



St. Dootton Ranch

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Debate

A2 Discourse Anuraag (done)

The role of the Ballot is to vote for the team that debates better.

Prefer our ROTB for six reasons.

First, ROTB that focuses on [insert their argument] is inherently self serving. Anyone can say racism is bad or sexism is bad, but that doesn't mean they deserve the ballot. Saying that you should vote for the debater who discusses these issues causes a race to the bottom and makes it impossible to affirm.

[insert their argument] won't be solved by discussion. It'll be solved through policy.

Second, Discourse fails because of competitive incentives.

You switch sides every round, meaning no one always reads what they believe in, they read what is most likely to win, which makes discourse ineffective. You don't make structural violence arguments on the other side which means you don't really care.

Third, if [insert their argument] dialogue is the most important thing to them, they shouldn't have abided by speech times, they should've given a 10 minute speech, showing their passion for the argument. But because they chose to stay within speech times, that means they view access to the ballot as the most important priority, which means the ballot should just be a fair referendum on the winner of the debate.

Fourth, they could have engaged with the debate and explained why the impact of structural violence outweighs, but instead they chose to frame it as if the only way to access the ballot is to read impacts to [insert their argument], which 1) makes the debate inaccessible for us but 2) undermines the discussion we attempt to have by running arguments about the harms of [insert your case impacts]. Instead of explaining to you why the impact comes first in the round and in any discussion of policy, they're telling you the simple act of reading the impact should be the only requirement to winning the ballot.

Fifth, By calling for the judges to vote them up to promote this strategy as "viable" at NDF, which people look towards as a model for the rest of the year, they're calling for the debate populace as a whole, which is an overall body of individuals of privilege, to commodify the struggles of minorities and those exploited just to win a ballot.

Sixth, Alcoff of Hunter College writes that discourse from the ivory tower where a first world person speaks for someone in the third world A: reinscribes the “hierarchy of civilizations” and also B: reduces the third world to objects to be championed from afar.

More Answers

1. The con commoditizes suffering in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy – this is worse than the violence itself

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [l'autre monde]. **we must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.** The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. *The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground* . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶

Baudrillard argues that the suffering of the global south is treated as a resource to be exploited by white liberals in the west, which ultimately reproduces neocolonialism. This commodification of suffering reduces all human experience into a lifeless product to be traded for the ballot.

2. Turn -- Patting ourselves on the back for speaking about the marginalized prevents us from solving oppression

Rowe 2003 (Aimee Carrillo Rowe, Associate Professor at Mike Curb College of Arts, Media, and Communication, "Women Writing Borders, Borders Writing Women", *In Our Voices: Essays in Culture, Ethnicity, and Communication*, 2003, PDF. DOA: April 19th 2018) TG

These questions drive this essay. I want to focus on voice—the struggle over the ability to speak and represent one's self or one's social group or both. *Although increasingly spaces are becoming available in which marginalized voices can be heard, such as Our Voices, the mere existence of these voices within hegemonic spaces is not necessarily evidence of systemic change. In fact, the inclusion of our marginalized voices risks becoming tokenized as proof that a given "we" (the academy, communication studies, U.S. society) are "beyond" racist, sexist, homophobic elitism.* I do not wish to dispute the fact that contributors to this and similar alternative, oppositional collections experience various forms of violent discrimination. Nor do I wish to compare oppressions. However, I do want to point to the way in which my own privilege as the author of this text functions, to explore the implications of my speech act, and to explore some possible ways of addressing inequality in the realm of representation.

Klare '11 concludes...

Karl Klare, George J. & Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished University Professor, Northeastern University School of Law, "Teaching Local 1330—Reflections on Critical Legal Pedagogy," ('11). School of Law Faculty Publications. Paper 167. <http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002528>

By now it has begun to dawn that one of the subjects of this class session is how lawyers translate their moral intuitions and sense of justice into legal arguments. Most beginning students have found themselves in the situation of wanting to express their moral intuitions in the form of legal arguments but of feeling powerless to do so. A common attitude of Northeastern students is that a lawyer cannot turn moral and political convictions into legal arguments in the context of case-litigation. **If you are interested in directly pursuing a moral and/or political agenda, at a minimum you need to take up legislative and policy work,** and more likely you need to leave the law altogether and take up grass roots organizing instead. I insist that we keep the focus on litigation for this class period. After the straw poll, I ask the students to simulate the role of Staughton Lynd's legal assistants and to assume that the court has just definitively rejected the claims based on contract, promissory estoppel, and the notion of a community property right. However, they should also assume, counter-factually, that Judge Lambros stayed dismissal of the suit for ten days to give plaintiffs one last opportunity to come up with a theory. I charge the students with the task of making a convincing common law argument, supported by respectable legal authority, that the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial relief. Put another way, I ask the students to prove that Judge Lambros was mistaken—that he was legally wrong—when he concluded that there was no basis in existing law to vindicate the workers' and community's rights. In some classroom exercises, I permit students to select the side for which they wish to argue, but I do not allow that in this session. All students are asked to simulate the role of plaintiffs' counsel and to make the best arguments they can—either because they actually believe such arguments and/or because in their *simulated role* they are fulfilling their ethical duty to provide zealous representation. ... If "what the defendant did was unjust" is all we have to offer, **lawyers bring no added value to the table**

We're the only side that creates change that helps people, they do nothing.

3. Even if you do accept their framing of discourse, whichever side offers the best *solution* to the problem facing [X] should win the round. This is because this discourse is inherently the *most productive discourse in the round*, it doesn't just talk about their *problems* but it identifies the best available solution, which is the only way we can understand how to reduce that suffering in the first place. Thus, if we win the flow on this issue and thus prove that we offer the best solution, we instantly win the round.

Crossfire line of questioning:

1. What does the ballot do? It advances us further in the tournament. Why is that important? Because the further we go in the tournament the more discourse we spark. So the only reason you want the ballot is to continue the discourse? So that's the only reason you want to go further in the tournament?

a. If yes: they say they only want to win to perpetuate discourse. If that's true then they would drop everything on the flow and go for this. They might say they need to win on the flow to better insure they go further, but that means that they themselves don't think that this discourse is reason enough to vote for them.

b. If no: They want to win the round to they can win the tournament. That is their goal. They are using the abuse of these immigrants to win themselves a debate round. That is dehumanizing

Alcoff 91, Hunter College and CUNY philosophy professor, 1991 (Linda Martin, "The Problem of Speaking for Others" originally published in Cultural Critique, No. 20, Winter, 1991-1992, cut from www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html)

*gender modified

Looking merely at the content of a set of claims without looking at their effects cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of it, and this is partly because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention to the discursive arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any given discursive event. For example, in a situation where a well-meaning First world person is speaking for a person or group in the Third world, the very discursive arrangement may reinscribe the "hierarchy of civilizations" view where the U. S. lands squarely at the top. This effect occurs because the speaker is positioned as authoritative and empowered, as the knowledgeable subject, while the group in the Third World is reduced, merely because of the structure of the speaking practice, to an object and victim that must be championed from afar. Though the speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, one of the effects of her [their] discourse is to reenforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser-privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard.¹⁸ This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize discourse, as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on.

A2 Disclosure Pranav (done)

Counterinterp--

[] only schools with established programs i.e. been competitive for 5 or more years have to disclose. Our program has only been competitive for 2 years

Reasons to Prefer--

1. We're more educational
 - a. Solves the offense about lit and prep; the most successful arguments are fully disclosed for everyone to research
 - b. Solves their in depth education warrants by establishing a scope of arguments and topic understanding without the harms of mandating disclosure for disadvantaged schools
2. We're fairer
 - a. Mandatory disclosure hurts small schools because of large school prep outs. There's no reciprocal advantage to disclosure for small schools; the counterinterp solves back for competitive small schools, too
 - b. Status quo proves that disclosure happens without mandating
3. They're worse for education
 - a. The only true in-round abuse that's concrete is the shift away from topic specific education caused by them running theory
4. They're worse for fairness
 - a. Time skew-- they've uniquely destroyed the time and strategy of our constructive by making it all useless once the round turns to theory; that's also in-round abuse and the best link into fairness

They don't access education--

1. Small scope- the impact decreases the longer we debate the topic
2. PF education was fine until now; there's nothing uniquely damaging about not disclosing since we haven't been doing it since PF was created
3. None of the arguments we're reading are squirrely or brand new; we have clash every round... that supercharges the in round loss of education

They don't access fairness--

1. Disclosure is only a check against parametricizing affs because available neg ground shifts depending on the aff advocacy; this is why disclosure is a norm in progressive LD and Policy. Their ground-based internal links aren't applicable

2. Link defense-- actual abuse would be delinking everything because we weren't actually abiding by the resolution. They pull the trigger before trying to engage us.

