

We negate; resolved: Development assistance should be prioritized over military aid in the Sahel region of Africa.

Observation One: The Pro has to explicitly show why development assistance cannot occur after or during the provision of military aid. The possibility for simultaneous action means the Con wins.

Observation Two: The Con can win in two ways. The first is to show that problems requiring a military solution are insurmountable. The second is to demonstrate that military solutions to problems are low-cost and therefore unobtrusive.

Contention One: Problems

The International Crisis Group outlines

The huge, sparsely populated, impoverished Sahel is affected by growing numbers of jihadi extremists and illicit activities, including arms, drugs and human trafficking, estimated to generate \$3.8 billion annually. Borders are porous, government reach limited. Populations and unemployment are soaring. **Within this perfect storm of actual and potential instability, criminal networks increasingly overrun Central Sahel** – the Fezzan in Libya's south, Niger and the Lake Chad Basin. State authority is weak in relatively stable Niger. To the south, the radical Islamist, primarily Nigerian, Boko Haram insurgency is responsible for thousands of civilian deaths and more than a million displaced. Western and regional counter-terrorism efforts are insufficient, but neither have more integrated approaches proposed by the EU and UN borne fruit. **Without holistic, sustained action against entrenched criminal networks, misrule and underdevelopment, instability is likely to spread and exacerbate radicalisation and migration.**

In fact, the problem has ballooned. **Yonah Alexander of the Potomac Institute shows**

Indeed, the stakes are too high for America to disengage from the Maghreb and the Sahel. **The more than 800 percent increase in regional terrorist attacks since 9/11 is being fed by the greater instability found in weak and transitioning states.** This report does not recommend that the U.S. take upon itself the role of arbiter of regional security issues. Rather, it is a reminder that America's vital interests in the region and those of its friends and allies are under assault by extremists who are doing us harm and want to inflict more damage in their wake.

There are three reasons why military aid is then necessary.

First, instability prevents distribution. **The European Union External Action Service details**

The security threat from terrorist activity by Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found a sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focused on Western targets and has evolved from taking money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region. AQIM resources and operational capacities are significant and growing.

Deteriorating security conditions pose a challenge to development cooperation and restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which in turn exacerbates the vulnerability of the region and its population.

Second, aid becomes the object of conflict. **Seyla Benhabib explains in her book *The Claims of Culture***

If we do not clean up the region, developmental assistance will not be effective. Military aid is a necessity in order for developmental assistance to be effective.

Logically **if we want the infrastructure and developmental assistance to last it would be a requirement that we clean up the area first or else the terrorist organizations that want more of the resources will find a way to get it, often violently.** This would logically lead to lawlessness over whatever resources were grown or given to the region.

Third, development aid insulates governments. **The World Bank expounds**

As Rodrik (1996: 31), notes, however, **external resources can help bad as well as good governments survive, by reducing the cost of doing nothing** as well as reducing the costs of reforming. **By providing an alternative source of revenues, aid can relieve pressure on recipient governments to establish the efficient policies and**

institutions necessary for attracting private capital. Large-scale foreign aid was originally justified largely as a means of overcoming capital shortages, yet many aid recipients maintain policies that have the effect of restricting inflows of private capital (Bauer, 1984: ch. 3). Similarly, the end of U.S. aid – which had been generous in the 1950s -- is often credited for the Korean and Taiwanese reforms of the 1960s (Rodrik, 1996: 31). **Aid can even increase political instability, by making control of the government a more valuable prize.** Instability shortens time horizons, leading regimes to grab everything they can for themselves and their supporters during their turn in power. For example, Maren (1997) blames Somalia's civil wars on competition for control of large-scale food aid.

