# Sjostrom/Verska - Millard North Neg v1

## Our Sole Contention is the Russian Pivot

#### Caroline Dorminey indicates in 2018 that

A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy, Date Accessed 2-8-2019 // JM

The second mechanism involves using arms sales to generate leverage over the conduct of other nations. As the producer of the world’s most advanced and sought-after weaponry, the United States can dictate, at least to some degree, the conditions under which it will agree to sell certain weapons.[39](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor039) As Andrew Shapiro puts it, “When a country acquires an advanced U.S. defense system, they are not simply buying a product to enhance their security, they are also seeking a relationship with the United States. This engagement helps build bilateral ties and creates strong incentives for recipient countries to maintain good relations with the United States.”[40](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor040)

#### This means that the arms sales are not just about weapons but the RELATIONSHIPS those arms sales create. In a world where we end arms sales, we leave a void that Saudi Arabia has to fill. Liz Sly indicates in December that:

Liz Sly, 12-5-2018, “In the Middle East, Russia is back”, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-the-middle-east-russia-is-back/2018/12/04/e899df30-aaf1-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c9129ebe80fa>, Date Accessed 2-12-2019 // JM

Among the presidents, prime ministers, kings and princes who have visited Moscow over the past year to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin are some of the United States’ closest allies, who once might have been expected to devote their travel time to Washington. There’s a new power rising in the Middle East, and it needs to be wooed. Three decades after the Soviet Union collapsed and the United States emerged as the undisputed superpower in the Middle East and North Africa, a resurgent Russia is back. Under the personal direction of Putin, Russia is [stepping into the vac­uum](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-seeks-to-fill-vacuum-in-the-middle-east/2013/09/30/7e7124cc-27c7-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html?utm_term=.235e68c4833c) left by the disengagement of the Obama administration and the unpredictability of the Trump one to challenge the United States’ dominant role in the region. Russian oilmen, arms dealers and financiers have been fanning out across the region, striking billions of dollars’ worth of deals, reviving old relationships and forging new ones from Libya to the Persian Gulf. At the center of it all is Putin, whose strongman image resonates with the region’s authoritarian rulers at a time when doubts are growing about Washington’s commitment to the Middle East.

#### This makes sense as Chuck Freilich indicated in 2018 that:

Chuck Freilich, 5-9-2018, "How Russia Is Taking Over the Middle East, One Country at a Time," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/how-russia-taking-over-middle-east-one-country-time, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

