

Copy paste every card in the pro blocks in this doc, ideally in order. New thing Chris thinks we should try so people have less trouble finding EV when asked.

Dollar heg high now

Evans Pritchard 2016 [Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the Telegraph, “AEP: Dollar hegemony endures as share of global transactions keeps rising”, *The Telegraph*, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/01/dollar-hegemony-endures-as-share-of-global-transactions-keeps-ri/>>] //CJC

The US dollar is tightening its grip on the global financial system at the expense of the euro, entrenching American hegemony and rendering the US Federal Reserve more powerful than at any time in history. Newly-released data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that **the dollar's share of the \$5.1 trillion in foreign exchange trades each day has continued rising to 87.6pc of all transactions. It is the latest evidence confirming the extraordinary resilience of the dollar-based international order, confounding expectations of US financial decline a decade ago.** Roughly 60pc of the global economy is either in the dollar zone or closely tied to it through currency pegs or ‘dirty floats’, and the level of debt issued in dollars outside US jurisdiction has soared to \$9 trillion. This has profound implications for monetary policy. The Fed has become the world’s central bank whether it likes it or not, setting borrowing costs for much of the global system. The BIS data shows that **the volume of transactions in which the euro was on one side of the trade has slipped to 31.3pc from 37pc in 2007. The dollar share has ratcheted up to 87.6pc over the same period.** It is much the same picture for the foreign exchange reserves of central banks, a good barometer of global trust. **The dollar share has recovered to 63.6pc, roughly where it was a decade ago.** The Fed has become the world’s central bank whether it likes it or not, setting borrowing costs for much of the global system. The euro share has tumbled over the last eight years from 28pc to 20.4pc, and is barely above Deutsche Mark share in the early 1990s. **“There are no foreseeable rivals to the dollar as a viable reserve currency,”** said Eswar Prasad from Cornell University, author of “The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global Finance”. “The US is hard to beat. The US has deep financial markets, a powerful central bank and legal framework the rest of the world has a great deal of trust in,” he said. **The eurozone is crippled by the lack of a unified EU treasury, joint bond issuance, and a genuine banking union to back up the currency.** It would require a change in the German constitution to open the way for fiscal union, an unthinkable prospect in the current political climate. **Neither the euro nor the yuan have succeeded in displacing the dollar.** **“There are existential questions about the euro.** The tensions pulling monetary union apart have not been resolved. It is not going to challenge the dollar even if it does get its economic act together, and that doesn’t look likely,” he said. Prof Prasad, former head of the International Monetary Fund’s China desk, said **the Chinese yuan is gaining global currency share steadily - at the cost of the euro – but it would be decades before it comes of age.** First China has to tame its \$27 trillion credit bubble and break out of the middle-income trap, weaning its economy from investment-led catch-up growth on steroids. He said the Communist system had become even more rigid under president Xi Jinping, raising the risk that social and political order “might unravel suddenly and dramatically,” in the event of an economic shock. **With hindsight it is clear that the US was never as weak as it looked** in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis in 2008, when China seemed to be walking tall and much of the emerging world was in a secular commodity boom. The pendulum has since swung back. Zero rates and quantitative easing by the Fed flooded emerging markets with dollar liquidity, leading to credit booms that have mostly ended painfully over the last few years. The shale revolution in the US and the revival of its energy intensive industries have eliminated much of America’s current account deficit. The US Treasury’s draconian policies forced a quick clean-up of the US banking industry, in stark contrast to years of debilitating drift in Europe. **The 20pc surge in the dollar index since mid-2014 has silenced any serious talk of a dollar crisis,** and revealed just how painful this can be for emerging markets. **“The world is more reliant on the dollar than ever before.** I don’t think people appreciate this enough,” said Stephen Jen from Eurizon SLJ Capital.

The US will always intervene in intrastate conflicts to pursue its interests

Bennett 2015 [Hailey Bennett is a BA in political science from James Madison University, “Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts”, *James Madison University*,

<<http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/7/>>] //CJC

Since the conclusion of World War II, the number of expansive interstate wars has decreased while devastating intrastate wars and conflicts have increased exponentially. The Cold War ushered in an era of international stability in the bipolar balance of power, but **proxy wars, wars of succession and independence**, genocide and civil war made the era anything but peaceful. These conflicts **proved to be breeding grounds for third party military interventions**, which increased simultaneously. In this thesis, I attempted to determine what factors encouraged third party states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in the post-World War II era. I conducted a mixed methods approach, incorporating statistical analyses and case studies to identify global and specific trends in intervention. The cross-national statistical analyses include logit and ordered probit analyses and support the role of threat to influence in the international system, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor as significant factors to decision-making. On the other hand, the case studies focus on three cases of U.S. intervention (or lack of) across time. They are Lebanon from 1982-1984, Algeria in 1992 and Libya in 2011. **The results of the case studies support factors such as threat to influence** media attention and previous successful interventions in the crisis state **as causes of U.S. military intervention. Ultimately, I establish that the United States will pursue interventions for the sake of its national interests abroad.**

Cutting spending causes more arms exports—empirically under Obama

Reuters 2016 [Reuters, “U.S. arms export boom under Obama seen continuing with Trump”, DefenceWeb, <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45880:us-arms-export-boom-under-obama-seen-continuing-with-trump&catid=113:international-news>] //CJC

U.S. arms exports, measured by production costs, **grew 54 percent in 2015 from 2008**, the year before President Barack Obama took office, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That represents the highest growth for any administration since the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies following World War Two. **The boom was fueled by consistent lobbying** by the Obama administration for arms deals, its policy of arming and training proxy groups in conflicts, **and by budget constraints at home that prompted arms makers to look abroad for sales**. In 2015, the U.S. accounted for 36 percent of world's arms exports, the Stockholm Institute's data shows, followed by Russia at 12 percent. That marked an increase in the U.S. share from 28 percent in 2008. **In fiscal 2015, U.S. arms sales to foreign governments exceeded \$47 billion, up 36 percent from around \$34 billion a year earlier**, according to the Department of Defense. Saudi Arabia, Australia, Iraq, Korea and Taiwan -- all considered U.S. allies -- were the top five recipients of U.S. weapons in the year ended September 2015.

Arms exports super high under Obama (despite mil spending cuts)

Hartung 2016 [William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, “The Obama Administration Has Brokered More Weapons Sales Than Any Other Administration Since World War II”, *The Nation*, <<https://www.thenation.com/article/the-obama-administration-has-sold-more-weapons-than-any-other-administration-since-world-war-ii/>>] //CJC

Though seldom thought of this way, **the US political system is also a global arms distribution system of the first order**. In this context, **the Obama administration has proven itself a good friend to arms exporting firms. During President Obama's first six years in office, Washington entered into agreements to sell more than \$190 billion in weaponry**

worldwide—more, that is, than any US administration since World War II.

Decreasing military spending doesn't reshape strategy and politics means it's worse in lots of ways

Meese 2014 [Michael Meese is Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, "Strategy and Force Planning in a Time of Austerity", *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, <<http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-287.pdf>>] //CJC

The defense budget system works most smoothly, of course, when budgets are growing, not shrinking.² In the 63 years of Department of Defense (DOD) budgets, the budget grew in 49 of those years.³ With one year's budget providing the base from which the next year's increase takes off, increasing budgets do not demand strategic reassessments. Budget debates concentrate on where best to allocate any incremental increases. **Decreasing budgets obviously are more challenging than increasing budgets. They require the articulation of a strategy, but that rarely happens, and even more rarely does strategy shape budgets.** Rather, **bureaucratic infighting tends to result in across-the-board, rather than tailored, budget cuts. With decremental spending, there is rarely an obvious reduction of strategic ends to guide the reduction in means.** As budget expert Allen Schick explains, "Decrementalism diverges from incrementalism in at least three significant ways. **Decremental budgeting is redistributive rather than distributive; it is less stable than incremental decisions; and it generates more conflict.**"⁴ As a practical matter, budgeting in austere times is different because of the budgetary context in which decisions are made. With an increasing budget, advocates of particular programs argue for increases to those programs from the overall increase to the budget. If successful, in the following year they can ask for still more funding; alternatively, programs that were not favored previously may receive additional funding in the following year's increment to compensate for smaller, earlier increases. **In contrast, with a decreasing budget, a reduction that is taken in one year may not insulate a particular Service or program from continued or increased reductions in the future. Quite the contrary, if a program survived with a 10 percent cut last year, the reduced level is the new starting point for next year's budget negotiation.** This places a premium on defense leaders understanding the long-term budgetary conditions as defining a reality in which, they hope, strategy can be made realistic. **Strategy involves far more than budgets.** But budgets consume attention. **Even if the budget system could be used to make relevant cuts, political, institutional, bureaucratic, and other factors can lead to continuing obsolete weapons, forces, bases, and concepts, even though they are likely not the most effective way to accomplish the ends of grand strategy with the means available.** As Carl Lieberman states, "**Decrementalism tends to apply cuts broadly, but often fails to establish clear-cut priorities for reducing expenditures.** Moreover, **in a period of decremental spending, powerful political forces are likely to seek exemptions from proposed reductions for their preferred agencies or programs.**"⁵ In the extreme, **austerity may cause political leaders to scramble to preserve constituent interests, military officers to fight to protect pet projects, and decisionmakers to placate the demands of competing groups, leaving no one to focus on the security needs of the Nation.** Consequently, **during a period of austerity, when it is most important to maximize the effectiveness of each defense dollar, billions can be diverted to goals that may not provide the most effective contribution to national security.** In austere times, this political reality has a bigger impact on the Nation's strategy than in periods of budgetary growth.

[...]

The return of sequestration-level cuts in FY2016 [the current law] **would significantly reduce the Department's ability to fully implement our strategy**. . . . [R]isks associated with conducting military operations would rise substantially. **Our military would be unbalanced and eventually too small** and insufficiently modern **to meet the needs of our strategy, leading to greater risk of longer wars with higher casualties**. . . . Ultimately, **continued sequestration-level cuts would likely embolden our adversaries and undermine the confidence of our allies**

Conflict goes nuclear – can't tell whether attacks are conventional or attempts to destroy other side's nukes

Talmadge 16 – Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University, February 2016 (“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.-China Conflict”, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf) //CJC

Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. **But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation**—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons—likely **would be higher than many observers realize**. Some **aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could**. This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, **in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption**, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. **Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch** based on faulty warning information, **and unauthorized launch** by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses. **Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent's perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation**. It can arise when one side's conventional military **campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side's ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal**. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other's command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side's conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, **command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets**; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines **share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter**; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location). For all of these reasons, **a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state's nuclear capabilities**. If the state fears the

latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.

US military spending includes DOD, VA, State Dept, DHS, FBI, DOJ, NNSA, DOE

Amadeo 2016 [Kimberly Amadeo received an M.S. in Management from the Sloan School of Business at M.I.T. in 1987, an M.S. in Social Planning from Boston College in 1978. "U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth", *The Balance*, <<https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>>] //CJC

The U.S. military budget is \$773.5 billion. That's the budget for Fiscal Year 2017 (October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017). There are four components. First is the **Department of Defense (DoD) base budget (\$523.9 billion)**. Second is **the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for DoD to fight ISIS (\$58.8 billion)**. But **there's more to military spending than the Department of Defense**. Many other agencies are involved with protecting our nation. **These expenses** total \$175.9 billion. They **include** the **Department of Veterans Affairs (\$75.1 billion), the State Department (\$37.8 billion), Homeland Security (\$40.6 billion), FBI and Cybersecurity in the Department of Justice (\$9.5 billion), and the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy (\$12.9 billion).** There is also \$14.9 billion in OCO funds for the State Department and Homeland Security to **fight ISIS.**

Reuters Editorial, 3-6-2016, "Russia will cut defense budget by 5 percent in 2016, RIA reports," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-defense-budget-idUSKCN0W80TL>

Russia's defense budget will be cut by 5 percent in 2016, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Tatiana Shevtsova said, according to the RIA news agency. Defense spending has been growing as part of a drive by President Vladimir Putin to restore Russia's military might. **The decision to cut shows, however, that even the armed forces are not immune to a slowing Russian economy, which has been hit by falling oil prices and Western sanctions.** The 5 percent cut, if approved by Putin, would be the biggest reduction in defense spending since he took office in 2000. In 2011, while prime minister, he announced plans to revitalize the Russian army and its aging equipment by spending 23 trillion rubles by 2020. Military interventions in Ukraine and Syria have made strengthening the military an even greater priority for the Kremlin. **The cut represents a victory for the finance ministry, which has said Russia can no longer afford the multi-billion-dollar revamp of the armed forces** and called for a 10 percent spending reduction across ministries. **The Russian economy shrank by 3.7 percent last year and is expected to decline by another 1 percent this year.**

Empirically, offshore balancing means world war

Thomas **Fingar, 2014**, Finger is an academic at Stanford University, an Asia expert, and a former high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department and intelligence community, similarly believes that China

has neither the incentive nor the intention of disrupting the current global system from which it has benefited so greatly. Instead, Fingar asserts that China will seek marginal adjustments to the existing rules and institutions to accommodate its growing stature and interests. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 28). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

There are alternatives to this approach, as examined above. Proponents of these alternatives are seeking other strategies that will reduce America's exposure to risk, cut its security costs, or fashion a diplomatic solution that will avert a clash of interests among the region's great powers. However, these alternatives to forward presence will not achieve these aims. Offshore balancing aims to reduce America's exposure to risky entanglements and to reduce the costly burden of forward presence. Proponents claim that this approach will give U.S. policymakers more freedom of action, including the option to reassert U.S. power in Eurasia to prevent the arrival of a hegemon that could threaten U.S. interests. However, this strategy only assures dangerous great-power instability in Eurasia that will very likely result in a costly U.S. return under highly unfavorable circumstances. The U.S. experience with offshore balancing during the first half of the twentieth century was very expensive, with two world wars and the three costly U.S. military campaigns required to restore stability. It is little wonder that no U.S. president since World War II has returned to offshore balancing. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 49). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

Power vacuum

Paul Salem, Fall, 2016, The Middle East Journal, Navigating a Turbulent Middle East: Priorities for Our Next President, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694> Paul Salem is vice president for policy and research at The Middle East Institute, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694>

The Obama Administration rushed to reverse the Bush Administration's overreach, bring troops home, and reprise the offshore balancer role of yore. However, that role presumes a tentative regional balance that can be managed and preserved from offshore; and it also presumes a state-based regional order in which power balancing, deterrence, and cost-benefit calculations are effective. By the time the wave of popular uprisings swept the Middle East in 2011, any tentative regional balance had been shattered by the dramatic de-containment and empowering of Iran after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was no regional stability or balance to maintain, and the US attempt to move offshore created a real and perceived regional power vacuum that made the destabilizing regional imbalance worse.

By 2013, the events of the so-called Arab Spring had brought down several states and created conditions for the rise or resurgence of major armed non-state actors from ISIS to Hezbollah, While offshore balancing presumes a balancing of states, groups like ISIS or alQa'ida, or even Hezbollah for that matter, do not play by the same rules.

2015. eBook Collection (EBSCOhost). Web. 15 Dec. 2016.

https://books.google.com/books?id=mFjxCQAAQBAJ&pg=PT162&lpg=PT162&dq=as+the+intensity+of+a+conflict+increases+by+1,000+military+casualties+there+is+an+increase+of+approximately+550+private+contractors&source=bl&ots=l-uCFB6fAs&sig=VQ02v0OfahGkNQ_iSS17kX5y-M8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjcguet3vvQAhVi1oMKHZSDQ8Q6AEIGzAA#v=onepage&q=as%20the%20intensity%20of%20a%20conflict%20increases%20by%201%2C000%20military%20casualties%20there%20is%20an%20increase%20of%20approximately%20550%20private%20contractors&f=false

The coefficient of 71 executive decision trend is .344, which suggests that the rate of change after the decision increased by .34 percent every year, holding other variables constant (see figure 3). DoD kia is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The coefficient for this intensity variable is .551, which suggests that **as the intensity of a conflict increases by 1,000 military casualties there is an increase of approximately 550 private contractors, holding other variables constant.**

The variable representing intensity Mass Unrest is also statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The coefficient for the intensity variable is 1.75, which suggests that as the intensity of the conflict increases for every 1,000 civilian casualties there is an increase of approximately 1,750 private contractors, holding other variables constant. The second model represents the second test of the hypotheses under investigation. Model 2 includes the dependent variable, contractors; the independent variables DoD Budget, DoD Personnel, DoD Overseas, the duration of the conflict using four independent variables covering four geographic regions Middle East, East Europe, Asia, and Africa; an interrupted time-series test of the independent variable 92 executive decision; and a test of the intensity of the conflict using two independent variables, DoD kia and Mass Unrest.

Loven, Seth H., "Private Soldiers in Africa: A Look at the Effects of Private Military Contractors and Mercenaries on the Duration of Civil Wars in Africa from 1960 to 2003." (2013). Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. Paper 22. <http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/22>

This paper examines the effect of private soldiers, both Mercenaries and Private Military Contractors (PMC), on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1960 to 2003. **Linear regression is used to determine if private soldiers increase or decrease the duration of civil wars. Ultimately it is found they have little to no statistical impact.** This is contrary to the expectations of the theoretical literature on private military contractors, some of which expects private soldiers to profit from war and seek to lengthen duration, and some of which expects the use of additional private soldiers to shorten the duration of wars. Some discussion is given to examining why no strong statistical results were found, and some directions for future research are proposed.

Gault, Matthew. "Donald Trump is Right About Defense Spending." Reuters. March 2 2016.

<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/03/02/trump-is-right-about-defense-spending-and-that-should-scare-you/>

Sanders has a history of protecting military contractors — if they bring jobs to his state. When he was mayor of Burlington in the 1980s, he pushed its police force to arrest nonviolent protesters at a local General Electric plant. The factory produced Gatling guns and also was one of the largest employers in the area.

Yet, Sanders ideological beliefs can sometimes color his views. He was chairman of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee in 2014 as scandal swept the Department of Veterans Affairs. Even as many VA supporters called for reforms, Sanders defended the hospital system because he felt conservatives were attacking a major government social-welfare agency. He still defends his stewardship of the committee. "When I was chairman, what we did is pass a \$15-billion piece of legislation," Sanders said during a recent debate with Clinton. "We went further than any time in recent history in improving the healthcare of the men and women in this country who put their lives on the line to defend us." In the age of terrorism and Islamic State bombers, the prevailing political wisdom holds that appearing soft on defense can lose a candidate the general election. For many of the 2016 presidential candidates, looking strong means spending a ton of cash. Even if you're from the party that holds fiscal responsibility as its cornerstone. **But Trump doesn't care about any of that. In speech after speech, he has called out politicians and defense contractors, or Private Military Contractors, for colluding to build costly weapons systems at the price of national security.**

Richard Palmer, The Trumpet, December 2015, "A New Global Arms Race",
<https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/13221.24.179.0/world/wmd/a-new-global-arms-race>

This is the reality of national defense in 2015: an arms race in Eastern Europe, an arms

race in the Middle East, and an arms race in Asia. why? And why now? Why is Saudi Arabia buying up arms out of fear of Iran at exactly the same time that Poland is buying up arms out of fear of Russia? At first glance, these arms races are unconnected. **The answer** to this question emerges as we consider the major power we have not looked at so far: **the United States.** Here is the telling exception to the increased spending trend. **In 2014, America cut its spending by 6.5 percent (\$40 billion). From 2010 to 2014, America's defense spending fell 20 percent. By the end of this year, it is expected to drop even further. The statistics clearly show the world is entering a new era. "The projected shift in global spending figures highlights the departure from the age where one country—the United States—spent almost as much as the rest of the world combined and enjoyed a historically unique level of conventional military dominance,"** explained IHS Jane's. "Now, however, the international system is shifting to equilibrium, under which one single state does not so massively tip the scales in its own favor" (June 25, 2014). "By 2019, for the first time in history, NATO will not account for the majority of worldwide defense expenditure, having accounted for almost two thirds of global spending as recently as 2010," it also wrote (Dec. 18, 2014). **This dramatic shift away from America's super-dominant military spending points to the common reason behind the jump in arms spending everywhere else. America is retreating. Its allies don't trust it. More aggressive nations around the world are becoming emboldened.**

Martin Feldstein, 12/24/2008, "Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus", Wall Street Journal, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123008280526532053> // JN
For the military, the increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays for procurement and for research would contribute about \$20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. **A 5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional \$10 billion.** That spending could **create about 300,000 additional jobs.** And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15% would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year.

Diem Nguyen Salmon, 15, A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget>

Some argue that the spending reductions were not a problem because of the sheer size of the budget and excessive waste in the department. **This is a misperception of the DOD budget. While waste does affect the DOD budget, it comprises a small portion of the overall budget, not nearly equivalent to the amount that was cut.** To illustrate this, in the "Department of Everything" former Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) itemizes an expansive list of wasteful programs in the DOD amounting to \$67.9 billion over 10 years.[17] **If Congress could eliminate every single one of the listed programs, the annual savings would amount to a little more than 1 percent of the budget**

Salmon 15, Diem Nguyen. "A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 13 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget>> // JH

Real Savings Through Reforming Entitlements. The national debt did not reach \$18 trillion overnight. **The main drivers of spending and the debt over the past 40 years have been federal health care, retirement, and welfare programs. In fact, reductions in defense spending during this period have offset some of the increase in mandatory spending.** Intentionally or not, Congress has effectively prioritized entitlement spending over honoring its core constitutional priority of providing for the common defense.

"ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES of WAR on the U.S. ECONOMY." *Economics and Peace*. THE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE, n.d. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Consequences-of-War-on-US-Economy_0.pdf.//JH

Military spending, like other forms of government spending, can be an important source of economic demand during times of low confidence and downturn. It can lead to the development of new technologies, generate new industries and create sources of demand and employment. If military spending is funded by progressive taxation, as it was during World War II, it can indirectly result in more efficient income distribution. The flattening of income distribution after 1945 helped facilitate the creation of a large consumer oriented middle class which was the foundation stone for the long post-war boom that underpinned the U.S.'s subsequent political economic pre-eminence.

Schultz , Jenna. "MILITARY'S IMPACT ON STATE ECONOMIES." NCSL. National Conference of State Legislatures, 19 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. <<http://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/military-s-impact-on-state-economies.aspx>>.//JH

The DoD contributes billions of dollars each year to state economies through the operation of military installations. This spending helps sustain local communities by creating employment opportunities across a wide range of sectors, both directly and indirectly. Impacts generally include salaries and benefits paid to military personnel and retirees, defense contracts, local business activity supported by military operations, tax revenues and other military spending. In 2015, for example, military installations in North Carolina supported 578,000 jobs, \$34 billion in personal income and \$66 billion in gross state product. This amounts to roughly 10 percent of the state's overall economy. In Kentucky the military spent about \$12 billion from 2014 to 2015, which was a reduction of \$3.5 billion since the last report in 2012. With around 38,700 active duty and civilian employees, the military is the largest employer in Kentucky by more than 21,000 jobs. They also support the highest payroll with a total of \$3.85 billion, \$80 million higher than the second largest industry in Kentucky. Even states with relatively small military footprints have reported significant economic impacts. A study in Massachusetts, for example, found that by investing \$9.1 billion in FY 2011, military installations contributed another \$4.6 billion in spending and added more than 30,600 jobs to the state economy.

Carafano, 2010 [James Carafano, “Top 10 Reasons to NOT Put Defense Spending ‘On the Table’”, *The Daily Signal*,
<http://dailysignal.com/2010/12/01/top-10-reasons-to-not-put-defense-spending-on-the-table/>] //AKC

#6. Defense cuts would mean a whole lot less defense. What primarily make defense spending inefficient are overly prescriptive laws, particular demands, and whipsaw policies established by Congress. When the budget is cut, the inefficiencies Congress created in the past don't automatically make go away. In fact, since they are still there, trying to do more with less becomes even more difficult and far less efficient. The American taxpayers would be paying for all the inefficiencies without getting much capability in return.

Eaglen, 2011 [Mackenzie Eaglen, “How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department”, *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/how-to-save-money-reform-processes-and-increase-efficiency-in-the-defense-department>] //AKC

The 112th Congress should use the best recommendations from various proposals and continue to pursue savings from within the defense budget in order to reinvest funds into modernizing all of the services. Five select packages of reforms promise to generate significant fiscal savings and government efficiencies while minimizing the increases in risk to national security:

1. Continuing and expanding select efficiencies initiatives undertaken by Secretary Gates,
2. Implementing and expanding select reforms recommended by the Fiscal Commission co-chairmen,
3. Expanding the use of public–private partnerships for performance-based logistics,
4. Modernizing base operations and the maintenance and supply systems, and
5. Reducing wear and tear on military equipment and increasing the use of multiyear contracts and block upgrades.

Making defense operations more efficient will not automatically produce savings, allowing further reductions in defense budgets. Whereas managers generally have incentives to improve efficiency in the private sector, there are typically fewer incentives for efficiency and good management in government.

For example, between FY 2002 and FY 2005, man-days of ship depot maintenance and days out of service per ship declined dramatically. The improvement in efficiency should have allowed the Navy to reduce maintenance manpower, save more than 12 percent of its maintenance budget, and redirect these savings toward procurement or some other urgent priority. However, analysts note that changes in efficiency norms do not appear to have entered the budgeting process. **Instead of decreasing to reflect greater efficiency, the maintenance budget increased each year during that period.**

Krugman, 2015 [Paul Krugman, “The case for cuts was a lie. Why does Britain still believe it? The austerity delusion”, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion>] //AKC

In May 2010, as Britain headed into its last general election, elites all across the western world were gripped by austerity fever, a strange malady that combined extravagant fear with blithe optimism.

Every country running significant budget deficits – as nearly all were in the aftermath of the financial crisis – was deemed at imminent risk of becoming another Greece unless it immediately began cutting spending and raising taxes. Concerns that imposing such austerity in already depressed economies would deepen their depression and delay recovery were airily dismissed; fiscal probity, we were assured, would inspire business-boosting confidence, and all would be well.

People holding these beliefs came to be widely known in economic circles as “austereans” – a term coined by the economist Rob Parenteau – and for a while the austerean ideology swept all before it.

But that was five years ago, and the fever has long since broken. Greece is now seen as it should have been seen from the beginning – as a unique case, with few lessons for the rest of us. It is impossible for countries such as the US and the UK, which borrow in their own currencies, to experience Greek-style crises, because they cannot run out of money – they can always print more. Even within the eurozone, borrowing costs plunged once the European Central Bank began to do its job and protect its clients against self-fulfilling panics by standing ready to buy government bonds if necessary. As I write this, Italy and Spain have no trouble raising cash – they can borrow at the lowest rates in their history, indeed considerably below those in Britain – and even Portugal’s interest rates are within a whisker of those paid by HM Treasury.

...

I don’t know how many Britons realise the extent to which their economic debate has diverged from the rest of the western world – **the extent to which the UK seems stuck on obsessions that have been mainly laughed out of the discourse elsewhere.** George Osborne and David Cameron boast that their policies saved Britain from a Greek-style crisis of soaring interest rates, apparently oblivious to the fact that interest rates are at

historic lows all across the western world. The press seizes on Ed Miliband's failure to mention the budget deficit in a speech as a huge gaffe, a supposed revelation of irresponsibility; meanwhile, Hillary Clinton is talking, seriously, not about budget deficits but about the "fun deficit" facing America's children.

...

The doctrine of "expansionary austerity" is largely associated with work by Alberto

Alesina, an economist at Harvard. Alesina used statistical techniques that supposedly identified all large fiscal policy changes in advanced countries between 1970 and 2007, and claimed to find evidence that spending cuts, in particular, were often "associated with economic expansions rather than recessions". The reason, he and those who seized on his work suggested, was that spending cuts create confidence, and that the positive effects of this increase in confidence trump the direct negative effects of reduced spending.

