# KG April TOC NEG

**We Negate Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.**

## Our Sole Point of Contention is Cooling The Kashmir Conflict

**Since 1947, India and Pakistan have been locked in a conflict over Kashmir, a majority-Muslim region in the northernmost part of India. However, in the 21st century there has been no true conflict over the region.**

**Granting India permanent membership on the UN Security Council, a group charged with governing international peace and security, would severely damage the situation. Shamsa of The Institute of Strategic Studies projects that a permanent seat in the UNSC will give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right and thus having the potential to destabilize the region by fueling regional confrontation and conﬂicts.**

**Specifically, the seat would give India free reign in Kashmir. Garrie of Global Policy explains that an Indian veto on the UNSC would mean the Kashmir crisis would never be solved as India could veto any motion put forward calling for peace on Kashmir.**

**Therefore, The Express Tribune reports Pakistan views anything that militates against the regional balance in South Asia as counterproductive and not in the interest of the region. They find that Pakistan said that any endorsement of the Indian bid for a permanent seat on the Council will have serious implications and a negative impact to peace and security in Asia.**

**Unfortunately, the perception of strength that India gets from being on the UNSC would force Pakistan to play its hand and respond, which has historically been through military proxies. Shah of The Observer Research Foundation finds that Pakistan uses state supported terrorism as an instrument to punch above its geopolitical weight. She furthers that Pakistan’s strategic thinking is that the only way to preserve its own security is by ensuring India is weak, defeated or kept in a constant state of chaos by supporting militant actors.**

**These attacks have happened in the past, such as the 2008 terrorist attacks on the city Mumbai. Shah concludes that the primary objective of the Mumbai attacks was to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan, as the militants hoped that by targeting a large number of foreigners, India’s image in the ‘eyes of the west’ would fall, with people seeing it as an unsafe country.**

**Allowing India onto the Security Council would cause tensions over Kashmir to be pushed past the tipping point. Khan of The Naval Postgraduate School explains that India’s entry into the UNSC would upset Pakistan’s security and economic concerns and cause further proliferation of tension and disputes in the Kashmir region.**

**Feeding the animosity over Kashmir escalates quickly. Lancini of Lifegate reports that proxy warfare remains the anchor of Pakistan’s defense strategy and the intensity of the conflict in Kashmir increases when the friction grows between India and Pakistan.**

**The impact to increasing Indo-Pakistan tensions is long term violence.**

**Filkins of The New Yorker writes that a long running insurgency in Kashmir has been supported openly by the Pakistani military. He finds that the once the cycle of militarism begins, it is endless: insurgent bombs cause Indian responses, which cause Pakistani militancy, which sparks Indian retaliation.**

**This is confirmed by Ghose of The Times of India, who quantifies that in the last 5 years, there’s been a 94% increase in number of security forces killed and a 177% increase in terrorist incidents because overwhelming use of force by the government tends to erode the boundaries between law and crime and paves the way for terrorism.**

**Increasing proxy terrorism is extremely dangerous for the future. The World Political Review writes that there is little incentive for India to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan because of the use of militant proxies in Kashmir which has created a powerful perception among Indian officials that Pakistan is an untrustworthy negotiating partner. They conclude that in the meantime, India and Pakistan can only prevent the crisis from escalating by retaining their responses to provocations to prevent long term conflict.**

**Stopping escalation is crucial. Historically, Peer of The New York Times quantifies that the last time both sides were stuck into a cycle of conflict in Kashmir in the mid 1990s, 70 thousand people were killed and several hundred thousand more were displaced.**

**Because it is better to take one step forward rather than two steps back, we are very proud to negate.**

<https://www.academia.edu/37138288/Violation_of_the_UN_Resolutions_on_Kashmir_Indias_Quest_for_UNSC_Permanent_Membership>

**The permanent seat in the UNSC will** also **give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right.** This would certainly **hav[ing]**e **[the]** a **potential to destabilise the region by fuelling regional confrontation and conﬂicts.** Even the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point in the Indian politics.

