

We Negate, Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road, or BRI, is an initiative started by China to expand infrastructure throughout the world.

With that in mind,

Our First Contention is maintaining peace across the Atlantic.

[Helen of DPA International](#) just last week writes that the EU and the US are seeking a reset in trade relations, eager to enter negotiations on trade.

In fact, [Al Jareeza in 2019](#) reports that both the EU and the US are close to a trade deal, and avoiding the usage of tariffs. For example, Al Jareeza furthers that Trump [postponed further tariffs](#) and signed a miniature [trade deal with the EU](#), as a symbol of progress.

However, in a world where the EU joins the Belt and Road Initiative, the economic relationship would crater.

[Thomas of Foreign Policy in 2019](#) writes that because the Belt and Road runs counter to his geopolitical interests, the EU joining the BRI would provoke Trump into destroying the economic relationship between the two and placing auto tariffs.

The impact is two-fold.

First is tariffs.

Tariffs decrease economic growth. [Heeb of Market Insider in 2019](#) writes that these tariffs would target huge European industries, and as a result cause a global recession, depressing global economic growth by 1.2%.

Second is preventing the trade deal.

Overall, because both economies are globally intertwined, [Kituyi of Aerta News in 2019](#) finds that trade tensions between the EU and the US would make it harder and nearly impossible to uplift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the world.

Contention Two is the South China Sea.

[Stashwick of Foreign Policy '19](#) writes that the counterbalancing of the US and its allies is the key reason that China has peaked in its South China Sea military buildup, historically stopping Chinese escalation and bringing them to the negotiating table.

In a world with the EU part of BRI, the status quo would shatter for two reasons.

First is because of leverage.

The Diplomat writes in 2018 that China does not want EU naval operations in the South China Sea to continue, but has been restrained verbally and physically from a direct confrontation.

The BRI would give China more non-confrontational ways to exercise leverage over the European Union. **Rizzo of Politico '19** finds that an advancement in economic relations between China and the EU would give China the ability to leverage its investment to influence decisions on issues such as the South China Sea. This would enable China to stop EU naval operations in the area.

Maintaining the ability to carry out these operations is critical, as the **Asian Nikkei Review in 2019** confirms that EU's military involvement in the South China Sea legitimizes US military operations and has brought on fellow Western allies into the coalition, concluding that joint EU-US military operations in the region collectively uphold freedom in the Sea and thus the peace in the region.

Second, is because of rising influence.

EU membership of the BRI would facilitate China's rise over the Eurasian continent.

Cavana of the University of Texas '19 writes that the BRI in Europe and Asia would create a continental zone of "pre-eminent Chinese influence" that would allow them to focus on the seas.

Ratner of CFR '18 explains that the perception the BRI creates a Chinese-led economic order would hamper opposition to China's militaristic expansion, as countries would be less likely to provide military assistance to the US or hamper Chinese aggression if they believe it will result in tangible forms of retribution.

The impact is Tensions.

Stashwick furthers writing that if the West pulls back its regional presence China would take the opportunity to reinforce its position in the region rather than sit back.

Pham of the Diplomat in 2018 furthers that backing down now would embolden China to expand its campaign to control the South China Sea.

Problematically, **Fourtane** furthers that if China is able to take the next step in the South China Sea and military escalate, it would threaten the stability of trade. Even if trade isn't disrupted they find that shipping companies would skyrocket insurance rates, spiking costs devastating global supply chains.

This is crucial as **Crabtree '16 of CNBC** writes that "over 5 trillion dollars worth of trade annually passes through the region, supplying a whopping 1.5 billion people with food and jobs,"

Even short term disruptions in trade can spike prices of basic food and push millions into poverty, which is why **PBS** finds the last time food prices spiked it pushed 44 million into poverty.

Thus, we negate.