This may sound too good to be true – and it was. But policymakers knew what they wanted to hear, so it was, as Business Week put it, "Alesina's hour". The doctrine of expansionary austerity quickly became orthodoxy in much of Europe.

"The idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect," declared Jean-Claude Trichet, then the president of the European Central Bank, because "confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery".

Besides, everybody knew that terrible things would happen if debt went above 90% of GDP.

Growth in a Time of Debt, the now-infamous 2010 paper by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University that claimed that 90% debt is a critical threshold,

arguably played much less of a direct role in the turn to austerity than Alesina's work. After all, austerians didn't need Reinhart and Rogoff to provide dire scenarios about what could happen if deficits weren't reined in – they had the Greek crisis for that. At most, the Reinhart and Rogoff paper provided a backup bogeyman, an answer to those who kept pointing out that nothing like the Greek story seemed to be happening to countries that borrowed in their own currencies: even if interest rates were low, austerians could point to Reinhart and Rogoff and declare that high debt is very, very bad.

What Reinhart and Rogoff did bring to the austerity camp was academic cachet. Their 2009 book *This Time is Different*, which brought a vast array of historical data to bear on the subject of economic crises, was widely celebrated by both policymakers and economists – myself included – for its prescient warnings that we were at risk of a major crisis and that recovery from that crisis was likely to be slow. So they brought a lot of prestige to the austerity push when they were perceived as weighing in on that side of the policy debate. (They now claim that they did no such thing, but they did nothing to correct that impression at the time.)

When the coalition government came to power, then, all the pieces were in place for policymakers who were already inclined to push for austerity. Fiscal retrenchment could be presented as urgently needed to avert a Greek-style strike by bond buyers. "Greece stands as a warning of what happens to countries that lose their credibility, or whose governments pretend that difficult decisions can somehow be avoided," declared David Cameron soon after taking office. It could also be presented as urgently needed to stop debt, already almost 80% of GDP,

from crossing the 90% red line. In a 2010 speech laying out his plan to eliminate the deficit, Osborne cited Reinhart and Rogoff by name, while declaring that “soaring government debt … is very likely to trigger the next crisis.” Concerns about delaying recovery could be waved away with an appeal to positive effects on confidence. **Economists who objected to any or all of these lines of argument were simply ignored.**

But that was, as **I said, five years ago.**

Again, some economists argued from the beginning that all the talk of expansionary austerity was foolish – back in 2010 I dubbed it belief in the “confidence fairy”, a term that seems to have stuck. **But why did the alleged statistical evidence – from Alesina, among others – that spending cuts were often good for growth prove so misleading?**

The answer, it turned out, was that it wasn’t very good statistical work. A review by the IMF found that the methods Alesina used in an attempt to identify examples of sharp austerity produced many misidentifications. For example, in 2000 Finland’s budget deficit dropped sharply thanks to a stock market boom, which caused a surge in government revenue – but Alesina mistakenly identified this as a major austerity programme. **When the IMF laboriously put together a new database of austerity measures derived from actual changes in spending and tax rates, it found that austerity has a consistently negative effect on growth.**

Yet even the IMF’s analysis fell short – as the institution itself eventually acknowledged. I’ve already explained why: most historical episodes of austerity took place under conditions very different from those confronting western economies in 2010. For example, when Canada began a major fiscal retrenchment in the mid-1990s, interest rates were high, so the Bank of Canada could offset fiscal austerity with sharp rate cuts – not a useful model of the likely results of austerity in economies where interest rates were already very low. In 2010 and 2011, IMF projections of the effects of austerity programmes assumed that those effects would be similar to the historical average. But a 2013 paper co-authored by the organisation’s chief economist concluded that under post-crisis conditions the true effect had turned out to be nearly three times as large as expected.

So much, then, for invisible bond vigilantes and faith in the confidence fairy. What about the backup bogeyman, the Reinhart-Rogoff claim that there was a red line for debt at 90% of GDP? **Well, in early 2013 researchers at the University of Massachusetts examined the data behind the Reinhart-Rogoff work. They found that the results were partly driven by a spreadsheet error.** More important, the results weren’t at all robust: using standard statistical procedures rather than the rather odd approach Reinhart and Rogoff used, or adding a few more years of data, caused the 90% cliff to vanish. What was left was a modest negative correlation between debt and growth, and there was good reason to believe that in general slow growth causes high debt, not the other way around.

By about two years ago, then, the entire edifice of austrian economics had crumbled. Events had utterly failed to play out as the austrians predicted, while the academic research that

allegedly supported the doctrine had withered under scrutiny. Hardly anyone has admitted being wrong – hardly anyone ever does, on any subject – but quite a few prominent austrians now deny having said what they did, in fact, say. The doctrine that ruled the world in 2010 has more or less vanished from the scene.

Amadeo, 2016 [Kimberly is President of WorldMoneyWatch.com. She has 20 years senior-level experience in economic analysis and business strategy working for major international , "U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth", October 26, 2016 <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>] PP

DoD Tries to Save Money, But Congress Won't Let It

The **Defense Department knows it needs to become more efficient. It now spends a third of its budget on personnel and maintenance. That will rise to 100% by 2024, thanks to retirement and medical costs.** That leaves no funds for procurement, research and development, construction, or housing. These necessary support programs now take up more than a third of DoD's budget. (Source: "[Pay Will Swallow DoD Budget by 2024](#)," Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments, April 8, 2013.)

Congress is also reluctant to allow DoD to cut other costs, like military health benefits and the growth of military pay. It recently gave service-members a 1% pay increase, but cut the cost-of-living-adjustment by 1% for veterans who retire before age 62. However, disabled veterans and surviving families had the cut re-instated. (Source: "[House Quickly OKs Bipartisan Budget Deal](#)," Stars and Stripes, December 12, 2013. "[Disabled Veterans Get Back Pension Raises](#)," CNN, January 14, 2014.)

Sequestration would have cut defense spending by \$487 billion in ten years if it had continued. However, many Congressmen said the cuts would jeopardize national security. They were particularly concerned about a cutback of about 100,000 troops, closure of domestic military bases, and termination of some weapons systems -- all of which would have cost jobs and revenue in their districts. **That's why defense spending is the only budget area that rarely gets focused on as an area to cut.** (Source: "[Lawmakers Skeptical of Cuts in 2013 Defense Budget](#)," Reuters, February 15, 2012.)

Analysis: congress will never let the military remove inefficient spending because while it doesn't help the military it helps politicians to create jobs n such à either they'll never get efficient or if they do they'll only be able to justify maintaining current capabilities, not increasing them.

Thompson, 2011 [Loren Thompson, "Defense Cuts Could Destroy A Million Jobs", *Forbes*,

What's wrong with the picture is that Washington is wasting a lot of time and energy trying to implement contradictory measures that will cancel each other out in terms of their impact on the economy. The Budget Control Act signed by the president in August could result in cuts to defense totaling \$100 billion annually for nine straight years beginning in fiscal 2013, and similarly sizable cuts to domestic programs. In a moment, I'll illustrate how the defense cuts by themselves could wipe out a million jobs, many of them high-paying tech positions in areas related to exports and innovation.

An especially troubling aspect of the present situation is that the cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act to reduce deficits could grow bigger if the president's jobs bill passes, because the special committee would need to find additional savings to cover the price-tag for its package of tax changes and targeted spending. So in the current environment where legislators are trying to cut deficits and stimulate the economy at the same time, the government could end up destroying many thousands of good jobs to create lots of not-so-good jobs in areas like construction. What kind of a tradeoff is that?

So let's do the math. The number of jobs created by defense spending varies depending on the nature of the activity and how much each job pays, but it's a safe bet that at least one direct job is created for every \$200,000 in spending. Thus, the \$100 billion in annual military spending cuts that might be spawned by deficit-control legislation potentially accounts for 500,000 direct jobs. But that's just the beginning, because numerous additional jobs are created in retail, construction, education and other pursuits as defense workers spend their income. Analysts argue endlessly about what this economic multiplier effect might be, however a very conservative guess would be that each direct job leads to the creation of at least one indirect job (the real number is probably over twice that). So

even a restrained analysis suggests that \$100 billion in defense cuts will wipe out a million jobs.

Veterans is included in defense budget

Zadeh 2010 [Ismael Hossein-Zadeh is an economics professor, "Social vs. Military Spending-A Rejoinder", *Ismael Hossein-Zadeh*, <<https://ismaelhossein-zadeh.com/social-vs-military-spending-a-rejoinder/>>] //CJC

The real national **defense budget**, according to Robert Higgs of the Independent Institute, is nearly twice as much as the official budget. The reason for this understatement is that the official Department of Defense budget excludes not only the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also a number of other major cost items. These **disguised cost items** include budgets for the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security; nuclear weapons research and development, testing, and storage (placed in the Energy budget); **veterans programs (in the Veteran's Administration budget); most military retiree payments (in the Treasury budget)**; foreign military aid in the form of weapons grants for allies (in the State Department budget); interest payments on money borrowed to fund military programs in past years (in the Treasury budget); and a number of other similarly misplaced expense items that tend to undercount the DoD budget.

Squo solves bad arms trades — laws require cutoff if HR

Lumpe 2014 [Lora Lumpe at the Open Society Foundations, "What the Leahy Law Means for Human Rights", *Open Society Foundations*, <<https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/what-leahy-law-means-human-rights>>] //CJC

The "**Leahy Law**" is a U.S. human rights law named for its primary sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). First approved by Congress in 1997, it **prohibits the United States from providing equipment and training to a foreign military unit or individual suspected of committing “gross human rights violations.**" Such violations include extrajudicial killing, rape, torture, and forced disappearances. **The State Department must vet any foreign military unit to ensure it has a clean human rights record before it can receive U.S. assistance.** The vetting process covers official history of abuse and independent reporting by legitimate NGOs. **If a unit, or individual member of a unit, is suspected of committing gross violations, assistance cannot be provided until the recipient government addresses the abuses.** This could take a variety of forms, including a legitimate investigation of the violations, disciplinary action, or prosecution. The Open Society Foundations are encouraging the Obama administration to dedicate adequate resources to speed the vetting process and improve the law's effectiveness. Why does this law matter? If a foreign security force unit were to receive U.S. support and then commit atrocities like mass rape or become involved in the disappearance of political activists, the U.S. government would be seen as complicit in the crime, undermining our moral authority and our values, and even endangering locally based U.S. troops and citizens. Stopping aid from going to a "dirty" unit is only part of the law's function. **It also encourages countries to monitor and professionalize their armed forces.** Awareness that human rights violations will disqualify a unit or individual for assistance is key to the law's effectiveness. If assistance is suspended, can it ever be resumed?

Assistance can be restored if a government "is taking effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice," according to the law, Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Meanwhile, the United States can continue to provide assistance to other security force units in that country that have not been implicated in gross human rights violations. Where has the Leahy Law been applied? WikiLeaks cables show that the U.S. State Department has implemented the law all over the world. We know that the United States has suspended units in Colombia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, among others. But for diplomatic and other reasons, the State Department generally does not publicize its decisions to suspend aid to a particular foreign unit.

LINK: the rate of police militarization depends on how much spare equipment the military has

Matt Apuzzo, 6-8-2014 ["War Gear Flows to Police Departments," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/us/war-gear-flows-to-police-departments.html?_r=0] MJS 12-8-2016

During the Obama administration, according to Pentagon data, police departments have received tens of thousands of machine guns; nearly 200,000 ammunition magazines; thousands of pieces of camouflage and night-vision equipment; and hundreds of silencers, armored cars and aircraft.

The Pentagon program does not push equipment onto local departments. The pace of transfers depends on how much unneeded equipment the military has, and how much the police request. Equipment that goes unclaimed typically is destroyed. So police chiefs say their choice is often easy: Ask for free equipment that would otherwise be scrapped, or look for money in their budgets to prepare for an unlikely scenario. Most people understand, police officers say.

Pentagon data suggest how the police are arming themselves for such worst-case scenarios. Since 2006, the police in six states have received magazines that carry 100 rounds of M-16 ammunition, allowing officers to fire continuously for three times longer than normal. Twenty-two states obtained equipment to detect buried land mines.

China Mil spending growth is decreasing cuz econ slowdown but still up

Global Security 2016 [Global Security, "China's Defense Budget", *Global Security*, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>>] //CJC

China announced 05 February 2016 that it will raise its defense spending by 7.6% this year, its lowest increase in six years. Citing a budget report, China's state-run Xinhua news agency says a sizable amount of the 146.7 billion US dollar budget will be used to protect China's maritime rights in the South China Sea. The defense budget hike was the first single-digit rise

since 2010. It followed a nearly unbroken two-decade run of double-digit jumps, and came as the Chinese economy slows. On March 4, 2015, China announced that it would raise its defense budget by approximately 10%. While down from the previous year's 12.2% increase, the announcement nonetheless marked the fifth consecutive year with a double digit increase in official military spending. This would roughly translate to 890 billion yuan , or about \$US145 billion.

Military Readiness First to Go — Examples of Readiness

Dunn 2013 [Richard, "The Impact of a Declining Defense Budget on Combat Readiness," *Heritage Foundation*. Accessed at:<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/the-impact-of-a-declining-defense-budget-on-combat-readiness.>] //GST

Combat readiness is defined as "[t]he ability of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy." [1] This is the most important factor to our war fighters, but as basic as it is to them, it remains a complicated subject for others to understand. Due to its multidimensional and somewhat diffuse nature, it also has few natural supporters. For a state that builds ships, it is easy to support a policy that increases the number of ships in the Navy, but it is difficult to construct a constituency to support the complex issue of military readiness. Therefore, readiness may suffer significant harm in the increasingly fierce competition for resources. To fight effectively, the armed forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate under dangerous, complex, uncertain, and austere conditions—often with little warning. They require the right personnel operating the right equipment with the right training to win. Readiness is like a three-legged stool. The personnel, equipment, and training “legs” need to be balanced and in sync to support the load. The most modern equipment is useless without highly trained personnel to operate and employ it. Conversely, outmoded or unreliable equipment can hamper the effectiveness of the most highly motivated and skilled personnel. To fight effectively, personnel must train with their combat equipment, practicing their combat missions under realistic, demanding conditions. Quality personnel, equipment, and training are the essential dimensions of combat readiness. Failure to maintain an appropriate balance among these dimensions during the current period of budgetary uncertainty will significantly degrade America’s ability to respond to threats to its interests. This can lead to major strategic setbacks and significant loss of life. The challenging balancing act requires wise and effective leadership across all defense-related institutions. History repeatedly shows that unanticipated events often catch us by surprise and that as a nation, we have paid a high price in blood and treasure to compensate for our lack of preparedness. Lower levels of defense resourcing have not been the sole cause of unpreparedness. In many cases, there is an inability to answer the fundamental question of "what are we preparing to do?" Absent an effective answer that guides the allocation of resources, we can end up with forces that are inadequately manned, equipped, or trained to meet a comprehensive range of threats, some of them unanticipated. Answering the "what, when, and where" question is particularly challenging and complicated in the current era of strategic uncertainty. The world is still a violent and dangerous place, and major existential threats remain vague and unfocused. In the Pacific, U.S. relationships with emerging powers and the future threats they may pose remain unclear. In the Middle East, the political instability that accompanied the Arab Spring may vastly alter the geopolitical landscape established in the 1920s, creating opportunities for a wide spectrum of Islamist parties to advance their undemocratic agendas. Terrorism by non-state actors like al-Qaeda continues to metastasize. At the same time, warfare is expanding into the economically vital cyberspace domain, and revolutionary developments in unmanned systems may be changing the very nature of conflict. Rapid reductions in the defense budget are leading to the restructuring or elimination of many programs. This will damage the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats to vital U.S. national interests. Maintaining a military posture capable of achieving these aims requires both sufficient forces of various types and the readiness of those forces for combat. History's Painful Lessons All of these developments have the potential to harm U.S. interests significantly. Although we know that the future may hold significant dangers, they remain ill defined, creating a challenging analytical problem for national security policymakers. History can provide useful insights into how to approach strategic uncertainty. We know we cannot "get it entirely right." Therefore, we should strive not to get it so far wrong that we suffer unacceptable consequences when hit by unexpected threats. Under conditions of uncertainty, a hedging strategy that provides a range of options makes the most sense. Historically, maintaining effective balance among the different dimensions of readiness and having some ready capability to deal with a wide range of potential threats have been an effective way to hedge strategic bets. In times of defense budgetary retrenchment, combat readiness of the armed forces often becomes one of the first casualties of fiscal tightening. This was particularly true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression and isolationism made military preparedness a very low national priority. Despite the threatening war clouds rapidly expanding in Asia and Europe, the U.S. was woefully unprepared for global conflict. The shock of Pearl Harbor mobilized both the industrial capability and the moral determination to overcome the early, disastrous reversals in the Pacific and tactical defeats in North Africa. Once focused on military production, the U.S. economy rapidly produced overwhelming quantities of

ships, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and other matériel needed for America to become the "Arsenal of Democracy." However, U.S. forces quickly learned that training for combat, particularly in developing military leaders, was just as complex and demanding. It took several years of internalizing battlefield lessons learned at high cost to train the leaders at all levels that brought the war to a victorious conclusion. After the war, "no more Pearl Harbors"^[2] became the rallying cry of the supporters of a strong national defense.

Regrettably, the record of U.S. military preparedness following World War II has been rather checkered. Since then, **the U.S. has had less than a year (often much less) to prepare for any of its major conflicts.**

[...]

While history never exactly repeats itself, we can draw several useful insights from the historical record. First, our ability to predict rapidly emerging threats is imperfect at best. Even in cases in which employment of force was optional, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we have had well less than a year to prepare. Thus, **dependence on having sufficient time to bring forces back up to the desired level of readiness before employing them can be a recipe for disaster.** As a corollary to this point, **readiness can degrade very quickly, so maintaining it requires continuous attention.**

Readiness is also somewhat specific to each scenario. Forces prepared for one type of conflict may not be as capable in another. Additionally, leaders trained to operate in one type of conflict may not have the mental agility to perform well in another. The Complexity of Military Operations Understanding the personnel, equipment, and training dimensions of combat readiness requires some understanding of the operations that military organizations perform. Combat operations of almost any scale are exceptionally complex, requiring integration and synchronization of myriad activities ranging from individual actions to coordinated movements by large, geographically dispersed organizations. They are usually executed under dangerous, uncertain, austere, and urgent conditions that compound the challenge. At the basic level of combat operations, individuals and crews must operate their equipment, ranging from individual weapons to combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships. This involves operating all of the systems for communications, situational awareness, etc. Then they must employ their equipment as part of larger unit teams, executing their part in tactical operations. Each smaller unit is part of an even larger team that incorporates many different functions ranging from fire support to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to logistical and medical support. As required, these can be combined into joint task forces that include all of these functions in land, sea, air, space, and even cyberspace dimensions. All of these organizations, from the smallest units to joint task forces, must be tied together by command, control, and communications networks that provide them with awareness of the friendly and enemy situations and orchestrate their individual activities to achieve the commander's intended objectives. At the same time, they all require support, including transportation, refueling, rearming with ammunition, maintenance, and medical evacuation and care. Joint forces are composed of interdependent "teams" at many different levels that are only as strong as their weakest members. For example, the Army may have great airborne paratrooper units, but they are ineffective unless Air Force transport aircraft can deliver them to the right drop zone. These transports, in turn, may require tanker aircraft to refuel them in flight to reach the drop zone. Therefore, the readiness of a joint force to conduct major combat operations is determined by the readiness of its individual components, in turn a function of their

manning, equipping, training, and leadership and the balance among these dimensions. **Because of their complexity, combat**

operations are often vulnerable to single points of failure. The loss to enemy action or equipment failure of a key communications node, radar, or other "low density" but essential capability at a critical point can put an entire operation at risk.^[8] The Dimensions of Readiness The readiness of military organizations to execute these complex operations is a function of the personnel, equipment, and training dimensions of combat readiness and an appropriate balance among them. Regardless of service, combat organizations are designed to accomplish a specific range of tasks. For this purpose, they are allocated specific numbers of personnel of appropriate ranks, skills, and skill levels to man and maintain the various types and numbers of equipment that they are authorized to have to accomplish those tasks. They also receive annual budgets to provide the resources (e.g., fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts) to train with their equipment. Personnel. High-quality, well-trained, and motivated personnel in the necessary numbers and ranks are essential to combat readiness. In the U.S. all-volunteer force, the first task is to recruit sufficient numbers of citizens with the required motivation and physical and mental capabilities to perform complex tasks under austere and often dangerous conditions. Here, the services compete with other opportunities afforded by the civilian economy. The challenge, then, is to provide appropriate incentives to make military careers attractive. While patriotism should never be underestimated as a motive for service, **the armed forces have found it necessary to provide salaries, educational opportunities, quality of life, retirement benefits, and health care to attract and retain the required numbers of quality recruits.**

The recent economic recession has reduced civilian opportunities, and the reductions in force size have reduced the number of recruits required to sustain personnel numbers and quality. However, if the economy recovers and generates more civilian opportunities, recruiting and retaining quality personnel may become increasingly more difficult. Once recruited, service personnel must be taught the individual skills unique to their military missions. Teaching all of these required skill sets is a task of immense scale and scope, ranging from teaching rifle proficiency to Army privates to training naval aviators to operate high-performance aircraft from aircraft carrier flight decks. This requires relatively large training organizations staffed with the highest quality instructors, facilities, and equipment. Moreover, personnel require individual training throughout their careers. Initially, junior officers must be taught basic tactics and leadership skills. As they become more senior and assume higher-level responsibilities, they must learn advanced skills ranging from organizational management techniques to national-level strategy. Enlisted personnel must also progress to become effective and mature leaders and managers at higher and higher levels. As military

operations and their enabling technologies become increasingly sophisticated and complex, **the training required to master them demands even more time and resources. Thus, it is more effective and efficient to retain trained personnel by motivating them to remain in the service than it is to recruit and train replacements.** Recruiting and training activities are both resource and time intensive, and limited assets are available to perform them. This **reinforces the requirement to make continued military careers attractive by providing adequate salaries and benefits, especially for more mature personnel with families.**

Leadership is the catalyst for the personnel dimension of combat readiness. It depends on native ability honed by training and experience. Leadership is an irreplaceable force multiplier. It often spells the difference between disaster and victory under the most trying of circumstances. Thus, the selection, development, and retention of the best leaders, especially those with combat experience, should be a top priority. Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as three to one." This remains as absolutely true today as when he said it. Although intangible, morale is essential to readiness. It is very much a function of leadership, training, and the overall condition of the force. Poorly led and trained personnel trying to operate unreliable equipment and living in substandard conditions will most likely have low morale and not be very combat effective. Equipment. Based on their missions, military organizations are authorized to have specific quantities of particular types of equipment. For example, armor battalions in the Army are authorized to have a certain number of tanks and the necessary support equipment, such as refueling and maintenance vehicles. Air Force fighter squadrons are authorized to have a certain number of fighter aircraft of specific models and associated ground support equipment. Equipment readiness depends on two factors: the number and types of equipment in organizations and the operational status of that equipment. Service regulations authorize organizations to have specific numbers of specific models of equipment. However, the equipment they actually have (their "equipment fill") depends upon inventories of existing equipment and the procurement of new, usually more modern equipment to replace equipment that wears out, is destroyed, or becomes

obsolete. **As procurement accounts decline, procurement of new equipment can be delayed, affecting readiness in two ways.** First, **older generations of equipment are less effective than the newer generations.** Second, **delayed modernization means using older existing equipment, which is less reliable and more difficult and expensive to maintain.** This tends to lower the operational status of equipment fleets. Maintenance and repair of equipment are essential to combat readiness. They are also tremendously time and resource intensive, requiring large numbers of highly skilled personnel, technically sophisticated tools, and a steady, reliable supply of replacement parts. The scope of maintenance and repair

ranges from the daily checks and services performed by operators and crews to repairs by unit maintenance personnel to detailed refurbishing done by depots, shipyards, and commercial corporations. As available funding declines, equipment maintenance and repair can be one of the first bill payers. As such, it is often an early indicator of collapsing combat readiness. For example, reduced funding for repair parts can lead to a vicious downward spiral in equipment operational readiness rates. Without replacement parts, units are tempted to cannibalize parts from equipment that is already non-operational. Removing parts to keep other equipment operating or flying not only places additional demands on maintenance manpower, but also creates “hangar queens” missing so many parts that they become very expensive to repair. Because most military equipment is designed for a long service life, it usually is scheduled for depot, shipyard, or commercial refurbishment several times during its “career.” This is essential for corrosion control in aircraft and ships and replacement of major sub-assemblies, such as suspensions in ground vehicles. It is also economically smart because it can significantly extend the useful

service life of the equipment. **As budgets tighten, such maintenance may be deferred, creating large backlogs and leaving organizations with less reliable equipment that is prone to breakdown.**

[...]

One of the earliest shocks hit in June 1950 when Soviet-supported North Korea invaded South Korea. After the Berlin Blockade in 1949, U.S. forces were focused on the Soviet threat to Europe. Less than five years after the defeat of Germany and Japan, **they were ill prepared for more limited wars in areas of less than strategic interest.** When the U.S. recognized that land forces would be required to stem the rout of the South Korean military, **a hastily assembled force from an Army division on occupation duty in Japan was quickly committed to block the advancing North Korean army.** Named after its commander, **Task Force Smith was poorly equipped with World War II-era weapons and had no opportunity to train as a unit. In the opening battle between U.S. and North Korean forces, it was rapidly overrun and suffered disastrous losses.** [3] Decades later, “no more Task Force Smiths” was still an object lesson in preparedness for U.S. Army leaders.[4]

After ending the war in Korea, and concerned with the economic costs of maintaining a large standing army, President Dwight D. Eisenhower relied on strategic air forces to deter Soviet aggression with the threat of massive nuclear retaliation.[5] **The subsequent reduction in ground forces contributed to the difficulty the U.S. faced in dealing with the “wars of national liberation”** that cropped up in the early 1960s, **most significantly in Southeast Asia.**

Committed to combat in Vietnam, the U.S. Army rapidly increased in size. **This rapid expansion strained the Army’s ability to induct and train new soldiers and junior officers.** The conflict also strained the intellectual adaptability of the Army’s senior leaders, most of whom had their formative combat experiences in the firepower-intensive, large-unit operations prevalent during World War II and the Korean War. **Ultimately, this meant that leaders were slow in adapting to the different counterinsurgency requirements of Vietnam.**

U.S. forces adapted relatively quickly to the realities of the post-Vietnam situation and refocused on the massive Soviet conventional threat to Europe, **where combat readiness had suffered significantly during Vietnam.** New equipment and doctrine prepared the new all-volunteer force to fight and win while outnumbered. Most notably, Army and Air Force leaders recognized the high value of synergistic air–land operations and developed the appropriate war fighting concepts and organizations.[6]

[...]

This again proved to be the case in 2003 when U.S. air and ground forces swept into Iraq, seized Baghdad, and toppled Saddam Hussein’s government. However, **when the U.S. occupation proved longer and more complicated than first thought, the U.S. Army was**

again slow in adapting to the changing nature of the conflict after having worked hard to put its Vietnam counterinsurgency experiences in its past.

