# Marist SV – Bronx Triples Neg

#### Sophie and I negate Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road Initiative.

#### Framework – whichever side proves they save the most lives should win the round

## Contention 1 – China’s Diplomacy

#### China is carefully crafting their diplomatic message in the world as Jane Perlez indicated at the end of September:

Jane Perlez, 9-25-2019, "China Wants the World to Stay Silent on Muslim Camps. It’s Succeeding.," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslim-camps.html, Date Accessed 10-12-2019 // JM

China is carefully shaping its image of Xinjiang in the diplomatic world. Over the past nine months, Beijing has invited select visitors on circumscribed tours of the detention camps to garner positive publicity. China has generally handpicked the visitors, including journalists from friendly countries. They are then often quoted in the state-run Chinese news media offering flattering comments. “I saw genuine smiles on the faces of trainees I interviewed,” Abdul Aziz Raddad A. Alrabie of the Saudi newspaper Okaz said in China Daily, a newspaper of the Communist Party. The trips do not always go as planned. Two reports — one by a Malaysian diplomat and another by European Union officials — were highly critical after their visits. The private account by the Malaysian diplomat, reviewed by The New York Times, contradicted China’s contention that the Uighurs were voluntarily attending the re-education centers. “Delegates could actually sense fear and frustration from the students,” the Malaysian wrote after his December visit with a dozen other diplomats from mostly Muslim nations. “China may have legitimate reasons to implement policies intended to eliminate the threat of terrorism, especially in Xinjiang. However, judging by its approach, it is addressing the issue wrongly and illegitimately, e.g. preventing Muslim minors from learning the Quran.” The diplomat referred to two cities in Xinjiang — once-bustling Kashgar and Hotan — as “zombie towns,” saying the streets were virtually empty and that China was probably “using the threat of terrorism as an excuse to ‘sanitize’ Uighur Muslims until they become acceptable Chinese citizens.” The report was never made public. At the time, Malaysia was working hard to repair relations with China over a troubled infrastructure deal. It has also become increasingly dependent on China for purchases of palm oil, its biggest export. “The $100 billion in annual bilateral trade is enough to focus the minds of Malaysian policymakers,” said Shahriman Lockman, a senior analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur. “China is too big a market to lose.” Three diplomats from the European Union visited Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, this year in what one of the participants said turned out to be a “Potemkin village tour.” The officials were shown a hastily built display of weapons that the Chinese guides said Uighurs had used in terrorist attacks; a mosque where there was no sign of religious observance; and a kindergarten where the children sang songs praising the party. At one camp, the class sang the Communist Party anthem. As they did, one Uighur man caught the eye of a diplomat and held up his wrists as if clamped together by handcuffs. Afterward, the European Union circulated an internal document saying that the visit “does not invalidate the E.U.’s profound concerns about human rights in Xinjiang, including in relation to mass detention, political re-education, religious freedom and Sinicization policies, as well as concerns that similar measures could be applied in other regions of China with notable Muslim minorities.”

#### The problem is that the BRI forces EU’s silence on major human rights issues – this is empirically proven as Andrea Kendall-Taylor argued in August that:

Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, 8-12-2019, "The U.S. or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614, Date Accessed 8-12-2019 // WS

Choosing the United States does not mean that Europe should forfeit all trade and economic relations with China. But as Europe advances its economic relationships with China, it must be clear-eyed about the risks that accompany those ties. Beijing expects that its economic influence will translate into lasting diplomatic leverage in Europe. It will use its investment to secure support for—or at least prevent the EU from taking a unified position against—human rights issues like Tibet, the mass detention of Uighurs in “re-education” camps in Xinjiang, and on geopolitical issues like Taiwan and the militarization of the South China Sea. China is already using its economic relationships to pressure Europe to acquiesce to its efforts to neuter democracy and human rights protections. For example, in 2017, Greece [blocked](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-u-n-idUSKBN1990FP) an EU statement at the UN criticizing China’s human rights record. This was almost certainly because of China’s growing economic investment in the country. As long as Europe continues to sit on the fence, actions like these will only continue. Europe could also work with the United States to [develop a joint response](https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-Power-Play-Addressing-Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Strategy.pdf?mtime=20180920093003) to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serves as a conduit for China’s influence and tactics. Here Europe and the United States could develop common transparency, environmental and social standards, and pool their financial resources to jointly invest in those countries where their interests are most at stake. Similarly, Europe could work with Washington to better insulate supply chains against Chinese influence. Finally, Europe and the United States could develop a set of common rules for data privacy and artificial intelligence and vocally criticize China for its blatant human rights abuses. Progress on any of these fronts would be welcome. But at the heart of the matter, Europe must clearly communicate to Beijing that it will unequivocally side with America to uphold democratic norms and standards.