SCS FIRST LINK EXTENSION

We're going for the first link on our second contention about leverage. What we tell you through the Rizzo evidence is that as the EU joins the BRI China would gain the ability to leverage its investments to influence European foreign policy in the South China Sea, which is critical as the Asia Nikkei Review evidence indicates that EU mil involvement in the SCS legitimizes the west's military actions, which is key as the statswish uniqueness evidence writes that western military push back is the reason china has peaked in their military expansion and is coming to the negotiating table. [then fourtane into pbs]

SCS SECOND LINK EXTENSION

We're going for our second link on our second contention about shifting the global perception. What we tell you from the Cavana evidence is that the EU joining the BRI would shift the global hegemon perception on the seas away from the US and towards China which is key as the Ratner ev writes that if the BRI creates a china-led global order countries in the SCS region would be much less likelier to push back against china for fear of retribution, leaving them unchecked in the region to increase their aggression. [then fourtane into pbs]

Cards

Trade deal=-tti

Tariffs/Trade Deal

Al Jazeera

<https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/trump-eu-trade-deal-close-190826195414136.html>

United States President Donald Trump said on Monday that he thinks the US will be able to reach a fair trade agreement with the European Union without imposing threatened tariffs on car imports.

Trump said it had been difficult negotiating with the European Union on trade issues, **but he struck an upbeat tone on the prospects for a broad agreement with Brussels** that would offer a potential lifeline to German carmakers.

"We're very close to maybe making a deal with the EU because they don't want tariffs,"

Trump said at a news conference at the end of the G7 summit in Biarritz, France. "I think we're going to make a deal **with the EU without having to go that route.**"

Merkel told reporters on Monday that [Germany](#) wants **the European Union to reach a trade agreement with the US as quickly as possible. "We want to talk now about the EU and the United States having deeper talks as quickly as possible."** Merkel told reporters at a briefing with Trump on the sidelines of the G7 summit. **"We have a great interest in our trade being intensified. I think we can find solutions,"** Merkel added. "Germany, within the framework of the EU, is working hard on this."

Thomas Foreign Policy

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/>

Unfortunately, some EU leaders in recent weeks have further raised tensions by promoting subsidized industries, as they did with Airbus and [contemplate doing](#) for artificial intelligence and electric batteries, in the guise of national champions; renewing an easy money policy that weakens the euro; siding with the Chinese mobile communications [powerhouse](#) Huawei in the dispute over 5G deployment; **and joining China's multibillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. This may be enough to provoke Trump into pulling the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin.**

Roberts Atlantic Council

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-china-trade-war-could-impact-u-s-eu-negotiations-and-the-wto>

Many EU members see an important economic benefit in being more closely engaged with China on BRI trade and investment projects and many have become major users of Chinese telecommunications and other technologies.

In coming negotiations, will the United States say to the EU “as a precondition for making the deal you have to reduce your ties with China or agree not to further increase them or not participate in BRI projects or not buy certain Chinese advanced technology products?” And will China step up its efforts to involve greater numbers of European countries in the BRI, further develop its markets in the

region, and apply pressure on countries to use Chinese companies in domestic projects as well as purchase Chinese technology or Chinese products rather than American ones?

Much of this kind of intense economic competition—with major political, strategic, and geopolitical implications—**might have occurred in any case.**

Heeb Market Insider

<https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273?fbclid=iwar031egstiho0acedn5vpgw5xpozkrwh2971t2h1mdssxtvnnrb1ac1rykm>

While that could benefit some American automakers and reduce bilateral trade deficits, it would also risk adding thousands of dollars to the price of vehicles, and raises **the threat of retaliatory duties that could worsen global trade tensions.**

"In a worst case scenario, fullblown titfortat auto tariffs could trigger a global recession,"

analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in a research note out this week, **adding they would expect growth in the world economy to fall nearly a percentage point to 1.2%.**

The Balance

<https://www.thebalance.com/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-ttip-3305582>

The United States trades more with the EU than with China. The total amount traded is already at \$1 trillion, but **the TTIP could quadruple that amount. It could boost U.S. GDP by 5% and the EU's by 3.4%. That's by eliminating all tariffs and other trade barriers.**

If completed, the TTIP would become the world's largest trade agreement. It would be bigger than the [North American Free Trade Agreement](#). The importance of the EU is even greater for [foreign direct investment](#). European companies accounted for \$2.96 trillion, or 68% of total FDI in the United States. American companies accounted for \$3.61 trillion, or 61%, of FDI in Europe in 2018.

These investments use 4 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic. That's how many are employed by the affiliates of European or U.S.-based companies. For example, the German company Siemens employs 60,000 people in the United States. General Electric employs 70,000 workers in Europe.