While history never exactly repeats itself, we can draw several useful insights from the historical record. First, our ability to predict rapidly emerging threats is imperfect at best. **Even in cases in which employment of force was optional**, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, we have had well less than a year to prepare. Thus, **dependence on having sufficient time to bring forces back up to the desired level of readiness before employing them can be a recipe for disaster.**

Military budget cuts cause allies to question commitment and resolve

Charles Morrison, 12-19-2014, "US defense cuts may undermine deterrence against China," American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.aei.org/publication/us-defense-cuts-may-undermine-security-western-pacific/> PT

The 2013 request was the first in a succession of BCA-driven budgets and strategic reviews that slowly-but-surely lifted the veil on America's military decline. As the BCA's original cut of \$487 billion—contained in the 2013 request—combined with an additional reduction of close to \$500 billion triggered by sequestration, ongoing crises in modernization, force structure, and readiness were laid bare. The Congressionally-chartered, bipartisan National Defense Panel (NDP) recently issued a stark warning about the implications of mounting defense shortfalls. The

NDP found that "**Not only have [the cuts] caused significant investment shortfalls in U.S. military readiness and both present and future capabilities, they have prompted our current and potential allies and adversaries to question our commitment and resolve.**"² Eroding US military power is especially disconcerting because America's military

underwrites the other components of its national power. In the words of the NDP, "The effectiveness of America's other tools for global influence, such as diplomacy and economic engagement, are critically intertwined with and dependent upon the perceived strength, presence and commitment of US armed forces."³ Consequently, as America's military power declines, so too will its global influence. Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in the Western Pacific today. While the US has traditionally relied upon a qualitative edge to prevail against

numerically superior forces, this technological edge may be rapidly shrinking.⁴ Indeed, the NDP warned, "**The balance of power in the Western Pacific is changing in a way unfavorable to the United States, and we believe that China's rapid military modernization is creating a challenging context for US military posture, planning, and modernization.**"⁵

Left unsaid by the panel is the disturbing reality that **as the military gap between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) narrows, the likelihood of conflict increases. If an overwhelming American conventional military advantage minimizes the chances for miscalculation or conflict, a lessened American military edge brings with it higher odds of conflict.** Moreover, despite the relative priority placed by senior officials on America's military presence in the Asia-Pacific, current plans are wholly inadequate to properly support the US military presence in the region. A rapidly shrinking US military is increasingly stressed by commitments worldwide, especially as instability grows in the Middle East, and Russia continues its assault on its neighbors. At the same time, much-needed modernization plans are too expensive for existing resources. The end result is a US military that is too small and too old to meet its many regional commitments. **In the absence of higher defense budgets, this would lead to a rapid erosion of American conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific.**

In the face of this challenge, the Republic of China (ROC) and other regional allies and partners can take several steps in order to minimize the danger of conflict. For one, the ROC is suggested to increase its defense spending—by as much as its finance allows. With additional defense resources, the ROC should continue and expand investments in anti-access/area-denial capabilities that seek to impose asymmetrical costs against PRC forces and the Mainland. Fortunately, momentum seems to be building in the US to at least partially overturn defense cuts and their consequences. Driven by international crises from Ukraine to Iraq and Syria, a clear shift seems to be taking hold both in terms of policymakers and public opinion. For instance, the NDP called for an emergency readiness supplemental to address immediate funding shortfalls, as well as a return to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' 2012 budget plan over the longer-term.⁶

Multi-Lateralism is Impossible and fails due to different national interests

Richard N. Haas November/December 2014, [President of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Unraveling: How to respond to a Disordered World, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-10-20/unraveling>] MJS

As for global governance, international accords are often hard to come by for many reasons. The sheer number of states makes consensus difficult or impossible. So, too, do divergent national interests. As a

result, attempts to construct new global arrangements to foster trade and frustrate climate change have foundered. Sometimes countries just disagree on what is to be done and what they are prepared to sacrifice to achieve a goal, or they are reluctant to support an initiative for fear of setting a precedent that could be used against them later. There is thus decidedly less of an "international community" than the frequent use of the phrase would suggest.

Link: Intervention for either side always makes conflicts ends faster and increases the chance of a negotiated settlement

JOYCE 2008 [Kyle Joyce, department of political science at Pennsylvania State University, "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process", *Journal of Peace Research*, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27640678.pdf>>] //CJC

Third-Party Support for Government or Opposition **Third-party intervention on the side of the government alters a government's decision calculus - specifically, the cost and benefits to the government for pursuing** specific policy choices (e.g. **continued fighting**) - and, in turn, the probability of specific outcomes occurring. The presence of **third-party support enables the government to** reduce the rent it extracts from its populace to **finance its civil war effort**. In turn, the reduced necessity to exact resources from the population, as well as the potential for an increase in the degree of security enabled by third-party resources, **allows a government to shore up political support**, while at the same time reducing the ability of an opposition group to gain a foothold on popular allegiance. Additionally, **third-party intervention on behalf of a government enables the latter to alter the probability of various civil war outcomes occurring, as the availability of greater military, political, and economic capability increases a government's odds of winning militarily**, provides it with greater leverage over the terms of negotiation, and reduces its odds of losing militarily. Similarly, **third-party interventions on the side of an opposition group** influence the behavior of the opposition group. Third-party intervention facilitates the ability of the opposition to impose costs on a government. **An opposition group supported by a third-party is more likely to challenge the government with a capable military threat**, thereby increasing the cost to the government of confronting the opposition, as well as **increasing the opposition groups chances of achieving victory**. Third-party support for the opposition enables the latter to demonstrate to the civil war state's populace that it presents a credible threat to the government. By providing resources to the opposition, third-party support increases the capacity of the opposition to disrupt a government's provision of security, goods, and services to its citizens. Indeed, **third-party support may enable the opposition to bid for popular support by providing a rival source of goods and services** and, in turn, challenging the government's monopoly over the 'hearts and minds' of its citizens. In general, **third-party support increases the likelihood that a combatant will more rapidly win the conflict militarily**.

[...]

Our first hypothesis anticipates that third-party support will increase the likelihood of the supported group achieving military victory, while decreasing the likelihood of the unsupported

group achieving military victory. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for intervention for government in the Government Military Victory model indicates that third-party intervention on behalf of the government of the civil war state increases the risk that the civil war will end in a government military victory and, therefore, decreases the time until such a victory will occur. The interaction between this variable and the natural log of time is negatively signed and statistically significant, indicating that, as a civil war persists, the benefit of third-party support for the government decreases the risk of a civil war ending in a government military victory. The coefficient for intervention for government in the Opposition Military Victory model is not statistically significant and is positive and statistically significant in the Negotiated Settlement model, suggesting that interventions on behalf of the government have no statistically significant effect on the time until an opposition military victory and decrease the time until a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, civil wars have a higher risk of ending in a negotiated settlement than a government military victory when a third-party intervenes on the side of the government. The results for this variable demonstrate the advantage of the competing risks approach, namely, that the effect varies across the three civil war outcomes. Figure 1 presents the estimated baseline survivor function for each civil war outcome when there is an intervention on the side of the government.¹¹ This figure demonstrates that a third-party intervention on the side of the government has a different effect on the expected probability of a civil war surviving past a given point in time for each civil war outcome. Importantly, these differing effects would not be evident had we estimated a Cox model where we pooled the three civil war outcomes. Turning to the results corresponding to intervention for opposition, the statistically significant coefficient for the Government Military Victory model indicates that third party support for the opposition decreases the risk that a civil war will end in a government military victory. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficient for this variable in the Opposition Military Victory model suggests that third-party support increases the risk that a civil war will end in an opposition military victory and, thus, decreases the time until such a victory will occur. Finally, the positively signed and statistically significant coefficient in the Negotiated Settlement model suggests that intervention on behalf of the opposition increases the risk of a civil war concluding more rapidly in negotiated settlement, lending support to our second hypothesis, though the risk is smaller than military victory by the opposition.

Decisive victories lead to long term peace

FORTNA, VIRGINIA P. ["Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* (2004): n. pag. *Columbia University*. Web.

<<http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF>] MJS

A closer look at the cases with respect to war outcomes suggests that the latter relationship might hold. Table 3 shows the post-Cold War cases as tabulated in the lower right portion of Table 1, identifying each case and whether or not the war ended in a victory for one side, as opposed to a military draw. As the number of victories (marked V) in the upper half of the table indicates, UN peacekeepers tend not to be deployed when war ends with a decisive winner (the only exceptions are Haiti and Rwanda in 1994). If decisive victories tend to yield more stable peace, a hypothesis tested below, then this would help to account for peacekeeping's poor showing in Table 1. Of those cases that end with no clear winner, peace fails in half (8 of 16) of those without peacekeepers, while only about one-third (8 of 23) of those with peacekeepers experience another war. War outcome is only one of many factors that might affect the duration of peace. To reach accurate assessments of the international community's effectiveness at maintaining peace, we need to be able to gauge the "degree of

difficulty” of the various cases (Blechman, Dorch, Eaton, and Stanley, 1997). And we need to know in what sorts of conflicts peacekeepers are likely to be dispatched. There have been a handful of studies examining the former question, and one (to my knowledge) on the second question.

What makes peace more or less likely to endure after civil wars? As noted above, peace is thought to be harder to maintain when war ends in a stalemate or compromise settlement than if one side achieves a military victory. Indecisive military outcomes leave all sides capable of resuming the fight, and no one fully satisfied with the terms of the peace. Wars that end in a draw also leave greater uncertainty about who would win another round of fighting.¹¹ That peace is more stable after decisive military victories than after wars that end in a tie is perhaps the most consistent finding of the literature on the durability of peace after both civil and interstate conflicts (Maoz, 1984; Kozhemiakin, 1994; Licklider, 1995; Stinnett and Diehl, 2001; Dubey, 2002; Toft, 2003; Fortna, 2004). On the other hand, peace that is ushered in with a formal peace settlement may be more stable than an informal truce. Formal agreements entail a political commitment to peace that invokes audience costs, both internationally and domestically

Tables 6–9 also tell us something about when peace will be harder or easier to maintain, whether or not the international community intervenes. As we would expect, peace tends to be quite stable after wars that end in a victory. The hazard for another war drops by about 70–90% when there is such a decisive military outcome.

NGO's increase conflict, Military security required; Empirics galore
Stein, 2000. “New Challenges to Conflict Resolution: Humanitarian Nongovernmental Organizations in Complex Emergencies.” *The National Academies Press*. Janice Gross Stein. <https://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/11#384> GST

The evidence is strong, though not determining, that in recent complex humanitarian emergencies the assistance that NGOs have provided to endangered populations has at times become the fuel for continued and renewed warfare.²⁴ In Somalia, for example, food was extraordinarily scarce as a result of drought and civil conflict and, consequently, its absolute value rose to unprecedented levels. Its high price, in the context of economic collapse, mass unemployment, and a dramatic drop in family income, increased the relative value of food. Therefore, food brought into Somalia through the relief effort was plundered by merchants, by organized gangs of young men profiteering from the black market, and by militia leaders who used the wealth that the food brought to buy weapons and the loyalty of followers.²⁵ In Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as well as Somalia and Sudan, assistance has been “taxed” or stolen to fuel processes of conflict escalation rather than promote conflict resolution. Resources channeled into Somalia by UN agencies and NGOs became part of a complex economy of warfare between rival militias and clans. Theft of those resources by militias was common. Equally significant was the ability of militias, in the absence of a security envelope for the local population and NGO personnel, to use force and the threat of force to compel NGOs to hire some of the same forces to guard relief supplies and convoys that

were the source of the humanitarian crisis.²⁶ In so doing, the NGOs legitimated those who were preying on local populations.²⁷

In **Sierra Leone** and **Liberia** conflict analysts and medical NGOs learned that they could plan by following the pattern of UN food deliveries: when food was distributed to a village or displaced-persons camp, the militias would quickly attack to steal the relief supplies, killing dozens of villagers as they did so. In **Sudan**, food, agricultural tools, and livestock were transferred from weaker to strong groups through restrictions on the passage of food aid by government forces and militias. In **Somalia** as well as Sudan, this transfer of assets was integrated into a parallel black economy controlled at the highest political levels.²⁸ The one supported the other.

UN and NGO resources in eastern Zaire were subject to political control and taxation by the forces that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Less by theft and diversion than by controlling the distribution of relief supplies and the flow of information, Rwanda's genocidaires turned UN-managed and NGO-operated refugee camps into political and resource bases for continued and renewed genocidal warfare, in both **Zaire** and **western Rwanda**.²⁹ When the post-1994 Rwandan regime sought to break the genocidaires' control of the camps, civilian refugees became moving shields between two armies. Relief supplies and the NGO presence were used to lure starving refugees out of hiding in the forests of Zaire, and these refugees were then slaughtered by the tens of thousands. At the extreme, NGOs were transformed from sources of protection into resources for destruction.

[...]

The violence is perpetuated as well, critics continue, because humanitarian organizations have reluctantly acceded to the constraining conditions imposed by governments and militias to gain access to populations at risk.³⁴ In complex humanitarian emergencies, **NGOs indeed have experienced enormous difficulties in gaining access to populations vulnerable to violence**.³⁵ These difficulties are deliberately created by warring parties that exploit the vulnerability of civilian populations for political or military purposes.³⁶ NGOs find themselves constantly renegotiating access and facing new designations of previously consented space as off limits. **Variants of these negotiations have occurred in Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.** The warring parties in turn frequently use negotiated access agreements to build international credibility. At the extreme **this leads to the perverse outcome that the more killing that is done the more NGOs respond with additional resources**.³⁷

[...]

Critics insist that **NGOs are being substituted for effective action by the major powers and exploited as a cover for their absence**.⁴¹ As I argued earlier, there is indeed a growing international indifference to humanitarian crises. Governments have privatized their assistance policies and adopted strategies of containment.⁴² They are increasingly resistant to accepting refugees and unwilling to grant asylum as mandated by the international refugee regime, even as they are less inclined to intervene politically or militarily to protect populations at risk.

[...]

Strategies to minimize diversion, alone or together, can reduce the scope and severity but never completely eliminate the transfer of assets to warriors and other negative externalities of emergency assistance. **Analysis of these cases suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more chaotic the security markets, and the more traumatized the social**

order, the more important an adequate security envelope is for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. For humanitarians working in complex emergencies, painful choices will continue to arise as long as the UN or regional organizations are unable to provide security as a public good and the major powers continue to disengage and privatize assistance as a substitute for political action.

[...]

CONCLUSION

Wittingly and unwittingly, humanitarian NGOs have become important participants in conflict resolution as assistance has been privatized and security has become a very scarce public good in many parts of the world. In large part **because of the failure** of the wider international community **to provide security** as a public good, **humanitarians increasingly find themselves confronting painful choices.** In complex humanitarian emergencies, **where security is absent,** some of **the assistance NGOs provide has gone to those who prey on the vulnerable and has prolonged and even fueled the cycle of violence.** Rather than contributing to conflict resolution, humanitarians have inadvertently contributed to conflict escalation.

[...]

I have argued that these painful choices have grown out of the disengagement of the major powers, the privatization of assistance, and the complexity of contemporary emergencies. Humanitarian emergencies are triggered by the failure of states or their capture by one group that uses the instruments of the state against another and the violent economic and social disruptions that follow as societies break apart and refugees spill across borders. A recent study concluded that **humanitarian emergencies constitute the most serious contemporary threat to security and that they are likely to continue into the foreseeable future.** The strategies of conflict resolution that I have identified as appropriate for humanitarian NGOs are no panacea even for the humanitarian community. On the contrary, each raises deep ethical, political, and strategic problems. Collectively, they underline the continuing importance of states, regional organizations, and global institutions, the traditional providers of security as a public good. **When security is scarce—or absent—no strategy of conflict resolution, postwar reconstruction, or peace building is likely to succeed.**

NGO military cooperation.

United States Institute of Peace. "NGOs in Conflict"

<http://www.usip.org/node/5607> GST

Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy working with military forces, whether from their own country or from the country receiving assistance. NGOs are conscious of the need to preserve their impartiality because of the protection that affords them. Military leaders have tended to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. **Yet NGO staff working in complex emergencies often need the help of the military for protection, logistics, and even evacuation.** **Attitudes on both sides have begun to change.** Exposure to each other's strengths and capabilities has increased the military's respect for the innovation

and dedication of NGOs and fostered an appreciation among NGOs for the unsurpassed logistical capacity of the military.

[...]

The Defense Department's Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Department of Defense 2006), **established peace and stability operations as core missions for the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. military**. To implement this mission, **the directive states that the military should be prepared to engage in planning and operations with a range of civilian agencies, international organizations, and NGOs**. The directive makes clear that coordination should begin before NGOs and the military first interact on the ground. In light of the directive, both groups are gaining a greater understanding of their respective roles, motivations, and responsibilities.

Aid reduces conflict

Ree, Joppe D., and Eleonora Nillesen. "Aiding Violence or Peace? The Impact of Foreign Aid on the Risk of Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Journal of Development Economics* 88 (2009): 301-13. DIW. Web.

<http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/90684/diwpublishing_de_enillesen.pdf>.

Ree: Utrecht University, The Netherlands

Nillesen: DIW (German Institute for Economic Research)

The main empirical finding is as follows: foreign aid is directly affecting the probability of civil conflict continuation (i.e., the probability of having conflict at t, conditional on having conflict at t-1), negatively and significantly. **Aid flows therefore reduce the duration of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. A 10% increase in foreign aid is estimated to decrease the probability of continuation by about 8% points (the unconditional probability of conflict continuation is about 90%).**

Diverts resources, 14% less genocide

Krain, Matthew. ["International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides." *International Studies Quarterly* (2005): n. pag. Genocide Watch. Web, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_International_Intervention_and_the_Severity_of_Genocides_and_Politicides.pdf] MJS

"Note that this theoretical argument does not assume that interventions change the balance of power between the perpetrator and the target. Rather, the introduction of forces against the perpetrators (1) signals that the international context has changed from permissive to prohibitive, and that the genocidaires no longer remain unchallenged and (2) diverts valuable time and resources from policies of domestic group eradication toward defense against an external challenger. Because neither impartial interventions nor interventions that support the perpetrator address both of these simultaneously, neither are likely to reduce the severity of state-sponsored mass murder."

"Even a single intervention against the perpetrator has a measurable effect on the severity of genocide or politicide in the "typical" case. When a single international actor challenges the perpetrator, the predicted probability that the killings will escalate drops from 0.6422 to 0.5510, while the probability that the killings will decrease jumps from 0.2836 to 0.3664. If two actors challenge the perpetrator, the probability of escalation drops further to 0.4564, while the probability that the killings will abate increases to 0.4580. Three challenging interventions increase the probability of lives saved to 0.5527."

(64-55)/64 = 14% reduction.

(36-28)/28 = 30% increase.

Perceived higher chance of intervention deters civil war outbreak (use a cred/perception/commitment link)

Cunningham 2015 [David Cunningham, professor of government at the University of Maryland.

"Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset", *Peace Research Institute*,

<http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com/uploads/4/2/9/7/42974855/cunningham_preventing_civil_war_feb112015.pdf>] //CJC

Civil wars occur in some countries at some times and not in others. I examine how the potential for large-scale external intervention can prevent civil wars. I argue that intervention by external states in civil war can be so overwhelming that it reduces one side's probability of victory to essentially zero. When dissidents anticipate this type of intervention on the side of government, they anticipate no chance of achieving success through violence and do not initiate civil wars.

[...]

In this article, I examine how the potential for large-scale international military intervention on the government side can deter the outbreak of civil war. There is a large literature on external intervention, but that

literature has almost exclusively focused on the intervention in ongoing civil wars. In a few cases, scholars have examined how, under certain conditions, the potential for intervention can make civil war more likely. Here, by contrast, I examine how the potential for intervention can prevent conflict. I analyze the process by which states and dissidents decide whether to use violence to resolve political conflicts and argue that, for civil war to occur, dissidents must have a motivation for violence, believe that violence

will help them achieve their goals, and be unable to negotiate a compromise settlement with the state prior to the outbreak of conflict. I argue that when dissidents anticipate that an external state or set of states will intervene on the side of the government to a degree that is so overwhelming that dissidents' costs of fighting exceed their probability of victory, they will anticipate gaining no benefit from fighting and not initiate civil war.

I further argue that, by freeing states from the threat of violent rebellion, governments anticipating this type of support can operate with a freer hand toward their population and therefore be more repressive. While this repression will increase grievance it should not increase the likelihood of civil war, rather, dissidents will choose other strategies of dissent to seek political change. I test these arguments using indicators of the likelihood of external intervention on behalf of the government. The primary indicator is that of U.S. hierarchy. Drawing on Lake's (2009) arguments that the U.S. enters into hierarchical relationships in which subordinate states give up some sovereign control in return for the United States providing "order," I argue that this provision of order means that potential rebels anticipate that the U.S. will intervene in a civil war. Consistent 3 with the expectations of the theory, I find that states in more hierarchical relationships with the United States are less likely to experience civil wars, more repressive, more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns and more prone to terrorist attacks. I conclude by discussing the implications of this argument for our understanding of civil war, and how external relations of states affect statedissident interactions.

[...]

Holding the other continuous variables constant at their mean and discrete variables at their mode, **states at the 10th percentile on the security hierarchy index have a 1.8% chance of experiencing a** 1,000 battle death **civil war** onset in a given year, while **those at the 90th percentile have a 0.97% chance, a decline in the probability of civil war of almost 50%.**

“International activism” and primacy arguments miss the boat – having global military presence does not necessitate use of it

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http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107 MJS

Why “deep engagement” best describes the current grand strategy:¹¹ Critics of deep engagement often call it “primacy,”¹⁰ but this terminology obscures more than it clarifies because it begs the core strategic questions at issue. Primacy is not strategy but a fact of international life: even if America “came home” and slashed military spending, it would retain the world’s greatest latent power potential. Indeed, *the grand strategy debate presumes primacy*—it is the United States’ unrivaled power and favorable geographical position that give it such a wide range of strategic choice.¹¹ The strategic question¹¹ is whether to translate that latent power into the global capacity to manage security affairs in multiple regions.¹¹ Other terms such as “international activism” make the opposite error by defining the strategy as a specific behavior—“the regular use of military power,”¹¹ as Barry Posen puts it.¹² Such terms imply that U.S. global security commitments necessitate regularly using military force—either to impose democracy on other societies, or, as Posen contends, “to change other societies so that they look more like ours.”¹³ In fact, deep engagement’s focus on leadership—even assertive leadership—does not imply the aggressive use of force to overturn the international status quo or force U.S. preferences on other societies. Military power is indeed a central tool of influence, as we discuss below, but not¹¹ in the way Posen and other retrenchment advocates imply. The use of military power—especially to promote democracy or respond to humanitarian crises—¹¹ is a choice. Having a large global military presence enables this choice but does not necessitate it. Countries that have radically different grand strategies—¹¹ Britain and France come to mind—also sometimes choose to intervene militarily¹¹ for humanitarian or other purposes. Many countries use military power frequently,¹¹ but their grand strategies are hardly comparable to the United States’.¹¹ The main point is that oft-used terms such as “primacy” and “international activism” miss the overarching questions at the center of the debate. First,¹¹ should the United States continue to maintain a wide roster of global security¹¹ commitments? Second, should it sustain a significant overseas military presence?¹¹ And third, should it seek to lead the liberal institutional order? On many¹¹ other pressing foreign policy questions—notably armed humanitarian intervention¹¹ and democracy promotion—advocates of retrenchment and deep engagement¹¹ do not have uniform opinions.¹⁴ On these three questions, however,¹¹ supporters of deep engagement uniformly answer “yes,” whereas advocates for¹¹ retrenchment just as consistently answer “no.”¹⁵ The question is, who’s right?

When the population feels safe we are less likely to care about other conflicts and therefore less likely to intervene

Stephen M. Walt, 2002, [American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, "AMERICAN PRIMACY: Its Prospects and Pitfalls", <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/swalt/files/art1-sp2.pdf>] MJS

The first problem created by America's favorable global position is a loss of public support for an active and engaged foreign policy. When asked, Americans still favor "engagement" over "isolationism," but public interest in foreign issues is declining, and support for a costly foreign policy is especially weak. In a 1998 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, for example, when Americans WALT 15 were asked to name two or three important problems facing the nation, foreign policy issues did not make the top seven; they constituted only 7.3 percent of all issues mentioned. When asked to name "two or three foreign policy problems facing the nation," the most common response (at 20 percent) was "Don't know." Support for traditional U.S. allies has also declined significantly.¹⁹ Thus, the United States withdrew from Somalia after eighteen soldiers were lost, stayed out of Rwanda completely, was visibly reluctant to send ground troops to Bosnia or Kosovo, and fought the air war in Kosovo from fifteen thousand feet. Public support for key international institutions has also declined, and foreign policy issues played at most a minor role in the 2000 presidential campaign. It is also worth noting that a key element of President George W. Bush's campaign platform was the need for the United States to be more "selective" in its overseas commitments. This is a far cry from the call to "pay any price and bear any burden" that animated U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. To be sure, there has been a surge of public interest and support in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Yet even here, the United States has relied heavily on proxy forces and remains ambivalent about taking on a long-term security role in Central Asia. Unless Al-Qaeda proves more resilient than it now appears, public attention is certain to wane over time. As it does, U.S. leaders will once again find themselves having to weigh their international ambitions against a rather modest level of popular interest and backing. These shifts are not simply a function of partisan politics or of former president William Clinton's delicate relationship with the U.S. military. Rather, they are a direct consequence of America's remarkably favorable world position. Because America is in such good shape, most Americans tend to ignore international politics and to focus their attention on other problems. The point is not that Americans are unwilling to run risks or bear costs; it is that they are reluctant to do so for the kinds of interests that are now at stake. This tendency will discourage any U.S. president from pursuing an activist foreign policy, because public support for it will be thin. Paradoxically, the very strength of America's present position reduces public support for using that power in costly or risky ways, except in those (one hopes rare) moments when the United States is attacked directly. Indeed, this policy may even make sense—when the world is already one's oyster, there is not much more to gain.²⁰

Aggressive FoPo is dead

Andrew Sullivan, May 1, 2014, The Dish, "Letting Go of American Hegemony," <http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/05/01/a-wartime-president-of-a-peacetime-country/>

The switch to disapproval happened about a year ago. Some of the subsequent shift may be due to the harsh criticism Obama received for not striking Syria after seeming to move toward it (even though the public wants to go to war in Syria like they want to abolish social security). Some of it may be due to Putin's ugly machinations – prompting unreconstructed neocons like McCain to blame Obama for somehow encouraging it. The open wound of the Israel-Palestine question – where Obama has been very very active but without any progress at all – may also be a factor. But I suspect the bigger picture is that we've seen both an acceptance of a much more restrained America after the catastrophe of neocon governance and subsequent lingering unease about no longer being the sole superpower whose authoritah is always respected.

Soft power fails – it takes too long and signals weakness, allowing conflicts to escalate.

Rubin 14 (Jennifer Rubin, Columnist and blogger for The Washington Post on domestic and foreign policy, “The evolution of Obama’s quarter-baked war plan,” The Washington Post, October 23 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/10/23/the-evolution-of-obamas-quarter-baked-war-plan/>, *fc)

The results are entirely predictable. Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry repeatedly ruled out force or at least effective force (“boots on the ground”) while promising that conflicts can be resolved at the bargaining table. Obama did it with Syria, and Kerry insists diplomacy hasn’t failed, to the amazement of critics such as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). He did it with Russia (which remains ensconced in Ukraine). He is doing it with Iran. **Absent force or the threat of force, these negotiations prove to be fruitless.** And they have led us to a ridiculous war plan.

