

We affirm.

Contention One is improving troops.

Johnson of the Heritage Foundation notes that the size of the American military has fallen by 100,000 troops, the smallest level it's ever been in 75 years due to spending cuts which began in 2011.

Fortunately, increasing military spending solves the recruitment crisis in two ways.

First, spending goes towards the DoD's recruitment and advertising budget. Demirjian of the Washington Post writes that Trump plans to financially boost the military's recruitment program. Analyst Bicksler finds that increasing the number of recruiters by 10% increases high quality enlistments by 4.7%.

Second, increasing personnel wages. According to Major Eisenhower, insufficient troop compensation has been a growing concern over why combat jobs are undesirable. However, Altman of the Military Times explains that a Republican congressional majority will likely push through pay raises for military personnel as part of a spending overhaul. This is critical, because Bicksler concludes that every 10% increase in military wages increases high quality enlistments by 11.3%.

For these two reasons, Dertouzos of RAND quantifies that every \$100 million in military spending attracts 20,000 recruits.

There are two impacts.

First, decreasing reliance on PMC's.

Moher of the University of Colorado Boulder explains that largely due to budget cuts, the military has turned to Private Military Contractors which are independently financed, thus having little regulation. Stanley explains that for every 1000 troop increase in the United States military, the amount of private contractors hired decreases by 1400 troops. Decreasing reliance on private military contractors is crucial as Moher concludes that dependence on PMC's increases the propensity for conflict due to the fact PMC's will always lobby for it, because they are employed off of its existence.

Second, increasing military readiness.

An independent 2016 analysis by the Heritage Foundation finds that the United States military is weak when it comes to readiness. Freedberg 15' of BreakingDefense writes that increased spending would fund training programs that would DOUBLE the military's readiness. That is why the U.S. military chief of staff writes that Readiness is the most effective tool to deter or defeat enemies, while assuring our allies of our foreign commitment. He adds that readiness is

the pre-requisite to decisive victory abroad for U.S. interests. Spencer of the Heritage Foundation explains that Military readiness is critical, because when we don't appear ready it signals to the world that the US is weak and unprepared for a fight. Long term, this could create greater hostilities with predatory nation states, so if we can increase our readiness now, we would deter potentially hostile nations from acting up and challenging the U.S. in regions of critical interest and preserving peace.

Contention Two: Sailing to Victory

Zachary Cohen of CNN explains that largely due to budget cuts, the U.S. Navy is at its smallest size since World War One. This is problematic as Sean Gallagher explains that if the U.S. doesn't increase spending on the Navy, we:

A. Won't be able to respond as quickly to international conflicts, and...

B. Risk a vacuum where other countries' navies fill the void.

Gallagher quantifies that in order to be able to respond to international conflicts we will need at least 15% more ships. Fortunately, Capaccio of Bloomberg finds that President Elect Donald Trump has promised to increase the naval fleet from 272 to 350 ships, and because funding is the only obstacle to this achievement, increasing spending would solve.

The impact is combatting Chinese belligerence.

Follet 16' of the EPI explains that China has claimed more than 80% of the South China Sea, sparking conflict with the U.S. and other countries in the region. Unfortunately, Rando 15' of CBN impacts that Chinese belligerence leads a high possibility of regional war which could go nuclear, killing 12 million Americans.

Fortunately, increasing the amount of ships in the region by affirming de-escalates tensions in two ways.

First, by supporting allies

Randy Forbes 13' explains that, increasing naval presence in the Pacific would allow the United States to better back our allies such as the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan in the region. This is crucial as Leed of Rice University furthers in a statistical analysis that when a target state has an ally committed to its defense, the probability of conflict initiation decreases 28%.

Second, by protecting trade.

The Council on Foreign Relations notes, \$1.2 trillion of U.S. trade flows through the South China Sea and the prerequisite to this trade is regional stability. Fortunately, Forbes furthers that a strong navy not only brings regional stability, but also the strength of the American economy is directly linked with the Navy's ability to maintain free trade. This is especially true, as Johnson of the Heritage Foundation finds that 95% of US trade is seaborne. Ultimately, Awad of Erasmus University empirically quantifies the impact writing that a 1% increase in trade leads to a decrease in the probability of conflict by 4.9%.

And for these reasons we affirm.

FRONTLINES

Justin T Johnson; Heritage Foundation; 2015

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/assessing-common-arguments-for-cutting-national-security-spending-informing-current-and-future-budget-debates>

The United States prefers the “away game.” The U.S. is fortunate to have large oceans between it and potential U.S. adversaries. If a conflict were to arise, the U.S. would rather fight on the far side of the ocean than on U.S. shores. This requires the ability to project power from the air and the sea. This ability to project power around the world also benefits the U.S. economy, which relies on international trade. Exports alone account for 13 percent of the U.S. GDP,[30] and 95 percent of U.S. foreign trade is seaborne.[31] A strong Navy is required to maintain the freedom of the commons and to ensure that maritime trade routes remain open and free.

Justin Johnson of the Heritage Foundation

Johnson 15, Justin. "Assessing Common Arguments for Cutting National Security Spending: Informing Current and Future Budget Debates." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 6 Nov. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/assessing-common-arguments-for-cutting-national-security-spending-informing-current-and-future-budget-debates>>./JH

While the budget debate continues, Americans should be concerned about the state of the U.S. military. The Heritage Foundation's 2016 *Index of U.S. Military Strength* assessed that America's ability to defend itself and its interests is only "marginal" while the global threat level is "elevated."^[3] Given the stakes, Americans need to understand where the arguments for cutting national security spending fall short.

Beverly Hallberg is a contributor to The Daily Signal, a visiting fellow at The Heritage Foundation, and president of District Media Group, The Daily Signal, How to Talk About Defense Spending and "Rebuilding the Military," <http://dailysignal.com/2016/10/25/how-to-talk-about-defense-spending-and-rebuilding-the-military/> October 25, 2016

Hardly a day passes without one (or seven) news reports highlighting conflicts abroad. What this reality means for America and our safety under the current budget isn't great.

As violence has increased, defense spending has decreased by about 25 percent since 2011. And now there is a legitimate question about whether slashing the budget has weakened our military as outlined in The Heritage Foundation's 2016 *Index of U.S. Military Strength*.

Justin Johnson of the Heritage Foundaotion

Johnson 15, Justin. "Assessing Common Arguments for Cutting National Security Spending: Informing Current and Future Budget Debates." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 6 Nov. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/assessing-common-arguments-for-cutting-national-security-spending-informing-current-and-future-budget-debates>>./JH

U.S. national security spending has been dramatically declining for years. In 2011, according to the same data, the U.S. spent more than the next 13 countries combined.^[4] In 2012, it was 10 countries.^[5] In 2013, it was down to eight countries.^[6] Finally, in 2014, it was down to seven countries.^[7] The trend is clear.

100,000 troop decrease in soldiers.

BarbaMcCain 16, John. "The Shrinking Military Budget Is Killing Our Readiness." *Task & Purpose*. N.p., 05 Aug. 2016. Web. 27 Dec. 2016. <<http://taskandpurpose.com/shrinking-military-budget-killing-readiness/>>./JH

It's not just the Air Force that is facing these growing challenges. Our budgetary and readiness crisis has become tragically commonplace throughout the military services. Arbitrary budget cuts have shrunk the Army by nearly 100,000 soldiers since 2012, bringing it to a size that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testified has put the Army at "high military risk." The Navy's fleet of 272 ships is [also] too small to address critical security challenges. Even with recent shipbuilding increases, the Navy will not achieve its requirement of 308 ships until 2021. Our shrinking fleet is in-turn extending deployments — taking a toll on our sailors and military families, while delaying

much-needed ship maintenance. **Marine Corps aviation is also suffering with a fleet that is too small and too old.** As a result, our Marines don't have enough aircraft on which to train, and are instead spending time they would otherwise devote to practicing flight techniques to maintaining the remaining aircraft to keep them in operation.

ra Bicksler

Bicksler, Barbara A (senior analyst at Strategic Analysis Inc). "Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force: The Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting Resources - An Update." December 2009.

[http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/MPP/AP/Bicksler Recruiting Paper 2009.pdf](http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/MPP/AP/Bicksler_Recruiting_Paper_2009.pdf)

Past experience has shown that a sufficiently large and experienced recruiter force can bring in high-quality recruits and effectively counter the negative effects that economic and demographic factors can have on recruiting. One recent study estimates that **increasing the number of Army recruiters by 10 percent will increase high-quality Army enlistments by between 4.1 and 4.7 percent.** Decreasing recruiters by 10 percent reduces high-quality enlistments by between 5.6 and 6.2 percent. Thus, a decline in the number of experienced recruiters has a greater negative impact on enlistments than the positive impact of increasing the number of recruiters (Simon and Warner 2008), due in part to new recruiters being less effective than their more experienced counterparts at securing enlistees.²⁴ Analysis has consistently shown a clear relationship between pay and high-quality recruits—when basic pay declines relative to civilian pay, the percent of high-quality enlistees declines as well. Recent analyses of the impact of relative pay estimate that **a 10 percent increase in military pay would increase high-quality Army enlistments by between 7 percent (Simon and Warner 2008) and 11.3 percent** (Asch et al. forthcoming). But as a policy tool, the pay hikes necessary to generate such impressive recruiting growth would be extremely expensive, since a pay raise designed to increase enlistments would have to be paid to all new enlistees, even those who would have enlisted at the original lower pay rate, as well as to the entire force. Today, a single percentage-point increase in basic pay (for both active and reserve members) adds about \$1 billion to the annual defense budget.⁴⁰ Thus, increasing military pay is not a cost-effective way to boost total enlistments.

Major Scott Eisenhower

Eisenhower, Scott (Major, US Army). "THE EFFECTS OF PAY AND BENEFITS ON RECRUITING AND RETENTION IN THE US ARMY." Air University. April 1999. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a396593.pdf>

As the United States Army enters the 21st Century, there is a growing concern over the deterioration of capabilities, specifically as a result of problems in manning the service. **Difficulties in recruiting qualified young men and women and the continuing departure of experienced soldiers and officers have prompted stronger calls for increased military pay and benefits.** Military Pay and Retirement Benefits – What is the impact on recruiting and retention in the U.S. Army? This is the major question that members of Congress and the Joint Chiefs are wrestling with. To ensure the Pentagon looks to improve military pay and benefits, congressional negotiators added a provision to the 1999 defense appropriations bill ordering a comprehensive review of current programs.¹

George Altman of the Military Times

Altman, George. "If Trump wants to impress the military, he'll order a decent pay raise." Military Times. November 25, 2016. <http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/donald-trump-military-times-poll>

The Defense Department under Obama has sought to reign in personnel costs as broader federal cutbacks have forced the Pentagon to funnel more of those resources toward weapons modernization. The value of troops' compensation has eroded as annual raises have fallen below civilian wage growth for the past five years. **The president has ordered a 1.6 percent military pay raise for 2017, a rate that will take effect in January unless members of Congress can secure additional funding for a slightly larger bump of 2.1 percent.**

James Dertouzos of the Rand Corporation

Dertouzos, James N. The cost-effectiveness of military advertising: Evidence from 2002-2004. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 2009.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2009/RAND_DB565.pdf

A regression was also run linking total DoD contracts (expressed in logarithms) with all Service advertising. The details of this regression are provided in Table 2. As in the case of the Army-only model, the coefficients representing the advertising effect (k, u) were positive and highly significant. The results suggest that nearly 40,000 contracts could be attributed to military advertising. It is also the case that even more contracts could have been signed on an annual basis if the advertising budget had been higher. The results indicate that **an extra \$100 million annual could attract nearly 20,000 recruits**. This regression, because it does not isolate the cross-Service enlistment flows, does not provide enough information to come to strong conclusions about the competition between Services. However, because the overall expansion effect is significant, one can conclude that, at least on average, a Service's program does more than merely draw enlistees who would have joined another Service.

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

Private military companies have many different effects on democracy. Security companies for example, affect strategy and organization overseas while PMCs in general lower audience costs by harming transparency. Research has shown that war is not only more likely to occur if the attacker perceives the costs of the war to be low, but also that a low-cost war is more likely to continue (Filson and Werner, 2002: 820). These findings become more significant if the aggressor in a conflict is confident about the resolve and military capabilities of their opponent (Filson and Werner, 2002: 820). This finding is also true for the defender in a conflict. If the attacker or defender is more likely to win battles or has lower costs associated with engaging in conflict then the bargaining range, or the amount each side is willing to compromise on, gets smaller because the demands for a successful termination of war for those with low costs increase (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). Wars will last until the private information concerning each actor's capabilities

is realized, therefore even if negotiations failed to prevent war they can be used to end the war (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). **Using this model it can be seen why the US would want to use PMC's: they not only reduce the audience costs associated with war, but they hide the capabilities of the US military to both the international and domestic populations. The use of private military companies means that transparency both with the international body and the domestic body is lost because costly and public signals are no longer a states' only option when expressing resolve. The US can now choose when to publicly signal resolve and when to privately respond to certain events. This means that in many cases the certainty in resolve that audience costs once gave the opponent is no longer available which will increase the likelihood of incorrect or incomplete information.** Fearon argues that incomplete information alone is not a rational reason for war, but rather the incentive to misrepresent

information to the other actor is rational and that incomplete or wrong information does lead to war (Fearon, 1995: 391). **The US has an incentive to misrepresent the cost versus the gain to its domestic population, while at the same time expressing resolve to its opponent. This allows US leaders to ensure their domestic political survival and also gain the benefits associated with the conflict. Because the use of PMCs have made engaging in war less domestically costly the bargaining range becomes significantly smaller.** This means that if the issue is important enough the US does not have to compromise because the cost is small but the potential benefit is large, such as creating a stable Iraq. It does mean that if the US is the attacker in the conflict, then it must maintain a credible threat to attack or else the defender will be less likely to concede (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). This model then suggests that in order to perpetuate a credible threat of attack, previous or future attacks are necessary. It also suggests that the leadership will be more likely to attack when there is the ability to misrepresent information to the domestic audience, because there would be limited political consequences for losing (Fearon 1994: 585).

