## AFF BLOCKS

### AT: Sanctions = Democracy

#### 1. 120 sanctions between 1990-2011 show that sanctions strengthen nondemocratic rule

**Julia Grauvogel, 2013.** (Julia Grauvogel, junior research fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs and Dr. Christian von Soest, senior research fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs. October 2013. “Claims to Legitimacy Matter: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” *German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers*, <https://giga.hamburg/en/system/files/publications/wp235_grauvogel-soest.pdf>. Page 3) ESG

International sanctions have been one of the most commonly used tools of Western foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to instigate democratization globally. However, despite long-term external pressure through sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and/or the United Nations, nondemocratic rule in cases such as Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea and Syria has proven to be extremely persistent. **In this paper, we analyze a new global dataset on sanctions from 1990 to 2011 and assess which international and domestic factors account for the persistence of nondemocratic rule in targeted regimes. The results of** a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of **120 episodes of sanctions provide new insights for the research on both sanctions and authoritarian regimes. Most significantly, sanctions strengthen nondemocratic rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy.** Such a “rally-round-the-flag” effect occurs most often in cases where comprehensive sanctions targeting the entire population are imposed on regimes that enjoy strong claims to legitimacy and have only limited linkages to the sanction sender

#### **2. The embargo doesn’t hurt the government, but the citizens of Cuba because Castro cannot be persuaded by his citizens**

Berta Hernández 2009 (Berta E. Hernández, Professor at Truyol University of Florida Levin College of Law, 1-1-2009 “Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba” from University of Florida Levin College of Law UF Law Scholarship Repository goo.gl/803qUc DOA: 1/21/17 P.75)ESM

It is common knowledge that trade sanctions hurt workers and industries, not the officials who authored the policies that are the target of the sanctions. The countries most likely to face sanctions are those run by undemocratic governments least likely to let the pain of their population sway them. These observations hold true in the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba. While in nearly fifty years of the embargo the purported goal of achieving democracy in Cuba has not been met, the embargo has had deleterious effects on Cuba and the Cuban people. First, a look at some factual data in light of trade relation confirms the reality and extent of the harms suffered. In 1958, the United States accounted for 6 7 % of Cuba's exports and 7 0% of its imports, placing it seventh on both export and import markets of the United States. 112 In 1999, by contrast, official U.S. exports to Cuba totaled a paltry $4.7 million, which was comprised mainly of donations of medical aid, pharmaceuticals, and other forms of charitable aid. 13 In the year 2000, Cuba ranked 184th of 189 importers of U.S. agricultural products. 1 14 The relaxation of sanctions against food and medicines beginning in 2000 found Cuba rising to 138th in 2001 and to 26th in 2004 for U.S. export markets." 5 By 2006, Cuba's ranking had fallen slightly to become the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural exports (exports totaling $328 million). 1 6 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates an ongoing annual loss to all U.S. exporters of approximately $1.2 billion for their inability to trade with Cuba.1 17 The Cuban government estimates that the total direct economic impact caused by the embargo is $86 billion, which includes loss of export earnings, additional costs for import, and a suppression of the growth of the Cuban economy.' 18 However, various economic researchers and the U.S. State Department discount the effect of the embargo and suggest that the Cuban problem is one of lack of hard foreign currency which renders Cuba unable to purchase goods it needs in the open market.' 19

#### 3. **Sanctions strengthened Castro’s regime and decreased improvement in human rights**

Brandon Amash 2012 (Brandon Amash, Deputy Chief Managing Editor at UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs [July 23, 2012](https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/) “EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO” from Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD. <https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/> DOA: 1/30/17) ESM

American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not

#### 4. **The Cuban Embargo prevents Cuba from revolting and becoming a democracy because citizens must put survival first**

Louis Perez 2010 (Louis A. Perez Jr, J. Carlyle Sitterson professor of history and the director of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. September 21, 2010 “Want change in Cuba? End U.S. embargo” from CNN DOA: 1/20/17 <http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/09/20/perez.cuba.embargo/index.html> )ESM

The Cuban embargo can no longer even pretend to be plausible. On the contrary, it has contributed to the very conditions that stifle democracy and human rights there. For 50 years, its brunt has fallen mainly on the Cuban people. This is not by accident. On the contrary, the embargo was designed to impose suffering and hunger on Cubans in the hope that they would rise up and overturn their government. "The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support," the Department of State insisted as early as April 1960, "is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship." The United States tightened the screws in the post-Soviet years with the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act -- measures designed, Sen. Robert Torricelli said, "to wreak havoc on that island." The post-Soviet years were indeed calamitous. Throughout the 1990s, Cubans faced growing scarcities, deteriorating services and increased rationing. Meeting the needs of ordinary life took extraordinary effort. And therein lies the problem that still bedevils U.S. policy today. Far from inspiring the Cuban people to revolution, the embargo keeps them down and distracted. Dire need and urgent want are hardly optimum circumstances for a people to contemplate the benefits of democracy. A people preoccupied with survival have little interest or inclination to bestir themselves in behalf of anything else. In Cuba, routine household errands and chores consume overwhelming amounts of time and energy, day after day: hours in lines at the local grocery store or waiting for public transportation. Cubans in vast numbers choose to emigrate. Others burrow deeper into the black market, struggling to make do and carry on. Many commit suicide. (Cuba has one of the highest suicide rates in the world; in 2000, the latest year for which we have statistics, it was 16.4 per 100,000 people.) A June 2008 survey in The New York Times reported that less than 10 percent of Cubans identified the lack of political freedom as the island's main problem. As one Cuban colleague recently suggested to me: "First necessities, later democracy." The United States should consider a change of policy, one that would offer Cubans relief from the all-consuming ordeal of daily life. Improved material circumstances would allow Cubans to turn their attention to other aspirations. Ending the embargo would also imply respect for the Cuban people, an acknowledgment that they have the vision and vitality to enact needed reforms, and that transition in Cuba, whatever form it may take, is wholly a Cuban affair. A good-faith effort to engage Cuba, moreover, would counter the common perception there that the United States is a threat to its sovereignty. It would deny Cuban leaders the chance to use U.S. policy as pretext to limit public debate and stifle dissent -- all to the good of democracy and human rights. And it would serve the national interest.

#### 5. **US – Cuban relations would foster improvements in human rights**

Brandon Amash 2012 (Brandon Amash, Deputy Chief Managing Editor at UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs [July 23, 2012](https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/) “EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO” from Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD. <https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/> DOA: 1/30/17) ESM

Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.

#### 6. Action in Washington is key to both relations and reform in Cuba

**Julia Sweig and Michael Bustamante, 2013** (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Bustamante, PhD candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. July/August 2013. “Cuba After Communism,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2013-06-11/cuba-after-communism>. Accessed 2 February 2017) ESG

**The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana.** In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. **Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization.**

### AT: Sanctions = Human Rights

#### 1. Sanctions worsen government respect for human rights

**Dursun Peksen, 2009** (Dursun Peksen, Department of Political Science, East Carolina University. January 2009. “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” *The Journal of Peace Research*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27640799.pdf>. Pg 59) ESG

Does economic coercion increase or decrease government respect for human rights in countries targeted with economic sanctions? If economic sanctions weaken the target regime's coercive capacity, human rights violations by the government should be less likely. If, on the contrary, sanctions fail to attenuate the coercive capacity of the target elites and create more economic difficulties and political violence among ordinary citizens, the government will likely commit more human rights violations. Focusing on competing views of why sanctions might improve or detetiotate human rights conditions, this article offers an empirical examination of the effect sanctions have on the physical integrity fights of citizens in target countries. **Utilizing time-series, cross-national data for the period 1981-2000, the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights, including freedom from disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment.** The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. **Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool, even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights.** Finally, multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions.

#### 2. **The Cuban Embargo prevents Cuba from revolting and becoming a democracy because citizens must put survival first**

Louis Perez 2010 (Louis A. Perez Jr, J. Carlyle Sitterson professor of history and the director of the Institute for the Study of the Americas at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. September 21, 2010 “Want change in Cuba? End U.S. embargo” from CNN DOA: 1/20/17 <http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/09/20/perez.cuba.embargo/index.html> )ESM

The Cuban embargo can no longer even pretend to be plausible. On the contrary, it has contributed to the very conditions that stifle democracy and human rights there. For 50 years, its brunt has fallen mainly on the Cuban people. This is not by accident. On the contrary, the embargo was designed to impose suffering and hunger on Cubans in the hope that they would rise up and overturn their government. "The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support," the Department of State insisted as early as April 1960, "is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship." The United States tightened the screws in the post-Soviet years with the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act -- measures designed, Sen. Robert Torricelli said, "to wreak havoc on that island." The post-Soviet years were indeed calamitous. Throughout the 1990s, Cubans faced growing scarcities, deteriorating services and increased rationing. Meeting the needs of ordinary life took extraordinary effort. And therein lies the problem that still bedevils U.S. policy today. Far from inspiring the Cuban people to revolution, the embargo keeps them down and distracted. Dire need and urgent want are hardly optimum circumstances for a people to contemplate the benefits of democracy. A people preoccupied with survival have little interest or inclination to bestir themselves in behalf of anything else. In Cuba, routine household errands and chores consume overwhelming amounts of time and energy, day after day: hours in lines at the local grocery store or waiting for public transportation. Cubans in vast numbers choose to emigrate. Others burrow deeper into the black market, struggling to make do and carry on. Many commit suicide. (Cuba has one of the highest suicide rates in the world; in 2000, the latest year for which we have statistics, it was 16.4 per 100,000 people.) A June 2008 survey in The New York Times reported that less than 10 percent of Cubans identified the lack of political freedom as the island's main problem. As one Cuban colleague recently suggested to me: "First necessities, later democracy." The United States should consider a change of policy, one that would offer Cubans relief from the all-consuming ordeal of daily life. Improved material circumstances would allow Cubans to turn their attention to other aspirations. Ending the embargo would also imply respect for the Cuban people, an acknowledgment that they have the vision and vitality to enact needed reforms, and that transition in Cuba, whatever form it may take, is wholly a Cuban affair. A good-faith effort to engage Cuba, moreover, would counter the common perception there that the United States is a threat to its sovereignty. It would deny Cuban leaders the chance to use U.S. policy as pretext to limit public debate and stifle dissent -- all to the good of democracy and human rights. And it would serve the national interest.

#### 3. **The embargo did nothing to improve human rights, but instead served as a scapegoat for Castro**

Human Rights Watch 2016 (Human Rights Watch. NOVEMBER 26, 2016 “Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Record of Repression” from the Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/26/cuba-fidel-castros-record-repression> DOA: 2/2/17) ESM

Under Fidel Castro, the Cuban government refused to recognize the legitimacy of Cuban human rights organizations, alternative political parties, independent labor unions, or a free press. He also denied international monitors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and international nongovernmental organizations like Human Rights Watch access to the island to investigate human rights conditions. Efforts by the US government during Castro’s rule to press for change in Cuba repeatedly failed. In the 1960s, those efforts took the form of covert military action to unseat Castro, including the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, and multiple botched assassination attempts. President Dwight Eisenhower established the embargo in 1960, which was later expanded by President John F Kennedy and eventually locked in place by the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Also known as “Helms-Burton,” the law prohibits the US president from lifting trade restrictions until Cuba has legalized political activity and made a commitment to free and fair elections. It also prohibits lifting the embargo as long as Fidel or Raúl Castro remains in office. The embargo imposed indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban population as a whole, and has done nothing to improve the situation of human rights in Cuba. Rather than isolating Cuba, the policy isolated the US. Castro proved especially adept at using the embargo to garner sympathy abroad, while at the same time exploiting it as a pretext to repress legitimate efforts to reform Cuba from within, dismissing them as US-driven and -funded initiatives.