The results could hardly be a surprise, given recent history. Waiting around for soft power or multilateral bodies to work led to mass civilian deaths in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s. It is not just that Obama repudiated his own liberal advisers’ idea that we have a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) those facing aggression and mass murder; it is that we have turned it on its head. The administration now asserts that it would be irresponsible to protect others. It is monstrously immoral, demanding that we must stand idly by while innocents are harmed and threats to our security build — and that others must, too. **You don’t have to believe that Obama wants dictators, mass murderers and terrorists to win to see that his policies make it more tempting for them to try and more likely that they will prevail.**

Eventually, Obama must succumb (e.g. against Libya, the Islamic State) to international realities and use some force. But if he can’t avoid force altogether, he will do the next best thing — use such limited, distant force that he can claim his ban on hard power is more or less intact.

He insisted on an airpower-only strategy in Libya, then subcontracted even that to NATO and now cannot be bothered to see that the country is once again a haven for jihadists. And Yemen, which he cited as a success in his minimalist use of force doctrine? The Post editorial board recently explained, Now Yemen appears in danger of disintegrating, as sectarian insurgents backed by Iran capture large parts of the country’s north, even while al-Qaeda forces surge in the south. Once again a narrowly focused U.S. engagement has helped make the breakdown possible.

That brings us back to the war against the Islamic State. No boots on the ground was the first and predictable edict (although about 1,500 booted members of the U.S. military are currently in Iraq). The lack of success brought a win-some-lose-some attitude toward Kobane. But realizing that a major defeat and civilian massacre would send a deadly signal to Iraq, the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army and humiliate the United States, Obama stepped up bombing and now strives, still by air only, to prevent Kobane’s fall. And now a war premised on getting the help of locals on the ground in Syria risks failure because we won’t put our own troops in there to help.

After six years, the notion that soft power can be divorced from hard lies in rubble. The idea that if we really must resort to force to defend our interests we should use the least force (and the least effective force) has proved disastrous. Now it may lead to our inability to defeat a vicious foe.

DOD is taking over non-military operations from the State Dept

Institute for Policy Studies 2012 [Center for American Progress, “Rebalancing our National Security,” *Institute for Policy Studies*. Accessed at: <https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/UnifiedSecurityBudget.pdf.>] //DNP

Unfortunately, what focus there is on nonmilitary instruments of policy is gaining traction at the Pentagon at the expense of the State Department as the functional leadership of many diplomatic and development policies is gradually migrating from the State

Department to the Department of Defense. This is evident in many ways. Threat prevention or “environment shaping,” for example, which involves using military deployments and activity to influence the longer-term goals of other nations, reassures our allies about our nation’s enduring commitments to our treaty obligations and has long been a subordinate part of the Pentagon’s mission. Traditionally, these functions—such as helping regions deal with challenges arising from economic problems, social instability, or lack of capacity—sat primarily with the State Department. But in recent years, as these functions have grown more central to the Pentagon’s force and budget rationales, they have taken on a more military complexion.

Trump diplomacy fails

Babbin Dec 5 2016 [Jed Babbin is a writer for the Spectator, “Trump-Style Diplomacy”, *The Spectator*, <<https://spectator.org/trump-style-diplomacy/>>] //CJC

Trump has been contacting other nations’ leaders since before he was elected. He diplomatic style is reminiscent of what Winston Churchill said of John Foster Dulles: “He is the only bull who brings his own china shop with him.” That’s not necessarily bad, because American diplomacy has for eight long years been a disaster that shunned our allies, embraced our enemies, and reduced us from a superpower to a France-like also-ran. Trump’s international relations are styled just as his campaign was. He seems to be breaking every taboo and, for the most part, getting it right. But what he’s getting wrong may come back to bite him. In August, Mexican President Peña Nieto invited both Trump and Clinton to visit. Only Trump went. Both Trump and Peña Nieto had mild reactions to the meeting, which apparently was cordial. The border wall was mentioned, but apparently there was no agreement who’d pay for it. Since the election, Trump has had about fifty conversations with other nations’ leaders, some of which are controversial. He called Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and told him he was a “terrific guy.” In that conversation Trump offered to help solve any problems the Pakistanis have. That’s an awful idea. Pakistan, since its founding, has been at war with India over the disputed province of Kashmir. Its foreign policy consists of enmity with India over Kashmir and sponsorship of Sunni Islamic terrorism. Pakistan was the nation that gave Osama bin Laden sanctuary for about a decade, hiding him from American forces seeking to capture or kill him. India is the world’s most populous democracy and should be our natural ally, but we’ve been pushing it away since the Bill Clinton era. We’ve been cozy with Pakistan over India since 9/11 because they enabled American forces to land and travel over their territory to reach landlocked Afghanistan. There’s no explanation from the Pakistanis for why bin Laden was given sanctuary. Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism. Terrorist networks based in Pakistan have conducted horrific attacks in India such as the 2008 Lakshar-e-Taiba attack in Mumbai that killed at least 164 people. Trying to solve Pakistan’s problems will almost certainly create more problems for us. The most controversial of Trump’s diplomatic conversations wasn’t that one. Though he spoke earlier with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump accepted a call last week from the recently elected president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen. The two reportedly exchanged congratulations, and little else was said. The last time an American leader spoke to a Taiwanese leader was in 1979, when Jimmy Carter threw democratic

Taiwan over the side in favor of declaring a “one China” policy that recognized Communist China as the only legitimate nation by that name. Predictably, not only are **the Chicoms in a carefully-staged uproar that Trump would even speak with Ing-Wen**, our media morons are as well. CNN has

written reports on the call that don't even mention Ing-Wen's name for fear of angering the Chicoms. Trump was right to take the call. No nation has any right to limit who an American president or president-elect speaks to. As one of my Navy evil-genius friends pointed out in an email, Trump may have blown up a Chinese plan to create a crisis over Taiwan in Trump's first days in office. We'll never know if that was true, but Trump should continue, whenever he feels the need, to speak to those national leaders regardless of what our enemies and adversaries (or State Department bureaucrats) think. Trump is and will continue to be his own chief diplomat. He probably needs a score keeper more

than a secretary of state. **Congress and the diplomatic community will want a secretary of state to keep Trump on a tight leash. Good luck with that. No one is even going to be able to control his Twitter feed.** For better and for worse, our next president will be himself wherever he goes and the ambassadors he chooses will be expected to faithfully deliver his messages, no matter how undiplomatic or politically incorrect they may be.

Most Military Drones Do Not Bomb

Micah Zenko, April, 2012, ["10 Things You Didn't Know About Drones" Foreign Policy.com, <http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/4.%20Zenko,%2010%20Things%20You%20Didn't%20Know%20About%20Drones.pdf>] AMS, 12-16-2016

Although decapitation strikes may get all the headlines, **the vast majority of the time, drones are used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance** – what the military calls ISR. **The U.S. Navy's first high-altitude drone can relay black-and-white photos covering roughly half the Persian Gulf; the Global Hawk's advanced radars make detailed images of the Earth and attempt to sniff out chemical or biological agents for telltale signs of weapons of mass destruction.** Soon, the Gorgon Stare drone will “**be looking at a whole city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we're looking at, and we can see everything,**” according to Maj. Gen. James O. Poss.

Drones empirically kill tons of terrorists and make it harder for them to train and communicate

Byman 2013 [Daniel L. Byman is a researcher and writer at the Brookings Institute, "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Brookings. N.p., 17 June 2013. Web. 07 Dec. 2016. <<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtons-weapon-of-choice/>>] //CJC

The Obama administration relies on **drones** for one simple reason: they **work**. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, **since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced.** In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that **when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders” and who are**

prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists' ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to "maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts" and "avoid gathering in open areas." Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda's command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.

Most recent drone strikes in Pakistan have 1.5% civilian casualty rate

Lewis 2013 [Michael W. "Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 21 Aug. 2013. Web. 05 Dec. 2016.

<<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/drones-actually-the-most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/>>] //CJC

How do we know that this has succeeded? Bowden mentions studies done by several independent organizations that have assessed civilian casualties caused by drones in Pakistan. The three most well respected and independent sources on this issue are the Long War Journal, the New America Foundation and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ). Among these, the U.K.-based TBIJ has consistently produced the highest estimates of civilian casualties for drone strikes. According to TBIJ, between January 2012 and July 2013, there were approximately 65 drone strikes in Pakistan, which they estimate to have killed a minimum of 308 people. Yet of these casualties, even TBIJ estimates that only 4 were civilians. This would amount to a civilian casualty rate of less than 1.5 percent, meaning that only 1 in 65 casualties caused by drones over that 19-month period was a civilian. This speaks to drones effective discrimination between civilian and military targets that no other weapons system can possibly match. Another indication that drones cause fewer civilian casualties than traditional warfare was provided by Hamid Karzai in 2011. The U.S. was employing all types of units in Afghanistan, ground troops, airstrikes, artillery and drones. But the source of friction with the Afghan government was not drones but rather special forces night raids. Karzai proclaimed that he would withhold further cooperation until his government was given greater control over night raids. Drones did not cause him or the Afghan people any appreciable concern.

Drones smash terrorists

Lawrence Kapp, September 2, Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf>

A focused, light-footprint approach proved devastatingly effective against core al-Qaeda, for example. Obama's first term saw an estimated 400 U.S. drone strikes, compared to roughly 50 during Bush's entire presidency. Those strikes, along with SOF raids and other tools, killed dozens of al-Qaeda leaders and hundreds of midlevel

operatives, and severely disrupted al-Qaeda's operations. “Drones have turned al-Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability,” wrote terrorism and Middle East expert Daniel Byman, “forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.”³⁶ There were other successes, too. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took a beating from drone strikes, assistance to local security forces, and other light-footprint methods prior to 2015. Similarly, and although **the rise of IS was a tremendous setback for U.S. policy, a light-footprint strategy centered on airpower.** SOF, and other enablers allowed Syrian and Iraqi partner-forces to roll back IS gains from 2014 onward. By late 2016, U.S. operations had helped those partners liberate key points from Manbij to Fallujah, while also **killing perhaps 45,000 IS fighters, in exchange for a handful of American combat deaths.**³⁷ In these cases, Obama’s approach leveraged unique U.S. capabilities to wage a cost-effective War on Terror.

Drones save more lives than they harm

Weiner and Sherman 2014 (Robert and Tom; Drones spare troops, have powerful impact; Oct 9; www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/oct/09/drones-troops-impact/; kdf)

A note from Osama bin Laden discovered at his Abbottabad residence by U.S. Seal Team Six during the U.S. raid on May 2, 2011, revealed, “Brothers said they were frankly exhausted from the enemy’s air bombardments.” Osama bin Laden hated drones, because they work. Drones save American troops from risk of death, kill far fewer civilians than ground troops operations, and make our military more effective against enemy combatants.

Regardless, drones are often decried by many liberals as too invasive, too impersonal and too deadly to innocent civilians. Southern California has been a national leader of the drone industry, ever since the San Diego-based General Atomics pioneered the first Predator drone development more than two decades ago. Currently, 13 California drone manufacturers operate across the state, including 3D Robotics of San Diego and Datron Communication Systems of Vista. Pentagon officials initially purchased 10 drones from General Atomics — that number has now swelled to over 10,000 drones currently under Pentagon control, according to The Washington Post, and unknown numbers in CIA hands; a Defense News report estimates at least 80. “The defense industry has been a huge incubator of jobs in California, especially Southern California,” said Assemblyman Steven Bradford, D-Gardena, last year. “We want these well-paying, high-tech manufacturing jobs to continue to grow here in California.” Californians, whether liberal or conservative, should champion drone programs that save American troops from having a larger footprint and having to put their lives in danger in foreign territories. Drones reduce ground troops, yet they have as powerful an impact. Hillary Clinton points out, in her recent memoir “Hard Choices,” that during her tenure as secretary of state, drone programs were “one of the most effective and controversial elements of the Obama administration’s strategy against Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists ... bin Laden himself worried about the heavy losses that drones were inflicting.” It is a key plus for drones that U.S. troops are three times safer from friendly fire attacks when deployed in war zones covered by drones compared with traditional warfare. During the Gulf War, American casualties totaled 382 in-theater deaths, of which nearly 62 percent were due to either friendly fire or other accidents, according to Navy research. However, during the current age of drones, only 21.5 percent of casualties are classified as “non-hostile,” according to Pentagon stats. America and our allies are sometimes literally our own worst enemy on the battlefield. Drones protect our troops from their own traditional battlefield errors. In a letter to President Obama in 2012, 25 congressmen stated, “We are concerned that the use of such “signature” strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States.” They are just wrong. In fact, it is a myth that drones disproportionately kill civilians. After a review of the deaths inflicted by American drones since 2004, the Pakistani Defense Ministry concluded that citizen fatalities occurred at a rate of 3 percent of total kills — a total of 67 innocent civilians.

US welfare spending is super high

Rector 2015 [Robert Rector, writer at the National Review, “Poverty in the U.S. — We Spend Much More Per Person on Social Welfare than Europe Does”, *National Review*, <<http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424009/poverty-us-we-spend-much-more-person-social-welfare-europe-does-robert-rector>>] //CJC

But even setting aside the private sector, the U.S. still has a very large social-welfare system. In fact, among affluent nations, the U.S. has the third-highest level of per capita government social-welfare spending. This is striking given that government spending in the U.S. is more tightly targeted to benefit the poor and elderly. When private-sector contributions to retirement, health care, and education are added to the count, social-welfare spending in the U.S. dwarfs that of other nations. In fact, social-welfare spending per capita in the U.S. rises to nearly twice the European average. As Garfinkel et al., conclude: For those who believe the absolute size of the US welfare state is small, the data presented . . . [in the book] are shocking and constitute a wake up call. Once health and education benefits are counted, real per capita social welfare in the United States is larger than in almost all other countries! Only one nation (Norway) spends more per person than the U.S. spends.

Threats of military force are the most effective form of diplomacy

Schettino 2009 [Ilario Schettino is part of the permanent mission of Italy to the UN. "Is Coercive Diplomacy a Viable Means to Achieve Political Objectives?" E-International Relations. 29 June 2009. <<http://www.e-ir.info/2009/06/29/is-coercive-diplomacy-a-viable-means-to-achieve-political-objectives/>>] //CJC

It should be remarked that coercive diplomacy offers an alternative to reliance on military action; it is based on the threat of force rather than the use of force in order to get other actors to comply with one's wishes. If force is used at all, it takes the form of an exemplary or symbolic use of military action, to demonstrate motivation and resolution to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary. Hence, in coercive diplomacy, force is not employed as part of conventional military strategy, but as a component of a political-diplomatic strategy aimed at persuading the adversary to back down. It is a more flexible, psychological instrument in contrast to the 'physical, quick and decisive' use made in military strategy. [4]The practice of coercive diplomacy is widely employed by states in the international system as it proves to be a viable means to achieve political objectives without resorting to war, which is costly also for the winner.

Interventions solve terrorism

Choi, Seung-Whan and Powers, Matthew, "How Effective are Troop Surges Against the Menace of Transnational Terrorism?" (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900583>>. Matthew Powers is a professor at the University of Chicago.

"In explaining political violence, Tilly emphasizes a group's ability to mobilize resources in support of collective action. He believes that, within any given polity, there are a number of different groups (governmental and non-governmental) competing against one another for power and control. In order to secure this power and control, a group must have the capacity to marshal resources to initiate and sustain collective action. Once this group attains the requisite amount of resources for collective action, they are free to compete for control over the polity and thus more likely to engage in political violence. Without these mobilized resources, however, collective action becomes more difficult and the ability to air grievances through political violence diminishes. Stated simply, his argument represents an

instrumental, rational choice approach toward collective violence where actors choose from repertoires of action based on their available resources.

When interventions are severe, the target population is unable to mobilize the needed resources for an effective terrorist campaign. Despite their desire to defend the homeland against highly intensive interventions, individuals have less of a chance to mobilize resources for launching terrorist attacks. In other words, **although individuals within these countries may have the motive to engage in terrorist attacks, the opportunity to do so is greatly constrained due to the presence of a massive, overwhelming force.** This is exacerbated through the fact that high intensity interventions make the risks associated with terrorist activity seem so costly and dangerous as to dissuade individuals from using this tactic.”

Shiite genocide root cause of ISIL recruitment—not the US

Pregent, Michael. "The U.S. Is Providing Air Cover for Ethnic Cleansing in Iraq." Foreign Policy. N.p., 28 Mar. 2015. Web. <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/28/the-united-states-is-providing-air-cover-for-ethnic-cleansing-in-iraq-shiite-militias-isis/>>. Michael Pregent was an embedded advisor with a Peshmerga battalion operating in Mosul, Iraq, in 2005 and 2006. He served as an advisor on Iraqi security forces with the U.S. Defense Department from 2006 to 2011 with multiple tours in Iraq.

On March 10, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a comprehensive study of human rights violations committed by both IS and pro-Iraqi forces. The Islamic State, OHCHR concluded, has likely committed genocide against the Yazidis, a ethno-religious minority in Iraq, in a catalogue of war crimes and crimes against humanity that include gang-rape and sexual slavery. But OHCHR's language is equally unambiguous in condemning the other side on the battlefield: “Throughout the summer of 2014,” the report noted, “[PMUs], other volunteers and [Shiite] militia moved from their southern heartlands towards [Islamic State]-controlled areas in central and northern Iraq. While their military campaign against the group gained ground, **the militias seem to operate with total impunity, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their wake.**”

Sunni villages in Amerli and Suleiman Bek, in the Salah ad-Din province, **have been looted or destroyed by militiamen operating on the specious assumption that all inhabitants once ruled by IS must be IS sympathizers or collaborators.** Human Rights Watch has also lately discovered that the “liberation” of Amerli last October — another PMU/Iranian-led endeavor, only this one abetted by U.S. airstrikes in the early stages — was characterized by wide-scale abuses including the looting and burning of homes and business of Sunni residents of villages surrounding Amerli. **The apparent aim was ethnic cleansing.** Human Rights Watch concluded, from witness accounts, that “building destruction in at least 47 predominantly Sunni villages was methodical and driven by revenge and intended to alter the demographic composition of Iraq’s traditionally diverse provinces of Salah al-Din and Kirkuk.”

The loss of confidence in the United States by moderate Sunnis in Syria is mirrored in Iraq. New polling data has confirmed that most Moslawis, for instance, welcomed IS back into Iraq’s second city not out of ideological sympathy for the terror group, but out of deep-seated political grievances with the Iraqi government. Yet the Obama administration is doing next to nothing to redress these grievances. The Anbar tribal leader Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, whose charismatic brother was notoriously gunned down by al

Qaeda just days after meeting with President George W. Bush in Baghdad in 2007, simply could not get a meeting with any significant official in White House during a 10-day tour of Washington last February. Vice President Joe Biden was good enough to drop in on a lesser confab, mainly to smile and pat them on the head and tell them to work constructively with the new government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

“Many of the people in Mosul will stand with [the Islamic State] if Shiite militias invade,” said Gen. Najim Jibouri. **“Eighty percent of the population is does not like [IS], but if the militias are involved — 80 percent will stand very strong with [IS].** I told the Americans before, the image now is not like it was in 2003. **Now the Sunni people want American forces.** They will throw the flowers on them now, because the battle now is not between them and the United States and [IS], it’s between the Sunnis and Iran.” Yet far too many Sunnis still see the United States as aligned with Iran against them, Jibouri said.

Security measures and surveillance specifically are empirically successful

Kroenig, Matthew, and Barry Pavel. "How to Deter Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 35.2 (2012): 21-36. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Web. <http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_12Spring_Kroenig_Pavel.pdf>.

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“Given the value that terrorists place on operational success, states can deter terrorism by convincing terrorists that operations are likely to fail. For this reason, simple homeland security measures can deter terrorist attacks. Improving domestic intelligence and hardening key targets are strong deterrents to attack. Indeed, we know of many cases in which terrorists were deterred from carrying out an attack by the fear of failure. For example, an al-Qaeda affiliate planned to attack a U.S. military base in Turkey in late 2003, but the United States improved its defenses at the site during the planning stages, and the terrorists called off the attack.

In order to regain its credibility, the United States should adopt a policy that emphasizes Washington’s intention to deny terrorists their strategic demands and then consistently follow through on that intention. Future U.S. force posture decisions should not be influenced by the wishes of terrorist organizations. Indeed, **standing firm in the face of terrorist attacks now may be the only way to rehabilitate Washington’s credibility and discourage terrorism in the future.**

FAT TURN: Trump’s unpredictability and irrationality is a ruse—he’s just using “madman” game theory to make deterrence of Russia and NoKo more effective and is actually a completely rational actor

Navarro 16 Peter Navarro is a professor at the University of California-Irvine. Trump, Putin and Kim Jong-un Walk Into a Deterrence Bar, 1-27-16 <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/trump-putin-kim-jong-un-walk-deterrence-bar-15036?page=2>] //CJC

Should we wring our hands and roll our eyes in the face of such Trumpisms? Or has “The Donald” captured an essential truth about the art of leadership and the deterrence of naked

aggression? In fact, all **Donald Trump is doing is tipping his** “Make America Great Again!” **cap to the power of the “Madman Theory”** first espoused in American politics by President Richard Nixon. **This theory is a well-known staple of game theory**, and one of the most important tools used to analyze various strategies to deter aggression and prevent the use of nuclear weapons. **In Nixon’s case, he deliberately feigned angry and erratic behavior as a strategy to convince the North Vietnamese to agree to American terms during the Paris peace negotiations.** In describing his “Madman Theory” to an aide, Nixon revealed: “**I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that**, ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. **We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’** and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.” Of course, in this particular negotiation, Nixon’s feigning of madness failed miserably in deterring North Vietnam’s aggression. Indeed, North Vietnamese negotiators knew full well that Nixon was more desperate than mad. That left Henry Kissinger with little leverage in Paris, and North Vietnam took Nixon and Kissinger to the negotiating cleaners—ultimately taking South Vietnam from an America in full retreat. The failure of Nixon’s madman ruse notwithstanding, **the importance of madness versus rationality in deterring ruthless and “crazy” guys like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un** can be highlighted by taking a page out of the book of game theorist Thomas Schelling. Here’s how Schelling might put the current North Korean conundrum: “**If North Korea’s Kim Jong-un does not act according to America’s conventional assumptions and international norms of behavior, America will consider Kim’s behavior “irrational,” and Kim’s perceived irrationality might result in him winning the competition.** However, **if Kim is not really irrational but simply but simply using his madman behavior as part of a conscious bargaining or competitive strategy** to get more food and fuel from the West while holding on to his nukes, **then this so-called irrationality is effectively rational in relation to the game’s ‘payoffs.’**” In other words, **the feigning of “madness” can be “wickedly rational.”** As to how this applies to any American president dealing with the likes of Putin and Kim, here’s the obvious deterrence problem: **Both Putin and especially Kim Jong-un project a willingness to start a nuclear war to get their way.** Since that would mean the end of the world as we know it, **many political leaders in the West perceive this behavior as irrational.** So far **the “rational” response of the Obama White House to Putin’s particular brand of brinkmanship and “craziness”** has been to use economic sanctions as a means of forcing Russia to cease its revanchist aggression. **With Putin not fearing any military intervention—because he believes President Obama fears any such intervention might lead to nuclear war—Putin continues to have his ruthless, revanchist and really quite rational way with Ukraine and parts of Eastern Europe.** And **that is exactly what Donald Trump is seeing in “Vladimir the Great” and why he admires Putin**—certainly not for his aggression but at least **for his rational madman cunning.** So what if Trump were elected president instead of ratiocinators like Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders or Marco Rubio? In this scenario, **Putin would know Trump is as rationally “mad” as he is and that Trump won’t never back down should Russian push come to American shove. Understanding he has met his madman match, Putin should therefore be far less likely to press the revanchist envelope in the same cavalier way he now does** with the ultimate ratiocinator, President Obama. Score one for a “crazy” Trump. In fact, a hawkishly uncertain demeanor was the ultimate power of Ronald Reagan in dealing with the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders could never really be sure what “the cowboy” would do, and in this way Reagan quite rationally kept the peace. In the case of Kim Jong-un, **the Obama White House likewise is pursuing a rational “carrot and stick” path.** The carrot has been the prospect of aid to North Korea if it disarms while the stick as been the same kind of economic sanctions strategy Obama is (mis)using with Russia. Thus far, of course, **this has been an utterly failed policy as a “crazy” Kim continues to test his bombs, refine his missile**

technology, and advance his nuclear proliferation agenda. As for what steps **the next American president might take to rein in a “crazy” North Korea, the most obvious is to put the clamps down on China**—a country that is not just North Korea’s primary benefactor but also America’s largest trading partner. At this juncture, **a President Trump appears to be far more likely to take such a dramatic step without regard for the economic consequences than any of the other candidates on either side of the aisle. Knowing this, China should therefore be more likely to crack down on North Korea and thereby avert a confrontation under a Trump presidency.** Score another one for a “crazy” Trump. The second, more draconian, option to deal with North Korea is to simply drop a precision bomb on Kim Jong-un and eliminate him. And here’s the Trumpian rub: **If Trump were elected president, Kim might actually begin to fear that Trump might indeed hunt him down with a swarm of F-22s, a drone or a long-range missile. In this scenario, the United States wouldn’t even have to assassinate Kim. All Kim would have to believe is that a President Trump would be “crazy” enough to do it; and that would be enough to restrain Kim’s behavior.** And so **the dance of deterrence goes—and so goes the argument that a “crazy” Donald Trump is actually smart like a fox and more likely to bring about peace in Eastern Europe and Asia than a “rational” President Obama** who relies on the tools of conventional western diplomacy. It’s risky business of course, but so far ratiocinator diplomacy is striking out from Moscow and Beijing to Pyongyang.

Military won’t do what Trump says

Feaver, 16 Peter D. Feaver is a professor of political science and public policy and Bass Fellow at Duke University, and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy. He is coeditor of Shadow Government, 2016 (“Will the Military Obey President Trump’s Orders?,” Foreign Policy, Accessible online at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/29/will-the-military-obey-president-trumps-orders-hayden-bill-maher/>] //CJC

Retired **General Mike Hayden** created a stir with his recent appearance on the HBO show, “Real Time with Bill Maher.” In the interview, Hayden **told Maher that if Donald Trump wins the election and then attempts to fulfill some of his more outlandish campaign promises, the new Republican president would be blocked by the senior military.** Actually what Hayden said was, “**the American armed forces would refuse to act**” and that the senior military will **be correct in doing so because, as he put it, military commanders, “are required not to follow an unlawful order.”** In response to this, Maher offered a typical sardonic response, joking that Hayden had offered, “a good reason not to support Trump” because were he to instruct the military to do those things, “there would be a coup in this country.” But jokes aside, Maher’s interview with Hayden raises some interesting and important issues here for civil-military relations. And given Trump’s standing as the Republican front-runner, this is also not merely an academic exercise.

Let’s begin by imposing a bit of precision on the analysis. General Hayden was talking about some very particular campaign promises by Trump, specifically that as president he would a) direct the military to intentionally target the families of terrorists to be killed, and b) direct the national security establishment to do a “hell of a lot worse” than water-boarding to the terrorists and families of terrorists that are captured on Trump’s watch.