Aerta News

<https://aretenews.com/trump-trade-war-erodes-anti-poverty-goals/>

GENEVA — **Trade conflicts sparked by U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs** against China, **the European Union and others threaten to undermine the work of international organizations trying to lift the world's poorest out of poverty.**

Leaders of international organizations that promote global trade and investment said their **efforts are at risk of stalling or failing because of the trade war between the United States and China and trade tensions between the United States and many of its most important trading partners.**

When the United Nations said in 2010 it reached one of its Millennium Development Goals five years early — halving extreme poverty from 1990 to 2015 — that achievement was a credit to international trade. The U.N.'s next-phase Sustainable Development Goals aim to end poverty and hunger everywhere by 2030.

Whether that is achievable remains to be seen. **But for international organizations, it is clear that a trade war and other trade tensions around the globe will make it that much more difficult — maybe impossible — to lift up the world's 800 million people** who are living in extreme poverty on less than \$1.90 a day.

South China Sea

Stashwick

<https://outline.com/RGKgzn>

Following years of Russian noncompliance, the United States officially [withdrew](#) from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Aug. 2. The Cold War-era arms control agreement had banned land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, and the next day the new U.S. defense secretary, Mark Esper, [told reporters](#) that he wanted to counter China's massive missile inventory "sooner rather than later." China responded furiously. Ironically, the threat comes as the most conspicuous flash point between the two countries, **China's military buildup on its artificial islands in the South China Sea, appears to be reaching a peak. In part, this is because of limits on the bases' military usefulness in future conflict, but the key reason is that the backlash and counterbalancing its militarization encourages from the United States and other countries threaten the islands' usefulness as a political signal at home, something that the Communist Party may value far more than their actual military potency.**

If the United States pulled back its regional presence to appease Chinese anxieties over the expanding U.S. presence in the region, **China is likelier to use the opportunity to reinforce its position than content itself with the gains it has made to date.** Despite China's often strident rhetoric, the presence of the **U.S. military in the South China Sea has generally heightened its sensitivity to provoking even stronger military responses and motivated greater, if dubiously productive, diplomatic engagement with its neighbors.**

The Diplomat

<https://outline.com/ncCTJ2>

Beijing only made official comments after Western media outlets cited anonymous British defence sources about the HMS Albion naval patrol. Similar to the U.S. FONOPs, China sent vocal warnings, its warship and fighter jets to shadow the HMS Albion operation. **In almost a week later, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged that the operational assertion was a**

provocation, violation of its domestic law, relevant international law and a breach of its sovereignty. China warned that additional operations would be detrimental to bilateral relations, regional peace and stability. Noticeably, China reactions were restrained both verbally and its actions at sea avoided any direct confrontation with the British warship thus preventing any escalation.

Rizzo Politico

<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614>

Choosing the United States does not mean that Europe should forfeit all trade and economic relations with China. But **as Europe advances its economic relationships with China**, it must be clear-eyed about the risks that accompany those ties. **Beijing expects that its economic influence will translate into lasting diplomatic leverage in Europe. It will use its investment to secure support for—or at least prevent the EU from taking a unified position** against—human rights issues like Tibet, the mass detention of Uighurs in “re-education” camps in Xinjiang, and **on geopolitical issues like Taiwan and the militarization of the South China Sea. China is already using its economic relationships to pressure Europe to acquiesce to its efforts to neuter democracy and human rights protections.** For example, in 2017, Greece **blocked** an EU statement at the UN criticizing China’s

human rights record. This was almost certainly because of China’s growing economic investment in the country. As long as Europe continues to sit on the fence, actions like these will only continue.

Asian Nikkei Review

<https://outline.com/kcT44b>

Both powers, however, have signaled their deep commitment to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight in China’s maritime backyard. In fact, **the U.K. has announced its intention to deploy the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier to the South China Sea, while working with France on joint maritime exercises and enhancing the ability to operate together in military situations with Japan, India and Australia across the Indo-Pacific. Through their naval deployments** to contested waters **and defense agreements with smaller Asian countries, Europe lends legitimacy to Washington’s Freedom of Navigation Operations. In effect, Europe and the U.S., along with the naval powers of Japan, India and Australia, are now collectively upholding the freedom of the seas.**

Canvana UT

https://tnsr.org/2019/07/unlocking-the-gates-of-eurasia-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-it-s-implications-for-u-s-grand-strategy/#_ftn167