Disad to their interp

1. Fostering a mandatory disclosure culture like in national circuit LD is bad for several reasons
 - a. Disadvantages small schools to prep outs by large squads
 - b. Decreases access to activity by small schools or schools with less funding for their program
 - c. Shifts the activity away from its lay roots to a highly rigid, formulaic style where everyone is just spreading through blocks they wrote to the case the weekend before

Theory in PF is bad

Our argument is that PF provides a unique type of education in the debate context; one of analysis and clash driven by the sole sources of offense being the direct interaction of contention-level arguments grounded by the core tenet of accessibility. You prefer this type of education over their generic "debate good" education because you could access that in LD or Policy. They undermine this better education in four ways.

1. Shifts the intent of the format-- laypeople don't understand theory
2. Kills topic specific education-- instead of debating about the resolution, we're debating about theory
3. Traditionality-- PF is structured to allow maximum flexibility in adaptation; theory debates decrease this skill and punish lay debaters
4. Forces line by line debate that trades off with big picture analysis that differentiates PF from other events

Conditional Theory is bad

1. Strat Skew-- By destroying all of our constructive ground and shifting the terms of the debate to theory, we're already a whole speech behind
2. Time Skew-- We start a whole 4 minutes behind you because the round is now about theory, not the arguments we staked out in our first speech
3. Race to the bottom-- multiple conditional arguments means they're going to default to the more undercovered argument instead of the stronger one, meaning clash decreases, turning their link into education
4. It's not reciprocal-- we're stuck with the one advocacy we started the round with; all the advantages they accrue through their condo good theory only applies to them

Don't vote

1. PF resolutions are inherently predictable-- everyone is linking into the same impacts... don't punish us because they don't want to debate content
2. Doesn't set a precedent-- dropping to theory doesn't change anything; we're not going to start disclosing, we're just going to get better about debating theory

3. Potential abuse isn't a voter--
 - a. Punishes us for behaviors we don't engage in
 - b. Infinitely regressive-- extremes of any behavior could potentially turn abusive in the future
 - c. It's unfair for them to garner links off of content not in the round; it shifts our ability to attack further down the link chain where it's harder to win

Fairness is the determinant voter

1. No one wants to play an unfair game; you can't get to your education impacts because we're beating you to the link
2. Fairness directly controls the education debate; the strat and time skew arguments above alone show how education concretely declined in this round
3. We have plenty of places to get education without the competitive aspect, like school. Fair, competitive debate is a unique incentive that your education arguments don't take into account

A2 Paraphrase Carter (Done)

Counter-interpretation: Public Forum teams may paraphrase cards if they do not misconstrue the claim of the author.

4 Standards:

1. Solves all abuse: as long as our paraphrasing does not misconstrue the evidence, that solves back for all the potential abuse coming from paraphrasing. The judge can call for the card after the round for proof. This puts the burden of proof onto you: you have to prove how I have misconstrued a card in order for you to get access to any of the theoretical offense from your shell, or I don't link into the abuse. Means I solve better for fairness impacts.
2. Substantive Clash: being able to paraphrase is uniquely good for clash in PF. Three warrants:
 - a. Paraphrasing means we can be more efficient because we can get through the argument of a card faster rather than having to read the card itself. Cutting down cards doesn't solve because we still have to use the language of the author, which might be clunky and slow. Means carding is uniquely bad because teams will be incentivized to cut out parts of the card to be more efficient, which leads to a higher chance of misconstruing of evidence.
 - b. Paraphrasing means we can fit the argument of the card better under our contention, so this makes it easier for you and the judge to understand arguments and adjudicate the round. Leads to better substantive clash because all of our offense is clear rather than having esoteric cards in which the author's argument is unclear.

- c. Cutting cards down is slow because you have to bold and underline certain parts of the card and then shrink the size of the other text. This means we waste time cutting down cards rather than actually making more arguments and finding more cards.

Substantive clash controls the internal link to education because it's the whole point of public forum debate: to have a substantive debate. Education from the topic is more relevant to our lives than theoretical education, and we uniquely need substantive education in PF because the topic changes every month. This is also a reason to reject your shell on face because you are trying to avoid engagement. You could have just engaged in the case and responded to my arguments. Means you're more abusive.

3. Norms: it's an engrained norm in PF to paraphrase cards: means your shell is uniquely bad for PF because many people paraphrase. Shows that you're just reading this shell to get access to the ballot, which is a reason for the judge to drop the shell on face. Go read this shell in LD, you tryhard.
4. Your shell is infinitely regressive: saying we shouldn't paraphrase because it can lead to misconstruing evidence is nonunique because cutting cards also means we manipulate the wording of the card. Even directly quoting would be bad because things can be taken out of context. Means there will always be abuse in your world too, so your shell is nonunique.

AND, if I win offense to a counterinterp, vote for me. 6 reasons

1. Reciprocity: my opponent can win on either theory or substance, while I need to win defense on theory and then win substance to win, forcing me to do twice as much work to win. Reciprocity key to fairness since it ensures equal access to the ballot.
2. Time-Skew: 2 warrants
 - a. Using time on theory puts me at a disadvantage on the substantive debate, thus skewing the round before we even get to substance, meaning that the ONLY fair place to vote is on theory and
 - b. It takes very little time to spew out a million abuse stories, but I have to spend lots of time beating theory back since it's a game over issue for me, RVIs rectify this. Time is key since it constrains our ability to debate and win
3. Without the threat of losing on RVIs, debaters can run theory against any argument they choose, creating a proliferation of bad theory that detracts from substantive education.
4. If I'm winning a counter-interp then that means I'm the better debater on the highest layer of the flow, theory, so don't force me to also have to be the better substantive debater.
5. If I win my counter-interp, then that shows that my opponent's interp was attempting to exclude my legitimate, fair, arguments. To arbitrarily exclude certain arguments is the definition of an abusive practice and precludes legitimate ground which is key to fairness because it dictates my ability to form arguments and win. This also links to education because it proves my opponent was preventing substantive, educational ground on the topic.
6. Competing interps justifies an RVI because if the goal of theory is creating the best norms for debate then you should vote me up for supporting the better interp.

EU Links

A2: BRI Needs EU Funding **anuraag (done)**

1. Nonunique; Leng '19 of the SCMP finds that BRI loans from Chinese banks are at a record high, approving double the projects approved during the same period in the last year. Clearly, the funding gap is not posing an issue for China.
2. Finnerty '18 of Fordham University: Major European banks such as the European Central Bank are undercapitalized and are 280 billion dollars short of the basic capital standards needed for a bank. EU literally has no money to spend on BRI.
3. Joining BRI isn't the same thing as funding it – no country just writes China a blank check for the BRI. For example, Italy joined the BRI recently, but they just signed a MOU, with no guarantee of any action. Make them prove to you with evidence what exactly the EU does.
4. Baker Mackenzie Principal '17 explains that the project isn't just funded by China domestically, but rather, by 2030, over 50 percent of the funding will come directly from foreign governments, private capital, and multilateral banks.
 - a. This can be seen in the status quo, as the CIR in 2019 writes that EU private banks are already getting involved with BRI, signing billion dollar deals. The money from EU and outside parties are going to come regardless.
5. China can go further into debt to continue financing the Belt and Road Initiative. Smith '19 of Heritage explains that Xi Jinping has staked his entire political career on the success of the BRI, so he'll try to fund it at all costs. No way CH lets BRI die.
6. Dialog Chino '19 finds that the BRI recently expanded to Latin America, which shows the program is still expanding. Uniq controls the link. They don't need EU funding if they're able to expand rn.
7. Ciurtin indicts:
 - a. Ciurtin assumes that there's a 3 trillion-dollar funding gap, but Hillman '18 of the Washington Post finds that estimates that say BRI will cost trillions of dollars count **all**

investment between China and partner countries. When you account for the investment specifically because of the BRI, the cost is much lower.

- b. The evidence says that European funding is needed for a path to Europe to emerge, not to complete the BRI in other countries. EU funding not needed for developing countries.
8. **Fitch Analytics Firm '19** writes that the current trade dispute between the U.S. and China has provided an incentive for China to expand to BRI to diversify away from its reliance on the U.S. for trade, which means China will amp up spending in either world. They find China inc. funding rn
 - a. For this reason **BRN in 2019** writes that 98% of senior executives expect investment in BRI to increase in the next year, as projects move away from requiring a partner and towards individual project investment.
9. Anything they say about “current Chinese conditions” is terrible. **The NSR in 2019** writes that all current issues are relatively minor when compared with the overall trend, and thus concluding that current forecasts of Chinese investment increasing to about 60 billion correct.
10. The EU can't agree on much these days, on things like immigration and bailing out Greece. No warrant on how they're going to agree on funding a massive project like BRI, no funding. In fact, even if single states want to fund, BRI is so divisive that even within parties there is total disagreement, meaning there won't be any funds going.