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado Boulder

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado

Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

The goals of this paper are to explain the consequences of using PMCs in modern day warfare. Section 1 consists of term definitions that are used throughout the rest of the paper. Section 2 lays out existing literature that explains why the use of private security companies (all support, security, and production companies geared to helping and working with the military) is so attractive to political leaders. In short private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs), limit the public's knowledge and ability to check government actions with regard to foreign policy, decisions about conflict interventions, and war. Section 3 transitions to the issue of private security contractors and their link to civilian brutality. Using primarily Campbell's research on counterterrorism's legal framework it is concluded that indiscriminate brutality against civilians and prisoners by a state is an ineffective strategy against terrorism, and may increase war duration and cause needless escalation. Then through Humphreys and Weinstein's assessment of loosely associated government groups and rebel groups, it is shown that the way private security firms are set up will lead to instances of misconduct and violent brutality, especially against civilians. The evidence portion of the paper is broken up between section 4 and section 5. Section 4 focuses on the lowering of audience costs; limited efficiency and lack of transparency that results from the use of PMCs and PSCs. Section 5 transitions to individual case studies to show the trends of PSCs using indiscriminate brutality against civilians and the radicalization of the Iraqi people. This indiscriminate brutality weakens the war effort and trust between Iraqis and Coalition forces, it will radicalize the local people and it will lead to an increase in violent recruitment and mobilization against those committing the brutality. All of these issues, from low audience costs to the radical mobilization of a host country's people, compound to one conclusion: **growing dependence on private military**

contractors and private security contractors will lead to an increase in the number of conflicts entered into as well as an increase in the duration of those conflicts. Section 1. Definitions Private service

contractors can be broken up into three main groups: military combatant companies, military consulting firms and military support firms (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military combatant companies provide forces capable of combat, but they are the smallest group. (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military consulting firms, provide training and advisory services, although they have increasingly expanded into traditional security services (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military support firms provide nonviolent services, like construction, food service and intelligence gathering (Isenberg, 2009: 11). These are different from private manufacturing contractors who build the weapons, ships, planes and general equipment (Isenberg, 2009: 12). For the purposes of this paper all private contractors, service, consulting, security, and manufactures, will be considered private military contractors or PMCs. Private security contractors (PSCs) will include military combatant companies, and those military consulting and training firms that have expanded their reach into security and bodyguard contracts. Private service contractors will include military consulting firms and military support firms. Private security contracts can then be broken down into three types as well. The first is static security contracts, which are for protecting buildings or places (Fainaru, 2008: 131). The second is private security detail, which is for protecting people, and the third is for convoy protection (Fainaru, 2008: 131).

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado Boulder

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

The War in Iraq lasted eight years. The War in Afghanistan is in its twelfth year. Only the Vietnam War can boast a longer duration and that is only if one counts sending military advisors as being the start ("Timeline of U.S. Wars"). The consequences of perpetually hiding the realities of war from the American people are real, and the implications are self-perpetuating. What is important to keep in mind when thinking about private military contractors is that they are simply a tool of the American Government. Their power comes from the fact that they are needed for the US to continue doing war the way that it has been. PMCs are very dependent on the contracts that the US government awards them, however the DoD and State Department in particular are equally dependent on them for reconstruction and security, which is why the argument for efficiency will never work in the way that has been argued. The use of private military contractors is first and foremost due to the political attractiveness of using them, and the lower costs that they allow when engaging in war. Even if the executive branch, contrary to all the evidence, did not use PSCs because of their political attractiveness, the three major consequences of using these companies would still be the same. First conflicts are becoming publically less costly and could be used to solve issues more quickly as well as continue longer. Second, the sovereignty of the host nation will be jeopardized when the accountability and regulation of private security firms is not a priority. **Last, because of the lack**

of central regulation and the recruitment style of PSC's, their use will result in more civilian brutality, instances of misconduct and the radicalization of the Iraqi people. This will undermine the war effort as well as increase the potential for violent mobilization against the US. The lack of transparency and audience costs in US wars create a space where military leaders, State Department officials and members of the executive branch can focus on the short- term gains of winning a war, and not the long term ends of what that country will look like once the US leaves it. Knowing that transparency is ebbing the US can hire previous insurgents such as the Sunni groups inside of Anbar, without

looking into the implications of sectarian violence. Yes, the hiring of these groups led to the eventual control of previous Al-Qaeda strongholds, but that came with a price because today those trained, armed and restless men have nowhere to go and no funding. Consequently, the less the people know about the real cost of war, the less likely they are to cry out against it, which means that a war can start easier and last longer. The other side of this realization is that PSC brutality inside of Iraq was not only institutionalized inside their very makeup but has also been shown to radicalize the population and perpetuate violent mobilization. Sparking the mobilization of violent groups and creating a steady pool for recruits perpetuates conflict needlessly. The potential for the worst abuses to a population come in the intelligence sector where limited regulation and visibility is coupled with the task of gaining national security intelligence. This creates a single-minded drive that is separate from the rest of the war effort. Therefore future research should focus on the intelligence sector specifically and what the consequences of privatizing large portions of it will be.

Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation

Jack Spencer, oo, The Facts About Military Readiness, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness> *Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against America in allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.*

The Heritage Foundation

Justin Johnson, 3-25-2016, "America's Military Is in Much Worse Shape Than You'd Think," Daily Signal, <http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/25/americas-military-is-in-much-worse-shape-than-you-d-think/>

America's military is dangerously weak and unprepared today, and it's not getting better. At least that's what top military leaders told Congress recently. Unfortunately, the testimony of these top generals and admirals did not get the attention it deserved. For the last 15 years, *the United States military has not prepared for conflict with a near peer competitor like Russia or China. General Mark Milley, chief of staff of the Army, shared his worries with Congress, explaining that the Army would be able to handle a serious conflict but "not at a level that is appropriate for what the American people would expect to defend them."* In other words, because soldiers are not adequately prepared, *the U.S. Army would either be late to arrive to a conflict (due to more time for training) or they would send soldiers into harm's way unprepared.* These are not issues isolated to the Army. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller, when commenting on the ability to meet requirements in a major conflict, said the Marine Corps "would be able to do that but probably not within a timeframe that current plans call for [them] to arrive to participate in that conflict." The chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, also admitted that there is "a readiness debt that we have had difficulty pulling out of or even making progress on as the funding levels are what they are and the security environment continues to put demands on the force." Almost two decades of conflict and years of budget constraints have taken their toll on the military, both in terms of deferred modernization and insufficient readiness. In the 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, the American military received a grade of "marginal". We can see why in one news story after another. Only one third of Army Brigade Combat Teams are battle ready. Half of the Air Force's combat forces are insufficiently prepared for a high-end conflict. The Navy is forced to put more strain on its sailors and ships by doing eight to ten month deployments, instead of the more manageable 6 months. All Marine Corps aircraft either need to be replaced or recapitalized. Not to mention, the Marines' current level of Class A mishaps is nearly double the ten year average. Neller confessed that "the simple fact is that we don't have enough airplanes to meet the training requirements for the entire force." Last year, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs said the planned defense budget was "the lower ragged edge of manageable risk need to execute our nation's defense strategy." The suggested base defense budget at the time was \$573 billion. This year's defense budget request is more than \$20 billion lower. If last year's estimate was the lower ragged edge, this year's budget request surely is below that edge of manageable risk.

Sydney Freedberg

SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. on October 02, 2015. Breaking Defense. *Guard Association (NGAUS): We Can Work With CSA Gen. Milley*

On other fronts, however, Milley said things that — while not promises — sounded surprisingly encouraging to Guard ears. He proposed restoring "roundout" units in which a Guard force is an integral part of a larger regular active-duty formation, called up to "round it out" in times of war; or, he said to Guard applause, maybe an active unit will round out the Guard. He suggested the Guard might need more paid days of training than the traditional 39; Guard leaders often complain of the unpaid time their more technical troops must put in to stay current. He said Guard units might need larger cadres of active-duty personnel assigned to them, on the model of the Marine Corps Reserve. *Most dramatically, Milley wants to double, from two to four, the number of Guard combat brigades that annually attend wargames at top-flight Combat Training Centers.* The Army's been hard-pressed in recent years to fund CTC rotations for active-duty units, let alone the Guard, so for Milley to make this a priority is significant. How quickly Guard units can get combat-ready in a crisis is a bone of bitter contention, *and Milley's measure — if funded — would double the number of Guard brigades at the highest level of*

readiness. That said, going from two brigades to four is still a relatively small part of the force. The Guard alone has 28 brigade combat teams: seven armored brigades that would train at Fort Irwin, California; 20 infantry brigades that would train at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and one Stryker brigade (infantry in light armored vehicles) that could go to either. At Milley's suggested four rotations a year — assuming two at Irwin and two at Polk — Guard soldiers in armored units would get top-level training at a CTC once every four years, but infantry only once a decade. "Down the road," Hargett told me, "maybe the answer's five, maybe the answer's six [Guard brigades going to CTCs a year]." **But there are both fiscal and organizational costs to consider**, he said: Sending a brigade is hard not just on the unit itself but on the state that supports it. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that going from two-CTC trained Guard brigades to four, **"you double your readiness"**, Hargett said. "It gives you more brigades ready to deploy." In general, "it's readily obvious to me that I need to employ more of the Guard, not less," Milley told the Guard conference. "There are operations around the world today that are ongoing, and there are contingencies that are always a potential [e.g. a war], and I believe that I can get the guard into those missions." "We're going to get smaller," Milley said bluntly, pointing to the ongoing budget agonies. "Because of that.... I've got to maximize every amount of capability out of all the piece parts of the Army. And I believe — because of what I've seen over the last 10-15 years — I believe that I can get a lot more out of the Guard."

Contention Two

Zachary Cohen of CNN

Cohen, Zachary. "Is the U.S. Navy Too Small?" CNN. Cable News Network, 08 Sept. 2015. Web. 27 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/us-navy-size-military-election-2016/>>.

CNN)For decades, the United States has had the world's largest and most advanced naval fleet, positioning ships and aircraft carriers in strategic locations across the globe to protect national interests and facilitate free trade. But as rival nations, such as China and Russia, expand their own naval capabilities, and with China's increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea, GOP presidential candidates are warning voters that America's dominance of the world's oceans could end unless lawmakers add significantly more ships to its arsenal to bring the fleet size closer to historic levels. Navy launches newest combat ship Navy launches newest combat ship 01:02 Former military officials and defense experts, however, say that weighing the current size of the Navy against past ship levels is a misleading comparison that misses the broader point: making sure the Navy is capable of achieving U.S. strategic goals, which depend as much on technological capability and force deployment as the raw number of ships. While many analysts think the Navy needs to grow, others think it's large enough -- given its global dominance -- and that funding realities mean there's a limit to how much it could expand in any case. That

hasn't stopped the expansion of the Navy from becoming a favorite Republican talking point. Outlining his policy on China in Charleston, South Carolina, **Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida warned, "Our Navy is now smaller than at any time since before World War I." In the first Republican debate last month, neurosurgeon Ben Carson similarly declared, "Our Navy is the smallest it's been since 1917." Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker in April compared the current number of ships to that under President Ronald Reagan, telling the New Hampshire Republican Leadership Summit, "We're headed down toward 250. That's less than half of where we were under Reagan."**

The U.S. naval force is currently made up of 273 ships, which is the smallest number since the fleet stood at 245 ships in 1916. While fleet size has fluctuated significantly throughout history, topping out at 6,768 during World War II, today's Navy is only slightly smaller than it was in 2006 under President George W. Bush, when it employed 281 active ships. But former military officials say comparisons between the Navy of 1917 and today's are an apples-to-oranges contrast. The modern Navy includes 10 aircraft carriers -- more than the rest of the world combined -- 90 surface warfare vessels and 72 submarines. "It is a useful bumper sticker," said Dakota Wood, a former U.S. Marine and senior research fellow for defense programs at the Heritage Foundation. "It resonates with people but doesn't go into the details." And those details, he continued, make the comparison off base. "Modern ships are much more capable than the ones 100 years ago. They have better radars and better missile systems," he said, though he noted that other nations' naval capabilities have also evolved. Inside the Navy's 'most lethal warship' 01:53 Rather than comparing ship numbers to those of past fleets, Peter Singer of the New America Foundation said candidates should be more concerned with outlining a naval strategy that reflects the threat environment of today's world. Calling the line about the smallest Navy "a pretty weak one," Singer said better questions about the future of the Navy would be, "What types of ships are they going to be and how are you going to pay for them?"

The foundation of the U.S. Navy's current strategic posture is based on maintaining what it calls a "forward presence," or an ability to deploy and station forces far from American shores by using

international waters and a network of allies to maneuver its assets as needed. Despite enjoying technological advantages over rival nations and an increasing ability to base forces close to key strategic regions, in places like Guam, Japan and Spain, Navy officials say they will need more ships in order to effectively and efficiently carry out mission goals going forward.

"A smaller force, driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would require us to make hard choices," according to a Navy report on force structure submitted to Congress in March. The Navy would face increased levels of risk for some missions and functions and a decrease in its forward presence and would have to reduce its footprint in some geographic regions, the report stated. "Such cuts would also limit our war-fighting advantages." The USS Independence (LCS 2), left, and USS Coronado (LCS 4) steam in the Pacific Ocean. The two are of the Independence variant LCS. Ships of this variant are 416.8 feet in length with a beam of 103.7 feet and a displacement of 3,100 metric tons. Photos: Meet the littoral combat ship With plans to send approximately 60% of its ships and aircraft to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by 2020, the Navy says it needs to add roughly 30 ships -- including an additional aircraft carrier and several amphibious vessels -- in order to maintain a consistent presence in other regions around the world. By adding more ships to its fleet and working with allies to position those ships closer to potential conflict regions, the Navy's top brass says it will be able to maximize the efficiency of its forces while minimizing maintenance costs and reducing the length of deployments.

However, Republican hopefuls -- including Rubio, Carson, Walker, Ohio Gov. John Kasich, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal and others -- insist that the U.S. must "rebuild" and "reinvigorate" the Navy by raising its ship count to as high as 350, a project that would likely cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Kasich recently listed "renewing the Navy" as his second-highest priority in a CNN op-ed on national security. "Those who mistakenly think they can deny access to a corner of the globe -- particularly in the Western Pacific or Persian Gulf -- need another visit from a carrier battle group to remind them that the global commons are, in fact, just that: shared real estate," he wrote.

Jindal has made a similar case. Addressing the American Enterprise Institute in 2014, Jindal warned that looming budget cuts would allow China to surpass the size of the U.S. fleet and inhibit America's ability to employ a global Navy. "The consequences of this foolish, nearly trillion-dollar cut over the coming decade (is) unacceptable. Under these cuts, America will not have a global Navy anymore," he said. Report: Women could be allowed into Navy SEALs How much does fleet size matter?