### AT: Myanmar Example

#### 1. Don’t let them tout Myanmar as an example of successful sanctions – the current human rights violations are *massive*

**Liam Cochrane, 2017** (Liam Cochrane, South-East Asia correspondent for *ABC News*. February 9th 2017. “Myanmar’s army may have killed ‘thousands’ of Rohingya Muslims,” *ABC News*, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-09/myanmar-may-have-killed-thousands-of-rohingya-muslims/8256344>. Accessed 9 February 2017) ESG

**The Myanmar military may have killed "thousands" of Rohingya Muslims in a campaign of rape and destruction described as ethnic cleansing by the United Nations.** Two unnamed United Nations officials spoke to the Reuters news agency in Bangladesh, where around 70,000 Rohingyas have fled. "The talk until now has been of hundreds of deaths … this is probably an underestimation — we could be looking at thousands," said one of the officials, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity. The officials were interviewed separately and based their estimates on testimony from refugees arriving in Bangladesh over the last four months. The "clearance operation" by the Myanmar military came after a small, newly-formed extremist group called Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement) attacked border posts, killing nine police officers and looting weapons. The Myanmar Government has said about 100 people have been killed in the subsequent crackdown, but independent verification is impossible since the army has sealed off parts of western borderlands. The Rohingyas have lived in Myanmar for generations but are not granted citizenship by the Buddhist-majority Government, and live with apartheid-like restrictions and abject poverty in Rakhine State. **A UN report last week described "devastating cruelty" based on interviews of 204 refugees who fled to Bangladesh.** "One mother recounted how her five-year-old daughter was trying to protect her from rape when a man "took out a long knife and killed her by slitting her throat," the report stated. "In another case, an eight-month-old baby was reportedly killed while his mother was gang-raped by five security officers." **The Myanmar Government has promised to investigate the allegations, however previous dismissals of mounting evidence have largely destroyed its credibility.** An earlier state-sanctioned investigation was led by Rakhine politician Aung Win, who told the BBC Rohingya women were "too dirty" to rape. This week Pope Francis issued a blunt condemnation of the atrocities. "They have been suffering, they are being tortured and killed, simply because they uphold their Muslim faith," Pope Francis said of the Rohingya in his weekly audience at the Vatican. He asked people to pray "for our Rohingya brothers and sisters who are being chased from Myanmar and are fleeing from one place to another because no one wants them". **The country's de facto leader and Nobel Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been silent on the issue, with her office releasing statements calling the allegations of sexual violence from various credible sources "fake rape".** Ms Suu Kyi has no power over the military and risks losing political support if she speaks up for Rohingyas, who are openly disdained by many of Myanmar's Buddhist majority.

### AT: Increases Poverty

#### 1. Cuba’s poverty situation is about as bad as it can get

**Maurice Jourdane 2016**(Maurice Jourdane, writer for the Huffington Post, May 5 2016, “Effect of Cuban Embargo”, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maurice-jourdane/effect-of-cuban-embargo\_b\_7201274.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maurice-jourdane/effect-of-cuban-embargo_b_7201274.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) DOA 1/24/17) MS

Life in Cuba was not as I expected. I learned that there exist two very distinct economies, one for the residents, one for the visitors. Fidel Castro led the revolution movement to equalize economic life in a country with a handful of rich and millions of poor. The Cuban people’s acquisition of property of the wealthy angered rich Cubans who fled to Miami. This led to a U.S. embargo of Cuba and loss to the Cuban people of their primary source of income, exportation of sugar cane. Because Cuba echoed Marx’s political theory of world-wide worker revolutions, **the Soviet Union assisted Cuba to continue its effort to improve the lives of the poor** which have been a success in Cuba’s exceptional health care and education program. **But, by 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved and its assistance to Cuba ended. Loss of Soviet financial support and the continuing U.S. economic embargo resulted in severe poverty. This led to the Cuban leadership encouraging Canadian and European tourism. Since the 1959 revolution, all Cubans received less than $20 a month, barely enough to survive**. (After talking with two university professors about socialism in Cuba, they asked if we could help them get food for their children.) However, with the expansion of tourism, some Cubans were able to increase their income through government-permitted small businesses. They rent rooms in their home (casa particulares), convert their kitchen into small restaurants, sell embroidery table cloths in stalls along the street and even doctors drive the family car, classic 1950s Chevys, as taxi cabs after they go home from work. Amiable and attractive Cubans have learned they can leave their poverty behind by flirting with, dancing with, and talking with visitors who become their companions and lovers. This has resulted in Cuba’s two economies, one for the people who earn $20 a month and the other for companions of tourists who spend more on a single meal or bed than those who are not connected to the tourist economy spend in a month.

#### 2. Lifting the embargo is key to economic prosperity in Cuba

**Julia Sweig and Michael Bustamante, 2013** (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Bustamante, PhD candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. July/August 2013. “Cuba After Communism,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2013-06-11/cuba-after-communism>. Accessed 2 February 2017) ESG

As the migration issue shows, Cuba’s economic and political predicaments cannot be appreciated in isolation from its international context. **The U.S. embargo remains a formidable obstacle to the island’s long-term economic prosperity, and it casts a long shadow over Cuban domestic politics. In the case of Vietnam, it was only after the lifting of the U.S. embargo in 1994 that the economy began to transform in earnest. Given Cuba’s proximity to the United States and its relatively low labor costs, a similar shift in U.S. law could have a profound impact on the island.** In January, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry opened his confirmation hearing by celebrating his close collaboration with Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) in overcoming the legacy of war in order to restore U.S. relations with Vietnam. Yet both Kerry and Obama still seem to defer to the outdated conventional wisdom on Cuba, according to which Washington cannot change its failed policy so long as Cuban Americans in Congress continue to oppose doing so. Reality, however, is already changing. These legislators’ constituents have started voting with their feet and checkbooks, traveling to the island and sending remittances to family there as never before. Several wealthy Cuban Americans, moreover, are now talking directly with Havana about large-scale future investments. As a Democrat who won nearly half of Florida’s Cuban American vote in 2012, Obama is in a better position than any of his predecessors to begin charting an end to the United States’ 50-year-long embargo.

#### 3. Entering the global economy would do wonders for Cubans – the embargo inhibits that

**Michael Totten, 2014** (Michael Totten, contributing editor at *World Affairs* who resided briefly in Cuba before writing this article. March/April 2014. “Letter from Cuba: To Embargo or Not,” *World Affairs*, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/letter-cuba-embargo-or-not>. Accessed 7 February 2017) ESG

**The path forward for Cuban prosperity is obvious: bring as many people as possible into the global economy, and specifically the American economy.** The people want it, clearly. They’re sick to death of being cut off from the greater North American region they had always belonged to before Castro. **Even if they’re exploited and paid a mere sixty-seven cents an hour—and I’d like to see Cubans make much more than that—they’d still earn eight to ten times what they’re getting right now.** Any decent person should want to see political liberalization alongside economic liberalization, but a limited amount of progress can be made without it. The Chinese Communist Party figured out how to do it. China hasn’t caught up to the West, but it’s way ahead of where it was when Mao Zedong micromanaged the country into famine. **But what’s left of the US embargo might put a major crimp in Raúl Castro’s plans to partially capitalize the economy.** Going full China, where Cuba produces a massive amount of merchandise for American consumers, is not an option if the embargo is not lifted first.

#### 4. Internet key to poverty reduction

**Jose Fernandez and Eric Lorber, 2015** (Jose Fernandez, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs and partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and Eric Lorber, formerly of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. February 17th 2015. “Havana Calling: Easing the Embargo Will Open the Cuba Telecom Sector,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2015-02-17/havana-calling>. Accessed 6 February 2017) ESG

It was no accident that Obama targeted Cuban citizens’ access to the Internet and other telecommunications services: Cuba has one of the lowest levels of Internet penetration [4] in the world. According to the International Telecommunication Union [5], only 25 percent of Cubans have access to the Web, and those connections are slow and often monitored by the government. Meanwhile, Cuban telecom penetration rates are the lowest in Latin America: ETECSA, Cuba’s sole telephone company, serves only 18 percent of Cubans [6]—a lower percentage than war-torn Afghanistan. **Increasing Internet access will have economic and political benefits for the Cuban people, as Internet connectivity can drive long-term economic development by facilitating efficient information distribution, lowering transaction costs, and reducing barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. According to the World Bank, there is a 1.3 percent rise in economic growth [7] for every ten-percentage-point increase in a country’s high-speed Internet connections.**

#### 5. **The embargo stops Cuba from improving food security**

JP Faber 2016 (JP Faber, Writer, Editor, Publisher September 5, 2016 “Seeds of Change” from Cuba Trade DOA: 2/5/17 http://www.cubatrademagazine.com/seeds-of-change/) ESM

Devry Boughner Vorwerk is one of those Americans. Vorwerk, who until recently worked in the Cuba Practice at legal powerhouse Akin Gump in Washington, D.C., also chairs the U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba (USACC). “The most compelling case is that the full embargo has been in place for 55 years, and it is not serving its purpose,” says Vorwerk, who attended the Sept. 14 hearing. “That goal was to change the regime.” Instead, says Vorwerk, the embargo has simply hurt the Cuban people. “When you travel to Cuba and go out to the depths of the countryside, and see the conditions that the Cuban citizens are up against—it’s shocking because the sanctions have everything to do this,” she says. “The Cuban people deserve the opportunity to unleash their creativity, to unleash their entrepreneurial spirit, and to engage in commercial relationships with the U.S. and the rest of the world.” And U.S. agriculture is all in favor of it, Vorwerk says. The organization she chairs, USACC, is the largest agriculture coalition in the country—and its more than 120 members, ranging from state agriculture associations to some of the biggest agribusinesses in the world, are pushing to end not only restrictions on U.S. food exports to Cuba, but also the entire embargo. “First and foremost, we—our farmers and agricultural businesses—are basically being told we are not allowed to freely trade with a willing customer,” Vorwerk says. “This is an ethical issue and sets back food security in Cuba.”