#### Increasing Chinese influence is dangerous as their power in the UN is growing which allows authoritarianism to go unchecked – Adam Shaw wrote at the end of September that there is:

Adam Shaw, 9-28-2019, "Chinese influence on display at UN as US decries human rights abuses," Fox News, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-influence-un-human-rights-abuses, Date Accessed 10-12-2019 // JM

The U.S. has also been warning of growing Chinese influence at the U.N. for some time. Not only does it represent one of the permanent five members on the Security Council, but it has also recently been creeping further into U.N. institutions. “There is no question that China is using any means possible to increase its influence in international organizations and across the greater international system,” a State Department official told Fox News in July. “China’s concerted push has more to do with advancing its self-serving interests and authoritarian model than demonstrating genuine leadership consistent with the principles and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the U.N Charter.” Chinese officials now run four out of 15 specialized U.N. agencies after a Chinese official was elected as the next director-general of the Food and Agriculture Organization this summer. Additionally, the U.N. and its officials are proving a receptive fertile ground for China’s big government, internationalist approach -- particularly as the U.S. increasingly embraces more nationalist policies and a more skeptical stance toward the U.N. The New York Times reported this week on the careful effort by Beijing to limit criticism of its human rights record at the U.N., while it has also been persistent in pushing its cooperation with U.N. bodies on issues such as multilateralism, environmental work and infrastructure. Specifically, the government has found a welcome reception for its “Belt and Road Initiative,” a massive trillion-dollar Beijing-led infrastructure project across Europe, Asia and Africa. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence last year took aim at the project, saying it was saddling developing nations with loans they can’t afford and forcing low-quality ventures onto them. "Know that the United States offers a better option. We don't drown our partners in a sea of debt, we don't coerce, compromise your independence," Pence said. "We do not offer a constricting belt or a one-way road. When you partner with us, we partner with you and we all prosper." U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, however, has praised the project. In remarks at a ceremony of a “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation” convened by Xi in April, he hailed China for “its central role as a pillar of international cooperation and multilateralism.” He went on to say that the Belt and Road Initiative “offers a meaningful opportunity to contribute to the creation of a more equitable, prosperous world for all, and to reversing the negative impact of climate change.” He then connected the Beijing project to the U.N.'s Sustainable Development Goals and said that the U.N. was “an important space where green principles can be reflected in green action.” “United Nations country teams stand ready to support Member States in capacity and governance building, and in achieving a harmonious and sustainable integration of the Belt and Road projects in their own economies and societies in accordance with national development plans, anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” he said. Jorge Chediek, the director for the U.N.'s Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), has been just as positive. In an interview with China.org in April, he hailed China’s vision as a “new vision for the world.” “The vision of China, based on the development of infrastructure, cultural connectivity, and intellectual connectivity, in conjunction with the work of the private sector, has promoted a new vision for the world, a new vision of prosperity, a new vision of sustainability, which is extremely compatible with the ideas and the best practices of the United Nations,” he said. “The obligations taken on by this great country are also a call for the world to do more -- not only governments, but also the private sector, civil society and academia,” he said.