Leng of July 2019 (Sidney Leng, journalist who's reported for Foreign Policy Magazine as well as National Public Radio, "Is Italy willing to defy the US and EU to join the belt and road?," South China Morning Post,
<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/3002657/cash-strapped-italy-eyes-chinas-belt-and-road> July 15, 2019, DOA 7/17/19

There has been a resurgence of borrowing from banks and by local governments since the start of this year, speeding up and boosting loan growth and bond issuance. **Total new loans in the first six months of 2019 reached 9.67 trillion yuan (US\$1.4 billion), a record high for Chinese banks, up from** 9.03 trillion yuan in the same period **a year earlier**, data from the central bank show. To boost infrastructure spending by the local governments, which have seen their revenues plunge as a result of tax cuts and sluggish growth, the central government has permitted proceeds from local government special purpose bonds to be used as initial capital for certain significant revenue-generating infrastructure projects. The quota for local government special purpose bonds, the proceeds of which must be used to [fund infrastructure projects](#), has reached 2.15 trillion yuan (US\$312 billion) so far in 2019, up 59 per cent, according to a report by Moody's. At the end of May, 860 billion yuan (US\$125 billion), or 40 per cent, of the year's quota had been issued, Moody's said. **The National Development and Reform Commission approved** 94 fixed-asset investment projects during the first half of 2019, worth a total of 471.5 billion yuan (US\$69 billion), spokeswoman Meng Wei said on Tuesday. The amount of investment was almost **double the** 260.3 billion yuan of the 102 **projects approved during the same period last year.**

European Banks are undercapitalized

Finnerty, John. “Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It.” Fordham University. 2018//SK

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jacf.12262>

responsible for stress testing the major European banks— and 2016. These **simulations detected large capital shortfalls at major European banks, shortfalls that were in fact greater in 2016 than in 2014, even without taking**

account of the additional negative effect of Brexit. Indeed, these independent stress tests suggested that, as of July 2016, **Europe’s largest banks would collectively have needed to raise more than \$280 billion to meet the capital standards required by the U.S. Federal Reserve for the eight U.S. banks that it deems to be systematically important**—and they would have needed more than **\$650 billion to be able to survive a financial crisis as severe as that of 2007-2009.**¹ These implied capital shortfalls, which are said to reflect mainly the condition of banks in five European nations—Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—are thus much larger, and of far greater concern, than the \$29 billion capital shortfall estimated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2014.² To the extent it succeeds in addressing the undercapitalization of the largest European banks, the ECB is in a position to reassure investors and taxpayers, reduce banks’ cost of capital, and reduce the risk of a systemic crisis. The latest bank failures in the Eurozone, and the ways in which they have been resolved, have prompted litigation by security holders who have suffered losses, as well as growing anxiety among taxpayers about the cost of future resolutions. Moreover, along with considerable concern about growth in the concentration of banking markets resulting from the merger of distressed with still solvent banks, the implementation of new European regulations favoring “bail-ins” and “punitive” rescues by bank competitors over taxpayer-funded “bailouts” has proven to be very controversial. Requiring undercapitalized banks to raise capital before the onset of financial distress is the key to eliminating the need for such extreme measures.

China not funding BRI alone

Jia, Stanley. “Belt & Road: Opportunity & Risk.” Baker McKenzie. 2017//SK

https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2017/10/belt-road/baker_mckenzie_belt_road_report_2017.pdf?la=en
Nevertheless, China’s influence over the region’s supply chain will grow. Chinese equipment manufacturers have enjoyed increased exports to BRI countries supporting both infrastructure-related projects and more general demand. Chinese developers are building industrial parks, from Malaysia to Ethiopia, as Chinese manufacturers look to lower cost jurisdictions for production, avoid high import tariffs, and meet local content requirements. **China will not fully fund BRI. By 2030, we expect that over half of BRI-related projects will be funded by private capital, multilateral banks and foreign governments.** “Notwithstanding the tightened regulations, strategic deals and transactions by SOEs have continued and we’ll likely see more in Southeast Asia, where deal sizes tend to be relatively small and often fly under the threshold of the capital controls. Nonetheless, both buyers and sellers must remain vigilant towards the latest legal and regulatory developments to ensure that deals aren’t jeopardised by a change in a regulatory stipulation.”

CIR 2019

<https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2019-issue-no-14/european-responses-to-bri-an-overdue-assessment>

is reported that their efforts are bearing fruit, with dozens of successful financing deals publicized that are in some way BRI related. For instance, in **2017, Deutsche Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the China Development Bank (CDB), agreeing to cooperate with the aim of supporting BRI projects worth \$3 billion.** CDB and Deutsche Bank also agreed to establish a joint team in order to further cooperate on projects that promote BRI.

In addition, **Standard Chartered Bank has reported positively on its BRI engagement and listed 20 financing deals linked to BRI that it has won in the past years.** Standard Chartered is also part of the Green Belt and Road Investor Alliance, which was founded in London in 2017 by an international investor group that aims to support sustainable and investable projects along the BRI. The group will focus on creating tools for the efficient crowding-in of private capital to projects that also involve public capital.

Most recently, **the level of engagement of EU-based entities in financing BRI projects has increased even more.** On the occasion of the latest Belt and Road International Forum, held in Beijing in April 2019, several new cooperation agreements were signed. For instance, Standard Chartered Bank entered into an agreement with the China Export-Import Bank, one of the most active supporters of BRI in terms of lending volume. The two banks will support third-party market cooperation under BRI. The EBRD has also reinforced its BRI engagement and joined several cooperation formats, the most prominent being

the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance, which was established by eight international financial institutions, including the EIB.

Expanding to Latin America

Liévano, Andrés. “China’s Belt and Road advances in Latin America’s Andean region.” Dialogo Chino. 2019//SK

<https://dialogochino.net/28021-chinas-belt-and-road-advances-in-latin-americas-andean-region/>

Since Panama [joined](#) in 2017, **Latin America has been linked to this multibillion-dollar network of infrastructure projects that also facilitates access to new sources of financing.** However, until now, the four largest economies in the region – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia – have been reluctant to join, amid vocal US [criticisms](#) about indebtedness. The arrival of Peru – Latin America’s sixth largest economy and one that has had a Free Trade Agreement with China for a decade – could boost the BRI in Andean region. Peru: new addition resurrects the railway **Date signed:** April 2019 **What they said:** “The act of signing this memorandum of understanding is the beginning of a cooperation model that China has offered to the world that I think is interesting and that allows expanding the bonds of cooperation” (Vice President [Mercedes Aráoz](#)) **Flagship projects:** Although two years ago Peru ruled it out because of costs, President Martín Vizcarra confirmed during his April trip to China that he is interested in reviving the interoceanic railroad with Brazil and Bolivia, which [could cost up to US\\$60 billion](#). The turnaround is due in part to new studies that estimate the Peruvian part would cost [US\\$7.500 billion](#), one fifth of the original quote. Vizcarra [said](#): “we are interested, Bolivia is even more interested, (...) but let’s see, because between the two of them a third partner is missing in order to carry out the project.” **Other projects underway, which will be rebranded under the BRI, include the construction of a mega port in Chancay and another in Ilo, as well as being the second largest foreign investor in the mining sector, owning the Las Bambas copper mine in Toromocho and the Marcona iron ore mine.**

Only \$400 billion so far

Hillman, Jonathan. “Five myths about China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” The Washington Post. 5/31/19//SSK

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision for putting Beijing at the center of global economic affairs is about forging new connections of all kinds, from building infrastructure to strengthening cultural ties. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers lofty promises of “win-win” investments that have persuaded some [126 countries](#) to sign on. But critics caution that the project, which began in 2013, stokes corruption, harms the environment, creates financial dependencies and extends Chinese military power. **The BRI is ambiguous by design, which has birthed several myths. “China’s \$8 trillion construction programme ‘riskiest environmental project in history,’” [warned](#) a British headline last year. The New York Times has [called](#) it “China’s \$1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order.”** Exact figures are elusive, because the BRI is loosely defined, ever-expanding and open-ended. Many estimates reflect China’s promises for infrastructure investment, only a fraction of which has been delivered so far. **According to data from the American Enterprise Institute, China had spent roughly \$400 billion as of mid-2018. The highest estimates tend to count all trade and investment between China and partner countries, mistakenly attributing it all to the BRI, or they conflate the BRI’s size with the world’s needs for infrastructure. Compared with those needs, the BRI doesn’t look so big.** Asia alone requires [\\$26 trillion](#) for infrastructure by 2030 to maintain growth and adapt to climate change, according to the Asian Development Bank. That provides an opportunity for countries, including the [United States](#), to shape and benefit from the world’s infrastructure boom. Officials in Beijing have allowed BRI estimates to balloon for [political gains](#), but Chinese lending has been [declining](#) and faces headwinds. The country’s foreign reserves have [dropped](#) since the BRI was announced, meaning it has less money to dole out but more partners to please — potentially a recipe for disappointment. China’s “efforts to build ports around the world aren’t because they want to be good shipbuilders and stewards of waterways, but rather they have a state national security element to each and every one of them,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has [warned](#). “It is a concerted, strategic endeavor by China to gain a foothold and displace the United States and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region,” the head of U.S. Pacific Command [said](#) last year.