### AT: Hurts US Econ

#### **1. Maintaining the embargo costs $1.2 billion, while lifting could make $4.3 billion from new jobs**

Washington Office on Latin America 2016 (Washington Office on Latin America, leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas. 10 MAR 2016 “Factsheet: Growing Support for Expanding U.S.-Cuba Relations” from Washington Office on Latin America. DOA: 2/5/17 https://www.wola.org/analysis/factsheet-growing-support-for-expanding-us-cuba-relations/) ESM

The cost to U.S. exporters of maintaining the embargo has been estimated at around $1.2 billion per year, according to the [U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC).](https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/u.s._chamber_submission_for_the_record_for_usitc_investigation_no._332-552.pdf) Cuba’s per capita rice consumption is the highest in the Western Hemisphere, and rice is seen as a vital part of the Cuban diet. [USITC estimates that](https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4597.pdf), with trade restrictions on Cuba removed, U.S. rice exports to the island could reach $40 to $60 million in two years. According to the head of U.S. Wheat Associates, the United States [could supply 80–90 percent](http://www.agweb.com/mobile/article/us-agriculture-has-big-appetite-for-cuba-trade-associated-press/) of Cuba’s wheat imports if Cuba were to resume purchases of U.S. wheat. Merchandise exports to Cuba could reach $4.3 billion annually if the embargo were lifted, according to a study by the [Peterson Institute for International Economics.](https://www.piie.com/publications/newsreleases/20140505cuba.pdf)

#### **2. Lifting the embargo could create 6,000 new jobs**

Washington Office on Latin America 2016 (Washington Office on Latin America, leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas. 10 MAR 2016 “Factsheet: Growing Support for Expanding U.S.-Cuba Relations” from Washington Office on Latin America. DOA: 2/5/17 https://www.wola.org/analysis/factsheet-growing-support-for-expanding-us-cuba-relations/) ESM

Merchandise exports to Cuba could reach $4.3 billion annually if the embargo were lifted, according to a study by the [Peterson Institute for International Economics.](https://www.piie.com/publications/newsreleases/20140505cuba.pdf) An analysis by [Texas A&M University](http://cnas.tamu.edu/Presentations/SAEA%2011%20Cuba%20Poster%20Web.pdf) found that opening trade with Cuba could create 6,000 new jobs in the United States. The U.S. agricultural industry stands to benefit immensely from scrapping the failed embargo with Cuba, where there is especially strong demand for U.S. grains like rice, wheat and corn, as well as fruit, livestock, and processed food products. The benefits of increased trade and investment in Cuba extend beyond the agricultural sector. It would bring a surge of new business to ports and airports, particularly in southeastern states.

### AT: Castros Suck ☹

#### 1. The death of Fidel Castro creates the opportunity for a move away from the state controlled economy of Cuba

**Siddhartha Mahanta 2016.** (Siddhartha Manhata, associate editor at The Atlantic. December 3, 2016. “The Case for the Cuba Embargo,” *The Atlantic.*https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/robert-menendez-cuba-castro-embargo/509366/ DOA: January 20, 2017.) EL

Now, with **the death of Fidel Castro**, “the intellectual leader of first a revolution and then a dictatorship,” comes “a symbolic end from the leader of the movement that enslaved the Cuban people,” Menendez said. This, in turn, **opens up an opportunity for Washington to steer Cuba away from a state-controlled economy that seems poised to**[**enrich**](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-09-30/want-to-invest-in-cuba-meet-your-partner-castro-s-son-in-law)**members of the Castro family**. “When we do business, allow business to take place and engage with [Cuba], we strengthen the regime that oppresses its people, not the people themselves.” (Menendez is doesn’t see much potential for change under Raul. “Raul Castro has more blood on his hands than Fidel did,” he said at his press conference.)

### AT: Sustainable Ag

#### 1. **Sustainable agriculture has been weak for years**

Dawn King 2012 (Dawn King, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Institute of Brown Environmental Studies. Lecturer in Environment and Society 2012 “Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Agriculture and Energy” from Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies Lehigh University. DOA: 1/17/17 <https://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/kingmdawn.pdf> p.7) ESM

The “special period in peacetime” transformed Cuban agricultural practices toward a more sustainable, organic, low-input system. However, from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, Cuban agricultural outputs began decreasing. Sugar production went from around 8.4 million tons per year in 1990 to a meager 1.5 million tons by 2007-2008 (Elledge 2009). Given the goals of the “special period” to decrease monoculture practices and increase food production, this statistic may not be all that surprising, yet total agricultural production fell 22% from 2000-2005 (Nova-Ganzález 2006) while basic food production declined another 8% from 2007-2008 (Elledge 2009). Further, Cuban dependence on U.S. food imports increased from $4.3 million in purchases in 2001 to $340 million in 2006 (Alvarez 2004, 1; Weissert 2011)1 , and urban agricultural plots decreased from 26,600 in 1997 to 9744 by 2000 (Premat 2005, 154-155)2 . Certainly, the decrease in sugar production is attributable to more than just increasing basic food production. In the early 2000s, the Castro government shut down half of the countries’ 156 sugar mills due to deteriorating infrastructure (Elledge 2009). A lack of national capital has led to many infrastructure problems throughout Cuba, but the disappearance of the sugar industry, once the cause of Cuba’s depleted soil conditions and lack of diverse food production, may lead to even more economic vulnerability for the country. Most of Cuba’s electric cogeneration is coupled with sugar production. A decrease in sugar production equates to a heavier reliance on fossil fuels, something Cuba does not want and cannot afford. With global sugar prices on the rise, partially due to an increase in world demand for sugarcane ethanol, Cuba can use what it learned in the “special period” to produce more sustainable sugarcane. Nicholas Elledge (2009) from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, argues that by “using state of the art technology, a sugar mill can generate over 10 times the electricity needed for its own operation…roughly equivalent to adding 4 power plants to the island” and that “an action as simple as modernizing the existing mills would… represent more than a 50% increase…to the system’s power capacity.” Given Cuba’s dire need for capital and the fact that food production has decreased over the past decade anyway, one means to achieving Cuba’s goal of self-sufficiency could be increasing sugar production. This, of course, requires opening the market up to partial outside investment – an institutional change that may also aid in increasing total food production. Cuba still imports 60% of its food (Robles 2010, 5), and many argue that the centralized economic system must be further decentralized since farmers are desperate to be free of government control. Armando Nova González (2006), a Cuban agricultural economist, argues UBPCs should be granted more autonomy since they are obligated to sell 70% of their produce to the state for below market prices, making the larger rural cooperatives inefficient and unprofitable. The most efficient agricultural practices in Cuba are those that are guided by a strong central government but also have autonomy and economic incentive to produce as much as possible, such as the parceleros operating small urban agricultural (UA) plots. Smaller plots within cities, as mentioned above, have usufruct rights to the land and often produce food for their own consumption. Given the average Cuban spends around 75% of their income on food (Nova González 2006), this makes UA gardens economically viable because gardeners now produce food they otherwise would have to buy and some make a little extra money in markets without being forced to supply government produce for below market cost (Enríquez 2003, 211; Buchmann 2009). However, even larger cooperatives within urban settings that are required to sell to the government, particularly Havana, are more productive and environmentally friendly than their rural counterparts.

#### 2. Much of the land is unusable

**Anne Nelson, November 2016** (Anne Nelson, Fellow at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. November 28th 2016. “The Next Cuban Revolution? What Castro’s Death Means for the Country’s Opening,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1118880>. Accessed 5 February 2017) ESG

And Gaviota is sure to profit further from Cuba’s opening. Havana has opened its doors to foreign investors, who have arrived from Brazil, Canada, France, and Spain, but their interest has been dampened by the requirement of 51 percent Cuban state ownership. In the meantime, China has poured millions into Cuba’s disintegrating infrastructure, especially in telecommunications. **Yet Cuba requires not more investment but an economic transformation that addresses the many sectors that the Castros left to decay and neglect. Cuba's agricultural economy is trapped by the legacy of the sugar monoculture, which destroyed food security and depleted the soil. Its educated populace will need digital skills and broadband access to participate in the global labor market. Basic functions such as advertising, distribution, and transportation of goods will need to be established from the bottom up.**

#### 3. **The embargo stops Cuba from improving food security**

JP Faber 2016 (JP Faber, Writer, Editor, Publisher September 5, 2016 “Seeds of Change” from Cuba Trade DOA: 2/5/17 http://www.cubatrademagazine.com/seeds-of-change/) ESM

Devry Boughner Vorwerk is one of those Americans. Vorwerk, who until recently worked in the Cuba Practice at legal powerhouse Akin Gump in Washington, D.C., also chairs the U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba (USACC). “The most compelling case is that the full embargo has been in place for 55 years, and it is not serving its purpose,” says Vorwerk, who attended the Sept. 14 hearing. “That goal was to change the regime.” Instead, says Vorwerk, the embargo has simply hurt the Cuban people. “When you travel to Cuba and go out to the depths of the countryside, and see the conditions that the Cuban citizens are up against—it’s shocking because the sanctions have everything to do this,” she says. “The Cuban people deserve the opportunity to unleash their creativity, to unleash their entrepreneurial spirit, and to engage in commercial relationships with the U.S. and the rest of the world.” And U.S. agriculture is all in favor of it, Vorwerk says. The organization she chairs, USACC, is the largest agriculture coalition in the country—and its more than 120 members, ranging from state agriculture associations to some of the biggest agribusinesses in the world, are pushing to end not only restrictions on U.S. food exports to Cuba, but also the entire embargo. “First and foremost, we—our farmers and agricultural businesses—are basically being told we are not allowed to freely trade with a willing customer,” Vorwerk says. “This is an ethical issue and sets back food security in Cuba.”

#### 4. Many farmers want to maintain sustainable agriculture but use freedoms to *improve* their practice

**Justine Williams, 2016** (Justine Williams, has MA and is pursuing a PhD in anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, researched and lived in Cuba from 2011-2015. April 5th 2016. “Why US-Cuba Relations Won’t End Cuba’s Alternative Agriculture Movement,” *Food First*, <https://foodfirst.org/why-us-cuba-relations-wont-end-cubas-alternative-agriculture-movement/>. Accessed 6 February 2017) ESG

**Indeed**, the **permaculturists and agroecologists** that I have interviewed **indicate that the future they dream of maintains small-scale farming livelihoods and continued access to socialized systems of medicine and education, with the improvement of easier access to products that will facilitate their current lifestyles. For instance,** one family told me they hoped that **improved US-Cuban relations would mean that more glass jars could be imported into or manufactured in Cuba, so that they could preserve their crops and sell them to local markets. Others mentioned that they would be interested in seeing a limited expansion of agricultural trade so that items like apples – that cannot easily be produced in Cuba’s climate – could become available.** Many of my interviewees were well-versed in the dangers of free trade. Through interactions with food sovereignty and sustainable food activists from Mexico and Central America, they learned about NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and CAFTA (the Central American Free Trade Agreement), and how these “free” trade deals undermine peasant livelihoods and genetic diversity of crops. Some of them insist Cuba will have the wisdom and experience to avoid these pitfalls.

#### 5. Cuba is already getting modern chemicals from Venezuela

**Raj Patel 2017** (Raj Patel, fellow at the Institute for Food and Development Policy. February 11th 2017. “What Cuba Can Teach Us About Food and Climate Change,” *Slate*, <http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2012/04/agro_ecology_lessons_from_cuba_on_agriculture_food_and_climate_change_.html>. Accessed 11 February 2017) ESG

**Yet all is not well in the Cuban food system.** For many, especially government officials, choosing agro-ecology wasn’t a red-blooded Communist decision. It was a practical one. They are quite ready for an industrial-agricultural relapse if the occasion arises. **Recently, they have had an unlikely enabler: Hugo Chávez.** In exchange for the 31,000 Cuban doctors who are treating Venezuelans, **Cuba receives** 100,000 barrels of oil a day, plus **a great deal of chemical fertilizer. As a result, the parts of the country untouched by agro-ecology are starting to spray and sow like it’s the 1980s again.** At odds aren’t just two different farming systems, but two different social approaches. On one hand, in Cuba and around the world, is industrial agriculture. In this top-down, command-and-control model, knowledge, fertilizers, seed, and land are all fed into the black box that is the farm. Wait long enough, and food comes out the other end.