Both of these proposed policies are clear violations of the law. Civilian deaths that occur as collateral damage incidental to strikes aimed at legitimate targets are always avoided but sometimes an unfortunate part of lawful warfare; **Trump is talking about deliberately targeting the family members as a matter of policy.** I do not know of a single law expert who would say

this is legal. On the second one, there was a debate among reasonable lawyers about whether the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT) program launched by the Bush Administration in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and then rolled back in the second term in the face of public pressure and adverse court rulings, were legal at the time. But that program was much more narrowly circumscribed than what Trump is talking about –indeed, he explicitly says he wants to do “a hell of a lot worse” than what was done in that program. And note: last October, Congress passed provisions in the 2016 Defense Authorization Act that make waterboarding and other techniques Trump wants to go way past explicitly illegal. There simply would not be much of a debate about Trump’s proposals. The overwhelming consensus would be that it is illegal. I suppose it would get especially tricky — and this is the thorniest part of the EIT saga — if some the government lawyers disagreed. **There is no chance the military lawyers would accept Trump’s line of reasoning**, but it is possible he could appoint some civilian lawyers that might back his case. This would provoke a massive legal fight inside the administration, one that makes the Bush administration’s debates over EIT and the NSA’s terrorist surveillance program, and the Obama administration’s debates over drone strikes against American citizens who have joined al Qaeda, pale in comparison. Every expert I have talked to has reached the same conclusion: **Trump (and any lawyers he could find) would likely lose the case and the military would rightly see the orders as illegal.**

Given that it would be illegal orders, **General Hayden is absolutely correct: not only would the senior military leaders refuse to follow those orders, they would be legally and professionally bound to refuse those orders.** Democratic civil-military relations theory further requires that they refuse these orders. **Refusing these orders would not be a coup. It would be reinforcing the rule of law and healthy civil-military relations.**

No one in the military follows orders from Trump if he does stupid shit

O’Brien 3-6-16 - Dan O’Brien, economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs, columnist with Independent newspapers and senior fellow at UCD, A Trump victory would mean global chaos, the Independent, <http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/a-trump-victory-would-mean-global-chaos-34515014.html>] //CJC

The effect of **his taking control of America's armed forces** would also have very serious repercussions at home. In the current issue of the neo-conservative magazine, the Weekly Standard, **two high profile international affairs analysts - both men of the right - talk of a "crisis in civil-military relations" if Trump were in charge.**¹ Max Boot and Ben Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations describe **what would be an effective mutiny if Trump followed through on his bellicose rhetoric**, including the use of torture as a standard operating procedure, the killing of terrorists' families and the carpet-bombing of areas of the Middle East in which civilians live.¹ They write: **"Many military personnel would refuse to carry out orders so blatantly at odds with the laws of war;** soldiers know that they could face prosecution under a future administration."

National security bureaucracy stops Trump

Stephen M. Walt **2-2-16**, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, The Big 5 and the Sad State of Foreign Policy in 2016,
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/02/the-big-5-and-the-sad-state-of-foreign-policy-in-2016-sanders-clinton-trump-cruz-rubio/> //CJC

Moreover, whenever the next president is elected, he or she is going to get an earful from the permanent national security bureaucracy about the difference between the fairy tales peddled during the campaign and the realities of the real world. Obama got schooled before he took office, and even an egomaniac like Trump might pay attention when experienced officials explain to him why his ideas make no sense. And even if Trump or Cruz remains unchastened, bureaucracies have lots of ways to slow down, obstruct, interfere, and dilute whatever cockamamie ideas a president might try to pursue.¹¹ Does this mean the election doesn't matter? Of course not. The United States is still the strongest country in the world, and whoever sits in the Oval Office can still make a huge difference, both in the people he or she appoints and the decisions he or she makes. And that's what saddens me most as I contemplate this election: Instead of being excited by a smart new leader with a promising vision for addressing our current challenges, I've been reduced to hoping that the foreign-policy establishment will rein in the various candidates' worst instincts.

Trump will moderate – numerous checks.

Palletta 6-8-16. [Damian, reporter, "Trump Will Consult Congress, Agencies On Iran Deal and Muslim Ban, Adviser Says" Wall Street Journal -- blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/] //CJC

Presumptive Republican White House nominee Donald Trump would consult with Congress and federal agencies on a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives, including reworking a nuclear deal with Iran and a proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S., a top adviser said Wednesday. Walid Phares, one of Mr. Trump's senior foreign policy advisers, said the candidate would seek domestic and international “consensus” on a range of foreign policy initiatives. During an hour-long interview with Wall Street Journal reporters and editors, Mr. Phares offered nuance to a number of Mr. Trump's foreign policy ideas, suggesting some aren't set in stone and could be modified as the campaign progresses. For example, Mr. Trump has called a recent nuclear deal with Iran "terrible" and "horrible" but Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump wouldn't immediately attempt to negate it once in office. "He is going to be revising, reviewing, and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal," Mr. Phares said. One option, he said, would be to resubmit the deal – or something like it – to Congress for a vote, a process whose outcome would depend on the makeup of Congress next year. Many bankers are watching the U.S. election closely and waiting for a clearer understanding of future U.S. policy towards Iran before doing business with the country. Mr. Phares's suggestion Mr. Trump would revise the agreement instead of completely voiding it could influence the way some financial institutions deal with companies in Iran seeking access to global markets. Similarly, Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump would consult with immigration, national security, law enforcement, and other officials before proceeding with his proposed temporary ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S. "His position which was strong – in terms of the ban – was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists," he said. Mr. Trump has faced criticism for his foreign policy platform, which breaks from GOP orthodoxy. Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump's worldview doesn't fit neatly into traditional labels of "isolationist" or "interventionalist." Rather, he described Mr. Trump as a "functionalist" who would work with allies when necessary but not overextend the U.S. in matters in which there isn't an American interest. He also said that many of Mr. Trump's proposals so far have only been offered as single ideas, which he compared to pieces of a puzzle. Once more proposals are set forward, something Mr. Phares predicted would happen soon, a broader approach to foreign policy would become clear, he said. "The expectation is the more she's going to attack, the more he's going to respond, and if he's going to respond, he

most likely he will address these issues," Mr. Phares said, referring to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. One key challenge for any Trump administration would be building bridges with Arab countries, many of which have been alarmed by some of Mr. Trump's proposals so far. Mr. Phares said he is interviewed by Arab media outlets at least once a day, and works to explain Mr. Trump's approach to the region. He predicted that numerous countries would be relieved to have a fresh start with the White House next year following several years of frosty relations with the Obama administration. Mr. Phares dismissed the caricature of Mr. Trump that Mrs. Clinton has worked hard to describe, suggesting, for instance, that he would rush into a nuclear conflict if his feelings get hurt or if another country insults him. "I don't see an unusual Trump presidency" as Madame Clinton is explaining where he's going to go crazy and start pressing buttons right away." Mr. Phares said, tapping on the table. "That's not going to happen. We have a rational institution here."

Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated – no incentives due to long time frame, resource requirements, and it's contradictory to their cause.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

While fear of nuclear weapons is rational, its extension to terrorism has been a *vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data*. Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,² and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larsen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real.

Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a "close call" regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal.

Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which **countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities**, or dismantled weapons in their possession.³ In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country's nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons.

If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larsen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, **evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons** or the acquisition of such weapons by other means **is virtually nonexistent**. This may be due to a combination of reasons. **Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder:** In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping.

Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their "trade." **If public sympathy is important to their cause**, an apparent plan or commission of **mass murder** is not going to help them, and indeed **will make their enemies even more implacable**, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The

acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it **requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work.** It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group's more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam's nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

They can't steal a weapon – dozens of safeguards and international collaboration account for loose nukes and irrational states

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Stealing nukes. Nothing is better protected in a **nuclear** weapon state than the **weapons** themselves, which **have multiple layers of safeguards that**, in the United States, **include intelligence** and surveillance, **electronic locks** (including so-called "permissive action links" that prevent detonation unless a code is entered into the lock), **gated** and locked **storage facilities, armed guards, and teams of elite responders** if an attempt at theft were to occur. We know that **most weapon states have such protections**, and there is no reason to believe that such protections are missing in the remaining states, since no weapon state would want to put itself at risk of an unintended nuclear detonation of its own weapons by a malevolent agent. Thus, **the likelihood of** an unauthorized agent secretly planning a **theft**, without being discovered, and getting access to weapons with the intent and physical ability to carry them off in the face of such layers of protection **is extremely low**—but it isn't impossible, especially in the case where the thief is an insider.

The insider threat helped give credibility to the stories, circulating about 20 years ago, that there were "loose nukes" in the USSR, based on some statements by a Soviet general who claimed the regime could not account for more than 40 "suitcase nukes" that had been built. The Russian government denied the claim, and at this point there is no evidence that any nukes were ever loose. Now, it is unclear if any such weapon would even work after 20 years of corrosion of both the nuclear and non-nuclear materials in the device and the radioactive decay of certain isotopes.

Because of the large number of terrorist groups operating in its geographic vicinity, **Pakistan is frequently suggested as a possible candidate for scenarios in which a terrorist group either seizes a weapon via collaboration with insiders** sympathetic to its cause, or in which terrorists "inherit" nuclear weapons by taking over the arsenal of a failed nuclear state that has devolved into chaos. Attacks by a terrorist group on a Pakistani military base, at Kamra, which is believed to house nuclear weapons in some form, have been referenced in connection with such security concerns (Nelson and Hussain, 2012). **However, the Kamra base** contained US fighter planes, including F-16s, used to bomb Taliban bases in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, so the planes, not nuclear weapons, were the likely target of the terrorists, and in any case the **mission was a failure**. Moreover, **Pakistan is not about to collapse, and the Pakistanis** are known to have received **major international assistance in technologies for protecting their weapons** from unauthorized use, store them in somewhat disassembled fashion at multiple locations, and have a sophisticated nuclear security structure in place (see Gregory, 2013; Khan, 2012).

However, the weapons are assembled at times of high tension in the region, and, to keep a degree of uncertainty in their location, they are moved from place to place, making them more vulnerable to seizure at such times (Goldberg and Ambinder, 2011). (It should be noted that US nuclear weapons were subject to such risks during various times when the weapons traveled US highways in disguised trucks and accompanying vehicles, but such travel and the possibility of terrorist seizure was never mentioned publicly.) Such scenarios of seizure in Pakistan would require a major security breakdown within the army leading to a takeover of weapons by a nihilistic terrorist group with little warning, while army loyalists along with India and other interested parties (like the United States) stand by and do not intervene. This is not a particularly realistic scenario, but it's also not a reason to conclude that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of no concern. It is, not only because of an internal threat, but especially because it raises the possibility of nuclear war with India. For this and other reasons, intelligence agencies in multiple countries spend considerable resources tracking the Pakistani nuclear situation to reduce the likelihood of surprises. But any consideration of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does bring home (once again) the folly of US policy in the 1980s, when stopping the Pakistani nuclear program was put on a back burner in order to prosecute the Cold War against the Soviets in Afghanistan (which ultimately led to the establishment of Al Qaeda). Some of the loudest voices expressing concern about nuclear terrorism belong to former senior government officials who supported US assistance to the mujahideen and the accompanying diminution of US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear activities.

States won't give terrorists nukes – there are no guarantees terrorists will cooperate and only results in the state becoming a nuclear target.

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015,] //CJC

Acquiring nukes as a gift. Following the shock of 9/11, government officials and the media imagined many scenarios in which terrorists obtain nuclear weapons; one of those scenarios involves a weapon state using a terrorist group for delivery of a nuclear weapon. There are at least two reasons why this scenario is unlikely: First, once a weapon state loses control of a weapon, it cannot be sure the weapon will be used by the terrorist group as intended. Second, the state cannot be sure that the transfer of the weapon has been undetected either before or after the fact of its detonation (see Lieber and Press, 2013). The use of the weapon by a terrorist group will ultimately result in the transferring nation becoming a nuclear target just as if it had itself detonated the device. This is a powerful deterrent to such a transfer, making the transfer a low-probability event.

It is impossible for terrorists to build a nuke – hundreds of challenges

Weiss 15 - Leonard Weiss, visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). He is also a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, 11/27/2015("On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 71, Issue 2, 2015] //CJC

Manufacturing a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, a terrorist group would have to obtain an appropriate amount of one of the two most popular materials for nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium separated from fuel used in a production reactor or a power reactor. Weapon-grade plutonium is found in weapon manufacturing facilities in nuclear weapon states and is very highly protected until it is inserted in a weapon. Reactor-grade plutonium, although still capable of being weaponized, is less protected, and in that sense is a more attractive target for a terrorist, especially since it has been produced and stored in prodigious quantities in a number of nuclear weapon states and non-weapon states, particularly Japan.

But terrorist use of plutonium for a nuclear explosive device would require the construction of an implosion weapon, requiring the fashioning of an appropriate explosive lens of TNT, a notoriously difficult technical problem. And if a high nuclear yield (much greater than 1 kiloton) is desired, the use of reactor-grade plutonium would require a still more sophisticated design. Moreover, if the plutonium is only available through chemical separation from some (presumably stolen) spent fuel rods, additional technical complications present themselves. There is at least one study showing that a small team of people with the appropriate technical skills and equipment could, in principle, build a plutonium-based nuclear explosive device (Mark et al., 1986). But even if one discounts the high probability that the plan would be discovered at some stage (missing plutonium or spent fuel rods would put the authorities and intelligence operations under high alert), translating this into a real-world situation suggests an extremely low probability of technical success. More likely, according to one well-known weapon designer,⁴ would be the death of the person or persons in the attempt to build the device.

There is the possibility of an insider threat; in one example, a team of people working at a reactor or reprocessing site could conspire to steal some material and try to hide the diversion as MUF (materials unaccounted for) within the nuclear safeguards system. But this scenario would require intimate knowledge of the materials accounting system on which safeguards in that state are based and adds another layer of complexity to an operation with low probability of success.

The situation is different in the case of using highly enriched uranium, which presents fewer technical challenges. Here an implosion design is not necessary, and a "gun type" design is the more likely approach. Fear of this scenario has sometimes been promoted in the literature via the quotation of a famous statement by nuclear physicist Luis Alvarez that dropping a subcritical amount of HEU onto another subcritical amount from a distance of five feet could result in a nuclear yield. The probability of such a yield (and its size) would depend on the geometry of the HEU components and the amount of material. More likely than a substantial nuclear explosion from such a scenario would be a criticality accident that would release an intense burst of radiation, killing persons in the immediate vicinity, or (even less likely) a low-yield nuclear "fizzle" that could be quite damaging locally (like a large TNT explosion) but also carry a psychological effect because of its nuclear dimension.

In any case, since the critical mass of a bare metal perfect sphere of pure U-235 is approximately 56 kilograms, stealing that much highly enriched material (and getting away without detection, an armed fight, or a criticality accident) is a major problem for any thief and one significantly greater than the stealing of small amounts of HEU and lower-enriched material that has been reported from time to time over the past two decades, mostly from former Soviet sites that have since had their security greatly strengthened. Moreover, fashioning the material into a form more useful or convenient for explosive purposes could likely mean a need for still more material than suggested above, plus a means for machining it, as would be the case for HEU fuel assemblies from a research reactor. In a recent paper, physics professor B. C. Reed discusses the feasibility of terrorists building a low-yield, gun-type fission weapon, but admittedly avoids the issue of whether the terrorists would likely have the technical ability to carry feasibility to realization and whether the terrorists are likely to be successful in stealing the needed material and hiding their project as it proceeds (Reed, 2014). But this is the crux of the nuclear terrorism issue. There is no argument about feasibility, which has been accepted for decades, even for plutonium-based weapons, ever since Ted Taylor first raised it in the early 1970s and a Senate subcommittee held hearings in the late 1970s on a weapon design created by a Harvard dropout from information he obtained from the public section of the Los

Alamos National Laboratory library (Fialka, 1978). Likewise, no one can deny the terrible consequences of a nuclear explosion. The question is the level of risk, and what steps are acceptable in a democracy for reducing it.

Although the attention in the literature given to nuclear terrorism scenarios involving HEU would suggest major attempts to obtain such material by terrorist groups, there is only one known case of a major theft of HEU. It involves a US government contractor processing HEU for the US Navy in Apollo, Pennsylvania in the 1970s at a time when security and materials accounting were extremely lax. The theft was almost surely carried out by agents of the Israeli government with the probable involvement of a person or persons working for the contractor, not a sub-national terrorist group intent on making its own weapons (Gilinsky and Mattson, 2010). The circumstances under which this theft occurred were unique, and there was significant information about the contractor's relationship to Israel that should have rung alarm bells and would do so today. Although it involved a government and not a sub-national group, the theft underscores the importance of security and accounting of nuclear materials, especially because the technical requirements for making an HEU weapon are less daunting than for a plutonium weapon, and the probability of success by a terrorist group, though low, is certainly greater than zero. Over the past two decades, there has been a significant effort to increase protection of such materials, particularly in recent years through the efforts of nongovernmental organizations like the International Panel on Fissile Materials6 and advocates like Matthew Bunn working within the Obama administration (Bunn and Newman, 2008), though the administration has apparently not seen the need to make the materials as secure as the weapons themselves.

ISIS and Al-Qaeda don't pose a threat – their tactics are not new and won't be catastrophic

Ward 15 - Alex Ward, Assistant Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council where he works on U.S. defense policy, strategy and military affairs., 5/29/15("How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?," published by How Much does ISIS really Threaten America, Available online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-much-does-isis-really-threaten-america-12993?page=2> //CJC

While some concern is warranted, there is no need for alarm on the scale we are currently witnessing. The ISIS threat is overhyped, giving the group more power than it deserves while distracting from bigger threats. More to the point, there is no new phase of terrorism, just the same phase—but with a different ability to promote use of usual tactics.

Indeed, the threats facing the American homeland today, mostly of the “lone wolf” variety, are threats the United States has faced for years. What is needed now is a new way of dealing with an old problem. In an era of increased connectivity, the ability of terrorists to contact lone-wolf candidates is greater than ever—and American leaders are worried. Terrorist organizations, like ISIS, have used the means of this hyper-connected era, especially social media, to great effect. A Brookings Institution study showed that ISIS has a “sophisticated and innovative methodology” that makes use of the “at least 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts.” This social media strategy—and the appeal of ISIS’ cause—has attracted lone wolves to carry out strikes in the West, with the brutal attack in Paris so far being the most significant. The United States is worried sick about a potential terrorist-inspired lone wolf operation on its own soil and is scrambling to tighten security at military bases and malls alike.

In addition, ISIS’ mastery of social media and messaging inspired a cadre of foreign fighters and people sympathetic to its mission. Many fighters have gone to the battlefields in Iraq, Syria, and beyond in hopes of establishing an Islamic state. Nicholas Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, called the rate of foreign fighters traveling to the area “unprecedented.”

The worry for Western governments is that these fighters will obtain advanced asymmetric warfare training and use them to great effect back in their home states. The thirty to forty Americans who have traveled to the Middle East—a dozen or so who may have joined ISIS—worry U.S. law enforcement because, upon their return, they pose a threat to homeland security.

These trends are certainly concerning, but they do not equate to a “new phase” of terrorism for the U.S. homeland. The reasons why are straightforward.

For one, ISIS’ main focus is consolidating gains and grabbing new territory in Syria and Iraq. What it has been able to do there certainly constitutes a new phase in the way terrorists operate, but does not radically change the danger calculus on American land. Indeed, ISIS is not yet fully focused on bringing chaos to the West. Yes, it wants to eventually destroy Western targets, but that is currently a lesser concern for ISIS. And, the lone wolf attacks the group does inspire will continue to be smaller and less catastrophic than has been seen in America’s recent past. Further, al-Qaeda—the bigger threat to the United States—is not at the capacity level at which it once was due to the United States. Its ability to pull off a spectacular attack like 9/11 is substantially reduced, although not impossible. So while the United States should still be vigilant for a large-scale attack, the country can breathe a little easier. It is also important to note that what is happening now with ISIS and many other anti-Western terrorist groups is not necessarily a new phenomenon. While ISIS certainly has an amazing ability to inspire action via social media, the appeal of fighting for an ideological cause has been around since time immemorial. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 2000s, the Afghanistan War in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and even the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s are just some examples of when foreigners came running in order to help a cause for which they believed they should die. As for lone wolf or smaller-scale attacks in the United States, the country has dealt with these kinds of issues for a long time. Even today the United States experiences “one attack, on average, every thirty-four days.” In essence, the fear from returning foreign fighters should not scare us any more than current domestic terrorists do because they are already here and acting. To claim that ISIS is currently more dangerous to American targets seems off, although a lack of a coherent policy to stem the group could change that calculus.

Al Qaeda does not pose a threat – lack of funds and leadership – drones have empirically been successful in reducing the number of attacks.

Lee 15 - Kangil Lee, research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research , 2015("DOES AL QAEDA CENTRAL STILL MATTER?," published by Revista UNISCI, Available online at <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72478/UNISCIDP37-2LEE.pdf>] //CJC

However, scholars who argue the demise of Al Qaeda Central seem to prefer a much simpler approach that measures al Qaeda’s operational capability by a couple of simple factors. There are two main pieces of evidence used to support the argument that Al Qaeda has been defeated. Firstly, the death of bin Laden and the demise of Al Qaeda’s core group of members, especially members of the Shura council. Secondly, the absence of terrorism in the West that Al Qaeda Central is involved in. These are central pieces of evidence that points towards al Qaeda’s demise, which suggest Al Qaeda Central is incapable of carrying out any attacks.

For example, in 2012, Peter Bergen argued Al Qaeda is defeated because CIA drone policy in Afghanistan (Al Qaeda Central’s stronghold for long time), successfully eliminated 28 Al Qaeda key members especially those on the Shura council revealed by Jamal al fadl, a former Al Qaeda member. Bergen said as a result, Al Qaeda only has one senior leader left, al Zawahiri, who lacks charisma, and who took over the group after the death of Osama bin Laden.³⁶ According to

Bergen, Al Qaeda Central has never launched a successful terrorist attack in the West since 9/11 except for the 7/7 London bombing that killed 52 commuters. Even so-called affiliates and lone wolves inspired by Al Qaeda have only killed 17 people in the United States since 9/11.

Sageman backs up this assertion, and in 2011 added to Bergen's claim, arguing a comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadi terrorism in the West highlights that there were 60 plots over the past 20 years, perpetrated by 46 different networks. Of these only 14 successfully inflicted any casualties, and only two were perpetrated by al-Qaeda proper in the past 20 years. Over the past five years, global neo-jihadi and al-Qaeda terrorism in the West has been in decline and the vast majority of the plots were perpetrated by independent home- grown groups, inspired by al-Qaeda but not linked to it or its allies.³⁷ Many terrorist attempts launched by like-minded terrorist groups or individuals have not been traced back to Afghanistan. Moreover, he says, there is no evidence Al Qaeda Central was involved in any terrorist plots since 9/11. Al Qaeda Central currently does not run a training centre for terrorists, and the group is not capable of funding terrorist attacks anymore due to the loss of its financial resources. There has been no global neo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the West in the past four years and none in the U.S. in the past eight years.

According to Javier Jordán, terrorism expert and the author of The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study, US drone policy managed to oppress the group's operational capability. Jordán claims that there were 136 terrorist incidents from 2001 to 2012, and Al Qaeda Central was involved in only 33 cases out of 136, 5 in the United States and 28 in Europe. From 2001 to 2006, Al Qaeda Central was quite active in plotting terrorist attacks, as 20 incidents were conducted during the first half of that period. Whereas, Al Qaeda Central's activity came to a lull especially after 2007, the year US drone activity was stepped up in Afghanistan. Even 13 cases of attacks between 2007 and 2012, did not cause any casualty or damage to Western society. Jordán concludes the complexity and lethality of Al Qaeda Central's terrorist actions on American and European soil have fallen dramatically.³⁸ Jordán evaluates Al Qaeda endured immense structural damage from the CIA drone campaign. As a result, Al Qaeda lost control over affiliates in strategic and operational positions, and switched into a significantly decentralized organization that has tried to recover its influence to affiliates but due to difficulties in communicating with affiliates, their efforts have largely failed. Now Al Qaeda Central has no or very little capability to plot and launch terrorist attacks, probably none outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.³⁹

After the US drone policy commenced, approximately 60 key members of Al Qaeda were killed by drones. It is unclear exactly how many Al Qaeda members died in this campaign, although Jordán and Sageman presumed around 60. As matter of fact, even bin Laden was concerned about the loss of experienced members and his anxiety is well expressed in one of his documents seized from the Abbottabad raid. It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. When this experienced leadership dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders and this would lead to the repeat of mistakes.⁴⁰

Although the effect of the targeted killing policy has never been proved, the killing of key members in the organization seems to have caused some level of disconnection between groups. As per bin Laden's recommendation to avoid wiretapping or signal intercepting by CIA, Al Qaeda members prefer hand-written letters to communicate with each other. This is safe but it takes time to communicate especially with affiliates outside of Afghanistan. Indeed, along with beginning of drone program, al Qaeda's terrorism operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan have significantly decreased since 2008. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only one terrorist attack occurred in Pakistan after 2008, conducted by Al Qaeda Central.⁴¹ Nevertheless, we have no idea what has brought on the decrease in the number of terrorism incidents.

NO LINK: Surplus weapons transfers got ended after govt panel concluded they suck — postdates your EV — and TURN: surplus weapons are key to police training and effectiveness

Griffith 2016 [Beth Griffith is a writer for The 109, "Return of military equipment causes frustration among some officers", *The 109*, <<http://www.the109.org/2016/02/09/recall-of-military-equipment-causes-frustration-among-some-officers/>>] //CJC

Around the same time Paris was under siege and a heavily armed couple killed 14 people and wounded more in San Bernardino, California, **law enforcement agencies across the country received an order to return armored personnel carriers and other equipment previously received by the federal government. The Obama administration issued an executive order from law enforcement agencies** in Los Angeles and New York to small cities like Benbrook, Texas, **telling agencies to return a variety of federal surplus military equipment** by Friday, April 1. The order was a response to the public outrage and concern about the "militarization" of law enforcement agencies during events like Ferguson and Baltimore. "We've seen how militarized gear can sometimes give people a feeling like there's an occupying force," President Barack Obama said last year as he announced the recall. "As opposed to a force that's part of the community, that's protecting and serving them." **The order gives a "prohibited equipment list" of items that law enforcement agencies will not be able to receive, keep or transfer. The prohibited items include tracked armored vehicles, bayonets, grenade launchers, large caliber weapons and ammunition, weaponized vehicles, vessels and aircraft.** Many agencies haven't had a problem complying with the order, but to retired police chief Bill Mathis and others, the orders were frustrating. Mathis served over 30 years in Oklahoma law enforcement and said the order to return equipment left departments without some of the tools they need to effectively combat terrorism and mass shootings. **"Police have to protect themselves,"** Mathis said. **"When things like Paris happen, we have to be ready for them. We have to make sure that our law enforcement has the equipment needed to go into those types of situations."** A paramilitary problem. **Federal programs like the 1033 Program allow the Secretary of Defense to transfer excess Department of Defense (DOD) property to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies free of charge.** According to **a White House Report**, since 1990 the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has given excess military equipment to approximately 8,000 federal and state law enforcement agencies nationwide. This added up to \$5.1 billion in total property, and \$2.7 billion in the last five years. After the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, federal departments viewed the police as critical assets to fighting terrorism. As the conflict escalated overseas and mass shootings across the nation rose, there was little criticism about police officers receiving militarized gear. However, after incidents like August of 2013 when Arlington, Texas SWAT officers stormed through the Garden of Eden organic farm in armored vehicles, all-black body armor, carrying shields and assault rifles, concerns about heavy-handed police tactics **using this gear came under scrutiny.** Then came Ferguson. When the town of Ferguson, Missouri flooded with rioters in the fall of 2014, the protesters were met by police officers wearing military grade gear and camouflage, equipped with tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets and more. During the protests in 2014, **Obama ordered a review of the military equipment program by a panel of experts**, including the head of the Defense Homeland Security and Justice Departments. **The panel's review stated the government failed to properly oversee the 1033 Program.** A dual purpose. On the other hand, some local officials said equipment acquired through the 1033 Program have helped small departments in more ways than one. **The majority of equipment given out through the 1033 Program since 1990 is conventional.** According to the Texas state property book, **equipment like general office supplies are the majority of equipment received.** The items included office furniture, first aid kits, storage containers and lockers that haven't been recalled. Mathis said in large cities like Dallas, **the equipment received through the 1033 Program allow police to respond and improve in areas of high criminal activity.** "It's a constant effort on departments to improve things, like in Dallas, where the chief had a certain area that had robberies," Mathis said. **A lot of departments don't have the budget to get that type of equipment.** Our first tactical van

was an old bread truck that we revamped. We were trying to make do and later one we acquired that equipment." Bryan Jamison, a Fort Worth police officer, also said the equipment is helpful in ways that don't involve civil unrest and terrorism. He said they include training exercises, hostage situations, and search-and-rescue operations. Fort Worth said the majority of the equipment remains tucked away for serious situations, but the department utilizes similar equipment in a reality-based training system, Jamison added. "We can simulate a school shooting where we can simulate an active shooter inside of a school, or anywhere for that matter," Jamison said. "We use it a lot for situational stuff to prepare a new officer or recruit officer – to put them in the environment, immerse them in it and get them as close as we possibly can to real life."