<https://eurasiafuture.com/2019/03/02/indias-aggression-against-pakistan-has-held-back-the-prospect-of-un-reform/>

At present, neither Pakistan nor India have a seat on the Security Council, but many who have called for UN reform, argue for an expansion of the Security Council’s permanent membership and as such, many such proponents of UN reform call for India to have a permanent seat on the Security Council, based on the fact that unlike in the 1940s, India is today a more prominent nation than Britain or France. And yet, giving a country with a history of aggression against its nuclear armed neighbours a permanent seat on the Security Council, would be grossly irresponsible. **An India veto at the [UNSC]** UN’s highest security body **would effectively mean** that **the Kashmir crisis could never be solved** as clearly, the civilians of Indian occupied Kashmir do not want to be ruled by New Delhi. And yet, **[as]** by giving India a permanent seat Security Council**,** **India’s** **Ambassador could simply veto any motion put forward** calling for peace, justice and calm in **[on] Kashmir.** If certain and generally well-meaning proponents of UN reform had their way, this is just what would happen as due to its size, India is typically considered as a potential permanent member of a reformed Security Council, far more often than Pakistan is mentioned in such a context. Due to India’s own reckless behaviour, even supporters of a would-be permanent Indian seat on the Security Council will now think twice. It is simply not in the interests of the wider world for a nuclear power in a virtual state of war with its neighbour, to hold veto power over an international body charged with promoting peace and win-win conflict resolution.

<https://tribune.com.pk/story/73240/pakistan-opposes-indias-quest-for-seat/>

“Pakistan has opposed India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council on the eve of US President Barrack Obama’s visit to India, where the issue is likely to ﬁgure high up on the agenda during his talks with the Indian leadership… it cautioned the US president against taking measures that disturb the regional balance.”**It is Pakistan’s considered view that anything that militates against the regional balance in South Asia is counterproductive and not in the interest of the region and the world**,” said a Foreign Oﬃce state- ment. In response to a question about the US endorsing India’s permanent seat, the Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcials told members that Pakistan’s approach to the reform of the Security Council was based on principles. The commiĴee was informed that Pakistan believes that decisions impacting global systems of inter-state relations based on the charter require consensus. “The spirit and the principles of the charter should not be compromised. The principle of sovereign equality is a cardinal one.” In a clear message to the US presi- dent, **Pakistan said that any endorsement of the Indian bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council will have serious implications.** It will also have **[and a] negative impact on issues relating to peace and security in South Asia.”**

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

India’s entry into the [unsc] **elite club** would **greatly** upset Pakistan’s security and economic concerns **and would create an imbalance in the region. India’s permanent membership of the UNSC would** [and] cause further proliferation of disputes, **in the** **region,** especially between India and Pakistan. **To qualify for the permanent membership of the UNSC, India must solve main disputes such as Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek. Pakistan, as a key regional country, must continue to work closely with members of the Ufc group to argue in favor of increase of non-permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC to block India’s entry as a permanent member. Pakistan and the Ufc members must try to capitalize on the differences between the G4 and the AU to prevent G4 states from achieving the required two-thirds majority at the UNGA.**

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-use-terror-tool-45691/>

The Mumbai attack of 26/11 was a clear demonstration by Pakistan’s jihadist organisations’ and its military-intelligence establishment’s strategic culture of causing hurt and harm to India. **Pakistan uses [state supported terrorism]** jihad, conducted by subnational groups (with state support) **as an instrument** that allows it **to punch above its geopolitical weight.** [1] Part of **the country’s strategic thinking is believing in the false idea that the only way to preserve its own security is by ensuring India is weak, defeated or kept in a constant state of chaos. Pakistan believes it can achieve this imperative by supporting militant actors,** thereby ensuring the Pakistani State has plausible deniability when the militant group strikes. Pakistan’s strategy of ‘bleeding India by a thousand cuts’ has been implemented by exploiting religious sentiments and whipping up passions on communal and sectarian lines. Before launching its proxy war in Kashmir in 1989, it exploited the tribal areas in Northeast India, and exploited discontented youth in Punjab to fight for the creation of Khalistan, a new Sikh nation-state. By supporting the Sikh militancy in Punjab, it hoped to tie down Indian security forces and divert them from the defence of Kashmir. When India crushed the Khalistani separatist movement, Pakistan turned its attention once again to Kashmir, fomenting instability in the state to check India’s power.

