

## Agro Ecology shifting away in the status Quo

[http://www.slate.com/articles/health\\_and\\_science/future\\_tense/2012/04/agro\\_ecology\\_lessons\\_from\\_cuba\\_on\\_agriculture\\_food\\_and\\_climate\\_change\\_.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2012/04/agro_ecology_lessons_from_cuba_on_agriculture_food_and_climate_change_.html)

For many, especially government officials, choosing agro-ecology wasn't a red-blooded Communist decision. It was a practical one. They are quite ready for an industrial-agricultural relapse if the occasion arises. Recently, they have had an unlikely enabler: Hugo Chávez. In exchange for the 31,000 Cuban doctors who are treating Venezuelans, Cuba receives 100,000 barrels of oil a day, plus a great deal of chemical fertilizer. As a result, the parts of the country untouched by agro-ecology are starting to spray and sow like it's the 1980s again.

### **The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition — leverage, influence, redirect reform, scapegoat**

**Koenig, 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, "Time for a New Cuba Policy"  
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>) //CJC

The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. **The United States** should take the following actions unilaterally:

**Lift completely the economic embargo.** Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, **the United States** should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to achieve *normal trade relations* between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.<sup>36</sup> **The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban**

**government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights** in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the "Cinco Heroes" and their plight is well known.<sup>37</sup>

So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. "The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms." <sup>38</sup> The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base.

Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. "Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba's commitment to the organization's values."<sup>39</sup> These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights.

The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The

combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. **The United States would**

**gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes.**

**Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban**

government, **but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.**

There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes **without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government.** From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study

Group, "We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook." 40 The United States needs **to take the initiative away** from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome.

**One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy** "... the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external." 41 This situation may present the **United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don't have a scapegoat.** Conclusion The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world

are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. **The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy.** The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42 **The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser** in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited

influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can't stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

**Blanchfield 2015** [Mike Blanchfield, "Cuba Real Estate Not For International Buyers, Envoy Says," *The Canadian Press*, 6/06/15 [http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/06/cuban-property-not-up-for\\_n\\_7012498.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/06/cuban-property-not-up-for_n_7012498.html)] //WGC

"OTTAWA - Vast, sandy expanses of undeveloped Caribbean coastline, sprawling green countryside and the faded but lingering beauty of old Havana have sparked many a business development fantasy in some of Cuba's more entrepreneurial visitors.

Those dreams of new beach resorts, golf courses and condos seemed a little closer to reality after this past December, when presidents Raul Castro and Barack Obama declared Cuba and the U.S. would try to normalize relations after 53 years.

But **Cuba's top North American envoy has a special message to all those dreamers — keep dreaming.**

"We are not against selling property, but not freely," said Julio Garmendia Pena, the Cuban ambassador to Canada.

**"We want to keep the country for Cubans."**

In a recent speech in Ottawa to an audience of diplomats, academics and government officials, Pena made clear Cuba may be open to foreign investment, but buying land is not on the table.

Many obstacles remain to a full-on Cuban-American rapprochement, including two big ones — establishing diplomatic relations and lifting the crippling U.S. economic embargo, which Cuba simply calls the blockade.

But the biggest one is a long-running feud over property, valued at billions of dollars.

After Fidel Castro's communist revolution in 1959, the new Cuban government seized and nationalized U.S. assets across the country. These included the American-owned telephone company, utilities, sugar cane fields, and various properties, including several Hilton hotels.

When heiress Paris Hilton recently visited Havana and posted selfies in front of the old Hilton hotel, she was castigated online for thumbing her nose at the legacy that underwrites her current life of celebrity leisure.

The value of seized American assets has been estimated at as much as \$7 billion, much of it claimed by the very angry and influential Cuban expatriate community in Florida that reviles the Castros.

Like many other informed observers, Mark Entwistle, Canada's ambassador to Cuba from 1993-97, said Monday some sort of compensation agreement will have to be reached before Cuba and the U.S. can move forward.

As one of the founders of a Toronto-based boutique merchant bank (his partners include Belinda Stronach and former Onex executive Anthony Melman), Entwistle has spent a lot of time in Cuba the United States recently.

One refrain he is hearing in the U.S. these days goes like this: "How do I buy that piece of beachfront, how do I buy a downtown city block of Havana to redevelop it?"

**No time soon**, is Entwistle's standard answer, **because Cuba views land as a national asset that belongs to the state. "There's a sense, especially in the United States, that there's some gold rush bonanza is about to happen,"** said Entwistle.

**"This is largely informed by a tremendous lack of information and understanding of Cuba itself, and where the Cubans have come from, and who they are and where they're going."**

**Pena himself made clear that Cuba had learned lessons** from its pre-revolution era of American influence.

**"We already went through this,"** he said. "And at the end of the day, when we began to see who is owning these properties, it was a frightening list. So **we decided to be more careful in that direction.**"

Eventually, Entwistle said, Cuba will have to open itself up to more foreign investment if it wants to grow an economy hobbled by a half century of economic isolation from its massive neighbour 135 kilometres to the north.

But that doesn't mean Cuba will start selling off deeds and titles to hoteliers and developers, especially from the United States, he added.

**"A situation in the past, in Cuban history, where one country owned two-thirds of the national economy and all the utilities and phones and electricity and over 80 per cent of the fertile sugar lands and agricultural lands — that's not going to happen again."**

That is if you're an interested international buyer."

Hoffman, 2016 [Bert, Senior Research Fellow, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, "Is Cuba's reform going in reverse?", *The Conversation*,

<http://theconversation.com/is-cubas-reform-going-in-reverse-67830>] //AKC

**But the slow pace of reform in Cuba is raising questions about President Raúl Castro's legacy. Frustration has begun to set in, with energy cuts paralysing production, the economy shrinking, and the country's economic "updating process" seemingly going in reverse.**

What is derailing Cuba's much-anticipated reform course?

More questions than answers

With the economy forecast to decrease by 2.9% in 2016, the country's socialist government is reimposing price controls **and putting brakes on the emerging small-scale private sector.**

## US Sole link to prevent Pol uprising in Cuba Squo

Francisco Toro, JAN. 16, 2015 Cuba Is Hoping To Replace Venezuelan Oil With American Tourists

<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/cuba-is-hoping-to-replace-venezuelan-oil-with-american-tourists/>

**With the fall in oil prices, the original worries about the stability of Venezuela's post-Chávez leadership have only increased, raising the prospect of Venezuelan aid stopping altogether. Only very fast growth in Cuba's two other major dollar-earners — tourism and remittances — could possibly compensate for a loss of Venezuelan oil. Only a dramatic opening to the U.S. could prevent a full-scale social and political crisis that could imperil**

**the government's stability. Raul Castro is a calculating politician, and detente with the U.S. is a move calculated to help his regime survive.**

**Deforestation is the 2nd biggest problem in Cuba**

**Cepero, 2004** [Eudel, "ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS FOR A CUBA IN TRANSITION", *Cuba Transition Project*, [http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research\\_Studies/ECepero.pdf](http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/ECepero.pdf)] //AKC

**The ecological costs of the Cuban totalitarian model** have yet to be assessed; however, future generations will inevitably have to pay a high price to repair the damage. **Among the Cuban archipelago's most serious environmental problems are, in order of importance,** soil degradation, **deforestation**, water pollution and contamination, deterioration of urban environments, and loss of biodiversity.

**Goode 15** [Erica Goode, "Cuba's Environmental Concerns Grow With Prospect of U.S. Presence", *New York Times*, [https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/science/earth/cubas-environmental-concerns-grow-with-prospect-of-us-presence.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/science/earth/cubas-environmental-concerns-grow-with-prospect-of-us-presence.html?_r=0)] //BS

Cuban officials insist that **the country's strong environmental laws and commitment to protecting natural resources will hold up in the face of American money and influence.**

And they note that **Cuba is no stranger to** tourism: Europeans, Canadians, Australians and others flock to cafes in Old Havana, visit Vinyales or sun themselves on the beach at Varadero or Cayo Coco, resort areas that already have hotels, developed with the help of **foreign investment.**

**ABCC 14** [ABCC is a non-profit dedicated to curing brain cancer, "FDA Approves Scorpion Venom-based Tumor Paint for Brain Tumor Clinical Trial", *Accellerate Brain Cancer Cure*, <http://abc2.org/press-blog/2014/09/fda-approves-scorpion-venom-based-tumor-paint-brain-tumor-clinical-trial>] //BS

Olson and his team went to work and discovered a chlorotoxin found the venom of the deathstalker scorpion could attach itself to cancerous cells in rats.

"So when it binds to the cancer cell, it flips inside the cancer cell and makes them light up so the surgeon can see them in real time while they are operating," said Olson.

**Olson and his team created a synthetic version for tumor paint based on the DNA structure of the chlorotoxin in the venom.**

The patient comes to the doctor and has an injection of tumor paint just prior to surgery. Olson says as soon as the surgeon opens up the cavity "they can see what is cancer what is not cancer." Cancer tissue reflects green under a laser light. So far Tumor Paint has only been tested on lab rats and dogs that developed cancer.

## Threat of sanctions empirically works. Lifting gives more leverage.

ENRICO CARISCH. 2011. Global Threats and the Role of United Nations Sanctions

<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08819.pdf>

The Libyan assets freezes, the DRC natural resource sanctions, and the threat of additional sanctions on Côte d'Ivoire, appear to confirm what sanctions monitors have gleaned from years of monitoring targeted financial sanctions: **the mere threat of sanctions tends to cause behavioral adjustments by many actors.** Those who depend on a positive public image will likely comply, whereas others may take advantage of sanctions- busting bonus opportunities presented by the absence of effective enforcement efforts. Examples are privately held companies, parastatal entities, or companies that can raise capital and interact with stakeholders who perceive defiance of sanctions as a positive. The decision to comply or not is partly based on an assessment of the credibility of sanctions, i. e., the risks of non-compliance weighed against the benefits of compliance.

## Threat of sanctions more effective than implementation.

José Luengo-Cabrera, September 2015. On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools

[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report\\_25\\_EU\\_Sanctions.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_25_EU_Sanctions.pdf)

**The actual application of sanctions is uncertain, and the very threat of sanctions can play a major role in changing target behaviour.** A sanction does not only impose costs on the target, but also on the country that imposes the sanctions. After all, both countries have to forego the benefits of international trade. Therefore the actions and reactions of the actors involved need to be analysed comprehensively, and the analyst needs to deal with expectations.

This implies, first of all, that we need to acknowledge that the expected outcome ex ante may be different from the observed outcome ex post (for example, the target may think it unlikely that the sanction threat will actually be applied).

Sanctions 'bite' most when they are unanticipated

Sanctions that are expected by the target give rise to activities that reduce their impact, such as stockpiling, setting up import substitution, refocusing exports and imports on non-traditional markets and reducing dependency on foreign capital and trade in general. Unexpectedness can be achieved by contingency planning, short deliberations, quick implementation, the engagement of unexpected (nontraditional) sanction imposers, and the use of instruments (new types of sanctions or restrictive measures) that have not been used before.

**The threat of sanctions is more effective than the actual imposition of sanctions**

Full toolset i.e. threat of sanctions and sanctions is stronger than sanctions alone.

Thomas Biersteker, The Graduate Institute, Geneva. 2011.

[http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG\\_images/Sanctions/Sanctions.pdf](http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG_images/Sanctions/Sanctions.pdf)

**The effectiveness of sanctions is typically assessed as a function of a policy outcome and some estimate of the sanctions contribution to that outcome.** The latter is especially difficult to measure, since it implicitly requires a counterfactual assessment of what would have happened in the absence of sanctions. It is made more difficult by the challenges of isolating the independent impacts of sanctions, as just discussed. A great deal of the literature on the effectiveness of sanctions is case specific, time delineated, and anecdotal. The assessment of ongoing sanctions is always provisional, based on the moment in time of the evaluation. The quantitative empirical literature on sanctions also combines an assessment of policy outcome and sanctions contribution. Most large-N empirical studies of sanctions group different types of sanctions (unilateral, multilateral regional and global) into aggregate data bases and conclude that they are effective about one-third of the time (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg 2007; Morgan et. al 2008). A more recent survey of the effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions only has concluded that sanctions are effective in the aggregate only 22% of the time (Biersteker et. al, 2013). The research on UN targeted sanctions distinguishes between the different purposes of sanctions (to coerce, constrain, and signal, as discussed above) and finds that efforts to constrain and signal are almost three times as effective as efforts to coerce, which succeed only 10% of the time. **There are theoretical reasons to believe that the threat of sanctions might be more effective in coercing a change in behavior than the actual imposition of the measures, as has been argued in some of the formal theory work on the subject (Hovi, Husby and Sprinz, 2005).** All implemented policy measures have both intended and unintended consequences. **Sanctions tend to leave legacies of criminality (Andreas 2005), a strengthening of authoritarian rule, and an increase in human rights violations in the targeted countries.** In some instances, the externalities can be more positive, however, particularly when the measures increase the capacity of states to monitor suspicious financial transactions (Biersteker 2010). Despite their limited effectiveness in coercing changes in behavior, sanctions are likely to remain an important instrument of contemporary global governance. **When applied in combination with other policy measures (negotiations, legal referrals, threats and use of force) they can constrain actors from engaging in proscribed activities** and if properly designed and communicated, can be a highly effective way to enforce international norms.

**Raul Castro Wants reforms, Phased out two-currency system, Embargo remains obstacle to international trade — 800m in fines**

**Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2014** ["Cuba's Wave of Change: The Lingering Impact of the Embargo," COHA. Accessed at: <http://www.coha.org/cubas-waves-of-change-the-lingering-impact-of-the-embargo/>.] //DNP

Havana's atmosphere is one of change and reform. Cuban President **Raúl** Modesto Castro Ruz **has steadily implemented a series of economic reforms**, not so much dialing back the

revolution as **creating a new, more pragmatic path to Cuban socialism**. In a world where many socialist countries have enacted private market measures which served to create new capitalistic oligarchies, Cuba has taken a different route. Havana has opened up the economy in a number of ways, allowing Cubans to buy foreign cars and buy and sell real estate, issuing more permits for entrepreneurs to initiate their own businesses, and lifting harsh restrictions on foreign business investment on the island. Despite these widespread changes, U.S. policy towards Cuba has remained a product of its Cold War rhetoric. President Castro's reforms ensure new developments for Cuba and its socialism, but they also highlight long overdue changes needed in U.S. policy. Easing into privatization, Havana has taken the initiative by issuing more licenses to those looking to start small businesses [1]. These privatization reforms have led many Cubans with savings, like successful artists, doctors, engineers, diplomats, and others with foreign currency, to leave their public sector jobs and start their own enterprises [2]. There are now over 450,000 private businesses registered on the island, and the number continues to rise [3]. Additionally, President Castro has modified real-estate law so that Cubans can now buy and sell their homes, allowing them to use their homes as a liquid financial asset [4]. Furthermore, **Havana has phased out its two-**

**currency system**, under which the more valuable Cuban Convertible Peso was being used as currency for foreigners while the lower-valued peso (a rate of 1 Convertible Peso to 25 pesos) was being used by Cubans [5]. Although the process of merging these two currencies has generated some confusion surrounding the official value of the new currency, these measures should promote economic opportunity and growth on the island in the long-run [6]. Critics of these free-market reforms, however, say that they are compromising the socialist integrity of the Cuban welfare system and, consequently, Cuban society. In an attempt to stimulate participation in the public sector, the government has laid off approximately 500,000 government employees [7]. Government planners hoped that this measure could also focus labor on more prosperous areas of the economy, such as lagging farm sectors. These reforms are reminiscent of the economic initiatives to be found in the People's Republic of China, beginning under Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1978, which eventually led to the destruction of the Iron Rice Bowl, the state's social welfare system. Although China's reforms led to a huge increase in GDP growth, many Chinese were left out of this prosperity. However, a Cuban Justice Ministry official denied any compromise in Cuba's socialist integrity, arguing that the Cuban welfare system would remain intact: "No one will be put on the street...the system of social justice will never be put at risk." [8] Contrary allegations of being anti-Socialist, these reforms are not intended to dismantle Cuba's socialist system. They were a pragmatic response to factors such as the collapse of aid from the USSR, episodic natural disasters, a sagging display in world trade, and the continued hindrance of the U.S. embargo. Havana stresses that despite Cuba's loss in foreign trade and slow GDP growth in the last several years (having an average GDP growth rate over the last five years of 2.1 percent), not a single school or hospital has been closed [9]. Cuba has been able to weather countless troubles throughout the last several decades without compromising its social integrity; this is a fact that Cubans should be (and are) proud of. It is also important to note that 65 percent of Cuba's GDP growth in 2011 was from its public sector, namely from healthcare, education, defense, and commerce [10]. The government's stated goal with these new reforms is to revamp the country's economic and social system in order to address the recent challenges, all without compromising the socialist ideals of the revolution. Alain Pena, Third Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations, has stated "No one will be left unprotected" economically, politically, and socially during the reforms [11]. Along with the free-market reforms for Cubans, there have been numerous reforms made on behalf of foreign investors and multinational corporations. The administration of President Castro Ruz has recently completed construction a modern port facility in the new Special Development Zone (SDZ) of Mariel [12]. Within the SDZ, foreign investors and companies are allowed to install factories, research centers, and freely import raw materials. All of this is in addition to the 10-year long tax exemption that they may obtain [13]. Brazil's investment of \$957 million USD into the new port and SDZ serves as an example of Cuba's success in attracting larger amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) [14]. Brazil is joined by China, Venezuela, Russia, the Netherlands, Mexico, Spain, and Germany, all of which have taken advantage of initiatives to develop their economic ambitions within Cuba's SDZ [15]. The Cuban legislature responded to this influx of capital by approving legislation in April which recognizes that FDI should play an integral role in the future growth of the Cuban economy [16]. As an added bonus, this legislation allows majority foreign ownership in

joint-ventures between Cuba and foreign multinational corporations in the SDZ, and reduces taxes on wages paid locally by foreign investors [17]. This **change in attitude toward foreign companies and investors demonstrates President Castro Ruz's desire to help spur economic growth** in Cuba. It is evident that his policies are much more open to global markets than those of his brother, Cuba's longtime leader Fidel Castro Ruz. However, this change in policy is due to the President not having the financial support of the socialist countries that his brother heavily relied upon. In this regard, it is evident that Havana's reforms are born out of a pragmatic assessment of the economic environment now surrounding Cuba. Even the first Vice

President of the Council of State, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, has said that **Cuba needs more hardline reforms if it wants to mend its deeply troubled economy** [18]. Díaz-Canel Bermúdez had administered economic reforms in the provinces of Villa Clara and Holguín, all the while keeping tight party control over reforms in both provinces [19]. With President Castro Ruz set to step down in 2018 and Vice President Díaz-Canel predicted to take over, Cuba will continue to experience reforms with government oversight. Despite these practical changes in Havana, the United States continues to strangle the Cuban people after 60 years of denying the country the ability to fully pursue economic prosperity. In an email to the author, the Press Officer at the Cuban Interest Section in Washington, Juan Jacomino, made reference to a Cuban report on UN Resolution 67/4 by saying: "in addition to **being the main obstacle for Cuba's overall national development, the U.S. economic circle stands in the way of the island's expansion of its trade relations with the world, severely impedes international cooperation to and by Cuba, and is marked by gross harassment of Cuba's international financial transactions.**"

That same report states that as of 2013 Cuba has lost over \$1 billion USD because of the embargo and that it prevents Cuba from accessing capital markets for investment and growth, thereby harming Cuba's domestic industries [20]. The U.S. embargo hovers over Cuba as a reminder of America's anti-communist, imperialist agenda that once dominated the island's affairs. The embargo was made official law in 1992 and 1996 with the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts, respectively, which institutionalized it in the U.S. legislature (previously, the embargo had merely been upheld only by an executive order) [21]. These measures state that Cuba must abide by humiliating concessions in order for the embargo to be lifted. These include handing over all property owned by U.S. companies prior to 1959 (which was over 70 percent of the island), embracing a U.S.-approved government, and submitting itself to the U.S. court system so that U.S. citizens can file suits against Cuba for lost property and capital [22]. **Coupled with these exaggerated demands is the embargo's responsibility for driving away foreign business in Cuba by imposing more than \$800 million USD in fees on European and Canadian companies** [23]. This shows that the embargo preventing Cuba's desired degree of involvement with the world economy [24].

## **Trade liberalization makes countries invest in safety nets**

**Wilson Center 2005** ["The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Poverty," *Wilson Center*. Accessed at: [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ImpactofTrade\\_low.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ImpactofTrade_low.pdf).] //DNP

These findings pointed toward a theme that recurred throughout the remainder of the conference: that **countries that liberalize trade will often need to undertake complementary changes** in other areas as well, **in order to enhance the impact of trade reform, ensure that the poor fully share in the benefits, and minimize transitional income and employment**

**losses for the poor.** Examples of complementary measures cited included **improved education; investments in rural roads and other infrastructure; support for agricultural research and extension; and the creation of effective social safety nets for the poor.** Mexico's

PROGRESA program is an excellent example of policies that helped boost education and health care for the poor, while ameliorating some of the challenges that can result from economic liberalization. Regarding labor markets, both panelists voiced strong support for core labor standards, but cited excessive minimum wages and stringent regulations on hiring and firing workers as serious barriers to hiring the poor. The discussant, Bruce Strokes, expressed concern that the debate in Washington, D.C. over the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would center on the effects of the agreement on the United States instead of addressing the more significant impact of the agreement on Central American countries.

## **IMF causes communist transition**

**Roaf 2014** [James, "25 Years of Transition: Post-Communist Europe and the IMF," *Regional Economic Issues Report*. Accessed at:

[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei\\_sr\\_102414.pdf](https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_102414.pdf).] //DNP

The **IMF has been closely involved with the transition process from the start.** In fact, some of the countries had joined the IMF well before 1989, with the Fund providing financial and technical support to early reform steps in Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia in the 1980s. But it was after the collapse of communism in 1989 that the main expansion of the Fund's membership and activities took place, with 25 new members from the ex-socialist bloc joining by the end of 1993. These **countries were almost all in parlous economic conditions and in desperate need of foreign financing and advice.** The arrival of the new members was the most significant development in the Fund's history since the ending of the Bretton Woods exchange rates system two decades earlier. It required a major expansion of all three of the main areas of IMF activity: Surveillance, meaning advice on both individual country policies and multilateral issues such as the dismantling of the ruble zone; **Program lending**, by which the IMF provided **financing to support countries' economic stabilization programs**, with disbursements conditioned on implementation of key policy measures; and **Training and technical assistance**, whereby teams of experts in a particular field worked closely with the country authorities **to help design and implement specific reforms** such as the adoption of a value-added tax, establishing new monetary policy frameworks, or strengthening expenditure controls. IMF staffing was upgraded accordingly, along with expertise in economic and legal issues relating to transition. At least, to the extent that such expertise existed. The problem was that the countries were in uncharted territory; no one at the Fund, or elsewhere, knew for sure how to create a market economy from scratch after decades of distortions under central planning. Thus, the **early programs involved a significant element of "learning by doing," jointly between the country authorities, IMF staff and other international advisors.**

**Fast and extensive reform empirically better in LITERALLY every metric — also TURNS gradualism negs**

**Tupy 2016** [Marian, "25 Years of Reforms in Ex-Communist Countries," *Cato Institute*.

Accessed at: <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/25-years-reforms-ex-communist-countries-fast-extensive-reforms-led>.] //DNP

**The transition from socialism to the market economy produced a divide between those who advocated rapid, or "big-bang" reforms, and those who advocated a gradual approach.** More than 25 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, providing ample empirical data to test those approaches. Evidence shows that early and **rapid reformers by far outperformed gradual reformers, both on economic measures such as GDP per capita and on social indicators such as the United Nations Human Development Index.** A key argument for gradualism was that too-rapid reforms would cause great social pain. In reality, **rapid reformers experienced shorter recessions and recovered much earlier than gradual reformers.** Indeed a much broader measure of well-being, the Human Development Index, points to the same conclusion: the **social costs of transition in rapidly reforming countries were lower.** Moreover, the advocates of gradualism argued that institutional

development should precede market liberalization, thus increasing the latter's effectiveness. In a strict sense, it is impossible to disprove this argument, for no post-communist country followed that sequence of events. In all post-communist countries, **institutional development lagged considerably behind economic reforms**. Waiting for institutional development before implementing economic reforms could easily have become a prescription for no reforms at all. However, after 25 years, **rapid reformers ended up with better institutions than gradual reformers**. This outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that **political elites who were committed to economic liberalization were also committed to subsequent institutional development**. Conversely, **political elites that advocated gradual reforms often did so in order to extract maximum rents from the economy**. One **extreme consequence of gradualism was the formation of oligarchic classes**. When it comes to the speed and depth of reforms, the relative position of countries has remained largely unchanged. Most countries that moved ahead early are still farthest ahead.

[...]

Seventh, "inputs and output" are positively correlated. **Countries that did the most to liberalize achieved the highest GDP per capita increases, experienced the least widening income distribution, suffered the lowest poverty ratio increase, and achieved the best scores in the HDI**. It should also be noted that non-GDP performance more or less mirrored GDP performance. That is to say, all countries that saw a decline in output in their first years experienced a worsening of welfare and a widening of the income gap between rich and poor. Yet as soon as GDP recovery began, social deterioration stopped. Since the **early reformers were the first to experience a recovery of economic output**, they also **experienced the least social costs**. They were additionally the first to enjoy the **benefits of transition—higher income, an end to shortages, access to a wide variety of goods, and improved quality of goods**.<sup>6</sup>

The most important question facing excommunist nations was whether to opt for gradual or rapid reforms. If economic performance is the main measure of success, the data speaks loudly. Countries that moved early and rapidly on reforms have performed far better. Why? As Anders Aslund of the Atlantic Council, Peter Boone of the London School of Economics, and Simon Johnson of Duke University noted in 1996, notwithstanding the mathematical sophistication and elegance of gradualist models, big-bang reforms

worked better because of the political economy in excommunist countries.<sup>33</sup>As these authors correctly understood, the **former communist elites in gradualist countries generally accepted that a new capitalist regime was inevitable, but they wanted to retain their privileged or ruling status**. Soon, they **enriched themselves through corrupt privatization schemes**. In a word, the gradualist model was too easily abused. Moreover, **rapid reforms, including price liberalization, trade liberalization, and business deregulation, quickly induced resource reallocation from inefficient communist dinosaurs to new firms, and that led to an early recovery of output**. Even in Poland and Slovenia, where the privatization of large state enterprises was long delayed, economic recovery came between 1993 and 1994.<sup>34</sup> The huge social pain of much longer recessions in the gradualist countries should not be underestimated. Certainly the continued decline of HDI values in the FSU suggests that the social pain was considerable.<sup>35</sup> As mentioned, institutional development in big-bang countries lags behind market liberalization, although it trends upward. The extensive literature on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) clearly shows that institutions matter. But they matter more for sustaining growth over the long term than for jumpstarting growth after a recession. So a complete establishment of good institutional structure was not initially needed. That it took centuries, not years, to build institutions in today's advanced market economies is one of the key lessons from the pioneer of the NIE school, the Nobel laureate economist Douglass North.<sup>36</sup> Just how much institutional development is needed to restart growth remains an unanswered question, but it is clear that the progress achieved by the mid-1990s in the CEB group was sufficient to sustain a comparatively higher rate of growth (see Figure 5). The evidence on sequencing also points to the fact that political leaders in gradualist countries may have been less than sincere. In spite of their frequent protestations that going slowly was necessary to allow time to build proper market institutions, nothing of the sort has happened (see Figure 5). There is not a single case of a country where improved institutional quality preceded liberalization. Critics of rapid reforms contended that the stress on economic fundamentals caused international financial institutions to ignore institutional development. Again, Figure 5 contradicts that contention. The **countries that took care of fundamentals early (that is, countries that achieved financial stabilization and market liberalization), also moved earlier and more resolutely in terms of institutional development**.

[...]

Twenty-five years of evidence resolves most, but not all, of the major questions concerning transition from communist dictatorship to capitalism and democracy. The main debate between rapid and gradual reformers seems to be settled in favor of the former. The empirical correlation between the **speed of reforms and relevant measures of economic and social results shows that rapid reformers far outperformed gradual reformers.** The argument of the big-bang proponents that **delaying reforms would permit rent-seeking and state capture by the economic elite has been largely confirmed in the rise of the oligarchs.** Rich capitalists have, of course, arisen in all transition economies, but their **concentration and degree of political influence appears to be far higher in slowly reforming countries,** in particular the large economies of the former USSR. Moreover, trends held strongly over the past 25 years. Early reform leaders still lead, and most of the laggards still lag. Breaking out of the gradualist mold is not easy, although that was precisely what some people tried to accomplish through the various “color revolutions.” Alas, only one true success story can be found. That success story is Georgia, and even the Georgian example is not a complete success.<sup>47</sup> As to the timing of institutional development, the arguments that it should precede liberalization are not supported by the historical facts. Neither the rapid reformers, nor the international financial institutions, ignored institutional development. The fastest progress on institutions was made by the very same countries that undertook rapid liberalization. The above does not, of course, rule out the logic of a counterfactual argument that some scholars still make today—that is, had the rapid reformers moved even earlier and faster on institutional development, things would have turned out even better. Unfortunately, no basis exists for testing this hypothesis. There has not been a single case of a country that reformed its institutions in advance of market liberalization.<sup>48</sup> While the transition is largely over in the most advanced ex-communist countries, legal and regulatory reforms remain unfinished. The lessons from the most advanced countries are not complicated. Countries need to ensure financial stability, and to continue to deregulate and simplify their regulations in order to eliminate corruption and rent-seeking. The countries of the former USSR are much farther behind. State capture and rentseeking by oligarchs is high, and vested interests have a lot to lose from liberalization.<sup>49</sup> In a few instances, where **popular democratic movements created a new window of opportunity for reform** (Serbia, 2000; Georgia, 2003; Ukraine, 2004; Kyrgyz Republic, 2005; and Ukraine again, 2014), **governments became more amenable to reform,** although the new efforts may not have always succeeded.

## Khan Overview shit

Khan, 2016 [Ramona, “Normalization Policies with Cuba: Implications for Political and Economic Reform”, *City University of New York*,

[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk\\_In8CsY/edit#](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk_In8CsY/edit#)]

**Arguments that negotiating with the Cuban government will weaken the United States’ status internationally does not stand up since the U.S. negotiates with other nations that have similar political systems (China, Russia, Iran, to name a few).** As part of the ongoing process, challenges will present themselves, but it seems that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Ending the trade embargo could create thousands of jobs for Americans in farming and other areas. **Lifting the sanctions will help Cuba to reintegrate into the world community and be able to compete globally. It will bring Cuba out of political and economic isolation while ensuring the United States’ economy benefits. The United States will be able to rebuild its geopolitical influence in other Latin American countries as well.**<sup>167</sup> The U.S. embargo and its support for Cuba’s exclusion from the Summit of the Americas have resulted in broken relationships with the Latin American region. Regaining influence seemed to be a determining factor for the normalization policy within the Obama administration. **Restoring relations allowed the United States to present itself as country willing to engage in mutual partnerships within the Caribbean region. Any backpedaling to this policy could impede on Cuba’s reintegration into the inter-American community and have the U.S. face backlash in the form of uncooperativeness within the Latin American and Caribbean**

**region. Continuous criticism from the Latin American region have created isolation for the United States. A Brookings Institute report in 2009 concluded that U.S. policy toward Cuba have had the opposite effect, namely, “undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and Latin America.”**<sup>169</sup> Failure of the United States to require Latin American countries to uphold sanctions on Cuba is a testament to the loss of influence in this region. Almost every Latin American country has diplomatic relations with Cuba. Once the Organization of American States (OAS) lifted its sanctions in the 70’s, almost all of Latin America resumed trade with Cuba. These trade agreements have resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars for the region. With Cuba’s generous support in humanitarian aid (doctors) to Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba is viewed as an “international leader in establishing coalitions among developing nations.”<sup>170</sup> Of course, one could argue that Cuba’s generous humanitarian aid to the Caribbean and Latin America is not based on altruism but on maintaining influence and economic benefits from trade relations within this region.