Non-U/Delink: Militarization is increasing despite promises to decrease it (and despite decreased military spending)

Tyler Durden, May 2016 [Zero Hedge staff writer, "The Militarization Of America's Police: Despite Obama Promises, War-Weapon Spending Soared In 2014/15," Zero Hedge, <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-05-11/militarization-americas-police-despite-obama-promises-war-weapon-spending-soared-201>] MJS 12-8-2016

The militarization of America's police has been a topic of concern for years (most openly since The Boston Marathon bombing in 2013) but reached a crescendo in 2014 amid Ferguson's riots when the average joe was exposed to MRAPs up close and personal. In October 2014, President Obama began planning to increase funding for military equipment transfers to the police, but then in May 2015, he flip-flopped - proclaiming his goal to de-militarize the police. However, this was another lie. As Forbes reports, despite Obama's pledge to demilitarize the police new federal data shows that 2014 and 2015 were peak years for shipments of surplus military gear to local police departments across America.

Tiny percentage of surplus equipment is weapons and vehicles, all vehicles get their weapons removed first, DLA rejects unreasonable requests, and police military gear is key to dealing with armored criminals and disaster relief

Harper 2014 [John Harper is a writer for Stars and Stripes, "How and why local police departments get military surplus equipment", *Stars and Stripes*, <<http://www.stripes.com/how-and-why-local-police-departments-get-military-surplus-equipment-1.299570>>] //CJC

More than 8,000 law enforcement agencies around the country participate in 1033. Since the program's inception, the Pentagon has transferred property worth \$5.1 billion. Last year, half a billion dollars' worth of gear was transferred, according to the Defense Logistics Agency, which manages the transfers. Equipment is free, but law enforcement agencies must pay maintenance and transportation costs. Some of the items — Humvees, mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, aircraft (rotary and fixed wing), boats, sniper scopes and M-16s — raise eyebrows. But only about 5 percent of the equipment is weapons, and fewer than 1 percent is tactical vehicles, according to the defense official. Much of the gear is non-military items, such as office equipment, blankets and sleeping bags, computers, digital cameras and video recorders, binoculars, flashlights, extreme weather clothing, repair tools, first-aid supplies and TVs. The official said all tactical vehicles are "stripped down" before they are given to law enforcement, and are without weapons. Transferred aircraft

is also unarmed and intended to give police greater observation capabilities, according to the official. Just because the Pentagon doesn't need a particular item doesn't mean law enforcement agencies can use it. The logistics agency has to approve every type of item that can be transferred. "No, you can't have a damn tank," the official said. What is it good for? Some wonder why a police force would need weapons and vehicles designed for war zones. Bill Johnson, the executive director of the National Association of Police Organizations, an advocacy group in Alexandria, Va., suggested that the level of violence on American streets sometimes justifies law enforcement's use of military-grade gear. Johnson cited the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing as an example. "You have armed and dangerous suspects who have already detonated two bombs and killed people and maimed people, and now you've got police tracking them down and chasing them and they're actually getting bombs thrown at them and being shot at and so forth," he said. "Unfortunately in America today ... it's so violent against the police that they really do need that level of protection." It's also about image in how the gear is presented and used, he said. "An MRAP, I think, obviously by its very form and appearance, is something that could be intimidating to people who aren't used to being around it." Johnson said what came to be known as the North Hollywood shootout in 1997 — in which heavily armed and armored bank robbers slugged it out with the LAPD for hours — is one example of law enforcement officials needing powerful rifles to subdue criminals. "The bad guys had military-grade body armor ... They were able to keep going and shoot and do damage" and the police officers' regular duty weapons "weren't doing anything," he said. The need for police in large cities to have heavy-duty weapons and equipment that could be used in a major crisis seems more reasonable to some than the acquisition of MRAPs and assault rifles by a number of small-town law enforcement agencies. But Johnson said that the size of the town being policed isn't necessarily the right metric. "It's more a function of the level of criminal activity and the potential violence associated with it than the population of the city." For example, he said, a very rural area could have a severe methamphetamine problem, which often is accompanied by violence. "You can have booby traps, you can have explosives, you can have people who are willing to very violently defend their [meth] lab or their [marijuana] growing area and so forth ... It doesn't mean you have to deploy it all the time. But I think it's a good tool to have in the toolbox." Military vehicles can also be useful for search-and-rescue missions. "When there's a natural disaster ... you [may] need vehicles like a Humvee to go through high water to get to an area that normally you wouldn't get to," Johnson said.

Grants from the DHS aren't topical — not part of military spending

NPP 2014 [National Priorities Project, "How Military Spending has Changed Since 9/11", *National Priorities Project*, <<https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/how-military-spending-has-changed/>>]
//CJC

Total military spending includes about \$16 billion in military expenses for the Department of Homeland Security, which was established in 2002. This department also gets funds that are not designated as military spending, including funding for law enforcement, border control, and other pseudo-military expenses. Non-military Department of Homeland Security funding is expected to be an additional \$43 billion in fiscal year 2015.

TURN: money for weapons is raised through raids and civil forfeiture, giving it away for free removes the perverse incentive

Alex Kane, 7-4-2014 [staff writer, "11 chilling facts about America's militarized police force," Salon,
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/04/11_disturbing_facts_about_americas_militarized_police_force_partner/] MJS 12-9-2016

8. **Asset forfeitures are funding police militarization.** In June, AlterNet's Aaron Cantu outlined how civil asset forfeiture laws work. "It's a legal fiction spun up hundreds of years ago to give the state the power to convict a person's property of a crime, or at least, implicate its involvement in the committing of a crime. When that happened, the property was to be legally seized by the state," wrote Cantu. He went on to explain that law enforcement justifies the seizing of property and cash as a way to break up narcotics rings' infrastructure. But it can also be used in cases where a person is not convicted, or even charged with, a crime. **Asset forfeitures bring in millions of dollars for police agencies, who then spend the money for their own uses. And for some police departments, it goes to militarizing their police force.** New Yorker reporter Sarah Stillman, who penned a deeply reported piece on asset forfeitures, wrote in August 2013 that "thousands of police departments nationwide have recently acquired stun grenades, armored tanks, counterattack vehicles, and other paramilitary equipment, much of it purchased with asset-forfeiture funds." **So SWAT teams have an incentive to conduct raids where they seize property and cash. That money can then go into their budgets for more weapons.**

Non-western countries increased military spending last year (despite US cuts) and it's a long term shift

Chadwick 2016 [Lauren Chadwick is a writer for the CPI. "Global military spending is increasing." The Center for Public Integrity, 6 Apr.

2016.<<https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/04/06/19532/global-military-spending-increasing>>]
//CJC

Last year, the world's military spending increased for the first time in four years, a directional shift that may herald even higher spending on armaments and operations in years to come, according to new data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The world heaped more than \$1.6 trillion on military programs and personnel in 2015, roughly 1 percent more than in 2014, a SIPRI analyst declared at the nonpartisan Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. on April 5. The increase follows four years of decline, which was preceded by 12 years of steady increases. So the brief falloff is over, and the familiar routine is back. "The dynamic for state spending has changed everywhere," Aude Fleurant, Director of the Arms and Military Expenditure Programme at SIPRI said during a panel discussion. **Many non- western countries in particular increased their military spending in 2015, she said."**

Chinese aggression increases in the absence of US presence, not as a reaction — proves deterrence is the critical factor in preventing conflict.

Shaohan Lin, June 2015. MA Student @ Royal Military College of Canada. "After the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Now what?" Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 16.2, p. 1-24. //CJC

The last tool of statecraft employed in the pivot is deterrence via alliance building and joint military exercises. While diplomatic exhortations and economic challenges are to transform unwanted behaviour to rule-based conduct, deterrence draws a line at Chinese belligerence. It is by no mean a constructive approach to China's rise. Rather, it is a latent threat that serves to preserve regional security through reinforced US military presence that can quickly take compellence acts if China goes overboard in its unilateral schemes. **Deterrence is the ace in the hole in Sino-US relations**; China can, to a certain extent, scoff at multilateral binds and shrug off economic initiatives, but it cannot ignore the stick at the US' disposal.

Unfortunately for the US, the balance of power is not completely tilted in its favour. As commonly stated, the US risks massive economic repercussions and lethal military responses, should China feels threatened. For China, there is nothing more threatening than military projection in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the "hedge" is emphatically pronounced in deterrence, as demonstrated by the delicate, low-intensity military deployments in the region. As previously mentioned, the US has garrisoned troops in Darwin, Australia, and their number is projected to increase to 2,500 by 2016.⁵⁴ Then again, Australia is hardly part of the Asia-Pacific region. Military bases in South Korea and Japan notwithstanding, the US has not put troops on any new soil closer to China. Deterrence has mainly taken the guise of joint military exercises and military aid with allied Asian Pacific states and those that enjoy a security partnership with the US. Prominent military exercises include Cobra Gold and Balikatan. Traditionally annual bilateral events between the US and a Southeast Asian ally, these exercises have significantly expanded to include multiple states in the region at a time consistent with the pivot. With respect to the South China Sea dispute, the US has offered military aid to the claimants challenging China. Since 2011, the US has continuously supplied hardware and intelligence to the Philippines.⁵⁵ American ships have also visited Filipino ports on a regular basis. As well, the US signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2011, which was a breakthrough in US-Vietnamese relations since the US had always rejected closer defense ties with this state.⁵⁶ Joint naval training was conducted as well. In addition to traditional allies in the region, even Cambodia was included in the US-led Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise in 2010.⁵⁷ The latest expansion of military exercises and military aid, while indicative of a response to China's truculent rise, does not necessarily threaten it. The

balance of power in Asia-Pacific has changed little. **US-led military activities certainly display intent – displeasure towards China and readiness to confront it if need be – but not the material resolve to structurally alter Chinese strategic calculus**. To be sure, installing new military bases on China's periphery would create a much greater impact on China's decision-making than spectacles featuring combat vessels and sailors. In short, **the American delicate military measures warned China, but have yet to plunge Asia-Pacific in security crises**. Sino-US relations have not deteriorated to an irreversible point and the door is open for both parties to cool off existing tensions between them. A strictly military example of working Sino-US relations is China's participation in Exercise RIMPAC in summer 2014. Due to low-cost military activities and the inclusion of China in military exercises, the deterrence dimension of the pivot cannot be taken more than "hedging," and must not be mistaken for containment or balancing. **Soft military procedures did not prevent China from retaliating in its own ways. When the US navy increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific and took sides in the South China Sea disputes, China responded with a rapprochement with North Korea**.

Not only did China abandon all efforts in persuading North Korea to denuclearize, it also improved aid and trade relations with it.⁵⁸ China stymied US denuclearization efforts on another occasion; in 2012, just as the US and other states sanctioned Iran for its illicit nuclear program, China reached an arrangement with Iran to purchase oil.⁵⁹ Both the North Korea and Iran cases are definite responses to the pivot as China worked alongside the US before the latter's increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Syria is yet another additional area of contention where China challenged the US. In spring 2014, China, along with Russia, vetoed a resolution backed by more than sixty-five countries to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for its numerous instances of human rights violations. This veto was in fact the fourth time China foiled Western resolutions regarding Syria.⁶⁰ Admittedly, it is unsure whether these sabotages were done out of spite or quite independently of the US pivot.

What these examples of reprisals show is that China avoids directly compromising the security of the Asia-Pacific. It has not answered the US military presence by increasing its own military presence, at least not in a fashion that menaces the US. Granted, China did voice its discontentment towards American territorial "infringement" in the South China Sea, but contrarily media and some scholarly claims, **China has not escalated tensions because of the pivot**; it may have very well done so without American interference in the region. As claimants challenge a rising China, it should be expected for the latter to make full use of its leverages, especially without the scrutinizing gaze of the Americans. It is not folly to believe that **security conditions would be worse without displays of US commitment and force that serve as a check to Chinese aggression. The harassments of Vietnamese and Philippine survey vessels by Chinese patrol boats in 2011, 2012 and 2014 are often cited as proof of Chinese behaviour aggravated by US showboating. But in 2005, when US presence in the Asia-Pacific was minimal, Chinese ships fired at Vietnamese boats, killing nine people.**⁶¹

Assuming that the US Navy has an impact on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, then it would be beneficial as cable-cutting and collisions, the primary mechanisms of violence today, are considerably milder than firing with the

intent to kill. **Thus far, the deterrence element of the pivot has succeeded in restraining real Chinese aggression** and has not shifted the status quo in the region.

NON-U: US already in arms race with NoKo, Russia, China, Iran

Chossudovsky 2016 [Michael Chossudovsky is a professor of Economics at University of Ottawa, "The US-Led Militarization of Southeast Asia. China, Russia, North Korea and Iran Are Targets in Pentagon World War III Scenarios", *Center for Research on Globalization*, <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-us-led-militarization-of-southeast-asia-china-russia-north-korea-and-iran-are-targets-in-pentagon-world-war-iii-scenarios/5535932>>] //CJC

Asked about the prospects of the diplomatic flare-up provoking a new arms race in the region, Chossudovsky suggested that unfortunately, one has already begun. **"We are already in an arms race situation, triggered by the United States. That arms race, at this particular juncture, is essentially directed against four countries – Russia, China...Iran and North Korea.**

Korea. These are the four countries which are on the drawing board of the Pentagon, and they have been there for many, many years. In all the war games – the World War 3 scenarios that the Pentagon [plays out] on a routine basis – these four countries are the targets...This is ultimately what is at stake." The professor reiterated that the militarization of the South China Sea is "there for two purposes: for threatening China, and [for preventing] the countries of the region – of Southeast Asia and the Far East from entering into cooperation agreements which would be more of a regional type." Such agreements, Chossudovsky noted, would serve as a clear threat to Washington's efforts to enforce the Trans-Pacific Partnership, aimed at putting countries throughout the region "under the geopolitical control of the United States." The professor also emphasized that under normal circumstances, the issue of maritime rights would be resolved through bilateral discussions. A Canadian, Chossudovsky recalled that the United States and Canada also have water boundary disputes. But this doesn't mean that the Chinese Navy butts in and deploys its own ships to these areas.

China will never invade Taiwan, Korea, Senkakus, or laundry list of other places and their expansion isn't a threat to the US

Babones 2015 [Salvatore Babones, American comparative sociologist at the University of Sydney in Sydney, Australia, "Is China a Threat? The Devil's in the Details," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, <<http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat-the-devils-in-the-details/>>] //CJC

For very different reasons, China poses little threat to South Korea. China increasingly views North Korea more as a burden than as an advance column for an attack on the South. **And China has recently been courting South Korean technology investment** in order to reduce its dependence on Japan. Political relations across the Taiwan Strait are inevitably dominated by questions over the status of Taiwan. **Every election in Taiwan sparks talk about and fears of Chinese invasion. But no country in the world has staged a large-scale amphibious assault since the U.S. landings at Incheon, South Korea in 1950.** For more than half a century, even American adventures abroad have been small-scale (Grenada) or launched from land bases (Iraq). **The Chinese military will never have the capacity to invade Taiwan against armed resistance — not now, not later, not ever. It just can't be done in the contemporary military context in which a single cruise missile can sink a transport ship carrying thousands of troops. It makes no sense to worry about something that is not technically possible.** The Philippines? Why would China want to invade the Philippines? Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar? Ditto, ditto, ditto. China is involved in a plethora of minor border disputes with its neighbors, but none of these involve core territorial interests or serious legal claims that China (or most of its neighbors, for that matter) have historically been interested in pushing. They're all frozen conflicts that are unlikely ever to thaw.

Some pundits worry about the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. India may not rival China as a great power, but even India should be able to contain China's ability to project power as far away as the Indian Ocean — and India has every reason

to do so. In short, it's difficult to imagine concrete scenarios for major regional conflict sparked by China. It's true that there are many flashpoints for minor conflict: the Senkaku Islands, various shoals and reefs in the South China Sea, China's expanded air defence identification zone, and most notoriously China's building of a whole new island in the middle of the ocean, presumably intended to form the basis for reinforcing its maritime claims. The outcome of these disputes may determine who gets to drill for deep offshore oil decades in the future. But they don't involve major national interests for any of the countries concerned, least of all the United States. So while it's possible that China will become involved in a minor air or sea incident with one or more of its maritime neighbors, it's entirely unlikely that China will become involved in a major regional conflict with any of them. No one is going to go to war because two warplanes collide in mid-air. Historically countries have not even gone to war over the intentional shooting down of civilian airliners, never mind military accidents.

[...]

There are as yet no signs that China's military expansion threatens the United States. Quite the contrary: It might support greater Chinese involvement in international peace-keeping, and it could spark more appropriate burden-sharing among America's Asian allies.

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Nukes

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, "Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China", ThinkProgress, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It's not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It's just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

...

But there's one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914—"The War To End All Wars"—would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war's end would be accomplished by the world's end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia's great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University's Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the "preemption temptation;" nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.

Sino-Japanese War Unlikely Because of Money

ThinkProgress, 2014 [ThinkProgress, "Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China", ThinkProgress, <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.c93ucq1h9>] //AKC

It's wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyu is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. **But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan's largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it'd be pretty painful for both.**

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he's probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. **He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.**

The 1978 crisis over the islands is a good example. Bilateral trade had grown substantially since the end of the last big dispute (1972), but they had entered into a new phase after Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms began in 1978. A key part of the early modernization plan was the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) with Japan, **a diplomatic treaty** that (among other things) **"facilitated a rush of Japanese firms into the Chinese market."** According to Koo, **"policy circles in China and Japan"** had **"increasingly recognized that the [Senkaku/Diaoyu] sovereignty issue could possibly jeopardize the PFT negotiations, thus undermining economic gains."** **The leadership tamped down tensions and, afterwards, "shelving territorial claims for economic development seemingly became the two countries' diplomatic leitmotif in the treatment of the island dispute."**

There's reason to believe today's China and Japan aren't bucking the historical pattern. Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late. Quartz's Matt Phillips, looking over the numbers, concluded that "the China-Japan trade war is pretty much over." Sure, Chinese business leaders are making some nationalistic noises, but Phillips points out that the "lack of mass, nationalistic protests in China suggests the powers-that-be have decided there's no need for that to hurt an important business relationship." Trade really does appear to be calming the waves in the East China Sea.

No Taiwan war- China doesn't want to invade, and deterrence checks escalation

Keck 13 (12/24, Zachary, formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog, Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues, Why China Won't Attack Taiwan, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/>) //CJC

Even assuming China's military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan. The first and least important is the dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, China's invasion of Taiwan would diminish any lingering debate over how

Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its own fate in Taiwan. Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this narrative would be convincing to none of China's neighbors. Consequently, Beijing would face an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power. But **the more important deterrent** for China would be **the uncertainty of success**. To be sure, China's military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its ability to quickly defeat Taiwan's military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nation's armed forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether. It is in this latter aim that **China's strategy is likely to falter**. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus, even if it quickly defeated Taiwan's formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to contend with the remnants of **resistance for years** to come. Such a scenario would be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as **this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance among various groups on the mainland**, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China. Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle **even Han Chinese** on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere. The entire situation would be *a nightmare for Chinese leaders*. Consequently, they are *nearly certain* to avoid provoking it by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus, the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is unlikely to be changed by military force. Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can facilitate this by offering favorable terms.

China and Taiwan are reaching consensus on key issues now with cooperation

Taipei Times 2014 [Staff writer "Taiwan, China reach consensus on nine deals,"
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/02/23/2003584158>] //AGK

Taiwan and China on Friday reached a consensus on proposals to improve the implementation of nine of 19 agreements they have signed to date. The consensus came after a two-day meeting in China's Changsha between the intermediary bodies handling negotiations for the two countries in the absence of official ties — the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). The Changsha meeting was held to review the implementation and impact of the 19 cross-strait pacts signed since 2008 when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) set in motion a more conciliatory approach toward China. During the review, **consensus was reached on improving the implementation of accords covering cooperation in the fields of finance, air transportation, sea transportation, healthcare, crime fighting, food safety, investment protection, fishing crews and agricultural quarantines**.

No risk of SCS conflicts – Globalization checks

Jenny, 15 – [Nicolas Jenny, Masters at Fudan University in Shanghai, 1-28-15, Trade Goes on as Usual in the South China Sea,

www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/01/28/trade_goes_on_as_usual_in_the_south_china_sea_110939.html] //CJC

International relations scholars and journalists have intensely debated the reasons behind China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea. But Beijing's foreign policy actions in the region have made most countries suspicious if not completely resentful of China.

This has led some to claim that, 'China today faces the worst regional environment since Tiananmen. Its relations with Japan are at a record low; China-ASEAN ties have similarly deteriorated due to the South China Sea disputes and China's heavy-handed use of its clout to divide ASEAN.'[¶] Despite this resentment, analysts have largely overlooked the trade dynamics between China and other claimants in the South China Sea dispute. One would naturally assume that deep suspicions or resentment of Beijing would translate into diminishing trade ties, yet the opposite has taken place.[¶] For example, **Vietnam recorded an 18.9% increase in Chinese imports in 2014** despite Hanoi's attempts to broaden its import partners. The issue became particularly relevant following China's decision to place an oil rig in disputed waters earlier in 2014.[¶] **The Philippines**, no stranger to Chinese pressure in the South China Sea, **also reported a 12.4% increase of exports to China** during the first nine months of 2014. Coincidentally, **China is also the Philippines' third largest, and Vietnam's largest trading partner.**[¶] While smaller East Asian states continue to hedge their bets against China, there is a resounding pattern in their trade statistics - they all present a strong trade deficit in China's favour. Vietnam's trade deficit with China reached a record high in 2014 while the Philippines' highest trade deficit is with China, representing 16% of imports, a 35% increase from previous years.[¶] **Herein lays the conundrum of the South China Sea dispute: while claimant states rally against Beijing's nine-dash line, economically, they need China more than China needs them. Access to China's market has forced foreign companies and their governments to compromise on politics.** While European companies have compromised on issues such as internet censorship, **Southeast Asia's governments have been forced to compromise on sovereignty in the South China Sea.**[¶]

This economic fact of life for Southeast Asian states has produced ripple effects across policy. For example, following the deadly anti-China riots in Vietnam, Hanoi promised to reimburse and rebuild China's factories damaged by the protests. Similarly, the Philippines' economy suffered tremendously in 2012 when China drastically cut banana imports.[¶] China will soon have successfully leveraged its economic power to reach political ends - the consolidation of the South China Sea as Beijing's core interest. It will not have primarily been through vast military expansion as many had predicted, but rather through its economic might. Trade has arguably been China's most widely used foreign policy tool and as China's wealth increases, this is only set to continue.[¶] As it should be remembered, the South China Sea dispute is not all about potential energy deposits in the region. It is a dispute over competing visions of the South China Sea and a weary China who sees itself surrounded. Heightened trade flows between China and the claimant states can assure a certain amount of stability in the region.[¶] And although many are quick to remind us that trade cannot serve as a deterrent to conflict, today's globalised world stands in stark contrast to the beginning of the 20th century. Even the Philippine president, Aquino, argued that territorial disputes in the South China Sea were unlikely to lead to conflict because **no one was willing to sacrifice the huge trade flows in the region.**[¶] Therefore, **despite the issues over sovereignty and the occasional flare-ups between various claimants, peace, no matter how precarious, will prevail - no country is ready, particularly China, to sacrifice trade at the expense of stability.**

No SCS miscalc - Empirics prove. Increased presence of CG ships actually results in /less potential for conflict.

Stashwick, 15 [Steven, spent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve.2015 ("South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and 'Miscalculation' Myths," The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/>] //CJC

In Asia, **there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint**, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the **South Korean warship Cheonan** **was sunk** in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible.

Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response.

It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a “flashpoint,” it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military “white hull” vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And while “gray hull” naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses.

As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation-, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions.

The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups.

Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes).

Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on “miscalculation” in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from “solving” disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region’s maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.

US-China war is impossible – deterrence checks even if they overtake us

Glaser 11 - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies (Charles, "Will China's Rise Lead to War?" Foreign Affairs, April 2011) //CJC

What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security--and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Low-level conflicts won't escalate to accidental war –MAD and diplomacy still checks

Keck 13 - Former Deputy Editor of E-International Relations (Zachary, The Diplomat, "Why China and the U.S. (Probably) Won't Go to War," <http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/>) //CJC

These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening, it's hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader's country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.