Foreign aid is, however, successful in the hands of stable countries. **The Journal of Economic Development empirically finds**

This paper examines **the inter-relationships among economic growth, foreign aid and political stability for thirty-one Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries from 1984-2007.** The analysis is performed using a unique and reliable index of political stability. The econometric procedure employed corrects for endogeneity due respectively to simultaneity and to time-constant country- specific effects. The preponderance of the evidence suggests that **foreign aid and political stability are significantly related to growth and that aid promotes growth when it is allocated to politically stable SSA countries.** These findings suggest that in pursuing the UN's Millennium Development Goals in SSA, political stability is a pertinent factor that should not be ignored.

Contention Two: Solutions

Sub-point A: Rapid Response

The Ebola virus continues to be a problem in the Sahel. **BBC reports** **Health officials** leading the fight against Ebola in Sierra Leone **say fear, fatigue and denial are allowing the [Ebola] virus to continue to spread.** Cases had been falling sharply since the start of the year. But **the decline [in cases] has stalled and more than a year since the outbreak was first declared in Sierra Leone, [and] new cases are still emerging every week.**

Military aid, however, can be the key difference. **Lena Sun of the Washington Post details** **The medical group [Doctors Without Borders] has long-opposed military involvement by governments, but its international president, Joanne Liu, said the [Ebola] situation had become so desperate that it was now appealing for military assets to provide critical logistical and operational support.** Priorities include the mass expansion of isolation centers, **[including] air bridges to move personnel and equipment to and within the most affected countries,** mobile laboratories for testing and diagnosis, and building a regional network of field hospitals to treat suspected or infected medical personnel. **Only the military,** Liu said in an interview Friday, **has the rapid- deployment capability and chain-of-command structure necessary now.** “Because the response has been so slow, we now have to switch to a mass-casualty response,” she said.

Sub-point B: Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations are the solution needed because they have succeeded in the past. **The Human Security Report notes**

The UN did not act alone, of course; the World Bank, donor states, a number of regional organisations and thousands of NGOs **[many international actors] worked closely with UN agencies and often played independent conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and peacebuilding roles of their own.** Prior to the end of the Cold War there had been little sustained activity in any of these areas. **Not one of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programs on its own had much of an impact on global security in this period.** Taken together, however, their effect has been profound. As the upsurge of international activism grew in scope and intensity through the 1990s, the number of crises, wars and genocides declined. Correlation does not prove cause, of course, and Part V reviews other possible explanations for the dramatic decline in political violence in the post- Cold War era. **Over the long term the evidence suggests that the risk of civil war is reduced by equitable economic growth, increased state capacity and inclusive democracy.** Development is a necessary condition for security—and vice versa. But Part V demonstrates that **[but] none of these factors**

can account for the sharp decline in political violence around the world that started in the early 1990s and has continued ever since. It argues that the single most compelling explanation for this decline is the upsurge of international activism described briefly above and in more detail in Part V.

The International Journal of Security and Development elaborates

First, regarding duration, peacebuilding can be a long-term process, taking as long as a generation to implement (World Bank 2011). Yet, peacebuilding can also yield immediate results, which reduce the risk of violence and the duration of the violent conflict. Protracted crises are often the result of recurrent cycles of violence that persist despite immense costs to both sides and the possibility of negotiated settlement. Often, a key barrier to civil war settlement is the lack of a third party that can credibly enforce ceasefires in the short term. In contrast to interstate wars, where negotiated settlements leave both parties with standing militaries that can be called back into action in the case of reprisal attacks, civil war settlements often require that one party – usually the rebels – lay down their arms and reintegrate into society, as was, for example, the case in Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

As a result, Havard Hegre from the University of Oslo quantifies

Table 7 shows the results for a model distinguishing between the different pko mandates. This model is the basis for scenarios 5–8. Again, PKOs seems to directly affect only the risk of major conflict. The estimate for traditional PKOs is negative but not statistically significant. The parameter estimate implies that the risk of major conflict is 35% lower in the presence of a traditional PKO. The estimate for the transformational PKO is both much larger and clearly significant. It implies that a transformational PKO reduces the risk of major conflict relative to no conflict by more than 90%.