**The primary objective of the Mumbai attacks was to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan.** While outright war would not have been the best-case scenario for Lashkar, the intended casualty was the ongoing India-Pakistan peace process. [6] Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was visiting Delhi the night the attacks began, in what was seen as a sign of improving ties. When news of the attack broke, Qureshi was asked to immediately leave the country. [7] **A key feature of the attack was its targeting of popular places frequented by foreigners.** The choice of Nariman House and the Taj and Oberoi hotels suggests that one of the objectives of the attacks was to increase the group’s stature in the jihadi community by targeted killings of Westerners and Jews. [8] **The militants hoped that by targeting a large number of foreigners, India’s image in the ‘eyes of the west’ would fall, with people seeing it as an unsafe country.**

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/view-pakistan-will-not-change-india-has-to-prepare-better/articleshow/68142741.cms>

Transforming this Pakistani behaviour fundamentally would require India to either engineer its own failure (so as to cease unnerving Pakistan through its strength), or surrender to Pakistani extortion over J&K. Because neither outcome is plausible -- and the prospect of a civilian government in Pakistan truly controlling the deep State is a pipedream -- India has to accept that Pakistan’s efforts at strategic coercion through terrorism will persist well into the future. **Pak[istan] may occasionally** change tactics. It may sporadically **restrain its proxies to permit the realisation of certain ends, such as encouraging bilateral negotiations or demonstrating Pakistan’s credentials as a responsible State. But such pauses will always be** ephemeral,[**temporary] because the overriding objective remains perpetual resistance to India. And there is no better instrument of defiance today than terrorism by proxy.**

<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>

India’s entry into the [unsc] elite club would greatly upset Pakistan’s security and economic concerns and would create an imbalance in the region. India’s permanent membership of the UNSC would [and] cause further proliferation of disputes, in the region, especially between India and Pakistan. To qualify for the permanent membership of the UNSC, India must solve main disputes such as Kashmir, Siachen, and Sir Creek. Pakistan, as a key regional country, must continue to work closely with members of the Ufc group to argue in favor of increase of non-permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC to block India’s entry as a permanent member. Pakistan and the Ufc members must try to capitalize on the differences between the G4 and the AU to prevent G4 states from achieving the required two-thirds majority at the UNGA.

<https://www.lifegate.com/people/news/kashmir-history-origins-conflict>

“The **proxy warfare** that had started in Kashmir in 1947 **remains the sheet-anchor of Pakistan’s defense strategy**,” Mohammad Taqi, a columnist for Pakistan’s Daily Times, explains in an interview with Al Jazeera. “The quest for the so-called ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan (a doctrine through which Pakistan supposedly exerts influence on its neighbour in relation to its tensions with India) is also a manifestation of this phenomenon”.**[and] According to many analysts, the intensity of the conflict in Kashmir increases when friction grows between India and Pakistan**, both nuclear powers. Following the events of the 26th of November in Mumbai, the Kashmir Valley experienced relative calm. While the first trade path opened across the Line of Control, a hundred young people protesting the government were killed, barely receiving any attention in the news. In addition, several jihadi groups based in Pakistan – LeT, JeM and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HuJI) among them – supposedly started to regroup, in an attempt to revive the violence seen in the 1990s.

What happens next? We don’t know, of course. But even as the catalysts for each crisis may be different, the basic parameters of the Indian-Pakistani conflict remain mostly unchanged. The fight is over Kashmir, which, like the rest of India and Pakistan, split apart when its British colonizers departed, in 1947. Sovereignty over Kashmir was disputed; Pakistan occupies about a third of it, and India most of the rest. While Pakistan and India are split roughly along Muslim-Hindu lines, Indian Kashmir—known officially as Jammu and Kashmir—remains India’s only Muslim-majority state. Both India and Pakistan claim each other’s Kashmiri territories as their own. That has set the stage for every war and skirmish since 1947.  **A long-running insurgency in** Indian **Kashmir has been supported**—often **openly**—**by the Pakistani military.** **Insurgent attacks have killed thousands, and have sucked [in] the Indian Army**, which has employed repressive measures to combat them, into a quagmire. **The cycle is endless: insurgent bombs beget Indian [responses]** reprisals**, which beget Pakistani militancy, which sparks Indian retaliation.**

<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-war-between-india-and-pakistan-for-kashmir-burns-on>

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<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/bloody-mary/reaching-out-in-kashmir-what-narendra-modi-can-learn-from-manmohan-singh/>