Many defense experts and lawmakers do agree that today's Navy needs more ships in order to respond to emerging threats around the world and to maintain its global presence, with some even suggesting numbers close to those called for by GOP candidates. Of the 273 deployable ships currently at the Navy's disposal, roughly 85 are at sea at a given time -- a ratio, some argue, that's wearing down U.S. ships and service members. This fall, the U.S. won't have an aircraft carrier stationed in the Persian Gulf for at least two months due to a mix of budget cuts and maintenance needs.

Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, agreed with the Republican view that the Navy needs to have closer to 355 ships to maintain current deployment patterns and to carry out missions ranging from disaster relief to military deterrence. He said that adding more ships to the fleet's rotation would allow the Navy to shorten deployments, which would help personnel retention and avoid carrier gaps in the future.

Sean Gallagher

Gallagher, Sean. "Why the Navy Needs More than Just More Ships." *Ars Technica*. N.p., 30 Sept. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/09/why-the-navy-needs-more-than-just-more-ships/>>.

It's not a problem that massive quantities of new military technology alone will solve. While consumer and business technology has grown in capability exponentially, while getting less expensive over the past three decades, military technology seems to get more and more expensive—even when defense contractors draw on commercial off-the-shelf technology. That's particularly true of the Navy, which has been shrinking in size since the first President Bush declared a "peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War. As of today, the US Navy has 272 ships active in the fleet—the smallest overall since 1916. "In the 1980s, we almost reached 600 ships," said Eric Wertheim, author of the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. That's not to say that the Navy is in danger of being outclassed any time soon. "Our Navy, when you count gross tonnage, is still more powerful than any Navy in the world," said O'Hanlon. "We have large deck amphibious ships and air craft carriers that other countries don't. We're still even more ahead [of potential adversaries] than the numbers would imply." But both O'Hanlon and Wertheim noted that even with stronger individual ships, a smaller fleet creates greater risks—risks created by not being able to maintain the sort of presence worldwide that the Navy is being called upon for. In the event that things heat up somewhere where a Naval presence is needed, there's not a reserve of ships ready to draw from to respond. And you can't just build ships when you need them. The Navy is already operating beyond a sustainable capacity. Even with reduced maintenance schedules, "ships now deploy for eight months or longer now instead of six," said

O'Hanlon, and repairs are put off so the ships stay available. As a result, the fleet and the sailors who crew its ships are becoming a bit frayed at the edges. **"If you do the math, alleviating the Navy's burden of deployment would require 15 percent more fleet capacity," said O'Hanlon. That's about 41 more ships, which would bring the Navy to a fleet of 312. But that's just to sustain current operations and doesn't address future needs. New combat ships, like the Air Force's new combat aircraft programs, are terribly expensive—at least the way the US government buys them. And as with the Air Force's F-22 and F-35A programs, the Navy's shipbuilding programs over the past decade or so have been slashed back in mid-stream because of rising costs—reducing the total construction, which in turn**

leads to even higher costs for each ship built. Starts and stops in programs have also increased

costs. The Navy has ordered more Arleigh Burke destroyers at \$1.8 billion per ship, because the Zumwalt and its sister ships in the DDG-1000 class will cost over \$3 billion (and as a result, the class has been reduced to three ships). "The process makes cost grow tremendously," Wertheim said. But the Air Force has been able, sometimes at Congressional insistence, to fill mission roles by modernizing older aircraft (such as the B-52). The Navy has already ditched its older hardware. As the service tried to fund its new ships, the Navy permanently reduced the number of ships already to save tens of millions of dollars per ship on operations while spending billions on a smaller number of ships that would, in theory, operate less expensively longterm. "People don't realize that one of the biggest costs of any ship is its crew," said O'Hanlon. So how large a fleet the US can sustain will in part be driven by "how manpower-efficient the ships are." The Littoral Combat Ship and the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class ships were designed with the idea of improving manpower efficiency—requiring a fraction of the crew required for the ships they are intended to replace. A lot of that comes through automation, making Navy ships more like their commercial counterparts. On the LCS, for example, the Officer of the Deck (the officer in charge of directing the movement of the ship on a watch team) actually "flies" the ship personally from a cockpit-like console; older ships require two enlisted watch standers to steer and signal orders to the engine room at the OOD's commands. Even so, the Navy's decisions on its existing ships have made a smooth transition between the two impossible, leaving gaps in capabilities. Two entire classes of combat ships—the Spruance-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry frigates—were retired at the end of the last decade by the Navy, while Wertheim said both ship classes could have been upgraded and their service lives extended. "The Perry class—if you look at what Australia did with theirs, they totally upgraded them," he said. "They added vertical missile launch tubes, and they are now really powerful warships that have evolved since the 1980s. The US Navy could have done it as well, but didn't take as good of care of them and wound up having to retire them." The Perry class, with a crew complement of 200, was supposed to be replaced by the LCS (which originally was to have fewer than 50 crew). But because of delays in the LCS program, the Perry class was retired much faster than the LCS ships could replace them. Only one Perry frigate, the USS Simpson (FFG-56), remains active in the US fleet—and was slotted to be decommissioned this month. Others have been sold to other nations' navies, or scrapped. The fate of the Spruance class of destroyers was even more swift. The ships, some of which had been upgraded with vertical launch tubes, could have been kept in service with proper maintenance through 2019. But the Spruances are now gone completely—only one ship remains afloat, as a remote-controlled test ship for self-defense weapons systems. The rest were scrapped, turned into artificial reefs, or "disposed of in a fleet training exercise"—sunk. Pacific Pivot or just your usual shuffle?

Part of the reasoning behind the Navy's resizing has been a "strategic pivot" toward the Pacific. "China is rising [as a naval power]. Other countries have been doing things that aren't desirable from our point of view, and we need more capability in the Pacific than we've had," O'Hanlon said. "So having a larger navy in that area would be a minimal requirement... we would like to increase the proportion of the fleet in the Pacific and actually get more presence there."

Many of the current demands on the fleet (including humanitarian operations and simply projecting a presence in areas around the world) could be conducted by relatively less expensive ships like the LCS and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ships now being built. The JHSVs, based largely on commercial long-range ferry designs, are capable of carrying company-size Army or Marine Corps units and supporting transport helicopters. They have been pressed into roles typically served in the past by frigates—but only require a crew of 22, compared to the 200 or so that manned an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate. The LCS class, built originally with a crew size of 40 or so in mind plus "mission" crews for different modules, has seen its crew grow to nearly 65 by comparison—still nearly a quarter of the crew of the Perry. If the numbers issue was one of just presence, the LCS and JHSV ships could fill the gap relatively quickly. The Spearhead class JHSVs cost \$180 million each to build. The LCS ships were originally supposed to cost just \$220 million to build, though there were substantial cost overruns, and the LCS class is now going through a redesign to make it more frigate-like in firepower. But "you could build 20 LCS with what it costs to build one aircraft carrier," O'Hanlon said. "The Navy could change the configuration of its fleet and get to 350 fairly easily." The problem faced in arriving at what size the fleet should be, however, isn't just about stopping its shrinkage. Part of the problem Navy leadership faces now is the lack of clarity over what enemy the service needs to prepare to fight.

If the future is going to be about a potential war against say China or Russia," Wertheim said, "SSNs (nuclear subs) are going to have a larger role, and we'll want more of them. If it's about low-risk contingency operations, then JHSVs and LCSs will do the job. You have to make sure that your ship building plan supports whatever the strategy is, and not the other way around." The risk of not doing anything, Wertheim added, is that "you lose the ability of allies to count on us and let other navies fill that vacuum. You cannot respond as quickly as you'd like to crises.

There's nothing wrong with allies shouldering some of the burden, but in the end you can't always count on your allies. There are times when we have to operate independently." Wertheim said that rather than just coming up with a number, there has to be a plan from leadership "really spelling out what the Navy wants to get done and what the Defense Department expects of the Navy in the future. They have to be realistic about where things are now, in that there's not enough ships or crews to go around." Ars attempted to contact the Heritage Foundation for comments, but received no response.

Anthony Capaccio of Bloomberg

Capaccio, Anthony. "Trump Would Get the 350 Ships He Wants Under Navy's New Plan."

Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 16 Dec. 2016. Web. 28 Dec. 2016.

<<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/trump-would-get-the-350-ships-he-wants-under-navy-s-new-plan-iwrthjb3>>.

Trump's Goal Trump said in a speech **in September that he adopted his 350-ship goal from a bipartisan panel created by Congress to review the Pentagon's 2014 quadrennial review of projected threats and U.S. responses. That report called for "somewhere between" 323 and 346 ships while cautioning more may be needed to meet challenges**

such as China's plan to have "close to" 350 vessels by 2020. The Navy's force-structure goal is adjusted every few years, and has been in the range of 306 to 328 ships since 2006, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last assessment was in 2014.

"While continuing the counterterrorism fight and appropriately competing with a

growing China and resurgent Russia, our Navy must continue to grow," Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus said in a statement. "All of the analysis done to date, inside and outside of the Navy, recognizes, as we have for nearly the last eight years, the need for a larger fleet."

The new goals would boost by 16 the number of "large surface combatants"-- destroyers, cruisers or both. It would add one aircraft carrier in addition to the 11 mandated by law today, 18 more attack submarines and as many as four new amphibious warfare ships. **Cost Constraints** Cost remains the biggest impediment: The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service estimates a 350-ship Navy would cost an average \$4 billion extra annually over the current forecast of about \$16.3 billion a year for new ship construction through 2021. The current budget calls for eight new vessels in fiscal 2018; seven in fiscal 19; and eight each in 2020 and 2021. Defense budget caps that remain in place for fiscal 2018 to 2021 under the 2011 Budget Control Act would constrain a naval build-up. The Pentagon faces about \$106.6 billion in potential cuts from its current budget projections -- starting with \$33.6 billion in fiscal 2018. Carter said in his Dec. 14 memo last year to Mabus, the Navy secretary, that the service's goal at the time of 308 vessels "should be met but not irresponsibly exceeded." He said the Navy had been counting on piecemeal funding of ships at the "expense of critically needed areas where our adversaries are not standing still." The Navy's new assessment was originally scheduled to be released next month but was accelerated by Mabus so that it would have his personal stamp before he leaves office with the arrival of the Trump administration.

Follett 16.

(Andrew Follett, Energy and Environmental Reporter, "China Plans To Build 20 Floating Nuclear Reactors In International Waters," 4/28/16, pg. online @ dailycaller.com/2016/04/28/china-plans-to-build-20-floating-nuclear-reactors-in-international-waters/)

"China plans to build 20 floating nuclear reactors in the South China Sea, likely to strengthen its claim to the valuable and disputed region, according to announcements by state media. China has claimed more than 80 percent of the South China Sea, sparking conflict with other countries in the region and with the U.S. The potential militarization of the islands worries America and its regional allies, as it could hinder the \$5 trillion of maritime trade that passes through the region each year."

The sections of the sea that are claimed by China are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Taiwan. *"Placing such high-tech infrastructure on man-made islands further cements Beijing's claims to this body of water--and in the most grandiose way,"* Harry Kazianis, a senior fellow for defense policy at The Center for the National Interest, told The Daily

Caller News Foundation. *"It shows China will do what it wants in the South China Sea,"* he damned the environmental concerns or the fact that Typhoons regularly rampage this part of the world. It shows the region who is in charge--besides all the military-grade air fields, anti-ship weapons, air defense platforms, fighter jets and advanced radars China has placed on its new islands. *"China has been building islands on reefs, which will ultimately host harbors and runways that are "up to military standards."*

The environmental cost of building the islands is significant, according to report prepared for the U.S. Congress. *"The U.S. military is increasingly deploying*

to the region," as part of the much discussed "pivot" to Asia -- *military aircraft has flown over the dispute artificial islands. Beijing angrily condemned these U.S. military missions designed to assert freedom of navigation* close to the reclaimed islands. Washington says these islands lie in international waters and China's actions violate international law. Despite military build up, America is still trying to respond to Chinese actions in the region without resorting to military force. *Chinese media has deepened American concerns by*

claiming the floating reactors "could provide reliable power for... defensive weapons and airports and harbors on islands in the South China Sea." China's President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the islands are

in a region that historically belongs to China and says Beijing will not hesitate to defend its sovereignty. "There are of course the more practical rationale: *China of course needs a power source* for things like housing, military platforms, soldiers and civilians who will live there," Kazianis continued. *"This could be achieved through many other means. However, nuclear has a certain sophistication to it--it screams great power."*

Asia Maritime Review 4/28/16 -- ("South China Sea WW3 Scenario: China To Send Nuclear Ships, Japan Patrols Philippine Waters," <http://asiamaritime.net/south-china-sea-ww3-scenario-china-to-send-nuclear-ships-japan-patrols-philippine-waters/>)/DWB

"Tensions are not letting up in the South China Sea region as countries like Japan and China mull over the use of warships and nuclear technologies." Japan just sent a warship to the Philippines for a visit while *Beijing is reportedly sending nuclear warships in the disputed region despite tensions.*

It was reported previously that *China is gearing up to build nuclear plants in the South China Sea* This has prompted concerns on national security and the environment but the country seems *unfazed with the opposition to its*

territorial ambitions. According to The Daily Mail, the first of the nuclear ships are presently being assembled in Huludao, Liaoning, north-east China.

These ships could eventually **offer energy to the artificial islands in the region** – as reported by People's Daily Online. This has sparked concerns that **if China succeeds in deploying such then the country would find it even easier to assume command over the disputed region.** The report also added that the announcement came after expert review of specialists from Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co Ltd, a subsidiary of China Shipbuilding Industry Corp (CSIC). How the deployment spells for the rest of the dispute will be determined once China gets everything into play. Read: China To Deploy Nuclear Weapons In South China Sea? As China continues its plans to dominate the South China Sea, other countries are making a move to prevent such aggression in the region as well. According to Channel News Asia, Japan just sent a warship to the Philippines for a visit which also consequently marks the second time in just three weeks that Japanese naval vessels sailed into Subic Bay. "We want to deepen the relationship with the Philippines," explained Ise Captain Masaki Takada to the press who were also given the chance to tour the vessel. However, the official denied commenting if Japan came across Chinese vessels during its journey. Along with the Philippines, Japan previously called out China on its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. "This visit will further strengthen our relationship with them. We have a strong relationship with them already but we want to enhance that," added Filipino Navy Captain Samuel Felix.