President Putin's fundamental strategic objective is to restore Russian global leadership, or to put it somewhat less delicately, to stick it to the United States wherever possible. His primary problem is that Russia does not have that much to offer today, it cannot compete with the United States and Western countries on an economic level, or alternatively on a diplomatic one, and all it does have to offer is [except] weapons, nuclear technology, and energy. The Middle East is one of the primary regions in the world in which Russia can pursue its ambitions today. Most global weapons sales are with Middle Eastern states, and a race is underway among them to procure nuclear power reactors. Moscow's willingness to sell them weapons and reactors, and to maintain close relations with rogue regimes such as those in Damascus and Teheran, provide it with a degree of influence that it does not have in much of the rest of the world. In Syria, with a minimal deployment of two fighter squadrons, Russia succeeded in turning the tide in the civil war, stabilized the Assad regime, and defended it from accusations that it had repeatedly used chemical weapons, despite the clear proof that it has done so. Russia allowed Iran and its affiliated militias to do the bleeding on the ground in Syria, while it hardly paid any price at all for intervening. In so doing, it has put paid to Obama's fears of intervention, lest the United States become mired in the Syrian quagmire, and his prophecy that Syria would become the Russian Vietnam. The fact that Russia is the only player in Syria today that maintains relations with all of the sides involved has turned it into the leading actor there and the only one that just may be able to bring about a diplomatic resolution of the domestic crisis and prevent a direct conflict between Iran and Israel. Russia has also succeeding in ensuring that its presence in Syria, in the Hamimim airbase and Latakia naval base, will be for the long-term. Advanced S300 and S400 air defense systems — manned so far solely by Russian personnel — have been deployed in Syria to defend these bases, which provide Russia with the ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In Egypt, after four decades in which Cairo has been aligned entirely with the United States, Putin succeeded in using the regime's anger towards Washington, following Mubarak's ouster and U.S. sanctions on arms sales, in order to deepen relations. Military ties have been renewed, including the sale of approximately fifty MIG 29 fighters and a similar number of attack helicopters, S300 missiles, and joint military exercises. The two countries are now cooperating in Libya, including the deployment of a small Russian military force in western Egypt. Last year a deal was concluded for the provision of four Russian nuclear power reactors to Egypt. Saudi Arabia, which has long lived under an American security umbrella, is now afraid to continue placing all of its "strategic eggs" in the American basket and has also improved ties with Russia. The first visit ever of a Saudi king in Russia took place last year, and the crown prince has also visited since then. A deal for the sale of S400 and antitank missiles has been signed, as well as a nuclear cooperation agreement, in preparation for Russian participation in a Saudi tender for the first two out of sixteen planned nuclear power reactors. Saudi Arabia and Russia, which jointly account for some 20 percent of the world's oil production, have also begun investing in joint energy projects and, more importantly, to coordinate moves in order to bring about a cut in the global supply of oil and a price hike. For decades Russia has maintained a strategic relationship with Iran. A Security Council resolution prevents resumption of arms sales to Iran until 2020, but talks are underway regarding the sale of fighter aircraft, tanks, and artillery, and Russia has already supplied Iran with S300 missiles. The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the resumption of sanctions on Iran, make it even more dependent on Moscow and both strategic and economic cooperation between the two, including a possible free-trade zone, is expanding further.