A2 BRI Legitimacy

Smith, Jeff. “Is This the End of Belt and Road, or Just the Beginning?” Heritage. 2019//SK
<https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-end-belt-and-road-or-just-the-beginning>

Leaders from [Australia](#) and several [European countries](#) soon began voicing their own concerns—about the lack of transparency, accountability, and financial sustainability, while highlighting the risks of corruption and debt traps. Rumbblings of discontent then spread to the developing world. Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and several African countries began scrutinizing, amending, or canceling BRI deals. Meanwhile, the U.S., India, and some European countries had official endorsements of the BRI [scrubbed](#) from UN resolutions. **Still, for two key reasons, BRI is here to stay. First, the BRI, enshrined in the Chinese constitution in 2017, carries the personal signature of President Xi Jinping and is intimately tied to his legacy, making BRI too Xi to fail. Second, as Italy recently demonstrated, the allure of billions of dollars in investments is still too tempting for many countries to disavow the BRI. This will remain true so long as China offers competitive packages of capital, expertise, and willingness to finance large infrastructure projects in risky and distressed markets.** To be sure, the backlash to the BRI has spurred greater awareness of the pitfalls it presents, as well as a greater appetite for devoting more attention and resources toward overseas connectivity initiatives in the West. In the past two years, the “Quad” (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) and the EU have signed a web of new cooperative infrastructure arrangements and unveiled new government programs. The U.S., in particular, [is revamping](#) its entire overseas development apparatus with the establishment of a new International Development Finance Corporation.

China is gonna fund BRI in either world. Game over

“Another Challenging Year For China's Belt And Road Initiatives.” Fitch Solutions. January 29th, 2019//SK
<https://www.fitchsolutions.com/infrastructure-project-finance/another-challenging-year-chinas-belt-and-road-initiatives-29-01-2019>

e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: National Sources, Fitch Solutions **However, we believe the current trade dispute between China and US will motivate Beijing to hasten its efforts to diversify trade activities away from US through the BRI.** China's economic growth had decelerated to a 28-year low in 2018 and the slowdown, in part, was attributable to decreased trade activity between China and US. The situation is likely to persist as our Country Risk team maintains the view that **we are unlikely to see a comprehensive trade deal signed between China and US in 2019, and that the trade dispute would remain a key impediment to economic growth** (see ‘Chinese Growth To Slow Further In 2019 On Trade Dispute, Slowing Consumption’, January 21, 2019). In this core scenario, we believe **the Chinese government would focus to increase trade activity with BRI countries as a measure to counter the effects of a decrease in trade activity with the US on its slowing economy.** Decreasing US Trade Flows To Hasten Diversification Of Chinese Exports China – Value Of Total Trade With US, USDmn Source: Wind, Fitch Solutions Since the inception of BRI, we note that China's trade volume with BRI countries have increased as a proportion of total trade - in Q4 2018, ASEAN accounted for 13.1% of China's total trade, up from 10.1% in Q1 2014. This highlights ASEAN's growing importance to Beijing as a key trade partner, and we believe the region will continue to benefit from newly constructed and upgraded infrastructure in the long term that would further unlock the economic potential of these countries. **Such developments would eventually allow China to diversify its exports away from the US to these countries, removing the element of uncertainty to economic growth as a result of the prolonged trade dispute. Therefore, in spite of the aforementioned challenges to BRI in 2019, we expect Beijing to expedite the progress of BRI projects, to prevent a further slowdown in economic growth in the long term.** Increasing Dependence On ASEAN For Trade China – Proportion Of Total Trade by Region Source: Wind, Fitch Solutions To hasten the progress of BRI, against the backdrop of an increasingly challenging political and economic environment, we expect Beijing to implement changes to the BRI framework to address viability and financing concerns. In order to make BRI projects more palatable to participant countries, we expect the current BRI model to undergo changes in the areas of financing and selection of projects. **We believe China will focus on BRI projects which are more economically viable, as the cash-strapped economies of some BRI countries necessitate more prudent project selection, borrowing and spending practices. Focusing on more viable projects will also make BRI projects more attractive to private investors and multilateral development banks such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).** We reiterate our view that private capital would play a larger role in terms of project financing in the long term (see ‘Belt And Road To Remain Central To Asia Infrastructure’, December 18, 2018), addressing concerns of an overreliance on funding from the Chinese government. However, **Chinese government loans will remain a key source of funding for**

projects which are less profitable but key to the overall BRI strategy. These projects include the construction of ports and the associated road and rail links to economic centres.

BRN 2019

<https://www.beltandroad.news/2019/02/23/investor-confidence-in-belt-road-initiative-booms/>

Market confidence in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has surged, with 98% of senior executives saying they expect investment to increase in the next year, according to a survey conducted by law firm CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro. Furthermore, there is also optimism about the source and composition of BRI investment, with **46% of respondents saying BRI projects will not necessarily require a Chinese partner.** While the BRI was originally launched as an international effort, the vast majority of projects have so far been dominated by Chinese capital and/or a Chinese partner. They have also largely centered on heavy industry and megaprojects, such as ports and railways. However, half of the respondents say they expect projects to take on a softer form in 2019 and focus data, services and IT.

European Investment Bank funding EU infrastructure only

Wu, Wendy. "China's Silk Road Fund 'seeking investment projects in Europe.'" South China Morning Post. July 15, 2019//SK

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2081067/chinas-silk-road-fund-seeking-investment-projects>

China's Silk Road Fund is looking for investment projects in Europe, according to a senior bank official. The fund, which provides financing for **China's "One Belt, One Road"** trade initiative to forge closer commercial ties with Asia and beyond, **is seeking investment opportunities with a unit of the European Investment Bank, the European lender's** vice-president Jonathan Taylor said. **"Cooperations between the European Investment Fund, a subsidiary of the EIB, and the Silk Road Fund are under discussion,"** Taylor said at the start of a five-day trip to China. **"Discussions between the EIF and the Silk Road Fund are centering on investment in Europe,"** he told a press conference. China pledged to contribute US\$40 billion to set up Silk Road Fund three years ago. The capital came from the country's foreign exchange reserves, the China Investment Corporation, which manages the sovereign wealth fund; the Export-Import Bank of China and the China

11. <https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-summer-2019-issue-no-14/european-responses-to-bri-an-overdue-assessment>

is reported that their efforts are bearing fruit, with dozens of successful financing deals publicized that are in some way BRI related. For instance, in 2017, Deutsche Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the China Development Bank (CDB), agreeing to cooperate with the aim of supporting BRI projects worth \$3 billion. CDB and Deutsche Bank also agreed to establish a joint team in order to further cooperate on projects that promote BRI.

In addition, Standard Chartered Bank has reported positively on its BRI engagement and listed 20 financing deals linked to BRI that it has won in the past years. Standard Chartered is also part of the Green Belt and Road Investor Alliance, which was founded in London in 2017 by an international investor group that aims to support sustainable and investable projects along the BRI. The group will focus on creating tools for the efficient crowding-in of private capital to projects that also involve public capital.

Most recently, the level of engagement of EU-based entities in financing BRI projects has increased even more. On the occasion of the latest Belt and Road International Forum, held in Beijing in April 2019, several new cooperation agreements were signed. For instance, Standard Chartered Bank entered into an agreement with the China Export-Import Bank, one of the most active supporters of BRI in terms of lending volume. The two banks will support third-party market cooperation under BRI. The EBRD has also reinforced its BRI engagement and joined several cooperation formats, the most prominent being the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance, which was established by eight international financial institutions, including the EIB.

<https://tnsr.org/2019/07/unlocking-the-gates-of-eurasia-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-implications-for-u-s-grand-strategy/>-BRI COLLAPSE DLINK

One of Belt and Road’s key challenges stems from China’s domestic troubles. These include an economic slowdown, debt, corruption, inequality, and a rapidly aging population. Additionally, traditional measurement methods like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have overestimated the strength of the Chinese economy.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Xi Jinping’s centralization of power could compromise the regime’s effectiveness, not to mention its system of succession. Each of these problems could single-handedly derail the country’s trajectory.⁵⁸ Belt and Road itself could exacerbate those tensions by diverting money that might better be used at home. Beijing’s economy could also suffer from the graft, rent-seeking, and domestic agendas of the initiative’s foreign recipients.⁵⁹ In fact, the steep fall of Chinese overseas investments since 2016 might jeopardize Belt and Road’s future.⁶⁰ Yet, those problems must be put into perspective. **China has made phenomenal progress since the 1980s. Moreover, it repeatedly disproved the experts who prophesied its demise, and its economy still has major assets including competent leadership, low government debt, vast foreign exchange reserves, manufacturing dominance, a much-underestimated ability to innovate, and solid growth — whether measured in GDP or alternative methods such as “inclusive wealth.”**⁶¹ As for **Belt and Road**, it is **likely to prove financially sustainable**. While considerable, the amount of money involved in the initiative pales in comparison to the \$5.9 trillion that the United States has spent on the global war on terrorism since 2001 or will inevitably spend in the form of interest rates, veterans’ care, and other obligations.⁶² **Some of Belt and Road’s losses were anticipated from the start and, despite the controversies surrounding China’s failures, many of its projects could yield high returns.** Moreover, **Beijing’s recent foreign direct investment review may optimize decision-making.**⁶³ **Forecasts put annual Belt and Road investments and construction contracts at \$50 billion and \$60 billion, respectively. Such predictions seem rather reasonable given China’s low stock-to-GDP ratio — 10.9 percent versus America’s 28.9 percent — and private investments could push them further.**⁶⁴ **Therefore, drawing any conclusions from Beijing’s current difficulties would be highly premature.**