Rando 15

(9/29, Consultant- Asymmetric Global Solutions DBA, MPH/MS-Biomedical Sciences & US Correspondent-Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Warfare Journal, Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, <http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/>)

"The dependence of China and other regional nations [on] surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one-third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, **leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere.** Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to **evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war,** and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster. China continues to assert sovereignty by constructing man made islands using sand dredged from the sea bottom and these artificial islands could be militarized. China has even affirmed its desire to have a military presence on these islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also professes the use of these land masses to facilitate commerce via shipping lanes and to protect Chinese fishing and other vessels from piracy. China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived "ownership" of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the "Chinese Dream". The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived "right" to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the "submarine factor", it is evident that China's submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India's nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China's submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. **China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances [like],** such as **the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters** claimed by both countries in the region **and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets.** A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. **China's Global Times** published an unprecedented report that **revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S.** with JL-2 missiles **could generate** up to **12 million American fatalities.** The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to **China's claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat,** which **included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation.** The possibilities of China's anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including conventional and, potentially, nuclear scenarios. " " China's South Sea naval facilities have seen significant upgrading and expansion, such as the facilities on Hainan, and the nuclear submarine base at Longpo serves as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The base also includes a submarine tunnel that is part of an underwater complex of nuclear facilities on Hainan. Also, Chinese-Russian wargames are worrisome, which adds to the concerns of nuclear confrontation and consequences globally. **The Chinese have asserted their right to defend its territories** which in their view, includes the South China Sea, **and they have stated verbally, and by their aggressive actions, that they will** continue to **pursue their strategic goals despite the threat of** confrontation and **conflict.** Many of the issues in contention in the South China Sea will remain unresolved for, probably, several years to come. We must remain balanced, and not overzealous in our approaches to assisting with conflict resolution in the area. We must apply reasonable diplomacy, without stirring up a hornet's nest that would serve to be counterproductive and

enhance animosities. However, the US, its allies, and other concerned nation-states must not refrain from being ever so vigilant and proactive in achieving peaceful resolution, while at the same time maintaining our national defense and security postures.”

Randy Forbes 13

Forbes, Randy. "The Conservative Case for American Seapower." RealClearDefense. N.p., 24 July 2013. Web. 28 Dec. 2016.

<http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/07/24/the_conservative_case_for_american_seapower_106709.html>.

As the Republican Party continues the process of reflection and analysis to assess our nation's direction, it is an appropriate time to ask what a conservative defense and national security agenda should look like going forward. If one surveys the next decade and considers the continued emergence of China on the world stage and its activity in the Near-Seas, Iran's nuclear ambitions and potential threat in the Strait of Hormuz, the global economy's dependency on commercial and energy shipping, and other flash-points for instability like the Horn of Africa, it is not difficult to deduce the starkly maritime character of the future security environment. Given this, I believe the backbone of any conservative defense agenda should be the prioritization of American seapower. Moreover, I believe seapower should be a defense priority for

conservatives, whose advocacy should be as closely associated with the GOP as support for missile defense has been for the past 30 years. ***Without a strong Navy underpinning American grand strategy, the very basis for a conservative agenda - the protection of liberty, robust economic growth, and strong support for free trade - would become untenable. With 80% of global trade traveling by sea, the strength of the American economy is directly linked with the Navy's ability to keep the world's sea lanes open and secure. The U.S. Constitution gave clear deference to the United States Navy when it declared Congress' authority "to provide and maintain a Navy".*** Whether it is combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa, preventing Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz to energy shipments, or upholding the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific, the Navy-Marine Corps team is essential to the health of the U.S. economy. The primacy conservatives should accord seapower is rooted in the centrality of a strong Navy to the traditional goals and objectives of a conservative foreign policy. Through two world wars and a half-century of Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has focused on shaping the rise of another great power with aggressive ambitions. Whether Imperial Germany, the Third Reich, Japan or the Soviet Union, the United States has spent the last century guarding the equitable balance of power in key regions of the world. In every instance, it has been the U.S. Navy's ability to command the seas where and when it chooses that allowed the U.S. and its allies to defeat or deter expansionist powers bent on dominating their neighbors. The American ascendancy to global naval dominance after World War II coincides directly with the decline in conflict between Great Powers. As with British naval predominance in the nineteenth century, a democratic superpower that can wield overwhelming seapower will generate a more stable, prosperous and peaceful international order. ***The benefits of embracing seapower as a core tenet of a conservative defense agenda extend across the spectrum of national security challenges. Strengthening alliances with key countries in the world's most critical regions is facilitated by a preponderance of American naval power, giving prospective allies the confidence that the U.S. will not abandon them in a crisis.***

Defense of the U.S. homeland is buttressed by the presence of Navy surface vessels equipped with ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology. The most effective and survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear deterrent are the Navy's ballistic missile submarines. American aircraft carriers remain the single most powerful instrument of power projection ever devised, bringing unparalleled military power to bear to deter adversaries in peacetime or contribute to victory in a time of conflict. And the amphibious fleet provides flexibility to project Marine combat power ashore or bring assistance during humanitarian crises. Indeed, the list of America's international diplomatic and security objectives that are supported by seapower capabilities is virtually endless. Prioritizing seapower is also the best means for conservatives to offer solutions to the challenges of the 21st century. The rise of China, both economically and militarily, is set to define this century. Due to the vast geography of the Asian-Pacific theater, the Sino-American competition promises to be maritime in nature. A renewed conservative emphasis on seapower is required to help steer the American relationship with China in a positive, peaceful direction. Only by resourcing a Navy capable of deterring aggression and reassuring American allies of our commitment to security in the Pacific can we hope for a positive result to the Sino-American rivalry. Finally, the current state of the U.S. Navy offers conservatives an opportunity to advocate and prioritize seapower as part of a forward-looking defense agenda. Even before sequestration, the Fleet had atrophied from 568 ships in 1987 to just 285 today. By 2015, the administration is projecting a continued decline of navy forces to an abysmal 270 ships. In key areas, including attack submarines and the amphibious vessels used to transport Marines around the world, the Navy will suffer serious shortfalls. Just as the investments made during the 1980s provided a powerful Navy that has benefited American interests in myriad ways for the last three decades, the choices made now will reverberate for decades to come. President Obama, who famously derided Mitt Romney's farsighted vision for a revitalized Navy as harkening back to "horses and bayonets", seems wholly uninterested in American seapower. The opportunity for conservative leadership on this subject could not be greater. Historically, the Republican Party has been the most vigorous champion of American seapower. Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet symbolized the arrival of the United States as a great power at the turn of the 20th century and Ronald Reagan's revitalization of the Fleet in the 1980s helped give the Soviet Union a final push onto the ash heap of history. It remains for the current generation of conservative leaders to establish seapower as the backbone of a defense policy dedicated to preserving the American-led global order.

Leed of Rice University

Leeds, Brett Ashley. [Professor Leeds specializes in the study of international relations from Rice University, and particularly in the design and influence of cooperative agreements and international institutions.] "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *Am J Political Science* American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (2003): 427-39. Rice University. Web. 21 Feb. 2016.

<<http://atop.rice.edu/download/publications/LeedsAJPS03.pdf>>.

METHODOLOGY: **The unit of analysis is the directed dyad year.6 Rather than offering predictions regarding the overall level of war in a system or the war proneness of a particular state, the dyadic research design allows scholars to make predictions about who is likely to fight with whom under what conditions. A directed-dyad research design distinguishes cases in which (for example) Britain initiates a dispute against Russia from cases in which Russia initiates a dispute against**

Britain Because I am interested in the conditions conducive to the decision by one state to initiate a dispute against another state rather than simply the conditions associated with the emergence of a dispute between two states, this is the appropriate unit of analysis. The temporal domain is dictated by data availability.⁷ The spatial domain follows a number of similar studies that have relied on simple decision rules to determine the types of relationships relevant for studies of militarized conflict. Prior studies have been posed at the system or state level of analysis. Singer and Small (1968), Ostrom and Hoole (1978), and Levy (1981) examine the correlation between the proportion of nations with allies and the proportion of nations in war and find no relationship that is consistent over time, but their studies do not attempt to determine whether there is any specific connection between particular alliances and particular wars. Siverson and King (1979) and Wayman (1990) examine the relationship between alliance membership and war participation at the state level of analysis and conclude that nations with alliances are more war-prone than nations without alliances, but it is unclear if they have revealed a causal relationship between alliance membership and war proneness or whether similar factors lead states to be both war prone and likely to form alliances.⁷ The indicators for my dependent variable and most of my independent variables are not available for cases occurring before 1816, and the data for my independent variables of primary interest (specific alliance commitments) are not yet available for years beyond 1944. flict. Because the sample of cases is unduly expanded by including states that we suspect have little ability or reason to engage one another in military conflict (for example, the Mauritania-Bolivia dyad or the Albania-Cambodia dyad), scholars have often limited analysis to the interactions of each state with its neighbors and with major powers (Maoz 1996). Lemke and Reed (2001) reassure us that this is unlikely to threaten proper inference. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the challenger initiates a militarized interstate dispute against the target in the year in question, and 0 otherwise. A Militarized Interstate Dispute is defined as an instance "in which the threat, display, or use of military force ... by one member state is directed towards ... another state" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 168). Some MIDs escalate to full scale war, while others end short of war.⁸ I employ the dyadic version of the MID data (version 1.1) provided by Zeev Maoz, so only pairs of states that engage one another directly are included as disputing dyads.⁹ I consider only original initiators and original targets; decisions to join ongoing disputes are not included.¹⁰ Original initiators are those states that are involved in a dispute when it begins on the side that first takes action, and original targets are

those states that are involved in a dispute at its inception on the side that does not take the first action to qualify as a MID.¹¹ **The independent variables of primary interest are three variables capturing types of alliance commitments to the potential target and the potential initiator. These are all drawn from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset.**¹² **The first variable is a dummy variable representing whether the potential target had any allies who were committed to defend the target in the event the target was attacked by this potential challenger. Only alliances that include specific commitments for active military support in the event of attack qualify, and**⁸**This study analyzes the effects of alliances on the probability of dispute initiation, which is one necessary step to the outbreak of war.** To understand the full effects of alliances on the probability of war, however, will require combining a study of the impact of alliances on dispute initiation with a study of the impact of alliances on the likelihood that disputes escalate to war.⁹ The data were obtained at

<http://spirit.tau.ac.il/~zeevmaoz>.¹⁰ Alliances should have a different impact on joining decisions than initiation decisions, and thus the two phenomena can be studied productively separately. See Bennett and Stam (2000b) for a useful discussion of operationalization decisions using the MID data.¹¹ For those familiar with the MID data, original initiators are those that are coded as original participants on side A, and original targets are those that are coded as original participants on side B.¹² The ATOP data can be obtained at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds/atop.html>. 432 BRETT ASHLEY LEEDS alliances are coded only for the dyadic relations to which they may apply. When, for instance, defensive commitments are limited to conflicts with particular adversaries, the same state in the same year might be coded as having an ally with a defensive commitment in some of its dyadic relations and not in others. For instance, if an alliance treaty specifies that the partners promise one another mutual defense if either is attacked by Germany, the alliance members would be coded as having commitments of defensive support in their dyadic relations with Germany, but not with Britain, or Italy, or any other dyadic partners. Alliance commitments may also be asymmetric. If one party promises to defend another without requiring a reciprocal guarantee, one member of an alliance may be coded as having a defensive ally while another is not. The second variable is a dummy variable representing whether the potential aggressor had any allies who were committed to join in an offensive attack against this target. Again, I took great care to code offensive alliances to the potential aggressor only in cases in which the treaty specifies promises of active military support that are not contingent upon one of the partners being attacked, and for dyads to which the specific *casus foederis* would apply. Thus, if offensive promises apply only to particular targets or to particular

locations, then the potential aggressor is coded as having offensive allies only in those dyadic relationships. **The third variable is a dummy variable representing whether any states had alliance commitments to the potential challenger that would preclude their intervention on the side of the target if the challenger attacked.** These alliances are neutrality pacts; they specify that a partner will not fight with adversaries against an ally. Not only was the coding of these commitments limited only to conflicts with the targets that meet the specifications of the treaty, however, but neutrality pacts were also only coded as applicable to potential challengers if they were not conditional upon a partner being attacked. Many neutrality pacts are specifically limited to instances in which a member of the alliance is not the aggressor. The variable for neutrality commitments to a potential challenger includes only those alliances that are applicable to the dyad in question with the alliance member in the role of conflict initiator. This is easiest to see by examining the bar graph pictured in Figure 1. This figure shows the percentage change in the probability of dispute initiation that can be attributed to outside allies when all other variables are held at their mean values. **The first bar shows that when a target state has an ally committed to its defense, the probability of dispute initiation is 28% lower than the probability of dispute initiation in a dyad with the mean characteristics in the dataset but no outside allies.**

The second bar represents the case in which the challenger has an offensive ally; in this instance, the probability of dispute initiation is 47% higher than it is in the case in which neither the challenger nor the target has any allies committed to intervene. model is designed to predict average effects across a population, and thus this characterization of a baseline value is appropriate. DO ALLIANCES DETER AGGRESSION? 437 Finally, the bar on the right shows that when challengers have obtained promises of neutrality from outside states, the probability of dispute initiation is 57% higher than it is when neither state has any allies. Notably, these substantive effects are similar to those associated with variables like power relations and similarity in alliance portfolios, which scholars of international politics have long considered crucial to predicting and preventing dispute initiation. Given the rare occurrence and severe implications of military conflict, the substantive effects of outside alliance commitments to potential conflict initiators and targets are important enough that they should influence scholarship and policy. Without exception, the data are supportive of the hypotheses proposed in this study. This suggests that alliances do influence the probability of militarized conflict, but the direction of that influence depends on the content of the treaty. Relevant defense pacts can deter aggressors from attacking alliance members, but relevant offense pacts and neutrality commitments can provide the assurances that aggressors need to facilitate attack.

The Council on Foreign Relations

Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4-1-2012, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>

Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest.

Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. **Each year, \$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for \$1.2 trillion of this total.** Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system.