Llana, 2010. “As Fidel Castro and his Cuban revolution fade, is Cuba rising?” NOVEMBER 27, 2010. Sara Miller Llana. Christian Science Monitor.  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1127/As-Fidel-Castro-and-his-Cuban-revolution-fade-is-Cuba-rising>

That is where many see a role for the Cuban community in the US, estimated at about 1.5 million. At least 1 million households in Cuba receive remittances totaling \$1.4 billion annually. The average amount sent is \$200 a month – 10 times the average monthly salary in Cuba. Manuel Orozco, a remittances expert at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, estimates that 10 percent of Cubans receiving remittances could eventually use that to invest in small business – to upgrade tool sets, fix car motors, or build extra bedrooms to rent to tourists. But it depends on how far the government is willing to take reform. Optimists point to positive change, including proposed access to microcredit and hiring rules that allow Cubans to employ more than just family members, so that they can form enterprises, says Mr. Spadoni. Yet questions abound: Where will they buy their products? Who will be able to pay for services? Will high taxes undermine businesses before they even get off the ground? Will taxes dissuade many from taking legal routes and drive entrepreneurs into the black market? **Even the government plan for private enterprise, leaked and circulating in a PDF document, acknowledges that many new businesses "could fail within a year" because of a lack of expertise and training, among other factors.** The Cuban exile community, once dedicated to the overthrow of Castro and the triumphant return of capitalistic investment to its homeland, has aged. And younger Cuban-Americans are more wary of investing too heavily. "The Cuban-American community will help, but nobody here is going to take out half a million dollars and plunk it into a business in Cuba with the system as it is," observes Jaime Suchlicki, director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami. **"There's no equipment, so any business is going to be very rudimentary, and who will buy their services? They are going to have a high rate of failure."**

## **Altieri goes aff**

**Philpott, 2016.** "Cuba's Organic Revolution: Coming to Your Fridge?" TOM PHILPOTT MAR. 23, 2016 5:00 AM. Mother Jones.

<http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2016/03/cuba-us-agribusiness-coalition-obama-vilsack-cargill>

Of course, most of what Cargill and its **US peers want to export into Cuba doesn't compete directly with these products—they're more interested in exporting things like corn and soybeans. At least initially, they'll be trying to displace commodity-crop producers in Brazil, Canada, and the European Union, not market gardeners in Havana.** For that reason, **the eventual end of the embargo don't present an immediate threat to Cuba's small producers,** said **Miguel Altieri**, a professor in the department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management at the University of California–Berkeley who visits Cuba regularly. **"The basic situation hasn't changed for the peasant movement," he said. Even if US firms eventually buy land in Cuba to grow export crops—say, pineapples or mangoes—it wouldn't necessarily affect the smallholder movement, he said, because only about 70 percent of Cuba's arable rural land is currently in production. So there's room for both the kind of industrial production that might interest US agribusiness firms and the small operations currently supplying Cubans with fresh food.**

## **Development leads to democratization in the medium and long-term despite short term negative effects**

**Treisman 2013** [Daniel Treisman political science professor, "Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover," *American Journal of Political Science*. Accessed at:

[https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/PAPERS\\_NEW/Democracy%20%20May%202013.pdf.](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/PAPERS_NEW/Democracy%20%20May%202013.pdf.)] //DNP

While some believe that economic development promotes democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that **development is associated with more democratic government—but in the medium run (10 to 20 years).** This is because **higher income usually only prompts a breakthrough to more democratic politics after the incumbent leader leaves office.** And in the **short run, faster economic growth increases the leader's survival odds.** I present evidence that leader turnover matters because **reformist leaders are selected out over time,** so long-serving leaders rarely reform. Authoritarian leaders also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why dictators, concerned only to prolong their own rule, often end up preparing their countries for breakthroughs to democracy after they eventually lose power.

## **No revolutions**

**Monica Hirst.** Brazilian-U.S. expert in international affairs based in Buenos Aires, professor in the Department of Economics and Administration at Quilmes National University. "Cuban-Latin

American and Caribbean relations: challenges beyond normalization” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. June 2013. February 7, 2017.

As the Cuban regime celebrated its 50th anniversary a wave of **progressive governments unleashed a non-violent process of change in Latin America**.<sup>3</sup> Holding stronger ties with Latin American countries while aiming to leave behind years of isolation and selective bilateral bonds is referred to in Cuba as a process of “normalisation”. In fact, **Cuban-Latin American relations are not nostalgic and do not at all follow a Proustian logic of the “search for a lost time”. Revolutionary processes that involve the use of violence and insurgency are no longer perceived in the region as a necessary pathway to social change and international autonomy.** Widespread social inclusion policies accompanied by economic measures aiming to protect national sovereignty have been pursued with no major damage to the rule of law in various parts of the region, in certain cases maintaining and deepening the democratic foundations, and preserving the rules of the market economy game.

## **EU trade with Cuba depends on US embargo**

**Hirst of Quilmes University 13** Monica Hirst. Brazilian-U.S. expert in international affairs based in Buenos Aires, professor in the Department of Economics and Administration at Quilmes National University. “Cuban-Latin American and Caribbean relations: challenges beyond normalization” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. June 2013. February 7, 2017.

Europe is Cuba’s second-largest trading partner (after Venezuela), and relations therefore benefit from bilateral understandings and commercial preferences. The EU does not support the U.S. blockade in any way. **In terms of business, European expectations are based on the “day after” the suspension of the U.S. blockade, particularly in areas such as tourism, services and infrastructure, since European investments are affected by the limitations imposed by U.S. legislation.** With the current economic crises Europeans face at home, the importance of expanding markets and foreign direct investment in Latin American and Caribbean countries has been reinforced. **Even more meaningful than potentially expanding the Cuban domestic market are expectations that the island could become a regional hub to serve neighbouring islands together with the south-east of the U.S.** (Feinberg, 2012: 15).

## **The embargo affects any company trying to do business in the US**

**Gordon 16** Joy Gordon. Ethics and International Affairs. “El Bloqueo: The Cuban embargo continues” *Harper’s Magazine*. July 2016. Accessed February 8, 2017.

As Cuba developed new initiatives to revive its economy, the embargo targeted each in turn. This included Cuba’s leading exports: nickel and sugar. Nickel is used in the manufacture of stainless steel, and Cuba is among the world’s largest producers. **The Helms–Burton law makes it illegal to export any metal object to the United States if it contains even trace amounts of Cuban nickel. The same is true of sugar — any company that sells candy in the United States may not include even tiny amounts of Cuban sugar in its products. In effect, the embargo means that any company that wants to do business in the United States has to boycott Cuba, or lose access to American markets themselves.**

## China Pulls away now

Andres **Oppenheimer** [Columbia University]. December **2016**. “China filling the vacuum created in Latin America.” Albuquerque Journal. <https://www.abqjournal.com/917278/china-filling-the-vacuum-created-in-latin-america.html>

Judging from what I hear from Latin American presidents and diplomats, Xi sees an opportunity to increase China’s presence in Latin America despite the recent decline in Chinese-Latin American bilateral trade and investments. **China’s trade with the region**, which soared over the past 10 years and reached its peak in 2013, **declined by 11 percent over the past two years, largely because of China’s economic slowdown**, according to U.N figures. In addition, China is stuck with billions in bad loans to Venezuela and Cuba.

## **Faster Reform Better but current Reforms fail — reliance on Venezuela**

**Mesa-Lago 2016** [Carmelo, “Can Cuba’s Economic Reform Succeed?,” *Americas Quarterly*.

Accessed at: <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/can-cubas-economic-reforms-succeed.>] //DNP

It is difficult to assess the impact of the reforms, a task made harder by the lack of reliable statistical series published by the government. At a macro level the reforms have failed to generate the economic growth the country needs. Official growth targets since 2009 have not been met, and economic growth has been among the lowest in the region. Cuba’s annual average rate of 1.7 percent from 2009 to 2014 suggests that the reforms have not helped to boost economic growth. Even these relatively paltry economic growth rates have been masked by the island economy’s dependence on Venezuela. The **oil-rich Bolivarian state accounts for 43 percent of Cuban trade, supplies 60 percent of its oil needs and is the leading direct investor**. I estimate the combined **value of the whole economic relationship with Venezuela** at about \$13 billion, tantamount to **21 percent of Cuban GDP**. However, as the serious economic and political problems mount in Venezuela—negative economic growth, double-digit inflation, declining oil production, and political instability—Cuba’s deep ties to Venezuela look increasingly risky. At the same time, reforms in the agricultural sector, while important, have failed to fill gaps in production. A year after the 2009 agricultural reforms, agricultural output fell by 5 percent, and grew 0.5 percent in 2012, but against a goal of 2.2 percent. The preliminary estimate for 2013 is 2.6 percent growth in the sector; but the production index in 2013 was below the 2005 level, except in three crops (rice, corn and beans). Part of the early growth came from the non-state sector, which expanded in 2011 and 2012 in terms of cultivated land and agricultural production, while state land and output shrank in both indicators. However, the opposite was true in 2013, when non-state agricultural production remained stagnant or with little growth. Efforts to reduce public sector spending have also had adverse social consequences. **Cuts in health care services**—such as the closure of hospitals and clinics, the reduction of doctors, diagnostic tests and other procedures, and the shutdown of subsidized workers’ cafeterias—**have reduced access to social services**. Removal of goods from rationing and their sale at much higher market prices, as well as increases in public utility tariffs and hard currency shops’ prices, have affected consumption. And **efforts to streamline public sector employment**, although **missing the targets**, **have pushed up** the open **unemployment rate** from 1.6 percent to 3.4 percent of the labor force from 2008 to 2013—still the second lowest in the region, but high by Cuban standards. At the same time, real wages and real pensions shrank by 73 percent and 50 percent, respectively, from 1989 to 2013. The number of homes built fell by 77 percent from 2006 to 2013. There are 480,000 elderly Cubans (60 years or older) who are considered to be in need of services; but only 15,825 spaces for the elderly are available in nursing homes and hospitals. Confronting an expanding, vulnerable population, Raúl has promised that nobody will remain unprotected. But, between 2006 and 2012, the number of beneficiaries of social assistance relative to the total population decreased from 5.3

percent to 1.5 percent, and the budget expenditure in social assistance went from 2.2 percent to 0.4 percent. In 2011, the Party Congress ordered the government to end assistance to those individuals who are already supported by relatives, a measure that ignores the widespread level of need in Cuba. On the whole, the **structural reforms** undertaken by Raúl have been generally positive and the most important to date under the Cuban revolution. They **have advanced much further than previous reform attempts and are clearly oriented toward the market**. But **suffocating state regulations, obstacles and taxes have created disincentives and impeded the progress necessary to achieve substantial effects**. Raúl has declared that the reforms are quite complex, must be tested by experiment and should not be hurried so as to avoid costly error. His motto is “slowly but without pause.” But time and age (Raúl has promised to retire in 2018 at the age of 86) conspire against such an attitude. “Updating the model,” as the government is attempting to do, while retaining central planning and the predominance of state property over the market and non-state property, has not succeeded in Cuba. Nor has it succeeded anywhere else. **The reform processes in China and Vietnam, in contrast, were faster and ultimately more successful in increasing economic growth and social welfare**, while keeping the governing party in power. Cuban leaders argue that replicating the Sino-Vietnamese model isn’t feasible due to significant differences with those countries. Nevertheless, the lack of substantial economic results from the reforms and the risks to the island’s most vulnerable populations suggest this argument should be reexamined. **Accelerating and deepening the market-oriented reforms will not only improve Cubans’ standard of living, but give the ongoing reform process a much-needed sense of legitimacy.**

**Turn- lifting the embargo hurts the regime, the money would cycle back into the US’s hands and US influence would spread.**

Griswold 9- director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “The US Embargo of Cuba Is a Failure” CATO institute, June 15, 2009, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-embargo-cuba-is-failure>] //CJC

**Advocates of the embargo argue that trading with Cuba will only put dollars into the coffers of the Castro regime.** And it’s true that **the government** in Havana, because it controls the economy, **can skim off a large share** of the remittances and tourist dollars spent in Cuba. But of course, **selling more US products to Cuba would quickly relieve the Castro regime of those same dollars**. If more US tourists were permitted to visit Cuba, and at the same time US exports to Cuba were further liberalised, **the US economy could reclaim dollars from the Castro regime as fast as the regime could acquire them**. In effect, **the exchange would be of agricultural products for tourism services, a kind of “bread for beaches”, “food for fun” trade relationship**. Meanwhile, **the increase in Americans visiting Cuba would dramatically increase contact between Cubans and Americans**. **The unique US-Cuban relationship that flourished before Castro could be renewed, which would increase US influence and potentially hasten the decline of the communist regime**. Congress and President Barack Obama should act now to lift the embargo to allow more travel and farm exports to Cuba. Expanding our freedom to travel to, trade with and invest in Cuba would make Americans better off and would help the Cuban people and speed the day when they can enjoy the freedom they deserve.

**Cuba has experienced decades of racial reform. While not solved it is better than most countries.**

DAMIEN CAVE MARCH 23, 2016. Cuba Says It Has Solved Racism. Obama Isn't So Sure.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/world/americas/obamaurges-raised-voices-incubas-husheddiscussions-ofrace.html>

Defensiveness has long hovered over the subject of race, in part because Fidel Castro said shortly after the revolution that racism had been solved, making the subject taboo. The discomfort, in part, came from pride: **Some of the revolution's most visible achievements involved ending institutionalized segregation, at beach clubs, at schools and in neighborhoods where the homes of wealthy white Cubans who fled were often given to Cubans of color. Socialized medicine and education also helped create a society more deeply shaped by interracial interactions and marriages than the United States.**

### **Cuban domestic Ag increases food prices 20%**

**Cave 2012** [Damien Cave at the New York Times, "Cuba's Free-Market Farm Experiment Yields a Meager Crop", *New York Times*,

<<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/world/americas/changes-to-agriculture-highlight-cubas-problems.html>>] //GT

No other industry has seen as much liberalization, with a steady rollout of incentives for farmers. And Mr. Castro has been explicit about his reasoning: **increasing efficiency and food production to replace imports** that cost Cuba hundreds of millions of dollars a year is a matter "of national security." Yet at this point, **by most measures, the project has failed. Because of waste, poor management, policy constraints, transportation limits, theft and other problems, overall efficiency has dropped:** many **Cubans are actually seeing less food at private markets.** That is the case despite an increase in the number of farmers and production gains for certain items. A recent study from the University of Havana showed that **market prices jumped by nearly 20 percent in 2011 alone. And food imports increased to an estimated \$1.7 billion last year, up from \$1.4 billion in 2006.** "It's the first instance of Cuba's leader not being able to get done what he said he would," said Jorge I. Domínguez, vice provost for international affairs at Harvard, who left Cuba as a boy. "The published statistical results are really very discouraging."

"A Rush of Americans, Seeking Gold in Cuban Soil" By KIM SEVERSON. JUNE 20, 2016

<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/dining/cuba-us-organic-farming.html>

Shortly after the revolution in 1959, Cuba began sending sugar, tobacco and research to the Soviet Union in exchange for a steady supply of goods that included food, agricultural equipment and farm chemicals. But 30 years later, when the Soviet bloc crumbled, the shipments ended. Without gasoline and spare parts, tractors sat idle in fields. Crops rotted and cattle died. Studies show that the average Cuban lost more than 12 pounds during what President Fidel Castro called the "special period in time of peace." With many large

government-owned farms failing, Mr. Castro told the nation to learn to grow food without chemicals. Oxen replaced tractors. Smaller, cooperative farms and new markets emerged. To be sure, **Cuba still imports 60 percent to 80 percent of its food, the United States Department of Agriculture estimates, and little or none of it organic.** **Agricultural chemicals are imported from other countries without trade embargoes.** **The Cuban government owns about 80 percent of the land the nation could use to grow food,** but more than half remains fallow. **It is unclear how much of the produce Cuba grows would qualify as organic under United States standards.**

**Parenti, 2011** [Christian Parenti, Christian Parenti is an American investigative journalist, academic, and author, "When food shortages mean war", *Salon*, [http://www.salon.com/2011/07/19/food\\_shortage\\_politics/](http://www.salon.com/2011/07/19/food_shortage_politics/)] //AKC

The answer is: far more than you might imagine. For one thing, that loaf can be "read" as if it were a core sample extracted from the heart of a grim global economy. Looked at another way, it reveals some of the crucial fault lines of world politics, including the origins of the Arab spring that has now become a summer of discontent.

Consider this: **between June 2010 and June 2011, world grain prices almost doubled.** **In many places on this planet, that proved an unmitigated catastrophe.** **In those same months, several governments fell, rioting broke out in cities from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to Nairobi, Kenya, and most disturbingly three new wars began in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.** **Even on Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Bedouin tribes are now in revolt against the country's interim government and manning their own armed roadblocks.**

And in each of these situations, the initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread. If these upheavals were not "resource conflicts" in the formal sense of the term, think of them at least as bread-triggered upheavals.

### **Other Countries Default Too**

**Hess, 2014** [Alexander Hess, "Not just Argentina: 11 countries near bankruptcy", *USA Today*, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/31/countries-near-bankruptcy/13435097/>] //AKC

**Argentina is not the only country that has struggled, or even failed, to pay its debt in recent years.** It is hardly the only country with a severely impaired credit rating either.

Alongside Argentina, Moody's currently lists **10 other countries** with a rating of Caa1 or worse. A Caa1 rating is several notches below Ba1, which still carries substantial credit risk. Based on ratings from Moody's Investors Service, these are the 11 countries at risk of default.

The countries with the lowest credit ratings significantly differ from one another. **They span the globe, ranging from Greece and Ukraine in Europe, to Pakistan in Asia, to Ecuador, Venezuela, and Belize in the Americas.**

**Cuba debt from a long time ago**

**Bases, 2014** [Daniel, "Cuba debt, often inert, moves on political winds", *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/cuba-usa-debt-idUSL1N0U31JA20141219>] //AKC

Cuba has effectively been shut out of global financial markets for decades. But **the detritus of its defaulted debt and unstructured loans from decades past** has been traded among a small cadre of risk takers on hopes for a resolution.

**Cuba understands that no defaulting k2 preserving invest and will work to better situation**

**Munevar, 2016** [Daniel, economist, "Cuba: What lies beneath the agreements on the debt with the Paris Club and other creditors?", *Committee For the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt*, <http://www.cadtm.org/Cuba-What-lies-beneath-the>] //AKC

Within this strategy, **the settlement of legal disputes on the Cuban debt plays a central role in helping attract foreign capital and the country's re-inclusion in international financial markets.** Both creditors and **Cuba are aware that the negotiations on the country's debt,** that reached around 25 billion dollars in 2015 including charges for default [5], **provide a unique space to discuss the conditions** and benefits that international investors can receive in exchange **for access to fresh capital to modernize the Cuban economy.**

## **Cuba Credit Rating Up**

**Jamaica Observer, 2015** [Jamaica Observer, "US credit rating agency upgrades Cuba's economic outlook", <http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/News/US-credit-rating-agency-upgrades-Cuba-s-economic-outlook>] //AKC

NEW YORK, United States (CMC) – **A major international credit rating agency has upgraded Cuba's economic outlook** to positive from stable.

**The Wall Street-based Moody's Investors Service** affirmed the Spanish-speaking Caribbean country's Caa2 foreign currency issuer rating and changed the outlook.

Moody's attributed "the key drivers" of the rating action to less dependence on Venezuela, saying it has lessened since 2014.

It said despite pressure on Cuba's external finances from lower economic and financial support from its main trade partner, "risks remain manageable"

## **Claims being solved in squo and Cuba's claims are about the embargo**

**Solomon 2016** [Jay Solomon at the Wall Street Journal, "U.S. and Cuba Take Steps to Expedite Claims Process", *Wall Street Journal*, <<https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-cuba-take-steps-to-expedite-claims-process-1469814705>>] //CJC

WASHINGTON—**Cuba and the U.S. are accelerating discussions to try to settle hundreds of billions of dollars in claims made against each other** over the past six decades, according to U.S. and Cuban officials. **A second official round of talks was concluded Thursday in Washington, according to a senior State Department official.** But **more regularized meetings are expected to occur in the coming months** after the normalization of relations between Washington and Havana earlier this year. **The Castro government is seeking hundreds of billions in claims for what Cuban officials said were the economic and humanitarian costs of the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba.**

## **More squo solves claims EV**

**Whitefield 2016** [Mimi Whitefield at the Miami Herald, "U.S. and Cuba agree to meet more to expedite claims process", *Miami Herald*, <<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article92584862.html>>] //CJC

After a gap of nearly eight months, **the United States and Cuba returned to the negotiating table this week on claims that both sides have against each other and entered a more "substantive" phase of discussions**, a senior State Department official said Friday. Both sides presented more details of their claims — far higher on the Cuban side than the American side — and discussed methods they had both used in settling claims with other countries during a meeting Thursday in Washington D.C. **"The U.S. delegation expressed its desire to resolve the claims as quickly as possible**, and we indicated that we were willing to dedicate a substantial amount of time and energy towards trying to get to resolution," the official said. The two sides had their first meeting on claims last December in Havana. **The official said both sides expressed interest in meeting more frequently and in resolving their claims in a "mutually satisfactory manner."** The next meeting will be held in Havana, but no date has been set.

## **Lifting the embargo solves claims negotiations**

**Feinberg 2015** [Richard Feinberg, professor of international political economy and scholar at the Brookings Institute. "Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba", *Brookings Institute*, <<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-Feinberg.pdf>>] //CJC

**The settlement of U.S. claims could be wrapped in a package of economic opportunities for Cuba.** Importantly, **the United States could further relax its economic sanctions** (amending or repealing Helms-Burton), **providing more trade and investment opportunities** — and the capacity for Cuba to earn the foreign exchange needed to service debt obligations. In turn, **Cuba will have to accelerate and deepen its economic reforms**, to offer a more

attractive business environment for investors and exporters. Politically, **the Cuban government could present a significant softening of the U.S. embargo as a victory, offsetting any concessions made in the claims negotiations.** A comprehensive package might also be more attractive to the U.S. Congress; formal Congressional consent would enhance the measures' legitimacy and durability and help to close off any court challenges, should some claimants be unsatisfied with the final settlement.

## **Empirically engagement prevents collapse and Venezuela Key – Reform from within key**

**Comparative National Systems 2009** [“Cuban Political System: More Than just Castro,” *Comparative National Systems*. Accessed at: <http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Cuba.pdf>.] //DNP

Around the world, the failure of authoritarian regimes to meet pledges on economic development, among other promises, has led to their collapse in the eyes of a population demanding more democratic governments. The Castro regime has “promised to improve economic equality, redistribute land, reduce rent and place a cap on utilities.”<sup>16</sup> It would be then understandable to believe that the failure to respond to citizens' expectations could hinder the stability of the Castro government. In reality, however, the Castro regime has already “survived” more than five decades of economic needs, so the possibility that economic factors would provide the opposition with sufficient strength to pose a threat to the regime's political stability seems unlikely. First, the status quo in the Cuban political system, especially over the last twenty years or so after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has proven wrong those people who claimed that a gradual opening of the economy would be accompanied by a similar degree of political liberalization.<sup>17</sup> In **the early 1990s, the Cuban government was forced to alleviate shortages of food, consumer goods, and services by gradually opening the economy to foreign investors.** In fact, the Castro regime has used the slight liberalization of the market to exert even larger levels of state leverage.<sup>18</sup> Second, although Cuba has lacked the basis on which to develop an economy able to provide jobs and wealth for its people, it has developed a state capable of controlling the emergence of dissident movements.<sup>19</sup> **A transition away from the current political system seems most likely to respond to differing views from within the Communist Party rather than from claims of failed expectations from the Cuban society.** Though, it is undeniable that the current world financial crisis has posed a new threat to the stability of the Castro regime, especially considering that Cuba imports near 80% of the food it provides to its citizens.<sup>20</sup> A few months ago, Raul Castro launched a nationwide consultation to evaluate possible solutions to the crisis. While the core of the discussions is to identify mechanisms to alleviate the economic effects of the crisis, the underlying fear of growing political and social instability cannot be neglected. An “ever-failing economy with an unproductive labor force, rampant unemployment, systemic corruption, a repressed and

deformed private sector, and obsolete industrial plants and equipment” pose an existential threat to the system

[...]

In a substantial way, the **survival of Cuban state-controlled economy depends on the alliance between Cuba and Venezuela**. In exchange for receiving oil at subsidized prices, Cuba has sent a few dozen of thousands of doctors to Venezuela.<sup>25</sup> Some estimates reveal that favorable terms of payment result in Venezuela providing around 20,000 bpd of free oil to Cuba.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, it is believed that Raul Castro is re-exporting this free oil at international market prices, generating effortless revenues that are essential in the functioning of the economy. Although the country is undoubtedly benefiting from the agreement, **a reliance on Venezuela for oil imports will continue to pose a threat** not only to public finances, but also **to the stability of the Castro regime**.

## **MASSIVE IFI CUBA IMPACT CARD Will Separate Later**

Vidal and Brown 2015 [Pavel Vidal and Scott Brown, “Cuba’s Economic Reintegration: Begin with the International Financial Institutions,” *The Atlantic Council of the United States: Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center*, July 2015] <http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba> //WGC

“US policy toward the island is in transition.

In light of the President’s executive orders in December, we are now seeing movement in Congress. Support is growing for removal of the travel ban. Trade, telecommunications, finance, and compensation for nationalized property will all be part of the agenda, as will human rights—a key point of contention given the lack of democratic freedoms for the Cuban people.

**Cuba is also in a historic period of transition. President Raúl Castro plans to step down in 2018. To jumpstart Cuba’s economy, he will need to accelerate the fiscal and monetary reforms started in 2008. International financial institutions (IFIs), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), hold the key to easing Cuba through a tough transition to a more stable economic model that will better the lives of its people.** Cuba’s reintegration will inevitably spur unprecedented economic change. **As this paper discusses, this transformation is precisely what occurred in previously closed economies that chose to rejoin the global economy.**

**But significant obstacles exist to Cuban admission to the IFIs. A series of US laws require US representatives to the IFIs to oppose such admission as well as any multilateral funding for Cuba.** Castro himself has been an outspoken critic of the IFIs, long-seen by the Cuban government as agents of imperialism and neoliberalism. Still, signs point to the potential of a new mindset around rejoining these institutions, with Castro greatly diminishing his vitriol against the IFIs in recent years.

**US policymakers should recognize the tremendous value of Cuban membership in the IFIs for bilateral relations with Cuba and the United States' international position.** The United States is the only major country that continues to impose economic sanctions against Cuba, a point that has consistently hindered its image and stature abroad. **Supporting Cuban participation in the IFIs, or even the less politically-toxic option of simply avoiding vocal opposition, will do much more than just strengthen partnerships with democratic allies around the globe. IFI monies and technical advice to modernize sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, banking, and tourism will be critical to renewing the island's economic vibrancy and creating new possibilities for Cubans to improve their lives."**

**"Engagement will be critical to buttressing the government's appetite for reform.** After twenty- five years of post-Soviet adjustment and patchy results from limited reforms, **a consensus exists that the economic system and old institutions require a fundamental overhaul. The Cuban government is cognizant of the imperative to allow the** "non state," or **private sector, to grow.** It is the only way to slim down the public sector without massive unemployment.

Now that Cuba has caught the eye of foreign investors and the international community, it is a good time to reignite discussion on Cuba's reintegration into the global economy. As with so many other countries before, **the critical first step will be to regain access to the international financial institutions (IFIs),** with a particular focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Accession would serve the interests of Cuba and its citizens, the United States, and the inter- national community. **In Cuba, the process of economic reform is at a pivotal moment, and more progress is needed** to lift the economy on to a new growth trajectory **before** President Raúl Castro is to step down in **2018.** Accession will require adjustments: improving data and transparency, aggressively working to unify the two currencies, and shifting official attitudes. But in the context of the new relationship with the United States, these should not be difficult."

“For the international community, Cuba’s accession is long overdue. Still, in the United States, agreement to Cuban accession could face objections. However, those objections rest on discredited assumptions that sanctions can bring political change and that international support will help only the government and not the people of Cuba. **US backing of Cuban membership in the IFIs** would be consistent with the new policy of helping to **support economic reform. This is a unique opportunity to stimulate further transformations in Cuba.**”

“Since 2008, when Raúl Castro took office as President, Cuban society has been changing. The economy is undergoing market liberalizations and macroeconomic adjustments. While the process may be at an early stage, **reforms have already tripled the number of private and cooperative businesses**, state lands have been distributed to farmers, the purchase and sale of vehicles and houses is now permitted, and consumer options (including hotels and cell phones) continue to grow.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the government has advanced toward reestablishing fiscal and balance of payments equilibriums, maintained low inflation, and promoted a more rational public expenditure. **Cuba is now diligently fulfilling international financial commitments and making progress in renegotiating its international debts.** **Raising the level of aggregate investment is** a top priority—in fact, it is **the primary objective of the strategy for reviving GDP growth.**

A seismic shift is underway in two of the fundamental mechanisms long used to exert control over the Cuban people: restrictions on the freedom of movement and economic activity. Cubans no longer need the permission of the state to leave the island—temporarily or permanently—and the expansion of nonstate activity means that fewer families now depend on the state for their income. Citizens have greater freedom to invest and spend money.

Cuban authorities have also announced an increase in Internet availability, which means greater access to information. Although relaxing restrictions does not mean dismantling them. The Cuban state continues to exert considerable control over society and the economy through extensive state ownership and command of the main economic activities. Still, the reform process is clearly understood as part of a journey toward a mixed economy.

The process of transformation was confirmed by the VI Congress of the Communist Party in April 2011, when five-year economic policy guidelines were laid out. This five-year period will end in April 2016. The VII Communist Party Congress will then set out the next stage of the Cuban reform agenda, where ongoing changes are expected to be deepened. Two years later, **in 2018, Raúl Castro will end his presidency. These two moments will mark a turning point in Cuban development. Collaboration with international financial institutions could allow the global community to seize this opportunity to support Cuba's economic transformation.**

**“Despite a host of reforms introduced since 2008, Cuban economic growth has been weak. From 2008-2014, average annual GDP growth reached only 2.8 percent.** While this is close to the Latin American and Caribbean average, it is only around half the originally anticipated 5.1 percent forecast by the Cuban government. Growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors fell particularly short of expectations, with average annual rates of only 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent respectively, while private household consumption registered only 2.6 percent growth—**well short of the amount needed to provide the hoped-for, and long-awaited, improvement in living standards.**

Over the past decade, growth has been led by the export of professional (principally medical) services, which have become the primary source of foreign currency income. **Cuba's dependence on** this activity—tied to its reliance on **oil imports from Venezuela** under very favorable terms—**has become a cause for deep concern** in Cuba as the economic and political crisis in Venezuela worsens.

One fundamental problem of the Cuban economic model is its inability to generate sufficient investment. The level of aggregate investment, according to official figures, has languished at around 10 percent of GDP for the past two decades: only half the regional average and less than a quarter of China's rate.