#### 6. Organic farming produces lower yields

**Steven Savage 2015** (Steven Savage, consultant specializing in agricultural technologies for large and small companies, for venture capital groups, and for multi-stakeholder organizations studying sustainability. October 9th 2015. “The Lower Productivity of Organic Farming: A New Analysis And Its Big Implications,” *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensavage/2015/10/09/the-organic-farming-yield-gap/#67ba731c240f>. Accessed 11 Feb 2017) ESG

I compared 2014 survey data from organic growers with overall agricultural yield statistics for that year on a crop by crop, state by state basis. **The picture that emerges is clear - organic yields are mostly lower.** To have raised all U.S. crops as organic in 2014 would have required farming of one hundred nine million more acres of land. That is an area equivalent to all the parkland and wildland areas in the lower 48 states or 1.8 times as much as all the urban land in the nation. As of 2014 the reported acreage of organic cropland only represented 0.44% of the total, but if organic were to expand significantly, its lower land-use-efficiency would become problematic. This is one of several reasons to question the assertion that organic farming is better for the environment. The USDA conducted a detailed survey of organics in 2008 and then again in 2014. Information is collected about the number of farms, the acres of crops harvested, the production from those acres, and the value of what is sold. The USDA also collects similar data every year for agriculture in general and makes it very accessible via Quick Stats. It is interesting that they don’t publish any comparisons of these two data sets as they would be able to make comparisons on a county basis. By working with both USDA data resources I was able to find 370 good comparisons of organic and total data for the same crop in the same state and where the organic represented at least 20 acres. That comparison set covers 80% of US crop acreage. **For 292 of those comparisons, the organic yields were lower (84% on an area basis).** There were 55 comparisons where organic yield was higher, but 89% of the higher yielding organic examples involved hay and silage crops rather than food crops. **The organic yield gap is predominant for row crops, fruit crops and vegetables as can be seen in the graphs below.**

### AT: Cuban Cigars

#### 1. Obama already relaxed restrictions on Cuban cigars – idiots who want to die already can

**Doug Palmer, 2016** (Doug Palmer, senior trade reporter with over 15 years of experience for *Politico*. October 14th 2016. “Obama relaxes trade restrictions with Cuba,” *Politico*, <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-cuba-trade-openings-expanded-229789>. Accessed 9 February 2017) ESG

**The latest move will** authorize collaboration between U.S. and Cuban medical researchers, allow U.S. citizens to provide services to improve Cuba’s infrastructure **and remove dollar limitations on the import of cigar, alcohol and other goods for personal use.** The new policy will also allow personal goods ranging from air conditioners to toothbrushes to be sent directly to Cuban citizens. It also removes caps on the amount of remittances U.S. citizens can send to Cuban relatives, which the administration hopes will create growth in the private sector, an administration official said.

### AT: Cuban Debt

#### 1. Cuba has begun to pay back their debts

**Julia Sweig and Michael Bustamante, 2013** (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Bustamante, PhD candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. July/August 2013. “Cuba After Communism,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2013-06-11/cuba-after-communism>. Accessed 2 February 2017) ESG

From the moment he assumed provisional power in 2006, Raúl Castro has spoken bluntly about Cuba’s predicament. “We reform, or we sink,” he declared in a characteristically short and pointed 2010 national address. Even as Havana sticks to its central political conviction -- namely, that the Communist Party remains the nation’s best defense against more than a century of U.S. interference -- terms such as “decentralization,” “accountability,” and “institutionalization” have become buzzwords, not taboos. Whereas in the 1990s, Havana was willing to permit only limited private enterprise as an emergency measure**, the government now talks openly of ensuring that 50 percent of Cuba’s GDP be in private hands within five years.** Realistic or not, such ambitious goals would have been sacrilege less than ten years ago. **Already, the representation of Cuban small-business owners in the country’s National Assembly and their participation in the annual May Day parade offer evidence of changes under way. The reforms have yielded several modest successes thus far.** After facing sharp liquidity and balance-of-payments crises in the wake of the 2008 global financial meltdown, **Cuba has succeeded in restoring a modicum of financial stability, resuming its debt payments, sharply cutting its imports, and beginning the arduous task of reducing public expenditures.** Several key strategic investments from international partners -- most notably, the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, with the aid of Brazilian capital, to transform it into a major container shipping port -- are moving forward on schedule. **Meanwhile, a new state financial accountability bureau has begun the hard task of weeding out endemic corruption.**

#### 2. Cuba is prioritizing paying back its debts

**Pavel Vidal and Scott Brown, 2015** (Pavel Vidal, former professor at the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana and analyst in the Monetary Policy Division of the Central Bank of Cuba, and Scott Brown, former mission chief for the IMF. July 2015. “Cuba’s Economic Reintegration: Being with the International Financial Instituions,” *Atlantic Council*, <http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba//CUBAIFI_0709_DP.pdf>. Accessed 12 February 2017. Page 5) ESG

**From a macroeconomic perspective, the government has advanced toward reestablishing fiscal and balance of payments equilibriums, maintained low inflation, and promoted a more rational public expenditure. Cuba is now diligently fulfilling international financial commitments and making progress in renegotiating its international debts. Raising the level of aggregate investment is a top priority—in fact, it is the primary objective of the strategy for reviving GDP growth.** A seismic shift is underway in two of the fundamental mechanisms long used to exert control over the Cuban people: restrictions on the freedom of movement and economic activity. Cubans no longer need the permission of the state to leave the island— temporarily or permanently—and the expansion of nonstate activity means that fewer families now depend on the state for their income. Citizens have greater freedom to invest and spend money.

### AT: Brain Drain

#### 1. Brain drain already exists!

**Anne Nelson, November 2016** (Anne Nelson, Fellow at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. November 28th 2016. “The Next Cuban Revolution? What Castro’s Death Means for the Country’s Opening,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1118880>. Accessed 5 February 2017) ESG

**Cuba has had great success in developing its human capital, as shown by its prowess in the visual and performing arts, public health, and education. But a major brain drain threatens to undermine all those achievements.** For decades, Castro has sustained his population on a diet of myth and ideology, even though he was an erratic ideologue himself. He came of age under the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, a corrupt military man who relied on the support of Americans ranging from the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles [7] to the mobster Lucky Luciano. Batista’s brutality sparked widespread opposition. He repressed and co-opted Cuba’s traditional political parties, but student groups were harder to quell. Castro cast himself as the líder máximo throughout, shortchanging the roles of Frank País, a preacher’s son from Santiago, and José Antonio Echeverría, a student at the University of Havana.

#### 2. For example, Brazil has taken many Cuban doctors

**Julia Sweig and Michael Bustamante, 2013** (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Bustamante, PhD candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. July/August 2013. “Cuba After Communism,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2013-06-11/cuba-after-communism>. Accessed 2 February 2017) ESG

Meanwhile, the death of Hugo Chávez, the former Venezuelan president, and the narrow margin in the election of his successor, Nicolás Maduro, have made it clear that Havana has reasons of its own to chart a path forward with the United States. In the last decade or so, Cuba came to depend on Venezuela for large supplies of subsi- dized oil, in exchange for a sizable brigade of Cuban doctors sta ng the Chávez government’s social programs. Political uncertainty in Caracas o ers a potent reminder of the hazards of relying too heavily on any one partner. Havana is already beginning to branch out. In addition to nancing the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, **the Brazilians have extended a line of credit to renovate and expand five airports across the island and have recently signed a deal to hire 6,000 Cuban doctors to fill shortages in Brazil’s rural health coverage.** Even so, in the long run, the United States remains a vital natural market for Cuban products and services.

#### 3. Even now Cuba has huge *internal* brain drain

**Emily Morris, 2017** (Emily Morris, Country Economist for Belize at the Inter-American Development Bank. January 2nd 2017. “Cuba’s Road Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2017-01-02/cubas-road-ahead>. Accessed 6 February 2017) ESG

As a result, Cuba now has a two-currency system. The Cuban peso (CUP) is used for state salaries and for prices within the domestic economy, but can be exchanged at the Cadecas for the “convertible peso” (CUC), which trades at a fixed rate of one CUC to the dollar. Since 2012, the Cadeca rate has been set at 24 CUP per CUC. The effects of the two-currency system are economically, socially, and politically pernicious. The prevalence of low fixed prices for basic goods within the domestic economy means that the CUP is heavily undervalued at the Cadeca rate (that means the spending power of a U.S. dollar greatly increases when converted to CUP—a bus fare, for instance, costs two cents). **The Cadeca rate provides enormous relative privilege to individuals with access to hard currency or CUC, who can enjoy incomes many times greater than the average state salary of 688 CUP per month ($29 at the Cadeca rate). It is therefore easy to understand why the country is facing a serious problem of internal brain drain, in which skilled public-sector workers abandon their careers for relatively unskilled CUC-earning jobs in the private sector.** At the same time as it promotes social divisions, the undervaluation of the CUP chronically drains state resources. Whenever Cubans (or indeed foreigners) pay for fixed-price goods or public services with CUC, they are enjoying a state subsidy, because the cost of producing these goods, measured in hard currency, is greater than the price in CUP paid by consumers. Most of this subsidy, moreover, is not measured in any accounting. Imported goods are also subsidized for those, such as state enterprises, with access to the overvalued CUC, meaning that state companies that use imported inputs to make goods for the domestic market have no incentive to produce efficiently. To deal with this evident distortion, the government has to ration access to foreign exchange for Cuban importers. But this is a cumbersome process that obstructs an enterprise’s ability to respond to changing international market conditions and discourages innovation. The currency system also hampers export growth. For potential exporters, anything using produced using CUP-denominated domestic inputs would struggle to report a profit. Again, the state bureaucracy is obliged to intervene to compensate for the exchange rate and price distortions: central planning provides mechanisms for directing resources to support exporters, but opportunities are still systematically obstructed through the absence of meaningful price signals and the burden of bureaucratic delays. The result is that despite the government’s stated intention to diversify exports and reduce import dependence, exports remain limited to a handful of products, domestic production remains uncompetitive, and the economy remains trapped in a slow-growth trajectory that is highly vulnerable to external shocks.