These trends could have important security implications. Since the early days of the post-World War II era, fears that a rising hegemon could capture **Eurasia's unmatched resources and markets have led American leaders to forge local alliances and to systematically oppose regional organizations and cross-regional energy networks. These efforts helped entrench Washington's hegemony and have legitimized its military, political, and economic interferences across Eurasia for decades.**¹⁶⁵ But today's emerging "continentalism" alters this paradigm. Combined with China's expanding security dialogues with entities such as the Arab League and the African Union and its growing responsibilities at the United Nations, including contributions to the budget and peacekeeping efforts, institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization **could gradually weaken America's ability to isolate its enemies.**¹⁶⁶ **Belt and Road could ultimately create a "continental zone of pre-eminent Chinese influence" and allow Beijing to concentrate on the seas.**

Ratner of CFR 18'

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_USCC%20Testimony%20CORRECTED.pdf

Belt and Road is arguably most important for security issues because it creates the perception of a China-led economic order in Asia. As Christopher Johnson at CSIS succinctly put it, BRI helps "to reinforce the emerging global narrative that China is moving to the center of global economic activity, strength, and influence."⁸ This has direct implications for military issues insofar as countries will be increasingly unwilling to partner with the United States or push back on Chinese assertiveness if they believe it will result in tangible and costly forms of retribution. China is already using economic carrots and sticks to coerce U.S. allies and partners to reduce security cooperation with the United States.⁹ Prominent recent examples include South Korea (over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system) and the Philippines (over disputes in the South China Sea). Countries as far as Greece are carrying Beijing's water on political matters in the European Union to reap what they expect to be the spoils of Belt and Road. Beijing's neutering of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the South China Sea is exemplary of how states and collections of states are likely to defy their national security interests to bend to China's demands for economic purpose

Pham

Pham of The Diplomat 18'-

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/now-is-not-the-time-to-back-down-in-the-south-china-sea/>

Hence, now is not the time for Washington to back down in the SCS. To do so would further embolden Beijing to expand and accelerate its deliberate campaign to control the disputed and contested strategic waterway through which trillions of dollars of global trade flows each year; and reinforce Beijing's growing belief in itself as a rising power and Washington as a declining power that can be intimidated out of the SCS and perhaps eventually the greater Indo-Pacific in accordance with its grand strategic design for national rejuvenation (Chinese Dream). **For Beijing, controlling the SCS is step toward regional preeminence and ultimately global preeminence.**

Fortane

<http://blog.ajilon.com/supply-chain-2/south-china-sea-dispute-and-supply-chains/>
Analysts fear that China's next response could include the creation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea. In the event of [if] China's threat becoming reality, all aircraft entering the designated airspace would be required to identify themselves. As a consequence, this would escalate tensions with the U.S. and Japan. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that roughly 80% of global trade by volume, and 70% by value, is transported on our oceans. Of that volume, 60% of maritime trade passes through Asia. If the South China Sea ushers across an estimated one-third of global shipping, then it is no wonder the dispute for this territory is a worthy cause for concern. Taiwan, Japan, China, and South Korea all rely on the waters of the South China Sea to transport their goods. Many of these countries' economic security is closely tied to the South China Sea. An imminent crisis restricting freedom of navigation would represent a catastrophic setback to supply chains and shipping operators that are still struggling to recover from the last recession. With an annual trade through the South China Sea of \$5.3 trillion, of which \$1.2 trillion accounts to trade with the U.S, the shipping industry will suffer greatly with the restrictions. Even if shipping is not completely affected, it is likely that insurance companies will skyrocket rates forcing companies to pay much higher costs. Thus affecting the whole supply chain.

with **Fortane of Ajilon in 2018** writing that China's first move would be to implement restrictive air policies that would skyrocket tensions in the region.

<https://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/commentary/south-china-sea-uncertain-times-for-shipping-and-trade/>

Thousands of ships transit the waters of the South China Sea every day, connecting markets and goods in East Asia with the Middle East and Europe. The numbers are staggering: \$5.3 trillion in annual trade, \$1.2 trillion of which begins or ends at U.S ports. For many nations on the western rim of the

Pacific, this is the only bulk trading route with key markets in Europe and the Americas.

Since one-third of the world's liquefied natural gas passes through the Straits of Malacca and into the South China Sea, bound for Japan and South Korea, a disruption to ship-borne trade could have a significant impact on energy supplies as well as global commerce.