A2: EU Increases BRI legitimacy Anuraag (done)

1. [Smith '19 of Heritage](#) explains that, despite all of the controversy, the allure of billions of dollars in investments is still too tempting for any countries to disavow the BRI, as shown by Italy joining.
2. Belt and Road Initiative is already sponsored/supported by ASEAN and the African Union – there's no reason why countries would look to Europe to see their opinion on the initiative when regional organizations already support it.
3. 20 out of the 28 European States have already signed Memorandums of Understanding, meaning this should already be triggered.
4. The root cause of the BRI losing legitimacy is econ harms to developing countries -- if we prove any disad to countries from the BRI in our neg case then we prove their impacts are exclusively short-term because that would trigger a legitimacy crisis.
5. They have to terminalize the end impact of an increase in BRI legitimacy, what does that mean? There are so many other factors controlling a country's appreciation of China's policies, that BRI cannot be isolated as the sole cause of relations bettering.
6. If anything without the EU joining there is more legitimacy - adding countries that were colonist in nature isn't going to help China's case to developing countries.
7. Indict to link evidence that Italy legitimizes BRI:
 - a. This is literally a quote from the US National Security Council's Twitter account...??

A2 BRI Legitimacy

Smith, Jeff. "Is This the End of Belt and Road, or Just the Beginning?" Heritage. 2019//SK

<https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-end-belt-and-road-or-just-the-beginning>

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Italy legitimizes indict

"Italy's BRI Blunder." Taipei Times. 2019//SK

<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/03/24/2003712068>

Since coming to power in June last year, Italy's governing coalition, comprising the populist Five Star Movement and the right-wing League Party, has pursued a China-friendly policy at the expense of wider EU and transatlantic interests. However, the pushback from the US has at least forced Italian officials — not least Minister of the Interior and League Party leader Matteo Salvini — to recognize that endorsing the initiative would have far-reaching geopolitical implications. **As the US National Security Council warned on Twitter, an MOU could legitimize China's "predatory approach to investment,"** while yielding "no benefits to the Italian people." That highly public intervention seems to have driven a wedge between the coalition partners. Whereas the Five Star Movement still supports the MOU as negotiated, the League Party is demanding concrete guarantees that Italian companies would be included in infrastructure projects for the initiative.

A2: BRI brings EU Expertise

1. There is no reason as to why they have to get the expertise through the BRI they can just simply hire western firms or use the existing ones to help direct investment.
2. Investment in the developing world is just inherently risky due to many political and economic factors, even if the EU makes the investments in a "Safer way" that doesn't necessarily make those other factors go away.
 - a. If anything the problem gets worse as if the EU expanded the initiative countries would attain higher debt levels raising the level of risk in those countries.
3. This argument is extremely vague there is 0 termanilization as to how many more projects can be made due to better investments or as to what extent the investments actually get better.\The Independent in 19' writes that China has unilateral control of the BRI and even if more countries from Europe join on China would do little to reform their lending practices.
 - a. They have to prove as to why they cooperate on projects, insofar as China paints themselves as a better alternative to the west who comes with no strings attached they wouldn't want to risk that narrative.
4. **Their own evidence finds that Chinese companies don't care.** [Landry 19](#) writes that The possibility has been raised that **Chinese firms may be in a haste to invest** in large projects, **regardless of risk,** because they aim to become too big to fail, **with the expectation that they will be bailed out even if they throw money down the drain.** They may also be seeking to transfer assets abroad to shield them from the state's prying hands should their political fortunes turn.

<https://blog.independent.org/2019/07/18/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-boon-for-growth-or-threat-to-civil-liberties/>

The EU joining would inc. debt/no reform

The Chinese lending practices stand in [contrast](#) to the United State government's Marshall Plan, which financed reconstruction in Western Europe after World War II almost exclusively through grants, rather than loans, which must be repaid with interest. (This isn't to say that the Marshall Plan was the best alternative for post-war development—that's a different issue.) **As more countries (particularly in Europe) join the BRI, it's unlikely that China's lending practices will get reformed. The BRI was born as a project with unilateral Chinese control and generally lacks transparency, so it's not a stretch to assume that new European and Asian partners will also be subject to debt traps.**

A2: BRI Increase Free Trade Agreements **Adriana**

1. [????] Don't let them blindly extend the idea of Free Trade Agreements without contextualizing who these new FTAs are with. In fact, the EU already has FTAs with tons of countries. Not only do they all trade with each other but Oppenheim 17 explains that the EU literally has trade agreements with literally 30 other countries.
 - a. If anything, the countries that the EU doesn't freely trade with they have a vested interest not to (such as CHN, who could undercut their domestic industry), so make them contextualize to you
 - i. which countries they sign onto FTAs with
 - ii. how much trade increases from the baseline of FTAs they already have
 - iii. why their decision calculus changes, and why they're suddenly willing to lift all pre-existing regulations against things like chinese goods when you affirm
2. IMPACT TURN TO CHINESE FTA: A free trade agreement with China would lead to dumping. Casarini 15 explains that the BRI would threaten the competitiveness of European companies by allowing china to dump goods priced below production costs into the European market, bringing industrial lines to their knees. The EU wouldn't be able to solve back because china would be granted market economy status. China's desire to be labeled this way has already begun as Stratfor 17 finds that Beijing's economic activity in Europe has created rifts, with BRI countries such as the Netherlands advocating for them to have market economy status. This is devastating, as Casarini continues that China's designation as a "market economy" would make it impossible to strike back against unfair export practices with countervailing tariffs. Scott 15 contextualizes that giving China this status would put 3.5 million jobs at risk and cripple the EU's GDP by 2%.

Beth Oppenheim, 10/10/17, Centre for European Reform

<https://cer.eu/in-the-press/eu-has-36-free-trade-deals-non-eu-countries-will-they-roll-over-britain-after-br-exit>

For the past 44 years, the UK has relied upon the European Union, formerly the European Economic Community, to negotiate trade deals. As an **EU** member, Britain cannot strike its own trade deals, but the bloc **has successfully secured 36 trade agreements for its member-states, spanning more than 60 countries.** It is unclear whether Britain can continue to participate in these deals once it leaves the EU.

China uses BRI as an avenue for dumping

Casarini, Nicole. "Is Europe to Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative?" Wilson Center. 2015

<https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwpl1540.pdf>

Some European critics worry that the **OBOR lacks transparency rules and that the opaque financing deals may threaten the competitiveness of European companies.** China requires, in fact, that

infrastructure works financed by its soft loans be carried out by Chinese companies, as in the case of the Hungaro-Serbian high-speed railway or Terminal II of Piraeus. This raises the question of reciprocity. While Chinese companies find an open-door environment in Europe, it is quite difficult – if not impossible – for a European company to succeed in winning a contract to build infrastructure projects in mainland China. The question of reciprocity is closely linked to what may be the thorniest issue in Sino-European relations: the market economy status (MES). A provision in China's WTO accession agreement that allows other countries to treat it as a non-market economy will expire in December 2016, potentially requiring the EU to begin drafting new trade legislation by the end of this year. Granting Beijing MES would make it easier for Chinese companies targeted in WTO anti-dumping cases to defend themselves. While Beijing argues that MES should be extended automatically in December 2016 under the terms of its WTO accession agreement, some EU member states maintain that the agreement instead requires Chinese exporters to prove first that they do not benefit from government subsidies and currency policy. There are growing concerns in Europe that **through the Belt and Road initiative, China seeks to tackle industrial overcapacity at home by dumping or exporting goods priced below production costs, risking thus to bring entire industrial lines across Europe to their knees. If the EU were to designate China as a "market economy," it would then be impossible for Brussels to strike back against unfair export practices with countervailing tariffs.** There is growing resistance in Europe from manufacturing industries that see themselves as vulnerable, and the EU – together with the US – may be tempted to resist granting China "market economy status."

Stratfor, 2017, "For China, All Roads (And Belts) Lead to Europe

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-all-roads-and-belts-lead-europe>

China's Belt and Road Initiative encompasses six economic corridors. But in geographic and ideological terms, Europe represents the end of the new Silk Road. Increased connectivity with Europe could offer China a chance to expand its access to new markets, as well as to high-tech and strategic assets, thereby facilitating its domestic industrial reform plans. Despite Beijing's stated goal of fostering greater integration throughout Eurasia with its Belt and Road scheme, however, its approach on the Continent has so far emphasized bilateral or subregional agreements with states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean. The strategy has raised concerns among the European Union's central powers that Beijing's influence in the countries could threaten their own, particularly as the bloc's political and economic rifts widen.