#### David Ottoway finds at the end of January that as:

David Ottoway, TheHill, 1-29-2019, "As US-Saudi relationship sours, a new suitor has come calling," https://thehill.com/opinion/international/427423-as-us-saudi-relationship-sours-a-new-suitors-come-calling, Date Accessed 2-4-2019 // JM

While the doors in Washington have been clos[e]ing on the Saudi crown prince, those in Moscow have been opening wider, and the king and his son are now reciprocating. Serious Saudi courtship of Putin began with the four-day visit of King Salman to Moscow in March 2017, the first ever by a Saudi monarch. Since [2017] then, MbS, who is also the defense minister, has been there [there have been] several times to discuss oil and Russian arms sales. Russia has already proved its value to Saudi Arabia in combating the new American role in setting international oil prices by coordinating their production levels to combat soaring U.S. production.

#### But this isn’t new – when the US suspends aid to a country, Russia fills in. This is empirically proven with Egypt. Stasa Salacnin wrote in 2017 that:

Stasa Salacanin, 3-13-2017, "Weapons sales: The key to Russia's Middle East agenda," alaraby, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/3/13/weapons-sales-the-key-to-russias-middle-east-agenda, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

The Middle East has been a major arms importing region in recent years, with several states rapidly building up their huge arsenals. And Russia doesn't want to miss out on its slice of market share. Between 2007 and 2011, arms imports by states in the Middle East rose by 86 percent. In 2012-2016, weapons sales to the region accounted for 29 percent of global imports, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The main suppliers to the region have been the US and several European states. Russia's position has been much more limited. According to Alexey Khlebnikov, senior editor of Russia Direct, Russia wants to restore its Soviet-era position in the arms market, which drastically declined with the collapse of the USSR. It would be fair to say, therefore, that Moscow seeks to reach at least parity with US suppliers in the new Middle East arms race. Russia has long been a supplier of limited volumes of weaponry to Egypt, but it is only in recent years that large deals have been signed. According to Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI, deliveries of 50 Mig-29M combat aircraft and 46 Ka-50 combat helicopters are to start soon, which will make Russia one of Egypt's largest suppliers. "These deals have several possible causes, including that that part of Egypt's arsenal was getting old," he told The New Arab. "Egypt reportedly got financial support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for the procurement, [after] the US suspended its military aid to Egypt for about two years in reaction to the military coup of 2013 - [this was] undoubtedly a reason for Egypt to diversify its arms suppliers [with Russian arms]." Russian weapon exports may be used as political leverage. Nikolay Kozhanov, an analyst formerly of Chatham House, [notes](https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/arms-exports-add-russia-s-tools-influence-middle-east) "Russian federal law states that strengthening military and political positions abroad is the primary goal of Russian military-industrial cooperation". It is therefore right to assume that Russia will exercise this policy in the Middle East. "Egypt is a good example here," says Khlebnikov. "The current Egyptian regime desires to modernise its military arsenal with Russian arms and diversifying its military suppliers, while strengthening ties with Moscow, which may be a guarantor of the regime's stability." In addition, Russia has another valuable client in the neighbourhood. According to SIPRI data, Algeria was the largest arms importer in Africa, with 46 percent of all imports to the region. Wezeman says Algeria has been one of the major recipients of Russian arms anywhere on the globe for the past ten years, while SIPRI estimates it to be the third-largest recipient of Russian arms from 2007-2016. "Other suppliers compete in that market too, including China and Germany, but Russia dominates by far, accounting for around 80 percent of Algerian arms imports," Wezeman added. Nevertheless, the relations between the two have not gone much beyond arms deals; relations remain politically neutral. Elsewhere in the MENA region, however, Russia has been less successful as an arms supplier. Wezeman said that efforts to make deals in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have led to little success - as this is market traditionally dominated by the US and UK, with France following at a distance. "The UAE has acquired some weapons, in particular air defence systems from Russia, around 2010 - but no major deals have been agreed recently," he noted. Bahrain also ordered some 250 9M133 Kornet/AT-14 anti-tank missiles in 2014, according to SIPRI's data. It will be hard for Russia to penetrate the GCC market due to such fierce competition.

#### However, it’s not about how successful the fill in is or even how long Russia can sustain themselves – Anna Borschevskaya indicates in 2017 that:

Anna Borshchevskaya, 12-20-2017, "The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East," Jamestown, https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?”[[xvi]](https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/#_edn16) For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt’s anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-22[[xvii]](https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/#_edn17) (which the US is currently not even exporting). Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from Washington. Moscow, unlike the US, does not prohibit secondary arms sales. This means, for example, that when the US sells weapons to Egypt, the weapon must stay in Egypt.[[xviii]](https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/#_edn18) But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily resell to someone else for profit may be a preferable option. Moscow also does not burden arms sales with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus, countries turn to Moscow when they wish to signal to Washington that they have other options if they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions. At the same time, some Arab states are genuinely interested in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several GCC states bought Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the America, invests effort across the MENA region to sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option: Moscow does not have to replace the US. Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages including quicker delivery and better negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made major inroads during the Putin era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.

#### There are two impacts to this new-found Russian influence in the region. First, their influence entrenches authoritarianism. Yuri Barmin indicates in 2018 that:

Yuri Barmin, 3-8-2018 , "Russia in the Middle East Until 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influence," Jamestown, <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-middle-east-2024-hard-power-sustainable-influence/>, Date Accessed 2-6-2019 // JM

