indicate the probability of an action, 'should' is used to determine the best course of action, disregarding external factors. This means the Pro advocacy looks to what is most beneficial, not most probable.

Contention One: Cooperative nation-building can improve Ukraine's situation.

Russian aggression in the future will be inevitable because of an imbalance in defense spending. **BBC warrants**

Speaking after a meeting of Nato's defence ministers in Brussels, the alliance's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said **Russia had [has] increased its military spending by 50% in the last five years, while Nato cut funding by 20% over the same period.**

Indeed, Russia is projected to continue its creation of a buffer zone. **George Friedman explains in his book, *The Next 100 Years***

In the next decade **Russia will become increasingly wealthy** (relative to its past, at least) **but geographically insecure. It will therefore use some of its wealth to create a military force appropriate to protect its interests**, ^{buffer} zones to protect it from the rest of the world – and then buffer zones for the buffer zones. **Russia's grand strategy involves the creation of deep buffers** along the northern European plain, while it divides and manipulates its neighbors, creating a new regional balance of power in Europe.

What Russia cannot tolerate are tight borders without buffer zones, and its neighbors united against it. This is why Russia's future actions will appear to be aggressive but will actually be defensive.

Antagonizing Russia only serves to invite retaliation elsewhere in Europe. On the contrary, having NATO engage Russia in reconstructing Ukraine would not only still constitute a strengthening of NATO's relationship with Ukraine but also would avoid escalatory conflict. **Clifford Gaddy explains**

The key point here is that **there can be no viable Ukraine without serious contributions from both Russia and the West.** Of all the options for Ukraine's future, **a Ukraine exclusively in the West is the least feasible.** A **[and a] Ukraine fully under Russian control** and with severed links to the West **is**, unfortunately, possible. But it is **in no one's interest** – not Russia's, not the West's and certainly not Ukraine's.

The International Crisis Group corroborates

It is important to recognise that the new Russian readiness to use force to change borders, first evident a half-dozen years ago in Georgia, now clearly requires a firm deterrent response including sanctions and reassuring NATO members of the commitment to fulfil collective security obligations. Those actions must, however, be paralleled by diplomatic steps to lessen the confrontation. On the ground in Ukraine today, Russia has immediate advantages of escalation; over time, the West likely has the economic and soft-power edge. **A successful, democratic Ukraine, substantially integrated economically in the West, but outside military alliances and a close cultural, linguistic and trading partner mindful of Russian interests would benefit all.** Finally, as Kyiv and its international supporters look to the future, all should keep in the centre of their attention that Ukraine is a profoundly damaged country. This damage goes far beyond separatism and is the fruit of the poor governance and massive corruption that, over the past two decades, has all but destroyed it.

Contention Two: Cyber fortification for Ukraine prevents espionage.

Simon Tsipis from the Institute for National Security Studies explains

Russia has managed to hit almost all Ukraine government websites and it was able to **take control** and to put on surveillance and monitoring all the Internet and telephone communications lines, before the invasion and occupation of Crimea by its military. Russian Special Forces managed to derail all important communications systems through direct physical impact on them by combined field and high-tech operation.

Cyber espionage is an integral part of military strategy and foreign policy of Russia towards the countries of the **former Soviet Union**. Being able to access information systems of diplomatic, government and military organizations for many years, since the USSR collapse, **giving Russia a huge advantage in predicting their tactics**, actions and analyzing the thinking of their neighbours.

Doug Bernard continues

As tensions have escalated between Kyiv and Moscow, so too has the frequency of online attacks

targeting a variety of government, news, and financial sites located across Ukraine and several in Russia.

So far, these attacks have amounted to mere skirmishes rather than all out cyber war.

However, **with the possibility of further Russian military incursions into eastern Ukraine, a full-blown cyber war may be looming on the European continent.**

This problem will persist if unmitigated. **Bernard warns**

But Baker and other analysts note that since then **Russia has invested considerable resources into building more sophisticated and potent offensive cyber capabilities**, which would likely be deployed this time in a more serious cyber battle.

That combination of Russian offensive capability and access to infrastructure makes Ukraine unusually vulnerable to cyber attack. And that's a situation the Kremlin may not be able to long resist.

NATO has taken measured responses before. **Joshua McGee corroborates**

In 2007, NATO member state Estonia suffered from major cyber attacks where dozens of critical Estonian websites were taken down for days. **NATO then realized that it needed to be concerned** not only **with** its own cyber defense, but also **the defense of member states**. In June 2007, defense ministers of NATO countries met and called for a framework to be created for cyber defense.

The official NATO Cyber Defense Policy was [then] approved in January 2008. Even though the contents of this Cyber Defense Policy remain classified, 2 entities [The Cooperation Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCoE) and the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA)] were created as a result of the Policy:

Contention Three: Establishing a humanitarian corridor saves lives.

A 'humanitarian corridor' is a term used to denote the means by which civilians can flee areas of violence. While sensible, **Alec Luhn notes**

Newly elected president Petro Poroshenko has promised a humanitarian corridor in the east, though there has been no sign of this in practice yet. On Thursday the security service ordered the commander of Kiev's "anti-terrorist

operation" to establish a corridor for the evacuation of civilians.

Claire Bigg adds

UNHCR's Andrysek describes **the Ukrainian government's reaction to the refugee crisis so far as "very unsystematic [because]."**

"One of the problems in Ukraine is that there has been a lot of upheaval in the past few months," he adds. **"The government has been faced by many concurrent priorities."**

This lack of organization could hinder efforts to dampen the crisis. **Carol Morello writes that**

But for many, flight only adds a new set of problems. **The crisis has developed so fast that the government has organized nothing to assist evacuees.** The help is all private, including -from churches, foundations, activists and ordinary citizens who are converting summer camps and hostels around the country into makeshift shelters.

The rebels in the East continue to pose a threat to the way of life for many civilians. This can be denoted as Russian aggression because **Michael Birnbaum reports that Russia's top diplomat on Wednesday acknowledged for the first time an official relationship with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine**, the same day that one of their top leaders made a surprise appearance in Moscow to whip up support for his cause.

At the same time, **Julianna Goldman reports that**

Putin said during a meeting today with his human rights ombudsman, Ella Pamfilova, that he **supports the creation of a "humanitarian corridor"** to allow Russian aid to reach people in Ukraine affected by the fighting.

This specific NATO action, therefore, would not incite Russian escalation. Moreover, this is a direct way to remove civilians from harm's way.

In the long-term, preventing a refugee crisis from spilling over means instability does not spread to neighboring countries. As inaction exacerbated Syria's crisis, the same must not happen in Ukraine. Allowing instability to occur would only increase Russia's excuses for intervening on behalf of their ethnic populations, which could next fall in a NATO nation.