There are alternate routes, but any attempt to circumnavigate the disputed waterway would require a lot of extra fuel, and wind up driving up the costs of goods in transport. Esben Poulsson, president of the Singapore Shipping Association, has said that it is "vital" that merchant ships be allowed to traverse the South China Sea "without diversion or delay."

Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Sudan

Extra Stuff

A2 Extinction Framing

We link into extinction

Prob more imp

Policy paralysis; inc risk of another

Prob more realistic and educational

(ask ryan)

Bias absurd

They claim for some reason we have reason, 1) regardless of bias it can also cause u to overestimate extinc, 2) need to hear specific biases we have, 3) in SCS we are overestim. Bc of a western view

EU > CH trade/econ growth

<https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/the-european-union-and-developing-countries>

The EB in 2019 writes that if China succeeds in its goal to coax the European Union towards Chinese standards and practices and away from the west, it would help to promote and legitimize China's alternative view of globalization.

Western Mil coop add in

First is reducing Western Military Cooperation.

Brookings reports in 2018 that the BRI is aimed to weaken Western unity on the issue of the South China Sea, and accelerate a challenge to the liberal international order.

The Diplomat furthers in 2018 writing that the BRI would further complicate EU-US military Cooperation, worsening the situation in the South China Sea.

For example, the CF in 2018 writes that the BRI's expansion into Western allies would make it harder for EU-US intelligence sharing, as Chinese firms such as Huawei, who pose potential security risks to current cooperation, expand into BRI countries.

Overall, Time Magazine writes in 2019 that the United States will not hesitate to force Europe into an all or nothing scenario, where they either stick with the West or shift towards China and lose cooperation with the US.

Frontline to Flippin in squo:

<https://outline.com/MYWatR> -March

However, despite concerns that China's influence might increase even further as it continues to fund projects there have been notable backlashes against the growing superpower.

Malaysia, another nation with claims on the South China Sea, recently became far more hawkish on China following the surprise election of 93-year-old Manathir Mohammed last year.

Ahead of a meeting with Duterte recently the Malaysian premier said "If you borrow huge sums of money from China and you cannot pay, you know when a person is a borrower he is under the control of the lender, so we have to be very careful with that," to ABS-CBN News Channel, asquoted by Nikkei Asian Review.

It's an example of what critics call "debt trap diplomacy" which has affected China's relationships with Sri Lanka and Laos in recent years. Sri Lankafamously gave China a 99 year lease on a strategic port after it ran into financial difficulty with its creditors.

China's attempts to control more and more of the South China Sea has led to reviews from other countries and could see further resistance in the future.

Pham of The Diplomat 18'

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/now-is-not-the-time-to-back-down-in-the-south-china-sea/>

Hence, now is not the time for Washington to back down in the SCS. To do so would further embolden Beijing to expand and accelerate its deliberate campaign to control the disputed and contested strategic waterway through which trillions of dollars of global trade flows each year; and reinforce Beijing's growing belief in itself as a rising power and Washington as a declining power that can be intimidated out of the SCS and perhaps eventually

the greater Indo-Pacific in accordance with its grand strategic design for national rejuvenation (*Chinese Dream*). **For Beijing, controlling the SCS is step toward regional preeminence and ultimately global preeminence.**

Frontlines

FL: EU economy ↓ in status quo

1. [Sarkar](#) writes that even with slowing growth, the preconditions for a recession have not been met. A recession is unlikely in the short term
2. Less trade and less economic growth makes it impossible to come out of the recession
[Fredrickson](#) argues in 2018 that tariffs reduce external demand for domestic products due to higher prices, decreasing overall output. As a result, EU manufacturers would struggle selling their goods in the US, resulting in economic losses.

FL: Trump

<https://www.craigslist.com/automotive/auto-industry-unites-oppose-trump-import-tariffs>

FL: Trump won't because of re-election

1. His voter base supports tariffs; his campaign is to bring jobs to America and as long as they perceive tariffs as a way to accomplish the goal, they will support it.
 - a. [Dover 19](#) of the Templeton Institute writes that Trump justified Chinese tariffs as countering China. This means that as long as tariffs on the EU are perceived as a response to China, the voters support him.
2. The number one point to his campaign is following through on promises: he promised to prevent chinese expansionism and punish countries who side with them.