Experts who had argued that authoritarianism in the Middle East would maintain stability and keep extremism at bay were proven wrong by the events of the Arab Spring.[xxxv] The Russian leadership, however, still projects its vision of “autocratic stability” onto the region. And even though Moscow repeatedly insists that it is up to the Syrian people to decide through a presidential election who will lead the nation into the post-war period, the Russian government is unlikely to become a supporter of democracy movements in the Middle East. After all, elections have been a crucial legitimization tool of Russia’s own “managed democracy.” The consolidation of power in the hands of the national leader as well as the securitization of the political agenda have characterized the Russian political system throughout the last 17 years Vladimir Putin has been in power. And they continue to guide him in how he sees regimes in the Middle East. Some of these authoritarian Arab regimes share a long history with Russia: during the Cold War, they proved their ability to maintain order for longer than any democratic regime could sustain it, not least due to Moscow’s financial and military support. The fact that Bashar al-Assad survived throughout the bloody Syrian conflict, to a large extent due to Russia’s aid, solidifies the idea that authoritarianism in the Middle East guarantees stability and puts a cap on “toxic” democratic values imposed from the outside. In Moscow’s view, authoritarian tendencies are indigenous to the region, much like they are to Russia, which is why they need not be battled but rather be correctly managed. Russia’s idea of “authoritarian stability” in the Middle East may find a potential supporter in Donald Trump, who notoriously dropped America’s agenda for promoting democracy in the Middle East. The distinct security focus of Donald Trump’s strategy toward the region has emboldened his allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and convinced them that the regional policeman will no longer restrain their geopolitical ambitions. The position of both Russia and the United States is, thus, likely to resonate with many governments in the region that previously had to put on airs of civil society engagement and liberalization just to have international political and diplomatic backing. Egypt and Turkey are the two cases in point: the 2017 Human Rights Watch World Report specifically points to them to illustrate how the tide of new authoritarianism is sweeping through the Middle East.[xxxvi] In Turkey, the attempted coup in July 2016 was used by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an excuse to crack down not only on suspected plotters but also on wider circles critical of the government’s policies. Western powers sharply rebuked Erdoğan over his suspension of the rule of law in the country and mass detentions—but Russia pointedly did not. Putin was the one world leader who gave a call to Erdoğan to tell him Moscow supports his campaign to root out dissent, which the Turkish president described as “anti-constitutional.”[xxxvii] Furthermore Putin hosted his Turkish counterpart in St. Petersburg less than a month after the failed coup, during which Erdoğan explained that Vladimir Putin’s call to him was an important move, “a kind of moral support and display of Russia-Turkey solidarity,” as the Turkish president described the situation.[xxxviii] All this occurred just weeks after Erdoğan’s late June apology to Russia for the November 2015 downing of a Russian Su-24 jet over Syria; and it goes to show how masterfully Vladimir Putin uses authoritarian movements to his own political benefit. Egypt is going through a similar wave of authoritarianism, with President Abdel Fattah El Sisi cracking down on dissent that is not necessarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. That government campaign is happening against the backdrop of economic instability, currency devaluation and increased poverty rates. However, the army’s grip on power and full control over the public sphere give a semblance of stability in the country. Sisi’s fight to eradicate extremism in the Sinai as well as his crackdown on dissent find support in Moscow, which is reflected in official statements coming from the Kremlin. Egypt reemerged as Russia’s key partner in the Middle East, including in crucial spheres of military-technical cooperation. The two countries signed a protocol on military cooperation in March 2015, significantly ramped up joint military exercises, and are looking to green light an agreement that would allow Russian military aircraft to use Egyptian airspace and infrastructure.[xxxix] With the turmoil and regular attacks in the Sinai Peninsula, counter-terrorism cooperation has become a distinct characteristic of the bilateral relationship. A security-heavy agenda acts as a glue between Moscow and Cairo, not least due to the military and security background of the political elites of the two countries. Both Russians and Egyptians will head to the polls in March 2018 to elect their respective heads of state, while presidential elections in Turkey are to take place in November 2019. The outcome is already known in all three countries; Putin, Sisi and Erdoğan will almost certainly serve out their next terms into the first half of the 2020s, meaning that we are unlikely to witness a disruption in the security-comes-first policy employed by Moscow in its bilateral relations with both Cairo and Ankara. The cases of Egypt and Turkey illustrate that Vladimir Putin is likely to encourage authoritarian “stability” across the region through skewed security-heavy policies. Putin’s support for autocratic tendencies will hardly find any resistance among other powers in the region and will almost certainly be embraced. Syria’s recovery from the seven-year war is unlikely to happen through the emergence of democratic institutions and freedom, but will probably lead to the creation of a strong regime with an inflated security apparatus to shield a fragile government and keep extremist tendencies at bay. Iraq’s increasingly sectarian policies hint at a similar trend. And as Libya’s internationally recognized government fails to establish control over much of the country’s territory, Libyan National Army Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar represents the type of leader the Kremlin would presumably like to see for a post–civil war Libya. If Russia’s Syria policy is any indication, a highly centralized system will be Moscow’s remedy for extremism throughout the wider region. The fear of a new wave of extremism will push many regimes to seek more control over the population, and a lack of incentives to democratize may bring about new repressive regimes. In other words Russia’s leadership in the Middle East may significantly lengthen and reinforce the era of authoritarianism there.