### AT: Pol Cap 2 Low

#### 1. **There is a lot of public support to end the embargo compared to the past**

Harry Enten 2014 ([Harry Enten](https://fivethirtyeight.com/contributors/harry-enten/), senior political writer and analyst for FiveThirtyEight DEC 17, 2014 “There Won’t Be A Backlash To Ending The Cuba Embargo” from FiveThirtyEight <https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/cuba-embargo-obama-backlash/> DOA: 2/4/17) ESM

Only 48 percent favor the embargo. That compares with 87 percent when the question was first asked 23 years ago and 62 percent in 2000. Although all generations have turned more against the embargo in recent years, opposition to it is especially strong among those who have recently arrived from Cuba. Only 42 percent of those who came to the U.S. in the past 20 years are in favor of keeping it, compared with a majority of those who came before 1994. Cuban-Americans older than 65 favor continuing it; all age groups below 65 oppose it. The American public overall has also grown more favorable to Cuba in recent years. Going back to 1999, Gallup has [always found](http://www.gallup.com/poll/1630/cuba.aspx%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) that more Americans have been in favor of ending the embargo than continuing it. And in Gallup’s 2009 survey, the most recent available, 60 percent of respondents said they favored “re-establishing U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba.” Finally, Cuban-Americans in Florida made up only 6 percent of all Florida voters [in 2012](http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank). That means for the embargo to have much of an electoral impact, there would have to be a big backlash from the Cuban-American community. It doesn’t look like that’s going to happen.

### AT: Need Leverage

#### 1. **The embargo has hindered chances for diplomacy between the US and Cuba**

Arturo Lopez-Levy 2013 (Arturo Lopez-Levy, PhD Josef Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver, Taught courses about American politics, Comparative Politics, Problems of International Relations, and Latin American Politics . December 4, 2013 “The U.S. Cuba Embargo: Making Diplomacy Impossible” from Institute for Poly Studies. DOA: 2/4/17 http://fpif.org/u-s-cuba-embargo-making-diplomacy-impossible/) ESM

Instead of using taxpayer money to pursue real terrorists, the Treasury Department’s [Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)](http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba.pdf%22%20%5Co%20%22Office%20of%20Foreign%20Asset%20Control%20%28OFAC%29%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) has stepped up sanctions on financial transactions with Cuba. The policy has caused a panic among banks, [leaving them unwilling](file://localhost/C/nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/cuba-the-sanctions-juggernaut-9480) to risk servicing the Cuban interest section’s account and leading to the current suspension of diplomatic services. So while Kerry is asking others in the hemisphere to support his demand for political change in Cuba, U.S. policies are working against the economic, social, and political liberalization that has already taken place. In Miami, the suspension of Cuba’s consular services has reverberated throughout the Cuban-American community, where émigrés have long complained about the Cuban government’s own limitations on their travel to the island. Instead of opening political space for Cuban Americans to press for changes in Cuba’s policy toward emigrants and their families, the U.S. crackdown on Cuban financial transactions crowds out constructive dialogue between the island and its diaspora. Several voices from the Cuban-American community, including Congressman Joe Garcia (D-FL), have advocated for a revision of the current policy.

### AT: Tourism = Food Scarcity

#### 1. The problem is not tourism itself – it is governance

**Azam Ahmed 2016.** (Azam Ahmed, journalist for The New York Times. December 8, 2016. “Cuba’s Surge in Tourism Keeps Food Off Residents’ Plates,” The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/world/americas/cuba-fidel-castro-food-tourism.html?_r=0> DOA: February 5, 2017.) EL

But **the** [**record arrival**](http://en.granma.cu/tourism/2016-08-24/cubas-tourist-boom-continues) **of nearly 3.5 million visitors to Cuba last year has caused a surging demand for food,** causing ripple effects that are upsetting the very promise of [Fidel Castro’s Cuba](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/world/americas/fidel-castro-dies.html)**. Tourists are quite literally eating Cuba’s lunch. Thanks in part to the United States embargo, but also to poor planning by the island’s government, goods that Cubans have long relied on are going to** well-heeled **tourists and** the hundreds of **private restaurants** that cater to them, **leading to soaring prices and empty shelves**.

#### 2. The recent rapprochement of the US had provided hope for the alleviation of long term food shortages

**Joe Lamar 2015.** (Joe Lamar, journalist for The Guardian. April 24, 2015. “For Cubans, the struggle to supplement meagre rations is a consuming obsession,” The Guardian. DOA: February 5, 2015.) EL

**Regular shortages of** milk and other such **basic goods underscore the many problems facing Cuba’s centrally planned and US-embargoed economy.** This makes a shopping trip an onerous and often disappointing task – even for those like Ramos who have a little spare cash. “The hardest thing to find here is milk,” says the 75-year-old, who has played for more than 40 years with [Manguaré](http://www.duranproductions.com/HistoriaManguare.html). “Whenever I travel, my suitcases are full of powdered milk when I return.” **Millions of Cubans have faced similar – or worse – problems for decades**, but President Raúl Castro has moved in recent years to change the system with a series of modest market reforms. [**The recent rapprochement with the US**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/17/us-cuba-diplomatic-relations-obama-raul-castro) **– which was the island’s main trading partner before the cold war – is also a source of hope for fuller shop shelves.**

### AT: Kills Venezuela Dependence

#### 1. Venezuela-Cuba ties are weakening fast

**Anatoly Kurmanaev 2016** (Anatoly Kurmanaev, reporter focusing on Venezuela for the *Wall Street Journal*. December 15th 2016. “Cuba and Venezuela’s Ties of Solidarity Fray,” *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-and-venezuelas-ties-of-solidarity-fray-1481675881>. Accessed 9 February 2017) ESG

CIENFUEGOS, Cuba—Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez proclaimed a decade ago that they presided over a single country, combining Cuba’s educated workforce with Venezuela’s oil wealth to challenge U.S. power across Latin America. Now Mr. Castro is gone, three years after Mr. Chávez’s death, and **the union between the two countries, while still strong on paper, is withering away fast. Daily shipments of more than 100,000 barrels of subsidized Venezuelan oil, the lifeblood of Cuba’s economy, have dropped by more than half since 2013, according to oil traders and Cuban refinery workers.** In November, Cuba had to buy oil on the open market for the first time in 12 years as Venezuela’s output plummets.

#### 2. For this reason, Cuba is likely going to need to rely on itself

**Anatoly Kurmanaev 2016** (Anatoly Kurmanaev, reporter focusing on Venezuela for the *Wall Street Journal*. December 15th 2016. “Cuba and Venezuela’s Ties of Solidarity Fray,” *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-and-venezuelas-ties-of-solidarity-fray-1481675881>. Accessed 9 February 2017) ESG

Overall, **Venezuelan exports of crude oil and refined products to Cuba, which generate most of the island’s electricity, fell to about 55,000 barrels a day this year through October from the peak of 115,000 in 2008**, according to data from Petro-Logistics SA, a consulting firm that tracks tanker movements. Traders say **deliveries have fallen further since, though it is unclear by how much. Venezuela’s crude production has fallen so much that state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela SA, known as PDVSA, had to resort to buying oil abroad to meet its minimum obligations to Cuba for December and January**, according to oil traders involved in the deals. After that, **the Cuban government may have to source most of its crude itself.**

#### 3. A decline in the Cuba-Venezuela relationship is best for both countries

**Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, 2014** (Ted Piccone, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and Harold Trinkunas, senior fellow in the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. June 2014. “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End?” *Latin America Initiative: Foreign Policy at Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CubaVenezuela-Alliance-Piccone-Trinkunas.pdf>. Accessed 9 February 2017. Page 8) ESG

The level of assistance that Venezuela provides is a key variable in determining the degree of its mutual dependence with Cuba. Despite the cost of its largesse, the Venezuelan government under Maduro is unlikely to abandon its privileged relationship with Cuba without compelling reasons. The Venezuelan government sees the benefits of intelligence, security, military and health support as too valuable. However, economic and political crises may force Venezuela to limit assistance to Cuba. The likely future scenarios for the relationship are either: i) a status quo level of support from Venezuela, allowing the relationship with Cuba to continue on its current path, ii) a slow decline in Venezuela’s support for Cuba, driven either by political or economic considerations, or iii) a rapid decline in support due to an economic collapse in Venezuela or a change in government. Expanded Venezuelan assistance to Cuba is unlikely. It is doubtful that Venezuela will re-experience the economic boom that financed the initial expansion of the Cuban-Venezuelan relationship under Hugo Chávez; oil prices grew dramatically from $11.20 per barrel on the week he was elected president to a peak of $142 per barrel in 2008.42 Of the remaining scenarios, the present Cuban and Venezuelan administrations are likely to prefer the status quo. However, **a slow decline in Venezuelan support for Cuba, the most probable future scenario, would benefit both populations by reducing the unsustainable dependence on subsidized economic relations, improving the prospects for Venezuela’s democracy, and strengthening the case for economic restructuring and diversification in Cuba.**

#### 4. Cuba-Venezuela interdependence hurts democracy and undermines the United States

**Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, 2014** (Ted Piccone, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and Harold Trinkunas, senior fellow in the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. June 2014. “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End?” *Latin America Initiative: Foreign Policy at Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CubaVenezuela-Alliance-Piccone-Trinkunas.pdf>. Accessed 9 February 2017. Page 11) ESG

For the United States, **Cuban and Venezuelan mutual dependence** on the present terms is also undesirable. It **strengthens the hand of political hardliners in each government. Their preferred policies undermine the prospects for democracy, human rights, and economic development in both Cuba and Venezuela. These are also the factions most interested in undermining both U.S. leadership in the region and the operation of inter-American institutions such as the Democratic Charter and the Inter-American Human Rights Court.** Of all the scenarios presented here, the gradual decline of Venezuelan assistance to Cuba is most likely to produce a positive outcome for all countries. It would most probably strengthen the hand of reformers in Cuba, which would lead to further liberalization of the economy and growth of the middle class. It would increase Venezuela’s prospects for democratic stability and rationalize its government expenditures in ways that provide greater benefit to its citizens.

### AT: Cuba-China Relations

#### 1. **Although the fear of China’s influence is popular, the US remains the largest power in the region even with trade diversification**

**Gregory Weeks 2014.** (Gregory Weeks , Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. September 4, 2016. “Is the US 'losing' Latin America?,” Aljazeera. DOA: February 9, 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/us-losing-latin-america-20149411713646156.html?utm=from_old_mobile>) EL

It should not be about China. **A popular argument is that China [is trading more](http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/08/09/4279681/andres-oppenheimer-obama-yes-to.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) with Latin America, thus decreasing the share of US trade, at times with dire forecasts about the trend continuing indefinitely.** The conclusion is that the United States [will not feel so at home in its "backyard"](http://fpif.org/china-trades-latin-america/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank). **Yet the US remains the [largest single source](http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/8/52978/ForeignDirectInvestment2013.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) of foreign direct investment into Latin America. The economic presence of the US is still huge even with trade diversification**. **Most of the anxiety centres** not on the present, but on **a hypothetical future where China pressures Latin America to block US initiatives**, such as in the United Nations. **There's no evidence of that now, and it requires believing that Latin American independence is automatically robbed by other large countries.** There is also a significant language barrier that does not exist with the US.

### AT: Hurts Cred

#### 1. Removing the embargo would be a show of good faith – it would significantly bolster US soft power and credibility – bolsters multilateral efforts in Latin America and globally.