As

Justin Johnson of the Heritage Foundation

Johnson 15, Justin. "Assessing Common Arguments for Cutting National Security Spending: Informing Current and Future Budget Debates." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 6 Nov. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/assessing-common-arguments-for-cutting-national-security-spending-informing-current-and-future-budget-debates>>./JH

While the budget debate continues, Americans should be concerned about the state of the U.S. military. The Heritage Foundation's 2016 *Index of U.S. Military Strength* assessed **that America's ability to defend itself and its interests is only "marginal" while the global threat level is "elevated."**^[3] Given the stakes, Americans need to understand where the arguments for cutting national security spending fall short.

Justin Johnson of the Heritage Foundaotion

Johnson 15, Justin. "Assessing Common Arguments for Cutting National Security Spending: Informing Current and Future Budget Debates." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 6 Nov. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/assessing-common-arguments-for-cutting-national-security-spending-informing-current-and-future-budget-debates>>./JH

U.S. national security spending has been dramatically declining for years. In 2011, according to the same data, **the U.S. spent more than the next 13 countries combined.[4] In 2012, it was 10 countries.[5] In 2013, it was down to eight countries.[6] Finally, in 2014, it was down to seven countries.[7]** The trend is clear.

100,000 troop decrease in soldiers.

McCain 16, John. "The Shrinking Military Budget Is Killing Our Readiness." *Task & Purpose*. N.p., 05 Aug. 2016. Web. 27 Dec. 2016. <<http://taskandpurpose.com/shrinking-military-budget-killing-readiness/>>./JH

It's not just the Air Force that is facing these growing challenges. Our budgetary and readiness crisis has become tragically commonplace throughout the military services. **Arbitrary budget cuts have shrunk the Army by nearly 100,000 soldiers since 2012, bringing it to a size that** Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testified **has put the Army at "high military risk."** **The Navy's fleet of 272 ships is [also] too small to address critical security challenges.** Even with recent shipbuilding increases, the Navy will not achieve its requirement of 308 ships until 2021. Our shrinking fleet is in-turn extending deployments — taking a toll on our sailors and military families, while delaying

much-needed ship maintenance. **Marine Corps aviation is also suffering with a fleet that is too small and too old.** As a result, our Marines don't have enough aircraft on which to train, and are instead spending time they would otherwise devote to practicing flight techniques to maintaining the remaining aircraft to keep them in operation.

Barbara Bicksler

Bicksler, Barbara A (senior analyst at Strategic Analysis Inc). "Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force: The Need for Sustained Investment in Recruiting Resources - An Update." December 2009.

[http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/MPP/AP/Bicksler Recruiting Paper 2009.pdf](http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/MPP/AP/Bicksler_Recruiting_Paper_2009.pdf)

Past experience has shown that a sufficiently large and experienced recruiter force can bring in high-quality recruits and effectively counter the negative effects that economic and demographic factors can have on recruiting. One recent study estimates that **increasing the number of Army recruiters by 10 percent will increase high-quality Army enlistments by between 4.1 and 4.7 percent.** Decreasing recruiters by 10 percent reduces high-quality enlistments by between 5.6 and 6.2 percent. Thus, a decline in the number of experienced recruiters has a greater negative impact on enlistments than the positive impact of increasing the number of recruiters (Simon and Warner 2008), due in part to new recruiters being less effective than their more experienced counterparts at securing enlistees.²⁴ Analysis has consistently shown a clear relationship between pay and high-quality recruits—when basic pay declines relative to civilian pay, the percent of high-quality enlistees declines as well. Recent analyses of the impact of relative pay estimate that **a 10 percent increase in military pay would increase high-quality Army enlistments by between 7 percent (Simon and Warner 2008) and 11.3 percent** (Asch et al. forthcoming). But as a policy tool, the pay hikes necessary to generate such impressive recruiting growth would be extremely expensive, since a pay raise designed to increase enlistments would have to be paid to all new enlistees, even those who would have enlisted at the original lower pay rate, as well as to the entire force. Today, a single percentage-point increase in basic pay (for both active and reserve members) adds about \$1 billion to the annual defense budget.⁴⁰ Thus, increasing military pay is not a cost-effective way to boost total enlistments.

Major Scott Eisenhower

Eisenhower, Scott (Major, US Army). "THE EFFECTS OF PAY AND BENEFITS ON RECRUITING AND RETENTION IN THE US ARMY." Air University. April 1999. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a396593.pdf>

As the United States Army enters the 21st Century, there is a growing concern over the deterioration of capabilities, specifically as a result of problems in manning the service. **Difficulties in recruiting qualified young men and women and the continuing departure of experienced soldiers and officers have prompted stronger calls for increased military pay and benefits.** Military Pay and Retirement Benefits – What is the impact on recruiting and retention in the U.S. Army? This is the major question that members of Congress and the Joint Chiefs are wrestling with. To ensure the Pentagon looks to improve military pay and benefits, congressional negotiators added a provision to the 1999 defense appropriations bill ordering a comprehensive review of current programs.¹

George Altman of the Military Times

Altman, George. "If Trump wants to impress the military, he'll order a decent pay raise." Military Times. November 25, 2016. <http://www.militarytimes.com/articles/donald-trump-military-times-poll>

The Defense Department under Obama has sought to reign in personnel costs as broader federal cutbacks have forced the Pentagon to funnel more of those resources toward weapons modernization. The value of troops' compensation has eroded as annual raises have fallen below civilian wage growth for the past five years. **The president has ordered a 1.6 percent military pay raise for 2017, a rate that will take effect in January unless members of Congress can secure additional funding for a slightly larger bump of 2.1 percent.**

James Dertouzos of the Rand Corporation

Dertouzos, James N. The cost-effectiveness of military advertising: Evidence from 2002-2004. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 2009.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2009/RAND_DB565.pdf

A regression was also run linking total DoD contracts (expressed in logarithms) with all Service advertising. The details of this regression are provided in Table 2. As in the case of the Army-only model, the coefficients representing the advertising effect (k, u) were positive and highly significant. The results suggest that nearly 40,000 contracts could be attributed to military advertising. It is also the case that even more contracts could have been signed on an annual basis if the advertising budget had been higher. The results indicate that **an extra \$100 million annual could attract nearly 20,000 recruits**. This regression, because it does not isolate the cross-Service enlistment flows, does not provide enough information to come to strong conclusions about the competition between Services. However, because the overall expansion effect is significant, one can conclude that, at least on average, a Service's program does more than merely draw enlistees who would have joined another Service.

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

Private military companies have many different effects on democracy. Security companies for example, affect strategy and organization overseas while PMCs in general lower audience costs by harming transparency. Research has shown that war is not only more likely to occur if the attacker perceives the costs of the war to be low, but also that a low-cost war is more likely to continue (Filson and Werner, 2002: 820). These findings become more significant if the aggressor in a conflict is confident about the resolve and military capabilities of their opponent (Filson and Werner, 2002: 820). This finding is also true for the defender in a conflict. If the attacker or defender is more likely to win battles or has lower costs associated with engaging in conflict then the bargaining range, or the amount each side is willing to compromise on, gets smaller because the demands for a successful termination of war for those with low costs increase (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). Wars will last until the private information concerning each actor's capabilities

is realized, therefore even if negotiations failed to prevent war they can be used to end the war (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). **Using this model it can be seen why the US would want to use PMC's: they not only reduce the audience costs associated with war, but they hide the capabilities of the US military to both the international and domestic populations. The use of private military companies means that transparency both with the international body and the domestic body is lost because costly and public signals are no longer a states' only option when expressing resolve. The US can now choose when to publicly signal resolve and when to privately respond to certain events. This means that in many cases the certainty in resolve that audience costs once gave the opponent is no longer available which will increase the likelihood of incorrect or incomplete information.** Fearon argues that incomplete information alone is not a rational reason for war, but rather the incentive to misrepresent

information to the other actor is rational and that incomplete or wrong information does lead to war (Fearon, 1995: 391). **The US has an incentive to misrepresent the cost versus the gain to its domestic population, while at the same time expressing resolve to its opponent. This allows US leaders to ensure their domestic political survival and also gain the benefits associated with the conflict. Because the use of PMCs have made engaging in war less domestically costly the bargaining range becomes significantly smaller.** This means that if the issue is important enough the US does not have to compromise because the cost is small but the potential benefit is large, such as creating a stable Iraq. It does mean that if the US is the attacker in the conflict, then it must maintain a credible threat to attack or else the defender will be less likely to concede (Filson and Werner, 2002: 832). This model then suggests that in order to perpetuate a credible threat of attack, previous or future attacks are necessary. It also suggests that the leadership will be more likely to attack when there is the ability to misrepresent information to the domestic audience, because there would be limited political consequences for losing (Fearon 1994: 585).

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado Boulder

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado

Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

The goals of this paper are to explain the consequences of using PMCs in modern day warfare. Section 1 consists of term definitions that are used throughout the rest of the paper. Section 2 lays out existing literature that explains why the use of private security companies (all support, security, and production companies geared to helping and working with the military) is so attractive to political leaders. In short private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs), limit the public's knowledge and ability to check government actions with regard to foreign policy, decisions about conflict interventions, and war. Section 3 transitions to the issue of private security contractors and their link to civilian brutality. Using primarily Campbell's research on counterterrorism's legal framework it is concluded that indiscriminate brutality against civilians and prisoners by a state is an ineffective strategy against terrorism, and may increase war duration and cause needless escalation. Then through Humphreys and Weinstein's assessment of loosely associated government groups and rebel groups, it is shown that the way private security firms are set up will lead to instances of misconduct and violent brutality, especially against civilians. The evidence portion of the paper is broken up between section 4 and section 5. Section 4 focuses on the lowering of audience costs; limited efficiency and lack of transparency that results from the use of PMCs and PSCs. Section 5 transitions to individual case studies to show the trends of PSCs using indiscriminate brutality against civilians and the radicalization of the Iraqi people. This indiscriminate brutality weakens the war effort and trust between Iraqis and Coalition forces, it will radicalize the local people and it will lead to an increase in violent recruitment and mobilization against those committing the brutality. All of these issues, from low audience costs to the radical mobilization of a host country's people, compound to one conclusion: **growing dependence on private military**

contractors and private security contractors will lead to an increase in the number of conflicts entered into as well as an increase in the duration of those conflicts. Section 1. Definitions Private service

contractors can be broken up into three main groups: military combatant companies, military consulting firms and military support firms (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military combatant companies provide forces capable of combat, but they are the smallest group. (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military consulting firms, provide training and advisory services, although they have increasingly expanded into traditional security services (Isenberg, 2009: 11). Military support firms provide nonviolent services, like construction, food service and intelligence gathering (Isenberg, 2009: 11). These are different from private manufacturing contractors who build the weapons, ships, planes and general equipment (Isenberg, 2009: 12). For the purposes of this paper all private contractors, service, consulting, security, and manufactures, will be considered private military contractors or PMCs. Private security contractors (PSCs) will include military combatant companies, and those military consulting and training firms that have expanded their reach into security and bodyguard contracts. Private service contractors will include military consulting firms and military support firms. Private security contracts can then be broken down into three types as well. The first is static security contracts, which are for protecting buildings or places (Fainaru, 2008: 131). The second is private security detail, which is for protecting people, and the third is for convoy protection (Fainaru, 2008: 131).

Casey Moher of the University of Colorado Boulder

Moher, Casey. "E Private Military Industrial Complex - Extending Conflict Duration and Quality: E Cost of Using Private Military Contractors." Academia. University of Colorado Boulder, Spring 2013. Web. 20 Dec. 2016.

<http://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=honr_theses>.

The War in Iraq lasted eight years. The War in Afghanistan is in its twelfth year. Only the Vietnam War can boast a longer duration and that is only if one counts sending military advisors as being the start ("Timeline of U.S. Wars"). The consequences of perpetually hiding the realities of war from the American people are real, and the implications are self-perpetuating. What is important to keep in mind when thinking about private military contractors is that they are simply a tool of the American Government. Their power comes from the fact that they are needed for the US to continue doing war the way that it has been. PMCs are very dependent on the contracts that the US government awards them, however the DoD and State Department in particular are equally dependent on them for reconstruction and security, which is why the argument for efficiency will never work in the way that has been argued. The use of private military contractors is first and foremost due to the political attractiveness of using them, and the lower costs that they allow when engaging in war. Even if the executive branch, contrary to all the evidence, did not use PSCs because of their political attractiveness, the three major consequences of using these companies would still be the same. First conflicts are becoming publically less costly and could be used to solve issues more quickly as well as continue longer. Second, the

sovereignty of the host nation will be jeopardized when the accountability and regulation of private security firms is not a priority. **Last, because of the lack of central regulation and the recruitment style of PSC's, their use will result in more civilian brutality, instances of misconduct and the radicalization of the Iraqi people. This will undermine the war effort as well as increase the potential for violent mobilization against the US. The lack of transparency and audience costs in US wars create a space where military leaders, State Department officials and members of the executive branch can focus on the short- term gains of winning a war, and not the long term ends of what that country will look like once the US leaves it.**

Knowing that transparency is ebbing the US can hire previous insurgents such as the Sunni groups inside of Anbar, without looking into the implications of sectarian violence. Yes, the hiring of these groups led to the eventual control of previous Al-Qaeda strongholds, but that came with a price because today those trained, armed and restless men have nowhere to go and no funding. Consequently, the less the people know about the real cost of war, the less likely they are to cry out against it, which means that a war can start easier and last longer. The other side of this realization is that PSC brutality inside of Iraq was not only institutionalized inside their very makeup but has also been shown to radicalize the population and perpetuate violent mobilization. Sparking the mobilization of violent groups and creating a steady pool for recruits perpetuates conflict needlessly. The potential for the worst abuses to a population come in the intelligence sector where limited regulation and visibility is coupled with the task of gaining national security intelligence. This creates a single-minded drive that is separate from the rest of the war effort. Therefore future research should focus on the intelligence sector specifically and what the consequences of privatizing large portions of it will be.

Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation

Jack Spencer, oo, The Facts About Military Readiness, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness> *Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world* that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. *Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against America* in allies and interests, *inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.*

The Heritage Foundation

Justin Johnson, 3-25-2016, "America's Military Is in Much Worse Shape Than You'd Think," Daily Signal, <http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/25/americas-military-is-in-much-worse-shape-than-you-d-think/>

America's military is dangerously weak and unprepared today, and it's not getting better. At least that's what top military leaders told Congress recently. Unfortunately, the testimony of these top generals and admirals did not get the attention it deserved. For the last 15 years, *the United States military has not prepared for conflict with a near peer competitor like Russia or China. General Mark Milley, chief of staff of the Army, shared his worries with Congress, explaining that the Army would be able to handle a serious conflict but "not at a level that is appropriate for what the American people would expect to defend them."* In other words, because soldiers are not adequately prepared, *the U.S. Army would either be late to arrive to a conflict (due to more time for training) or they would send soldiers into harm's way unprepared.*

These are not issues isolated to the Army. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller, when commenting on the ability to meet requirements in a major conflict, said the Marine Corps "would be able to do that but probably not within a timeframe that current plans call for [them] to arrive to participate in that conflict." The chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, also admitted that there is "a readiness debt that we have had difficulty pulling out of or even making progress on as the funding levels are what they are and the security environment continues to put demands on the force." Almost two decades of conflict and years of budget constraints have taken their toll on the military, both in terms of deferred modernization and insufficient readiness. In the 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, the American military received a grade of "marginal". We can see why in one news story after another. Only one third of Army Brigade Combat Teams are battle ready. Half of the Air Force's combat forces are insufficiently prepared for a high-end conflict. The Navy is forced to put more strain on its sailors and ships by doing eight to ten month deployments, instead of the more manageable 6 months. All Marine Corps aircraft either need to be replaced or recapitalized. Not to mention, the Marines' current level of Class A mishaps is nearly double the ten year average. Neller confessed that "the simple fact is that we don't have enough airplanes to meet the training requirements for the entire force." Last year, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs said the planned defense budget was "the lower ragged edge of manageable risk need to execute our nation's defense strategy." The suggested base defense budget at the time was \$573 billion. This year's defense budget request is more than \$20 billion lower. If last year's estimate was the lower ragged edge, this year's budget request surely is below that edge of manageable risk.

Sydney Freedberg

SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. on October 02, 2015. Breaking Defense. *Guard Association (NGAUS): We Can Work With CSA Gen. Milley*

On other fronts, however, Milley said things that — while not promises — sounded surprisingly encouraging to Guard ears. He proposed restoring "roundout" units in which a Guard force is an integral part of a larger regular active-duty formation, called up to "round it out" in times of war; or, he said to Guard applause, maybe an active unit will round out the Guard. He suggested the Guard might need more paid days of training than the traditional 39; Guard leaders often complain of the unpaid time their more technical troops must put in to stay current. He said Guard units might need larger cadres of active-duty personnel assigned to them, on the model of the Marine Corps Reserve. *Most dramatically, Milley wants to double, from two to four, the number of Guard combat brigades that annually attend wargames at top-flight Combat Training Centers.* The Army's been hard-pressed in recent years to fund CTC rotations for active-duty units, let alone the Guard, so for Milley to make this a priority is significant. How quickly Guard units can get combat-ready in a crisis is a bone of bitter contention, *and Milley's measure — if funded — would double the number of Guard brigades at the highest level of*

readiness. That said, going from two brigades to four is still a relatively small part of the force. The Guard alone has 28 brigade combat teams: seven armored brigades that would train at Fort Irwin, California; 20 infantry brigades that would train at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and one Stryker brigade (infantry in light armored vehicles) that could go to either. At Milley's suggested four rotations a year — assuming two at Irwin and two at Polk — Guard soldiers in armored units would get top-level training at a CTC once every four years, but infantry only once a decade. "Down the road," Hargett told me, "maybe the answer's five, maybe the answer's six [Guard brigades going to CTCs a year]." **But there are both fiscal and organizational costs to consider**, he said: Sending a brigade is hard not just on the unit itself but on the state that supports it. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that going from two-CTC trained Guard brigades to four, **"you double your readiness"**, Hargett said. "It gives you more brigades ready to deploy." In general, "it's readily obvious to me that I need to employ more of the Guard, not less," Milley told the Guard conference. "There are operations around the world today that are ongoing, and there are contingencies that are always a potential [e.g. a war], and I believe that I can get the guard into those missions." "We're going to get smaller," Milley said bluntly, pointing to the ongoing budget agonies. "Because of that.... I've got to maximize every amount of capability out of all the piece parts of the Army. And I believe — because of what I've seen over the last 10-15 years — I believe that I can get a lot more out of the Guard."

Contention Two

Zachary Cohen of CNN

Cohen, Zachary. "Is the U.S. Navy Too Small?" CNN. Cable News Network, 08 Sept. 2015. Web. 27 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/us-navy-size-military-election-2016/>>.

CNN)For decades, the United States has had the world's largest and most advanced naval fleet, positioning ships and aircraft carriers in strategic locations across the globe to protect national interests and facilitate free trade. But as rival nations, such as China and Russia, expand their own naval capabilities, and with China's increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea, GOP presidential candidates are warning voters that America's dominance of the world's oceans could end unless lawmakers add significantly more ships to its arsenal to bring the fleet size closer to historic levels. Navy launches newest combat ship Navy launches newest combat ship 01:02 Former military officials and defense experts, however, say that weighing the current size of the Navy against past ship levels is a misleading comparison that misses the broader point: making sure the Navy is capable of achieving U.S. strategic goals, which depend as much on technological capability and force deployment as the raw number of ships. While many analysts think the Navy needs to grow, others think it's large enough -- given its global dominance -- and that funding realities mean there's a limit to how much it could expand in any case. That

hasn't stopped the expansion of the Navy from becoming a favorite Republican talking point. Outlining his policy on China in Charleston, South Carolina, **Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida warned, "Our Navy is now smaller than at any time since before World War I." In the first Republican debate last month, neurosurgeon Ben Carson similarly declared, "Our Navy is the smallest it's been since 1917." Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker in April compared the current number of ships to that under President Ronald Reagan, telling the New Hampshire Republican Leadership Summit, "We're headed down toward 250. That's less than half of where we were under Reagan."**

The U.S. naval force is currently made up of 273 ships, which is the smallest number since the fleet stood at 245 ships in 1916. While fleet size has fluctuated significantly throughout history, topping out at 6,768 during World War II, today's Navy is only slightly smaller than it was in 2006 under President George W. Bush, when it employed 281 active ships. But former military officials say comparisons between the Navy of 1917 and today's are an apples-to-oranges contrast. The modern Navy includes 10 aircraft carriers -- more than the rest of the world combined -- 90 surface warfare vessels and 72 submarines. "It is a useful bumper sticker," said Dakota Wood, a former U.S. Marine and senior research fellow for defense programs at the Heritage Foundation. "It resonates with people but doesn't go into the details." And those details, he continued, make the comparison off base. "Modern ships are much more capable than the ones 100 years ago. They have better radars and better missile systems," he said, though he noted that other nations' naval capabilities have also evolved. Inside the Navy's 'most lethal warship' 01:53 Rather than comparing ship numbers to those of past fleets, Peter Singer of the New America Foundation said candidates should be more concerned with outlining a naval strategy that reflects the threat environment of today's world. Calling the line about the smallest Navy "a pretty weak one," Singer said better questions about the future of the Navy would be, "What types of ships are they going to be and how are you going to pay for them?"

The foundation of the U.S. Navy's current strategic posture is based on maintaining what it calls a "forward presence," or an ability to deploy and station forces far from American shores by using

international waters and a network of allies to maneuver its assets as needed. Despite enjoying technological advantages over rival nations and an increasing ability to base forces close to key strategic regions, in places like Guam, Japan and Spain, Navy officials say they will need more ships in order to effectively and efficiently carry out mission goals going forward.

"A smaller force, driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would require us to make hard choices," according to a Navy report on force structure submitted to Congress in March. The Navy would face increased levels of risk for some missions and functions and a decrease in its forward presence and would have to reduce its footprint in some geographic regions, the report stated. "Such cuts would also limit our war-fighting advantages." The USS Independence (LCS 2), left, and USS Coronado (LCS 4) steam in the Pacific Ocean. The two are of the Independence variant LCS. Ships of this variant are 416.8 feet in length with a beam of 103.7 feet and a displacement of 3,100 metric tons. Photos: Meet the littoral combat ship With plans to send approximately 60% of its ships and aircraft to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by 2020, the Navy says it needs to add roughly 30 ships -- including an additional aircraft carrier and several amphibious vessels -- in order to maintain a consistent presence in other regions around the world. By adding more ships to its fleet and working with allies to position those ships closer to potential conflict regions, the Navy's top brass says it will be able to maximize the efficiency of its forces while minimizing maintenance costs and reducing the length of deployments.

However, Republican hopefuls -- including Rubio, Carson, Walker, Ohio Gov. John Kasich, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal and others -- insist that the U.S. must "rebuild" and "reinvigorate" the Navy by raising its ship count to as high as 350, a project that would likely cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Kasich recently listed "renewing the Navy" as his second-highest priority in a CNN op-ed on national security. "Those who mistakenly think they can deny access to a corner of the globe -- particularly in the Western Pacific or Persian Gulf -- need another visit from a carrier battle group to remind them that the global commons are, in fact, just that: shared real estate," he wrote.

Jindal has made a similar case. Addressing the American Enterprise Institute in 2014, Jindal warned that looming budget cuts would allow China to surpass the size of the U.S. fleet and inhibit America's ability to employ a global Navy. "The consequences of this foolish, nearly trillion-dollar cut over the coming decade (is) unacceptable. Under these cuts, America will not have a global Navy anymore," he said. Report: Women could be allowed into Navy SEALs How much does fleet size matter?

Many defense experts and lawmakers do agree that today's Navy needs more ships in order to respond to emerging threats around the world and to maintain its global presence, with some even suggesting numbers close to those called for by GOP candidates. Of the 273 deployable ships currently at the Navy's disposal, roughly 85 are at sea at a given time -- a ratio, some argue, that's wearing down U.S. ships and service members. This fall, the U.S. won't have an aircraft carrier stationed in the Persian Gulf for at least two months due to a mix of budget cuts and maintenance needs.

Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, agreed with the Republican view that the Navy needs to have closer to 355 ships to maintain current deployment patterns and to carry out missions ranging from disaster relief to military deterrence. He said that adding more ships to the fleet's rotation would allow the Navy to shorten deployments, which would help personnel retention and avoid carrier gaps in the future.

Sean Gallagher

Gallagher, Sean. "Why the Navy Needs More than Just More Ships." *Ars Technica*. N.p., 30 Sept. 2015. Web. 28 Dec. 2016. <<http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/09/why-the-navy-needs-more-than-just-more-ships/>>.

It's not a problem that massive quantities of new military technology alone will solve. While consumer and business technology has grown in capability exponentially, while getting less expensive over the past three decades, military technology seems to get more and more expensive—even when defense contractors draw on commercial off-the-shelf technology. That's particularly true of the Navy, which has been shrinking in size since the first President Bush declared a "peace dividend" at the end of the Cold War. As of today, the US Navy has 272 ships active in the fleet—the smallest overall since 1916. "In the 1980s, we almost reached 600 ships," said Eric Wertheim, author of the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World. That's not to say that the Navy is in danger of being outclassed any time soon. "Our Navy, when you count gross tonnage, is still more powerful than any Navy in the world," said O'Hanlon. "We have large deck amphibious ships and air craft carriers that other countries don't. We're still even more ahead [of potential adversaries] than the numbers would imply." But both O'Hanlon and Wertheim noted that even with stronger individual ships, a smaller fleet creates greater risks—risks created by not being able to maintain the sort of presence worldwide that the Navy is being called upon for. In the event that things heat up somewhere where a Naval presence is needed, there's not a reserve of ships ready to draw from to respond. And you can't just build ships when you need them. The Navy is already operating beyond a sustainable capacity. Even with reduced maintenance schedules, "ships now deploy for eight months or longer now instead of six," said

O'Hanlon, and repairs are put off so the ships stay available. As a result, the fleet and the sailors who crew its ships are becoming a bit frayed at the edges. **"If you do the math, alleviating the Navy's burden of deployment would require 15 percent more fleet capacity," said O'Hanlon. That's about 41 more ships, which would bring the Navy to a fleet of 312. But that's just to sustain current operations and doesn't address future needs. New combat ships, like the Air Force's new combat aircraft programs, are terribly expensive—at least the way the US government buys them. And as with the Air Force's F-22 and F-35A programs, the Navy's shipbuilding programs over the past decade or so have been slashed back in mid-stream because of rising costs—reducing the total construction, which in turn**

leads to even higher costs for each ship built. Starts and stops in programs have also increased

costs. The Navy has ordered more Arleigh Burke destroyers at \$1.8 billion per ship, because the Zumwalt and its sister ships in the DDG-1000 class will cost over \$3 billion (and as a result, the class has been reduced to three ships). "The process makes cost grow tremendously," Wertheim said. But the Air Force has been able, sometimes at Congressional insistence, to fill mission roles by modernizing older aircraft (such as the B-52). The Navy has already ditched its older hardware. As the service tried to fund its new ships, the Navy permanently reduced the number of ships already to save tens of millions of dollars per ship on operations while spending billions on a smaller number of ships that would, in theory, operate less expensively longterm. "People don't realize that one of the biggest costs of any ship is its crew," said O'Hanlon. So how large a fleet the US can sustain will in part be driven by "how manpower-efficient the ships are." The Littoral Combat Ship and the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class ships were designed with the idea of improving manpower efficiency—requiring a fraction of the crew required for the ships they are intended to replace. A lot of that comes through automation, making Navy ships more like their commercial counterparts. On the LCS, for example, the Officer of the Deck (the officer in charge of directing the movement of the ship on a watch team) actually "flies" the ship personally from a cockpit-like console; older ships require two enlisted watch standers to steer and signal orders to the engine room at the OOD's commands. Even so, the Navy's decisions on its existing ships have made a smooth transition between the two impossible, leaving gaps in capabilities. Two entire classes of combat ships—the Spruance-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry frigates—were retired at the end of the last decade by the Navy, while Wertheim said both ship classes could have been upgraded and their service lives extended. "The Perry class—if you look at what Australia did with theirs, they totally upgraded them," he said. "They added vertical missile launch tubes, and they are now really powerful warships that have evolved since the 1980s. The US Navy could have done it as well, but didn't take as good of care of them and wound up having to retire them." The Perry class, with a crew complement of 200, was supposed to be replaced by the LCS (which originally was to have fewer than 50 crew). But because of delays in the LCS program, the Perry class was retired much faster than the LCS ships could replace them. Only one Perry frigate, the USS Simpson (FFG-56), remains active in the US fleet—and was slotted to be decommissioned this month. Others have been sold to other nations' navies, or scrapped. The fate of the Spruance class of destroyers was even more swift. The ships, some of which had been upgraded with vertical launch tubes, could have been kept in service with proper maintenance through 2019. But the Spruances are now gone completely—only one ship remains afloat, as a remote-controlled test ship for self-defense weapons systems. The rest were scrapped, turned into artificial reefs, or "disposed of in a fleet training exercise"—sunk. Pacific Pivot or just your usual shuffle?