Assurance low now

Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15

(Bruce, "Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?," Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot_107662.html)

The Asia Pivot Is Not Working America's **Allies Are Not Reassured**. During his 2014 Asia trip, President Obama claimed that "our alliances in the Asia Pacific have never been stronger. Our relationship with ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia has never been stronger. I don't think that's subject to dispute." But **for all the emphasis on the Asia Pivot, there is little to show in actual, tangible results. Allies are nervous, and opponents are emboldened**. Indeed, a prevalent theme of President Obama's foreign policy and his 2014 Asia trip was built around the need to reassure U.S. friends and allies in the region. Allies of the United States around the world—not just those in Asia—have expressed grave misgivings about Washington's capability and resolve to help them defend against escalating security threats. First up were the Europeans, who expressed concern that the Asia Pivot meant a reduced American commitment to their defense. The withdrawal of two U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) from the continent, cutting in half the BCTs that the U.S. maintained in Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, heightened their trepidation. **Asian allies**, initially heartened by the renewed U.S. focus on the region, **continue to express concern about China's unrelenting assertiveness in pushing extralegal sovereignty claims on their territories**. The weak U.S. response to Beijing's bullying led the Philippines, one of just a handful of American treaty allies, effectively to cede its claims to the Scarborough Shoals. **Consequently, an increasingly nervous Tokyo has called repeatedly for stronger U.S. support to deter similar Chinese intimidation against the Japanese controlled Senkaku Islands. South Korea and Japan watched with growing dismay as Washington first cut \$480 billion from the long-term military budget only to warn then of the catastrophic consequences that sequestration would have for U.S. armed forces.** Yet when the sequester hit, slicing an additional \$500 billion, Washington claimed that it could still fulfill American security commitments, though admittedly with "additional but acceptable risk." **Seoul and Tokyo were flummoxed when Syrian President Assad crossed the U.S. redline against using chemical weapons against civilians and President Obama refused to implement the pledged military response. These allies have privately expressed fears that Washington might similarly abandon its defense commitments to them if North Korea or China attacked.** In early 2013, **North Korea ratcheted up tensions by threatening nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea, abrogating the armistice ending the Korean War and nullifying all inter-Korean nonaggression pacts**. Initially, the United States demonstrated resolve, augmenting forces committed to an annual bilateral military exercise with South Korea. However, Secretary of State Kerry soon revealed that as the crisis continued, the Obama Administration had elected to change course in the face of North Korean threats. Kerry stated during a press conference in Seoul that "President Obama [had] ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken. We have lowered our rhetoric significantly." **Rather than standing up to blatant belligerence, the United States stepped back, citing the potential for conflict escalation on the Korean peninsula as its primary concern**. Secretary Kerry explained, "Let's face it. Everyone here knows this, we've got enough problems to deal with around the world." One can only imagine the glee in Pyongyang and the trepidation in Seoul at the U.S.'s prioritizing other regions over defending our Korean ally, in addition to the pall cast over the initial optimism accompanying announcement of the United States' return to Pacific affairs. Finally, **Russia's military incursion into Crimea and subsequent U.S. affirmation of support to European NATO nations triggered yet more concerns of a "reverse Asia Pivot."** U.S. officials were dispatched to provide reassurance once again to both European and Asian allies. But **the ease with which Putin annexed Crimea and the U.S. inability to prevent it from happening heightened anxiety that China could be emboldened to try a similar seizure in the Pacific. Opponents Have Not Moderated Behavior.** Despite an uptick in meetings in Asia—a case of substituting wingtip shoes for soldiers' boots—the United States has failed to temper Chinese and North Korean belligerence. In recent years, **Beijing has used military and economic threats, bombastic language, and military bullying to extend its extralegal claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas**. In November 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, and threatened to use its military to enforce it. Washington condemned the declaration as a provocative act that exacerbated tensions in the region and increased the risks of a military clash. However, **U.S. protests and those of other countries in the region have had marginal effect as China continues to maintain the ADIZ**. Beijing attempts to divert attention from its own actions by mischaracterizing Japan as a threat to regional security. **China's bellicose actions have fueled regional concern and have triggered a greater Japanese willingness to confront Chinese expansionism and strengthen the Japanese military**. Japan's willingness to defend its territory has been mischaracterized by China as a resurgence of 1930s imperial Japanese militarism when, in fact, it is a logical response to increased Chinese provocations. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has maintained his regime's threatening behavior and has continued its quest to augment its nuclear and missile-delivery capabilities. North Korea credits Jong-un with

being the mastermind behind the regime's two attacks on South Korea in 2010, which resulted in 50 South Korean deaths. Clearly, **the Administration's current approach to North Korea is insufficient as the Communist nation continues to menace U.S. allies.**

Empiric: Chinese aggression is higher with low spending, high spending needed to deter

Shaohan Lin, June 2015. MA Student @ Royal Military College of Canada. "After the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Now what?" Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 16.2, p. 1-24. //CJC

The last tool of statecraft employed in the pivot is deterrence via alliance building and joint military exercises. While diplomatic exhortations and economic challenges are to transform unwanted behaviour to rule-based conduct, deterrence draws a line at Chinese belligerence. It is by no mean a constructive approach to China's rise. Rather, it is a latent threat that serves to preserve regional security through reinforced US military presence that can quickly take compellence acts if China goes overboard in its unilateral schemes. **Deterrence is the ace in the hole in Sino-US relations;** China can, to a certain extent, scoff at multilateral binds and shrug off economic initiatives, but it cannot ignore the stick at the US' disposal.

Unfortunately for the US, the balance of power is not completely tilted in its favour. As commonly stated, the US risks massive economic repercussions and lethal military responses, should China feels threatened. For China, there is nothing more threatening than military projection in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the "hedge" is emphatically pronounced in deterrence, as demonstrated by the delicate, low-intensity military deployments in the region. As previously mentioned, the US has garrisoned troops in Darwin, Australia, and their number is projected to increase to 2,500 by 2016.⁵⁴ Then again, Australia is hardly part of the Asia-Pacific region. Military bases in South Korea and Japan notwithstanding, the US has not put troops on any new soil closer to China. Deterrence has mainly taken the guise of joint military exercises and military aid with allied Asian-Pacific states and those that enjoy a security partnership with the US. Prominent military exercises include Cobra Gold and Balikatan.

Traditionally annual bilateral events between the US and a Southeast Asian ally, these exercises have significantly expanded to include multiple states in the region at a time consistent with the pivot. With respect to the South China Sea dispute, the US has offered military aid to the claimants challenging China. Since 2011, the US has continuously supplied hardware and intelligence to the Philippines.⁵⁵ American ships have also visited Filipino ports on a regular basis. As well, the US signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation in 2011, which was a breakthrough in US-Vietnamese relations since the US had always rejected closer defense ties with this state.⁵⁶

Joint naval training was conducted as well. In addition to traditional allies in the region, even Cambodia was included in the US-led Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise in 2010.⁵⁷ The latest expansion of military exercises and military aid, while indicative of a response to China's truculent rise, does not necessarily threaten it. The

balance of power in Asia-Pacific has changed little. **US-led military activities certainly display intent – displeasure towards China and readiness to confront it if need be – but not the material resolve to structurally alter Chinese strategic calculus.** To be sure, installing new military bases on China's periphery would create a much greater impact on China's decision-making than spectacles featuring combat vessels and sailors. In short, **the American delicate military measures warned China, but have yet to plunge Asia-Pacific in security crises.** Sino-US relations have not deteriorated to an irreversible point and the door is open for both parties to cool off existing tensions between them. A strictly military example of working Sino-US relations is China's participation in Exercise RIMPAC in summer 2014. Due to low-cost military activities and the inclusion of China in military exercises, the deterrence dimension of the pivot cannot be taken more than "hedging," and must not be mistaken for containment or balancing. **Soft military procedures did not prevent China from retaliating in its own ways. When the US navy increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific and took sides in the South China Sea disputes, China responded with a rapprochement with North Korea.**

Not only did China abandon all efforts in persuading North Korea to denuclearize, it also improved aid and trade relations with it.⁵⁸ China stymied US denuclearization efforts on another occasion; in 2012, just as the US and other states sanctioned Iran for its illicit nuclear program, China reached an arrangement with Iran to purchase oil.⁵⁹ Both the North Korea and Iran cases are definite responses to the pivot as China worked alongside the US before the latter's increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Syria is yet another additional area of contention where China challenged the US. In spring 2014, China, along with Russia, vetoed a resolution backed by more than sixty-five countries to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for its numerous instances of human rights violations. This veto was in fact the fourth time China foiled Western resolutions regarding Syria.⁶⁰ Admittedly, it is unsure whether these sabotages were done out of spite or quite independently of the US pivot.

What these examples of reprisals show is that China avoids directly compromising the security of the Asia-Pacific. It **has not answered the US military presence by increasing its own military presence, at least not in a fashion that menaces the US.** Granted, **China did voice its discontentment towards American territorial "infringement" in the South China Sea, but contrarily media and some scholarly claims, China has not escalated tensions because of the pivot; it may have very well done so without American interference in the region.** As claimants challenge

a rising China, it should be expected for the latter to make full use of its leverages, especially without the scrutinizing gaze of the Americans. It is not folly to believe that security conditions would be worse without displays of US commitment and force that serve as a check to Chinese aggression. The harassments of Vietnamese and Philippine survey vessels by Chinese patrol boats in 2011, 2012 and 2014 are often cited as proof of Chinese behaviour aggravated by US showboating. But in 2005, when US presence in the Asia-Pacific was minimal, Chinese ships fired at Vietnamese boats, killing nine people.⁶¹

Assuming that the US Navy has an impact on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, then it would be beneficial as cable-cutting and collisions, the primary mechanisms of violence today, are considerably milder than firing with the intent to kill. Thus far, the deterrence element of the pivot has succeeded in restraining real Chinese aggression and has not shifted the status quo in the region.

Chinese military will be comparable to the US in 2020

Davis 2015 [Malcolm Davis is a writer at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “Why the PLA is no paper tiger (part 2)”, *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, <<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-pla-is-no-paper-tiger-part-2/>>] //CJC

In considering Paul Dibb’s analysis on the Chinese PLA, I’d recommend anyone interested in the state of China’s military start by reading Roger Cliff’s China’s Military Power: Assessing Current and Future Capabilities. Cliff argues that ‘...**by 2020, the quality of China’s military doctrine, equipment, personnel and training will likely be approaching, to varying degrees, those of the US and other Western militaries.**’ Although prevailing weaknesses in organisational structure, logistics and organizational culture will limit the effectiveness of PLA weapons and platforms, ‘defeating China in these scenarios [Taiwan and South China Sea] could nonetheless be difficult and costly for the United States’ primarily as a result of the geographic advantages that China enjoys, as well as specific systems capabilities.’ Finally, he suggests, ‘the 2020s are likely to be a time of power transition in East Asia, from a region in which the United States has had the capability to defend its allies against virtually any form of aggression, to one where China has the capability to, at a minimum, contest control of the seas and airspace and where an attempt to oppose a Chinese use of force will be dangerous and costly for any country, including the United States.’ Cliff’s conclusion is also echoed in a recent RAND report, ‘The US China Military Scorecard,’ which argues that China is catching up to the US, is becoming more assertive and confident, and has geography on its side. The report notes that ‘China [has been able] to narrow the military gap in almost every area and move ahead in some’ and that the ‘overall capability trend lines are moving against the United States.’ The report also highlights the speed of change in China’s military: it’s pushing forward in key capability areas and its modernisation is occurring more rapidly than that of the US. China is leapfrogging, whilst the US is plodding.

Credible US military reduces the risk of regional arms races

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, <http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review>

Preservation of reasonable stability in key regions of the world. World War II demonstrated that America cannot isolate itself from conflict overseas that threatens our vital interests and allies. Both our security and prosperity are enhanced by peace and stability in key regions. This is a fundamental reason why America has remained actively engaged abroad since World War II. And since America is a military power without peer that has no interest in taking or subjugating other lands, its forward military presence and commitments to allies have greatly lessened the likelihood of arms races and damaging military competitions among [SEP] regional rivals. Absent America's leadership, large parts of the world would likely evolve to dangerous imbalances, particularly in Eurasia, threatening American trade and investment and potentially leading to conflicts greatly damaging to the United States.²

Past empirics prove that China is territorially aggressive - weakening US presence causes Senkaku takeover

Fearon, James D. 2001 ["Selection Effects and Deterrence." Department of Political Science Stanford University (2001): n. pag. Taylor and Francis, 2002. Web. 21 Feb. 2016.

<<https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Selection-Effects-and-Deterrence.pdf>>] JSM

James Fearon is a professor of political science at Stanford University

China has been rapidly expanding her economy over the last thirty years and increasing naval power in recent years. As a result, the argument on the Chinese threat is increasing in Japan. The major reason why Prime Minister Hatoyama gave in to the bureaucrats in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as the United States is an idea of deterrence against China. In order to counter the growing naval and economic power of China, Japan must maintain the Security Treaty with the United States, they concluded. Yukio Okamoto, a former diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a former advisor to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, argues that if the United States Marine Corps withdrew from Okinawa, China would move into the Senkaku Islands. In the past, China occupied the Paracel Spratly Islands when the United States troops withdrew from Vietnam, the Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands when Russia withdrew her troops from Danan in Vietnam, and the Mischief Reef when the United States did from the Philippines. Okamoto says. According to him, Japan would lose the Senkaku Islands to China because China would first send fishing boats, then observatory ships, and finally naval vessels. In such a case, Japan would lose her interests in fishing and marine resources, and a boundary line with China would come closer to Okinawa. He further contends that the Marine Corps in Okinawa is not there to directly defend Okinawa. The overall presence of the United States armed forces in Japan including the Marine Corps and strong will of the United States to defend Japan constitute a strong deterrence against the Chinese territorial ambition. Okamoto concludes that if China moved into the Senkaku Islands under the present strong Security Treaty, the Sino-United States relations would certainly deteriorate and China must avoid this kind of situation for now. In Okamoto's view, the constant presence of the United States forces in Japan brings about a strong deterrence, and that is the essence of the Security Treaty.

However, others bring forward a counterargument. Dustin Wright contends that it is ridiculous to imagine a military clash between the United States and China since there are close economic relations between the two countries. Cheap Chinese imports support American consumers' life and Chinese money invested in the United States sustains the American economy. In fact, the United States depends on China. Such a United States will think twice whether it is a wise policy to use military means when a territorial issue arises between Japan and China to defend Japan's interests. Therefore, Japan cannot rely on the United States to deal with this issue. Then, why does Japan keep the United States forces in Japan to deter China if she cannot depend on the United States? There is a way that Japan can resolve the territorial issue without relying on the deterrence of the Marine Corps in Okinawa.

Russia wants better US Russia relations

New York Post Nov 9 2016 [New York Post, “Putin wants to restore relations between Russia and US”, New York Post, <<http://nypost.com/2016/11/09/putin-wants-to-restore-relations-between-russia-and-us/>>] //CJC

MOSCOW – Russia is ready to do its part to fully restore ties with Washington following the election of businessman Donald Trump as the next U.S. President, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday. Trump stunned the world by defeating heavily favoured rival Hillary Clinton in Tuesday’s presidential election, ending eight years of Democratic rule and sending the United States on a new, uncertain path. Among those uncertainties will be the Trump administration’s future relations with Russia. Ties between Washington and Moscow have become increasingly strained over the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and allegations of Russian cyber attacks featured in the U.S. election campaign. We heard the campaign statements of the future U.S. presidential candidate about the restoration of relations between Russia and the United States. Putin said on Wednesday at a ceremony to receive credentials from new foreign ambassadors. “It is not an easy path, but we are ready to do our part and do everything to return Russian and American relations to a stable path of development,” he added.

Russia Not a Threat: Threat Created by MIC

Fang, 2016 [Lee Fang, “U.S. Defense Contractors Tell Investors Russian Threat Is Great for Business”, *The Intercept*, <https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/nato-weapons-industry/>] //AKC THE ESCALATING ANTI-RUSSIAN rhetoric in the U.S. presidential campaign comes in the midst of a major push by military contractors to position Moscow as a potent enemy that must be countered with a drastic increase in military spending by NATO countries.

Weapon makers have told investors that they are relying on tensions with Russia to fuel new business in the wake of Russian’s annexation of Crimea and modest increases in its military budget.

In particular, the arms industry — both directly and through its arsenal of hired-gun, think-tank experts and lobbyists – is actively pressuring NATO member nations to hike defense spending in line with the NATO goal for member states to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

Retired Army Gen. Richard Cody, a vice president at L-3 Communications, the seventh largest U.S. defense contractor, explained to shareholders in December that the industry was faced with a historic opportunity. Following the end of the Cold War, Cody said, peace had “pretty much broken out all over the world,” with Russia in decline and NATO nations celebrating. “The Wall came down,” he said, and “all defense budgets went south.”

Now, Cody argued, Russia “is resurgent” around the world, putting pressure on U.S. allies. “Nations that belong to NATO are supposed to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense,” he said, according to a transcript of his remarks. “We know that uptick is coming and so we postured ourselves for it.”

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Many experts are unconvinced that Russia poses a direct military threat. The Soviet Union’s military once stood at over 4 million soldiers, but today Russia has less than 1 million. NATO’s combined military budget vastly outranks Russia’s — with the U.S. alone outspending Russia on its military by \$609 billion to less than \$85 billion.

And yet, the Aerospace Industries Association, a lobby group for Lockheed Martin, Textron, Raytheon, and other defense contractors, argued in February that the Pentagon is not spending enough to counter “Russian aggression on NATO’s doorstep.”

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“Russian saber-rattling has additional benefits for weapons makers because it has become a standard part of the argument for higher Pentagon spending — even though the Pentagon already has more than enough money to address any actual threat to the United States,” he said.

Russia's military budget is collapsing, no war risk

Harry J. Kazianis (@grecianformula) is **director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest**, founded by former U.S. President Richard M. Nixon. Kazianis also presently serves as Executive Editor of the National Interest and fellow at both the Potomac Foundation and the Center for China Policy at the University of Nottingham (UK). He is the author of the book *The Tao of A2/AD: China's Rationale for the Creation of Anti-Access*. Kazianis in the past has led the foreign policy communication efforts of the Heritage Foundation, is the former editor-in-chief of *The Diplomat* and a fellow at CSIS:PACNET. **November, 14, 2016**

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/11/14/how_donald_trump_can_make_the_pivot_to_asia_great_again_112118.html

While Russia might be flexing its muscles in Ukraine and in Syria, Moscow faces long-term and well documented demographic and economic challenges it will not easily overcome. And with big cuts coming to its military budget starting next year, we might be witnessing the peak of Russian military and diplomatic might.

The 125B number is unrealistic, overstated, completely unscientific, the plan is dead and will never happen, and inefficiencies are inevitable

Woodward 2016 [Bob Woodward has worked for the Washington Post since 1971 and is an editor, "Pentagon buries evidence of \$125 billion in bureaucratic waste", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.a048ad93a840>] //CJC

After the board finished its analysis, however, **Work** changed his position. In an interview with The Post, he did not dispute the board's findings about the size or scope of the bureaucracy. But **he dismissed the \$125 billion savings proposal as “unrealistic” and said the business executives had failed to grasp basic obstacles to restructuring the public sector. “There is this meme that we’re some bloated, giant organization,”** he said. "Although there is a little bit of truth in that . . . I think it vastly overstates what’s really going on." **Work said the board fundamentally misunderstood how difficult it is to eliminate federal civil service jobs** — members of Congress, he added, love having them in their districts — **or to renegotiate defense contracts.** He said the Pentagon is adopting some of the study's recommendations on a smaller scale and estimated it will save \$30 billion by 2020. **Many of the programs he cited, however, have been on the drawing board for years or were unrelated to the Defense Business Board’s research.** Work acknowledged that the push to improve business operations lost steam after then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was replaced by Ashton B. Carter in February 2015. Carter has emphasized other goals, such as strengthening the Pentagon's partnerships with high-tech firms. **"We will never be as efficient as a commercial organization," Work said. "We're the largest bureaucracy in the world. There's going to be some inherent inefficiencies in that."**

'Dark matter' Work, a retired Marine officer, became deputy defense secretary in May 2014. With the military budget under the most pressure since the end of the Cold War, he sought help from the Defense Business Board, an advisory panel known for producing management studies that usually gathered dust. Work told the board that the outcome of this assignment would be different. In a memo, he directed the board to collect sensitive cost data from the military services and defense agencies that would reveal how much they spent on business operations. Pentagon officials knew their back-office bureaucracy was overstaffed and overfunded. But nobody had ever gathered and analyzed such a comprehensive set of data before. Some Defense Business Board members warned that exposing the extent of the problem could have unforeseen consequences. "You are about to turn on the light in a very dark room," Kenneth Klepper, the former chief executive of Medco Health Solutions, told Work in the summer of 2014, according to two people familiar with the exchange. "All the crap is going to float to the surface and stink the place up." "Do it," Work replied. To turn on the light, the Pentagon needed more outside expertise. A team of consultants from McKinsey was hired. In a confidential August 2014 memo, McKinsey noted that while the Defense Department was "the world's largest corporate enterprise," it had never "rigorously measured" the "cost-effectiveness, speed, agility or quality" of its business operations. **Nor did the Pentagon have even a remotely accurate idea of what it was paying for those operations, which McKinsey divided into five categories: human resources; health-care management; supply chain and logistics; acquisition and procurement; and financial-flow management.** **McKinsey hazarded a guess:** anywhere between \$75 billion and \$100 billion a year, or between 15 and 20 percent of the Pentagon's annual expenses. **"No one REALLY knows," the memo added.**

[...]

Taking fire Meantime, the backlash to the \$125 billion savings plan intensified. On Feb. 6, 2015, board members briefed Frank Kendall III, the Pentagon's chief weapons-buyer. Kendall's operations were a major target of the study; he oversaw an empire of purchasing agents and contractors that were constantly under attack from Congress for cost overruns and delays. Kendall put up a stiff fight. He challenged the board's data and strenuously objected to the conclusion that his offices were overstaffed. "Are you trying to tell me we don't know how to do our job?" he said, according to two participants in the meeting. He said he needed to hire 1,000 more people to work directly under him, not fewer. "If you don't believe me, call in an auditor," replied Klepper, the board's restructuring expert. "They'll tell you it's even worse than this." In an interview, Kendall

acknowledged he was “very disappointed” by the board’s work, which he criticized as “shallow” and “very low on content.” He said the study had ignored efforts by his agencies to become more efficient, and he accused the board of plucking the \$125 billion figure out of thin air. “It was essentially a ballpark, made-up number,” he said. Still, Kendall knew that lawmakers might view the study as credible. Alarmed, he said, he went to Work and warned that the findings could “be used as a weapon” against the Pentagon. “If the impression that’s created is that we’ve got a bunch of money lying around and we’re being lazy and we’re not doing anything to save money, then it’s harder to justify getting budgets that we need,” Kendall said. More ominously, board members said they started to get the silent treatment from the Pentagon’s highest ranks. Briefings that had been scheduled for military leaders in the Tank — the secure conference room for the Joint Chiefs of Staff — were canceled. Worse, the board was unable to secure an audience with Carter, the new defense secretary. Stein, the board chairman, accused Carter of deliberately derailing the plan through inaction. “Unfortunately, Ash — for reasons of his own — stopped this,” he said in an interview. Peter Cook, a spokesman for Carter, said the Pentagon chief was busy dealing with “a long list of national security challenges.” He added that Work and other senior officials had already “concluded that the report, while well-intentioned, had limited value.” The fatal blow was struck in April. Just three months after Stein had been reappointed as board chairman, Carter replaced him with Michael Bayer, a business consultant who had previously served on the panel and clashed with Stein. Bayer declined to comment. A few weeks later, Klepper resigned from the board. The \$125 billion savings plan was dead. In an interview, Tillerson, the Pentagon’s acting deputy chief management officer, called the board’s recommendations too ambitious and aggressive. “They, perhaps, underestimated the degree of difficulty we have in doing something that in the commercial sector would seem to be very easy to do.”

THE US AND RUSSIA ARE GOING TO BE ALLIES SOON

NEIL MacFARQUHAR, (New York Times), “Putin and Trump Talk on Phone and Agree to Improve Ties, Kremlin Says,” November 14, 2016
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/europe/putin-calls-trump.html>

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President-elect Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone for the first time on Monday, agreeing to review what both consider the poor state of relations between the two countries, according to a statement from the Kremlin. The two agreed “on the absolutely unsatisfactory state of bilateral relations,” said the statement, and they both endorsed the idea of undertaking joint efforts “to normalize relations and pursue constructive cooperation on the broadest possible range of issues.” The issues discussed included trade and economic ties as well as combating terrorism. Mr. Putin was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Mr. Trump last Wednesday, sending him a telegram about an hour after he had emerged the victor, but the two men have not met nor had they spoken previously. **Mr. Putin repeated the congratulations over the phone. The Russian president said he hoped that Moscow could build a “collaborative dialogue” with Washington on the bases of “equality, mutual respect and noninterference in the other’s internal affairs,” the release said.**

Hegemony isn’t needed in Europe, EU actors fill the void

Ted Carpenter **April 2013**, [a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor to *The National Interest*, is the author of nine books and more than 500 articles and policy studies, “Delusions of Indispensability” <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/delusions-indispensability-8145>] MJS

But even during the final decades of the Cold War, the U.S. security blanket unfortunately caused an excessive and unhealthy dependence on the part of democratic Europe. And with the demise of the Soviet Union, a policy based on U.S. dominance now reeks of obsolescence.

Despite its recent financial struggles, the European Union collectively has both a population and an economy larger than those of the United States. And Russia, if it poses a threat at all, is a far less serious menace than was the Soviet Union. Yet U.S. leaders act as though the EU nations are inherently incapable of managing Europe's security affairs. And for their part, the European allies are content to continue free riding on Washington's exertions, keeping their defense budgets at minimal levels and letting the United States take primary responsibility for security issues that affect Europe far more than America. Even a modest increase in defense spending by the principal European powers would enable the EU to handle any security problems that are likely to arise in the region. In that sense, Washington's dominant role in dealing with the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s was not evidence of the continuing need for U.S. leadership, but rather underscored the negative consequences of having encouraged Europe's security dependence on the United States for so many decades. The reality is that the threat environment in Europe is quite benign. There are few plausible security threats, and the ones that might arise are on the scale of the Balkan spats—problems that the European powers should be able to handle without undue exertion. Washington can safely off-load responsibility for European security and stability to the countries directly involved. The United States is most certainly not indispensable to the Continent's security any longer.

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No Baltic invasion

Bandow 2016 [Doug Bandow is senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States”, *Cato Institute*, <<https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states>>] //CJC

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the **Baltic nations** from doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO standard. Yet **the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced.**

Vladimir Putin’s behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, “old” Europe, or even

most of Russia's neighbors. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status, protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward Russia. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate substantial popular resistance. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. As I argue in National Interest: "The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come."

Putin doesn't want the Baltics

Pravda 2016 [Pravda.ru is a Russian Newspaper, "Those thinking Russia can attack Baltic States need their heads examined - Putin", Pravda.ru, <http://www.pravdareport.com/news/russia/kremlin/05-09-2016/135521-russia_baltic_states-0/>] //CJC

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the concerns about Russia's possible attack on the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia) were nothing but "nonsense." "All sane people" realize that there is no such threat." Putin said in an interview with Bloomberg. During the interview, a journalist suggested that the West does not trust Russia because of the wish of the latter to expand its zone of influence and establish control over border areas. "I think that all sensible people, who are really involved in politics, understood that the reference to Russia's threat to, let's say, the Baltic countries is complete nonsense. Are we going to wage war against NATO or something?" Putin wondered. Putin reminded that NATO countries are home to approximately 600 million people, whereas Russia is home to 146 million. Putin mentioned that Russia was a nuclear power, but then added: "Are you really suggesting that we are going to conquer the Baltic States using nuclear weapons, or what? What kind of nonsense is that?" Putin said.

Economic interdependence prevents a US-Russia War.

Stewart 3/7/14, staff writer for the New York Times, cites a study by J.P. Morgan Securities, quotes a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, (James B., March 7, 2014, "Why Russia Can't Afford Another Cold War", New York Times,

[http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/why-russia-cant-afford-another-cold-war.html? _r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/why-russia-cant-afford-another-cold-war.html?_r=0)//CJC

Russia is far more exposed to market fluctuations than many countries, since it owns a majority stake in a number of the country's largest companies. Gazprom, the energy concern that is Russia's largest company by market capitalization, is majority-owned by the Russian Federation. At the same time, Gazprom's shares are listed on the London stock exchange and are traded over the counter as American depositary receipts in the United States as well as on the Berlin and Paris exchanges. Over half of its shareholders are American, according to J. P. Morgan Securities. And the custodian bank for its depository receipts is the Bank of New York Mellon. Many Russian companies and banks are fully integrated into the global financial system. This week, Glencore Xstrata, the mining giant based in Switzerland, was in the middle of a roughly \$1 billion debt-to-equity refinancing deal with the Russian oil company Russneft. Glencore said it expected to complete the deal despite the crisis. Glencore's revenue last year was substantially larger than the entire gross domestic product of Ukraine, which was \$176 billion, according to the World Bank. The old Soviet Union, in stark contrast, was all but impervious to foreign economic or business pressure, thanks in part to an ideological commitment to self-sufficiency. As recently as 1985, foreign trade amounted to just 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product, and nearly all that was with the communist satellite countries of Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union's economic insularity and resulting economic stagnation was a major cause of the Soviet Union's collapse. According to Mr. Talbott, the Soviet Union's president at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, was heavily influenced by Soviet economists and other academics who warned that by the turn of the century in 2000, the Soviet economy would be smaller than South Korea's if it did not introduce major economic reforms and participate in the global economy. To attract investment capital, Mr. Gorbachev created the Moscow stock exchange in 1990 and issued an order permitting Soviet citizens to own and trade stocks, bonds and other securities for the first time since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. (Before then, Russia had a flourishing stock exchange in St. Petersburg, established by order of Peter the Great. It was housed in an elegant neoclassical building directly across the waterfront from the Winter Palace. As a symbol of wealth and capitalism, it was one of the earliest casualties of the revolution.) Even before this week's gyrations, the Russian stock market index had dropped near 8 percent last year, and it and the Russian economy have been suffering from low commodity prices and investor concerns about the Federal Reserve's tapering of bond purchases — factors of little significance during the Cold War. By contrast, today "Russia is too weak and vulnerable economically to go to war." Mr. Aslund said. "The Kremlin's fundamental mistake has been to ignore its economic weakness and dependence on Europe. Almost half of Russia's exports go to Europe, and three-quarters of its total exports consist of oil and gas. The energy boom is over, and Europe can turn the tables on Russia after its prior gas supply cuts in 2006 and 2009. Europe can replace this gas with liquefied natural gas, gas from Norway and shale gas. If the European Union sanctioned Russia's gas supply to Europe, Russia would lose \$100 billion or one-fifth of its export revenues, and the Russian economy would be in rampant crisis."