#### Perry Cammack concludes:

Perry Cammack & Michele Dunne, 10-23-2018, “Fueling Middle East Conflicts – or Dousing the Flames,” Caregie Endowment for Interpnational Peace, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548>, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

Against this complicated backdrop, four competitive dyads—Saudi Arabia–Iran, Israel-Iran, U.S.-Iran, and U.S.-Russia—seem especially critical to shaping a new regional security balance. The likelihood of resolving any of these is low. Some of these struggles are viewed in near-existential terms, while leaders in others appear to derive significant political benefits from the rivalries. While reconciliation among the most contentious of these axes may not be possible for the foreseeable future, there is an urgent need to explore whether these inevitable competitions for influence can be made less lethal. This would spare states such as Syria and Yemen their wholesale destruction, and allow Middle Eastern governments the opportunity to focus on providing for the social and economic well-being of their citizens. Scholars of international security policy warn of security dilemmas, in which steps taken by one state to increase its security result in countermeasures from an adversary who in turn feels less secure, thus risking a chain reaction leading to conflict.3 This dynamic well describes today’s Middle East. To observers in Israel or Saudi Arabia, it is self-evident that Iran is playing a highly destructive role in places such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Israeli security officials point to the importance of creating credible military deterrence given decades of Iranian hostility.4 From an Iranian perspective, however, such actions are justified as a defensive response to Israeli threats of military strikes and the U.S. military installations in close proximity to Iran’s borders.5 The Trump administration has recently announced efforts to create a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) with the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Egypt, and Jordan.6 Although the prospects for success seem low given inter-Arab divisions and the track record of previous initiatives, such an alliance could certainly produce tangible security benefits for its members in coordinating counterterrorism efforts and countering Iranian influence. But in so doing it would likely to harden divisions in the Middle East. In comparison with almost every other geographical region, the Middle East suffers from a lack of both regional dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic protocols that might reduce the scope for regional conflict. While the Cold War was defined by the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides increasingly felt the need for inclusive institutions and mechanisms to reduce tensions. Every U.S. president during the Cold War, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George H. W. Bush, met with his Soviet counterpart. During the tensest moments, high-level U.S.-Soviet channels of communications were especially important. Over time, a number of confidence-building institutions and transparency-enhancing measures were created, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successive arms control agreements, and later the Treaty on Open Skies, which allows for unarmed surveillance flights over signatory countries to promote military and nuclear weapons openness. In the Middle East, however, the absence of any similar mechanisms or organizations, particularly amid proliferating military conflicts, feeds security dilemmas across multiple vectors, so that steps justified by one state as necessary to its security—military intervention, arms procurement, alliance formation, and so on—are perceived by its rivals as threatening.

#### Second, their influence changes the direction of Saudi Arabia’s development of nuclear power.. Sagatom Saha indicates in 2018 that:

Sagatom Saha, 7-20-2018, "The US Must Build Saudi Arabia’s First Nuclear Reactors," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-must-build-saudi-arabias-first-nuclear-reactors/149914/, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

Riyadh will get its atomic energy. The question is who gets the construction contracts — and the influence that goes with them. For all the attention on Iran’s atomic ambitions and the U.S. withdrawal from a deal meant to hold them in check, there is another nuclear story unfolding in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia intends to award the contracts to build its first two nuclear reactors next year, en route to building 16 of them by 2040. It is a matter of national security that the United States re-establish its leading position in the global nuclear trade by successfully pursuing this and similar projects. Riyadh’s nuclear ambition is not a one-off story; it represents a larger revival of nuclear power generation. Nuclear may be declining in the developed world, but it is poised for growth in the world’s emerging economies for environmental and technological reasons. The Trump administration should capitalize on these trends to fulfill its promise to revitalize America’s domestic nuclear industry while reducing risk of ceding influence to China and Russia. While Saudi Arabia did not explicitly enshrine nuclear in its 2015 Paris commitments like other countries, it has the ninth-highest ambient air pollution. More broadly, warming in the Middle East is expected to exceed twice the world average, making the region uninhabitable by mid-century. New designs like the nearly-commercial small modular reactor, or SMR, can also expand nuclear’s global reach. Many developing nations cannot use nuclear power because today’s 1,000-megawatt reactors are too large for smaller grids. But 50-megawatt SMR modules could fit right in. Even the Saudi grid, with 66 gigawatts of generating capacity, could benefit from SMRs, which could more easily replace fossil-fuel plants aging out of service. Because SMRs are compact, uniform, and factory-made, financing and construction costs would be less than gigawatt-scale designs. SMRs should also assuage safety concerns: they have simpler safety systems and can be buried for additional security, a critical consideration in the Gulf. Although SMRs are not yet ready for commercial sale in Saudi Arabia, the technology is expected to deployable in the 2020s, well within the Kingdom’s overall nuclear plans. While the idea of a Saudi Arabia with any nuclear capability may seem dangerous, it is also inevitable. The Kingdom has already received bids from companies based in the United States, but also in France, China, Russia, and South Korea, demonstrating a global willingness to supply nuclear technology. If the United States does not build them, another country will step in. But the U.S. nuclear industry has been in decline for a generation. Past administrations have been able to impose legally required, rigorous nonproliferation commitments from importing nations because they craved U.S. operational and regulatory experience. Despite America’s previous market leadership and strong safety and security record, its nuclear firms are no longer a clear choice.