**The government has accepted that it needs more foreign investment.** In 2014, in the hope of attracting an estimated \$8 billion in new foreign investment, a foreign direct investment law was introduced, a “Special Development Zone” at the upgraded and expanded Mariel port was inaugurated, and a prospectus of proposed projects was published. Although the targets for new contracts have yet to be met, foreign business interest has grown. A major factor in this renewed attention appears to be the rapprochement with the United States”

**“The IFIs are in a position to leverage the capacity of the Cuban economy to attract investment and raise the rate of capital formation.** Development loans from IFIs would allow Cuba to carry out much-needed improvements to its depleted infrastructure and would reduce the cost of doing business. **Benefits from IFI support include:**

- **An international vote of confidence in the Cuban economy. This would influence attitudes toward Cuba in global financial markets.** Reducing country risk perceptions would support greater economic integration, including the possibility of Cuba’s inclusion in international companies’ global value chains. **It would also enable Cuba to gain access to lower interest rates for international financing, easing its balance of payments constraint and therefore enabling stronger economic growth.**
- **Access to technical assistance and training. Cuban entrepreneurs and policymakers would benefit from this assistance and the adoption of international best practices.** Agriculture could be modernized. Communications, Internet, and telephony improvements can begin. Enhancement of the tourism sector could also draw on international training, quality standards, and marketing expertise. Still, the banking and financial services sector needs to be strengthened and legitimized before companies can have a serious presence in Cuba.”

“Two areas of **reform will be the focus of the Cuban government in the next few years:** reform of state-owned companies and currency unification. Though **access to IFIs** does not guarantee the success of these reforms, it **would certainly help.**

The state-owned companies that continue to hold a monopoly over most sectors in the Cuban economy have already been undergoing deep changes, with new regulations and procedures implemented. But progress on decentralization, reorganization, restructuring, and rationalization has been painfully slow, and technological deficiencies and low productivity continue to impede growth. **Through the IFIs, Cuba could have access to research and evaluation in the reform of state enterprises.**

**The dual currency system remains an enormous burden on the Cuban economy, distorting all decision-making, negatively affecting the management of companies and increasing financial risk.** The over-valued official exchange rate of the Cuban peso, artificially pegged to the American dollar, has warped corporate balance sheets, skewed prices, and reduced competitiveness. **Currency unification** has been predicted and postponed countless times, contributing to uncertainty on the future value of the exchange rate and inflation levels. But unification **is imminent.** The

result is that—no matter the attractiveness of foreign investment laws—the dual exchange rate creates a high level of risk for foreign investors.

**IFI support could be particularly important for Cuba as it contemplates the replacement of this dual-currency system with a single adjustable exchange rate. There are risks of monetary instability inherent in this process,<sup>3</sup> and Havana might welcome guidance on the design and construction of a monetary and exchange system that establishes both financial stability and contributes to economic growth. The IFIs are well-equipped to support such a process.**

“Cuba is not the first country to undertake an accession process to the IFIs. Many others have done so with **Albania and Vietnam providing two useful examples.** Although their conditions differ in important ways from those faced by Cuba, **each provides relevant experience** from which lessons can be drawn when considering the Cuban process. **In both cases, acceding to the IFIs was a significant turning point, in terms of both providing a boost to economic performance and giving support to a process of structural transformation.**”

“To what extent might Albania’s experience presage what might be expected if Cuba were to pursue economic reform and membership in the international financial institutions? **The following appear to be key lessons:**

- Reengagement is likely to yield benefits for Cuba and for the rest of the world (including the United States), stemming from new opportunities for trade and investment, greater regional stability, and reduced risk of a migrant crisis.
- The gains from IFI membership will depend both on success in catalyzing other external support, and (even more) on the progress of economic reforms that improve its economic performance and investment climate.
- An increase in international economic integration can accelerate the process of economic and political liberalization.
- The replacement of a centrally-planned economy with one based on free markets typically needs a long period of training, education, and restructuring of public institutions. The IMF and other external sources (including the US government) can play an important role in facilitating the learning process.
- **Popular expectations may outrun the benefits of reform and reintegration,** especially if citizens have limited familiarity with market mechanisms. New opportunities and improvements in the availability of consumer goods and

essential inputs will emerge. But establishing a modern and stable financial sector, restructuring and rationalizing public enterprises, and becoming a strong international competitor will likely take time. Improving the availability and quality of public information can help to dispel uncertainty and encourage public participation in domestic policy debates.

## “What Is the Best Way to Help the Cuban People?”

Engagement should be more successful in helping the Cuban people than previous policies of isolation, particularly at a moment when the country is going through a process of far-reaching economic and institutional reforms. The government has acknowledged that to increase public-sector wages, it needs to boost the productivity of state companies and reduce a glut of workers in the public sector. This requires meaningful measures of productivity and profitability that imply decentralization of decision-making, with prices and markets replacing the old system of centralized planning. To slim down the public sector without creating an unacceptably high unemployment rate, the Cuban government has accepted the need to allow the domestic nonstate sector to grow and attract more foreign investment.

The appetite for reform is strong. After twenty-five years of post-Soviet adjustment and patchy results from limited reforms, there is a consensus that the economic system and old institutions require a fundamental overhaul. A profound sense of frustration, with real wages remaining below 1990 level and the pillars of the socialist model (strong health, education, and social services) deteriorating, has created a moment of opportunity for new ideas.

The overhaul of the public sector and opening to nonstate enterprise has won the enthusiastic backing of most Cubans, but not all. Engagement can help to consolidate support for reform. Resistance to reform comes not only from those who fear a loss of power, status, and privilege, but also from economically vulnerable groups whose livelihoods might be threatened. The degree of resistance will be inversely related to the extent to which the reform process can deliver improvements—in wages, public services, infrastructure, a social safety net for the vulnerable, and economic prospects for the ambitious. The legitimacy of the reform process will be reinforced by improvements in the Cuban economy. As

**part of this engagement, Cuban membership in the IFIs, by supporting economic growth, would help to underpin economic reform.**

**The IFIs' experience of reform has involved not only liberalization but also the construction of the necessary institutional architecture**—including financing instruments and mechanisms, procedures for project management, monitoring and evaluation, regulatory systems, contract laws, taxation regimes, payment mechanisms, insurance, accountability and labor, and consumer and environmental protection. **Solid institutions replace centralized control with a system based on free markets, competition, and transparency. The benefits go not only to large foreign investors but also to small businesses, farmers, employees, and consumers. The wider the benefits of reform are spread, the more popular they will be; once in place, reversal will be increasingly difficult.**

**“Cuba is at a moment of profound economic transformation** and the openings in US policy—with more movement expected from Congress—have recast both the bilateral relationship as well as Cuba’s broader international engagement. **Economic reform and full reintegration into the global economic community will provide further momentum for a nascent Cuban private sector while improving the lives of everyday Cubans.**

Isolation is increasingly a policy of the past; Cuba, the United States, and the international financial institutions must catch up to this reality. To do so, each must rethink outdated policies. **The end goal is to understand that joining the IFIs is a critical step in the long-term process of full economic reintegration.**

**Only a lack of dissenters kept Cuba from collapsing when Soviet Bloc tanked their economy. S-Quo levels of dissent could prompt Civ War.**

**Gorrell, 5** - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim Gorrell, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //WGC

“Since the mid-1970s each administration has been surprised by a major unanticipated strategic crisis: Carter in Iran; Reagan in Central America; Bush in the Persian Gulf; Clinton in the

Balkans and Africa; and the current Bush administration with the global war on terrorism (GWOT). **Cuba, specifically post-Castro Cuba, could very well trigger the next unanticipated crisis** even though the writing is on the wall. Fidel Castro is 78 years old, the current life expectancy of a Cuban male. When Castro dies, it is questionable whether his designated successor can hold power, so **anarchy is a real possibility. The Cuban infrastructure and economy may implode** with or without Castro”

“PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY Cuba presents the U.S. with a unique challenge. U.S. policy makers have allowed their animosity toward Castro (or Castro’s animosity toward the U.S.) to cloud policy decisions. During the Cold War, U.S. isolation of Cuba was appropriate because Cuba was indeed a threat to U.S. interests. For the U.S., isolating Cuba through sanctions and employing covert activities to undermine the Castro regime were among the ways that the U.S. was pursuing its Cold War ends. **When the Soviet Union fell, Cuba lost heavily. Gone were significant foreign aid and an essential trading partner**; the collapse of communism left Cuba literally alone among the few remaining isolated Communist regimes in the world. **However, Cuba was a different communist regime. Unlike the regimes in Eastern Europe, Castro had no real political opposition**, at least none at the level of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia.<sup>15</sup> **Cuba’s dissident community was not well established within the country or among the exiles and no obvious leader has emerged.**

“Regardless of the succession, **under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen.** In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of **the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war.** Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. **When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach.** The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.<sup>26</sup> Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.<sup>27</sup> While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. **In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases.** If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. **Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.”**

**Economy on the verge of collapse in 2017 — 2016 resilience with extra stuff Torres 2016** [Nora Torres, “Economic Hardships in Cuba spark rumors of a new “Special Period”,” *The Miami Herald*. Accessed at:

<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article90321772.html>.] //DNP

Cuban ruler Raúl Castro may have ruled out a return to the “Special Period” — the devastating economic crisis sparked by the loss of Soviet subsidies in the early 1990s — but he was clearly somber earlier this month when he confirmed that the island faces a grim future. Castro **predicted the economy would grow by only 1 percent — half the previous forecast** — and confirmed that deliveries of Venezuelan oil have fallen “despite the firm commitment of President Nicolás Maduro.” Key Cuban exports such as nickel and sugar face low international prices, and the latest sugar harvest was 19 percent smaller than the previous year’s. But here’s the real headline, according to some experts: “The most striking part of this is that we could see it coming,” said **Cuban economist Pavel Vidal**, among various experts who had **long predicted that Venezuela's economic and political crisis would force the Cuban government to rethink its economic strategy and accelerate the warming of relations with the United States**. “It was clear the Venezuelan crisis at some point would have a negative impact on the Cuban economy. Nevertheless, the commercial and financial dependence on Venezuela remained high and not enough was done to search for alternatives,” he said. **Cuban diplomats have renegotiated with debt-holders** and opened new spaces for international integration as alternatives to Venezuela, but **until now that has not translated into bigger flows of trade, finances or investments**,” Vidal added. The **shortage of liquidity is so serious that Castro** informed the population that Cuba **has not been paying its foreign debts on time** and Minister of the Economy Marino Murillo — who was later reassigned to a new position — said the **government would not be paying new debts for the rest of the year**. His public statements came as U.S. agricultural producers are lobbying Congress, hard but without success so far, to ease laws and regulations that currently require Cuba to pay cash and in advance for its U.S. agricultural purchases. Rep. Rick Crawford, R-AK., recently withdrew his proposal to ease those requirements after agreeing with Florida members of congress to look for different ways to meet the interests of U.S. agricultural producers. Crawford’s office issued a brief statement saying that Cuba’s failure to pay its debts and lack of liquidity “will not affect the Congressman’s efforts.” Castro ruled out, however, dire predictions of a new “Special Period” along the lines of the concerns expressed recently by the deputy editor of the Communist Party’s Granma newspaper, Karina Marron, about **possible outbreaks of large-scale protests against the government**. “As was expected, in an effort to spread despondency and uncertainty among the people, we are starting to see omens and speculations about the imminent collapse of the economy and a return to the worst part of the Special Period we faced at the beginning of the 1990s — and which we knew how to survive thanks to the Cuban people’s capacity to resist and its unlimited trust in Fidel (Castro) and the (Communist) Party,” he said. “We do not deny that we could have problems, perhaps even worse than the ones we have now, but we are now more prepared and in better condition to overcome them.” Murillo promised that any electricity blackouts would not affect either citizens or tourism, although other sectors like street lighting might have to be cut by 50 percent. Some state employees already have been sent home on “vacation” and private taxis have raised their prices because they depend largely on gasoline bought on the black market, where the fuel has been increasingly scarce. At the end of the recent National Assembly session, an official announcement said Murillo was removed as Minister of the Economy so he could focus on “updating the economic model” — the package of economic reforms pushed by Castro since he succeeded brother Fidel 10 years ago. The government recently acknowledged that only 21 percent of the “guidelines” established to achieve the reforms have been implemented. Murillo retained the post of vice minister of the Council of Minister and was replaced as minister of the economy by Ricardo Cabrisas, also a vice minister and a key figure in Cuba’s foreign debt renegotiations. Experts say Cabrisas, well known abroad, faces a tough task because the worst is yet to come. Vidal, who had developed his own index for measuring the Cuban economy, had predicted a 1.8 percent growth in Gross Domestic Product this year if all trade links to Venezuela were halted. He now estimates GDP growth in 2016 at zero or slightly lower. **The worst will come next year, 2017,**” said Vidal, a

professor at the Universidad Javeriana in Colombia. **"In 2016, Cuban officials could cushion the blow by using up inventories of raw materials and finished products. Our forecast is a drop of 3 percent of GDP in 2017,** with the subsequent contractions of real salaries and consumption." For now, Cuba continues to count on tourism as a lifeline. More than 94,000 U.S. visitors — not counting Cuban Americans — set foot on the island in the first four months of this year and regular commercial flights between the two countries are expected to start in the fall, despite concerns among some U.S. Congress members about security at Cuban airports. But in the short run, Cubans face another hot summer of shortages and economic uncertainties.

### Trade with other countries

Seaman 10 (David Seaman, Prof., Social Science, U. Osnabruck, Germany, "U.S. Democracy Promotion: The Case of Cuba, <[http://www.blissfieldschools.us/downloads/justin\\_pooley/casebook\\_2\\_inherency\\_2013\\_20130611\\_075447\\_1.pdf](http://www.blissfieldschools.us/downloads/justin_pooley/casebook_2_inherency_2013_20130611_075447_1.pdf)> 2010) //CJC

While the U.S. embargo creates an extremely difficult economic situation in Cuba, **the island is able to find relief from much of the economic pressure in several ways.** Firstly, **the lack of international support for the embargo has made it possible for Cuba to continuously find substitute trading partners** and adapt to new and changing circumstances, helping fill the void created by the end of the massive Soviet subsidies and aid. Cuba enjoys trade with several Western capitalist states, foremost Canada, Spain, and the Netherlands, Cuba's three largest Western trading partners. Most recently, the country has developed close trade relations with **Venezuela and China**, which together **now make up more than 50% off all trade for Cuba.**

### Scapegoating non-unique

Kline 2010 [Michael, "Economic Reforms in Cuba?," *American Diplomacy UNC*. Accessed at: [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline\\_cuba.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline_cuba.html).] //DNP

The Cuban government, which has experimented unsuccessfully with minor reforms since the early 1990s, has apparently decided that a deeper overhaul is required to repair the island's failed economy. In an address to the National Assembly in August, **Raul Castro admitted:** "We have to erase forever the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world in which people can live without working." He further admitted **that the decades old US embargo – "a crippling, punitive measure" – could no longer be blamed for all the island's woes.**

### Private sector 3x now

Vidal and Brown 2015 [Pavel Vidal and Scott Brown, "Cuba's Economic Reintegration: Begin with the International Financial Institutions," *The Atlantic Council of the United States: Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center*, July 2015] <http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba> //WGC

“Since 2008, when Raúl Castro took office as President, Cuban society has been changing. The economy is undergoing market liberalizations and macroeconomic adjustments. While the process may be at an early stage, **reforms have already tripled the number of private and cooperative businesses**, state lands have been distributed to farmers, the purchase and sale of vehicles and houses is now permitted, and consumer options (including hotels and cell phones) continue to grow.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the government has advanced toward reestablishing fiscal and balance of payments equilibriums, maintained low inflation, and promoted a more rational public expenditure. **Cuba is now diligently fulfilling international financial commitments and making progress in renegotiating its international debts. Raising the level of aggregate investment is a top priority—in fact, it is the primary objective of the strategy for reviving GDP growth.**

### **SOEs transitioning toward private sector**

**Ashby 13** – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs; served in the U.S. Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration as Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean and as acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Western Hemisphere; a counsel with the international law firm Dentons; he has PhD, JD and MBA degrees (Dr. Timothy, “Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises,” Council of Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13, <http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby//CJC>

**U.S. policy** specifically **supports “a market-oriented economic system”** [3] **toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector—including 300,000 agricultural producers—or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”).** [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when **Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers.** [5] **A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class—both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions.** Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs. **Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy.** In December 2012, **the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs** in construction, transportation, and other industries. **Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops “will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity.”** [6] **Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurship, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island’s economy to free-market competition** from government-managed socialism. In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, **co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business.** Of the 300 largest co-ops in

the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7] Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major U.S. policy goal.

## **No Diaz Canel Takeover**

**Azel 2013** [Jose Azel, senior scholar at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, "The Illusion of Cuban Reform: Castro Strikes Out", *World Affairs*, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/illusion-cuban-reform-castro-strikes-out>>] //CJC

Cuba's first vice president of the Council of State, the eighty-two-year-old José Ramón Machado Ventura, was expected to be Raúl Castro's pro forma successor. In February 2013, however, he was replaced in that post by Miguel Díaz-Canel, a factotum-like party apparatchik in his early fifties. The international media jumped on the appointment and concluded that Cuba's Gorbachev had arrived on the scene. But **while Díaz-Canel is in line to succeed Raúl in the Council of State, this is not equivalent to being number two in the regime. General Raúl Castro leads Cuba not because he is president of the Council of State, but because he is first secretary of the Communist Party, head of the armed forces, and Fidel's brother. Article 5 of the Cuban Constitution makes it clear that the Communist Party is "the superior leading force of the society and the State." It is the eighty-two-year-old Machado who remains second secretary of the fifteen-member Politburo of the Communist Party—and thus, at least for now, Raúl Castro's heir apparent.** Under Cuba's governing succession protocol, the military-dominated Politburo is the cabal that will recommend, when the time comes, the country's next leader. The succession plot thickens when we consider that the president of the Council of State is also the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. **When Raúl Castro leaves office, it is difficult to envision old comandantes like Ramiro Valdés and three-star generals of the Politburo offering their allegiance and subordinating themselves to a youthful civilian bureaucrat like Díaz-Canel.** Civilian control of Cuba's armed forces is not part of Revolutionary Cuba's genetic makeup.

## **Latin Rels solve failed state**

**Perez JD Yale Law School 2010** David Perez "America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department" Harvard Latino Law Review lexis //CJC

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a

disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, **Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region.** These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that **a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship,** the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real. **If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war, face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing.**

There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.

### **No Removal w/o Congress**

**Francis 16** [David Francis, March 21 2016, Obama's Cuba Reset is now in the hands of congress. Too bad it won't budge", *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/21/obamas-cuba-reset-is-now-in-the-hands-of-congress-too-bad-congress-wont-budge/>] //BS

For U.S. President Barack Obama, this week's trip to Cuba helps cement a foreign-policy legacy that now includes ending more than five decades of strife with a onetime Cold War rival. For Cuban President Raúl Castro, the visit represents a chance to welcome American tourists and businesses. **But without help from Congress, Obama will have done about all he can to normalize relations.**

What the American president has done since the normalization process began in December 2014 is significant. He has made it easier for U.S. citizens to travel there, though tourism in the traditional sense is still prohibited. Obama has eased restrictions on U.S. businesses plying their trade in Cuba; as he visited, Starwood Hotels & Resorts became the **first** U.S. hotel chain to sign a deal with Cuba since the 1959 revolution. Obama is set to attend a Major League Baseball exhibition game in Havana on Tuesday. In December 2015, Washington and Havana announced the resumption of direct flights between the countries.

**But Obama can't do much more unless Congress acts to repeal the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which formalized the embargo** put in place by President John F. Kennedy in 1962 **and bars the executive branch from lifting it without congressional approval.** In other words, without the help of Congress, Obama can't fully lift all financial penalties against Havana, and proponents of the move have [acknowledged](#) that is unlikely to happen while Republicans control both the House and the Senate. Some Republicans, including Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.), have vowed to fight it down the line.

**Erikson 2009** [Daniel, "Engaging Cuba: A New Way Forward," *Conflict Prevention Resolution Forum*. Accessed at: <https://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRF-Engaging-Cuba-Transcript.pdf>.] //DNP

The second concept, which is linked to the first, is that the United States embargo represents leverage over the Cuban government, which can be used to extract concessions from the Cuban government in the field of democracy, human rights, release of political prisoners and so forth. **If the last 47 odd years of the embargo prove anything, it's that the US embargo over Cuba represents the absence of US leverage over the island.** And so **trying to somehow hang on to the embargo because we can trade away this piece or that piece of it in exchange for changes on the Cuban side probably is not realistic.** **The last kind of fallacy,** but a widely-held belief in the US foreign policy community, is that the **US should remove sanctions incrementally,** and only when the Cubans reciprocate—a kind of "we move, you move". And you saw Obama state that very clearly at the Summit of the Americas, after making the changes allowing, for example, Cuban-Americans to send remittances to Cuba, he said now the Cubans can respond by releasing political prisoners, or by reducing their exchange tax on the US dollar, which is now around 20%. You know, 20% is a pretty hefty tax, it would probably be good if the Cubans lowered it, but does the United States really want to hinge the future of its Cuba policy on the internal exchange rate that Cuba uses on the island? And I think this kind of tit-for-tat aspect of the policy inevitably leads the United States to focus on small ball issues. And for those three reasons, I would like to see the US move more towards the unilateral fashion. But it's just very hard because there is still this logic saying "we move, and then they move." And I think that while Obama during the campaign said that, one of his most evocative phrases was that he wanted to "change the mindset of American foreign policy." But I think it is going to be very difficult to change the mindset of US policy towards Cuba.

**Haass 98** [Richard Haass is President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing", *Brookings Institution*, <http://www.cfr.org/experts/afghanistan-iraq-middle-east-and-north-africa/richard-n-haass/b3350>] //BS

A corollary to the above is no less important: Broad sanctions should not be used as an expressive tool in a manner not justified by a careful accounting of likely costs and benefits. Again, sanctions are serious business. **Sanctions are a form of intervention.** Depending upon how they are used, **they can cause great damage to innocent people—as well as to American business, workers, and U.S. foreign policy interests.** In addition, **sanctions can reduce U.S. leverage.** **Elimination of**

**education, training, and aid for foreign militaries, mandated by Congress to express displeasure with Pakistan and Indonesia, reduced U.S. influence with a powerful constituency in both those countries.** Foreign policy is not therapy, and its purpose is not to feel good but to do good. The same holds for sanctions.

### **Informal econ good, solves govt control**

**Feinberg, Brookings 16** [“Soft Landing in Cuba”, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/cuba-entrepreneurs-middle-classes-feinberg.pdf>] //KC

**In Cuba, as throughout the developing world, many small businesses prefer to remain “informal,” incentivized to remain beyond the reach of authority and taxation.** In Cuba, this informal sector includes workers less visible to government inspectors, such as those re-selling second-hand clothing in their homes, repairing broken household appliances, or serving as backroom assistants in their families’ bed and breakfasts and restaurants. As in informal sectors worldwide, some TCPs make this rational calculation: **they prefer the risks of detection, of being caught and propositioning a bribe or simply suffering confiscation and starting over again from scratch, rather than taking the time to register, pay monthly fees and taxes, and be subject to onerous government audits.** Furthermore, private businesses that do not fall within the legally authorized categories (see Section 4, page 12) have no choice but to remain extra-legal and informal.

### **No guns in Cuba**

**Hoffman 2016** [Gabriella Hoffman at the Washington Times, “How guns could liberate Cuba”, *Washington Times*, <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/3/gabriella-hoffman-how-guns-could-liberate-cuba/>>] //CJC

**Ever since the Castro regime violently and ruthlessly rose to power in 1959, the presence of firearms has been nonexistent.** Since installing a military dictatorship, **the Castro brothers have made private gun ownership impossible, subject to regulation, and punishable by law.** Cubans have thus been rendered defenseless — a factor convincing many Cubans to flee the communist nation for freedom elsewhere. **Cuba’s government has deliberately created an environment where a Second Amendment can’t thrive. It has complete pull over all industries in the country, including the firearms industry.** It assigns responsibilities to loyalists in Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) — thuggish neighborhood watch programs slipping into obsolescence — to enforce laws to discourage dissent, instill fear in neighbors who fail to goose-step with the regime, and provide so-called security for those who pledge to a CDR. Moreover, the government exploits disarmament policies to instill fear in people.

### **Cuba can’t join IMF and World Bank**

**Torres 2015** [Hector Torres at the World Economic Forum, “Should Cuba re-join the IMF?”, *World Economic Forum*, <<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/should-cuba-re-join-the-imf/>>] //CJC

**Membership in the IMF is a precondition for joining the World Bank,** and the advantages that Cuba could gain from membership in the latter are easy to see. Cuba is rightly proud of its social achievements, but ensuring that they remain sustainable will require that its economy continues to grow. For that, Cuba will need to pursue and deepen the economic reforms that it has started, address its technological obsolescence, and upgrade its public infrastructure. All of this requires raising capital. And, though Cuba could (and possibly should) seek financial support from sources other than the World Bank, there are problems with many

of the multilateral alternatives. The Andean Development Corporation's financial support could be limited. The procedures for accession to the BRICS countries' New Development Bank are not yet established. And joining the Inter-American Development Bank could be politically sensitive, given its link to the Organization of American States. Cuba could of course borrow from bilateral creditors. But state-to-state loans usually include conditions that are less transparent than those attached to funds from rules-based international financial institutions. Moreover, none of these other potential sources of financing would match the World Bank's technical support. Likewise, joining the IMF could yield tangible benefits for Cuba. The country's balance of payments is under chronic strain, and attracting foreign direct investment – including from the Cuban diaspora – would be easier if the country could bring its reforms to fruition and rationalize its complex exchange rates. Cuba prints two currencies, the convertible peso (paired one-to-one with the US dollar) and the Cuban peso (pegged at 24 to the dollar). In addition, there are also several special exchange rates – for things like oil purchases, imports for hotels, and export revenues. Rationalizing its exchange rates would strengthen Cuba's competitiveness and increase its exports. But it would also be challenging – even if carried out gradually. Prices and salaries would be significantly affected, and the authorities would need to make the case that the long-term gains will eventually outweigh the intermediate hardships. Persuasion alone, however, will not suffice. Preserving social consensus for economic reforms will also require active fiscal policies. It takes more time to build up skills and open trade opportunities than it does to lay off workers and shut down inefficient firms. Cuba could use the IMF's financial assistance and technical advice as it compensates short-term losers, retrains the unemployed, and supports new businesses. The World Bank and the IMF would also benefit from admitting Cuba – which currently is the most conspicuous exception to both institutions' near-universal membership. Given that combating poverty is its overarching goal, the World Bank should be interested in helping Cuba preserve its social achievements and supporting its transition from a centralized planned economy to one with an entrepreneurial private sector. For the IMF, Cuba's membership would fit squarely into its mission of facilitating international trade and eliminating the foreign-exchange restrictions that hamper it. Cuba may or may not be politically ready to join the international financial institutions, but it clearly meets the conditions needed to apply for accession to the IMF. Cuba is a "country," with the attributes of statehood as defined by international law. Its government should have no problem demonstrating that it is willing and able to fulfill the obligations of membership contained in the IMF's articles of agreement. Indeed, Cuba was one of the IMF's founding members, before voluntarily leaving the organization in 1964. The process for accession is relatively simple. As soon as Cuba files an application, the IMF will send a technical mission to gather the necessary data and prepare a paper describing the economy and recommending a quota of voting rights and contributions. Determining Cuba's quota is the crux of the accession process, and the country will need to choose an executive director to represent its interests during that discussion. Theoretically, Cuba could choose any of the current 24 executive directors, though it is likely to prefer one from Latin America. Cuba's application will require the support of a simple majority of the IMF's executive board. Although the US does not have enough votes to block Cuba's admission on its own, it wields enough influence to derail the process.

## **Cuba can't join IMF**

**CIGI 2016** [Center for International Governance, "The IMF's Final Few: What will it take for Cuba to rejoin?", *CIGI*, <<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/imfs-final-few-what-will-it-take-cuba-rejoin>>] //CJC

It is difficult to know whether the **Castro government was interested in rejoining the IMF** in the 1990s. What is clear is that **any effort in that direction would have been futile**. The reasons, though, are a little complex. **Approval of an application for membership requires only a simple majority of votes cast by the IMF Board of Governors. Opposition by the U.S., which holds approximately 17 percent of the vote, would not be decisive. In the case of an application from Cuba, most other countries would probably be receptive, but many would be reluctant to vote in favour in the face of strong opposition from the U.S. In past cases, notably when Poland applied to rejoin in 1981, U.S. opposition induced the Managing Director to decline to bring the matter before the Board,** and no vote was ever taken until the U.S. dropped its objections.

## **Informal Econ → Income Inequality Reverse Causal**

**Winkelried, 2005** [Diego, Associate professor and Head of the Academic Department of Finance at Universidad del Pacífico, "Income Distribution and the Size of the Informal Sector", <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/inequality/SSRN-id777144.pdf>] //AKC

**This study aims to contribute with this fresh view of the informal sector by addressing the question of whether income inequality affects informality** and by focusing exclusively on its effect on market demand.

A simple model with features from Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (2000) is developed. On the production side, firms decide simultaneously the quantity of output to produce and the sector in which to operate. Each sector embodies a different technology. Formal firms produce under increasing returns to scale as they can

use a productive public services in exchange of a tax payment. Informal firms, on the other hand, neither pay taxes nor access to the public services benefits. It follows that it is easier to comply with the prevailing regulations if the demand firms face for a given fiscal burden (tax rate) is large enough. In other words, the larger the demand that a firm has to meet, the higher the benefits from formality. This fact establishes a link with the demand side on the model which is entirely determined by the income distribution.

With this framework we were able to find that **high inequality leads to a large informal sector**, and that redistribution towards the middle class decreases the size of the informal sector while it increases the ability of fiscal instruments, either demand or supply orientated, to reduce informality. To support this, empirical evidence for Mexican cities is provided.

## **Development banks vs IMF**

**Torres 2015** [Richard Torres, researcher for the Center of Studies Into the Cuban Economy, "Cuba and the international financial institutions: Has the time come?", *ProgresoWeekly*, <<http://progresoweekly.us/cuba-and-the-international-financial-institutions-has-the-time-come/>>] //CJC

Although the talk is about international financial institutions (IFIs), it should be noted that in reality there are two different types of organizations whose functions are complementary, to a certain degree: A) On one hand, there's the International Monetary Fund (IMF), one of whose main functions is to look after the proper activities of the international monetary system and the transactions between countries, such as preventing or correcting the crises in the balance of payments of any of its members. Because this area is closely related to the exchange policies, which in turn are related to monetary and fiscal policies, many times the IMF's activities involve the design of a country's economic policy, something that has caused some sensitivity in many governments and social and political groups that reject that direct interference in sovereign decisions.

B) On the other hand, there are institutions that function as development banks, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Andean Development Bank (CAF). Their basic mission is to grant loans under favorable conditions for projects of high economic and social significance. Among them are social services and infrastructure, including aqueducts and highways.

As often happens, it is important to point out the evolution of the context to understand why this issue now becomes relevant. Among the identified restrictions that obstruct the success of the transformations in the island's economy and its long-term development are the imbalances in the foreign sector (finance, trade, integration), which have several causes and dimensions. One of them has to do with the access, under favorable conditions, to the international financial markets, that is, the ability to mobilize foreign savings to finance investment projects of various types on Cuban soil.