#### Without any international backlash, oppression will only continue as The New Statesmen concludes in 2019:

New Statesmen, 3-21-2019, "China’s Uyghur detention camps may be the largest mass incarceration since the Holocaust,” <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2019/03/china-s-uyghur-detention-camps-may-be-largest-mass-incarceration-holocaust>, Date Accessed 7-23-2019 // WS [Edited for trivialization, we don’t endorse the authors use of the word or offensive language]

Over the last few years, a network of enormous detention camps has sprung up across China’s remote northern province of Xinjiang. According to the US State Department, the United Nations and other researchers and activists, they may hold at least a million Uighurs, a Muslim minority Beijing seems increasingly determined to strip of freedom and identity. It is almost certainly the largest mass incarceration of a racial or religious group since the ~~Holocaust~~. And it is neither front-page news nor a major part of diplomatic or political dialogue. In many respects, that is testament to how ruthlessly effective China’s approach has been. The country has been remarkably successful at using its economic clout to minimise international criticism, while limiting outside and foreign access to Xinjiang and making it hard to tell what is truly going on. What experts and activists alike do agree, however, is that the situation for the Uyghurs is deteriorating quickly. Foreign powers – including Britain – have a host of challenges on which they feel they need China, leaving them understandably reluctant to raise thorny issues like the Uyghurs, Tibet or wider human rights abuses. There are some early signs that this is changing – but not nearly fast or far enough. What is happening to the Uyghurs could set an appalling precedent for the coming era. Already, Beijing’s cutting-edge technology and diplomatic clout – and complete lack of squeamishness about using it – means China’s Uyghurs are being pressured like no population before in human history. Within Xinjiang, networks of cameras with facial recognition software mean everyone is under continuous state surveillance. Any displays of behaviour dubbed “foreign” or Islamic – such as wearing a beard or publicly praying – can result in immediate imprisonment. Friends and relatives of Uyghur activists or journalists overseas, such as those for the US-funded Radio Free Asia, are often detained by the dozen. Foreign governments – including Muslim states such as Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan – have been pushed into deporting Uyghur students back to China, where some are never seen again. Earlier this month, Britain and Turkey were the only two countries to speak on China’s abuse of Uyghurs at the UN Human Rights Council. Ministers say they have also raised the issue with their Chinese counterparts, including on visits to Beijing. Nevertheless, the topic is strikingly absent from most official speeches and comments, including on Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s July 2018 trip to China. Perhaps expecting a business-focused, Brexit-obsessed Conservative government to prioritise the Uyghur issue would always have been over-optimistic. But nor does it seriously appear to have been on Labour’s horizon until earlier this year, when shadow foreign secretary Emily Thornberry addressed London-based Uyghur and other activist groups. “We need to raise awareness of this now, and make it clear it cannot continue,” she said. Compared to China’s other minorities, such as Tibetan Buddhists and Christians, the Muslim Uyghurs have had relatively few friends in the outside world. With the exception of Turkey, even most Middle Eastern nations have turned on them following pressure from Beijing. China says such steps are necessary to prevent the spread of Islamist militancy. Small numbers of Chinese Uyghurs have joined groups such as Islamic State, as well as conducting a handful of knife and other attacks in China. But the scope of the crackdown remains out of all proportion to the threat, prompting growing – if still too limited – international condemnation. This week, a consortium of human rights groups, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch called on European governments in particular to step up their criticism of China. Last week saw the United States make its most aggressive comments on the issue, slamming Beijing in its annual review of human rights. As well as more repeated and public criticism, potential responses could include sanctioning individual Chinese officials linked to the crackdown, as well as restrictions on the sale of surveillance equipment. How many truly die in the camps is very far from clear – although dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Uyghurs say they have been told of the deaths of relatives. On other occasions, those long missing have been revealed to be alive. That’s a key reason outside scrutiny is so vital. If those in power in Beijing believe they can continue the crackdown with impunity, they will act accordingly – at worst, opening the door to outright genocide. Talking about the Uyghurs will unquestionably complicate relations with China just as the world’s great powers desperately need to work together. The clear lessons of history, however, are that not to do so could prove even more dangerous.