Whether Beijing's signature policy project will help alleviate these problems is unclear, however, since resolving them is less a priority for China than for its partners in Eastern Europe. China's investment in Eastern Europe has never exceeded 1 percent of a target country's gross domestic product, with the exception of Hungary. (Its investment level in the region trails even those of Japan and South Korea.) Furthermore, Beijing prefers mergers and acquisitions, employing its own management teams rather than building local teams from the ground up, undermining host countries' desires to boost employment and gain experience with high-end technology. China, meanwhile, still receives just a fraction of these countries' total exports, despite their best efforts to increase their share of the Chinese market. In fact, for Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, the trade deficit with China has grown over the past three years. And as Beijing keeps pushing domestic-branded vehicles, electronics and machinery onto the European market, the Central and Eastern European states' domestic industries stand to lose more ground to their Chinese counterparts.

To Berlin and Brussels, however, Beijing appears to be trying to undermine EU trade and investment standards, and perhaps even its policies on China. The European Union wants European companies in China to compete on an even playing field with their Chinese counterparts, and it is worried about Beijing's practices, including efforts to force foreign firms into joint ventures with local ones. Beijing's often-nationalist economic policies, moreover, and the growing role of state-owned enterprises in Belt and Road projects have fueled concerns about future competition with China, particularly among countries with advanced technology sectors, such as Germany. At the recent Belt and Road Initiative Forum in Beijing, the German government even announced that it would not sign the Belt and Road communique unless China first guaranteed free and fair trade.

A more fragmented European Union is not in Beijing's best interest, especially as it works to expand its economic influence westward. But **Beijing's activities on the Continent have created new rifts in the bloc**. Member states such as the Czech Republic and Denmark have backed away from criticizing the country for its stance on human rights issues and political dissidence. **Other countries, including the Netherlands,**

have advocated for granting China market economy status. As Beijing tries to deepen its ties with Europe, some nations on the Continent may be forced to choose between their political ideologies and their economic imperatives.

SCOTT, Robert, Economic Policy Institute, “Unilateral grant of market economy status to China would put millions of EU jobs at risk”, 9/8/15

<https://www.epi.org/publication/eu-jobs-at-risk/>

The European Union is considering whether to formally recognize China as a “market economy,” a move that would fundamentally change the way EU countries handle dumped exports under the World Trade Organization (WTO). With some EU officials reportedly in favor of unilaterally granting market economy status (MES) to China—and with the United States and other countries set to debate the same question—it is useful to examine what the change would mean for the European economy and its workers.

According to our analysis, an EU decision to unilaterally grant MES to China would put between 1.7 million and 3.5 million EU jobs at risk by curbing the ability to impose tariffs on dumped goods and thus allowing Chinese companies to undercut domestic production by flooding the EU with cheap goods. Specifically, we project that the increased imports arising from granting MES to China would reduce EU output by between €114.1 billion and €228 billion per year, a 1 percent to 2 percent reduction in EU GDP (relative to base year output in 2011) that translates into 1.7 to 3.5 million potential jobs lost among import-competing industries, their suppliers, and the companies that depend on the wages of displaced workers.

A2: BRI increase 3rd Party Financing Andrew

1. **Delink:** Third Party Financing streams to BRI projects ONLY when they are successful enough. That being said, the BRI requires an insane amount of money to be successful, meaning investment will always fall short. Hurley 18 writes for the Center for Global Development, “the sustainability of BRI financing will depend [...] on the productivity of the BRI projects” But, that “\$26 trillion in infrastructure investments are needed [in Asia alone] from 2016-2030 to maintain economic growth” It’s an uphill battle, because financing only comes when projects are successful, but it requires so much financing that the gap is never filled.
2. **Delink:** Investors are NOT trigger happy. Chandran 19 of CNBC reports, that the trend is the opposite. “Countries are scaling down or scrapping entire projects that are part of China’s BRI amid mounting financial concerns over the continent-spanning venture. In recent months, many developing nations have either canceled or backed away from previously negotiated BRI commitments, citing worries over high project costs” The issue is not the lack of investors, the issue is that the investments NEVER pay off.
3. **Turn:** The EU joining the BRI would kill third party financing to infrastructure projects. The reason why, is failed projects. When EU nations invest billions of dollars into a black hole, they are disincentivized from future projects. Chandran 19 explains, that several BRI projects have encountered delays, suspension, or outright cancellations “due to skepticism and pushback against the project.” These issues cause domestic concern around infrastructure. For example,

after these issues, Pakistan reduced their investment into Chinese rail projects by \$2 billion. The same applies to third parties seeking to turn a profit, they will be pushed away.

4. **Turn:** To fund the BRI, countries and parties take on huge debts. While it may seem like a smart idea in the long run, the money spent financing these debts is taken from internal infrastructure, which is way more important than external infrastructure. Hurley 18 corroborates, that oftentimes big debts lead to downward spirals, where domestic spending on infrastructure and social services is sacrificed in order to service the debt, with the problem compounded when governments borrow additional funds just to meet debt servicing needs.
 - a. You can implicate this as offense for us, because if the EU and Third Parties are financing the BRI, they are reducing the amount that they spend on internal infrastructure. The difference is key, because internal infrastructure helps with basic needs like transportation to and from a job or the hospital, while external infrastructure is the difference between 15 million tons of steel or 20 million tons of steel. Voting aff leads to domestic harms.

Chandran - Investors Skeptical

Nyshka Chandran, CNBC, "Fears of Excessive Debt Drive to Cut", Jan 2019,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html>

Some countries are scaling down or scrapping entire projects that are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative amid mounting financial concerns over the continent-spanning venture. In recent months, developing nations such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone have either canceled or backed away from previously negotiated BRI commitments, citing worries over high project costs and their impact on national debt and the economy. That revised stance not only confirms global fears over the terms of BRI financing, it could also indicate that developing countries are now more willing to prioritize sovereign interests over their need for foreign investment. Since April 2018, several BRI projects have encountered delays, suspension, or outright cancellations "due to skepticism and pushback against the project," according to an August report by The Economist Intelligence Unit. News emerged this week that Islamabad had requested Beijing in December to shelve a joint \$2 billion coal power project. That comes after Pakistan's Railways Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad said in October that his country would be reducing Chinese loans for rail projects from \$8.2 billion to \$6.2 billion.

Hurley - \$26 Trillion

John Hurley, Center for Global Development, "Examining the BRI", March 2018,

<https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf>

Some public reporting has expressed alarm about the implications of BRI for debt sustainability.² The primary concern is that an \$8 trillion-dollar initiative will leave countries with debt "overhangs" that will impede sound public investment and economic growth more generally (see Box 1). There is also concern that debt problems will create an unfavorable degree of dependency on China as a creditor. Increasing debt, and China's role in managing bilateral debt problems, has already exacerbated internal and bilateral tensions in some BRI countries, such as Sri Lanka, where citizens have regularly clashed with police over a new industrial zone surrounding Hambantota port,³ and Pakistan, where Chinese officials openly appealed to opposition politicians to embrace the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), BRI's "flagship project" to bolster ties between Beijing and Islamabad.⁴ **The sustainability of BRI financing will depend in part on the productivity of the BRI projects themselves.** The developmental benefits of increased public infrastructure investment more broadly

have been promoted by multilateral development institutions. For example, a widely quoted ADB study asserts that in Asia alone, \$26 trillion in infrastructure investments are needed over the 2016-2030 period to maintain 3 to 7 percent economic growth, eliminate poverty, and respond to climate change.⁵

When government borrowing is not accompanied by enough economic growth and revenue generation to fully service the debt, it can generate a downward spiral that inevitably ends in the need for debt restructuring or reduction.⁶ Domestic spending on infrastructure and social services may be sacrificed in order to service the debt, with the problem compounded when governments borrow additional funds just to meet debt servicing needs.⁷ This occurred from the 1970s into the 1990s, when developing countries' debt compounded at an annual average of roughly 20 percent, rising from \$300 billion to \$1.5 trillion. For the poorest countries, external public debt increased from slightly above 20 percent of GDP in 1970 to almost 140 percent of GDP by 1994. Between 1978 and 1988, interest payments alone on low-income countries' external debts jumped from \$230 million to \$1.3 billion.⁸

A2: Juncker Plan Funding Moved to BRI Carter

1. [DL] [The European Council](#) explains that the Juncker Plan has absolutely nothing to do with the BRI. It is literally a government program that takes away some risk for private investors to invest in **European companies**. The “funds” my opponents talk about is just the increase of domestic investment since the Juncker Plan began. This moving of funds is completely arbitrary and just makes no sense.
2. [DL/M] Huge issue on the level of scale for three reasons.
 - a. Juncker has negligible funding as a whole
 - i. It'll take **6 years** to pay for **one year of BRI deficit** that
 1. <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/eu-commissions-eu-asia-connectivity-strategy-omits-china/>
 2. [Chandran 19](#) writes that “the BRI faces a funding gap of up to \$500 billion a year” and this is steeply trending upwards as Beijing plans to increase project spending by [14% a year](#). To continue the BRI, it would eventually take trillions every year.
 - b. Even less funding when you realize the majority of funds come from predicted private investments. EU investors are willing to invest in the Juncker plan but not the BRI for two reasons [insert a2 priv funding]
 - c. EU is not gonna move the funding to BRI. They would honestly move it towards their own infra projects not help give more loans
 - i. Due to the aforementioned reasons, their uniqueness is extremely negligible
3. DL: It doesn't make sense that the EU would take money out of the Juncker Plan, which funds infrastructure **domestically**, in the EU, and put it towards **other countries**. The EU will always prioritize itself, especially with the growing wave of populism in Europe.
4. DL: The EU Commission 19 explains that there is already 410 billion dollars in “triggered investment” that has already been guaranteed for the Juncker Plan. The funding has already been given, they can't divert money from the BRI.