FL: Trump won't trigger a global recession

1. [Blake 19](#) of the Washington Post writes that Trump said that a trade war with China could cause a recession, but he "had to do it". This means that retaliating and maintaining status is more important than the economy to Trump
2. [BI writes in 2019](#) that trump literally has zero disregard for the people who are hurt by his tariffs and doubled down after seeing the damage, he doesn't care

FL: Trump won't because he fears EU economic retaliation

1. EU won't be able to retaliate. Our **Economist** evidence in case tells you that Europe is seeing extremely slow growth, and **Dooley** tells you that right now Europe is focusing on buying bonds to prepare for the recession. They are in no state to start an economic war with America

FL: Trump won't because he fears international backlash

1. International backlash has never stopped him before. Despite receiving backlash for the wall, selling arms to Saudi Arabia, being allies with Russia, starting a trade war w/ China -- and much more -- he continues to do whatever he wants. If Trump wants to retaliate against the EU, he will.

FL: Trump's base against harming EU because it is an ally

1. Obviously if he put tariffs on them in the past this does not factor into his decision making calculus
2. Trump's base is for bringing jobs to America and tariffs are theoretically what does that so his base will be receptive to them

FL: Summit was only minor goods tariffed

A2 BUILD ACT

1. The build act is for developing nations, not countries that are already developed, like the EU. the way you know I'm right is that when Italy joined we didn't send foreign aid, instead Mike Pompeo threw a fit. In fact the Asan Forum explicitly writes that the BUILD act isn't being used for Europe

<http://www.theasanforum.org/from-friend-to-foe-ish-washingtons-negative-turn-on-the-belt-and-road-initiative/>

A2 CH recession more important than EU recession

No, Elgar 19' writes that the EU is the main trading partner of developing nations, who are worse off on net because every single dollar of trade is critical whereas wealthier countries like China can weather the storm

<https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/the-european-union-and-developing-countries>

A2 EU/CH have incentive to keep working bc trade war

1. No. WP 18 writes that the trade war is helping China non-economically by providing a target for the leadership while helping divide the West, which is why some believe that they want Trump to continue the trade war and sow more havoc internationally.
2. No. CNN 19 writes that tensions are rising between EU and CH because of other issues, obviously the trade war isn't uniting them because both want to take advantage of the dec. in econ holdings of the other, we still link into SCS.

A2 He wants trade deal

Nah, cnbc (most recent) says that he doesn't think he needs a deal with china for exaple for 2020, meaning he's fine prolonging the economic damage even if it means no deal

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/20/trump-says-he-doesnt-need-a-trade-deal-with-china-before-the-2020-election.html>

A2 Trump tryna nuke EU w tariffs rn

1. NYMAG which postdates them writes that these tariffs aren't unique to trump, every president has used these really small scale luxury only tariffs to pressure trade negotiations to move along, writing that he's actually using the WTO to run these tariffs through, he's just applying very minimal pressure, these tariffs are irrelevant, once the EU joins then shit hits the fan
2. [The Voa news ev](#) is very good in clarifying that there recently was a reset in rels and that things are getting better now, and the al jazeera ev specially isolates trade talks and says they're moving along

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/09/trumps-cheese-tariffs-may-be-his-most-normal-trade-policy.html>

A2 US Prescene NU

1. No, staswick indidcates allies are key
2. US dervies is strength from security agreements with region and coop missions, if those go away through out links then US gets weaker, we still link in

Debt Contention Add in

Contention One: A Debt Disaster

As a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, the European Union would accept Chinese BRI Projects.

Unfortunately, these projects require countries to take on Chinese loans, which have higher interest rates and short repayment periods.

This is why the Independent '19 concludes that as the EU joins the BRI, it is likely to face heavy debt burdens.

The impact is economic stimulus

Roberts of Counterfire '19 writes that due to the cyclical nature of recessions, and drastically slowing growth around the world, we are heading to a global recession.

Unfortunately higher debt loads makes it impossible for countries to respond to recessions with stimulus spending.

Indeed, Roman of Brookings '19 finds that European countries with lower debt-to-GDP levels were able to respond to economic downturns with much more stimulus spending, thus suffering much less in the aftermath.

For example, in 2008, Cimadomo of the Economic Society of Australia in '11 finds that implementation of stimulus spending helped to avert an even more severe economic downturn during the great recession.