**Khan, 2016** [Ramona, "Normalization Policies with Cuba: Implications for Political and Economic Reform", *City University of New York*, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk\\_In8CsY/edit#](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk_In8CsY/edit#)] //AKC

Despite promising figures and easing license restrictions on travel and remittances, obstacles prevent U.S. investment from flowing freely in Cuba. As noted earlier, the majority of the Cuban workforce is in the government and foreign companies have to hire workers through the

government, who end up paying these workers a small portion of what was actually paid to them. **The fact that all U.S. exports to Cuba are conducted on a cash basis means there is little room for credit and will pose risks for investors who may not get paid in some cases. In 2013 the U.S. government supplied license sales of almost \$300 million in medical products and another \$3 billion in agricultural exports to Cuba. However, the return on these licenses was only about \$359 million in trade. This can be explained through the law that requires Cuba to pay for U.S. exports in cash that is a problem for a country that is struggling with its economy and widespread debt.**<sup>162</sup>

**Khan, 2016** [Ramona, “Normalization Policies with Cuba: Implications for Political and Economic Reform”, *City University of New York*, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk\\_In8CsY/edit#](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SNQKmNKALkh7RrjtVu8kwRdqn0SDDYhPRWk_In8CsY/edit#)] //AKC

**In addition, open relations with Cuba could benefit Americans in the medical field and also boost our economy in the agricultural sector.** In 2005, Daniel Griswold gave a speech at Rice University suggesting that dollars Cubans earn from U.S. tourists could potentially come back to the U.S. to buy American farm goods and products. **He pointed out that losses from the embargo “costs American firms a total of \$700 million to \$1.2 billion per year.** Farmers in Texas and neighboring states are among the biggest potential winners.” But he also acknowledged that real change could only come about if serious market reforms are implemented in Cuba.<sup>166</sup>

Arguments that negotiating with the Cuban government will weaken the United States’ status internationally does not stand up since the U.S. negotiates with other nations that have similar political systems (China, Russia, Iran, to name a few). As part of the ongoing process, challenges will present themselves, but it seems that the benefits will outweigh the costs. **Ending the trade embargo could create thousands of jobs for Americans in farming and other areas. Lifting the sanctions will help Cuba to reintegrate into the world community and be able to compete globally. It will bring Cuba out of political and economic isolation while ensuring the United States’ economy benefits. The United States will be able to rebuild its geopolitical influence in other Latin American countries as well.**<sup>167</sup>

#### **Trade Helps Fight Income Inequality (Warrant List)**

**Flanigan, 2014** [Maggie, associate, “Can International Trade Help Decrease Economic Inequality?”, *BusinessForward*, <http://www.businessfwd.org/blog/can-international-trade-help-decrease-economic-inequality>] //AKC

**A new report by Progressive Economy Executive Director Edward Gresser finds that trade agreements can help to decrease economic inequality.** Overall, the gains from trade would outweigh the risks.

Here is a summary of the report’s key findings:

Many Trade Barriers Hurt Low-Income Americans

**International trade policy is especially influential on the lives of lower-income consumers. Tariffs for necessary consumer goods such as shoes, clothes, and blankets make up a greater proportion of the final price than those on higher-end counterparts.**

New trade agreements have the potential to correct this regressive taxation and increase the purchasing power of lower-income individuals.

....

## Trade Can Increase Economic Growth

**International trade helps to increase economic growth, which counteracts income inequality.** The Progressive Economy report argues that though international trade is a secondary factor in affecting inequality, it does expand the pool of consumers to which businesses can export. Last year, every \$1 billion of exports supported nearly 6,000 jobs. Increasing exports would lead U.S. businesses to expand and hire. Even if the income gap between the richest and the poorest is not directly decreased because of international trade, the overall standard of living for the least affluent is improved.

## Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x

**CATO Institute**, January 9, 2004, "How Free Trade Promotes Democracy" Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies]

<https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

"A new Cato study finds strong evidence that **free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights in countries that open their borders to the global economy.** Specifically, the research finds that **countries that are the most open to trade are three times more likely to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are nine times less likely to suffer under political tyranny.** Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba."

## Oceans resilient

Kennedy 2 - Environmental science prof, Maryland. Former Director, Cooperative Oxford Laboratory. PhD. (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, <http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm>)

There is evidence that **marine** organisms and **ecosystems are resilient** to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the **biological components** of marine systems are tightly **coupled to physical factors**, **allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change** and thus **rendering them ecologically adaptable**. Some **species** also **have** wide **genetic variability** throughout their range, **which** may **allow for adaptation** to climate change.

## **Coral whitening, tourism, fishing, and hurricane protection are all alt causes**

Latin America Now, 7/10/13 ("Latin America Lost 30% of Its Biodiversity Since 1992, UN Reports,"

<http://latinamericanow.com/2013/07/10/latin-america-lost-30-of-its-biodiversity-since-1992-un-reports/>, bgm)

Astráлага remarked that even before it was debated whether global warming was a natural phenomenon alien to human activity, we now know that it is a reality to which we contribute.

"In the Caribbean region, one of the most serious problems is the whitening of corals, that if they continue to decline at the current rate, will be gone by 2070, as well as damage due to tourism, fisheries and hurricane protection they mean," the environmental expert continued to emphasize.

## **Tons of biodiversity already being lost**

UNEP, '10 (United Nations Environmental Programme, "State of Biodiversity in Latin America and The Caribbean," <http://www.cbd.int/gbo/gbo3/doc/StateOfBiodiversity-LatinAmerica.pdf>, bgm)

Recent assessments suggest that **the immense biodiversity of Latin America and the Caribbean is being lost or seriously threatened by human activities** at all levels and practically throughout the region's territory. The region includes 5 of the 20 countries with the highest numbers of species of fauna endangered or threatened, and 7 of the 20 countries whose plant varieties are the most threatened. The most severe recent increase in extinction risk has been observed among coral species, probably due in large part to the widespread bleaching of tropical reef systems in 1998, a year of exceptionally high sea temperatures. The region is among those with the greatest numbers of tree species in danger of extinction, threatened or vulnerable. Amphibians are suffering the ravages of the chytrid fungus owing to changes in macroclimatic and microclimatic conditions, and similar situations obtain in a

variety of groups of organisms. According to the estimations, over the past 100 years Latin America and the Caribbean has lost 75 per cent of the genetic diversity of its agricultural crops.

### **Cuban environmental protections are strong enough to incorporate economic development**

Barclay 4 (Eliza Barclay, truthout.org, 11 June 2004, Tourists and U.S. Embargo Threaten Cuba's Environmental Gains, <http://www.truth-out.org/archive/item/48343:tourists-and-us-embargo-threaten-cubas-environmental-gains>)

Some leading Cuban environmental experts sense no threat from increasing international commerce. Rosa Elena Sime n Negr n, Minister of Science, Technology, and the Environment, said that the Ministry has set up a sophisticated system of environmental research and management institutes. "Considering these established structures, the environment is not a transitory issue that can be brought down by more favorable economic conditions," she said. "It's a collective commitment that will remain under any circumstance, even when the U.S. blockade against Cuba is eliminated."

### **Lifting embargo leads to broader cooperation and influence in the region and globally — solves failed state**

Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David Perez "America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department" Harvard Latino Law Review lexis //CJC

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real. **If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war, face a**

humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing.

There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. <sup>n21</sup> To address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.

## **Cuban urban agriculture isn't sustainable – economic growth makes labor too expensive**

**Kost, 4** – agricultural economist, Specialty Crops Branch, Economic Research. Service, US Department of Agriculture (William, "CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?"

<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf>) //CJC

Even without an organic approach to food production, is Cuba's urban gardening system viable? In Cuba, both were an integral part of a common development. That integration is not required. While it is possible to have a high-tech and chemical-based production system in a small-scale gardening environment, it is unlikely to be sustainable at levels sufficient to provide a significant portion of a city's food needs. Most high-tech and chemical technologies employed respond to economies of scale. Incentives to grow into commercial operations will exist and production will shift away from central cities to areas with less severe constraints on land. Urban gardening systems are also labor-intensive systems. As long as labor is freely available or wages are low elsewhere, urban gardening can afford to utilize high-labor production techniques. As the Cuban economy grows and recovers, the demand for labor in other industries will grow and wages will rise. Because it will be more profitable to work elsewhere, labor would likely be drawn away from the urban gardens. Replacing labor with mechanization could also shift production away from urban locations. Mechanization also generates benefits from economies of scale. Thus, fewer and fewer urban gardens would remain producing for the urban markets.

At the same time, economic growth in Cuba should make commercial agriculture enterprises more profitable, more productive, and better able to supply food to urban markets. Marketing infrastructures should improve. With higher incomes, urban workers would be more able to purchase needed food. Commercial agricultural sources would become increasingly competitive with food from urban gardens, and urban workers would increasingly quit growing their own food. While there might continue to be urban gardens, it is unlikely that they will have a long-term role in providing a substantial portion of urban consumers' food needs.

## **Cuban sustainable ag is a myth**

**Avery, 9** - Dennis T. Avery, is a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute in Washington. Dennis is the Director for Global Food Issues [cgfi.org](http://cgfi.org). He was formerly a senior analyst for the

Department of State (“Cubans Starve on Diet of Lies” Canadian Free Press, 3/23,  
<http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/9571>) //CJC

The Cubans told the world they had heroically learned to feed themselves without fuel or farm chemicals after their Soviet subsidies collapsed in the early 1990s. They bragged about their “peasant cooperatives,” their biopesticides and organic fertilizers. They heralded their earthworm culture and the predator wasps they unleashed on destructive caterpillars. They boasted about the heroic ox teams they had trained to replace tractors.  
Organic activists swooned all over the world.

Now, a senior Ministry of Agriculture official has admitted in the **Cuban press that 84 percent of Cuba’s current food consumption is imported**, according to our agricultural attaché in Havana. **The organic success was all a lie**—a great, gaudy, Communist-style Big Lie of the type that dictators behind the Iron Curtain routinely used throughout the Cold War to hornswoggle the Free World.

This time the victims of the Big Lie are the Greens in the organic movement who want us to trust our future food supplies to their low-yield “natural farming” The Greens want us to outlaw nitrogen fertilizer, biotechnology and whatever else might save room for the planet’s wildlife through higher farm productivity. But now the Cubans have admitted sneaking rice, wheat, corn and soy oil imports into the country, bought with tourist dollars from European and Canadian visitors—many of whom came to see Cuba’s “stunningly successful” farming-of-the-future. As the U.S. embargos have loosened, food imports from the U.S. are also increasing.

The Cuban farming deception was aided by the “useful idiots” in the non-Communist world. The late Donnella Meadows, who wrote the stunningly-foolish book Limits to Growth in 1972, gushed over Cuban farming: “Suddenly deprived of half its food and most of its agricultural inputs, [Cuba] has not only maintained but increased its food supply in a way that creates jobs and improves the environment.”

Right, by importing 84 percent of the food.

Cuba has lots of unused farmland, but Castro’s system discouraged rural farmers. They couldn’t get their over-quota surplus to the cities for lack of fuel and trucks. Much of Cuba’s rural land has now grown up to thorny marabou bushes.

Instead, more than 10,000 Cuban city dwellers have become full-time gardeners. Environmentalist Bill McKibbin wrote in Harpers of an few-acre urban garden in Havana, on a site intended for a hospital. It grows 25 different vegetables, employing 64 people. Most of the beans and carrots have to be delivered to the government for the “ration stores” but the gardeners can make their own deals with the neighbors for the rest. The gardeners only make about 150 pesos per month. Still, there’s even less to buy in Cuba than in the old Soviet Union—including almost no meat and little milk. They mainly subsist on rice and beans.

Should America force its people to spend their days’ hand-weeding vegetables in a field that should have been a hospital? Should our food be rationed like Cuba’s? Instead, 3 percent of Americans grow the food, on far less expensive land.

As Blake Hurst concluded in his March, 23 Weekly Standard article, “Dirt Poor in the Workers’ Paradise:” “If you are going to have a sustainable agricultural paradise, it helps to have a nearby neighbor with a million or so industrial farmers.”

## **Zero chance the US adopts the Cuban model**

**Pfeiffer, 3** – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,  
[http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103\\_korea\\_2.html](http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html). //CJC

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

## **The impact is exaggerated – Cuban ag isn’t sustainable**

Thompson and Stephens, 12 – \* Ph.D. Curriculum and Education Director @ Duke University AND \*\* Marian Cheek Jackson Center (Charles D. and Alexander, “Visions for Sustainable Agriculture in Cuba and the United States: Changing Minds and Models through Exchange”, Southern Spaces, March 22 2013, <http://www.southernspaces.org/2012/visions->

[sustainable-agriculture-cuba-and-united-states-changing-minds-and-models-through-exchan](#)  
//CJC

Following the Cuban Revolution (1953–59), the Soviet Union's (USSR) agricultural imperatives drove the island toward state-run farms, marginalizing many family run operations. The breakup of the USSR in 1990 spelled the end of Soviet agricultural influence but intensified Cuban food shortages. Cuba began to look within for solutions, finding indigenous knowledge and encouraging local innovation. Exaggerated praise for developments in the country's sustainable agriculture belies the reality that Cuba is no

utopia. Popular descriptions often oversimplify the narrative of Cuba's sustainable agriculture. For example, the website of the Durham, North Carolina, non-profit NEEM (Natural Environment Ecological Management) features a narrative sketch that labels the rise of organic garden collectives in Cuban cities "the urban agriculture miracle."<sup>5</sup> Others have suggested that we can expect "an ecological agriculture" in Cuba's future.<sup>6</sup>

In much sustainable agriculture praise of Cuba, we do not hear that the country (like the U.S.) has confinement hog and chicken houses, that major U.S. food conglomerates are already selling vast quantities of grain and other products there, or that **the embargo on trade with Cuba does not apply to U.S. agribusiness**. We are not told that thousands work in small farming because they have no other option.

Agricultural work is popular in Cuba, in part, because state-supported income is drying up for hundreds of thousands of wage earners and there is often nowhere else to turn but to small-scale farms and gardens. Yet **much of Cuba's former sugarcane land, once a volatile but powerful economic life-force, is idle and in poor condition. Even with its admirable innovations in sustainable and organic farming, Cuba's domestic agricultural producers cannot meet the food needs of the island's population; there is a real sense of food insecurity**. Looking for food (in dollar stores, on the black market, legally), is a major pre-occupation for much of the population. Cuba imports at least 80 percent of its food, with much of it coming from its largest trading partners—China and Venezuela. **This is hardly a sustainable scenario, and while there does not appear to be starvation in Cuba, food shortages remain a problem, even as the government's meager food rationing is fading**.<sup>7</sup> However, household food insecurity is also on the rise in the U.S. today.

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture at least 14.5% of U.S. households were food insecure at some time during the year in 2010, up from 11% in 2005.

## **Cuban oil doesn't solve rels or impact energy prices — there isn't enough of it**

Hira, 13 – Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University (Andrew, "Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation - edited by Benjamin-Alvarado, Jonathan" Book Review, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 32, Issue 1, pages 119–121, January 2013) //CJC

Due to its strategic role during the Cold War, Cuba retains a special fascination for scholars.

This edited volume contains five chapters that explore two questions: first, **whether Cuba's newfound offshore oil could improve its economic future; and second, whether the oil could serve as a catalyst to improve US–Cuban relations**.

Despite the authors' conclusions, **the answer in looking at the evidence seems to be 'no' to both**.<sup>8</sup> The chapters do not have a comprehensive

approach for these questions, and the text suffers as a result. The conclusion more or less summarises points made in earlier chapters, and observations such as poor quality of oil are repeated across several chapters. More importantly, this volume does not seem to address the most fundamental question – whether there is a political context that would allow for a warming of US relations with Cuba and what kinds of systems Cubans will create short of free markets to manage their economy. The authors focus on economic reasons for their presupposition – that Cuba's potential oil is attractive enough to the USA in a time of concern about scarcity and energy security to overcome political blockage, and Cuba's need in turn for ready markets and financial capital for its oil, biofuels and electricity sectors. **Yet, even this argument is**

**undermined by the facts pointed out by the authors: that Cuba's potential contribution to the US oil supply would make an insignificant dent to prices or security**; that Cuba has

had a great deal of success in attracting other investors from around the world; and **that Cuba's oil reserves have been less promising in terms of both quality and quantity.** They further point out that Cuba's energy sector now sports a dependence on Venezuela, including a new refinery and subsidised transport and fuels, and that Castro is opposed to a conversion of the Cuban sugar industry to biofuels, seeing this as a loss of food security.

## **Oil prices low now — will take years for prices to be high**

**Krauss Dec 2016** [Clifford Krauss, writer at NYT, “Volatility? Simple Economics”, *New York Times*, <[https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/energy-environment/oil-prices.html?_r=0)>] //CJC

The oil industry, with its history of booms and busts, has been in its deepest downturn since the 1990s, if not earlier. Earnings are down for companies that made record profits in recent years, leading them to decommission about two-thirds of their rigs and sharply cut investment in exploration and production. Scores of companies have gone bankrupt and an estimated 250,000 oil workers — about half in the United States — have lost their jobs. **The cause is the plunging price of oil barrels, which at one point fell more than 70 percent compared with June 2014 levels.** Prices have recovered a few times over the last year, and although the industry has managed to cut costs, many wells remain unprofitable. Executives think **it will be years before oil returns to \$90 or \$100 a barrel**, a price that was pretty much the norm over the last decade.

## **Flood attempt Inev: U.S. shale production will encourage a Saudi flood**

**Plumer, 12** (Brad, domestic correspondent for the Washington Post, “OPEC is worried about cheaper oil. Why isn’t Saudi Arabia?”, Washington Post, 6/13/2012, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/opec-is-worried-about-cheap-oil-why-isnt-saudi-arabia/2012/06/13/gJQA7F3ZaV\\_blog.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/opec-is-worried-about-cheap-oil-why-isnt-saudi-arabia/2012/06/13/gJQA7F3ZaV_blog.html)) //CJC

Right now, the world is pumping more oil than it needs. That means falling prices: good for oil consumers in the U.S. and Europe, bad for producers in the Middle East. So when OPEC meets Thursday, some oil states like Iraq will ask the cartel to throttle output and push prices back up. But Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, appears to be okay with letting prices fall further — even below their current price of \$96 per barrel. At first glance, that might seem odd. Shouldn’t the Saudis *want* sky-high prices? Wouldn’t that mean more money for them? Perhaps. Yet according to energy economist Philip Verleger, the Saudis have all sorts of subtle reasons for wanting prices to ease up further — from punishing Iran and Russia to staving off America’s quest for oil independence. The first thing to note, Verleger explained in a phone interview, is that Saudi Arabia is most concerned about two countries — Iran and Russia. Iran’s nuclear program is causing other Middle Eastern governments to sweat uncomfortably. And the Saudi king recently suggested, in a rare rebuke, that he was unhappy with Russia’s veto of a U.N. resolution to curtail the violence in nearby Syria. Both Iran and Russia are major oil producers. And their economies would be hurt by lower crude prices. Many analysts believe that Iran needs oil prices well above \$100 per barrel to balance its budget. That gives Saudi Arabia a lot of leverage. “The Saudis know that lower prices are a much better way to put pressure on Iran than sanctions,” says Verleger. Second, Saudi Arabia is a member of the G-20 and wants to stay in the good graces of the United States and Europe. So, Verleger says, the Saudis may want to let prices drop further — even below their current, still-historically-high level of \$96 per barrel — to provide further economic stimulus to the rest of the world. “The Saudis believe that letting prices fall 50 percent in 1999 helped the world recover from the Asian debt crisis,” Verleger says. Third, Verleger says, **the Saudis are casting a wary eye on the nascent shale-drilling boom in the United State and Canada.** “Some of those [North American] producers

are very sensitive to the price of oil,” he says, “so if the Saudis let oil prices keep falling, that will slow production.” Saudi Arabia is **none too keen on other countries developing their own sources of oil anytime soon.** Those three reasons may help explain why Saudi Arabia recently called for a higher target for OPEC’s crude output — even though prices are already dropping. Saudi production has driven the recent boom in oil supply, cranking out 9.9 million barrels per day in May, its highest level all year. Because of its gargantuan reserves, Saudi Arabia can still play a major role in determining the price of crude, at least when demand is slack. If the Saudis decided to cut back their output — as happened after the financial crisis in 2009 — they could put a floor on prices. But they seem to have little interest in doing so for the time being. Other OPEC countries, particularly Iran, Russia, Venezuela and Iraq may not like this state of affairs. “But there’s not much they can do about it,” Verleger says. “The Saudis run the show.”

## **Transition not happening – fossil fuels outpacing renewables**

Plumer, 7/10 (Brad, Washington Post, “Bad news: The world’s energy supply isn’t getting any cleaner”, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/10/bad-news-fossil-fuels-are-more-than-keeping-up-with-clean-energy/>) //CJC

We’ve seen plenty of charts over the past few years showing that wind and solar power are growing at astronomical rates — not just in the United States, but around the world. That seems like an encouraging sign for efforts to tackle global warming. **But here’s a sobering counterpoint.** Roger Pielke, Jr., an environmental studies professor at the University of Colorado, has charted data on the share of carbon-free energy as a fraction of the world’s overall consumption. When you look at things this way, **the share of clean energy around the world has actually stagnated over the past 20 years:** It’s true that carbon-free sources like wind and solar and hydropower and geothermal have been growing rapidly. But fossil fuels like oil, coal, and natural gas have also been growing rapidly in the past two decades — particularly in China and India. **The result is a stalemate of sorts.** The world’s energy supply isn’t any cleaner than it was in the 1990s. (By the way, fans of nuclear will note that the share of carbon-free energy grew most quickly 1965 and 1999 — a period, Pielke notes, when “nuclear power increas[ed] by a factor of 100 and hydropower by a factor of 6.”) Another way to look at the same phenomenon is to measure the “carbon-intensity” of the world’s energy sector — that is, how many tons of carbon dioxide are released into the atmosphere for each unit of energy that’s generated. This takes into account improvements in efficiency and the fact that natural gas is a cleaner fossil fuel than coal. Here, too, there’s been a real stagnation over the past few decades. Check out that gray line: **This chart comes from a report this year by the International Energy Agency, which notes that since 1990, the carbon-intensity of the global economy has improved by a mere 1 percent** — despite all the concern and all the conferences on climate change. **If that trend continues, the IEA says, global carbon-dioxide emissions will keep rising sharply and climate models suggest the Earth could heat up by as much as 6°C (10.8°F) over the long term.** That’s what the purple line represents. By the way, the World Bank isn’t sure that humanity will be able to adapt to even 4°C of warming. So 6°C isn’t exactly ideal. **Now, alternatively, if the world wants to avoid that balmy fate and keep global warming below 2°C, then carbon intensity will have to improve dramatically — far more dramatically than we’ve seen over the last four decades.** That’s what the blue line represents. Is the blue line actually possible? That’s the trillion-dollar question. The full IEA report, “Tracking Clean Energy Progress 2013” (pdf) has a slew of ideas on how to clean up the world’s energy sector. For instance, global coal use would have to peak before 2020; power plants and factories would have to get a lot more efficient; things like nuclear power and renewables would have to expand at an even faster rate. **For now, though, the world’s not on track.**

## **Renewables not a standalone strategy – intermittency, efficiency is a prerequisite, grid alterations, electricity prices, and European examples aren't in the context of the US grid.**

Rosenthal 3-23 (Elisabeth, "Life After Oil and Gas", NYTimes, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/sunday-review/life-after-oil-and-gas.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>) //CJC

"There is plenty of room for **wind and solar** to grow and they are becoming more competitive, but these **are still variable resources** — the sun doesn't always shine and the wind doesn't always blow," said Alex Klein, the research director of IHS Emerging Energy Research, a consulting firm on renewable energy. "**An industrial economy needs a reliable power** source, so we think **fossil fuel will be** an **important** foundation of our energy mix **for** the next few **decades**." Fatih Birol, chief economist at the 28-nation International Energy Agency, which includes the United States, said that reducing fossil fuel use was crucial **to curbing global temperature** rise, but added that improving the **energy efficiency** of homes, vehicles and industry **was an easier short-term strategy**. He noted that the 19.5 million residents of New York State consume as much energy as the 800 million in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) and that, even with President Obama's automotive fuel standards, European vehicles were on average more than 30 percent more fuel efficient than American ones. He cautioned that **a rapid expansion of renewable power would be complicated and costly**. Using large amounts of **renewable energy** often **requires modifying** national power **grids**, and **renewable energy is still** generally more **expensive** than using fossil fuels. **That is particularly true in the United States**, where natural gas is plentiful and, therefore, a cheap way to generate electricity (while producing half the carbon dioxide emissions of other fossil fuels, like coal). **Promoting wind and solar would mean higher electricity costs for consumers and industry**. Indeed, many of the **European countries** that have led the way in adopting renewables **had little fossil fuel** of their own, **so electricity costs were already high**. **Others had strong environmental movements** that made it politically acceptable to endure higher prices in order to reduce emissions.

## **No commercially viable oil – recent failures prove**

Offshore Magazine, 12 ("Another Cuban oil well turns up dry," 11/25, <http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/2012/11/another-cuban-oil.html>) //CJC

The Venezuelan government-owned company PDVSA reported that it found **no commercially viable oil in Cuban waters** in the Gulf of Mexico, **making their exploration well the third unsuccessful search for oil** in recent months, reported the Havana Times. Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CUPET closed their exploratory well last week in Cabo de San Antonio, off the far western end of the island, having found no "potential for commercial exploitation," the Cuban state-run enterprise Cubapetroleo (CUPET) explained. Nevertheless, PDVSA will continue to operate in Cuba, according to a statement by the company. "The technical expertise and valuable geological information obtained have contributed to reaffirming PDVSA's decision to continue its participation in the exploration campaign in Cuban waters," read the statement. This finding is another setback for the Cuban government. The present effort was the third failed attempt to find oil in the Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In late May, the Spanish energy company Repsol announced it was shutting down its oil exploration effort off the coast of Cuba after failing to find oil on its first bore.

## **Obama just removed oil restrictions on Cuba**

**Guzzo 2017** [Paul Guzzo at the Tampa Bay Times, "U.S. signs agreements opening gulf to Cuba drilling, partnering on cleanups," *Tampa Bay Times*, <<http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/us-signs-agreements-opening-gulf-to-cuba-drilling-partnering-on-cleanups/2310268>>] //CJC

In its final days in the White House, **the Obama administration made it easier for the Cuban government to drill for oil in gulf waters just beyond the country's maritime border with the United States.** It's the result of a treaty signed Wednesday that defines who controls a 7,700-square-mile area that begins just over 200 miles off the coast of Tampa Bay and Florida, long known as the Eastern Gap. It is thought to be rich with oil but had no clear owner because it fell just beyond the maritime boundaries of the United States, Cuba and Mexico. The provisions of the treaty had been agreed upon under the Carter administration but were never formalized. Cuba gets around 10 percent of the Eastern Gap. Past oil explorations in Cuban waters have come up dry, but the government has said it intends to look again. Cuba has invited drillers to lease around the gap area but had no takers — probably, analysts have said, because of uncertainty over who owns the gap.

## **Cuba is key to US-Latin American Relations-specifically spills-over to global coop on warming- overcomes alt causes**

Shifter '12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America," April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>) //CJC

Cuba, too, **poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America.** The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. **Although the United States has recently moved** in the right direction and taken steps **to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle** its severe, outdated **constraints on** normalized relations with Cuba. **Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement.** At the same time, Cuba's authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba's eventual transition to democratic rule. **An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba,** without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, **would be an important first step.** Many of the **issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions.** Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Iran's nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other **Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global** political, environmental, and **security issues.** Several for which **US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important** include: As the world's lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-

proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. **Many countries in the region give priority to *climate change challenges*. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives** Brazil and five other **South American nations a special role to play.** Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. **Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds** on drug policy, **they have mutual interests** and goals **that** should **allow** consultation and **collaboration** on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

## **Cooperation key to solve warming- requires interconnected solutions**

Garamone '9 (Jim Garamone reporter with American Forces Press Service. He has been covering the defense beat since 1976. Mr. Garamone served 13 years in the U.S. Army and Army Reserve.¶ American Forces Press Service, 11-20 2009 " Gates Urges More Western Hemisphere Cooperation" <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=56806>) //CJC

**The United States and other Western Hemisphere nations must increase cooperation and collaboration for** their continued **security**, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said here today.¶ Noting that the **challenges facing Western Hemisphere nations have changed** since the end of the Cold War -- a period of tension that inspired the United States and Canada to establish the North American Aerospace Defense Command -- Gates said he wants the United States and Canada to build on this legacy of cooperation and interoperability to face the challenges of new threats.¶ "This **engagement** and this partnership **are** so **necessary because** the emerging security **challenges we face are increasingly interconnected, and the nontraditional threats require a collective approach,**" Gates said.¶ And it requires more than simple defense cooperation, the secretary said. Threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, smuggling and others require "an uncommon degree of coordination among the national-security, homeland-defense and criminal-justice agencies of our governments," the secretary said.¶ The nations are working together more closely. In 2006, Canada and the United States agreed to expand the NORAD mission to include maritime warning. The two nations also signed a new emergency management cooperation agreement in December, and the U.S. military is prepared -- at Canada's request -- to assist the nation as it hosts the Winter Olympics early next year.¶ **One area where cooperation is needed is** in the Arctic, as **global warming** has increased access to the normally ice-bound region. While there are disagreements -- Canada asserts that the Northwest Passage is in Canadian waters, and the United States and Western European nations say it is an international waterway -- there are areas of cooperation.¶ "We share an interest in developing more icebreaking ships for mobility and improving domain awareness to support search-and-rescue operations in light of increased tourism up north," Gates said.¶ Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark and the United States have claims on parts of the Arctic. "Even as the U.S. 'resets' relations with Russia, we will work with Canada to ensure that increased Russian activity in the Arctic does not lead to miscalculation or unnecessary friction," Gates said.¶ The nations of the hemisphere have to band together to handle natural or man-made disasters, Gates said, noting recent examples of that cooperation. Canada and Mexico assisted New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005. The United States assisted Haiti last year after Hurricane Ike hit the island nation, and helped El Salvador last month after rainstorms caused mudslides in that Latin American nation.¶ Global warming could cause more frequent and intense storms, Gates said, and the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review will examine how the U.S. armed forces can respond to such natural disasters. But man can be the biggest threat, he added, and the nexus of drug trafficking and terrorism poses a danger to both the United States and Canada.¶ "The same means and routes used to transport drugs could also be used for dangerous weapons and materials," Gates said. Smugglers have used semi-submersible vessels that can carry tons of drugs and are difficult to detect, he said.¶ The terrorist group known as FARC has used ungoverned areas of Colombia to grow and refine drugs, and must be met with the force of law, Gates said. "We cannot expect to make headway on narcotics without a multifaceted, multinational comprehensive approach to the problem," he said. "We need to work together to fortify judicial institutions and the rule of law."¶ Gates emphasized that this must be accomplished in ways respectful of human rights. Police in many countries often are outgunned by their adversaries, and military forces have stepped in. Colombia and Mexico are working to instruct soldiers in how to defeat the enemy while respecting the rights of the people, the secretary said.¶ Gates also stressed that the military should not be the lead agency in confronting many of the threats in the Western Hemisphere.¶ "It is important to keep front and center that the military is in a supporting -- not a lead -- role in dealing with most of the problems," he said, though he acknowledged that in some situations, only the military can provide the manpower, logistics, transportation or expertise to handle crises or threats.¶ **Through increased cooperation and collaboration, the secretary said, Western Hemisphere nations must address these issues before they find themselves working through them at a disaster site.**

## **Cuban health care fails now due to lack of supplies and equipment**

**Plant, 13** – MA in Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews (Hanna, “The Challenges of Health Care in Cuba,” Global Politics, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/hanna/>)//CJC

However, challenges remain. Healthcare may be free and available for all Cuban citizens but medication is not. Pharmacies are often very poorly stocked and rationing of supplies is minimal. 13 There are claims that hospitals are often in poor conditions and doctors have to bring in their own supplies and equipment to allow them to treat their patients. 10 Despite the production of medical supplies and technology, it seems very little of this actually remains in Cuba. Every year Cuba exports huge amounts of medical aid, mostly to other Latin American countries for purely financial returns. 22 For example, Venezuela provides much-needed oil to Cuba and in exchange receives Cuban doctors and medical supplies. 14 Cuba’s dual economy has a lot to do with why such disparity exists. Medication and equipment is there and available but only to pay for in American dollars, of which the poor and middle classes of Cuba are very unlikely to have. 23 The ‘pesos pharmacies’ and local state hospitals are drastically under-stocked and thus access for the poor to needed medication is minimal, despite the service being free.