A2: Saudi Arabia funds BRI Kevin

6 responses.

1. [Delink] **Lin 19'** explains that Saudi Arabia has already joined the BRI. Make them show that Saudi Arabia is already funding BRI projects abroad. They won't be able to because it's not true.
2. [Delink] Saudi Arabia is a destination, not a co-sponsor of the BRI. **Fulton of the SCMP** writes that Arab nations have been the destination of 23 billion dollars.
3. [Delink] Saudi Arabia isn't enough. **Curtin 17'** indicates that the EU is the **only** actor with enough economic might to cofinance the entire BRI. Even if Saudi Arabia can contribute a bit, it's nowhere near enough.
4. [Delink] Saudi Arabia needs money for themselves. **Khashan 17'** explains that Vision 2030, MBS' main foreign policy initiative, requires over 2 trillion dollars, and Saudi Arabia has nowhere near enough for that.
5. [Delink] Funding won't go abroad. **Executive 19'** writes that Saudi Arabia is going to align the BRI with its **domestic** development plan, Vision 2030.
6. [Delink] Saudi Arabia is reliant on high oil prices to generate revenue. Unfortunately, **Henney of Fox** explains that oil prices are plunging to a 7-month low, causing massive revenue loss for Saudi Arabia.

李Lin, 2019-04-09, "Belt and Road makes good progress in Arab world," No Publication, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-04/09/content_37456264.htm

The Belt and Road Initiative has been widely supported and welcomed by the Arab countries. At the eighth Ministerial Meeting of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum held in Beijing July 2018, China and Arab countries signed three important documents including the Beijing Declaration, the Action Plan for 2018-2020 and the Declaration of Action on China-Arab States Belt and Road Cooperation. Earlier, **China signed a nonbinding memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative with nine Arab countries - Saudi Arabia, the Republic of the Sudan, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco.** At the same time, cooperation documents on energy with five Arab countries including the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Egypt were signed as well.

Jonathan **Fulton**, xx-xx-xxxx, "For China, the Belt and Road run through the Middle East," **South China Morning Post**,

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2155258/china-belt-and-road-run-through-middle-east>

To this end, **China committed US\$23 billion in loans and aid to Arab states, with money bookmarked for infrastructure and reconstruction projects, humanitarian aid and efforts to support social stability in Arab states.** The focus on development speaks to the vision of Middle Eastern peace consistently articulated by Chinese leaders: security through development. In a 2014 interview with Al Jazeera, Wang made this point explicitly, saying: "We believe that development holds the key and serves as the foundation for solving all problems. Any solution to hot-spot and political issues hinges on economic growth and better life for the people. As far as Arab countries are concerned, the most crucial task facing them is national development and economic revitalization."

Curtin, 2017, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf

However impressive the sums might appear at a first glance, they fall short of the needed amount. The first stages of developing the Belt-and-Road require no less than \$3 trillion (according to some accounts, even more). And this is a task that China – despite its constant growth and increasing economic power – cannot accomplish alone.³⁶ It really needs co-interested parties. And that is where the European Union (with its unbearable economic force) comes into the spotlight: it is not supposed to be just a "passive" destination at the end of the road, but also a co-owner in this joint venture. **Without European cash – from public and private sources – it is highly improbable that other actors could feasibly join China in funding the initiative. Russia, Iran, Turkey or**

Kazakhstan (or even Japan and India³⁷) are in an entirely different economic league than what is needed for such a massive project. For a path to Europe to emerge, Europe itself is needed along the way. In reality, EU-based institutions already are the largest lenders in the region (see Figure 3 below). And **Europe is highly interested in developing infrastructure and connectivity with its marginal areas.**

Hilal **Khashan**, 5-13-**2017**, "Saudi Arabia's Flawed "Vision 2030"," Middle East Forum,
<https://www.meforum.org/6397/saudi-arabia-flawed-vision-2030>

The McKinsey plan projects a \$2 trillion investment program, which will double Riyadh's GDP over the next fourteen years.[7] **Yet, a sober economic analysis describes the ability to raise such a staggering amount of money as "practically next to impossible"**, unless crude oil prices see a significant appreciation, or Saudi Arabia plans to sell a higher portion of Aramco." [8] **Since the goal of Vision 2030 is to double GDP by increasing the industrial output of the private sector, investment in appropriate industries is a requirement.**

Maritime **Executive** **2019**-02-26, "China to Boost Belt and Road Links with Saudi Arabia," Maritime Executive,

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-to-boost-belt-and-road-links-with-saudi-arabia>

Saudi Arabia and China enjoy a rapid development in economic and trade cooperation at present, Mohammed said. "We see China as an important strategic partner and appreciate China's support for the domestic reforms and development of Saudi Arabia." Noting that the Arabian Peninsula is a part of the ancient Silk Road, **Mohammed said Saudi Arabia supports the Belt and Road Initiative and hopes to align it with the Saudi Vision 2030. Part of the vision includes transforming the nation into a leading industrial powerhouse and a global logistics hub focusing in on four key sectors: industry, mining, energy and logistics.** And at a G20 ministerial conference in Argentina last year Saudi leaders said they were willing to work with China on Belt and Road projects, particularly infrastructure for ports and energy grids.

Megan **Henney**, 8-8-**2019**, "Saudis trying to prop up oil as prices slump over recession fears," Fox Business,

<https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/saudis-trying-to-prop-up-oil-as-prices-slump-over-recession-fears>

Saudi Arabia is reaching out to other oil Opens a New Window. producers to discuss possible responses as **oil prices plunged to a seven-month low**, according to a Bloomberg report. Citing a Saudi official, Bloomberg reported that the kingdom "won't tolerate" falling oil prices. It's unclear what measures, exactly, Saudi Arabia plans to take. Alongside other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, agreed to cut production in hopes of ending an emerging supply glut. Non-OPEC members, including Russia, reduced output.

Frameworks

A2: Biocentrism Asher (done)

1. Turn the framework. Rejecting an anthropocentric mindset won't cause us to value animals more but rather to further devalue human life. Schmahmann 95 explains that even if we put the life of animals and humans on the same playing field, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the animals that it is best not to trouble

ourselves about it at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be humans, because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat animals like human beings, but that there is no good reason why we should not treat human beings like animals. Voting for them doesn't improve the conditions of animals and only worsens the conditions of humans.

2. Anthropocentrism is not always consistent with environmental destruction or the exploitation of nature. Bartkowski in 2014 writes that anthropocentrism does not mean that we may destroy all ecosystem as we wish. Just the contrary: it is in our interest to, e.g., keep the climatic system in a more-or-less stable state; keep the oceans clean as they are an important source of food; protect large ecosystems, such as the Amazon rainforest, for their destruction might have unexpected negative consequences for us. In a world where humans do not harvest nature for their own benefit, many environmental issues will remain unaddressed, ultimately worsening the state of the environment in the long run. At best this is terminal defense demonstrating that rejecting anthropocentrism won't help the environment and at best its offense for us because an anthropocentric mindset is better than the alternative.
3. Biocentrism, practically speaking, makes no sense. If policymakers operated under a strict biocentrist framework, no developing nation would be able to feasibly grow. The reason is that the construction of all infrastructure inevitably results in some habitat loss, so developing nations would be forced to halt all current development initiatives, whether that be schools, roads, renewables, etc. This has 2 implications.
 - a. It means we win under the framework because infrastructure development is a prereq to economic growth and more economically developed countries can allocate more resources to wildlife preservation in the long run
 - b. It also proves that the framework itself is problematic because it is effectively saying that developing nations have to inhibit their own progress to not perpetuate environmental harms that the developed world created
4. [not amazing] Biocentrism reverses all progress on climate change. The further development of renewable technology such as windmills and solar panels will definitely cause some habitat loss, meaning politicians will be limited in efforts to build green infra. This outweighs on timeframe because absent further renewable development the effects of climate change will manifest faster which means that all organisms have less time to live.