## Contention 2 is NATO

#### The EU joining the BRI will destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO in two ways

#### First is military mobility. Robbie Gramer writes in March that

Robbie Gramer, 3-20-2019, Trump Wants NATO’s Eyes on China, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/us-wants-nato-to-focus-on-china-threat-critical-infrastructure-political-military-huawei-transatlantic-tensions/>, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // JM

“The United States has been very clear that we are concerned with certain foreign investment in and control over critical infrastructure, including telecommunications and transportation elements,” the spokeswoman said. “These investments represent a challenge to transatlantic security, including to institutions like NATO.” U.S. officials also worry that China is gaining too many commercial footholds in some of Europe’s largest and most important ports, including Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, and Piraeus, that it could use to wield political influence over European governments. In its 2018 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration identified Russia and China as top threats to global order, marking a new shift away from the yearslong fight against terrorism as Washington’s top national security priority. In a tour of Central Europe last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned countries against forging closer ties with Moscow and Beijing, citing Huawei as an example of China’s tactic of masking geopolitical aims in commercial ventures. “Beijing’s handshake sometimes comes with strings, strings that will leave Hungary indebted both politically and economically,” he said during a stop in Budapest. The United States has also threatened to curb intelligence cooperation with allies that allowed Huawei to build up new mobile internet infrastructure. But the warnings may have fallen on deaf ears, as Germany, Britain, and other European countries signal they have no intention of banning Huawei from their 5G networks. European officials said U.S. intelligence briefings with allies on Huawei did not offer enough proof that Beijing would use the company to steal information, according to the [New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/huawei-ban.html). Some European countries, bristling from Trump’s repeated public broadsides against them on trade and defense issues, seem determined to resist U.S. pressure on the China issue. On Tuesday, Italy became the first European country to sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trillion-dollar infrastructure investment project to connect China with Europe, Eurasia, and Africa. Growing U.S. concerns come as the EU, coordinating with NATO, is pushing its member states to boost infrastructure projects across Europe for military means. It aims to minimize logistical roadblocks for militaries to quickly deploy and confront a Russian invasion. Though the possibility of a full-fledged conflict with Russia remains remote, defense planners worry NATO members aren’t equipped to support quickly moving military columns in any worst-case scenario. The projects include upgrading roads and bridges to support the weight of tanks and other heavy military equipment, preparing ports to handle a surge in military supplies, and ensuring each member country has permission to move its military through its neighbors’ roads and airspace. The so-called military mobility initiatives center around the potential threat posed by Russia, but Western defense officials want policymakers to assess how Chinese investments in ports and infrastructure could hamper their plans in the event of a conflict.

#### Shannon O’Neal furthers in April that

Shannon K. O'Neil, 4-3-2019, "Why Europe Is Getting Tough on China," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-03/why-europe-getting-tough-china, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // WS

Working with Europe not only increases U.S. leverage but helps ensure that U.S. policy won’t be undermined by lack of consensus among allies. The United States can, for instance, unilaterally limit the access that Chinese investors, companies, and researchers have to U.S. advanced technologies—through the 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, say, revised export controls, or other new regulations. But the measure would have diminished effect if China could still access similar technologies from Germany or the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, any role that Europe decides to grant Chinese firms in 5G networks and other critical infrastructure such as ports will directly affect transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation, from information transfers to NATO’s mobilization capacity. China has long been an afterthought for all but a handful of U.S. Atlanticists, and Europe has long been an afterthought for most U.S. China experts. Predictably, this gap has produced a corresponding gap in analysis, as well as a reactive approach to many critical policy decisions, with U.S. interventions sometimes coming unhelpfully late in European debates and with mixed success.

#### Second is American backlash. Specifically, this retaliation comes in the form of the US decreasing financial contributions toward NATO as Stephan Walt writes in 2016 that as a result of the EU turning their back on the US

Stephan Walt, 2016, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EUGS\_Opinion\_1\_Walt\_0.pdf, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS

A growing proportion of US military power will be assigned to Asia, while American officials will devote more time and attention to managing strategic partnerships there. Having once focused on preventing Germany and the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, the US will now strive to keep China from dominating Asia. Europe will play little or no role in this effort. China is not a threat to Europe, meaning European states have no incentive to balance against it. On the contrary, they will be eager to invest in China and some may be happy to sell Beijing whatever it might desire, perhaps even sophisticated weaponry. Consequently, US leaders will be increasingly reluctant to subsidise Europe’s defence or guarantee its security, especially if European companies are helping China grow stronger.