On the face of it, there can’t be two more different personalities than former PM Manmohan Singh and PM Modi. The former is the self-effacing soft spoken technocrat, the latter a popular, swaggering, muscular nationalist. Yet in Kashmir, India’s most complex conflict zone, there are lessons that muscular nationalists can learn from the softer more nuanced approach. A careful examination of the Manmohan years shows how the softer touch is always more successful in Kashmir than a hard-fisted ideological offensive, focused on zero tolerance of stone pelters and well-publicized surgical strikes. It must be recalled here that just two months after the surgical strikes there was a terror strike on the army base at Nagrota. **In the last five years there’s been a 94% increase in number of security forces killed and a 177% increase in terrorist incidents.** **[because]** State violence inevitably normalizes and legitimizes extreme violence insociety. [and] **Overwhelming use of force by the government tends to erode the boundaries between law and crime,** thus **normalizing violence in society,** inevitably **[and] paving the way for** the next step in unrestrained violence, namely **terrorism.** Manmohan Singh’s approach to Kashmir was to soften India-Pakistan borders by opening cross-border trade and implementing the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service in 2005, a landmark move which has stood the test of time. By working closely with first Mufti Mohammed Sayeed and then Omar Abdullah, Singh ensured the political process in J&K didn’t flag. By sending a team of interlocutors headed by former editor Dileep Padgaonkar to Kashmir, Singh signaled New Delhi’s doors were open for all Kashmiris.

<https://outline.com/JnXdps>

Nonetheless, the debate over casualties obscures the larger implications of India’s action. Simply put, New Delhi’s military retaliation against Pakistan for an attack by a terrorist group it hosts sets a precedent. Pakistan’s old calculation, that nuclear weapons shield it from retaliation, no longer holds. **Another** major **attack against India**n targets **traced to Pakistan could evoke an even tougher response from its much larger neighbor**. The cost of hosting JeM, as well as the equally deadly Lashkar-e-Taiba, just rose dramatically.

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/27761/without-dialogue-between-india-and-pakistan-another-kashmir-crisis-is-inevitable>

**There is little political incentive for India to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan**, no matter which party wins the Indian election that is underway. **[because] Islamabad’s use of militant proxies in Kashmir and elsewhere in India has created a powerful perception among Indian officials that Pakistan is an untrustworthy negotiating partner.** Previous attempts by India’s political leadership to initiate dialogue have been hampered by attacks by militants operating from Pakistani territory. During the 2000s, a series of talks known as the “composite dialogue process” came close to resolving the Kashmir issue, but they were derailed by the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. In order to prove its seriousness as an interlocutor, Pakistan will have to halt its support of terrorist groups and militias. Once that is done, India will have to accept that Kashmir is a contested issue bilaterally that requires a negotiated solution. Once both sides are able to commence a serious dialogue unhindered by spoiler attacks, there will be a need to include local Kashmiri voices from across the spectrum, including both mainstream political parties and separatist factions. Only a long-term political solution forged through dialogue can prevent a serious conflict from flaring up again in Kashmir. Such a process is unlikely in the near term, however, **so in the meantime, India and Pakistan can only prevent crises from escalating** into full-scale waris **by restraining their responses to provocations.** In response to the February suicide bombing that set off the latest standoff, Indian air force jets targeted Jaish-e-Mohammed training camps deep inside Pakistani territory, prompting a swift response from Pakistan and demonstrating the fragility of the situation. The crisis was only defused when Pakistan agreed to return a captured Indian pilot, aided by backchannel diplomacy by Gulf states and the United States. Future flare-ups could escalate in a similarly dangerous way. Only a genuine break in this cycle of attack and counterattack can build a stage for a sustainable dialogue between all involved parties.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/sunday/kashmir-india-pakistan.html>

Political discontent has simmered in Kashmir since the partition of India in 1947. India and Pakistan, which each control parts of the region and claim the whole, have fought three wars over it. India eroded the autonomy of the part of Kashmir it controlled by imprisoning elected leaders and appointing puppet administrators. After a rigged local election in 1987, Kashmiris began a secessionist armed uprising with support from Pakistan. Indian military presence rose to half a million, and by the mid-1990s Islamist militants from Pakistan began to dominate the insurgency. Fighting ebbed by the 2000s, but not before it exacted a high price: Around **70,000 people** have been **[were] killed, several hundred thousand [were] displaced, [and ] 10,000** more are **[went] missing** since being arrested. Half a million Indian troops remain in the region. In the 2000s, Kashmiris turned to street protests — either peaceful or armed with nothing more than stones — against the military occupation. Indian troops responded with bullets, and more recently, with pellet guns, completely or partially blinding hundreds of protesters.

**Tellis of The Economic Times continues that while Pakistan may occasionally retrain proxies to encourage negotiations or demonstrate their credentials, such pauses will always be temporary because the overriding goal is perpetual resistance to India. Pakistan believes there is no better instrument of defiance than terrorism by proxy.**