#### And the US leadership on this is crucial as Reuters reported yesterday that:

Rueters, 2-14-2019, "U.S. to block Saudi path to atomic weapon," http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2019/Feb-14/476610-us-to-block-saudi-path-to-atomic-weapon.ashx, Date Accessed 2-15-2019 // JM

U.S. senators from both parties introduced a resolution requiring that any deal to share U.S. nuclear power technology with Saudi Arabia [will] block the kingdom from making a nuclear weapon. Under the measure, any U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, or 123 agreement, with Saudi Arabia would prevent enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium made in reactors - two routes to making nuclear weapons.

#### However, Saha indicates that on the other hand,

Sagatom Saha, 7-20-2018, "The US Must Build Saudi Arabia’s First Nuclear Reactors," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/us-must-build-saudi-arabias-first-nuclear-reactors/149914/, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

China’s and Russia’s growing role in the global nuclear trade should worry U.S. policymakers. Moscow has a demonstrated history of leveraging energy dependencies, exploiting its dominance in the European natural gas market for political concessions. China, too, could gain similar leverage by subverting America’s security guarantees. As part of its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has already made predatory investments to trap countries into indebtedness. Each reactor exported could serve as an anchor for geopolitical leverage over its sixty- to eighty-year lifespan. These emerging market dynamics will hurt international nuclear security. Both China and Russia are known for lax standards on nuclear security, poor track records on safety, and a general willingness to turn a blind eye toward partners who violate international norms — a special consideration for Saudi Arabia.

#### That’s bad because Jacob Weindling indicated THIS WEEK that:

Jacob Weindling, 2-12-2019, "Trump Wants Saudi Arabia to Have Nuclear Power. Here Are 5 Ways That Can Go Very Wrong," pastemagazine, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2019/02/trump-is-trying-to-get-saudi-arabia-nuclear-power.html, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // JM

2. It Sparks a Nuclear Arms Race Even if Saudi Arabia doesn’t get nuclear weapons, just the pursuit or even the perception of a pursuit of nuclear weapons can spark a nuclear arms race. Iran has been trying for years to obtain a nuclear weapon, and they would surely ramp up those efforts if their other geographical foe tried to get one. I said “other” geographical foe because Israel’s claim to not have nukes is the most well-known lie in the world. Saudi Arabia trying to get nukes means Iran trying to get nukes. Period. And I haven’t even mentioned Turkey yet. 3. Oh yeah, Turkey Oh yeah, the country with, according to the World Bank, the 17th largest economy in the world—larger than the economies of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. Turkey is ruled by a despot who spends his days persecuting political dissidents and trying to get the starting center for the New York Knicks extradited and would not hesitate to incorporate nuclear weapons into his widening power grab. If Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran have nukes, that means Turkey gets nukes. Period. We could be barreling towards a scenario where 28% of the highlighted countries and the vast majority of landmass in this picture are controlled by nuclear powers. 4. This Nuclear Arms Race Could Spill Out of the Middle East Given that “Middle East” is an inherently colonialist term (what is it “middle” and “east” of?), it’s not exactly concretely descriptive, but given the recent history of U.S. foreign policy adventurism, that image is more or less a good representation of what landmass constitutes the Middle East as we have come to know it. To its east, India and Pakistan have been rattling the world’s nerves with their nuclear weapon-empowered posturing for decades. North of that is the western portion of nuclear-armed China, and north of that is nuclear-armed Russia. Giving the Saudis nuclear weapons would kick-start a chain-reaction that would lead to a nuclear firewall stretching from the Mediterranean to the Pacific—and that’s only including countries that already have nuclear weapons. If the entire Middle East power center is laden with nukes, why not the North African power center? Nigeria has a larger economy and much more oil than Israel, why shouldn’t they have nukes too? [South Africa](https://www.pastemagazine.com/tag/South%2BAfrica) ended its nuclear weapons program in 1989, but you can bet that those files still exist somewhere and they could restart the program next year if they wanted to. And if a country like Nigeria gets nukes, why not the eighth largest economy the world (Brazil)? Like South Africa, they have a dormant Cold War-era nuclear program that they could resuscitate if they wanted to. See how all it takes is one shift in the power balance of one region to spark a litany of others throughout the region and beyond? This is not a topic to be trifled with.