Straub of the AEA '12 confirms, finding that stimulus spending in the last recession rose GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6%.

This is critical, as recessions can push millions into poverty.

The European Parliament '16 overall concludes that the recession moved the EU away from poverty reduction targets, with an additional 6.7 million people put into poverty and a quarter of the population being put at risk of poverty.

Without having the ability to increase stimulus spending, tens of millions more would have found themselves in poverty.

"The One belt, One road project is One giant mistake for Europe, because of One person: Trump

A2 Disc Theory

Counterinterp-- schools that have more than 10 teams must disclose on the NDCA PF wiki 15 minutes before round at TOC qualifying tournaments.

Reasons to Prefer--

1. We're more educational
 - a. Solves the offense about lit and prep; the most successful arguments are fully disclosed for everyone to research
 - b. Solves their in depth education warrants by establishing a scope of arguments and topic understanding without the harms of mandating disclosure for disadvantaged schools

2. We're fairer
 - a. Mandatory disclosure hurts small schools because of large school prep outs. There's no reciprocal advantage to disclosure for small schools; the counterinterp solves back for competitive small schools, too
 - b. Status quo proves that disclosure happens without mandating

3. They're worse for education
 - a. The only true in-round abuse that's concrete is the shift away from topic specific education caused by them running theory

They don't access education--

1. Small scope- the impact decreases the longer we debate the topic
2. None of the arguments we're reading are squirrely or brand new; we have clash every

round... that supercharges the in round loss of education

They don't access fairness--

1. Disclosure is only a check against parametricizing affs because available neg ground shifts depending on the aff advocacy; this is why disclosure is a norm in progressive LD and Policy. Their ground-based internal links aren't applicable
2. Link defense-- actual abuse would be delinking everything because we weren't actually abiding by the resolution. They pull the trigger before trying to engage us.
3. Their interp says that we have to disclose before the coinflip; that kills fairness because they can't sift through the disclosed case anyways.

Disad to their interp

1. This shell reinforces national circuit elitism. Random High School AA has no idea what the NDCA wiki page is. Insofar as national circuit teams are trying to make this a universal framework for debate, they're just trying to ridiculously win rounds against small schools. Participation in debate is more important than their tiny violations of fairness or education, so reject the debater to ensure our activity's existence.

Defense on their interp

Don't vote on dis theory

1. PF resolutions are inherently predictable-- everyone is linking into the same impacts... don't punish us because they don't want to debate content
2. Doesn't set a precedent-- dropping to theory doesn't change anything; we're not going to start disclosing, we're just going to get better about debating theory
3. Potential abuse isn't a voter--
 - a. Punishes us for behaviors we don't engage in
 - b. Infinitely regressive-- extremes of any behavior could potentially turn abusive in the future
 - c. It's unfair for them to garner links off of content not in the round; it shifts our ability to attack further down the link chain where it's harder to win

Weighing

Tariffs/Trade

TT vs. Trade

1. Timeframe, recession caused immediately whereas trade takes 5 years to develop and decades to see trade resulting from
2. Tariffs and recession will wipeout trade making it so infra is useless
 - a. This is because tariffs would make investors and unwilling to put money into they system even if the BRI exists.
3. Probability; link defense makes it unlikely that infra will benefit, whereas tariffs 10)% cause global recession

TT vs. Overcap

1. If EU goes into recession then there will be more political chaos and so EU can't agree on what projects to accept so overcap won't be reduced
2. Signing the trade deal would generate economic growth around the world inc. demand for infra globally, solves for overcap

TT vs. FDI

1. Trade deal inc US investment, their impact is NU in both worlds
2. If the EU goes into recession then CH won't even invest in EU they'll keep money in their own country

SCS

SCS vs. Trade

1. Their impact is only EU trade not global trade, that's our impact, we outweigh on scope
2. Inc in trade lot less impact than trade shocks, inc prices where poor can't access, hurt a lot more on severity.
3. Control internal link; won't coop and inc trade if tensions are very high
4. High insurance costs functions as terminal defense, people won't trade if the cost/risks are too high, can't access their impact, offense for us bc we prevent any future inc. in trade in either world not even specific to the BRI.

5. Most of BRI infra is in SCS, so if tensions rise here than EU can't access benefits of global trade integration
 - a. Fortune 80% trade in region, its over