Shifter, Georgetown University foreign service professor, 2015

[Michael, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2015, “Shift in US-Cuba Policy: Implications for US-Latin American Relations” <https://books.google.com/books?id=j2U3CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=cuban+embargo+and+soft+power+and+credibility&source=bl&ots=E9s5J3BTdT&sig=9y-TGl-GMbv4yTWH-S8SJX3McKg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjVmtKzhoTSAhUDTSYKHYZsDxUQ6AEIIjAB#v=onepage&q=cuban%20embargo%20and%20soft%20power%20and%20credibility&f=false>, p.104-106, accessed 2-9-17, TAP]

Soft power and US engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean. In a broader sense, the reopening of relationships between the United States and Cuba represents an opportunity for a hemispheric restart. In short, a thaw is less about bringing new dynamics to regional cooperation but rather removing obstacles to it. The Cuban embargo has been and continues to be immensely unpopular across Latin America and the Caribbean, and an attempt to lift it (as President Obama announced in his State of the Union address on January 20, 2015) will almost certainly bolster US soft power and engagement efforts in the region. While Washington’s policy on Cuba was once widely supported across Latin American governments, prior to the announcement it had come to serve as a much-derided symbol of US Cold-War era aggression. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Latin American countries have become progressively more vocal in their criticisms of the embargo and other attempts by Washington to diplomatically isolate the Cuban regime.10 At the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, Latin American and Caribbean presidents made it clear that they would not attend the next such gathering if Cuba did not participate. The presidents forced the issue that united Latin America in its opposition to the United States and that had long been a major irritant in inter-American relations. The Organization of American States (OAS) also suffered a considerable decline in regional legitimacy in no small measure because of its historically fraught, US-driven antagonism towards Cuba. Although Cuba’s suspension from membership was lifted – conditions notwithstanding – at a 2000 General Assembly meeting in Honduras, the question of whether or not it will rejoin is still outstanding.11 That decision now rests with Cuba. In either outcome, the rapprochement between Washington and Cuba should create a more propitious climate for effective, multilateral diplomacy within the OAS. Latin America’s opposition to the US-Cuba policy over the past decade helps account, in part, for the rise in various regional groupings that exclude the United States and Canada. The most relevant of these is probably the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC), launched in 2011, and representing all countries of the region. Last year Cuba presided over the group and hosted its annual meeting in Havana. No matter how much progress is made on US-Cuban relations, such mechanisms are likely to persist, reflecting a strong tradition of regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean.12 Nonetheless, the possibility of a renewed relationship with Cuba offers the United States a chance at reengagement. The soft power credibility that the United States stands to gain – or rather, regain – is immense, regardless of the eventual specifics. Without the punitive policy, so long associated with Washington, in place, the anti-US rhetoric and claims of quasi-imperialism often heard across the region lose considerable resonance. As a result, US diplomatic goals from trade deals to human rights could conceivably become easier to negotiate. If nothing else, the restoration of diplomatic ties, moves towards normalization, and eventual lifting of the embargo would serve as a powerful show of good faith towards the rest of the region. To be sure, some hard-line leaders will doubtless find other reasons to attack the United States, but at least with more moderate governments, the Cuba initiative will likely yield some diplomatic dividends – especially regarding broader multilateral efforts in Latin America.

### AT: Offshore Drilling

#### 1. Nobody wants to drill with Cuba – lifting the embargo won’t cause an environmental disaster

**Julianne Geiger, 2016** (Julianne Geiger, researcher for Divergente LLC consulting firm. February 12th 2016. “In Spite of its Vast Oil Reserves, Cuba Fails to Woo Investors,” *Oil Price*, <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/In-Spite-Of-Its-Vast-Oil-Reserves-Cuba-Fails-To-Woo-Investors.html>. Accessed 9 February 2017) ESG

What it has to offer is total undiscovered technically recoverable reserves of 4.6 billion barrels of crude oil, 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 900 million barrels of natural gas liquids, based on 2004 estimates by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The country has traditionally—and very steadily—produced about 50,000 barrels of liquids per day, most from the coastal reserve areas east of Havana. But it’s not all about the reserves. **It’s about past failures, an anticipated investor-unfriendly environment, and a lack of oil and gas infrastructure projects. Deepwater drilling hasn’t been successful.** In the spring of 2015, Cuba noted that it had billions of barrels of oil in its Gulf of Mexico deepwaters, but there have been no commercial discoveries offshore as a result of exploratory drilling by Spain’s Repsol and Russia’s Zarubezhneft. So the promise now is being touted in the onshore and shallow water arenas. **Infrastructure plans that would make oil and gas exploration and production more feasible have languished in project purgatory. A 2010 bid won by China to build a refinery and upgrade a crude oil import terminal has stalled. And a key pipeline hooking the Cienfuegos refinery to the producing fields of Matanzas hasn’t been operable since the early 1990s. What is really keeping investors away is the fact that Cuba has made it clear that** while there is the potential for joint ventures in exploration and production, **this will be a state-run game for the most part. Any major deal will have majority Cuban ownership.** Independent MEO Australia oil company may disagree, because it’s moving in on Cuba’s Block 9, where oil has been recovered in the past, certain that there is a potential for “significant onshore prospects”, according to UPI. But it’s basing that on wells drilled from the 1970s to the early 1990s. But MEO Australia is the exception rather than the rule. Operating costs as low as $9 per barrel have MEO convinced that this is the one of the best new venues to play. And while those are impressive operating costs when oil is just under $30 per barrel, it still hasn’t been enough to prompt a rush on Cuba. Embargo lifting doesn’t immediately teleport Cuba from the Cold War era into the 21st century. Lifting the embargo is only the first of many doors Cuba will have to pass through to make this a key venue for foreign investors in oil and gas, and the question is whether Cuba—which is desperate to develop its oil and gas—will be willing to shed some state control to do so.

#### 2. Most explorations come up empty – investors will want to drill elsewhere

**Paul Guzzo, 2015** (Paul Guzzo, staff writer for *Tampa Bay Online*. July 23rd 2015. “Cuba may drill for oil using U.S. equipment,” *Tampa Bay Online*, <http://www.tbo.com/news/cuba/cuba-embargos-end-could-lead-to-drilling-in-gulf-20150722/>. Accessed 10 Feb 2017) ESG

\*\*\*Note: Pinon = Jorge Pinon, director of the Latin America and Caribbean Energy Program at the University of Texas.

“The Cuban tourism industry earns over $2 billion a year,” Piñon said. “Are they going to put that at risk to drill for oil that has yet to be found?” **By some estimates, 5 billion to 20 billion barrels of oil and 8 billion cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath Cuban waters. Yet four past explorations have come up dry.** “So that is your big question: Will someone want to risk the over $200 million it will cost to for an exploratory rig?” Piñon said. “**I’m not sure someone will drill in Cuba** in the next year **considering there are better options right now.” Mexico is one example**, he said. He predicts drilling in Cuba is two to three years off.

#### 3. Obama’s policies could already allow this – its preferable to using other equipment

**Paul Guzzo, 2015** (Paul Guzzo, staff writer for *Tampa Bay Online*. July 23rd 2015. “Cuba may drill for oil using U.S. equipment,” *Tampa Bay Online*, <http://www.tbo.com/news/cuba/cuba-embargos-end-could-lead-to-drilling-in-gulf-20150722/>. Accessed 10 Feb 2017) ESG

The U.S. embargo has stymied Cuba’s search for oil off its shores. And so it should, say critics of the ruling communist regime. An oil windfall would boost Cuba’s economy and provide energy self-sufficiency, strengthening one-party rule there. But new policies announced in January by President Barack Obama may quietly pave the way for change, raising the prospect of offshore drilling near Florida waters even as state leaders work to prohibit drilling here**. At issue is whether Cuba gets access to U.S. drilling equipment, regarded as the best and safest in the world** — and if so, how much and which parts. Answers to those questions take on greater urgency with Cuba’s announcement that it intends to resume exploring for oil by 2016. Under the current embargo, equipment made with only a small percentage of U.S. content cannot be sold to Cuba or used to benefit its economy. Oil drilling rigs fall under the rule. Other countries honor the embargo by refraining from selling Cuba any parts made in the U.S. to avoid falling from favor with a major trading partner. But one new **Obama policy calls for the U.S. Department of Commerce to license for export to Cuba any items deemed necessary for protection of U.S. coastal environments. Some leaders in environmental protection and the petroleum industry read this to include those portions of oil drilling rigs that prevent spills.**

#### 4. Biodiversity loss is entirely survivable.

**Roger Sedjo, 2000.** (Roger Sedjo, Fellow for Resources for the Future. 2000. *Conserving Nature’s Biodiversity*, p 114)

But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of “how much.” Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece **of biodiversity** (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible**. The global ecosystem can function with “somewhat more” or “somewhat less” biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times**. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The “value question” is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth’s life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity

### AT: FDI Evil

#### 1. FDI improves pay for its workers since foreign firms pay more

**Watipaso Mkandawire et al, 2004** (Watipaso Mkandawire, Coordinator of the Regional Investment Agency Unit within the COMESA Secretariat, Michael Mortimore, Chief of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Dirk Willem te Velde, Research Fellow in the International Economic Development Group at the Overseas Development Institute in London. 2004. “Foreign Direct Investment; Income Inequality and Poverty,” *Overseas Development Institute,* <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7987.pdf>.Accessed 11 February 2017. Page 29) ESG

The macro evidence shows that FDI does not tend to reduce wage inequality but may increase it. However, it should be emphasised that the evidence available so far is thin and that most research covers wage inequality in the manufacturing sector and only over a recent period. We have not found any published macro-evidence for specific Latin American countries other than Mexico. This chapter extends the analysis in te Velde and Morrissey (2004) for East Asia to Latin America countries, where evidence is scarce. **At the micro level, the empirical evidence shows that foreign-owned firms pay more to their workers than local firms, even after controlling for size, location and industry.** An important observation for the current chapter is that studies that distinguish between average wages in two separate skill categories find that wage differentials are greater for non-production (relatively skilled) workers than for production (less skilled) workers. Table 2.6 shows that this applies to Mexico, but skilled workers are also the main beneficiaries of such pay premia in Indonesian manufacturing (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2001); Thai manufacturing (Matsuoka, 2002) and Chinese manufacturing (Zhao, 2001). Such static wage differentials would ceteris paribus raise wage inequality.

### AT: Hurts Puerto Rican Tourism

#### 1. Tourism already increasing DESPITE the embargo.

Florida Business Review, 7-27-16

[“What's the Future of Hospitality and Tourism in Cuba as US Embargo Loosens?” Lexis Nexis, accessed 2-7-17, TAP]

Already, the number of tourists vacationing in Cuba has increased substantially over the past year. According to the Cuban government, the total number tourists in 2015 was more than 3.52 million, representing a 17 percent increase from 2014. U.S. citizens or residents comprised 450,000 of the total, up 77 percent from the year before. While tourism per se remains illegal under the embargo, the Obama administration has been promoting purposeful travel by allowing Americans to visit the island under 12 exemptions to the travel ban, which include cultural exchanges, medical and religious missions, and "people-to-people" visits. Although travel restrictions are loosening, many Americans continue to see the island as the "forbidden fruit." In their minds, Cuba has been frozen in time, and they want to get a glimpse of the country before it starts to change. The number of American tourists is expected to further increase later this year when eight airlines begin to offer 20 daily nonstop flights between American and Cuban cities. Cruise lines are cautiously expanding trips to Cuba as well. Cuban officials have set lofty goals in order to cash in on this potential influx of tourists and their dollars. Over the next decade, they have set out to build scores of new hotels and to more than double the number of hotel rooms in the country. Foreign hospitality companies will be crucial to this endeavor. Their investment generally takes the form of a joint venture with the Cuban government as the majority partner. These companies have a management contract for a hotel that is owned by the Cuban government. Earlier this month, Starwood Hotels and Resorts opened Four Points Havana, the first U.S. hotel in Cuba in almost 60 years and one of the few to offer Wi-Fi throughout the premises. Transformation of the Cuban hospitality and tourism industry will not be limited to traditional hotels. Already, there is large demand in Havana and the beach cities for private rooms, lodges and bed-and-breakfasts. You should expect an increase in the number of such privately owned accommodations as well as paladares, which are privately and often family-owned restaurants. Tourists tend to flock to these private establishments instead of their government-run counterparts in search of real interaction with the Cuban people.