#### These two reasons are problematic as The Economist reports in March that as a result there would be gaps in military capabilities and the EU would be forced to

The Economist, 3-14-19, https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself, Date Accessed 9-13-2019 // WS

There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the gap-filling could take 15 years or so. That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided. It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface. “Establishing a purely European defence”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “[which] would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily.”

#### There are two impacts

#### The first is a welfare spending tradeoff. Since The EU would be forced to fill the new defense gap and increase their own defense spending it would directly trade off with their welfare expenditures as Ted Galen writes that the EU is

Ted Galen, 7-12-2010, "U.S. Defense Spending Subsidizes European Free-Riding Welfare States," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-defense-spending-subsidizes-european-freeriding-welfare-states, Date Accessed 9-13-2019 // WS

Most other NATO governments appear to have implicitly made similar calculations. They are reducing their militaries to skeletal size and increasingly rely[ing] on the U.S. to protect their security. But it gets worse. Instead of being grateful to [the] U.S. taxpayers for [is]enabling European welfare states to persist without the drag of more military spending, European elites miss no opportunity to castigate "American conditions" — a caricature of "cut-throat capitalism."

#### These welfare systems are critical to reducing poverty as the European Commission writes that on average

European Commission, "Poverty and social exclusion," No Publication, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=751&amp;langId=en, Date Accessed 9-26-2019 // WS

This is still above the target set out in the [Europe 2020 strategy](http://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_en), but several indicators have improved, as shown by 2017 statistics: 22.4% of the EU population are at risk of poverty or social exclusion – this includes 24.9% of all children in Europe, 23.3% of women, 18.2% of those over 65 6.7% of all Europeans still live in severe material deprivation, though their number has significantly decreased 17% of Europeans live on less than 60% of their country's median household income 9.3% of Europeans live in households where no one has a job However, EU citizens have not benefitted from the economic recovery equally. On average, the richest 20% EU households earn five times more than the poorest 20% households Fewer people live in jobless households, but their poverty level remains high or is increasing, reaching around 60% in the EU The share of working poor is increasing in a number of Member States, reaching 9.6% in the EU 30.1% of people with disabilities in the EU were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, compared to 20.9% of people without disabilities Welfare systems in different EU countries are not equally effective. The best system reduced the risk of poverty by 57%, the least effective by 16% (the EU average is 34%)

#### The second impact is war. Heidi Hardt writes in 2018 that currently NATO deters Russian aggression through its Article 5 agreement which states

Heidi Hardt, 7-16-2018, HuffPost, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-hardt-trump-nato\_n\_5b4c9dfde4b022fdcc5b89d6</span>, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS

Simply put, withdrawing from NATO would make the world less safe. It would likely increase the risk of attacks on allies and reopen the possibility of conflict among them. As part of the original [North Atlantic Treaty](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf), NATO’s critical Article 5 binds together the security of 29 member states; an attack on one state is considered an attack on all of them. The article was intended to act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, and recent history suggests that it still serves this purpose against Vladimir Putin’s Russia. For example, Estonia, Lithuania and other former Soviet states that are now NATO allies have so far found themselves to be immune to a Russian incursion of ground troops. However, Russia did intervene in Georgia and in Ukraine ― two states seeking NATO membership. These actions suggest that Putin perceives Article 5 as a credible commitment by allies to defend its eastern border. In addition to providing collective defense for its member states, NATO has two other core [tasks](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm): crisis management and cooperative security. The organization intervenes in crises around the globe on a scale that no one state has preferred to handle alone. The alliance is engaged in military operations around the world, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, with a renewed commitment to extend the latter operation till 2024. In addition to training Afghan security forces, NATO has committed to a new training mission in Iraq. The alliance also provides a forum for states to work together and teach one another in domains of common interest, such as arms control, counterterrorism and cybersecurity. After Russia’s internationally disputed annexation of Crimea, NATO reprioritized collective defense. The [declaration](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm) that came out of this year’s NATO summit labels Russia as an aggressor that has undermined the “rules-based world order.” The alliance also disincentivizes conflict among its member states. Wars begin for many reasons, from leaders’ misperceptions to miscommunications and information gaps about capabilities and intentions. By regularly engaging in dialogue, NATO diplomats and military leaders ensure that disagreements among allies do not become conflicts ― all while working together to address common security problems. Importantly, the organization provides infrastructure, in the form of political and military headquarters in Belgium, where representatives of the member states communicate every day about security issues. Past studies in international relations have shown that providing such institutionalized cooperation can be an effective means of preventing conflicts. For the U.S. to leave NATO, or for the organization to disband, would bring significant risks to the internal and external security of its member states ― including the U.S. Although the U.S. spends significantly more of its gross domestic product on defense than any other country, it is not exempt from threats to its national security. After the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time. The alliance has been key in supporting reductions in nuclear stockpiles. Without the security of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, European states without nuclear weapons might be more likely to consider acquiring them, increasing the risk of an intentional or accidental nuclear attack. Additional security risks could result from the end of NATO. Russia could be more willing to intervene in allied member states to reclaim former Soviet territory ― increasing the spread of authoritarianism and leading to more human rights violations like those observed in Russia. Eliminating allies’ existing cooperation on counterterrorism could increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Similarly, ending cooperation on cyberdefense could make more states susceptible to cyberattacks by Russia, China and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations.

#### This has empirically deterred Russian aggression, however, if NATO were to disband or the US reduce contributions, Hardt continues it

Heidi Hardt, 7-16-2018, HuffPost, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-hardt-trump-nato\_n\_5b4c9dfde4b022fdcc5b89d6</span>, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS

Simply put, withdrawing from NATO would make the world less safe. It would likely increase the risk of attacks on allies and reopen the possibility of conflict among them. As part of the original [North Atlantic Treaty](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf), NATO’s critical Article 5 binds together the security of 29 member states; an attack on one state is considered an attack on all of them. The article was intended to act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, and recent history suggests that it still serves this purpose against Vladimir Putin’s Russia. For example, Estonia, Lithuania and other former Soviet states that are now NATO allies have so far found themselves to be immune to a Russian incursion of ground troops. However, Russia did intervene in Georgia and in Ukraine ― two states seeking NATO membership. These actions suggest that Putin perceives Article 5 as a credible commitment by allies to defend its eastern border. In addition to providing collective defense for its member states, NATO has two other core [tasks](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm): crisis management and cooperative security. The organization intervenes in crises around the globe on a scale that no one state has preferred to handle alone. The alliance is engaged in military operations around the world, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, with a renewed commitment to extend the latter operation till 2024. In addition to training Afghan security forces, NATO has committed to a new training mission in Iraq. The alliance also provides a forum for states to work together and teach one another in domains of common interest, such as arms control, counterterrorism and cybersecurity. After Russia’s internationally disputed annexation of Crimea, NATO reprioritized collective defense. The [declaration](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm) that came out of this year’s NATO summit labels Russia as an aggressor that has undermined the “rules-based world order.” The alliance also disincentivizes conflict among its member states. Wars begin for many reasons, from leaders’ misperceptions to miscommunications and information gaps about capabilities and intentions. By regularly engaging in dialogue, NATO diplomats and military leaders ensure that disagreements among allies do not become conflicts ― all while working together to address common security problems. Importantly, the organization provides infrastructure, in the form of political and military headquarters in Belgium, where representatives of the member states communicate every day about security issues. Past studies in international relations have shown that providing such institutionalized cooperation can be an effective means of preventing conflicts. For the U.S. to leave NATO, or for the organization to disband, would bring significant risks to the internal and external security of its member states ― including the U.S. Although the U.S. spends significantly more of its gross domestic product on defense than any other country, it is not exempt from threats to its national security. After the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time. The alliance has been key in supporting reductions in nuclear stockpiles. Without the security of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, European states without nuclear weapons might be more likely to consider acquiring them, increasing the risk of an intentional or accidental nuclear attack. Additional security risks could result from the end of NATO. Russia could be more willing to intervene in allied member states to reclaim former Soviet territory ― increasing the spread of authoritarianism and leading to more human rights violations like those observed in Russia. Eliminating allies’ existing cooperation on counterterrorism could increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Similarly, ending cooperation on cyberdefense could make more states susceptible to cyberattacks by Russia, China and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations.