## **The US facilitates medical brain drain now**

**Erisman, 13** – professor of political science at Indiana State University (Michael, “United States Efforts to Undermine Cuban Medical Aid Programs” 7/2, <http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1221-us-efforts-to-undermine-cuban-medical-aid-programs>) //CJC

As part of its larger policy of hostility and confrontation, Washington's response to Havana's globetrotting doctors has been the Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) program. The CMPP was launched during the Bush Administration on August 11, 2006, is designed to facilitate the defection and entry into the United States of personnel (especially doctors) serving in Cuban overseas medical aid contingents' the program has been continued by the Obama Administration. The "godfather" of the CMPP was Cuban-born diplomat Emilio González, director of the U.S. Citizen & Immigration Services from 2006 to 2008. A former colonel in the U.S. Army, Mr. González is a staunchly anti-Castro exile. He has characterized Cuba's policy of sending doctors and other health workers abroad as "state-sponsored human trafficking." So far, approximately 12,000 defectors have been processed through the program.

## **Embargo hurts health care – hampers UN programs**

Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” <http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf> //CJC

The increase in the costs for purchasing the necessary medicine or medical materials is hampering the implementation of UN development projects and programmes. The repercussions of

these difficulties are ultimately felt by the intended beneficiaries of these programmes, who face long delays before having access to adequate medicine or treatment.

### **Embargo hurts health care – infrastructure**

Amnesty International 2009 “ The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights” <http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf> //CJC

The impact of economic sanctions on health and health services is not limited to difficulties in the supply of medicine. Health and health services depend on functioning water and sanitation infrastructure, on electricity and other functioning equipment such as X-ray facilities or refrigerators to store vaccines. The financial burden and commercial barriers have led to shortages or intermittent availability of drugs, medicines, equipment and spare parts. It has also hindered the renovation of hospitals, clinics and care centres for the elderly.<sup>64</sup>

### **US embargo has severely damaged Cuban health and the health care system – lack of access to supplies**

Amnesty International, 9 (“The US Embargo Against Cuba,” <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR25/007/2009/en/51469f8b-73f8-47a2-a5bd-f839adf50488/amr250072009eng.pdf>)//CJC

**The negative impact of the US embargo on the Cuban health care system** and on the right to health of Cubans during the 1990s has been documented in a 1997 report by the American Association for World Health (AAWH).<sup>45</sup> The 300-page document is still the most comprehensive study on the issue. Based on a fact-finding mission to Cuba, the AAWH identified that **the embargo contributed particularly to malnutrition affecting especially women and children, poor water quality, lack of access to medicines and medical supplies, and limited the exchange of medical and scientific information due to travel restrictions and currency regulations**. The AAWH found that “a humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventive health care to all of its citizens... Even so, **the U.S. embargo of food and the de facto embargo on medical supplies has wreaked havoc with the island's model primary health care system**.”<sup>4</sup>

### **US embargo destroys effectiveness of Cuban health care system**

Quiang, 12 – Editor, Xinhua News (Hou, “Cuba healthcare weakened by U.S. embargo,” Xinhua News, 11/28, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-11/28/c\\_132004531.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/health/2012-11/28/c_132004531.htm))//CJC

HAVANA, Nov. 27 (Xinhua) -- Cuban medical authorities said on Tuesday **a 50-year trade embargo imposed by the United States has severely undermined the country's healthcare system**.

Cuban hospitals suffer restrictions in acquiring imported medical consumables and medicine, advanced medical technology and latest scientific information, officials said.

The public Institute of Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surgery, where thousands of people receive free medical care every year from international specialists, is financially strained by the embargo.

**"We must find alternatives that sometimes include purchasing from distant markets, buying from third parties, which means higher prices for these products,"** said Director of the institute Dr. Lorenzo Llerena.

**He added some equipments were simply unattainable, "because they are manufactured in the United States."**

The embargo has caused Cuba a loss of more than 200 million dollars in the medical sector alone by 2011, representing a significant impact on the tiny Caribbean nation, according to official figures

### **The Embargo is why Cubans are perceived as so much better**

Griswold 14 [Alison Griswold is a Slate staff writer covering business and economics, "The Ban on Cuban Cigars Is Over. Will Their Mystique Disappear, Too?", *Slate*, [http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/12/18/cuban\\_cigars\\_legal\\_embargo\\_stands\\_but\\_travelers\\_c\\_an\\_import\\_100\\_of\\_tobacco.html](http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/12/18/cuban_cigars_legal_embargo_stands_but_travelers_c_an_import_100_of_tobacco.html)] //BS

**Since the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba took effect, Cuban cigars have become something of the stuff of legend.** Before instating the ban in 1962, President John F. Kennedy famously secured 1,200 of the cigars for himself. They are widely thought to be superior to all other varieties and command hefty prices. In 1996, the New York Times reported that a box of 50 Cuban cigars would fetch up to \$850 on the black market in the U.S. Today, genuine handmade Cuban cigars tend to start at \$250 for a box of 25, says Jeff Borysiewicz, president of Corona Cigar Co., an online retailer. The finest kinds can retail for hundreds of dollars more.

"It's a forbidden fruit," explains Eric Newman, president of Tampa, Florida-based J.C. Newman Cigar Co., a cigar manufacturer. "The biggest market in the world prohibits them from entering the marketplace." Rather than deterring U.S. consumers, **that ban may have in fact proved the biggest selling point for Cuban cigars over the past 50 years.** People in the industry compare their allure to that of Coors beer before it became easily available beyond the American West. So great was the East Coast's unrequited love for Coors in the 1970s that the quest to bring the beer from West to East was depicted in the popular 1977 film *Smokey and the Bandit*.

### **Cubans are legal in the sq**

Oppmann 16 [Patrick Oppmann is CNN's Havana-based correspondent, responsible for covering Cuba and the surrounding region for all of the network's platforms, "US lifts import limits on Cuban cigars, alcohol", *CNN*, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/americas/cuba-cigars-us-embargo-lifted/>] //BS

But **Cuban cigars are no longer a forbidden luxury**, as President **Obama** on Friday **issued a directive that would allow Americans to engage in more commerce** with the communist-run island, including potentially allowing Cuban state-run pharmaceutical companies to sell their low cost, innovative medications in the US.

But it was the news that **American travelers can now bring back an unlimited amount of Cuban** alcohol and **tobacco -- including the famous cigars** -- that captured many people's interest.

### **Lifting the embargo will help the Cuban biotech industry**

[Bill Frist, "Cuba's Most Valuable Export: Its Healthcare Expertise," *Forbes*, 8 June 2015, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrist/2015/06/08/cubas-most-valuable-export-its-healthcare-expertise/2/#4d0e9eba5384>] //ES

**As we rapidly move toward normalization of relations with Cuba**, we have much to learn from its effective primary care model successfully implemented under severely constrained financial resources. Part of Cuba's success can be attributed to having the world's largest number of physicians per capita. Physician office locations are centrally planned, with each physician team responsible for the health of the citizens within a geographic area.

But we must also look at the bigger picture when considering the Cuban Paradox. In addition to investing in accessible primary and family healthcare, the Cuban government has focused on providing access to education, housing, and nutrition—key non-medical or social determinants of health. Cuban citizens may be driving cars from the 1950s and have a meager average monthly wage of \$20, but they boast "first world" population health status because of a combination of attention paid to social and environmental factors of health paired with planned, accessible primary care.

**We also have the potential for the exchange of ideas and research in the biomedical field, in which the Cuban government has invested heavily.** Shortly after President Obama's administration announced the beginning of normalization of relations with Cuba, news reports of a Cuban-developed lung cancer vaccine were widely circulated. In April, Cuba's Center for Molecular Immunology signed an agreement with the Roswell Park Cancer Institute in Buffalo, New York to import the cancer vaccine, known as CimaVax, to begin U.S. clinical trials.

### **Cuban health care and biotech currently fail due to lack of resources and knowledge flow – easing the embargo key to scientific growth**

Thorsteinsdóttir et al., 4 – Adjunct Professor, Global Health, Dalla Lana School of Public Health (Halla, Tirso W Sáenz, Uyen Quach, Abdallah S Daar, and Peter A Singer, "Cuba – innovation through synergy," *Nature Biotechnology*, Volume 22, December, [http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/cuba-innovation\\_through\\_synergy.pdf](http://www.sld.cu/galerias/pdf/cuba-innovation_through_synergy.pdf))//CJC

Lack of funding and **the US trade embargo**. Despite strong government commitment, **Cuba's health biotechnology sector faces a lack of financial resources**. The economic conditions in Cuba are problematic, and the government does not have an impressive track record of building a strong and diversified economy<sup>7</sup>. Limited access to international credit has made it harder for the country to engage in ambitious restructuring schemes, such as those taking place in Eastern Europe, and Cuba continues to struggle to pay off its debt. **The US trade embargo has limited the economic options for Cuba, including development of the health biotechnology sector**. For example, Cuba is forced to import research equipment from countries other than the

United States—a situation that not only consumes time but adds to the cost. Another challenge imposed by the poor Cuba-US relations is the increasing difficulty that Cuban scientists face obtaining visas to enter the United States to attend conferences and other related activities. Also, even though the US Treasury Department has as of April 2004 officially permitted papers from embargoed countries to be edited and published in US journals, the uncertainties of the embargo have made it difficult for Cuban papers to be accepted in US journals<sup>8</sup>. **The embargo therefore restricts the knowledge flow involving Cuban scientists in the international scientific community and adds costs, because Cubans have to attend conferences that are held in countries other than the United States.** Another challenge is the dominance of US firms in the global health biotechnology sector. This may limit the options for Cuba in developing joint ventures, strategic alliances and licensing of their technologies.

### **'Increases' in tourism really just displace non-US tourists**

**Romeu, 2008.** ["Vacation Over: Implications for the Caribbean of Opening U.S.-Cuba Tourism." Rafael Romeu. International Monetary Fund.

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08162.pdf> GST]

The results presented suggest an increase of Caribbean tourism arrivals of roughly 10 percent, and a shift toward U.S. tourism. U.S. consumers would experience an increase in purchasing power as the dead weight loss of the current policy were to be eliminated. **For Caribbean competitors, a hypothetical opening of Cuba to U.S. tourists would imply hedging toward alternative tourist sources, as U.S. visitor losses would occur on impact. The results suggest that binding capacity constraints in Cuba would likely displace current tourists as new U.S. arrivals with immensely lower travel costs would compete for limited hotel rooms.** Capturing this short-term dislocation is important for offsetting potential U.S. tourist losses. The results also suggest that permanent declines in travel costs for U.S. tourists alongside their importance in this market would increase their long-term presence in the region. **As U.S. tourists would be able to spend less on getting to their destination, they would be able to outbid other visitors for greater tourism quality and quantities.**

### **Lifting embargo doesn't solve, tourists can go there whether or not embargo is lifted**

PR

**Young, 2016** ["Cashing in on Cuba: Why the U.S. tourism industry isn't waiting for Congress to lift the embargo" by Angelo Young, Salon News. Writer and editor for Salon News. AUG 29, 2016]

In the past seven years, two-way travel restrictions have been lifted, diplomatic ties have been restored, prisoners have been swapped and more U.S. business delegations have been exploring the streets of Havana. And U.S. companies eager to do business in and with this long off-limits market have been leading calls to end the 56-year-old trade embargo.

Now after **the Obama administration used its executive powers to lift some trade restrictions** in September and renewed calls to lift the embargo, companies in the tourism

sector have decided the time to try to gain a foothold in Cuba is now. **They're working around the embargo**, which Congress has failed to rescind.

**Although there are still only 12 approved reasons for U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba, they can now be defined broadly enough to accommodate almost any type of tourism, according Samuel Engel, vice president for the Aviation group of ICF International, a global advisory firm. "You'd have to be pretty uncreative not to find a way to put yourself into one of the 12 categories in order to fly to Cuba from the U.S.," Engel told Salon. What, for example, constitutes "educational activities," or "support for the Cuban people," two of the authorized reasons to visit Cuba?**

**In other words, the gaps in the embargo's fine print are big enough to sail a cruise ship through.** Indeed, earlier this year, Carnival became the first U.S. leisure travel company since the 1950s to offer cruise packages to Cuba by carefully categorizing the tour as a cultural exchange program.

### **Cuban Workers to benefit from tourism increase**

**Feinberg, 2016.** "Tourism in Cuba: Riding the Wave Toward Sustainable Prosperity." Richard E. Feinberg and Richard S. Newfarmer. DECEMBER 2016. Brookings.

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp\\_20161202\\_tourism\\_cuba\\_feinberg\\_newfarmer.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20161202_tourism_cuba_feinberg_newfarmer.pdf) GST

Benefits for Workers: Labor Markets and Wages Virtually all direct expenses for labor remain in-country. **Industry experts suggest that 29 percent of expenses go to pay wages.** In Cuba, **hotels exclusively employ Cubans** (hired through state employment entities by law), except in the case of management contracts where perhaps half a dozen expatriates are employed, primarily in overseeing food and beverage operations. **This important return to Cuban workers does not capture gratuities from tourists, which can exceed base wages by a multiple of ten or more;** we spoke to workers who indicated that while their base wage was CUP 600 or \$25 per month, they received tips in hard currencies of up to \$300 a month during the high season. Other direct hotel expenses, such as maintenance and utilities (power, water, telecommunications), are paid to other state-owned enterprises.

[...]

Purchases from the local economy deepen the benefits of the industry. Most important are expenditures for food and beverage. A cursory survey of food and beverage offerings at several four- and five-star hotels in Havana and beach locations would suggest that a two-thirds/one-third division between locally-sourced and imported products would be a reasonable guess. Locally produced foods typically include some dairy and meats, fish and seafood (including lobsters), and seasonally available fruits and vegetables; local beverages include bottled water, some soft drinks and beer, and of course Cuban rum. Items typically imported include chicken (from U.S. vendors), some meats, yogurts and breakfast cereals, canned or frozen vegetables, and alcoholic beverages other than rum and local beers. These correspond to numbers reported in international trade statistics. **If we assume a two-thirds/one-third split, 18 percent of hotel revenues would leak out of the country to import food and beverages for tourist consumption.**

## Tourism leads to Democratic Change

Peñalosa, 2013. ["Tourism and Democracy: A Two Way Street." The World Bank. Enrique Peñalosa is the President of the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. July 2013. <https://handshake.pppknowledgelab.org/columns/tourism-democracy/> GST]

SEEDING DEMOCRACY. Finally, the vast number of tourists typically visit from more egalitarian societies. They see through local classist hierarchies, like India's caste system. All developing countries have local hierarchies and aristocracies that the outside visitor sees as they are: ludicrous. **When visitors share this view with their local hosts, it encourages equality. Ultimately, these travelers bring more democratic ideas and attitudes to extremely unequal developing countries. Tourists' views may seed democratic change, leading to a more just society**—because long after bags are packed and photos are developed, ideas remain.

## Tourism Multiplier: 70%

Ashley, 2007. ["The Role of the Tourism Sector in Expanding Economic Opportunity." Caroline Ashley, Peter De Brine, Amy Lehr, and Hannah Wilde. The Fellows of Harvard College, Overseas Development Institute, International Business Leaders Forum. [http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/report\\_23\\_EO%20Tourism%20Final.pdf](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/report_23_EO%20Tourism%20Final.pdf) GST]

First are tourism's direct effects, the wages and earnings of those who participate directly in the sector as workers or entrepreneurs. International evidence shows that tourism is more labor-intensive than other non-agricultural sectors. It also uses a relatively high proportion of unskilled or semi-skilled labor.<sup>7</sup> For these reasons, in some countries, tourism is an important source of employment for poor people. Many examples of responsible tourism come from rural areas, where tourism may be the only formal sector employment option. As agrarian systems decline, tourism may also offer rural dwellers an alternative to unemployment or migration to urban areas. Tourism's employment impact can also be highly significant in urban and coastal areas with higher population densities. Secondly, indirect effects occur through the tourism value chain. Tourism draws on inputs from the food and beverage, construction, transportation, furniture, and many other sectors. **Evidence suggests that in developing countries, this inter-sectoral impact adds an extra 60-70% on top of the direct effects of tourism.**<sup>8</sup> There are some destinations, such as Namibia and Luang Prabang in Laos, where one third to one half of the income poor people derive from tourism comes via the supply chain.<sup>9</sup> Finally, tourism has a wide range of dynamic effects. Tourism development can affect the livelihood strategies of local households, the business climate for small enterprise development, patterns of growth of the local or national economy, and the infrastructure or natural resource base of the destination. Tourism also tends to employ a relatively high proportion of women and to purchase products, such as foods and crafts, produced by women in the informal sector – and as a result, may be able to enhance women's economic positions and help overcome gender barriers. Finally, in certain locations, the tourism sector has a key role to play in planning for and responding to natural disasters, which often have particularly serious effects on poor communities.

## **Lifting Embargo would create 10,000's of jobs and Billions of \$\$**

**Sanders, 2002.** "Economic Benefits to the United States from Lifting the Ban on Travel to Cuba." Ed Sanders and Patrick Long. Center for Sustainable Tourism.

<https://www.american.edu/clals/upload/Cuba-Policy-Foundation.pdf> GST

The U.S. income and number of U.S. jobs associated with these arrivals was calculated for each scenario based on representative figures for each major industry segment that would directly serve the Cuban travel market (i.e., airlines, cruise lines, tour operators, travel agents, hotels and related hospitality services). In addition, the study estimated the indirect and induced income and jobs generated by expenditures of the primary industries and their workforce. Under Scenario 1, which allows Americans to travel to Cuba legally, but does not allow U.S. companies to provide supporting services, the benefits are quite limited. We assume that only travel agents would earn income from the increased travel to Cuba. This would generate \$8.5 million in U.S. income and 45 jobs in the first year and \$23.9 million and 239 jobs in the fifth year, including the indirect and induced impacts. Under Scenario 2, which allows U.S. carriers and tour operators to provide services to American travelers, the economic benefits to the United States increase dramatically. Allowing for indirect and induced effects, \$523 million in additional income and 3,224 jobs would be generated for the United States in the first year and \$1.7 billion and 10,749 jobs by the fifth year. **Under Scenario 3, which assumes complete elimination of the embargo,** U.S. economic benefits would increase somewhat more, primarily because U.S. hotels and other hospitality providers could operate in Cuba. Total U.S. income would increase to \$545 million in the first year and 3,797 new jobs would be created. **Total income would rise to over \$1.9 billion and 12,180 new jobs would be created by the fifth year.** Airlines would create the most income and jobs for the U.S. economy as a result of lifting the travel ban, followed by the cruise ship industry. U.S. hotel companies and tour operators would also be significant income and employment generators. For example, by the fifth year after completely lifting the embargo under Scenario 3, the allocation of U.S. income and jobs created by industry would be as follows: [...] The economic benefits to the United States from lifting the embargo, or at least relaxing the ban on U.S. travel and travel-related businesses would be substantial. **The potential increase in income and jobs in the United States alone provides a compelling argument for re-thinking the U.S. policy toward travel by Americans to Cuba.** In addition to the benefits in the travel and tourism industry, **U.S. agricultural exports could be expected to increase by over \$300 million because of increased U.S. tourism under Scenario 3.** In order to avoid double-counting, food exports are not included here because they have been separately estimated in another study sponsored by the Cuba Policy Foundation that specifically examined the impact of lifting the embargo on U.S. agricultural exports. However, the income and jobs associated with U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba resulting from increased tourism would provide additional benefits to the American economy from lifting the trade embargo.

**Stratfor 16** [Reggie Thompson, September 2016, "Why Cuba's Half-Century Embargo Won't Be Lifted Overnight" <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-cubas-half-century-embargo-wont-be-lifted-overnight>] //WGC

“Analysis

Whether Cuba will soon undergo an economic revolution depends more on politics in Washington than in Havana. After all, the only thing standing in the way of unrestricted trade between the world's largest economy and the island nation just 145 kilometers (90 miles) south of it is an embargo that rests on U.S. law. But after U.S. voters in November choose a new president, and perhaps change the makeup of the Senate and House of Representatives, the U.S. Congress could begin discussing the embargo's end. Lifting the long-standing sanctions against Cuba will be easier said than done, though, especially given the lingering controversy over [Havana's thawing relations with Washington](#). Even if the next U.S. president were willing to begin restoring trade ties between the two countries, there is little to suggest that a post-embargo Cuban government would look much different from the one in power today — a problem that will no doubt create headaches for whoever wins the U.S. election.”

“But even with Castro's departure, the structure of the Cuban government is unlikely to change enough to comply with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, one of the most important pieces of U.S. law presently upholding the embargo. **The law, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, stipulates that U.S. recognition of the Cuban government would require the disbandment of several Cuban intelligence and security institutions, the establishment of an independent judiciary and competitive elections. Yet it is unlikely that any Cuban administration — even one in financial straits as dire as the Diaz-Canel government would be — would agree to such a massive overhaul in exchange for the embargo's end.** Cuba's reluctance can largely be explained by the fact that many of the officials in its current government rose to power under Fidel Castro and will continue to serve after his brother is replaced in 2018. The government the Castro brothers erected during their five-decade rule is civilian in name only and is heavily underpinned by the political and economic backing of [the Cuban armed forces](#).”

## **Cuba relations normalization cost Clinton Florida**

**Byas 16** [Steven Byas is a Sociology lecturer at Randall University, “Did Obama’s Overtures to Castro Cost Clinton Florida?”, *The New American*, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/item/24666-did-obama-s-overtures-to-castro-cost-clinton-florida>] //BS

President Barack **Obama’s overtures to** the Castro dictatorship in **Cuba may have won praises in some places in the United States**, but **within the Cuban-American community in Florida it was deeply resented.**

And **it may have cost** Democratic nominee **Hillary Clinton** any chance of winning **Florida’s** 29 electoral votes.

**Democrats tend to win more votes among Americans of Hispanic ancestry in comparison to the Republicans.** In fact, Democrats and even many Republicans are constantly lecturing the GOP that they need to “reach out” to American Hispanics. But whatever the merits for that argument, one group that the **Democrats** continue to **have trouble with** are **Cuban Americans in Florida.**

### **Congress republicans block**

Cuban Trade Relations Under the U.S. Embargo and their Impact on Human Development

Elizabeth Drew Ernest 2016 \ZA

<http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4366&context=etd>

*Cuba, as he views any weakening in the embargo as “caving” to the Castro regime.* There are many others like him in Miami, New York, and other regions of the U.S. who have been very successful in the U.S. *but remain angry at the Castro government over what was taken from them, and they significantly influence current American politics.* This was evident over the past year in the presidential campaign of *Marco Rubio*, a son of Cuban immigrants born in West Miami whose campaign website *lists Cuba as one of the key issues on his platform and calls the Obama administration’s Cuba policy “nothing but unilateral concessions from the United States that will strengthen the brutal Castro regime and do nothing to help free the Cuban people”* (“How Marco Rubio...”).

[...]

Recently, the two countries have begun working to ease tensions and lift the embargo, although it has been a gradual process. The 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act began allowing agricultural and medicinal exports to Cuba for humanitarian purposes, and in 2009 this legislation was amended to make these transactions easier. ***As a result, the U.S. has been the main provider of food and agricultural products to Cuba since 2002*** (The U.S. Embargo). Also in 2009 President Obama lifted restrictions on travel for educational and religious purposes, and U.S. telecommunications companies were allowed to begin exploring business opportunities on the island. In 2014, after Cuba released over 50 political prisoners, President Obama finally agreed to restore diplomatic relations and begin easing economic sanctions against Cuba. Cuban-Americans were allowed to begin sending more money to relatives in the country, and plans were put in place to enable use of American credit and debit cards on the island. In May 2015 the United States removed Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which had increased economic sanctions and prevented Cubans from accessing American banking services. Two months later, the two countries reopened embassies and officially resumed diplomatic relations (Santiago). ***However, the embargo itself is still in place and can only be lifted by legislative action on the part the U.S. 14 Congress, which currently has a Republican majority that has largely opposed President Obama’s attempts to improve relations with Cuba***

### **Trump will not Normalize Relations w/ cuba**

Obama: End The Embargo on Cuba Before Trump Presidency, Ollie Hopkins.

Nov 2016, Global Research.\ZA

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-end-the-embargo-on-cuba-before-trump-presidency/5558832>

*THE election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States, where he will be in office alongside Republican Party majorities in both houses of Congress, raises new threats to Cuba. The Obama administration has not gone far enough with its Cuba policies: the blockade is still in*

*place, Guantanamo Bay is still illegally occupied and US interference in Cuba continues.*

Nevertheless, the limited progress that has taken place, including the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, has been a welcome move in the right direction. *This progress is now under serious threat from a Trump administration.* This week *Trump appointed the pro-blockade lobbyist Mauricio Claver-Carone to his transition team,* which may give an insight into a change in direction of US Cuba policy. Claver-Carone is the executive director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, “a non-partisan organisation dedicated to the promotion of a transition in Cuba towards human rights, democracy and the rule of law” and he also serves on the Board of Directors of the US-Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee (USCD PAC), which describes itself as “the largest, single foreign-policy political committee in the United States.” USCD PAC spent \$600,000 in the most recent elections, with large donations going to pro-blockade, anti-Cuba candidates including Marco Rubio. *Claver-Carone* is also editor of Capitol Hill Cubans, a blog largely dedicated to attacking President Barack Obama’s Cuba policies. *“In short, Obama’s new course for Cuba has made a bad situation worse,” he writes. A strong supporter of the blockade, he writes how “sanctions are an important tool of leverage for democratic change, particularly in a post-Castro era.”* Despite the huge fines carried out by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) towards companies for trading with Cuba due to blockade legislation — which have reached over \$14 billion under the Obama administration — Claver-Carone wrote last week how “companies [...] feel protected by the Obama administration’s current policy,” and in a sign of what to expect when Trump arrives in the White House, he wrote: “That will change in 65 days.” *Florida Republican Mario Diaz-Balart,* who in the House of Representatives *has called for the reversal of Obama’s Cuba policies,* has suggested that a change in direction will happen quickly. “All of these things that the president has done as unilateral concessions to the Castro regime, the days are numbered to all of those,” he said. *“I expect it to happen pronto.”* Just days before the election, *Mike Pence,* Trump’s running mate and new vice president-elect *said:* “Well let me make you a promise: When *Donald Trump* is president of the United States, we *will repeal Obama’s executive orders on Cuba.* “We will support continuing the embargo until real political and religious freedoms are a reality for all the people of Cuba. Donald Trump will stand with freedom-loving Cubans in the fight against communist oppression.” *Trump* was at one time supportive of improving relations, although he said he’d have got a “better deal” than Obama. But he *changed his line on Cuba when speaking to a Cuban-American crowd in Miami* in October. He said: “All of *the concessions that Barack Obama has granted the Castro regime were done through executive order, which means the next president can reverse them — and that is what I will do,* unless the Castro regime meets our demands.” Recent months have shown how Trump can change his line on arguments from day to day and depending on the audience. Without any experience in public office, *the team Trump constructs around him may give an insight into his administration’s Cuba policies* and the appointment of Claver-Carone suggests Trump may stick to his Miami-crowd anti-Cuba line and reverse attempts towards normalisation. Many names that are being reported as candidates for high level positions are hard-line, *staunch anti-Cuba politicians including John Bolton and Newt Gingrich.* Bolton accused Cuba of developing chemical weapons in 2002 when undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. And in recent months he said he’d “put them right back on the terrorism list.” Gingrich was speaker for the 1996 Helms-Burton blockade legislation and in 2011 called for a much more aggressive policy toward Cuba to bring about a “Cuban spring” and “usher in democracy.” He said the US should use every “non-military tool” available against the island, including covert operations “exactly as Reagan did in eastern Europe.” *The recent United Nations general assembly vote of 191 to 0 in favour* (with the US and Israel abstaining) *of ending the embargo* demonstrates that international support for ending the US blockade and normalising relations with the island is at an all-time high. *But a Trump administration with many leading anti-Cuba figures, alongside an already hostile Republican-controlled Congress,* clearly *poses huge threats to Cuba.* The Cuban people have resisted over five decades of US aggression, US-backed invasion, terrorism, assassination attempts and subversion and will continue to resist and defend their independence and sovereignty. In light of the new threats to Cuba, international solidarity is clearly now more important than ever. The Cuba Solidarity Campaign calls on President Obama to use his executive powers to repeal those remaining parts of the blockade legislation which fall under his jurisdiction in his remaining time as president. In the forthcoming months it is critical that we maintain pressure on the US government to continue on the path to normalise relations with Cuba and ultimately to end its 54-year blockade against the island and illegal occupation of Guantanamo Bay.

## **UNICEF doesn't think it's an issue**

Lamrani, 2014 ["Cuba, The United States and Human Trafficking." The Huffington Post. Salim Lamrani. September 20, 2014. [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salim-lamrani/cuba-the-united-states-an\\_b\\_5604799.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salim-lamrani/cuba-the-united-states-an_b_5604799.html)] GW

The most serious charge concerns child prostitution. **Yet UNICEF — the United Nations Children's Fund — does not share this opinion and, in fact, salutes the advances made by Cuba in the field of child protection. According to the UN agency, "Cuba is an example in the protection of children."**<sup>5</sup> According to José Juan Ortiz, UNICEF's representative in Havana, "severe malnutrition does not exist in Cuba [because] there is the political will" to eliminate it. "Here, there are no children in the streets. In Cuba, children are always a priority and that is why they do not suffer from the shortages that afflict millions of other children in Latin America, who work, who are exploited or who are involved in prostitution networks."

## **Poverty is the root cause of human trafficking**

Caswell, 2014. ["Poverty and Human Trafficking." Borgen Magazine. Lydia Caswell. March 24, 2014. <http://www.borgenmagazine.com/poverty-and-human-trafficking/>] GW

The real criminal behind this scenario isn't the trafficker – they are often just parents with hungry kids and no other job prospects – but rather the economic status of a region. Sometimes girls enter willingly into the human slave market, even when they know what awaits them, because they would rather take their chances than face the certain starvation and ruin of absolute poverty.

The Swedish Department for Global Development wrote in its 2003 report that "[p]eople become the victims of human traffickers mainly due to inequitable resource allocation and the absence of viable sources of income."