#### 2. Lifting the embargo would help Puerto Rico

**Matt Schiavenza, 2015** (Matt Schiavenza, Senior Content Manager for Asia Society, is a contributor to the Atlantic. September 22nd 2015. “Puerto Rico vs Cuba: A rivalry in the making?” *Fortune*, <http://fortune.com/2015/09/22/puerto-rico-cuba-tourism/>. Accessed 11 February 2017) ESG

Still, he argues that **the U.S. commonwealth can nonetheless profit from the disruption. “Puerto Rican firms can provide services to the Cuban tourism industry,”** he said. **“Puerto Rico is pretty sophisticated in terms of technology.”** How Puerto Rico could benefit **According to the International Monetary Fund, the rest of the Caribbean should benefit, too—a 2008 study published by the institution estimated that unfettered U.S. access to Cuba would increase tourism by 11% region-wide. Puerto Rico tourism experts** told Miami’s WPLG TV that they **hope to attract Europeans who have been visiting Cuba, and they want to partner with Cuba on marketing campaigns.** "I see it as a great opportunity for Puerto Rico," said Ingrid Rocafort, the executive director of the Puerto Rico Tourism Company.

### AT: Hurts Puerto Rican Manufacturing, etc

#### 1. Lifting the embargo could create a mutually beneficial Cuba-Puerto Rico investment corridor

**Dante Disparte, 2016** (Dante Alighieri Disparte, founder and CEO of Risk Cooperative, an innovative strategy and risk advisory firm. August 13th 2016. “Puerto Rico-Cuba Investment Corridor,” *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/08/13/puerto-rico-cuba-investment-corridor/>. Accessed 11 February 2017) ESG

Where Havana is filled with hope and some trepidation about a brightening future, one island over, in the equally neglected U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, persistent storm clouds of economic collapse and massive outmigration linger on the horizon. **A bright path for both Cuba and Puerto Rico can be paved by linking the U.S.-Cuba normalization process to Puerto Rico’s turnaround.** The policy prescriptions to achieve this combined vision can not only leverage the natural cultural, linguistic and economic union between these compatriot islands, they may very well represent an all ship’s rising proposition garnering support in D.C., Havana and San Juan. To begin with, the overarching issue remains the economic sanctions that have been levied against Cuba since 1960. This crippling economic regime has largely left the Cuban economy in the 1950s. While nostalgic charm may make for good tourism, it hardly translates into market-readiness for Cuba to frame its competitiveness in a hyper-connected global economy. **To address the asset, talent and infrastructure gap that persist in Cuba, every dollar of foreign direct investment (FDI) must come with meaningful skills-transfer and connections that move the Cuban workforce up the value chain and the Cuban economy into the 21st century. Who better to shepherd this development than their Puerto Rican brethren.** Concretely, as the U.S. vacillates about how and when to fully lift economic sanctions, Puerto Rico and Puerto Rican registered companies that largely hire a local workforce should be granted an immediate waiver from the sanctions regime. Not only will this promote and accelerate natural trade and investment linkages, it will also attract inward investment into Puerto Rico, possibly spurring the repatriation of the more than 400,000 island residents who left during the last 10 years. **Focused investments in the energy sector, financial and professional services, information technology, along with a broad array of industrial projects can promote meaningful linkages between the two islands creating much needed economic development, job creation and, critically, trust building.** It would also create much needed regulatory clarity on how prospective U.S. investors can enter the Cuban economy, without facing punitive measures or other risks in Cuba or the U.S. This Puerto Rico-Cuba Investment Corridor (PRCIC) can be launched with a 5 to 8 year horizon, during which time the Cuban’s control the inward flow of U.S. investments, all channeled and with the meaningful involvement of trusted Puerto Rican counterparts. U.S. mainland companies and existing Puerto Rican firms and investors wishing to take advantage of this corridor can also leverage a number of pre-existing investment promotion incentives and taxation advantages that are enshrined in Puerto Rican law. This includes, Acts 20 and 22 granting reduced income taxes for qualified individuals who take up residence on the island. Additionally, Puerto Rico boasts of a fledgling offshore financial center, which is the perfect staging ground for the much needed participation of the international banking and insurance sectors throughout the Caribbean basin. Puerto Rico’s development will not come at Cuba’s expense. On the contrary, business and investment stemming from the PRCIC would be received on the Cuban side with a series of preferential terms and conditions that benefit the Cubans in a shared manner. This would include the allowance of joint-ventures, cross shareholding and meaningful skills and technology transfer, including in potentially sensitive areas.

#### 2. Lifting the embargo helps Puerto Rican manufacturing

**Julia Sagebien and Ramon Coto-Ojeda 1999** (Julia Sagebien, Associate Professor at the School of Business Administration at Dalhousie University, and Ramon Coto-Ojeda, ‎Managing Partner at Coto & Associates in Puerto Rico. “PIRATES OR PARTNERS? CUBA-PUERTO RICO COMMERCIAL RELATIONS IN A POST-EMBARGO SCENARIO,” *Cuba in Transition*, <http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v09-sagebien.pdf>. Accessed 11 Feb 2017. Page 87-88) ESG

**Cuba is not expected to present a threat to Puerto Rican manufacturers, but rather a number of opportunities. The basic logic that will determine how large Puerto Rican-based U.S.-owned firms respond to these opportunities will most likely be that of globalized production, not of inter-island competition or cooperation.** Moreover, the future of this sector in Puerto Rico once Section 936 benefits are completely phased out is unknown. What is clear, however, is that **as Puerto Rican manufacturing specializes ever more on high tech products and wages rise, less skilled production is likely to be transferred out of Puerto Rico.** But transferred where? **Cuba will be only one manufacturing relocation contender** among many others. Thus the strategy to secure a strong Puerto Rico-Cuba axis would require a twofold approach: (1) the Puerto Rican government must devise a new set of corporate incentives that can retain and increase the large U.S.-owned manufacturing base in Puerto Rico itself; and (2) Puerto Rico-based managers must begin to proactively develop plans for natural manufacturing linkages with Cuba that can convince stateside upper management of the merits of the expansion. **One of the natural linkage sectors is likely to be pharmaceuticals. The combination of Puerto Rico expertise in manufacturing, and more recently in research and development, combined with Cuba’s strong base in biotechnology could provide opportunities for joint development and production of pharmaceuticals.**

### AT: IMF/WB Bad

#### 1. Cuba joining the IMF and World Bank would be beneficial to its regrowth

**Eileen Sosin, 2015** (Eileen Sosin, journalism reporting on Cuban economic news for *Progreso Weekly.* August 4th 2015. “What if Cuba returns to the IMG and the World Bank?” *Progreso Weekly*, <http://progresoweekly.us/what-if-cuba-returns-to-the-imf-and-the-world-bank/>. Accessed 12 February 2017) ESG

What does Cuba gain with membership in the IMF and the WB? Torres’ answer is quite convincing. “Cuba is rightly proud of its social achievements, but ensuring that they remain sustainable will require that its economy continues to grow. For that, Cuba will need to pursue and deepen the economic reforms that it has started, address its technological obsolescence, and upgrade its public infrastructure. All of this requires raising capital.” Vidal and Brown argue that **the multilateral financial institutions would help to propel foreign investment and would represent “a vote of international confidence” in the Cuban economy. In other words, they would contribute to a greater global insertion and an integration into valuable world networks. The perception of “risk country” would be reduced, and there could be a drop in the interest rates that Cuba pays for foreign financing, which would soften the balance-of-payment restrictions and favor economic growth. Technical training and assistance, improvement in communications, access to the Internet, agriculture, tourism, standards of quality and market experience would be other potential advantages**, according to the Atlantic Council report.

#### 2. Cuba joining the WB and IMF serves their interests as well

**Hector Torres, 2015** (Hector Torres, former Executive Director of the IMF and a former Chair of the G-24 Bureau in Washington, D.C. July 2nd 2015. “Should Cuba re-join the IMF?” *World Economic Forum*, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/should-cuba-re-join-the-imf/>. Accessed 12 February 2017) ESG

**The World Bank and the IMF would also benefit from admitting Cuba** – which currently is the most conspicuous exception to both institutions’ near-universal membership. Given that combating poverty is its overarching goal**, the World Bank should be interested in helping Cuba preserve its social achievements and supporting its transition from a centralized planned economy to one with an entrepreneurial private sector. For the IMF, Cuba’s membership would fit squarely into its mission of facilitating international trade and eliminating the foreign-exchange restrictions that hamper it.** Cuba may or may not be politically ready to join the international financial institutions, but it clearly meets the conditions needed to apply for accession to the IMF. Cuba is a “country,” with the attributes of statehood as defined by international law. Its government should have no problem demonstrating that it is willing and able to fulfill the obligations of membership contained in the IMF’s articles of agreement. Indeed, Cuba was one of the IMF’s founding members, before voluntarily leaving the organization in 1964. The process for accession is relatively simple. As soon as Cuba files an application, the IMF will send a technical mission to gather the necessary data and prepare a paper describing the economy and recommending a quota of voting rights and contributions. Determining Cuba’s quota is the crux of the accession process, and the country will need to choose an executive director to represent its interests during that discussion. Theoretically, Cuba could choose any of the current 24 executive directors, though it is likely to prefer one from Latin America.

#### 3. Cuba’s economic growth is of interest to everyone – spills over

**Richard Feinberg 2011** (Richard Feinberg, professor of international political economy at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. November 2011. “Reaching Out: Cuba’s New Economy and the International Response,” *Latin America Initiative at Brookings,* <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf>.Accessed 12 February 2017. Page 69) ESG

**Cuban economic activity has spillover effects on other economies in the Caribbean region that are members; one obvious example is Cuban tourism**, in fact the subject of an article published in 2010 by IMF staff. 85 As part of the IMF’s responsibilities for regional surveillance, awareness of the Cuban economy is part of the broader equation. • **Cuba’s trade, investment, exchange-rate, and external debt policies—the bread-and-butter issues of the IMF—are of considerable interest to other member states and their business enterprises engaged with the Cuban economy, including both the traditional European powers and the emerging market economies.** • Cuban economic and social policies are topics of some interest to social scientists and policymakers in member states and the Bretton Woods institutions ought to be sufficiently informed so as to be able to provide judgments and advice to members. 86 • At some point, Cuba will cease to be the lone outlier and will rejoin the Bretton Woods agencies, and staff should be adequately prepared, ready to describe the economy as it is and to prescribe policy options for consideration by Cuban authorities and the IFI’s managements and executive boards. Internal analyses found that one reason the IFIs did not perform optimally in Russia in the early 1990s was their admitted failure to have staffed up on time. The Fund and Bank should not make the same serious mistake with Cuba. The current casual watching briefs fall well short of the in-depth professional knowledge that the institutions will need when the day finally arrives.