#### Specifically, due to NATO’s perceived weakness and inability to respond to an invasion, Moscow would invade the Baltics as Jack Beauchamp writes in 2016 that

Zack Beauchamp, 7-21-2016, "Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS

According to [some Russia experts](http://www.interpretermag.com/putin-believes-he-can-win-a-war-with-nato-piontkovsky-says/), Vladimir Putin’s ultimate wish in Europe is to break NATO. The way to do that, according to these scholars, is to expose the Article 5 guarantee as hollow: to show that when push comes to shove, the United States or other large NATO powers wouldn’t actually defend the weaker states. The Baltic states would be the most likely scenario for this to happen. They are very small, they’re right on Russia’s borders, and they aren't really all that important to Western countries' own security. By threatening these states, Russia would force a question: Are the United States, Britain, and France really willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in defense of a tiny state?

#### The impact is death. The Baltic states would force their civilians to fight in a ‘total defense’ strategy if Russia invades. Michael Peck writes that

Michael Peck, 10-21-2017, "If Russia Ever Invades the Baltics, This Is the Plan to Make It as Painful as Possible," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-russia-ever-invades-the-baltics-the-plan-make-it-painful-22807" Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS

The Baltic states have a plan to defend themselves against Russian invasion: mobilize their societies for the struggle. Should Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania go to war, their civilian populations will play a large part in the struggle, according to two RAND Corporation researchers. However, it’s not by choice. “As small countries with little strategic depth and limited human and economic resources, they are increasingly adopting a ‘total defense’ approach to national security, which includes enabling civilians to be able to protect themselves and to also support their nation’s professional armed forces in case of a conflict,” write Marta Kepe and Jan Osburg in [Small Wars Journal](http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/total-defense-how-the-baltic-states-are-integrating-citizenry-into-their-national-security-). The three nations only have a combined population of 6.2 million people, with about twenty-two thousand troops and 450 artillery pieces, but no tanks or jets. Russia can muster 845,000 troops—three hundred thousand in western Russia alone—backed by 2,600 tanks, 5,500 artillery pieces and almost 1,400 warplanes. Planning for a conventional conflict with Russia would be pointless. Despite popular resistance, an authoritarian nation like Russia might simply choose to absorb the costs of occupying all or parts of the Baltic states. Russia’s hybrid-warfare strategy, using a low-cost mixture of local irregulars backed by special forces and some regular troops, would be a relatively low cost way of seizing Baltic territory. In the end, no clever strategy can change the fact that Russia is big and the Baltic states are small. Nonetheless, as in any situation where there is bullying, simply declaring your readiness to stand up to a bigger aggressor just might deter attack—or at least not leave you feeling so helpless.

# Other stuff

#### By increasing Chinese influences, more governments are able to get away with human rights abuses. Abbas Faiz indicates in 2019 that:

Abbas Faiz, 6-7-2019, “Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Undermining Human Rights?,” The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-undermining-human-rights/>, Date Accessed 9-17-2019 // JM