The Institute for Trafficked, Exploited & Missing Persons (ITEMP) **identifies poverty as the root cause of international human trafficking, and according to the International Rewards Center, every \$1,000 reduction in a country's GDP makes that country 12% more likely to be a source for international human trafficking victims.**

## **The failed embargo kills US credibility—looks inhumane, costly and utterly useless**

**Charbonneau 12** — Reuters' United Nations bureau chief based in New York (Louis, "U.N. urges end to U.S. Cuba embargo for 21st year," Reuters, 11/13/12, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/13/us-cuba-embargo-un-idUSBRE8AC11820121113>)/CJC (Reuters) - Repeating an annual ritual, the U.N. General Assembly called on Tuesday for the United States to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, whose foreign minister said the blockade against the communist-run island was tantamount to "genocide."<sup>¶</sup> For the 21st year, the assembly's vote was overwhelming, with 188 nations - including most of Washington's closest allies - supporting the embargo resolution, a result virtually unchanged from last year.<sup>¶</sup> Israel, heavily dependent on U.S. backing in the Middle East, and the tiny Pacific state of Palau were the only two countries that supported the United States in opposing the non-binding resolution in the 193-nation assembly. The Pacific states of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia abstained.<sup>¶</sup> President Barack Obama further loosened curbs last year on U.S. travel and remittances to Cuba. He had said he was ready to change Cuba policy but was still

waiting for signals from Havana, such as the release of political prisoners and guarantees of basic human rights.¶ But Obama has not lifted the five-decade-old trade embargo, and the imprisonment of a U.S. contractor in Cuba has halted the thaw in Cuban-U.S. relations.¶ Havana's Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told the assembly that Cuba had high hopes for Obama when he was first elected in 2008 and welcomed his calls for change. But he said the result had been disappointing.¶ "The reality is that the last four years have been characterized by the persistent tightening of ... the embargo," he said.¶ 'EXTERNAL SCAPEGOAT'¶ Rodriguez said the "extraterritoriality" of the blockade measures - the fact that Washington pressures other countries to adhere to the U.S. embargo - violates international law. He added that the blockade is not in U.S. interests and harms its credibility.¶ "It leads the U.S. to adopt costly double standards," he said, adding that the embargo has failed to achieve its objectives of pressuring the government to introduce economic and political freedoms and comply with international human rights standards.¶ "There is no legitimate or moral reason to maintain this embargo that is anchored in the Cold War," he said.¶ He said it qualified as a "act of genocide" against Cuba and was a "massive, flagrant and systematic violation of the human rights of an entire people."¶ U.S. envoy Ronald Godard rejected the resolution's call for ending the blockade and Cuba's allegation that the United States was to blame for Cuban financial difficulties. He added that the government in Havana was putting the brakes on Cuba's further development, not the United States.¶ "It is the Cuban government that continues to deprive them of that aspiration," he said, adding that Cuba was seeking an "external scapegoat for the island's economic problems."

## **Cuban oil doesn't solve rels or econ — there isn't enough of it**

Hira, 13 – Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University (Andrew, "Cuba's Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation - edited by Benjamin-Alvarado, Jonathan" Book Review, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 32, Issue 1, pages 119–121, January 2013) //CJC

Due to its strategic role during the Cold War, Cuba retains a special fascination for scholars. This edited volume contains five chapters that explore two questions: first, **whether Cuba's newfound offshore oil could improve its economic future; and second, whether the oil could serve as a catalyst to improve US–Cuban relations.** Despite the authors' conclusions, **the answer in looking at the evidence seems to be 'no' to both.** The chapters do not have a comprehensive approach for these questions, and the text suffers as a result. The conclusion more or less summarises points made in earlier chapters, and observations such as poor quality of oil are repeated across several chapters. More importantly, this volume does not seem to address the most fundamental question – whether there is a political context that would allow for a warming of US relations with Cuba and what kinds of systems Cubans will create short of free markets to manage their economy. The authors focus on economic reasons for their presupposition – that Cuba's potential oil is attractive enough to the USA in a time of concern about scarcity and energy security to overcome political blockage, and Cuba's need in turn for ready markets and financial capital for its oil, biofuels and electricity sectors. **Yet, even this argument is undermined by the facts pointed out by the authors: that Cuba's potential contribution to the US oil supply would make an insignificant dent** to prices or security; that Cuba has had a great deal of success in attracting other investors from around the world; and **that Cuba's oil reserves have been less promising in terms of both quality and quantity.** They further point out that Cuba's energy sector now sports a dependence on Venezuela, including a new refinery and subsidised transport and fuels, and that Castro is opposed to a conversion of the Cuban sugar industry to biofuels, seeing this as a loss of food security.

## **No impact—LNG not explosive**

Lloyd's List 2008 (One of the world's oldest continuously-running journals, having provided weekly shipping news as early as 1734, "LNG is not an explosive issue", Lexis)//CJC

INTEMPERATE language has been employed in attacking the liquefied natural gas industry ever since its inception almost 50 years ago. But in the roll call of vilification, a recent article in the Los Angeles Times takes some beating. Referring to the potential of a piracy incident, a "specialist in maritime energy security" quoted by the newspaper warns that "an LNG tanker going up is like 50 Hiroshimas". It is this kind of ill-informed sensationalism that has fuelled an overly fearful attitude to the industry, particularly in the US, where the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier or terminal have been hotly debated. The Los Angeles Times report actually concerned the seizure of the Sirius Star, a sufficiently serious incident in its own right, one would think. But the article's specialist went on to speculate: "If it was an LNG tanker seized, we're looking at something potentially catastrophic." The seizure of any gas carrier or oil tanker is an event of some gravity. But as the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas points out, LNG is not explosive or flammable in its liquid state. "Although a large amount of energy is stored in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon, it cannot be released rapidly enough to cause the over-pressures associated with an explosion," the Center says. Thus, the "atomic bomb" allusions refer to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. The fact that the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas is an industry trade association should not detract from its arguments, which have been corroborated by numerous studies. The Los Angeles Times report serves only to feed the misconceptions that have surrounded the supposed dangers represented by LNG carriers. It cannot be stated often enough that LNG shipping has an impeccable safety record, with eight accidents in almost 50 years, none of which led to loss of life or a breach of a vessel's cargo containment system.

## **Ship design checks—prevention measures.**

Tony Muncer 2005 (Managing Director, UAE Lloyd's Register EMEA, "Balance debate key to eradicating sensationalist untruths," Lloyd's List, Lexis) //CJC

Many who denounce LNG base their calculations on the total volume of LNG in a ship. It is unrealistic to imagine, however, that the entire cargo of any ship can be released instantaneously. To mount such an attack would require the equivalent of a full-scale military operation like that carried out against the USS Cole. It is more likely that the LNG would be released over time, based on the size of the breach in the inner hull. Similarly, the 'against' lobbies often quote the 9 m hole blown into the side of the Limburg to demonstrate that large holes can easily be created in the side of a ship. What they fail to understand is that this was the size of the hole in the outer hull; it is the size of the hole in the inner hull which dictates the outflow rate and, in the case of the Limburg, this was only 1 m - enough to lose containment but not enough to allow instant out-pouring of the cargo. This slow release has a significant mitigating effect on the potential consequences of a spill. It is for this reason that the idea that LNG carriers are potential atom bombs is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'atomic bomb' statement refers to the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when it is burned, its energy does not all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire.

## **No impact—LNG explosion is extremely unlikely even if there is a spill**

San Diego Union-Tribune '4  
(February 7, 2004, p.Lexis) //CJC

The industry notes that liquefied natural gas is explosive only within a narrow range of concentrations in the air, 5 percent to 15 percent. Within that range, however, the fuel is combustible, so an uncontrolled release of LNG could trigger an explosion or fire. If liquefied gas spills but doesn't immediately ignite, the evaporating

gas will form a vapor cloud that could drift away from the spill site. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, it can catch fire or, less likely, explode.

## **LNG explosion does not cause extinction – not equivalent to 55**

### **Hiroshima bombs**

Kalelkar, 06 - Dr. G. A. Melhem, President and CEO at ioMosaic), Dr. A. S. Kalelkar, Principal Consultant at ioMosaic, Dr. S. Saraf, partner at ioMosaic, and Henry Ozog, general partner at ioMosaic ("Managing LNG Risks: Separating the Facts from the Myths," August, ioMosaic Corporation, a leading provider of safety and risk management consulting services.

<http://archives1.iomosaic.com/whitepapers/Managing%20LNG%20Risks.pdf> //CJC

Myth No. 1 An LNG tanker holds thirty three million gallons of LNG, or twenty billion gallons of natural gas, the energy equivalent of fifty five Hiroshima bombs.

Fact :**The estimation of hazard based on energy content is very misleading and erroneous.** Using the same flawed reasoning relating LNG energy content to hazard potential, one can conclude that:

- 3 hours of sun shine over 10 square feet equals 3.2 lbs of TNT explosive
- A 24 gal automobile gasoline tank equals 1,225 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of wood equals 3,530 lbs of TNT explosive
- 1,000 lbs of coal equals 4,470 lbs of TNT explosive

Hazard potential depends on both the amount of energy and the rate at which it is released.

Energy release during LNG burning is relatively slow. Explosion energy is released "lightning-like" causing the formation of a shock wave that travels outwards and can cause severe damage to people and property.

## **Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated – no incentives due to long time frame, resource requirements, and it's contradictory to their cause.**

**Weiss 15** - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015, ] //CJC

While fear of **nuclear** weapons is rational, its extension to **terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data.** Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,<sup>2</sup> and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larsen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal.

Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which **countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities**, or dismantled weapons in their possession.<sup>3</sup> In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would

be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country's nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, **evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent**. This may be due to a combination of reasons. **Terrorists understand that *it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder***: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their "trade." **If public sympathy is important to their cause**, an apparent plan or commission of **mass murder** is not going to help them, and indeed ***will make their enemies even more implacable***, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The **acquisition** of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it ***requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work***. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group's more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam's nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

## **They can't steal a weapon – dozens of safeguards and international collaboration account for loose nukes and irrational states**

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a **nuclear** weapon state than the **weapons** themselves, which **have multiple layers of safeguards that**, in the United States, **include intelligence** and surveillance, **electronic locks** (including so-called "permissive action links" that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), **gated** and locked **storage facilities, armed guards, and** teams of **elite responders** if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that most weapon states have such protections, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, **the likelihood of** an unauthorized agent secretly planning a **theft**, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and

physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection is extremely low—but it isn't impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were “loose nukes” in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 “suitcase nukes” that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists “inherit” nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). However, the Kamra base contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the mission was a failure. Moreover, Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis are known to have received major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012). However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it's also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear activities.

## **States won't give terrorists nukes – there are no guarantees terrorists will cooperate and only results in the state becoming a nuclear target.**

**Weiss 15** - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015, ]//CJC

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon

state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, *it cannot be sure the weapon will be used* by the terrorist group *as intended*. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the *weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation* (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring *nation becoming a nuclear target* just as if it had itself detonated the device. *This is a powerful deterrent* to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.

## **It is impossible for terrorists to build a nuke – hundreds of challenges**

**Weiss 15** - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is *very highly protected* until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device *would require the construction of an implosion weapon*, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, *a notoriously difficult technical problem*. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, *if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation* from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, *additional technical complications present themselves*. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But *even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered* at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. *More likely*, according to one well-known weapon designer,<sup>4</sup> *would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device*.

There is *the possibility of an insider threat*; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario *would require intimate knowledge of the materials* accounting system *on which safeguards* in that state *are based and adds another layer of complexity* to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a "gun type" design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and

the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear “fizzle” that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, **stealing that much highly enriched material** (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) **is a major problem for any thief** and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s<sup>5</sup> and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, **there is only one known case of a major theft** of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s **at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government** with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, **not a sub-national terrorist group** intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor’s relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials<sup>6</sup> and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.

## **ISIS and Al-Qaeda don’t pose a threat – their tactics are not new and won’t be catastrophic**

**Ward 15** - Alex Ward, Assistant Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council where he works on U.S. defense policy, strategy and military affairs., 5/29/15("How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?," published by How Much does ISIS really Threaten America, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-much-does-isis-really-threaten-america-12993?page=2>] //CJC

While some concern is warranted, *there is no need for alarm* on the scale we are currently witnessing. The ISIS threat is overhyped, giving the group more power than it deserves while distracting from bigger threats. More to the point, *there is no new phase of terrorism, just the same phase*—but with a different ability to promote use of usual tactics.

Indeed, the threats facing the American homeland today, mostly of the “lone wolf” variety, are threats the United States has faced for years. What is needed now is a new way of dealing with an old problem.

In an era of increased connectivity, the ability of terrorists to contact lone-wolf candidates is greater than ever—and American leaders are worried. Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, have used the means of this hyper-connected era, especially social media, to great effect. A Brookings Institution study showed that ISIS has a “sophisticated and innovative methodology” that makes use of the “at least 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts.” This social media strategy—and the appeal of ISIS’ cause—has attracted lone wolves to carry out strikes in the West, with the brutal attack in Paris so far being the most significant. The United States is worried sick about a potential terrorist-inspired lone wolf operation on its own soil and is scrambling to tighten security at military bases and malls alike.

In addition, ISIS’ mastery of social media and messaging inspired a cadre of foreign fighters and people sympathetic to its mission. Many fighters have gone to the battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond in hopes of establishing an Islamic state. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, called the rate of foreign fighters traveling to the area “unprecedented.”

The worry for Western governments is that these fighters will obtain advanced asymmetric warfare training and use them to great effect back in their home states. The thirty to forty Americans who have traveled to the Middle East—a dozen or so who may have joined ISIS—worry U.S. law enforcement because, upon their return, they pose a threat to homeland security.

These trends are certainly concerning, but they do not equate to a “new phase” of terrorism for the U.S. homeland. The reasons why are straightforward.

For one, *ISIS’ main focus is* consolidating gains and *grabbing new territory* in Syria and Iraq.

*What it has been able to do* there certainly constitutes a new phase in the way terrorists operate, but *does not* radically *change the danger calculus* on American land. Indeed, *ISIS is not* yet fully *focused on bringing chaos to the West*. Yes, it wants to eventually destroy Western targets, but that is currently a lesser concern for ISIS. And, the *lone wolf attacks* the group does inspire will *continue to be smaller and less catastrophic* than has been seen in America’ recent past. Further, *al-Qaeda*—the bigger threat to the United States—*is not at the capacity level at which it once* was due to the United States. *Its ability to pull off*

a spectacular attack like *9/11 is substantially reduced*, although not impossible. So while the United States should still be vigilant for a large-scale attack, the country can breathe a little easier.

It is also important to note that *what is happening now* with ISIS and many other anti-Western terrorist groups *is not* necessarily *a new phenomenon*. While ISIS certainly has an amazing ability to inspire action via social media, *the appeal of fighting for an ideological cause has been around since time*

*immemorial*. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 2000s, the *Afghanistan War* in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and even *the Spanish Civil War* of the 1930s *are* just some *examples of when foreigners came running* in order to help a cause for which they believed they should die. As for lone wolf or smaller-scale attacks in the United States, *the country has dealt with these kinds of issues for a long time*. Even today the United States experiences “one attack, on average, every thirty-four days.” In essence, the fear from returning foreign fighters should not scare us any more than current domestic terrorists do

because they are already here and acting. To claim that ISIS is currently more dangerous to American targets seems off, although a lack of a coherent policy to stem the group could change that calculus.

**Al Qaeda does not pose a threat – lack of funds and leadership – drones have empirically been successful in reducing the number of attacks.**

**Lee 15** - Kangil Lee, research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research , 2015("DOES AL QAEDA CENTRAL STILL MATTER?," published by Revista UNISCI, Available online at <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72478/UNISCIDP37-2LEE.pdf>] //CJC

However, scholars who argue the demise of Al Qaeda Central seem to prefer a much simpler approach that measures al Qaeda's operational capability by a couple of simple factors. There are two main pieces of evidence used to support the argument that Al Qaeda has been defeated. Firstly, the death of bin Laden and the demise of Al Qaeda's core group of members, especially members of the Shura council. Secondly, the absence of terrorism in the West that Al Qaeda Central is involved in. These are central pieces of evidence that points towards al Qaeda's demise, which suggest Al Qaeda Central is incapable of carrying out any attacks.

For example, in 2012, Peter Bergen argued Al Qaeda is defeated because CIA drone policy in Afghanistan (Al Qaeda Central's stronghold for long time), successfully *eliminated 28 Al Qaeda key members* especially those on the Shura council revealed by Jamal al fadhli, a former Al Qaeda member. Bergen said *as a result, Al Qaeda only has one senior leader left*, al Zawahiri, *who lacks charisma*, and who took over the group after the death of Osama bin Laden.<sup>36</sup> According to Bergen, *Al Qaeda Central has never launched a successful terrorist attack in the West since 9/11* except for the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. Even so-called affiliates and lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda have only killed 17 people in the United States since 9/11.

Sageman backs up this assertion, and in 2011 added to Bergen's claim, arguing *a comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West highlights that there were 60 plots* over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these *only 14 successfully inflicted any casualties, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda* proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West has been in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent home-grown groups, inspired by al-Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies.<sup>37</sup> Many terrorist attempts launched by like-minded terrorist groups or individuals have not been traced back to Afghanistan. Moreover, he says, there is no evidence Al Qaeda Central was involved in any terrorist plots since 9/11. *Al Qaeda Central currently does not run a training centre for terrorists, and the group is not capable of funding terrorist attacks* anymore due to the loss of its financial resources. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years.

According to Javier Jordán, terrorism expert and the author of The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study, US drone policy managed to oppress the group's operational capability. Jordán claims that there were 136 terrorist incidents from 2001 to 2012, and Al Qaeda Central was involved in only 33 cases out of 136, 5 in the United States and 28 in Europe. From 2001 to 2006, Al Qaeda Central was quite active in plotting terrorist attacks, as 20 incidents were conducted during the first half of that period. Whereas, Al Qaeda Central's activity came to a lull especially after 2007, the year US drone activity was stepped up in Afghanistan. Even 13 cases of attacks between 2007 and 2012, did not cause any casualty or damage to Western society. Jordán concludes the complexity and lethality of Al Qaeda Central's terrorist actions on American and European soil have fallen dramatically.<sup>38</sup> Jordán evaluates *Al Qaeda endured immense structural damage from the CIA* drone campaign. As a result, *Al Qaeda lost control over affiliates in strategic and operational positions*, and switched into a significantly decentralized organization *that has tried to recover its influence to affiliates but due to difficulties in communicating* with affiliates, their efforts have largely failed. Now Al Qaeda Central has no or very little capability to plot and launch terrorist attacks, probably none outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>39</sup>

After the US drone policy commenced, approximately 60 key members of Al Qaeda were killed by drones. It is unclear exactly how many Al Qaeda members died in this campaign, although Jordán and Sageman presumed around 60. As matter of fact, even bin Laden was concerned about the loss of experienced members and his anxiety is well expressed in one of his documents seized from the Abbottabad raid. It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. **When this experienced leadership dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced** as the former leaders **and** this would lead to the **repeat of mistakes**.<sup>40</sup>

Although the effect of the targeted killing policy has never been proved, the killing of key members in the organization seems to have caused some level of disconnection between groups. As per bin Laden's recommendation to avoid wiretapping or signal intercepting by CIA, Al Qaeda members prefer hand-written letters to communicate with each other. This is safe but it takes time to communicate especially with affiliates outside of Afghanistan. Indeed, along with beginning of drone program, al Qaeda's terrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly decreased since 2008. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only one terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan after 2008, conducted by Al Qaeda Central.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, we have no idea what has brought on the decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.

### **China presence in Latin America leads to US-China conflict**

Ellis 5 (R. Evan Ellis, expert who focuses on defense transformation and Latin American security issues, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, June 2005, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub606.pdf> an associate with Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.)//CJC

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY **It is not necessary to postulate Chinese troops and bases in Latin America in order to conclude that an expanded Chinese presence in the region has enormous consequences for U.S. national security**, and as such, warrants serious examination. During the past century, the U.S. military was deeply engaged in the politics of Asia, consistent with the view that such global engagement made our own hemisphere more secure. **In the present century**, by contrast, **the United States repeatedly will be forced to choose how much Chinese engagement in our own hemisphere we can afford to ignore on the grounds that it does not constitute an "immediate threat."**

In general, **the Chinese presence in Latin America reflects significant erosion in the relative power and geopolitical position of the United States**, and the advent of a new century in which the United States is preoccupied about Chinese adventurism in the Americas, balancing out traditional Chinese concerns about the U.S. presence in Asia. **The dynamics and potential consequences of these trends** range from economic damage to the United States to the potential for significant crises which, **if mismanaged, could bring about direct conflict between the United States and China in this hemisphere**. Some of the most immediate consequences of the current Chinese engagement in Latin America involve the economic security of the United States and the livelihood of U.S. citizens. To the extent that Latin American countries sign free trade agreements both with China and with the United States, American markets will become increasingly open to duty free Chinese products—something that China has never been able to obtain through direct negotiations with the United States.<sup>129</sup> The free trade accord that Chile has negotiated with the United States, for example, in combination with the one that Chile is currently negotiating with China, raises the possibility that Chile (or other Latin American nations pursuing similar agreements) could be used as a "pass through," country, by which Chinese goods were sold without tariffs to U.S. markets. Although the U.S.-led initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is currently experiencing difficulties, its achievement would compound U.S. vulnerability to this Chinese competition.

## **Chinese influence in the region kills US-Latin American relations.**

GIGA FOCUS 13 (German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, "The Dragon in the Backyard: US Visions of China's Relations toward Latin America" 2013, [//CJC](http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/gf_international_1305.pdf)

**Nonetheless, deepening economic relations between China and Latin American countries may have an indirect, negative impact on US-Latin American relations** (Ellis 2012a; Farnsworth 2012) **by undermining the ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in the region.** These growing relations with China send the signal to Latin American governments that economic development can be achieved without adhering to Western proscriptions. **Regimes hostile to the United States can turn their backs on Western lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus, countries could sidestep the negative consequences of actions deemed hostile to the interests of the United States and US companies – for example, defaulting on loans or nationalizing industries, amongst other things.**

## **Chinese influence in Latin America is zero-sum—China's growing support sparks Taiwan war**

**Fergusson 12** — Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow (Robbie, "The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine," e-International Relations, 7/23/12, [//CJC](http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy?¶ China's goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People's Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of **China's main foreign policy goals is to isolate Taipei internationally. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where 12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside.**¶ The historical background¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy.¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the 'China seat' to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.¶ The economics of international recognition¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, **the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies.** Li notes that "from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan's direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean," [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. **Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin**

America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that **for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice.** The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition.¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, **for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena.** The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008.¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China) Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan) Central America Mexico, Costa Rica El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama Caribbean Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela Paraguay¶ On the other hand, **for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the 'Taiwan issue' unilaterally.** Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to 'outbidding' Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that "the region's leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other." [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan's economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a \$58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China "provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan," [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC "has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan)," [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example "in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan." [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China's experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 "the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Latin America," [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China's economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

## **Taiwan is the most probable scenario of conflict between US and China—causes nuclear escalation and miscalculation**

**Lowther 13** — Citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (William, "Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report," Taipei Times, 3/16/13, [//CJC](http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211)

**Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US**, a new academic report concludes.¶ **"Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,"** says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¶ Prepared by the CSIS' Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that **Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan's independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan's defense.**¶ "Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, **the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,**" the report says.¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing **Taiwan** as **"the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia."**¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis.¶ **"This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,"** Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.¶ The CSIS study says: **"For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments** in the Asia-Pacific region."¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do "provide kindling" for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US.¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says.¶ "Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, **the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,**" the report says.¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party.¶ To make things worse, **"neither side seems to believe the other's declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,"** it says.

## **Lifting the embargo won't cause Cuban abandonment of agroecology - they'll be able to outcompete industrial models and promote global adoption**

Christina Cornell, Research Associate at Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 4/17/09

(Cuba Elevates Urban Gardening to a Cause,

[//CJC](http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=11525)

Many worry whether Cuba's budget and planning services will be able to maintain its commitment to urban agriculture and sustainable methods, as the country enters the global economy and faces pressures to restructure its economic and political system, especially as Washington nears a decision to lift the U.S.- Cuba trade embargo. As the economy opens, the tourism industry and multinational food corporations will compete for urban land and attempt to flood the Cuban market with cheap imported food products that could undermine the urban agricultural system. Havana must develop policies that will protect their growing agricultural sector, but also allow for international influence and trade to flourish. **Although the opening of trade relations threatens local**

food production, Cuba's success in the agriculture industry makes it a *substantial contender in the global market*. Its products are competitively priced and thus, have the ability to generate a considerable profit for the island nation. Not only will increased participation in international trade boost revenue, but it could also promote social reform in the country. Cuba's urban centers, once underdeveloped and filthy, are now encouraging progressive goals, targeting rising living standards and sanitation concerns, while promoting national initiatives that will support future improvements in the urban landscapes. Agriculture for the Future Cuba's successful implementation of *urban agriculture should serve as a model* for other developing countries, particularly in Latin America. By embracing more modern and effective methods of farming, countries theoretically have the opportunity to transform their local markets, augmenting the labor force and cultivating capital and infrastructure. *Introduction to the global market would allow* a country like *Cuba to become an important economic actor*, ultimately expanding its profits through competitive transactions and trade.

## **Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material transfers is key.**

Ayson'10

Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via InformaWorld //CJC

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these **two nuclear worlds**—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially **an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states** that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, **how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN 40** and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”<sup>41</sup> Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, **if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing**

tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, **would** officials and political **leaders not** be tempted to **assume the worst?** Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

**Washington's** early **response** to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil **might** also **raise the possibility of** an unwanted (and **nuclear aided**) **confrontation with Russia and/or China**. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, **the U.S.** president **might** be expected to **place** the country's armed forces, including **its nuclear arsenal**, **on a higher stage of alert**. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that **Moscow and/or China** **might mistakenly read this as** a sign of **U.S.** intentions to use **force** (and possibly nuclear force) against them. **In that situation**, the **temptations to preempt** such actions **might grow**, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. **As part of** its initial **response** to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) **Washington** might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming **attack** against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. **Depending on** the identity and especially **the location of these targets**, **Russia and/or China** might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abettors of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the "Chechen insurgents' ... long-standing interest in all things nuclear."<sup>42</sup> American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither "for us or against us") might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, **it may be informative to reverse** the **tables. Russia**, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, **is subjected to** an attack of **nuclear terrorism**. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. **How would Washington view such a possibility?** Would it really be keen to support Russia's use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia's traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? **In the charged atmosphere** immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, **how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other** major nuclear **powers not to respond in kind?** The phrase "how dare they tell us what to do" immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. **This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of reducing, but**

probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further international cooperation on the control of existing fissile material holdings

## **Diaz Canel will take over in 2018**

**Newsmax Dec 2016** [NewsMax, "Castro Heir Apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel to Shake Up Havana?", *Newsmax*, <<http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/castro-heir-apparent-miguel-diaz-canel/2016/12/02/id/761798/>>] //CJC

**Castro heir apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel** is patiently awaiting his hour after Fidel Castro's death and his brother **Raul Castro's vow to step down as president within 15 months. Diaz-Canel**, an advocate for modernizing Cuba's state-run media and abysmal internet access, was elevated to the position of first vice-president in 2013, putting him **next in line for the presidency**, reported Reuters. At 56, he is a relative youngster in the ruling Communist Party's leadership and will need to appeal to younger generations if Cuban communism is to thrive beyond the Castro brothers. Fidel Castro died Nov. 25 at age 90 and the 85-year-old **Raul Castro, who took over as president in 2008, says he will step down in February 2018**, at the end of his second five-year term.

## **Sanctions Decrease Likelihood of Regime Change**

**Licht 2011** [Amanda, "'Falling Out of Favor: Economic Sanctions and the Tenure of Leaders," *University of South Carolina*. Accessed at: <http://visionsinmethodology.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/LichtMPSA2011FallingOutOfFavor.pdf>.] //DNP

The more cautious coding of leader turnover, tenure dynamics, and selection effects undertaken herein reverse earlier findings. Economic sanctions do not destabilize leaders. They are systematically aimed at leaders experiencing elevated domestic instability, but their independent impact is insullatory. Threats and **imposed sanctions significantly decrease the likelihood of being replaced by a challenger** for both democratic and authoritarian leaders across the range of their tenure in office. The effect is substantively notable, with democrats' risks reduced by 82% and authoritarians' **by 95%**.

## **Embargo increases the power of Cuba's government, provides scapegoat — makes human rights worse**

**Bilbao 2013** [Tomas Bilbao, "Restoring Executive Authority Over US Policy Toward Cuba," *Cuba Study Group*. Accessed at: [http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\\_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059](http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059).] //DNP

**Helms-Burton has failed to advance the cause of freedom and prosperity** for the Cuban people. This is not surprising, since **never in modern history has there been a democratic transition in a country under a unilateral sanctions framework** as broad and severe as the

one codified in Helms-Burton. Its blanket sanctions *lack ethical or moral* consideration since they indiscriminately impact all levels of Cuban society, from senior Cuban officials to democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs. While it is no secret that **Cuban government policies** are primarily to blame for the Island's economic crisis, their impact **has only been exacerbated and made disproportionately greater among the most vulnerable segments of the population by** the blanket **sanctions** codified under Helms-Burton. In addition, **these sanctions deny Cuba access to the international financial institutions it would need to implement** the type of macroeconomic **reforms that U.S. policy has sought for more than 50 years**. Helms-Burton preconditions the lifting of its blanket sanctions on sweeping political change in Cuba. In practice, this "*waiting game*" has **strengthened the relative power of the Cuban government vis-à-vis the Cuban people while simultaneously giving the former a convenient scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders**. Cuban blogger and democracy advocate Yoani Sanchez best illustrated the impact of the "waiting game" enabled by Helms-Burton when she wrote: "The five decade prolongation of the 'blockade' [as the embargo is referred to in Cuba] has allowed every setback we've suffered to be explained as stemming from it, justified by its effects...To make matters worse, **the economic fence has helped to fuel the idea** of a place besieged, **where dissent comes to be equated with an act of treason**. The **exterior blockade has strengthened the interior blockade**."ixFormer political prisoner and independent economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe agrees, writing that Helms-Burton's blanket **sanctions have only served** "...to give the Cuban government an alibi to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, **to justify repression** and to (pass) the blame for the economic disaster in Cuba."xConditioning our policy of **resource denial** on sweeping political reforms **strengthens the Cuban state because the scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and will continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby increasing the state's relative power and its ability to control its citizens**. History has shown that the **negative effects of such isolation can be long lasting and counterproductive to change**. During the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe was not based on isolation or resource denial. Indeed, an analysis of these transitions reveals an extraordinary correlation between **the degree of openness toward former communist countries and the success of their transitions to democracies and market economies**.xiIn recent years, ongoing political and economic reforms in Burma suggest that U.S. policy toward this Asian country could offer a viable model for the United States to follow in its policy approach toward Cuba. Since their enactment in 1990, Burma sanctions have allowed for unrestricted travel by U.S. citizens and travel-related financial services.xiiBurma sanctions have also allowed for the export of most U.S. goods and services and offer broad discretion to the President on which Burmese products it allows to be imported into the United States. The broad political reforms taking place in Burma today offer a sharp contrast to the narrow reforms that have taken place in Cuba during the same period and underscore the ineffectiveness of blanket unilateral sanctions.

## **Economic Sanctions Worsen Human Rights Record of Target Country** **(4 independent warrants)**

Dursun Peksen, "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights," Journal of Peace Research 46 (2009), pp. 59-77. Accessed at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640799> [PhD in PolySci. Assistant Professor @ East Carolina University] //DNP

Contrary to the expectation that sanctions improve human rights conditions suggested by the naive theory of sanctions, the alternative view emphasizes the inadvertent political and economic consequences of sanctions and maintains that economic

coercion will likely increase the use of repression by the government. **The underlying logic behind this argument is that foreign economic pressure unintendedly permits the targeted leadership to enhance their coercive capacity and create more opportunities to violate the basic rights of average citizens.** The following paragraphs outline four major factors to account for how sanctions contribute to the repressive capacity of the targeted elites and provide more reasons to violate human rights. **First, economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency.** Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions), political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Rowe, 2000; Cortright, Millar & Lopez, 2001). Political elites also **avoid the cost of sanctions by generating revenues and securing the supplies of scarce resources through illegal smuggling and other under ground transnational economic channels** (Andreas, 2005; Seiden, 1999: 75-76; Gibbons, 1999). Hence, the **targeted elites likely remain unharmed by coercion, as economic sanctions disproportionately affect average citizens.** Furthermore, **sanctions strengthen the authoritarian regime's ties with prominent social groups because those groups are dependent on the regime's control over the distribution of scarce resources** (Gibbons, 1999; Reuther, 1995). **In the case of Iraq, for instance, it is suggested that economic sanctions did not cause any major damage to the regime's stability, but instead boosted the allegiance of prominent groups** (i.e. the Sunni minority, the Baath Party, and military and police forces) as Saddam's rule granted economic rents and secured access to scarce resources in return for those groups' loyalty (Reuther, 1995; Hoskins, 1997). Consequently, the sanctions against Saddam Hussein consolidated his **repressive authoritarian rule by enhancing the relationship between the regime and the key groups, allowing him to maintain a strong repressive rule against civilians.** Thus, economic sanctions will likely fail to damage the coercive strength of political leadership and instead **enhance the connection between authoritarian regimes and their supporters.** This process results in the allocation of more power to the regime to employ repression against citizens.