Part of the reasoning behind the Navy's resizing has been a "strategic pivot" toward the Pacific. "China is rising [as a naval power]. Other countries have been doing things that aren't desirable from our point of view, and we need more capability in the Pacific than we've had," O'Hanlon said. "So having a larger navy in that area would be a minimal requirement... we would like to increase the proportion of the fleet in the Pacific and actually get more presence there."

Many of the current demands on the fleet (including humanitarian operations and simply projecting a presence in areas around the world) could be conducted by relatively less expensive ships like the LCS and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ships now being built. The JHSVs, based largely on commercial long-range ferry designs, are capable of carrying company-size Army or Marine Corps units and supporting transport helicopters. They have been pressed into roles typically served in the past by frigates—but only require a crew of 22, compared to the 200 or so that manned an Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate. The LCS class, built originally with a crew size of 40 or so in mind plus "mission" crews for different modules, has seen its crew grow to nearly 65 by comparison—still nearly a quarter of the crew of the Perry. If the numbers issue was one of just presence, the LCS and JHSV ships could fill the gap relatively quickly. The Spearhead class JHSVs cost \$180 million each to build. The LCS ships were originally supposed to cost just \$220 million to build, though there were substantial cost overruns, and the LCS class is now going through a redesign to make it more frigate-like in firepower. But "you could build 20 LCS with what it costs to build one aircraft carrier," O'Hanlon said. "The Navy could change the configuration of its fleet and get to 350 fairly easily." The problem faced in arriving at what size the fleet should be, however, isn't just about stopping its shrinkage. Part of the problem Navy leadership faces now is the lack of clarity over what enemy the service needs to prepare to fight.

If the future is going to be about a potential war against say China or Russia," Wertheim said, "SSNs (nuclear subs) are going to have a larger role, and we'll want more of them. If it's about low-risk contingency operations, then JHSVs and LCSs will do the job. You have to make sure that your ship building plan supports whatever the strategy is, and not the other way around." The risk of not doing anything, Wertheim added, is that "you lose the ability of allies to count on us and let other navies fill that vacuum. You cannot respond as quickly as you'd like to crises.

There's nothing wrong with allies shouldering some of the burden, but in the end you can't always count on your allies. There are times when we have to operate independently." Wertheim said that rather than just coming up with a number, there has to be a plan from leadership "really spelling out what the Navy wants to get done and what the Defense Department expects of the Navy in the future. They have to be realistic about where things are now, in that there's not enough ships or crews to go around." Ars attempted to contact the Heritage Foundation for comments, but received no response.

Anthony Capaccio of Bloomberg

Capaccio, Anthony. "Trump Would Get the 350 Ships He Wants Under Navy's New Plan."

Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 16 Dec. 2016. Web. 28 Dec. 2016.

<<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/trump-would-get-the-350-ships-he-wants-under-navy-s-new-plan-iwrthjb3>>.

Trump's Goal Trump said in a speech **in September that he adopted his 350-ship goal from a bipartisan panel created by Congress to review the Pentagon's 2014 quadrennial review of projected threats and U.S. responses. That report called for "somewhere between" 323 and 346 ships while cautioning more may be needed to meet challenges**

such as China's plan to have "close to" 350 vessels by 2020. The Navy's force-structure goal is adjusted every few years, and has been in the range of 306 to 328 ships since 2006, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last assessment was in 2014.

"While continuing the counterterrorism fight and appropriately competing with a

growing China and resurgent Russia, our Navy must continue to grow," Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus said in a statement. "All of the analysis done to date, inside and outside of the Navy, recognizes, as we have for nearly the last eight years, the need for a larger fleet."

The new goals would boost by 16 the number of "large surface combatants"-- destroyers, cruisers or both. It would add one aircraft carrier in addition to the 11 mandated by law today, 18 more attack submarines and as many as four new amphibious warfare ships. **Cost Constraints** Cost remains the biggest impediment: The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service estimates a 350-ship Navy would cost an average \$4 billion extra annually over the current forecast of about \$16.3 billion a year for new ship construction through 2021. The current budget calls for eight new vessels in fiscal 2018; seven in fiscal 19; and eight each in 2020 and 2021. Defense budget caps that remain in place for fiscal 2018 to 2021 under the 2011 Budget Control Act would constrain a naval build-up. The Pentagon faces about \$106.6 billion in potential cuts from its current budget projections -- starting with \$33.6 billion in fiscal 2018. Carter said in his Dec. 14 memo last year to Mabus, the Navy secretary, that the service's goal at the time of 308 vessels "should be met but not irresponsibly exceeded." He said the Navy had been counting on piecemeal funding of ships at the "expense of critically needed areas where our adversaries are not standing still." The Navy's new assessment was originally scheduled to be released next month but was accelerated by Mabus so that it would have his personal stamp before he leaves office with the arrival of the Trump administration.

Follett 16.

(Andrew Follett, Energy and Environmental Reporter, "China Plans To Build 20 Floating Nuclear Reactors In International Waters," 4/28/16, pg. online @ dailycaller.com/2016/04/28/china-plans-to-build-20-floating-nuclear-reactors-in-international-waters/)

"China plans to build 20 floating nuclear reactors in the South China Sea, likely to strengthen its claim to the valuable and disputed region, according to announcements by state media. China has claimed more than 80 percent of the South China Sea, sparking conflict with other countries in the region and with the U.S. The potential militarization of the islands worries America and its regional allies, as it could hinder the \$5 trillion of maritime trade that passes through the region each year."

The sections of the sea that are claimed by China are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei and Taiwan. *"Placing such high-tech infrastructure on man-made islands further cements Beijing's claims to this body of water--and in the most grandiose way,"* Harry Kazianis, a senior fellow for defense policy at The Center for the National Interest, told The Daily

Caller News Foundation. *"It shows China will do what it wants in the South China Sea,"* he damned the environmental concerns or the fact that Typhoons regularly rampage this part of the world. It shows the region who is in charge--besides all the military-grade air fields, anti-ship weapons, air defense platforms, fighter jets and advanced radars China has placed on its new islands. *"China has been building islands on reefs, which will ultimately host harbors and runways that are "up to military standards."*

The environmental cost of building the islands is significant, according to report prepared for the U.S. Congress. *"The U.S. military is increasingly deploying*

to the region," as part of the much discussed "pivot" to Asia -- *military aircraft has flown over the dispute artificial islands. Beijing angrily condemned these U.S. military missions designed to assert freedom of navigation* close to the reclaimed islands. Washington says these islands lie in international waters and China's actions violate international law. Despite military build up, America is still trying to respond to Chinese actions in the region without resorting to military force. *Chinese media has deepened American concerns by*

claiming the floating reactors "could provide reliable power for... defensive weapons and airports and harbors on islands in the South China Sea." China's President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the islands are

in a region that historically belongs to China and says Beijing will not hesitate to defend its sovereignty. "There are of course the more practical rationale: *China of course needs a power source* for things like housing, military platforms, soldiers and civilians who will live there," Kazianis continued. *"This could be achieved through many other means. However, nuclear has a certain sophistication to it--it screams great power."*

Asia Maritime Review 4/28/16 -- ("South China Sea WW3 Scenario: China To Send Nuclear Ships, Japan Patrols Philippine Waters," <http://asiamaritime.net/south-china-sea-ww3-scenario-china-to-send-nuclear-ships-japan-patrols-philippine-waters/>)/DWB

"Tensions are not letting up in the South China Sea region as countries like Japan and China mull over the use of warships and nuclear technologies." Japan just sent a warship to the Philippines for a visit while *Beijing is reportedly sending nuclear warships in the disputed region despite tensions.*

It was reported previously that *China is gearing up to build nuclear plants in the South China Sea* This has prompted concerns on national security and the environment but the country seems *unfazed with the opposition to its*

territorial ambitions. According to The Daily Mail, the first of the nuclear ships are presently being assembled in Huludao, Liaoning, north-east China.

These ships could eventually **offer energy to the artificial islands in the region** – as reported by People's Daily Online. This has sparked concerns that **if China succeeds in deploying such then the country would find it even easier to assume command over the disputed region.** The report also added that the announcement came after expert review of specialists from Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co Ltd, a subsidiary of China Shipbuilding Industry Corp (CSIC). How the deployment spells for the rest of the dispute will be determined once China gets everything into play. Read: China To Deploy Nuclear Weapons In South China Sea? As China continues its plans to dominate the South China Sea, other countries are making a move to prevent such aggression in the region as well. According to Channel News Asia, Japan just sent a warship to the Philippines for a visit which also consequently marks the second time in just three weeks that Japanese naval vessels sailed into Subic Bay. "We want to deepen the relationship with the Philippines," explained Ise Captain Masaki Takada to the press who were also given the chance to tour the vessel. However, the official denied commenting if Japan came across Chinese vessels during its journey. Along with the Philippines, Japan previously called out China on its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. "This visit will further strengthen our relationship with them. We have a strong relationship with them already but we want to enhance that," added Filipino Navy Captain Samuel Felix.

Rando 15

(9/29, Consultant- Asymmetric Global Solutions DBA, MPH/MS-Biomedical Sciences & US Correspondent-Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Warfare Journal, Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, <http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/>)

"The dependence of China and other regional nations [on] surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one-third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, **leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere.** Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to **evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war,** and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster. China continues to assert sovereignty by constructing man made islands using sand dredged from the sea bottom and these artificial islands could be militarized. China has even affirmed its desire to have a military presence on these islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also professes the use of these land masses to facilitate commerce via shipping lanes and to protect Chinese fishing and other vessels from piracy. China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived "ownership" of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the "Chinese Dream". The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived "right" to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the "submarine factor", it is evident that China's submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India's nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China's submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. **China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances [like],** such as **the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters** claimed by both countries in the region **and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets.** A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. **China's Global Times** published an unprecedented report that **revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S.** with JL-2 missiles **could generate** up to **12 million American fatalities.** The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to **China's claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat,** which **included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation.** The possibilities of China's anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including conventional and, potentially, nuclear scenarios. " " China's South Sea naval facilities have seen significant upgrading and expansion, such as the facilities on Hainan, and the nuclear submarine base at Longpo serves as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The base also includes a submarine tunnel that is part of an underwater complex of nuclear facilities on Hainan. Also, Chinese-Russian wargames are worrisome, which adds to the concerns of nuclear confrontation and consequences globally. **The Chinese have asserted their right to defend its territories** which in their view, includes the South China Sea, **and they have stated verbally, and by their aggressive actions, that they will** continue to **pursue their strategic goals despite the threat of** confrontation and **conflict.** Many of the issues in contention in the South China Sea will remain unresolved for, probably, several years to come. We must remain balanced, and not overzealous in our approaches to assisting with conflict resolution in the area. We must apply reasonable diplomacy, without stirring up a hornet's nest that would serve to be counterproductive and

enhance animosities. However, the US, its allies, and other concerned nation-states must not refrain from being ever so vigilant and proactive in achieving peaceful resolution, while at the same time maintaining our national defense and security postures.”

Randy Forbes 13

Forbes, Randy. "The Conservative Case for American Seapower." RealClearDefense. N.p., 24 July 2013. Web. 28 Dec. 2016.

<http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/07/24/the_conservative_case_for_american_seapower_106709.html>.

As the Republican Party continues the process of reflection and analysis to assess our nation's direction, it is an appropriate time to ask what a conservative defense and national security agenda should look like going forward. If one surveys the next decade and considers the continued emergence of China on the world stage and its activity in the Near-Seas, Iran's nuclear ambitions and potential threat in the Strait of Hormuz, the global economy's dependency on commercial and energy shipping, and other flash-points for instability like the Horn of Africa, it is not difficult to deduce the starkly maritime character of the future security environment. Given this, I believe the backbone of any conservative defense agenda should be the prioritization of American seapower. Moreover, I believe seapower should be a defense priority for

conservatives, whose advocacy should be as closely associated with the GOP as support for missile defense has been for the past 30 years.

Without a strong Navy underpinning American grand strategy, the very basis for a conservative agenda - the protection of liberty, robust economic growth, and strong support for free trade - would become untenable. With 80% of global trade traveling by sea, the strength of the American economy is directly linked with the Navy's ability to keep the world's sea lanes open and secure. The U.S. Constitution gave clear deference to the United States Navy when it declared Congress' authority "to provide and maintain a Navy". Whether it is combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa, preventing Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz to energy shipments, or upholding the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific, the Navy-Marine Corps team is essential to the health of the U.S. economy. The primacy conservatives should accord seapower is rooted in the centrality of a strong Navy to the traditional goals and objectives of a conservative foreign policy. Through two world wars and a half-century of Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has focused on shaping the rise of another great power with aggressive ambitions. Whether Imperial Germany, the Third Reich, Japan or the Soviet Union, the United States has spent the last century guarding the equitable balance of power in key regions of the world. In every instance, it has been the U.S. Navy's ability to command the seas where and when it chooses that allowed the U.S. and its allies to defeat or deter expansionist powers bent on dominating their neighbors. The American ascendancy to global naval dominance after World War II coincides directly with the decline in conflict between Great Powers. As with British naval predominance in the nineteenth century, a democratic superpower that can wield overwhelming seapower will generate a more stable, prosperous and peaceful international order.

The benefits of embracing seapower as a core tenet of a conservative defense agenda extend across the spectrum of national security challenges. Strengthening alliances with key countries in the world's most critical regions is facilitated by a preponderance of American naval power, giving prospective allies the confidence that the U.S. will not abandon them in a crisis.