Last April, President Xi Jinping hailed the governments, companies, and organizations participating in China’s second Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum, which was held April 25-27, 2019. What he did not mention, but perhaps was pleased to know, was how political governance in most of those countries was edging toward the China model. China’s export of the BRI is reshaping the current perceptions of development around the world. It is also reshaping political processes. The BRI has a lure to many millions of people in Asia as the mighty arm of their economic hero pushing the United States out of the way. It also mesmerises people in Asia and Africa because they see the initiative as a mighty blow by their underdog hero against their former colonialists. China’s BRI has provided more job opportunities in its target countries, with the promises of better roads, hospitals, schools, and other income-generating infrastructure. It has also generated more authoritarianism — further weakening of judicial systems, more repression of dissent, more curbs on freedom of expression under China-inspired cyber security laws — all paving the way for government leaders to show allegiance to the Chinese governance model. The BRI has been a double success for China. It has shifted the global power balance in its favor. It has also given currency to China’s long held and self-serving argument that for development you need a strong authoritarian system undeterred by expectations of civil liberties and political pluralism. Addressing the side impact of China’s BRI on civil liberties outside China’s borders can be misinterpreted as siding with the United States in its trade war with China. This is a false assumption and must not deter genuine studies of the BRI’s impact on human rights. There is no dearth of studies on the United States’ negative impact on human rights around the world. More needs to be said about China’s record, too. For a study on China’s impact, the period 2014-2018 is important as it helped shape the political environment in which the BRI could flourish. This was the case in Pakistan. Even knowing that the BRI was informed by China’s pursuit of access to global markets, job opportunities for its own workforce [with reported tax breaks from Pakistan](https://www.dw.com/en/belt-and-road-forum-is-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-failing/a-48473486), and closer global control over cyber activity, the BRI’s development benefits for Pakistan — the pledge of $60 billion in loans, some with a reported low interest rate of 2 percent — are immense. Yet, BRI operations during 2014-2018 coincided with further curbs on civil liberties evident, among other measures, by the [Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act of 2016](https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/pakistan/report-pakistan/) — which Amnesty International has called “draconian” — that curbs peaceful internet use especially when critical of the authorities. Such curbs usually lead to the deepening of the inequality gap and harsher labor conditions. The 60,000 or so BRI-employed Pakistanis are not likely to have fared better than what Human Rights Watch calls [unfair and abusive labor practices in Pakistan](https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/23/no-room-bargain/unfair-and-abusive-labor-practices-pakistan). This was the case in other BRI linked countries. Since 2014, the government of Bangladesh has used every opportunity to remove human rights safeguards in law and practice, as I underlined in an Al Jazeera [Head to Head](https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/2019/02/gowher-rizvi-bangladesh-party-state-190227124251797.html) program earlier this year. The Maldives government’s defiance of human rights between 2014 and 2018 strikingly coincided with its growing closeness to China. The [government’s attack on human rights](https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/04/maldives-human-rights-in-free-fall-as-authorities-step-up-crackdown/) included the politicization of independent state institutions, including the judiciary, leading to sham trials of opposition leaders, curbs on freedom of the media, and an unexplained reluctance to stop attacks against journalists investigating corruption. This paved the way for an amendment to the Maldives Constitution that allowed the then-government to sell islands to China without a bidding process. Ominously, nearly all the governments signing onto the BRI are headed by administrations perceived to be [seriously corrupt](https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018). China’s poor human rights record, including its suppression of labor activism, has been widely documented by [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/) and [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet); yet a critique of China’s impact on human rights in other countries has been in short supply. The need to develop an independent scrutiny of China’s global expansion is more urgent now that the geopolitical tectonics are shifting. If it is right (and to me it is) to hold the United States and the United Kingdom to account for the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia, it should also be right to criticize China for the sale of arms to Bangladesh to which China is said to be the biggest [supplier](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh-relationship/). Civil society activists have frequently expressed their distrust about China’s creeping influence in their countries. Aspirations for democracy and human rights and distrust of China were at the heart of movements that have influenced the outcome of elections in several South Asian countries in recent years. These include Sri Lanka (2015), Pakistan (2018), and the Maldives (2018 ) where calls to distance the country from China have been unmistakably loud. These newly elected governments have consequently tried to rewrite the open invitation that their predecessors had extended to China only to find it is more airtight than they had expected. This was Sri Lanka’s experience. The government closed China’s operations after the 2015 elections. China demanded the return of its loans. The government could not repay, and allowed China to return. China has already locked itself firmly into the development processes in South Asia during the BRI’s formative years and is not likely to go away. Deeper scrutiny of its impact on civil liberties can undermine the wishes of any South Asian government to import and legitimize China’s style of governance in their country.