**Second,** earlier research on the humanitarian consequences of economic coercion shows that **sanctions create unintended consequences of greater poverty, higher levels of unemployment, and poor health conditions for ordinary citizens** (e.g. Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Cortright, Millar & Lopez, 2001; Cortright & Lopez, 1995, 2000). As economic coercion creates more grievances among economically disadvantaged groups, the target regimes face more instability (Allen, 2004; Marinov, 2005). **Increasing socioeconomic need is suggested to be a major source of economic grievance and political violence** (Gurr, 1968, 1970), **which, in turn, increases the use of repression by governments** (Henderson, 1991; Poe & T?te, 1994; Poe, T?te & Keith, 1999).

Consequently, **as anti-government movements rise,** especially among the economically disadvantaged groups following sanctions, **the target regimes will use more repression to suppress those groups to maintain the status quo.**

**Third, economic sanctions are also exploited by the target leadership to broaden their legitimacy and to justify repression against anti-regime movements** (Galtung, 1967; Miyagawa, 1992: 84-86). Specifically, **leaders often depict economic sanctions as an external threat to national integrity and unity.** As sanctions are shown as a serious external threat to national unity, **political elites justify their repression against anti regime groups who are critical of the government under the guise of maintaining domestic cohesion.** In

Cuba, for instance, **Castro depicted US sanctions as an imperialistic attempt to infringe on the independence and integrity of the Cuban people.** Sanctions, therefore, allowed Castro to divert public attention from internal problems of the communist regime to the external threat posed by sanctions. Thus, as **Castro became a heroic leader fighting against the imperialist power, economic coercion made it easier for him to justify his oppressive regime** (Schreiber, 1973: 404-405; Miyagawa, 1992: 84-86). To sum up, where economic sanctions are portrayed as an external threat to national sovereignty, there will be more occasions of repression, especially against anti regime groups under the justification of maintaining domestic cohesion to fight external challenges.

**Fourth** and finally, **economic coercion also deteriorates human rights by isolating target countries from global economic and political influences.** More specifically, sanctions - particularly comprehensive economic coercion that cuts almost all the economic and political ties between target countries and international actors - play a major role in the international isolation of target countries by discouraging international trade and investment from foreign economic agents (Hufbauer et al., 1997; Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003; Caruso, 2003; Yang et al., 2004). **Economic integration** through international trade and foreign investment **is** considered to be **essential in promoting government respect for human rights** (Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Meyer, 1996; Goldstone, Bates & Epstein, 2000; Apodaca, 2001; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; Hafner-Burton, 2005a,b). According to this line of reasoning, economic integration promotes the protection and advancement of human rights by creating economic wealth, a politically stable and strong middle class, and more respect for the basic rights of citizens. Thus, **limiting the target's integration into the global economy and thwarting the emergence of strong social groups demanding more respect for basic rights, sanctions contribute to the consolidation of target's repressive rule, while diminishing the international support for pro-human rights movements in targets.**

## **Lifting the Embargo Solves Human Rights — several warrants**

**Amash 2012** [Brandon, "Evaluating the Cuban Embargo," *Prospect Journal*. Accessed at: [https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/.](https://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/)] //DNP

Although **America's previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba,** not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, **the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba.** Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.

§ 4.1: **Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially.** Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, "a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. [...] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country" (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, **integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United**

**States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country**, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.

§ 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, **the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation.**

**Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems** in Cuba could produce immense **improvements to the human rights** situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba's economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.

§ 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.

§ 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.

**Cuba regime collapse causes a shit ton of bad shit and probably turns everything — refugees, econ, corruption, drugs, and no democracy or positive capitalist outcomes**

**NAÍM, 1** – editor of Foreign Policy (MOISÉS, “When Countries go Crazy”, MARCH 1, 2001, [//CJC](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/03/01/when_countries_go_crazy))

Some countries can drive other countries crazy. When people have this effect on one another, it is because of imbalances in the brain's neurotransmitters. With countries, it often happens because of the disproportionate influence of special interests. Cuba, for example, has long driven the United States crazy. Just think of the Bay of Pigs invasion or the outsourcing of Castro's assassination to the Mafia. For more recent examples of irrational behavior, think of the Helms-Burton Law or Elián. The problem is that Cuba not only drives the United States crazy but also seems to induce some acute form of learning disability among U.S. politicians. Cuba makes them forget -- or unlearn -- everything

the world has painfully discovered about the transition from communism. This knowledge can be distilled into five simple maxims: Lesson one: **Failure is more common than success in the transition to a democratic market economy.** Lesson two: **The less internationally integrated, more centralized, and more personalized a former communist regime was, the more traumatic and unsuccessful its transition will be.** Lesson three: **Dismantling a communist state is far easier and faster than building a functional replacement for it.** Lesson four: **The brutal, criminal ways of a powerful Communist party with a tight grip on public institutions are usually supplanted by the brutal, criminal ways of powerful private business conglomerates with a tight grip on public institutions.** Lesson five: **Introducing a market economy without a strong and effective state capable of regulating it gives resourceful entrepreneurs more incentive to emulate Al Capone than Bill Gates.** It is therefore safe to assume that **if the Castro regime suddenly implodes, Cuba will end up looking more like Albania than the Bahamas.** But that is not the assumption on which U.S. politicians base their efforts to hasten Castro's demise. **Although a lot of money, political capital, and thought have been expended trying to overthrow the Cuban government, ideas about what to do the morning after are scarce and often unrealistic. They usually hinge on the expectation that in the post-Castro era democracy will emerge** and Cuban-American exiles will lead other investors in transforming Cuba into a capitalist hub. **More likely is that instead of a massive flow of foreign investment into Cuba, the United States will get a massive inflow of refugees escaping the chaos of a post-Castro regime. Frictions between Cuban-Cubans and Miami-Cubans will make politics nasty and unstable.** New investments and privatizations will be mired in the

legal mess produced by the 5,911 claims to property in Cuba (valued at more than \$17 billion) that have been filed with the United States Claims Commission by former property owners. (That amounts to nearly seven years' worth of Cuban exports.) **The Cuban public sector is inextricably intertwined with the Communist Party, so the demise of the party will**

**paralyze the government,** at least for a while. And **the cost of any resulting humanitarian crisis will mainly be borne by U.S. taxpayers, who will likely pay much more than the \$2 billion spent containing the influx of Haitian refugees in 1994.**

But can't the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund support Cuba's transition with money, experts, and projects? Sure, except that the United States forbids them from spending even a dollar to prepare themselves and Cuba for the coming transition. The result is that these institutions are not ready to help Cuba. Again, the United States forgets a useful lesson from another continent: The day after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin shook hands at the White House in 1993, the World Bank -- which had been instructed to prepare for the event -- was immediately ready to lend and invest in projects under the control of the Palestinian Authority, even though the authority was not and still is not a member of the bank. Allowing such an initiative in Cuba's case would cost U.S. taxpayers nothing and would help plan for the challenges ahead. Also, training Cuban professionals to run a modern market economy is bound to be a better investment for the United States than blocking academic exchanges with the island. The rational, self-interested approach for the United States that also avoids much future human pain in Cuba is to concentrate all efforts on ensuring as smooth a transition as possible. This view, of course, is not shared by all. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms recently said that "the opponents of the Cuban embargo are about to run into a brick wall on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. President Bush is a committed supporter of the embargo." The failure of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba to achieve its stated objectives over the last 40 years is dismissed by Senator Helms and some Cuban-Americans who argue that the embargo has never been vigorously implemented. Perhaps, as Senator Helms predicts, things are about to change and the aging Cuban dictator will finally fall. **If Cuba collapses and becomes a failed state 90 miles**

**away from U.S. shores, the epicenter of the Caribbean drug trade, the source of a massive flood of refugees to the United States, a corruption haven, and a black hole for substantial sums of U.S. aid,** President Bush will have no one to blame but himself. Or, more precisely, the powerful interest groups that blinded him to the lessons of experience.

**Cuban collapse turns literally everything — terrorism, democracy collapse, instability, econ collapse, drug trade, US intervention, and anti-Americanism — seriously this card ends the round**

**Correll, 5** - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, "CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?" <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //CJC

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba's problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable.

However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. **When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility** if the U.S. maintains the "wait and see" approach.

The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.<sup>26</sup> Many were criminals; this time the number could be **several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.**

Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, **the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia.** The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba's actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.<sup>27</sup> While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. **If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.**

**In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S.** or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. **Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas.** A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

## **1.5 million new tourists**

**Stone, 2015.** "U.S. hotel chains circle Cuba as visitors surge, restrictions ease." Wed Sep 30, 2015 | 9:19am EDT. By Mike Stone and Mitra Taj | NEW YORK/LIMA, PERU.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-hotels-idUSKCN0RU0BZ20150930> GST

The race for Cuba's beach-front is on. Executives from major U.S. hotel chains have stepped up their interest in the Communist island in recent months, holding informal talks with Cuban officials as Washington loosens restrictions on U.S. firms operating there. Executives from Marriott International, Hilton Worldwide and Carlson Hospitality Group, which runs the Radisson chain, are among those who have held talks with Cuban officials in recent months, they told Reuters. **"We're all very interested."** said **Ted Middleton, Hilton's senior vice president of development in Latin America.** **"When legally we're allowed to do so we all want to be at the start-line ready to go."** The United States wants to strike a deal that lets U.S. airlines schedule Cuba flights as soon as possible, a State Department official said last week, amid speculation that a U.S. ban on its tourists visiting Cuba could be eased. **U.S. hoteliers are not currently allowed to invest in Cuba,** and the Caribbean island officially remains off-limits for U.S. tourists unless they meet special criteria such as being Cuban-Americans or join special cultural or educational tours. Foreign companies have to partner with a Cuban entity to do business and U.S. hoteliers expect they will have to do likewise if and when U.S. restrictions are lifted. While they wait for the politicians to iron out their differences, U.S. hotel bosses are conducting fact-finding missions in Havana and holding getting-to-know-you meetings with government officials in Cuba and various European cities. **A recent relaxation of some of the restrictions on U.S. travelers has encouraged over 106,000 Americans to visit Cuba so far this year, more than the 91,254 who arrived in all of 2014,** according to data compiled by tourism professor José Luís Perelló of the University of Havana. **Overall, tourist arrivals are up nearly 18 percent this year after a record 3 million visitors in 2014,** making Cuba the second-most popular holiday destination in the Caribbean behind the much-smaller Dominican Republic. **"If and when the travel ban is lifted. We estimate there will be over 1.5 million U.S. travelers on a yearly basis."** said Laurent de Kousemaeker, chief development officer for the Caribbean & Latin American region for Marriott.

**Tourism leads to Democratic Change**

**Peñalosa, 2013.** ["Tourism and Democracy: A Two Way Street." The World Bank. Enrique Peñalosa is the President of the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. July 2013. <https://handshake.pppknowledgelab.org/columns/tourism-democracy/> GST]

SEEDING DEMOCRACY. Finally, the vast number of tourists typically visit from more egalitarian societies. They see through local classist hierarchies, like India's caste system. All developing countries have local hierarchies and aristocracies that the outside visitor sees as they are: ludicrous. **When visitors share this view with their local hosts, it encourages equality.** **Ultimately,** these **travelers bring more democratic ideas and attitudes** to extremely unequal developing countries. **Tourists' views may seed democratic change, leading to a more just society**—because long after bags are packed and photos are developed, ideas remain.

### **Embargo lift will cause 9.3B in trade**

**Barnes 2015** [Michael Barnes of the Baltimore Sun, "Lifting Cuba trade embargo is good business", *Baltimore Sun*, <<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-cuba-embargo-20150823-story.html>>] //CJC

Rep. Tom Emmer, Republican of Minnesota, and Rep. Kathy Castor, Democrat of Florida, recently introduced a bill in the House that would lift the embargo, and last month the Senate Appropriations Committee passed amendments that would allow American citizens to travel to Cuba freely and ease some commercial activity. This is happening as Americans increasingly support eliminating the embargo. **A Pew Research Center poll released on July 21 showed that 72 percent of Americans, including 55 percent of conservative Republicans, favor ending the embargo.** A recent poll by Univision found that 40 percent of Cuban-Americans said they would back a candidate who favors completely normalizing relations, while 26 percent said they would not. The benefits of improved relations with Cuba, even in the short term, are manifold: **increased cooperation on hurricane tracking, environmental protection, fighting drug trafficking, combating illegal migration.** In the longer term, **allowing U.S. companies to compete for rights to energy exploration in the Cuban waters of the Florida Straits, currently monopolized by Asian and European competitors, would benefit our economy and contribute to increased energy independence.** A recent study predicts that **U.S. exports to Cuba would be \$4.3 billion, while Cuban exports to the U.S. would be \$5.8 billion per year.** The embargo has been in place in various forms since 1962. As Congressman Emmer has said, **"The embargo has benefited the Castro regime and hurt the Cuban people. We've given it plenty of time."** President Obama agrees, as does a strong majority of the American people. So what's the hang up?

### **Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x**

**CATO Institute**, January 9, **2004**, "How Free Trade Promotes Democracy" Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies] <https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

"A new Cato study finds strong evidence that **free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights** in countries that open their borders to the global economy. Specifically, the research finds that **countries that are the most open to**

trade are **three times more likely** to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are **nine times less likely** to suffer under political tyranny. Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba.”

### **Lifting embargo key to gradualism success — AND the Neg guarantees collapse because lack of US involvement guarantees eventual reversal of reforms, causing civil war**

Katz 2016 [Evan Katz at University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, “Why the U.S. Should Lift Its Embargo on Cuba”, *POLITICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE*, <<https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/why-the-us-should-lift-its-embargo-on-cuba/>>] //CJC

**Another reason to lift the embargo is to aid Cuba’s transition from total state control to a mixed economy. Cuba’s president, Raúl Castro, has committed to gradually reforming his country’s economy** between now and when he passes the torch on to his likely successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in 2018. **However, the embargo severely impedes the transition. Because Cuba has no experience with a market economy, Castro’s reforms are targeted in all the wrong places, rendering them totally ineffective and potentially counterproductive. If the United States were to establish a normal trade relationship with Cuba, it could provide technical assistance and market expertise to the Castro regime to make the transition effective.** When the U.S. provided such assistance to China and Vietnam when both nations were undergoing similar processes, their transitions were successful. Cuba is no different. **Lifting the embargo and establishing normal trade relations would also enable American foreign direct investment in Cuba’s economy, which would provide the regime with access to the dollar to be able to sell its exports competitively on the global market.** This would provide a major boost to Cuba’s dying economy. **Absent U.S. involvement in the transition, Cuba could potentially collapse into a state of total chaos, which could have major security implications on the United States. The policy of gradual reform is proof that the regime is still reluctant to cede total authority over its citizens, which means the transition is unsustainable absent U.S. involvement, and Cuba will revert back to a totally state controlled economy. Such a crackdown would cause Cuban citizens to backlash, potentially triggering a major civil war on the island.**

### **Gradual reforms fail and continue political repression**

DemDigest 13 (Democracy Digest, Democracy Digest provides news, analysis and information on democracy assistance and related issues. The Digest consists of a blog and an e-bulletin produced at the National Endowment for Democracy. "'Repression continues' in dubious transition to post-Castro Cuba" February 28, 2013.

[www.demdigest.net/blog/2013/02/repression-continues-as-dubious-transition-to-post-castro-cuba-starts/](http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2013/02/repression-continues-as-dubious-transition-to-post-castro-cuba-starts/))

Cuba's Communist authorities denied Yoani Sánchez (right) the right to travel twenty times, but she has now arrived in the Czech Republic, Radio Praha's Jan Richter reports:¶ Sánchez, who said she only knew Prague from the books of Milan Kundera, will attend the One World Festival of human rights documentaries and appear at a concert in support of Cuban artists, organized by the humanitarian Czech NGO People in Need,\* which provides support for Cuban journalists and opposition activists.¶ But the dissident blogger warned that the partial relaxation of travel curbs did not signify a real shift in government policy.¶ **"I don't think that this is a sign of significant political change,"** she said. **"Instead, the government is trying to create the impression that Cuba is progressing and improving, that the country has begun to open up.** The reality is that **repression continues on the island** [see videos below], **and that human-rights and opposition activists continue to be violently oppressed.**¶ "I do hope that there will be change. But I don't believe it could come from the government. Rather, the civic society, which has developed and acquired new tools such as technology, can push for a process of democratisation. That's my hope."¶ Cuban dissidents are equally skeptical that Raul Castro's announcement that he will step down in 2018 will do more than re-allocate authority within the ruling elite. Castro's appointed "dauphin," Vice-president Miguel Diaz-Canel, would be the first leader not to be a veteran of the Cuban revolution – assuming he ever takes office.¶ "It's going to be a challenge," said analyst Brian Latell. "The record of the Cuban revolution is littered with the names of people who were thought to be No. 3 or 2 and all of them fell by the wayside, going back to Che Guevara."¶ Diaz-Canel's elevation is a sign of continuity rather than change, observers suggest.¶ "It confirms **the gradualism of Raúl's approach,**" said Geoff Thale, program director for the Washington Office on Latin America, referring to Castro's modest economic reforms. "I don't think there's any evidence that he is someone looking to bring rapid or dramatic change to Cuba's political or economic system," he tells the New York Times:¶ Raúl Castro has mostly praised [Diaz-Canel] for his hard work, and his "ideological firmness" — more than enough to attract the ire of anti-Castro Cuban-Americans who have already criticized him for being a Castro protégé. American officials have expressed skepticism, noting that the top-down selection of a new leader does not amount to democracy.¶ Mr. Díaz-Canel may in fact find himself on a lonely perch if he manages to seize the top job. He will be surrounded by pent-up demands for more significant change, but without the heft attributed to the Castros and the revolutionaries who fought with them.¶ "He will have to watch his back," Mr. Latell said.¶ The ruling Communist party's determination to retain its political monopoly explains why external actors need to keep up the pressure, and post-Communist states like the Czech Republic have a special role and responsibility, said Sánchez.¶ "The position of the Czech government towards the opposition — one of solidarity, collaboration and support, is very important at this moment," she said. "It seems that for many, Cuban affairs are beginning to lose importance because many people believe that Cuba is changing. Maintaining the pressure is crucial."¶ Sánchez arrived in Prague after a visit to Brazil, where she received a hostile reception from Leftist demonstrators, reportedly orchestrated by the Cuban regime, who on one occasion, "burst into an event at a bookstore, forcing organizers to cancel it," the Wall Street Journal reports:¶ For many Brazilians, the headline-making attacks are a national embarrassment. In one dramatic scene in Bahia this week, the 71-year-old Brazilian Sen. Eduardo Suplicy put himself between an angry mob and Ms. Sánchez to protect her. "Have the courage to listen!" he shouted. They didn't, and the event was canceled for safety reasons.¶ "Why are we talking so much about Cuba and Yoani Sánchez? Because this woman is living proof of the Castros' unfulfilled promise of liberty, a promise that seduced and involved, from the start, some of the greatest intellects of our continent," wrote O Estado de S. Paulo columnist Eugênio Bucci.¶ Sánchez noted that the demonstrators were exercising the rights to protests and free speech denied to Cuba's people.¶ "I am a self-taught democrat. I believe in the plurality of ideas. But when it comes to verbal or physical violence, that's no longer plurality, that's fanaticism," she said, explaining Latin America's "illusion" about Cuba.¶ "There are young people attracted to the idea of revolution. And there are not so young people who can't accept that the ideas they believed in are defunct, or for whom it is too late in life to say 'I was wrong.'"¶ Brazil's ruling Workers' Party has remained supportive of Cuba's Communist dictatorship. Pro-democracy activists criticized then-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva when he suggested that hunger-striking dissidents were common criminals. Labor unionists have also highlighted Lula's hypocrisy, recalling the international solidarity he received while struggling for the same democratic rights as a young union militant.¶ Brazil's stance could backfire when Cuba becomes a democracy, said Sánchez.¶ "There's been a lack of toughness or frankness [from Brazil] when it comes to talking about human rights on the island. I would recommend a more energetic position, because the people don't forget," she said.

## **Diaz Canel is a WORSE time to lift the embargo — less politically stable than Raul**

**Kreiter Nov 2016** [Marcy Kreiter at the International Business Times, "Who Will Succeed The Castros In Cuba? Miguel Diaz-Canel Is The Immediate Heir Apparent But There's A Younger Generation In The Wings", *International Business Times*, <<http://www.ibtimes.com/who-will-succeed-castros-cuba-miguel-diaz-canel-immediate-heir-apparent-theres-2451357>>] //CJC

In appointing Diaz-Canel, Raul Castro declared, "Comrade Diaz-Canel is not an upstart nor improvised." He stopped short, however, of declaring Diaz-Canel his successor. When he assumed power from his brother in 2013, Raul Castro said he would serve only five years but left open whether he also will resign his positions as head of the Cuban military and the Communist Party. **The question is whether Diaz-Canel will be able to maintain the same kind of control as the Castro brothers, who forged strong relationships with the military,** which controls nearly all of the island's money and economy. Cuban dissident and human rights activist Antonio **Rodiles thinks not.** He told the Latin Post **Diaz-Canel will be little more than a figurehead for the military, a placeholder until younger members of the Castro family, like Raul Castro's son Alejandro are ready to seize power.** "When Raul Castro is the president, then yes, the president runs Cuba," Jaime Suchliki, director of the University of Miami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, told the Miami Herald. "When Raul Castro is not president, that will be a very different matter. Díaz-Canel has no tanks and no troops."

### **Diaz-Canel won't change relations**

**Wilkinson, 13** – chair of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba (Stephen, "What Will a New Generation of Leadership Mean for Cuba?" 3/6, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3254>)

A: Stephen Wilkinson, chairman of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba: "This is a very challenging question to answer for any Cuba watcher because I think it is fair to say that the appointment of **Miguel Díaz-Canel** came as a surprise. He is not a person who was hitherto well-known. He traveled abroad very rarely and has had very little contact with the United States or foreign affairs. This means that it is almost impossible to predict what his appointment will mean. It is evident that he is the first person to hold the post of first vice-president who was born after the revolution. He is therefore a member of the generation that benefitted the most from the social advances that it made. He comes from a relatively modest background, and he is not a member of any of the prominent families that fought the revolution, nor is he a military figure. This might suggest that he has been carefully selected because in him it is very difficult to accuse the Cuban leadership of being nepotistic or dynastic, or of being militarized. His lack of prior contact with the United States is also important to consider. As an unknown quantity, he will be harder to influence or predict. He has an impeccable record as a party member, appears to be modest and is obviously extremely hard-working. I feel therefore that he will represent continuity rather than change. I believe **talk of a significant generational switch is somewhat exaggerated.** Even if he obtains the highest office, **Díaz-Canel will still be surrounded for years by members of the generation that fought the revolution,** many of whom are not as old as the Castros. Esteban Lazo Hernández for example, who has just taken over the presidency of the National Assembly, is 68 and fought in the revolution as boy. Even under the new two-term rule, he could still be in office in 2022! If anything, the lesson I would draw from this for **the policymakers in Washington is to wake up to the fact that waiting for the Castros to die is a waste of time.**"

**Diaz-Canel will be replaced if he pushes too much reform**

**Suchlicki, 13** – is the Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami (Jaime, “Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro”, The Atlantic, 3/5/13, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/>)/EX

Dressed in an impeccable, custom-tailored suit and a Versace tie, instead of his usual military fatigues, General Raul Castro addressed the Cuban Parliament on February 24. He did not discuss political or economic reforms. Instead, he announced he would be stepping down from power at the end of the five-year term for which he had just been elected. If the Pope retires, “I can also retire,” he explained. Yet the Cubans would have to wait for the “younger” brother to reach 87 years of age to see the end of the Castro dynasty.

But not so fast. There are other Castros in the wings. In particular, Raul's son, Alejandro Castro Espin, a colonel in Cuba's intelligence apparatus, could be groomed in the future by becoming a general and a member of the Communist Party Politburo, Cuba's ruling body. In the meantime, Raul appointed a younger Communist, Miguel Diaz Canel, as first vice president among five other vice presidents. **A hardline party apparatchik, Diaz Canel, a 52-year-old**

**engineer and former Minister of Education, grew up under Fidel's and Raul's shadow as an obedient and disciplined Marxist. A protégé of Ramon Machado Ventura, an old communist and (till Sunday) first vice president, Diaz Canel mirrors the ideological rigidity of his mentor.**

A second appointment followed. This one for President of the National Assembly (Cuba's Parliament). Raul picked another old and loyal Communist, Esteban Lazo. Lazo has been the only prominent Cuban black to occupy any high-ranking position in the predominantly white-controlled Cuban government. A bland, obedient bureaucrat, Lazo will follow the Parliaments' tradition of rubber-stamping the laws issued by the leadership.

The two appointments seemed more symbolic than significant. **Raul Castro wanted to send a double message: that the octogenarian Cuban leadership was now giving way to a new, younger generation of leaders. Also, aware of the unhappiness among Cuba's black population, impoverished and neglected by the regime, Castro wanted to elevate a loyal supporter to the ceremonial position in the Parliament. It is doubtful that the majority of Cubans (more than 60 percent of whom are black and mulatto) will be appeased by these appointments or renew their belief in the Cuban revolutionary leadership. Similarly, the appointment of a young hardline bureaucrat is unlikely to gain much favor with Cuba's youth, hoping for deeper political and economic changes.**

Raul Castro seemed to have overlooked legal requirements in his own constitution, which calls for the Party's Political Bureau to be the key group to recommend a post-Castro successor. If Raul dies or becomes incapacitated, the Politburo will recommend and the Council of State will decide who will be Cuba's new president. Since the Politburo is dominated by the military, it's obvious who will make the final decision. Not only does the military control the Party's Politburo, but more than 60 percent of the island's state enterprises, including the all-important tourist industry, are in the hands of the military.

Diaz Canel's tenure as first vice president may follow the fate of other younger leaders promoted earlier by Fidel Castro. Former Czars of the economy Carlos Aldana and Carlos Lage and former foreign ministers Roberto Robaina and Felipe Perez Roque were all promoted in the past to those key positions, only to be removed by Castro when he doubted their loyalty or resented their prominence.

It is one of the ironies of totalitarian regimes that the road to bureaucratic success is not through efficiency or hard work but through loyalty. Perhaps **Diaz Canel** has learned this lesson in his short career. **Without any popular support or base of power in the military, his future may be as precarious as those of his comrades fired from their jobs and now living in oblivion.**

### **Diaz-Canel won't reform to a revolution- strictly Marxist/Leninist**

Nelson 13 – CBS4 News member, National Association of Television Arts and Sciences (Gary, Miami CBS News, “Miguel Diaz-Canel: Cuba's Next President?”, Feb 26, 2013, <http://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/02/26/miguel-diaz-canel-cubas-next-president/>)/EK

“He may be the guy,” said University of Miami's Professor **Jaime Suchlicki** on Tuesday, adding that it wouldn't seem likely, however. It is the Politburo, the same bunch that elected Raul to a new term Sunday, that will name his successor. “They'll get together and they'll decide

who is the next President of Cuba. Most likely it will be somebody of the military, since the military controls the Politburo,” Suchlicki said. Even if Diaz-Canel, an immaculately dressed fellow who sports perfectly styled salt and pepper hair, should assume power; Suchlicki cautions that **significant reforms should not be expected in the Cuban system. “He is the godson of one of the leaders of the revolution. He has been nurtured in that atmosphere. He is a Marxist/Leninist,”** Suchlicki said. Should Canel fail to toe the party line he could find himself working as a “farmer in an interior section of Cuba,” Suchlicki said. **“He will be constrained by the same forces, by the military, by the communist party.”** Suchlicki said the same structure that has **kept the Castro brothers in power for more than half a century will fight to resist democratic or capitalistic reforms.** At the same time, the UM expert noted that Raul Castro has brought greater communication, freedom to travel and some economic reforms to Cuba that may have room to grow. “That would certainly be our hope,” Suchlicki said.

### **Only a complete rollback of the embargo can buy time for Raul’s reforms to succeed preventing a Cuban implosion and increased terrorist activity**

Timothy Ashby, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13  
(PRESERVING STABILITY IN CUBA AFTER NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADING WITH STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, [www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/](http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/)) //CJC

Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolutio The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process. **The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy,** if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. **This could bring social chaos,** especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. **To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises,** both private and state-owned. **The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries.** It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by **a downturn in the Cuban economy** which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: • Avoid one or more mass migrations; • Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; • Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; • **Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists** and others **wishing to harm the United States.** [2] All of **these** national security **threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.** U.S. policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector—including 300,000 agricultural producers—or State-Owned

Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5] A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. **Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability** and fostering the growth of a middle class—both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.

### **Economic collapse causes a Cuban failed state and refugee crisis**

Sergio Dickerson, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, 2010 (UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)) //CJC

**While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region.** In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy. From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

### **Lifting the embargo causes 500m→ 17B in FDI**

**Bremmer 2015** [Ian Bremmer is a writer at TIME Magazine, “These 5 Facts Explain the Economic Upsides of an Opened Cuba”, *TIME*, <<http://time.com/3828156/ian-bremmer-business-cuba-economy-embargo-lift/>>] //CJC

\*\*Math: 17 billion/500 million=34, meaning investment increases 34x

5. Foreign investment. **Cuba currently attracts around \$500 million in foreign direct investment (FDI)—good for just 1% of GDP.** Given its tumultuous political history and underdeveloped economy, it is difficult to accurately predict how **quickly investors will flock once the embargo has been lifted.** But a good comparison might be the Dominican Republic, another Caribbean nation with roughly the same size population as Cuba. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that Cuba could potentially attract as much foreign capital as the Dominican Republic, which currently receives \$17 billion in FDI (\$2 billion from the U.S).

### **Post embargo increases Cuban Private sector — Tourism, remittances, entrepreneurship**

**Griswold 2005** [Daniel Griswold at the Cato Institute, "Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba", *CATO Institute*, <<https://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/four-decades-failure-us-embargo-against-cuba>>] //CJC

If the goal of U.S. policy toward **Cuba** is to help its people achieve freedom and a better life, the economic **embargo** has completely failed. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse off by depriving them of lower-cost food and other goods that could be bought from the United States. **It means less independence for Cuban workers and entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from American tourists and fueling private-sector growth.** Meanwhile, Castro and his ruling elite enjoy a comfortable, insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced by their captive subjects.

[...]