Defense of the U.S. homeland is buttressed by the presence of Navy surface vessels equipped with ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology. The most effective and survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear deterrent are the Navy's ballistic missile submarines. American aircraft carriers remain the single most powerful instrument of power projection ever devised, bringing unparalleled military power to bear to deter adversaries in peacetime or contribute to victory in a time of conflict. And the amphibious fleet provides flexibility to project Marine combat power ashore or bring assistance during humanitarian crises. Indeed, the list of America's international diplomatic and security objectives that are supported by seapower capabilities is virtually endless. Prioritizing seapower is also the best means for conservatives to offer solutions to the challenges of the 21st century. The rise of China, both economically and militarily, is set to define this century. Due to the vast geography of the Asian-Pacific theater, the Sino-American competition promises to be maritime in nature. A renewed conservative emphasis on seapower is required to help steer the American relationship with China in a positive, peaceful direction. Only by resourcing a Navy capable of deterring aggression and reassuring American allies of our commitment to security in the Pacific can we hope for a positive result to the Sino-American rivalry. Finally, the current state of the U.S. Navy offers conservatives an opportunity to advocate and prioritize seapower as part of a forward-looking defense agenda. Even before sequestration, the Fleet had atrophied from 568 ships in 1987 to just 285 today. By 2015, the administration is projecting a continued decline of navy forces to an abysmal 270 ships. In key areas, including attack submarines and the amphibious vessels used to transport Marines around the world, the Navy will suffer serious shortfalls. Just as the investments made during the 1980s provided a powerful Navy that has benefited American interests in myriad ways for the last three decades, the choices made now will reverberate for decades to come. President Obama, who famously derided Mitt Romney's farsighted vision for a revitalized Navy as harkening back to "horses and bayonets", seems wholly uninterested in American seapower. The opportunity for conservative leadership on this subject could not be greater. Historically, the Republican Party has been the most vigorous champion of American seapower. Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet symbolized the arrival of the United States as a great power at the turn of the 20th century and Ronald Reagan's revitalization of the Fleet in the 1980s helped give the Soviet Union a final push onto the ash heap of history. It remains for the current generation of conservative leaders to establish seapower as the backbone of a defense policy dedicated to preserving the American-led global order.

Leed of Rice University

Leeds, Brett Ashley. [Professor Leeds specializes in the study of international relations from Rice University, and particularly in the design and influence of cooperative agreements and international institutions.] "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *Am J Political Science* American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (2003): 427-39. Rice University. Web. 21 Feb. 2016.

<<http://atop.rice.edu/download/publications/LeedsAJPS03.pdf>>.

METHODOLOGY: **The unit of analysis is the directed dyad year.6 Rather than offering predictions regarding the overall level of war in a system or the war proneness of a particular state, the dyadic research design allows scholars to make predictions about who is likely to fight with whom under what conditions. A directed-dyad research design distinguishes cases in which (for example) Britain initiates a dispute against Russia from cases in which Russia initiates a dispute against**

Britain Because I am interested in the conditions conducive to the decision by one state to initiate a dispute against another state rather than simply the conditions associated with the emergence of a dispute between two states, this is the appropriate unit of analysis. The temporal domain is dictated by data availability.⁷ The spatial domain follows a number of similar studies that have relied on simple decision rules to determine the types of relationships relevant for studies of militarized conflict.⁶ Prior studies have been posed at the system or state level of analysis. Singer and Small (1968), Ostrom and Hoole (1978), and Levy (1981) examine the correlation between the proportion of nations with allies and the proportion of nations in war and find no relationship that is consistent over time, but their studies do not attempt to determine whether there is any specific connection between particular alliances and particular wars. Siverson and King (1979) and Wayman (1990) examine the relationship between alliance membership and war participation at the state level of analysis and conclude that nations with alliances are more war-prone than nations without alliances, but it is unclear if they have revealed a causal relationship between alliance membership and war proneness or whether similar factors lead states to be both war prone and likely to form alliances.⁷ The indicators for my dependent variable and most of my independent variables are not available for cases occurring before 1816, and the data for my independent variables of primary interest (specific alliance commitments) are not yet available for years beyond 1944. ⁸ Because the sample of cases is unduly expanded by including states that we suspect have little ability or reason to engage one another in military conflict (for example, the Mauritania-Bolivia dyad or the Albania-Cambodia dyad), scholars have often limited analysis to the interactions of each state with its neighbors and with major powers (Maoz 1996). Lemke and Reed (2001) reassure us that this is unlikely to threaten proper inference. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the challenger initiates a militarized interstate dispute against the target in the year in question, and 0 otherwise. A Militarized Interstate Dispute is defined as an instance "in which the threat, display, or use of military force ... by one member state is directed towards ... another state" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 168). Some MIDs escalate to full scale war, while others end short of war.⁸ I employ the dyadic version of the MID data (version 1.1) provided by Zeev Maoz, so only pairs of states that engage one another directly are included as disputing dyads.⁹ I consider only original initiators and original targets; decisions to join ongoing disputes are not included.¹⁰ Original initiators are those states that are involved in a dispute when it begins on the side that first takes action, and original targets are

those states that are involved in a dispute at its inception on the side that does not take the first action to qualify as a MID.¹¹ **The independent variables of primary interest are three variables capturing types of alliance commitments to the potential target and the potential initiator. These are all drawn from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset.**¹² **The first variable is a dummy variable representing whether the potential target had any allies who were committed to defend the target in the event the target was attacked by this potential challenger. Only alliances that include specific commitments for active military support in the event of attack qualify, and**⁸**This study analyzes the effects of alliances on the probability of dispute initiation, which is one necessary step to the outbreak of war.** To understand the full effects of alliances on the probability of war, however, will require combining a study of the impact of alliances on dispute initiation with a study of the impact of alliances on the likelihood that disputes escalate to war.⁹ The data were obtained at

<http://spirit.tau.ac.il/~zeevmaoz>.¹⁰ Alliances should have a different impact on joining decisions than initiation decisions, and thus the two phenomena can be studied productively separately. See Bennett and Stam (2000b) for a useful discussion of operationalization decisions using the MID data.¹¹ For those familiar with the MID data, original initiators are those that are coded as original participants on side A, and original targets are those that are coded as original participants on side B.¹² The ATOP data can be obtained at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~leeds/atop.html>.⁴³² BRETT ASHLEY LEEDS alliances are coded only for the dyadic relations to which they may apply. When, for instance, defensive commitments are limited to conflicts with particular adversaries, the same state in the same year might be coded as having an ally with a defensive commitment in some of its dyadic relations and not in others. For instance, if an alliance treaty specifies that the partners promise one another mutual defense if either is attacked by Germany, the alliance members would be coded as having commitments of defensive support in their dyadic relations with Germany, but not with Britain, or Italy, or any other dyadic partners. Alliance commitments may also be asymmetric. If one party promises to defend another without requiring a reciprocal guarantee, one member of an alliance may be coded as having a defensive ally while another is not. The second variable is a dummy variable representing whether the potential aggressor had any allies who were committed to join in an offensive attack against this target. Again, I took great care to code offensive alliances to the potential aggressor only in cases in which the treaty specifies promises of active military support that are not contingent upon one of the partners being attacked, and for dyads to which the specific *casus foederis* would apply. Thus, if offensive promises apply only to particular targets or to particular

locations, then the potential aggressor is coded as having offensive allies only in those dyadic relationships. **The third variable is a dummy variable representing whether any states had alliance commitments to the potential challenger that would preclude their intervention on the side of the target if the challenger attacked.** These alliances are neutrality pacts; they specify that a partner will not fight with adversaries against an ally. Not only was the coding of these commitments limited only to conflicts with the targets that meet the specifications of the treaty, however, but neutrality pacts were also only coded as applicable to potential challengers if they were not conditional upon a partner being attacked. Many neutrality pacts are specifically limited to instances in which a member of the alliance is not the aggressor. The variable for neutrality commitments to a potential challenger includes only those alliances that are applicable to the dyad in question with the alliance member in the role of conflict initiator. This is easiest to see by examining the bar graph pictured in Figure 1. This figure shows the percentage change in the probability of dispute initiation that can be attributed to outside allies when all other variables are held at their mean values.

The first bar shows that when a target state has an ally committed to its defense, the probability of dispute initiation is 28% lower than the probability of dispute initiation in a dyad with the mean characteristics in the dataset but no outside allies. The second bar represents the case in which the challenger has an offensive ally; in this instance, the probability of dispute initiation is 47% higher than it is in the case in which neither the challenger nor the target has any allies committed to intervene. model is designed to predict average effects across a population, and thus this characterization of a baseline value is appropriate. DO ALLIANCES DETER AGGRESSION? ⁴³⁷ Finally, the bar on the right shows that when challengers have obtained promises of neutrality from outside states, the probability of dispute initiation is 57% higher than it is when neither state has any allies. Notably, these substantive effects are similar to those associated with variables like power relations and similarity in alliance portfolios, which scholars of international politics have long considered crucial to predicting and preventing dispute initiation. Given the rare occurrence and severe implications of military conflict, the substantive effects of outside alliance commitments to potential conflict initiators and targets are important enough that they should influence scholarship and policy.

Without exception, the data are supportive of the hypotheses proposed in this study. This suggests that alliances do influence the probability of militarized conflict, but the direction of that influence depends on the content of the treaty. Relevant defense pacts can deter aggressors from attacking alliance members, but relevant offense pacts and neutrality commitments can provide the assurances that aggressors need to facilitate attack.

The Council on Foreign Relations

Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4-1-2012, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>

Alliance security and regional stability. U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest.

Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims. Economic interests. **Each year, \$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for \$1.2 trillion of this total.** Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches. Cooperative relationship with China. The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system.

Mark Milley, the U.S. military Chief of staff in 2016

http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Murphy-Milley_04-07-16.pdf

The United States Army is the most formidable ground combat force on earth. America's Army has convincingly demonstrated its competence and effectiveness in diverse missions overseas and in the homeland. Today, these missions include: fighting terrorists around the world; training Afghan and Iraqi Army forces; peacekeeping in the Sinai Peninsula and Kosovo; missile defense in the Persian Gulf; security assistance in Africa and South America; deterrence in Europe, the Republic of Korea, and Kuwait; rapid deployment global contingency forces; and response forces for the homeland. Additionally, we maintain 12,000 miles of U.S. waterways; respond to hurricanes, floods, and severe snowstorms; patrol our Southwest border; and assist with the response to the outbreak of pandemic diseases. In support of these U.S. Geographic Combatant Command missions, the Army has approximately 190,000 Soldiers deployed to 140 countries. Largely due to deliberate investments in Soldier training, equipping, and leader development, today's Army continues to excel at these diverse and enduring missions. However, we cannot become complacent, remain static, and look to the past or present to be a guarantor of future victory. To sustain this high performance and remain prepared for potential contingencies, the Army must make the most of the resources entrusted to us by the American people. This ultimately requires a balance of competing requirements—readiness, end strength, and modernization—to ensure America's Army remains ready to fight and win both today and in the future. Throughout history, successful armies anticipated the future, adapted, and capitalized upon opportunities. Today, the Army faces a rapidly changing security environment that requires the Army to make difficult decisions in order to remain an effective instrument of the Nation's military power. An Army ready for combat is the most effective tool to continually assure allies and deter or defeat adversaries. However, given the past three years of reduced funding coupled with the uncertainty of future funding, the Army risks going to war with insufficient readiness to win decisively. Therefore, the Army's number one priority is readiness.

Stanley, Bruce E. Outsourcing Security : Private Military Contractors And U.S. Foreign Policy. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2015. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 15 Dec. 2016. _____

The first model represents the first test of the hypotheses under investigation. Model 1 includes the dependent variable, contractors; the independent variables DoD Budget, DoD Personnel, DoD Overseas, duration of the conflict using four independent variables covering four geographic regions Middle East, East Europe, Asia, and Africa; an interrupted time-series test of the independent variable 71 executive decision; and test of the control variable intensity DoD KIA and Mass Unrest. **The variable representing defense budgets, DoD Budget, is statistically significant** at the $p < .01$ level. The coefficient for the *DoD Budget* variable is -4.92, which suggests that **for every decrease of \$100 million there is a corresponding increase of approximately 495 private contractors, holding other variables constant.** Neither of the variables representing defense personnel, *DoD Personnel*, nor the variable *DoD Overseas* is statistically

significant. The variable representing duration, *Middle East*, is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The coefficient for the *Middle East* variable is $-.001$, which suggests that when conflicts in the Middle East are reduced by 300 days, there is a corresponding decrease in private contractors by about 3, holding all other variables constant. The variables representing duration in *East Europe*, *Asia*, and *Africa* are statistically insignificant.

Stanley, Bruce E. *Outsourcing Security : Private Military Contractors And U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2015. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 15 Dec. 2016. _____

The U.S. budget for fiscal year 2001 provides a good starting point to demonstrate that military expenditures decreased after the end of the cold war. In 1987 U.S. defense outlays were 28.1 percent of the national budget. By 2001 the U.S. defense outlays were 16.4 percent of the national budget. In 1987 the defense budget represented 6.1 percent of the gdp. By 2001 the defense budget represented only 3.0 percent of gdp. **Carafano (2010, 56) concludes that “the upward- spiraling manpower costs and downward- spiraling size of the military have fueled the Pentagon’s reliance on contractors.”** Given the unique market niche they fill, Carafano argues that there are few practical alternatives to pmcs. Thus the extant literature suggests that the decrease in military outlays helps explain the increasing reliance on the private security industry.

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Shearer (1998) was the first to suggest that Western military force reductions resulted in an expansion of the private military sector. Furthermore he asserts that “demobilization has released former soldiers on the job market” and “the net result is a sharp increase in expertise in the private sector” (27). The majority of military cutbacks were in support areas, such as logistics (Singer 2003). In addition it is believed that with the end of the cold war, “Americans interpreted a reduced threat to national security that would result in a peace dividend or an accelerated reduction of military size and expenditure” (Kidwell 2005, 27). Similarly Carafano (2008, 52) explains that “the post– Cold War peace dividend affected all the services. Not only did the numbers drop, but organizations shrank, bases closed, equipment was retired, and civilian employees were let go.”

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DoD Budget is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The coefficient for the *DoD Budget* variable is -3.69 , which suggests that for every decrease of \$100 million there is a corresponding increase of about 370 private contractors, holding other variables constant. *DoD Personnel* is statistically significant at the $p < .10$ level. The coefficient for the *DoD Personnel* variable is -1.42 , which suggests that **for every 1,000 decrease in DoD personnel there is a corresponding increase of approximately 1,400 private contractors, holding other variables constant.** *DoD Overseas* is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level. The coefficient for the conflict variable is 4.95 , which suggests that for every 1,000 Defense Department personnel committed overseas, there is a corresponding increase of approximately 4,900 private contractors, holding other variables constant.