## AFF EXTENSIONS

### EXT: Need Aff for Internet

#### 1. The embargo may prevent companies from fully investing in telecommunications

**Jose Fernandez and Eric Lorber, 2015** (Jose Fernandez, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs and partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and Eric Lorber, formerly of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. February 17th 2015. “Havana Calling: Easing the Embargo Will Open the Cuba Telecom Sector,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2015-02-17/havana-calling>. Accessed 6 February 2017) ESG

Cuba’s underserved and largely untapped communications market is an enticing opportunity for U.S. companies. The U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments’ regulatory amendments expand upon previous permissions granted to U.S. companies that provide telecommunications and Internet services, as well as those working on Cuban infrastructure projects. The revised rules clarify old ambiguities [8]: former regulations prohibited any investment in the Cuban domestic telecommunications network but also authorized the provision of services that linked third-party nations to the island. Owing partly to the difficulty of determining when third-party services were terminated within Cuba, U.S. telecom and IT companies avoided the country altogether. **Although telecommunications companies are now permitted to conduct transactions that establish mechanisms for commercial telecom services on the island, a patchwork of other U.S. restrictions remains in place. Several decades’ worth of overlapping sanctions may still deter some U.S. firms from entering Cuban markets in the first place, as doing business in a country subject to some sanctions—even if said sanctions are unrelated to the sector in question—increases the risk of running afoul of U.S. law, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in fines.**

#### 2. Internet key to poverty reduction

**Jose Fernandez and Eric Lorber, 2015** (Jose Fernandez, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs and partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and Eric Lorber, formerly of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. February 17th 2015. “Havana Calling: Easing the Embargo Will Open the Cuba Telecom Sector,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2015-02-17/havana-calling>. Accessed 6 February 2017) ESG

It was no accident that Obama targeted Cuban citizens’ access to the Internet and other telecommunications services: Cuba has one of the lowest levels of Internet penetration [4] in the world. According to the International Telecommunication Union [5], only 25 percent of Cubans have access to the Web, and those connections are slow and often monitored by the government. Meanwhile, Cuban telecom penetration rates are the lowest in Latin America: ETECSA, Cuba’s sole telephone company, serves only 18 percent of Cubans [6]—a lower percentage than war-torn Afghanistan. **Increasing Internet access will have economic and political benefits for the Cuban people, as Internet connectivity can drive long-term economic development by facilitating efficient information distribution, lowering transaction costs, and reducing barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. According to the World Bank, there is a 1.3 percent rise in economic growth [7] for every ten-percentage-point increase in a country’s high-speed Internet connections.**

### EXT: Latin American Relations

#### 1. Lifting the embargo is key to US-Latin American relations

**Julia Sweig and Michael Bustamante, 2013** (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Michael Bustamante, PhD candidate in Latin American history at Yale University. July/August 2013. “Cuba After Communism,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cuba/2013-06-11/cuba-after-communism>. Accessed 2 February 2017) ESG

**The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba.** For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America’s unanimous disapproval of Washington’s position on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana’s diplomatic isolation, **U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era, contributing to Washington’s own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington.** The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the Americas. But **the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S.–Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy.**

### EXT: Demo Promo

#### 1. Latin American liberalism is backsliding – US is key

Michael Allen, 2009 (Michael Allen, editor of *Democracy Digest*. 2009. “Latin America: democracy on a high, but backsliding seen in authoritarian drift,” *Democracy Digest*, <http://www.demdigest.org/latin-america-democracy-on-a-high-but-backsliding-seen-in-authoritarian-drift/>) ESG

Latin America faces a “revelatory moment”, in the wake of the Honduran constitutional crisis, [writes Jorge G. Castañeda](http://www.tnr.com/magazine-issue/december-30-2009). The episode confirmed a “remarkable—and certainly transformative fact”: that the United States “is no longer willing, or perhaps even able, to select who governs from Tegucigalpa, or anywhere else in the region for that matter.” He  is concerned that a U.S. retreat from the Monroe Doctrine entails a passivity that could undermine the hard-won consensus on the “need to anchor Latin America’s democracy in a strong, intrusive, and detailed legal framework,” while resisting the threat of [populist authoritarianism](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64753/richard-feinberg/latin-americas-struggle-for-democracy-constructing-democratic-go).  Support for democracy is at its highest level since the late 1990s, according to [the latest Latinobarómetro poll](http://www.economist.com/world/americas/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=15080535) taken in 18 countries and published by The Economist. The survey reveals growing trust in democratic institutions, an increase in governments’ legitimacy, and greater social liberalism. But concerns remain about the robustness of Latin America’s democratic institutions. “Backsliding is always a threat**,**” Secretary of State [Hillary Clinton said this week](http://www.demdigest.net/blog/democracy-assistance/principled-pragmatism-will-govern-us-approach-to-promoting-democracy-human-rights-and-development.html), citing developments in “the Americas where we are worried about leaders who have seized property, trampled rights, and abused justice to enhance personal rule.” Three U.N. human rights experts this week accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of creating a climate of fear following the arrest last week of a woman judge who ordered the conditional release of imprisoned banker Eligio Cedeno. “There was a time that judges who failed to follow Chávez’s instructions risked being removed from the bench,” [said Robert Amsterdam](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/15/chavez-venezuela-judge-cedeno), one of Cedeño’s lawyers. “Judicial independence had been on life support, but sadly, it is now officially dead.” Alberto Arteaga Sanchez, a criminal law professor at Venezuela’s Central University, condemned the “unacceptable pressure being put on the judicial branch by the executive branch.” “It’s a case that demonstrates the weakness of Venezuela’s democratic system,” he said. It is imperative that the U.S. remain actively engaged with the institutions that buttress the emerging but fragile democratic consensus, Castañeda argues, including the [American Convention on Human Rights](http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html) and the [Inter-American Democratic Charter](http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm). These structures have great potential, but they have yet to address some key questions.

#### 2. Absent democracy, States can commit violent genocide

Palam Akhavan 2011 (Palam Akhavan, Former Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecuter, 2011, “PREVENTING GENOCIDE: MEASURING SUCCESS BY WHAT DOES NOT HAPPEN,” Criminal law forum, Vol. 22 Issue 1-2 pg. 1-30 //MV)

First, States in which elites espouse exclusionary ideologies or ideologies that justify actions to restrict, persecute or eliminate groups were more susceptible to such killings**.** Second, regimes without democratic or quasi-democratic institutional checks on executive power had an increased potential for geno-/politicide. Harff noted that many observers have identified ethnic and religious cleavages as preconditions for ethnic conflict. Indeed, her study found that violent ethnic conflict was a precursor to 24 or 37 of the geno-/ politicides, and that risks of geno-/politicide were two and a half times more likely in countries where the political elite was based mainly or entirely on an ethnic minority’.29 A State’s economic and development conditions also had an impact on levels of stability and violence. Harff noted that social scientists have shown that low economic development, measured by a State’s infant mortality rate, produced conditions conductive to armed conflict and regime change. A State’s international relations also significantly influenced its risk of geno-/politicide – [C]ountries with low trade openness had two and a half times greater odds of having State failures culminate in geno-/politicide’.30 Lastly, elites and armed forces became accustomed to mass killings as a political strategy, explaining why ten of the States were settings for multiple genocides or politicides over the period of study.

### EXT: Internet Probability

#### 1. Gonna happen – Diaz Canel

**Anne Nelson, November 2016** (Anne Nelson, Fellow at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. November 28th 2016. “The Next Cuban Revolution? What Castro’s Death Means for the Country’s Opening,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1118880>. Accessed 5 February 2017) ESG

Castro’s death raises the stakes in the debate over such changes. **Raúl Castro**, now 84, **has said that he intends to step down in 2018. The heir apparent is currently First Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel.** The genial 56-year-old official, trained as an electrical engineer and by necessity a Communist Party stalwart, belongs to a new generation of technocrats. They represent both a generational and a cultural shift from the old revolutionary guard, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of information technology. Cuba’s internal war against “ideological diversionism” has required total state control of all print and broadcast media. The aging military officers of the FAR have taken a dim view of the global digital revolution, regarding it as an American Trojan horse meant to destroy the revolution. As a result, Cuba lags far behind in Internet access, e-commerce, and other foundational technologies of the modern global economy. **Díaz-Canel**, by contrast, **has described information technology as economically “essential.” Over the past three years, Cuba has taken major steps to** create WiFi hot spots, **legalize private computers and cell phones, and bring down the prohibitive pricing imposed by ETECSA, the state telecommunications agency.**

#### 2. Miguel wants internet freedom for his people

**Daniel Trotta 2016** (U.S. general news correspondent for Reuters in New York. Previously posted in Cuba, Spain, Mexico and Nicaragua. NOV. 30, 2016. “The man next in line for Cuba's presidency wants to modernize the country,” Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-castro-diaz-canel-idUSKBN13P0FC> DOA: 2/11/17) CDY

HAVANA (Reuters) - **With revolutionary leader Fidel Castro dead and his brother Raul vowing to step down as president in 15 months, it will soon be the hour of heir apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel, an advocate for modernizing Cuba's state-run media and abysmal internet access.** Fidel Castro died last Friday aged 90 and the 85- year-old Raul Castro, who took over as president in 2008, says he will step down in February 2018 at the end of his second five-year term. Diaz-Canel was elevated to the position of first vice- president in 2013, putting him next in line for the presidency. At 56, he is a relative youngster in the ruling Communist Party's leadership and will need to appeal to younger generations if Cuban communism is to thrive beyond the Castro brothers. **He has already established press and internet freedom as signature concerns, a potentially disruptive change in a one-party state that has monopolized the media for nearly 58 years.**

### EXT: Growth Good

#### 1. Economic growth promotes long term democracy

**Daniel Treisman, 2014** (Daniel Treisman, professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. December 29th 2014. “Economic development promotes democracy, but there’s a catch,” *The Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/29/economic-development-promotes-democracy-but-theres-a-catch/?utm_term=.dfb8b4d3bae8>. Accessed 11 Feb 2017) ESG

Within the tenure of a given dictator such as Franco, increases in income do not prompt democratization. However, in periods in which the leader changed, the link between income and political liberalization is strong. **Since leaders always change if you wait long enough, the income-democracy relationship emerges more strongly in statistical analysis in the medium run—periods of 10-20 years—than if one looks at annual or even five-year blocks of time.** Franco is not the only dictator to have held back the tide for a while. **The following table lists all 21 leaders of non-democracies between 1875 and 2004 under whom GDP per capita topped $6,000 (at 1990 prices). These dictators were no fans of free government**: on average, political institutions became slightly less democratic under them. **Yet the pressures they bottled up exploded** after they departed**. In three quarters of the cases, the decade after the dictator left office saw political liberalization – and often a dramatic breakthrough. On average, these countries’ Polity scores jumped over that decade by more than eight points on the 21-point scale.**