Yes, more American dollars would end up in the coffers of the Cuban government, but **dollars would also go to private Cuban citizens.** Philip Peters, a former State Department official in the Reagan administration and expert on Cuba, argues that **American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes.** Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmer's markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food vendors, and other entrepreneurs. Second, **restrictions on remittances should be lifted. Like tourism, expanded remittances would fuel the private sector, encourage Cuba's modest economic reforms, and promote independence from the government.**

## **Engagement works – diplomacy may be a long process, but it's the only way to solve**

Takeyh 9 (Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/7/2009, Council for Foreign Relations, "The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement," <http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362>) //CJC

As the Obama administration charts its foreign policy, there is increasing unease about its lack of achievements. The Iraq war lingers, Afghanistan continues to be mired in its endless cycle of tribal disarray and Islamist resurgence, Guantanamo remains open. Still, Obama has introduced important changes in both the style and substance of **US diplomacy. An honest dialogue with the international community has at times led the president to acknowledge our own culpabilities and shortcomings.** Even more dramatic has been **Obama's willingness to reach out to America's adversaries and seek negotiated solutions to some of the world's thorniest problems.** It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. **Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace.** Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. **Diplomacy** is likely to be a painstaking

process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, **the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions**. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation.¶ **Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling a durable international coalition to isolate and pressure them**. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic indifference.¶ The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a dramatic twist of events, **the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive**. Iran's mounting nuclear infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of low-enriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations.¶ **The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes**. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

## **Appeasement good in Cuba**

Lopez-Levy 11 (Arturo, Lecturer¶ - [Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver](#)¶, [Institute for the Study of Israel in the Middle East](#), 1/10/11, The Havana Note, "Appease Cuba? What Would Winston Churchill Say?," <http://thehavananote.com/node/845>)  
//CJC

Several former Castro's government officials such as Cuba's former Ambassador to the United Nations, [Alcibiades Hidalgo](#) and ex diplomat [Juan Antonio Blanco](#), who worked in the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, have explained how Cuban leaders need enmity with the United States to derive their internal legitimacy and protect their authoritarian privileges. According to these former officials, every time there was a chance of lifting the embargo, Fidel Castro did something to keep it: Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), and the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996. ¶ Those views are an exaggeration of Cuba's policy towards the United States but I don't dismiss their evidences. For some in the Cuban leadership, "anti-imperialism", manifested at its worst as "anti-Americanism", is central to their identity. Cuban nationalists have a long list of historic complaints and grievances against U.S. interventionism, from the exclusion of the Paris Treaty in 1898 and [the Platt Amendment](#) in 1902 to the [Helms-Burton Act](#) in 1996.¶ Fidel Castro's opposition to U.S. policies over the world is documented and consistent. The Cuban "historicos", the generation who fought in the revolution, don't secretly aspire to be United States' allies or to relations between Cuba and the United States of the cordial kind Russia and Finland have. It is logical, **they know only one way to govern, the "under siege" one. A rapprochement with the United States would unleash unpredictable pressures for reform and**

public deliberation, with more transparency and opportunities for those who think differently. Such a situation would undoubtedly dilute their power.¶ But there is a growing pluralism not only in Cuban civil society but also within the Cuban elites. The business of revolution for many of the sons and daughters of those who fought in Sierra Maestra or Bay of Pigs is not communist revolution but business in a globalized economy. Communism is as much a bankrupt ideology in Havana as in Moscow or Beijing. Some months ago, [Esteban Morales, a leftist intellectual, denounced corruption](#), authoritarian lack of transparency, and inefficiencies as the most powerful threats against the current system.¶ The rise of Raul Castro to power brought expansions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces-security complex over the Cuban state. The FAR apparatus supposedly designed to defend the party control over the Cuban government is today master of the state and the party. Most of the new military cadres come from a different experience than the revolution "historicos". Their professional career is related not to the fights of the 1960's but to the Africa wars that ended in a compromise with the United States and South Africa, and the economic management of the new sectors developed in the last two decades. Contrary to most of the "historicos", these cadres or their immediate relatives have contacts with friends and family in the Cuban American community.¶ Therefore a policy of engagement can bring substantial political gain by undercutting the blame-the-blockade narrative and exposing Cuban pluralist civil society and elites to people to people contacts with the United States through academic, educational, cultural, sports and even simple tourism exchanges.¶ Only in Miami could [Ninoska Perez](#), a well-known hard-line radio show host, reject such engagement because ["Adolf Hitler was able to murder six million Jews, while apologists found excuses to justify his crimes. It is no different in Cuba"](#) without raising concerns about her mental health. **No matter how repugnant certain of Castro's policies might be towards political prisoners or Cubans living abroad, any comparison with the power, aims and Human Rights violations of Hitler's Germany or, for that matter, the apartheid regime in South Africa and its colonial rule over Namibia, is simply nonsense.** Unfortunately, Mrs. Perez's analogies are not marginal among the right wing exiles who defend the Helms-Burton Act, the legislation that guides current U.S. policy towards Cuba. ¶ Of course, this is delusional. The Cuban communist political system and command economy might have prevented economic development of the Cuban people and repressed its civil and political liberties but **there is little evidence about genocidal or expansionist tendencies in Raul Castro's government.** The U.S. inclusion of Cuba in the terrorist list of the State department is seen as the world paradigm of political manipulation of a core theme of American foreign policy for domestic political reasons.¶ So, where does a policy of engagement - or as critics would call it, "appeasement" - fit in? In fact, **appeasement shouldn't be a bad word for U.S. policy towards Cuba since the island is a minor power with limited capacity to cause damage to U.S. national interests.**¶ As Winston Churchill, the main opponent of appeasing Hitler, wrote in 1950: "The world appeasement is not popular but appeasement has its place in all policy. Make sure you put it in the right place. Appease the weak. Defy the strong". Cuban nationalism and its sense of victimhood have never been a stronger conviction of the Cuban people. But the Cuban state's power position versus foreign powers is the weakest since 1959. Under the weight of the Special Period, the period of crisis that began in 1989 and amount to forty percent of post revolutionary history, the Castros' regime is economically exhausted. This is why Raul Castro is attempting a serious reform.¶ **Now is most likely the optimal time for the United States to address appeasable Cuban nationalism and engage Cuban post-revolutionary society.** To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the question should be whether Cuban power holders see virtue in a permanent conflict with the United States, or there is space for accommodation of Cuba's national interests in a U.S. led world order. Only through engagement can Obama test whether Cuba's new leaders are rooted in a Cold War opposition to the United States, or are just defending their interests, values and privileges against U.S. impositions.

## **Appeasement now – and the plan makes it effective**

Cave '12

[Damien. Foreign Correspondent for the New York Times. "Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo" 11/19/12 The New York Times In] //CJC

The longstanding logic has been that broad sanctions are necessary to suffocate the totalitarian government of Fidel and Raúl Castro. Now, especially for many Cubans who had previously stayed on the sidelines in the

battle over Cuba policy, a new argument against the embargo is gaining currency – that the tentative move toward capitalism by the Cuban government could be sped up with more assistance from Americans. Even as defenders of the embargo warn against providing the Cuban government with “economic lifelines,” some Cubans and exiles are advocating a fresh approach. The Obama administration already showed an openness to engagement with Cuba in 2009 by removing restrictions on travel and remittances for Cuban Americans. But with Fidel Castro, 86, retired and President Raúl Castro, 81, leading a bureaucracy that is divided on the pace and scope of change, many have begun urging President Obama to go further and update American policy by putting a priority on assistance for Cubans seeking more economic independence from the government. “Maintaining this embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hard-liners.” said Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban exile and co-chairman of the Cuba Study Group in Washington, which advocates engagement with Cuba. “What we should be doing is helping the reformers.”

## Thesis of the DA is wrong – signals are BS, and if leaders are as crazy and power hungry as your ev assumes, signals don’t matter

**Yglesias 08** (Matthew Yglesias, senior editor at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, “The Appeasement Paradox” May 23, 2008 [//CJC](http://prospect.org/article/appeasement-paradox-0))

One defining feature of appeasement-phobia, after all, is a curious tendency to underrate the importance of objective reality in determining the behavior of foreign countries.

In a speech Tuesday on Cuba policy, McCain derided willingness to “sit down unconditionally for a presidential meeting with Raul Castro” on the grounds that this would “send the worst possible signal to Cuba’s dictators -- there is no need to undertake fundamental reforms; they can simply wait for a unilateral change in U.S. policy.” The idea that Cuban decision-making would hinge on a “signal” from Washington is baffling. After

all, the past 50 years of failed American efforts to starve the Cuban people into rebelling against the Castro regime is better evidence than any signal that Havana has no need to back down in the face of our embargo. Similarly, Buckley worried that meeting Khrushchev would signal low U.S. morale to Moscow, with unspecified dire results. And McCain says the trouble with meeting with Iranian leaders (when he’s not too busy being confused about who the leaders of Iran are) is that a meeting “is the most prestigious card we have to play” and scheduling one might give the Iranians an ego boost and “confer both international legitimacy on the Iranian president and could strengthen him domestically.” ¶ That’s all fine, but the premise of the appeasement frame is that we’re dealing with hardcore irrational ideologues who’ll stop at nothing to destroy us.

Adolf Hitler actually was such a man and, not coincidentally, he wasn’t particularly interested in acquiring the international prestige and legitimacy associated with a sit-down with English politicians -- he wanted a giant war. In general, the right wants us to believe that world history is littered with countries whose rulers, like Hitler, will stop at nothing short of world-domination but who also spend their evenings fondly dreaming of the chance at a White House photo-op. But that’s absurd. One shouldn’t, of course, strike a bad bargain with a foreign country just because you held a meeting, but to fear that the very act of holding a meeting is a blow to the national interest is silly. Genuine madmen aren’t going to care what “signal” we’re sending, and non-crazy people can be productively bargained with.

More evidence – credibility’s not a thing – states have external incentive to presume resolve

Tang '5 Shipping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62 //CJC

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that **reputation cannot form in conflicts because of the anarchical nature of international politics**. Because of its simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer's. **Anarchy remains the defining feature of international politics, so states operate within an environment of uncertainty. Anarchy produces "a strong sense of peril and doom"**<sup>62</sup> and "a conservative **tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worst plausible cause terms**".<sup>63</sup> States have to consistently assume the worst possible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.<sup>64</sup> **This "worst-case mentality" has major implications for reputation under anarchy** on at least two fronts.<sup>65</sup> Foremost, **because** a state's **security ultimately depends on self-help**, the worst-case mentality means that **a state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be irresolute**. Essentially, this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and reputation becomes impossible to develop under anarchy. **A state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its adversaries by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict because its adversaries will always assume the state to be resolute** (the baseline image) **in the next conflict**. By the same token, a state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its allies by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict, for its allies will always assume the state to be irresolute in the next conflict. A state is assigned its baseline image by its adversaries and allies at the beginning of a crisis, and no past behavior can change that image ex ante.<sup>66</sup>

## **Appeasement good when strong— empirically solves conflicts, the WWII comparison is moot**

Record 8 (Jeffrey, defense policy critic and teaches strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, Summer 2008, "Retiring Hitler and 'Appeasement' from the National Security Debate,"

<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08summer/record.pdf>) //CJC **Appeasement**, which became a politically charged term only after World War II, **actually means "to pacify, quiet, or satisfy**, especially by giving in to the demands of," according to Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to list synonyms including "amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise."<sup>13</sup> These terms are consistent with what most historians and international relations theorists understand to be **the phenomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their differences by measures short of war**. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as simply **"the policy of reducing tensions with one's adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement"**,<sup>14</sup> a definition echoed by political scientists Gordon Craig and Alexander George: "the reduction of tension between [two] states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them."<sup>15</sup> Thus Richard Nixon was guilty of "appeasing" Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijing's one-China policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of "appeasing" the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving tensions with Moscow over actual and planned deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.<sup>16</sup>

**Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy, "the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous" was generally viewed as "constructive, positive, and honorable."**<sup>16</sup> Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great anti-appeaser of Hitler, **declared, "Appeasement in itself may be**

good or bad according to the circumstances. **Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal.** He added, "**Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace.**"<sup>17</sup> An oft-cited case of successful appeasement from a position of strength is

Great Britain's resolution of disputes with the United States from 1896 to 1903.<sup>18</sup> By the 1890s the number and power of Britain's enemies were growing. Britain had no great-power allies and faced rising challenges from Germany and Russia coupled with continuing tensions with France and the United States. Tensions with industrially expanding and increasingly bellicose Germany became especially acute when in 1898 Berlin gratuitously moved to challenge British naval supremacy in European waters. Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its military power by resolving outstanding disputes with the United States and France. With respect to the United States, it agreed to American demands that Britain explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine; submit British Guiana's border dispute with Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to US construction, operation, and fortification of an interoceanic canal through Central America; and settle an Alaskan-Canadian border dispute in America's favor. None of these concessions involved vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced by transforming the world's greatest industrial power from a potential enemy into a friend (and later indispensable ally). Accepting US dominance within the Western Hemisphere not only laid the foundation of American entry on Britain's side in World War I; it also permitted a British naval evacuation of the hemisphere for operations in European waters. <sup>19</sup>Meaning of the Word Use of the Munich analogy not only twists the meaning of appeasement; it also ignores the extraordinary nature of the Nazi German threat.

**Though the analogy's power to persuade is undeniable, Nazi Germany remains without equal as a state threat. Genuinely Hitlerian security threats to the United States have not been replicated since 1945.** The scope of Hitler's nihilism, recklessness, military power, and territorial-racial ambitions posed a mortal threat to western civilization, and there was nothing inevitable about his ultimate defeat. **No other authoritarian or totalitarian regime ever employed such a powerful military instrument in such an aggressive manner on behalf of such a monstrous agenda. Hitler was simultaneously unappeasable and undeterrable—a rare combination that made war the only means of bringing him down. He understood that he could not achieve his international ambitions without war, and no territorial or political concessions the democracies might offer him would ever be enough.**

### **Zero evidence supports a Cuban bioweapons program**

**Smith, 7** - was a U.S. diplomat and specialist in Cuban affairs for roughly 25 years, leaving the Foreign Service in 1982, when he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, because of his disagreements over Cuba policy. He has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University since 1984 and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC since 1992 (Wayne, "Take Cuba Off The Terrorist List" The National Interest, 8/6, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-track-take-cuba-off-the-terrorist-list-1733 //CJC>

### **Boqus Charges That Cuba is a Biological Warfare Threat**

**Back in 2004, Bolton said that the Bush administration was "concerned that Cuba is developing a limited biological weapons effort . . . and believes Cuba remains a terrorist and biological warfare threat to the United States."**

Bolton's charges caused a stir. **Over the past three years, however, they have widely come to be seen as politically motivated and groundless.** Certainly neither he nor anyone else has been able to put forward any evidence to support the charges. The Department of State no longer even makes them.

Further, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) sent several delegations to Cuba to investigate and in one case was accompanied by CIP. They were allowed to go anywhere they wished and see anything requested. Their conclusions were perhaps best summed up by retired General Charles Wilhelm, the former commander of SOUTHCOM, who accompanied one of the delegations. **"While Cuba certainly has the capability to develop and produce chemical and biological weapons, nothing we saw or heard led us to the conclusion that they were proceeding on this path."**

Wilhelm's conclusions were practically echoed by a National Intelligence Estimate conducted in the summer of 2004 and reported in The New York Times on September 18, 2004. It said that "the Intelligence Community continues to believe that Cuba has the technical capability [emphasis added] to pursue some aspects of an offensive biological weapons program." It made no claim, however, that Cuba was pursuing such a program. In sum, unless accompanied by new evidence, any charges that Cuba poses a biological warfare threat to the United States must be seen as baseless.

### **The bioweapons charge was based on pre-Iraq WMD intel**

Smith, et al 2004- \*senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, Muse \*\*member of the American Society of International Law and the American branch of the International Law Association, Baker \*\*\*senior researcher in the Washington, D.C. office of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)

(Wayne S., Robert , Glenn, "Cuba Should Not Be on the Terrorist List", International Policy Report, November 2004, [http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList\\_.pdf](http://www.scarletnotes.com/downloads/CubaonTerroristList_.pdf), google scholar)//KW

In March of 2004, Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Cuba of moving ahead with a developmental effort Conference panelists Glenn Baker, Cynthia McClintock and Jonathan Tucker..2 to produce biological weapons. Cuba heatedly denies the charge and has invited anyone who wishes to come and see for themselves. Various U.S. delegations to Cuba led by CDI have seen no evidence at all to suggest that Cuba is in fact developing biological weapons. The charge that it is doing so appears to be a politically motivated statement by Mr. Bolton based on fragmentary intelligence that is ambiguous at best.

The central question we should ask here is how can U.S. interests possibly be served by putting forward these spurious allegations against Cuba, by insisting that it is a terrorist state when it obviously is not, and by rebuffing its offers to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism? Does this not undermine our own credibility and cast doubt on our seriousness of purpose? Conference organizers invited Under Secretary of State John Bolton and representatives of the State Department to participate in the conference so as to have the opportunity to defend their positions. They declined to do so.

### **Trump will moderate – numerous checks.**

**Paletta 6-8-16.** [Damian Paletta, reporter, "Trump Will Consult Congress, Agencies On Iran Deal and Muslim Ban, Adviser Says" Wall Street Journal -- [blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/](https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/)] //CJC

Presumptive Republican White House nominee Donald **Trump would consult with Congress and federal agencies on a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives**, including reworking a nuclear deal with Iran and a proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S., a top adviser said Wednesday. Walid Phares, one of Mr. **Trump's senior foreign policy advisers, said the candidate**

**would seek domestic and international “consensus” on a range of foreign policy initiatives.** During an hour-long interview with Wall Street Journal reporters and editors, Mr. Phares offered nuance to a number of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy ideas, suggesting **some aren’t set in stone and could be modified** as the campaign progresses. For example, Mr. Trump has called a recent nuclear deal with Iran “terrible” and “horrible” but Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump wouldn’t immediately attempt to negate it once in office. “He is going to be revising, reviewing, and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal,” Mr. Phares said. One option, he said, would be to resubmit the deal – or something like it – to Congress for a vote, a process whose outcome would depend on the makeup of Congress next year. Many bankers are watching the U.S. election closely and waiting for a clearer understanding of future U.S. policy towards Iran before doing business with the country. Mr. Phares’s suggestion Mr. Trump would revise the agreement instead of completely voiding it could influence the way some financial institutions deal with companies in Iran seeking access to global markets. Similarly, Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump would consult with immigration, national security, law enforcement, and other officials before proceeding with his proposed temporary ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S. “His position which was strong – in terms of the ban – was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists,” he said. Mr. Trump has faced criticism for his foreign policy platform, which breaks from GOP orthodoxy. Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump’s worldview doesn’t fit neatly into traditional labels of “isolationist” or “interventionist.” Rather, he described Mr. Trump as a “functionalist” who would work with allies when necessary but not overextend the U.S. in matters in which there isn’t an American interest. He also said that **many of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far have only been offered as single ideas**, which he compared to pieces of a puzzle. Once more proposals are set forward, something Mr. Phares predicted would happen soon, a broader approach to foreign policy would become clear, he said. “The expectation is the more she’s going to attack, the more he’s going to respond, and if he’s going to respond, he most likely he will address these issues,” Mr. Phares said, referring to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. One key challenge for any Trump administration would be building bridges with Arab countries, many of which have been alarmed by some of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far. Mr. Phares said he is interviewed by Arab media outlets at least once a day, and works to explain Mr. Trump’s approach to the region. He predicted that numerous countries would be relieved to have a fresh start with the White House next year following several years of frosty relations with the Obama administration. Mr. Phares dismissed the caricature of Mr. Trump that Mrs. Clinton has worked hard to describe, suggesting, for instance, that he would rush into a nuclear conflict if his feelings get hurt or if another country insults him. **“I don’t see an unusual Trump presidency** as Madame Clinton is explaining **where he’s going to go crazy and start pressing buttons right away.**” Mr. Phares said, tapping on the table. **“That’s not going to happen. We have a rational institution here.”**

## **National security bureaucracy stops Trump**

Stephen M. **Walt 2-2-16**, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, The Big 5 and the Sad State of Foreign Policy in 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/the-big-5-and-the-sad-state-of-foreign-policy-in-2016-sanders-clinton-trump-cruz-rubio/> //CJC

Moreover, **Whenever the next president is elected, he or she is going to get an earful from the permanent national security bureaucracy** about the difference between the fairy tales peddled during the campaign and the realities of the real world. **Obama got schooled before he took office, and even an egomaniac like Trump might pay attention when experienced officials explain to him why his ideas make no sense.** And even if Trump or Cruz remains unchastened, **bureaucracies have lots of ways to slow down, obstruct, interfere, and dilute whatever cockamamie ideas a president might try to pursue.**¶ Does this mean the election doesn’t matter? Of course not. The United States is still the strongest country in the world, and whoever sits in the Oval Office can still make a huge difference, both in the people he or she appoints and the decisions he or she makes. And that’s what saddens me most as I contemplate this election: Instead of being excited by a smart new leader with a promising vision for addressing our current challenges, I’ve been reduced to hoping that **the foreign-policy establishment will rein in the various candidates’ worst instincts.**

## **NO change in Latin Rels under Trump**

**Rapoza 2017** [Kenneth Rapoza at Forbes, "In Latin America, Mexico The Only Real 'Loser' Under Trump", *Forbes*, <<http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/01/17/in-latin-america-mexico-the-only-real-loser-under-trump/#4b520cee5cf1>>] //CJC

In just four days, Donald Trump goes from PEOTUS to POTUS. **Latin America is not impressed. They'll get over it.** While **most of the knee-jerk reactions of fear and loathing have subsided south of the Rio Grande**, Trump is widely seen as a negative by those who live there. **The only country really in Trump's crosshairs is Mexico.** And even with that hanging over them, the World Bank is forecasting Mexico's economy to rise over the next three years so long as the U.S. economy gets a boost from Trump's corporate tax cuts and other fiscal stimulus measures. Nevertheless, **Mexico will face the brunt of Trump's wrath.** The country is dependent on the U.S. not only for duty free exports, but also for the billions of dollars in remittances it receives from Mexican citizens working in the U.S. Remittances are one of the largest sources of foreign capital coming into the country. Trump has threatened to tax those payments if Mexico doesn't play ball on trade and immigration. The new sheriff of Washington holds all the cards when it comes to Mexico. On Monday, political risk analyst Simon Whistler, writing for FORBES, **said that South America will keep its status quo relationships with Washington.** Whistler believes Cuba won't see any serious reversal of President Barack Obama's move towards normalizing relations. Cuba and the U.S. will move closer under Trump, so long as Raul Castro doesn't go too heavy on the Che Guevera and treat the U.S. like it's the 1950s.

### **Plan won't capture the Cuban market – Cuba will stay with its existing partners**

**Margulies, 8** – JD, New York University (Michael, "STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS" 8 *Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L.* 147, lexis)

[https://works.bepress.com/michael\\_margulies/1/](https://works.bepress.com/michael_margulies/1/)

Legal Expert Michael D Margulies, New York University

While Cuba has been outspoken about the mutual benefits of enhanced trade relations with the United States, n163 it might not be willing to sacrifice the relationships developed with trade partners that have stepped up since the dissolution of the Soviet presence in Cuba. In particular, trade relations with Venezuela, Bolivia and China, because of their similar political ideals, n164 will likely flourish in years to come, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to occupy any share of the market those countries currently possess. Additionally, countries that are willing to enter into trade agreements with Cuba on the basis of credit, as well as those prepared to defer pre-existing loan payments, will [\*176] have a greater opportunity to play an increased role in Cuban foreign trade. n165 Though Cuba does not have any outstanding loans with the United States, the "payment of cash in advance" requirement of TSRA n166 and the subsequent OFAC clarifications of this terminology n167 render the United States a less attractive trade partner than countries offering transactions on the basis of credit. Even if the U.S. Congress can pass legislation easing these restrictions, Cuba's poor credit rating n168 might discourage U.S. corporations and banking institutions from entering into such agreements.

### **Cuba says no to greater US trade – it's counter-revolutionary**

**Margulies, 8** – JD, New York University (Michael, “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS” 8 *Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L.* 147, lexis)

Should all the requisite factors fall into place on the U.S. side in order to ease or lift the existing trade restrictions against the export of agricultural commodities - or even allow other forms of trade - there is no guarantee that Cuba will seize the opportunity to enter into such an enhanced relationship with the United States. As evidenced by its initial rejection of the U.S. offer to export agricultural goods in 2001, immediately following the adoption of TSRA, n155 Cuba may be less willing [\*174] to accept such an offer than an economic analysis would indicate. For Cuba, U.S. commodities - whether agricultural or of another nature - may be significantly cheaper than those offered by other trade partners, as a result of the proximity between the two countries and the related transportation costs. n156 The Cuban government, however, whether under the leadership of Fidel or Raul, has very strong ideals and convictions when it comes to relations with the United States. These may impede the expansion of any such trade.

It is well known that one of the central tenets of the Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime is a strong policy against "neo-liberal globalization," the United States and capitalist imperialism. n157 These convictions may lead Cuba to balk at the opportunity to take advantage of some forms of trade with the United States. Such selectivity has been present even under TSRA-authorized trade with Alimport. Cuba has claimed that the reduction in purchases by Alimport in 2005 came not as a result of tightened restrictions by the Bush administration and subsequent difficulties working out contracts with U.S. agricultural entities, but rather as a result of "efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba to increase the motivation of United States-based companies, organization; state and local governmental representatives; and Members of the United States Congress to be more visible in their lobbying efforts for changes in United States policy, law and regulations." n158

**Business Inquirer 2014** ["IMF no longer forces 'structural adjustment' – chief," *Business Inquirer*. Accessed at: <https://business.inquirer.net/168309/imf-no-longer-forces-structural-adjustment-chief>.] //DNP

**The International Monetary Fund has changed and no longer imposes tough “structural adjustment” programs as it did in poor countries two decades ago, IMF chief Christine Lagarde** said Saturday. Told by a journalist from Ghana that many people there had “a phobia for the IMF” due to the harsh conditions of its past structural adjustment programs in Africa and South America, Lagarde responded: “Structural adjustment? That was before my time, I have no idea what it is. We don’t do that anymore.” The crisis lender is sensitive to charges it dictates socially and economically harsh reforms on countries availing themselves of its support. In recent years, it has come under heavy criticism for the austerity policies – mostly government spending cuts and tax hikes – that have accompanied its rescue programs for Greece, Portugal

and others. Lagarde, speaking in a press conference during the **IMF/World Bank spring meetings in Washington, stressed that the conditions the IMF places now in loan programs are decided together with recipient governments.** “Seriously, you have to realize that we have changed the way in which we offer our financial support,” she added. “It’s really on the basis of partnership. There is always in partnership a bit of hardship to go with it.” “If the Fund is called upon to help, it’s because the country feels it cannot decide certain things on its own, it needs back-up support, financing to make sure that it has access to enough funding.” She added that the IMF also offers countries technical assistance and help building the capacity to manage an economy. “So it’s a new face.”

**WIEGO** [“About the Informal Economy,” *Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing*. Accessed at: <http://wiego.org/informal-economy/about-informal-economy>.] //DNP  
**The informal economy is** the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are **not regulated or protected by the state.** The concept originally applied to self-employment in small unregistered enterprises. It has been expanded to include wage employment in unprotected jobs.

**Heyse 2005** [Allison, “INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.” Accessed at: <http://business.pages.tcnj.edu/files/2011/07/heyse.thesis.tcnj.pdf>.] //DNP

Since the 1950's and 1960's, income inequality and its impact on the economy has frequently been studied using by numerous authors. Even though numerous studies on many aspects of the effects of income inequality have been completed, there are still many questions that remain. One of the lingering questions involves the nature of the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Studies indicate conflicting conclusions about the relationship between income inequality and growth. This paper attempts to reevaluate income inequality data from particular countries and shed new light on the complex relationship between inequality and growth. The particular countries used in this study are classified as **less developed countries or developing countries.** Based on panel data **estimation over the 1966 – 1990 time period,** **the empirical evidence will show that developing countries with higher income inequality** do not grow at a slower rate than developing countries with a more equal income distribution. With **a one point increase in income inequality,** there is an associated **.3% annual increase in real GDP per capita growth over the next five year period.**

Biodiversity improves and is preserved with tourism.

**Costas Christ, Oliver Hillel, Seleni Matus, Jamie Sweeting, 2003 UNEP and Conservation International: TOURISM AND BIODIVERSITY Mapping Tourism's Global Footprint**

<http://www.unep.fr/shared/publications/pdf/WEBx0016xPA-TourismFootprint.pdf>

Tourism will require careful planning in the future to avoid having further negative impacts on biodiversity. Many of the factors associated with biodiversity loss— land conversion, climate change, pollution—are also linked to tourism development. As the maps have shown, resources that are important for conserving biodiversity and supporting the livelihoods of local people, such as fresh water, are also affected by tourism development, and recognizing these links is important to managing tourism development into the future. **At the same time, an increasing**

**number of examples have shown that tourism development guided by the principles associated with ecotourism—environmental sustainability, protection of nature, and supporting the well-being of local peoples—can have a positive impact on biodiversity conservation. By creating private reserves, providing justification for existing and new national parks and protected areas, and building a local conservation constituency among the people who live closest to important biodiversity areas, tourism can have and has had a positive impact on biodiversity conservation.** Properly managed, tourism does have the potential to contribute to biodiversity conservation and to support poverty reduction

EcoTourism will happen in Cuba and become the new norm for Tourism.

**Douglass Rader, 2015: Ecotourism in Cuba: A model for sustainable economic development.**

<https://www.edf.org/blog/2015/03/03/ecotourism-cuba-model-sustainable-economic-development>

**Today, Cuba's pristine Jardines de la Reina National Marine Park – Gardens of the Queen – is home to a sustainable, but small, tourism enterprise that provides badly needed economic impetus for small coastal communities.** Nearly one-quarter of the families in Jucaro – the small fishing village from which trips to the Gardens depart – already have a source of income directly related to the largest marine protected area in the Caribbean. The current ecotourism operation in the Gardens is tiny still; only 1,500 visitors per year are granted access to this world-class treasure. But **the industry also has a tiny spatial and ecological footprint, which means it could be replicated at broader scales across Cuba's two southern archipelagos, and become an economic and ecological centerpiece for broader development plans for the region.**

Russia doesn't like the embargo, and voted against it in the UN

United Nations Press Release, 2016. ["As United States, Israel Abstain from Vote for First Time, General Assembly Adopts Annual Resolution Calling for Lifting of United States Embargo on Cuba." United Nations. October 26, 2016. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11846.doc.htm>]  
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In a near-unanimous vote, the General Assembly today adopted a resolution on the necessity of ending the United States economic, commercial and financial embargo on Cuba, despite the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries two years ago.

While 191 countries voted in favour, the United States and Israel abstained rather than vote against the text for the first time, during a year that also saw the first visit to Cuba by a United States President in almost 90 years and the reopening of embassies in those respective capitals.

[...]

Also speaking today were Niger (on behalf of the African States), Singapore (on behalf of Association of South-East Asian Nations), Russian Federation, Kuwait (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Venezuela (on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement), Mexico, China, Viet Nam,

Bolivia, India, Tonga, Egypt, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Israel, Slovakia (on behalf of the European Union), Democratic People Republic of Korea, Belarus, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Iran, Mozambique, Costa Rica, Angola, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Indonesia, Algeria, El Salvador, Malaysia, Libya, and Namibia.

[...]

**SERGEY B. KONONUCHENKO (Russian Federation) said the United States embargo against Cuba must be lifted immediately**, as it flew in the face of the Charter. Indeed, it showed the short-sightedness and counter-productivity of applying unilateral coercive measures to achieve political gains. Such blockades negatively impacted ordinary individuals and the most vulnerable people in particular, and they constrained and undermined Cuba's capacity to mobilize resources for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. The international community, having assumed the obligation to leave no one behind, did not have the moral right to tolerate the blockade, he stressed, recalling that the Russian Federation had called repeatedly for its termination. Noting that the Cuban people were upholding their freedom and sovereignty despite those major challenges, he reaffirmed his country's willingness to foster an equitable and fair international order, and urged all countries to vote in favour of today's resolution.