David **Schmahmann, 8-1-1995**. "The Case Against Animal Rights," Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review,

<https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context=ealr>

Every individual member of every species would have recognized claims against human beings and the state, and perhaps other animals as well. As the concept of rights expanded to include the "claims" of all living creatures, the concept would lose much of its force, and human rights would suffer as a consequence. Long before ..

.If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow men, because the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason

why we should not treat human beings like brutes. Extension of this principle leads straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau and Auschwitz, where the German and the Jew or Pole only took the place of the human being and the Colorado beetle.

Bartosz Bartkowski, 7-19-2014. "IN DEFENCE OF ANTHROPOCENTRISM," The Sceptical Economist, <https://zielonygrzyb.wordpress.com/2014/07/19/in-defence-of-anthropocentrism/>

Given these conceptual and practical problems, to which I do not know any convincing solutions, I would like to propose that the best available ethical basis for protecting the environment is our broadly understood self-interest. Broadly understood, for **anthropocentrism does not mean that we may destroy all ecosystem as we wish. Just the contrary: it is in our interest to, e.g., keep the climatic system in a more-or-less stable state; keep the oceans clean as they are an important source of food; protect large ecosystems, such as the Amazon rainforest, for their destruction might have unexpected negative consequences for us;** etc. Of course, from an anthropocentric perspective the protection of "pristine" ecosystems makes little sense, unless we view them as a legacy/heritage that we would like to pass on to our descendants. But, as I already pointed out above, pristinity is a myth. So is, by the way, the idea that the introduction of exotic species to "native" ecosystems is generally bad—in fact, most species were exotics at some time where they are now considered to be "natives".

A2: Bostrum Asher (done)

1. The idea that we should prioritize existential risks is inherently flawed. Debate is based on the idea that debaters attempt to mimic real-world policy makers. Policy makers are far more likely to pass policy based on what is likely to happen because
 - a. Incremental policy is easier to adjust to any situation so it covers more
 - b. More probable scenarios are more likely to have an impact on the people that the politicians serve
 - c. If politicians make a dumb decision based on something that has a 0.0000001% chance of happening then they are never going to be relected.
2. Every action could technically cause some existential threat – that paralyzes policy making because then we can't take any action as it would have a chance of causing extinction
3. Richard Jackson of the National Centre for Peace tells you historically, big threats are constructed by policymakers to avoid structural violence – you are much more likely to die from a lack of healthcare or gun violence than you are from a random extinction scenario. You reject the framework on face because it turns a blind eye to massive human rights abuses in the sqo in the name of preventing an existential risk that has nearly a 0% probability of ever manifesting.

Richard Jackson, 8-5-2012. "The Great Con of National Security," National Centre for Peace, <https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/>
It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. **For the most part, however, most of what you've been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence** of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and

proliferation of weapons – among others. The facts are simple and irrefutable: **you're far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers;** from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called 'national security issues', the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of 'security theatre' designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious. And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won't notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won't notice how much structural violence there is in the world. More than this, they are hoping that you won't notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate. Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don't want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. **Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.**

A2: Deontology (Prefer Util)

1. ROTB
2. Policy Paralysis
3. Access to the ballot
4. Inaction is a choice, falls under deontology framework

A2: Changing World Order

1. **[Delink]**. There's no precedent - AP News reports in 2019 that even after Italy signed an MOU with China, they remained firmly rooted in its alliance with the United States, NATO, and other European partners to look out for their own economic interests.
2. **[Delink]**. It doesn't match with history—when the US was establishing economic hegemony, it did so through plans like the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt economies under a new American framework for global trade. The BRI is different. Meyer 19 of Penn explains unlike US foreign aid, the BRI is Chinese investment that expects a return. This means BRI projects are created with economic intention for returns, rather than money being loaned for countries to rebuild and restructure their economic systems around Chinese trade and investment.
3. **[Delink]**. We've lost allies to Chinese economic projects before and nothing has happened. Schuman 19 explains that the Obama administration tried to convince allies from participating in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but allies like France and Germany still joined. Even then, nothing happened, and these countries still cooperate with us on economic projects.
4. **[???]**. This argument makes no sense - just because the EU joins the BRI doesn't mean they lose all of their western values, and cooperation with the US on security measures, human rights violations, etc. This cooperation is rooted in security concerns and deep-seated values that no trade deal can reverse.

Italy stance on joining the BRI

<https://www.apnews.com/dae5c72c5cf94e6cb3dce96f9ba9c62f>

March 23, 2019. Accessed 9/4/19.

Some Italian government officials were critical of the deals, worried that Italy might be ceding national sovereignty in key strategic areas to Beijing. In a sign of opposition, Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister and interior minister, stayed away from the official ceremonies with the Chinese delegation. **Di Maio stressed that Italy remains firmly rooted in its alliance with the United States, NATO and its European partners, but said Italy must also look out for its own economic interests. "Like someone in the United States said 'America first,' I continue to repeat: 'Italy first' in commercial relations," Di Maio said.** In response to concerns that the memorandum could open the way to colonization by China, Di Maio countered it would instead help goods manufactured in Italy "to colonize the world." "That is a good colonialization," he said. The Belt and Road project has so far seen investments totaling more than a trillion dollars since its launch more than five years ago, and China says some 150 countries have signed agreements related to the project

Meyer, Marshall. UPenn. "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High" 4/30/19.

Accessed 9/4/19. // AK

<https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/>

Ensuring funding for BRI projects was the key theme during last week's meeting. "In the language that came out of the Belt and Road meeting, I picked up one word repeatedly – rehabilitation," said Marshall W. Meyer, Wharton emeritus professor of management and a China expert. "What's got to be

rehabilitated here is not the concept that China is going to recreate the Silk Route, but the underlying financials.” **Meyer noted that unlike U.S. foreign aid or the Marshall Plan to rebuild economies after World War II, the BRI is “Chinese investment that expects a return.”** Chinese financial institutions lend money for BRI projects in partner countries, and the construction contracts are awarded to mostly Chinese firms, he said. “A Chinese company [thus] receives much of the proceeds of the loan, but the host country has got the debt. If the [return on investment] isn’t sufficient to pay off the debt, China will repossess [the project, and it] becomes a debt-for-equity swap.”

Schuman, Michael. “The U.S. Can’t Make Allies Take Sides Over China”. The Atlantic. 4/25/19. Accessed 9/4/19. //AK.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/us-allies-washington-china-belt-road/587902/>

The U.S. is not having much success in other points of conflict with China, either. Washington is on a strident campaign to persuade its allies to bar telecommunications equipment made by China’s Huawei Technologies, claiming that its gear presents a security threat. Some traditional allies share that fear; Australia and New Zealand have banned Huawei from building their next-generation mobile-data networks, and the United Kingdom is leaning that way too. But Huawei is hardly a company on the ropes. According to its latest annual report, Huawei’s revenue in 2018 jumped nearly 20 percent from last year, to \$105 billion. The company ranked third in the global smartphone market in 2018, just behind Apple, according to the research firm Strategy Analytics. Many governments, even those with close ties to Washington, remain unmoved by American warnings. Germany, for instance, is still open to Huawei even though Donald Trump’s administration has threatened to curtail intelligence-sharing with European allies which allow the use of the company’s equipment. Barack **Obama’s administration** didn’t have much better luck. It **tried to dissuade its allies from participating in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Beijing-sponsored multilateral lending institution,** on the grounds that it might not uphold proper standards like the U.S.-led World Bank. **That argument, too, swayed almost no one. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other usually reliable U.S. partners all became AIIB members.**

Specific Infrastructure

A2: Nuclear Energy Plants on the Aff

1. [Read a2 funding]
 - a. Diplo writes that china has 30 nuke plants planned
2. [NPR](#); UK signed deals for BRI nuke plant
 - a. NU, bri already in EU
 - b. Other reasons why countries aren't accepting, they don't solve
3. [NPR](#): china using BRI to give nuke plants to countries that are dangerous bc they haven't signed onto the NPT treaty
 - a. War happens biggest impact and causes nuke meltdown too
4. [NPR](#); nuke plant operation costs goes up over time,
 - a. Host country actually loses money
5. [NPR](#); Nuke plants actually inc emissions bc of how resource intensive they are, links into CC
6. [read coal disad + 80%]
 - a. Make sure to read huff post that coal doesn't solve EP
 - b. Read UN that they're going to green tech regardless
7. Non Unique. [The Guardian in 2019](#) writes that Russia is exporting Nuclear plants and tech to developing nations in areas such as Asia and Africa.
8. China companies have a profit incentive to keep expanding, its non unique
9. [CNBC 19'](#) finds a couple things:
 - a. SK/FR are also exporting Nuclear, won't buy CH and impact is NU
 - b. US is starting to ramp up its exports, its NU