#### This coupled with our departure from the INF agreement almost guarantees escalation towards war – Andrew Roth argues in 2019 that:

Andrew Roth, 1-3-2019, "Fragmenting nuclear arms controls leave world in a more dangerous place," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/03/fragmenting-nuclear-arms-controls-leave-world-in-a-more-dangerous-place, Date Accessed 2-14-2019 // JM

Taken together, these treaties are the bulk of the nuclear arms control framework that the United States and Russia inherited from the Cold War or have developed since. Experts from both sides note that the treaties weren’t perfect but warn that brokering deals is far more difficult than breaking them. The probability of an arms buildup is growing. “The INF decision and failure to get into real discussions about extending New START has us sleepwalking into a new nuclear arms race,” said Richard Burt, a former ambassador who served as chief negotiator for the United States on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, during an Atlantic Council event earlier this year. Viktor Yesin, the former chief of staff of the Russian Federation Strategic Missile Force, said that the US decision to exit the INF was largely with an eye to military developments in China and other countries not bound by the treaty. But the decision could lead to deployments of missiles in Europe, he said, unless the United States and Russia take steps to avoid it. Only “political measures” could avert “the worst outcome for Russia and Europe in the development of a ‘missile crisis,’ which will unavoidably arise after the United States exits the INF,” he said. Those warnings appear to be apt. A leaked memo published by the Washington Post showed that Bolton had ordered the Pentagon to “develop and deploy ground-launched missiles at the earliest possible date.” The order was tabled only after European allies intervened to prevent an immediate US pullout from the INF. Washington has issued Moscow a 60-day ultimatum, after which it will exit the treaty. Russia, which has not admitted to violating the treaty, has signalled it won’t change its behaviour. The driving force behind the pullout is seen as Bolton, who has spoken fervently against similar arms control treaties and presided over the demolition of both the anti-ballistic missile treaty in 2001 and now the INF. Determined individuals can change the course of history. In 1983, Petrov’s decision not to alert his superiors came down to a “funny feeling in my gut.” Now, Bolton appears resolved to finally see a United States released from the bonds of missile treaties and nuclear arms control.

# Extra Cards

#### Second, nuclear waste. Jeffrey Hays writes that

Jeffrey Hays, 2016, "NUCLEAR WASTE AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IN RUSSIA," http://factsanddetails.com/russia/Nature\_Science\_Animals/sub9\_8c/entry-5066.html, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // WS

None of Russia nuclear power plants has a complete safety certificate. Many have been cited for hundreds of violations. Even so the government wants to build more nuclear plants, including 40 "fast breeder" reactors that use plutonium for fuel. Some of Russia’s nuclear power plants rely on the same technology as the plant at Chernobyl. The Chernobyl reactor was a RBMK-type reactor. A total of 17 of these reactors were built—four in the Ukraine 11 in Russia and 2 in Lithuania. Most of the other reactors in the former Soviet Union are similar to those in the United States and Europe. One problem with many Russian nuclear power plants is that they do not have concrete containment domes, which contain the radiation, like those found on Western countries [also]. In 2003, the United States made a deal with Russia to build two-coal burning power plants in exchange for closing three plutonium reactors regarded as among the most dangerous in the world. Nevertheless, experts predict that nuclear energy probably will play an important role in the Russian economy if enough investment is available to expand existing capacity. In 1992 Minatom announced plans to double nuclear energy capacity by 2010, but ensuing financial problems have caused a reduction of that goal, and no new capacity has been added since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) projects that construction of new capacity will not begin until after 2005, even if the investment climate is favorable. \* Over three decades, the Soviet Union and Russia [has] pumped billions of gallons of radioactive water and waste directly into the earth. Most of it has been injected between layers of shale and clay, which are regarded as leakproof, often near major rivers. There have been reports of leaks, in some cases long distances from their source. The three most potentially dangerous sites are: 1) Dimitrovgrad near the Volga River, 2) Tomsk near the Ob River and 3) Krasonoyark on the Yenisei River. The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea. The Ob and the Yenisi flow into the Arctic Ocean. The amount of radioactivity of the injected nuclear material has been estimated at three billion curies (in contrast the accident at Chernobyl released 50 million curies and the accident at Three Mile Island released 50 curries).

#### The CEF terminalizes that

CEF, No date, "Dangers and Effects of Nuclear Waste Disposal," Conserve Energy Future, https://www.conserve-energy-future.com/dangers-and-effects-of-nuclear-waste-disposal.php, Date Accessed 2-13-2019 // WS

If disposed of properly, nuclear waste disposal need not have any negative effects. Instead, nuclear waste can lie in its storage place for many thousands of years until it is no longer radioactive and dangerous without being disturbed. However, if the nuclear waste is improperly disposed of or if the disposal methods are compromised, there can be serious consequences and effects of nuclear waste disposal. . Accidents: Although most of the time a lot of emphasis is placed on the safe disposal of nuclear waste, accidents do occur. Throughout history there have unfortunately been a number of examples of times where radioactive material was not disposed of in the proper ways. This has resulted in a number of disastrous situations, including nuclear waste [can] being spread by dust storms into areas that were populated by humans and animals and contaminated of water, whether ponds, rivers or even the sea. These accidents can have disastrous knock on effects for the animals that reside in or around these areas or that rely on the water of lakes or ponds to survive. Drinking water can become contaminated, too, which is absolutely disastrous for locals and residents close to the epicenter of the disaster. Even if nuclear waste just seeps into the ground, it can eventually get into reservoirs and other water sources and, from there, can reach the homes of people who unwittingly drink high radioactive material. There are examples of these sorts of accidents from all over the world and from all time periods, with severe accidents happening very rarely but having a huge effect on very many people. 2. Scavenging: A particularly bad problem in developing nations, people often go scavenging for abandoned nuclear waste that is still radioactive. In some countries there is a market for these sorts of scavenged goods, which means that people will willingly expose themselves to dangerous levels of radiation in order to make money. Unfortunately, however, radioactive materials can be highly volatile and cause a number of problems. Usually, people who scavenge these sorts of materials will end up in hospital and may even die of problems related to or caused by the radioactive materials. Unfortunately, once someone has been exposed to nuclear waste, they can then expose other people who have not opted to go scavenging for nuclear waste to radioactive materials. 3. Transportation: Transporting nuclear waste from power plants can occasionally result in problems. If poor shipping casks are used for the containment of radioactive material, for instance, then a slight knock or bump or even crash could cause the contents to spill and affect a wide radius. Despite all the cautions that are put into place when transporting nuclear waste, accidents still occur and can have a devastating effect on all those in the vicinity of the crash. 4. Health Effects: The biggest concern is the negative effects that can have on the human body when exposed to radiation. Long term effects to radiation can even cause cancer. It is interesting to know that we are exposed to radiations naturally by living our lives that comes from the ground below us. Radiation can cause changes in ‘DNA’ that ensures cell repair. 5. Expense: If one of these accidents does occur, the cost of cleaning everything up and making everything safe once again for people, animals and plants is very high. There is no simple or easy route when trying to clean up spilled radioactive material: instead, it can take years to ensure that an area is safe to live in or even to visit once again. In the case of very serious accidents, it may take many tens of years until things start growing or living normally once again.