No NoKo collapse — economic reforms and shifts in power structure increase flexibility

Moon et. al. 15 — Chung-in Moon, a professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea, and Illo Hwang, a journalist with Donga Ilbo who specialises in North Korean affairs, 2015 ("North Korea still stable despite external vulnerabilities," *East Asia Forum*, December 28th, Available Online at <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/28/north-korea-still-stable-despite-external-vulnerabilities/>, Accessed 07-21-16)

North Korea seems to have had an *internally stable* 2015. Its economy is far from faltering and Kim Jong-un has firmly **consolidated his power base**. There were no explicit signs of internal challenge. Kim is both reigning and ruling. But Pyongyang's provocative behaviour in the international domain could produce severe consequences for North Korea. Uncertainty remains high.

In late October, Pyongyang announced that it will hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in May 2016, 35 years after the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the late North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il mentioned to then South Korean president Kim Dae-jung that he would convene a congress, but it was never realised. Kim Jong-un succeeded power without the congress ever being held. This announcement is therefore a significant move.

Kim Jong-un is likely to use the upcoming party congress as a platform to declare the beginning of a new era under his leadership. His 2015 New Year speech had already **hinted the possibility of redirecting the governing ideology**.

Kim Jong-un's previous New Year speeches made it clear that his rule is founded on two pillars: the ideological lines of his grandfather Kim Il-sung and father Kim Jong-il. But in 2015, such ideological edifices did not appear. Instead, Kim Jong-un routinely mentioned old rhetoric such as strengthening monolithic leadership, juche (self-reliance), as well as the importance of songun (military first) politics. The North Korean leader may well introduce his own brand of ruling ideology at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016.

The decision reveals Kim Jong-un's growing confidence in economic performance and power consolidation. North Korea underwent major economic difficulties in 2015 — partly because of international sanctions and poor harvests, and partly because of falling prices of coal and iron ore that accounted for almost half of its exports.

But Pyongyang's economic *performance has remained rather robust*, owing to the flourishing informal sector. Since 2009, more than 400 **jangmadang** (informal marketplaces) have been introduced. They have facilitated the distribution of necessary consumer goods through a quasi-market mechanism. Such informal markets critically mitigated the negative consequences of severe drought and poor harvest. This was a sharp contrast to the period of mass starvation of the 1990s, after which the public distribution system collapsed. Equally important is the advent of **donju** (money holders) who are serving as new agents of capital accumulation as well as sources of valuable hard currency.

The size of the informal sector is now believed to be larger than that of the formal sector. Some experts even compare the current North Korean economy to the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up initiative. As the logic behind a market economy becomes more widespread, the state economy is becoming increasingly flexible. The state no longer commands and dictates the economy. Citizens themselves have become increasingly adaptive and entrepreneurial, seeking their own survival through whatever means available.

Paradoxically, the adaptive behaviour of ordinary citizens has weakened the effectiveness of international sanctions.

The power structure has also been shifting from old, vested interests (such as the military) to the party and the cabinet. They now control overall economic activities, including foreign exchange earnings and foreign direct investment. Cadres from the Organisation and Guidance

Department of the KWP — which played a pivotal role in Kim Jong-un's smooth succession to power — have emerged as the core power elite group.

The generational change of the power elite has been another defining characteristic of the Kim Jong-un leadership in 2015. Relatively young party members have been extensively recruited. Old guards, such as the second generation of revolutionary leaders and military personnel who were powerful during the Kim Jong-il era, have been either purged or discharged.

Your authors are just wrong — North Korea cares too much about regime survival to escalate

Jackson and Suh, 7-9-15 – [Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, Hannah Suh, Asia-Pacific Security Program at Center for a New American Security, 7-9-2015, The Biggest Myth about North Korea, The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-biggest-myth-about-north-korea-13290>] //CJC

A million lives and a trillion dollars. Experts in the 1990s predicted that the costs of war with North Korea would reach at least this magnitude. While this is probably true of a worst-case scenario, and estimates would doubtless be even higher today, pundits and officials alike have allowed it to cloud reasoned judgment about North Korea. A strawman argument has taken hold that any actions against North Korea will lead to cataclysmic death and destruction.

This is wrong. Alliance military actions against North Korea will not automatically trigger a nuclear holocaust or the annihilation of Seoul.

Fear, risk aversion and a misunderstanding of North Korea have allowed the most dangerous scenario to be conflated with the most likely one. Rather than being paralyzed by the fact that anything is possible, alliance policy and military planning needs to recognize a simple reality: no matter what North Korea threatens, it will assiduously seek to avoid war-triggering actions. North Korea's own historical behavior and its widely presumed goal of regime survival confirms as much. It isn't hard to find pundits who would have us believe North Korea is prepared to immolate the Korean Peninsula in a blaze of glory at the first hint of conflict.

One argument goes that offensive military action “likely would trigger a war which would devastate South Korea.” Another offers that even an “extremely limited” preemptive strike “...risks sparking a major military conflict...that might have devastating consequences for the [United States], Korea, and beyond...” Still others argue that there’s nothing the United States or South Korea can do because North Korean artillery aimed at Seoul prevents even minor military actions, implying that any attacks on North Korea will trigger the worst scenario imaginable.

One analyst even pointedly remarks that using force against North Korea would be worse than allowing its nuclear program to expand. Nor is this illogic limited to pundits; successive U.S. administrations have fallen prey to the same fear-based, rather than logic-based, thinking. During the George W. Bush administration, the prevailing view “...was that if any kind of military strike starts against North Korea, the North Koreans would invade...and they will cause enormous destruction of Seoul.” And

former secretary of defense Robert Gates wrote in his memoir of the Obama administration’s hyperventilating pleas with the highest levels of the South Korean government not to retaliate against North Korea for its November 2010 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Widespread fear of a North Korean total war is a pathology based on an imaginary North Korea. No matter one’s political leanings, right and left alike agree that North Korea’s primary goal is regime survival, meaning that North Korea will not only take actions to safeguard its regime, but also avoid taking actions that put its survival at risk.

This bears out in sixty years of observing North Korean behavior—even during the so-called “second Korean war” of the late 1960s, North Korea never escalated beyond isolated military attacks. Today, North Korea threatens South Korean NGOs that send propaganda balloons into its territory, yet fires at the balloons and not the people launching them. In repeated naval clashes with South Korea in the Yellow Sea, North Korea strikes some blows and suffers others, but it never escalates beyond the local clash. North Korea has had countless opportunities to escalate or broaden conflicts in a crisis, yet has consistently chosen restraint.

Whatever North Korea’s rhetoric and motivations for violence, its track record shows a preference for not taking actions that would jeopardize the regime, and

the North Korean escalation that everyone fears would do precisely that. Even if North Korea responded with violence when attacked or retaliated against, there is a massive difference between responding with limited or tit-for-tat violence (its historical modus operandi) and responding with the most devastatingly lethal response it can come up with, like a nuclear first-strike or artillery barrages against Seoul. The latter are regime-ending actions, while the former may demonstrate resolve against the alliance and allow both sides a chance to sue for peace.

North Korea wont lash out unless directly threatened

McKirdy and Kwon '16 Euan- Digital Producer based in Hong Kong for CNN, KJ- CNN producer based out of Seoul, 5-8-16, "Kim Jong Un: We'll only use nuclear weapons if sovereignty threatened," <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/07/asia/north-korea-nuclear-use-sovereignty/> //CJC

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the country would not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached by "invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons," according to the country's state news agency KCNA. He made the remarks Saturday at the ruling Workers' Party of Korea's Seventh Congress in Pyongyang, which began the day before. Kim also reportedly said North Korea will faithfully fulfill its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and make an effort to realize global denuclearization. In his 15-minute opening speech Friday, Kim touted the country's weapons development, saying they had "elevated our respect to the world and enemies."

Perceived lack of US resource commitment to security emboldens NoKo and China—no one else secures Asia, military is key

Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15 (Bruce, "Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?", Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot_107662.html) //CJC

Perceptions that U.S. rhetoric has not been backed by sufficient resources and commitment and that Washington remains focused on a series of unresolved crises elsewhere can have profound implications for Asia. North Korea and China, for example, may be emboldened to test the United States as they pursue policies that are inimical to peace and stability in Asia. Asia's Strategic Importance to the United States. Asia has been since the 19th century—and will continue to be—a region of vital importance to the United States. At present, Asia contains more than half of the world's population; two of the three largest global economies (China and Japan); and the world's fastest-growing economies, which generate 40 percent of the world's GDP growth—more than any other region. Asia is America's largest trading partner, accounting for 38 percent of total U.S. trade in goods for 2013, compared with 30 percent with North America and 20 percent for Europe. Five of the United States' seven major defense

treaties are with Asia-Pacific nations, and Washington has strong partnerships with many other nations in the region. Consequently, control of Asia by a hostile power would threaten American economic and security national interests. Yet stability in Asia is already being threatened by a number of factors: North Korea's growing military capabilities, China's increasingly aggressive behavior, long-standing sovereignty disputes, historical animosities, and rising nationalism. In the absence of any regional architecture comparable to either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, the United States has proven to be the only nation with both the capabilities and the historical record necessary to assume the role of regional balancer and "honest broker." But to reassure allies and deter opponents, the United States must maintain a strong economic, diplomatic, and military presence throughout Asia. Such an unambiguous approach is the key to regional peace and stability.

US hegemony is unique from past eras – empirics irrelevant

Michael Beckley 12, [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012, "China's Century?", *International Security*, Vol. 36, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf] MJS

At its core, the debate about U.S. decline is a debate about the relevance of history. Declinists contend that history tends to repeat itself and that the history of world politics can be characterized as a "succession of hegemonies,"⁸ as the recurrent "rise and fall of the great powers,"⁹ as an "observable pattern of great power emergence,"¹⁰ or as a series of "long cycles."¹¹ The Habsburg, French, and British Empires were defeated and surpassed by rising challengers. It is therefore natural for America's "unipolar moment" to be similarly consigned to the ash-heap of history.¹²

Several established academic theories underpin this cyclical view of history. First, declinists fuse hegemonic stability theory with traditional balance of power theory.¹³ In this view, the United States, like Great Britain in the nineteenth century, supplies the world with public goods. Weaker states not only free-ride on these services, but also engage in sabotage, erecting diplomatic and economic obstacles to U.S. initiatives and forming anti-American alliances.¹⁴ As a result, others rise while the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch."¹⁵ Second is the theory of convergence and its claim that, in an open global economy, poor countries tend to grow faster than rich countries.¹⁶ China, like Germany, Japan, and South Korea before it, can reap the "advantages of backwardness," adopting modern technologies and methods while skipping the long, arduous process of inventing them.¹⁷ Meanwhile U.S. investment in foreign countries "tends to abort the reinvigoration of the American domestic economy and its technical infrastructure."¹⁸ Globalization thus stimulates growth abroad while undercutting it at home, diffusing not just technology but also technological and military capabilities. By contrast, the basic argument of the alternative perspective is that the laws of history do not apply to contemporary world politics. The United States is not like Britain; rather, its "combination of quantitative and qualitative material advantages is unprecedented, and it translates into a unique geopolitical position."¹⁹ Moreover, China is not like past rising challengers; "its emergence is occurring in the context of a transformation in the manner in which production is organized, a shift that makes China's rise categorically different from that of predecessors such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea."²⁰ In sum, the declinist perspective emphasizes how U.S. hegemony and the current global economy resemble those of past eras, whereas the alternative perspective emphasizes how they are unique. I elaborate these two focal points of debate below.

Arms race doesn't lead to war — need capability AND intent, empirics prove arms races only provide capability for war

Sundstrom 15 (Ian Sundstrom is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy and holds a master's degree in war studies from King's College London. "An East Asian Arms Race: Does It Even Matter?" <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>, AB)

Whatever the case may be, most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent. The first comprises military forces, economic wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is not cause and effect.

The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race – a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict – led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any change in the naval

balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the "Missile Gap" on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect. The more interesting question when pondering arms races involves a potential adversary's intentions. In the context of an East Asian arms race, what are Chinese intentions? If we look at the historical record it does not seem that China's expanding military will necessarily be used for aggressive campaigns. China last went to war in 1979, fighting a brief conflict with Vietnam in response to that country's invasion of Cambodia the year before. Before that, it fought a short border war with India in 1962 after repeated border clashes as it sought to consolidate its control over Tibet. Earlier, in 1950, China went to war against the United Nations on the side of North Korea after Douglas MacArthur led his troops all the way to the Yalu River. If you take Beijing's point of view, its wars have been defensive, to protect its interests and allies against aggression. That is, of course, what every nation that has ever gone to war believes, but from the outside China's historical record is not obviously aggressive. China does have a recent history of aggressive rhetoric about Taiwan and islands in the East and South China Seas, though. Taken at face value, this would indicate that expanded Chinese military capabilities will be used offensively. However, talk is cheap whereas war is not, and rhetoric is just as often used to mask intentions as display them. Aggressive public statements are an easy way to placate nationalist sentiment at home and apply diplomatic pressure abroad. I do not have any doubt that China desires both de facto and de jure control over Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and

the various islands and reefs of the South China Sea, but **it is more likely that China will continue its current “salami-slicing” diplomatic tactics than it will use its expanding military to engage in campaigns to seize the islands.** China currently has the capability to seize these territories (Taiwan possibly excepted), even if it couldn't defend them against recapture, and so continued restraint speaks volumes to Chinese intent. While we fret about the PLA Navy's newest frigate and latest stealth fighter, **China will slowly use diplomatic maneuvering to achieve its ends well below the threshold of open war.**

No impact to arms races

Paul F. Diehl, 1985 (University of Georgia), "ARMS RACES TO WAR: TESTING SOME EMPIRICAL LINKAGES",
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4106219.pdf>

Only approximately 20 percent of arms races and unilateral military buildups respectively were immediately followed by the escalation of a militarized dispute to war; this was not statistically different from militarized disputes that did not involve rapid arms acquisition.

Hegemony has proven to prevent great power wars; multipolarity fails

Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano, 6/3/13, "Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?", <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/> //CJC

During the 20th century multi-polar international systems resulted in instability and led to two world wars in less than 50 years. The balance of power and the system of alliances of the early 20th century was swept away by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914. That event triggered World War I, a global conflict that caused the death of more than 15 million people in less than five years. After few decades, the multi-polar world emerged by World War I with a new system of alliances and the multilateral body of the League of Nations was not able to tame the totalitarian aspirations of Hitler. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 triggered World War II, the deadliest conflict of the history which resulted in millions of deaths and in the holocaust. Since the end of the World War II the world has never been multi-polar again, nevertheless these historical accounts seem to indicate how multi-polarity often created an unstable and unpredictable world, characterized by shifting alliances and by the aspiration of the rising powers to change the balance of power and create a new order. These historical features of multi-polarity will likely distinguish also the future multi-polar world, in spite of its strong economic interconnection and institutionalization. History indeed has also shown how the effects on stability of a global economy and of multilateral institutions have been sometimes overestimated. The multi-polar world at the beginning of the 20th century was highly economically interconnected and characterized by a large cross-border flows of goods, capital and people, at the point that the ratio of trade to output indicates that "Britain and France are only slightly more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then" (The Economist, 99; Van den Bossche, 4). Nevertheless, this high interconnection was swept away by World War I. Furthermore, the presence of the League of Nations did not prevent World War II; likewise, the multilateral organization of the UN has not always been effective in promoting peace and security, and membership in the European Union did not prevent European countries from having different positions and antithetic behaviors in the wake of US war in Iraq in 2003. A shifting from a well defined hierarchy of power to a great power rivalry will therefore result in a less stable world order.

No threats to Heg in the squo

Salvatore Babones, June 11th, 2015, [an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney. He is a comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the social sciences, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay "<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089>] MJS

Ultimately, it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade. But how long is the long run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. American hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh.

The rise of China does not lead to the decline of US hegemony

Michael Beckley 12, [research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2012, "China's Century?", *International Security*, Vol. 36, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Chinas_Century.pdf] MJS

According to the Global Language Monitor, which tracks the top 50,000 media sources throughout the world, the "rise of China" has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-first century, surpassing the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, the election of Barack Obama, and the British royal wedding.¹ One reason for the story's popularity, presumably, is that the rise of China entails the decline of the United States. While China's economy grows at 9 percent annually, the United States reels from economic recession, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget deficits. This divergence in fortunes has produced two pieces of conventional wisdom in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy debates.² First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization—the integration of national economies and resultant diffusion of technology from developed to developing countries—and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. An alternative, though less prevalent, perspective rejects both of these assumptions.³ In this view, U.S. power is durable, and globalization and America's hegemonic role are the main reasons why. The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or "declinist," perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China's growth by "[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy" and subdue China's ambitions by "disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia."⁴ If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China's growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China's ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia. With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings.⁵ First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits

of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conflate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing” based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.⁶ The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others. Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This flaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, however, is not whether the United States is more powerful than China at present, but whether it will remain so in the future. Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible to answer this question. This study addresses these shortcomings by comparing the United States and China across a large set of economic, technological, and military indicators over the past twenty years. The results are mixed, but the bulk of the evidence supports the alternative perspective. Over the last two decades, globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens have expanded significantly, yet the United States has not declined; in fact it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991.

China has narrowed the gap in terms of GDP and now exports a greater volume of high-technology products and employs more scientists than any country in the world. However, GDP correlates poorly with national power; more than 90 percent of China’s high-tech exports are produced by foreign firms and consist of low-tech components; and China’s quantitative advantage in scientists has not yet translated into qualitative advantages in innovation. The United States suffers from a huge debt problem that its political system appears ill-suited to solve. China, however, faces its own fiscal mess, which may be more intractable than America’s. The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in high-technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China’s decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up.⁷

Increased military spending is key to maintaining military dominance, which is the prereq to diplomacy and key to leadership and influence

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, <http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review>] //CJC

In the first half of the 20th century alone, the world experienced two devastating world wars, the rise of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian menace, and the advent of the nuclear age. This grim history and the threats to America and her interests following World War II prompted America’s leaders to employ our extraordinary economic, diplomatic, and military power to establish and support the current rules-based international order that has greatly furthered global peace and prosperity and ushered in an era of post-war affluence for

the American people. This order is not self-sustaining; it requires active, robust American engagement and sustained contributions by our allies. To be sure, other nations have benifited and will continue to benefit. But make no mistake, America provides this international leadership because it greatly enhances America's own security and prosperity. (3)¹ There is clearly a cost to this kind of leadership, but nowhere near what America paid in the first half of the 20th century when conflict was allowed to fester and grow until it rose to the level of general war. Indeed, our policy of active global engagement has been so beneficial and is so ingrained that those who would retreat from it have a heavy burden of proof to present an alternative that would better serve the security interests and well-being of the United States of America. Since World War II, no matter which party has controlled the White House or Congress, America's global military capability and commitment has been the strategic foundation undergirding our global leadership. Given that reality, the defense budget cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, coupled with the additional cuts and constraints on defense management under the law's sequestration provision, constitute a serious strategic misstep on the part of the United States. Not only have they caused significant investment shortfalls in U.S. military readiness and both present and future capabilities, they have prompted our current and potential allies and adversaries to question our commitment and resolve. Unless reversed, these shortfalls will lead to a high risk force in the near future. That in turn will lead to an America that is not only less secure but also far less prosperous. In this sense, these cuts are ultimately self-defeating. The effectiveness of America's other tools for global influence, such as diplomacy and economic engagement, are critically intertwined with and dependent upon the perceived strength, presence, and commitment of U.S. armed forces. Yet the capabilities and capacities rightly called for in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, hereafter referred to as the QDR, clearly exceed the budget resources made available to the Department. This gap is disturbing if not dangerous in light of the fact that global threats and challenges are rising, including a troubling pattern of territorial assertiveness and regional intimidation on China's part, the recent aggression of Russia in Ukraine, nuclear proliferation on the part of North Korea and Iran, a serious insurgency in Iraq that both reflects and fuels the broader sectarian conflicts in the region, the civil war in Syria, and civil strife in the larger Middle East and throughout Africa. These are among the trends that mandate increased defense funding. Others include the rapidly expanding availability of lethal technologies to both state and non-state actors; demographic shifts, including increasing urbanization; diffusion of power among many nations, particularly rising economic and military powers in Asia; and heated competition to secure access to scarce natural resources. These and other trends pose serious op-erational challenges to American military forces. (9–11) Conflicts are likely to unfold more rapidly. Battlefields will be more lethal. Operational sanctuary for U.S. forces (rear areas safe from enemy interdiction) will be scarce and often fleeting. Asymmetric conflict will be the norm. (17–19)

() In this rapidly changing environment, U.S. military superiority is not a given; maintaining the operational and technological edge of our armed forces requires sustained and targeted investment.

US military leadership key to defusing global threats – terrorism, pandemics, climate

Brooks, Dartmouth government professor, et al., 13 [Brooks, Stephen G., Ikenberry, G. John, Wohlforth, William C., STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung

Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, "Lean Forward", Jan/Feb2013, Vol. 92, Issue 1, Academic Search Complete, accessed 7-2-13, AFB] //CJC

CREATING COOPERATION. What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."

NO Welfare Tradeoff and NO Private Sector Tradeoff

Whitten 2011 [Guy, "Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 55. Accessed at: <https://faculty.missouri.edu/~williamslaro/Whitten%20and%20Williams%202011.pdf>.] //DNP

While the first line of research on the "guns vs. butter" trade-off took a direct approach and found ambiguous evidence, the second approach examines the relationship less directly by

examining the impact of military spending on economic growth and employment and finds evidence in the opposite direction—military spending has a positive impact. If there is a “guns vs. butter” trade-off, then we should see a negative relationship between military spending and economic growth. But, in the most comprehensive study of this relationship to date, Mintz and Stevenson found that only in Canada and Nicaragua, two of their 103 cases, was there a statistically significant negative relationship between military spending and economic growth (1995).³ The effect of military spending on economic growth was positive and statistically significant at conventionally accepted levels for seven cases and statistically indistinguishable from zero in 94 cases. The “guns vs. butter” trade-off also implies a negative relationship between military expenditures and employment. But studies of this relationship have consistently found a statistically significant multiplier effect of military spending on employment (Best and Connolly 1976; Hooker and Knetter 2001). This effect works in two ways: as a payroll effect, by increasing the number of civilian and military personnel employed by the defense sector, and as a purchasing effect, by increasing the level of military expenditures on goods and services (Sasaki 1963). This relationship appears to work stronger in reverse; cuts in military spending are followed by employment reductions, partly due to the difficulty in converting specialized military industries to civilian purposes (Brauer and Marlin 1992; Hooker and Knetter 2001). Taken together, these two bodies of research imply that politicians do not make guns versus butter trade-offs, nor should they. To the extent that military spending affects domestic economies, it appears to do so in a fashion that implies a “guns yield butter” relationship; an increase in military spending may or may not increase economic growth, but it is likely to increase employment. If we put aside for the moment the foreign policy implications of military spending, these findings suggest partisan priorities for military spending that would otherwise seem counterintuitive. Given the priority that supporters of left-wing parties place on employment (e.g., Hibbs 1979), we should expect pro-welfare politicians to view military spending as one of the policy tools available to stimulate employment growth. Given that employment growth tends to lead to inflation, more right-wing governments may be inclined (ignoring foreign policy consequences) to decrease or hold constant military spending. In spite of these empirical findings about the impact of military spending, one might still reasonably ask why a government would choose to use such an indirect approach to accomplish its macroeconomic goals. An excellent set of answers to this question can be found in Nincic and Cusack’s (1979) classic work on the political business cycle of U.S. military spending. These authors argued that guns were a politically and otherwise efficient means for yielding butter on three grounds. First, defense spending increases may be justified to fiscal conservatives by grounding them in national security terms. Second, unlike other types of spending, military spending can supplement the private sector and does not compete directly with private investment. And third, military spending creates a large opportunity for capital purchases because machinery quickly becomes obsolete (112).

Neither relative nor absolute decline is inevitable but the US must choose to maintain primacy—reject their ahistorical analysis

Merry, The National Interest Editor, 12 [Robert W., 2/8/12, The National Interest, "Understanding America's Fall," nationalinterest.org/commentary/understanding-americas-fall-6473] //CJC

Kagan goes after the notion, put forth by Harvard's Stephen Walt and others, **that while American power remains relatively strong, the country no longer has the capacity to have its way over as much of the globe as in the past.** Kagan argues that nothing much has changed there. **Since 1945, he writes, the challenge of maintaining America's position in the world and fostering global stability has always generated defeats, frustrations and embarrassments along with the triumphs.** "We tend to think back on the early years of the Cold War as a moment of complete American global dominance," he writes. **"They were nothing of the sort."** He provides some pretty good history of those years' foreign tribulations, including the communist takeover of China, the Korean War agony, the loss of America's nuclear monopoly, Suez, the Vietnam debacle and Japan's economic rise. All of these things led **many in America to decry the country's loss of relative power in the world, and yet America always managed to spring back.** And there certainly were times akin to today when America truly did lose standing in the world and things could have gone badly—most notably the late 1970s, when the U.S. economy faltered, Soviet adventurism was on the rise, Mideast oil politics was turning against America and the Iranian hostage crisis was at full intensity. And yet **American ingenuity and resilience once again prevailed, and under Ronald Reagan the country came back with greater force than ever, remediating its faulty economy and out-competing the Soviets into oblivion.** "The difficulties in shaping the international environment in any era are immense," writes Kagan. "Few powers even attempt it, and even the strongest rarely achieve all or even most of their goals."

That's why, he avers, **"preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment."** In the end, he says, **the decision is in the hands of Americans. "Decline,"** as Charles Krauthammer has observed, **is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate**—at least not yet." Here's where the analysis gets a bit ragged. Contra Krauthammer, **great powers** never make a "choice" to slip into decline. They **may choose to accept the decline that fate forces upon them,** as Britain eventually did. But **the choice is really over what kinds of policies a great power wishes to pursue on the global stage and whether those policies will bolster or undermine its global status.** Hence, Kagan's catalogue of America's Cold

War defeats and difficulties is instructive but perhaps not precisely as he intends. He seems to be saying that all great powers experience such defeats and difficulties, so we should just go for it. A better lesson is that such experiences suggest caution, a measured approach to foreign policy that preserves power for when it's really needed and places power bets that are commensurate with the possible payoff—and the risks involved.

Nuclear terror escalates to full nuclear war

Ayson, 10 Professor of Strategic Studies [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford's Centre for International Studies. "After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593] //CJC

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states

that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors

themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just

possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups.

They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be "spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from." Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?

Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abettors of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as

Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear

Any nuclear use could escalate

MALLAVARAPU 2013 (Siddharth Mallavarapu, Mallavarapu is an associate professor in, and chairperson of, the Department of International Relations at South Asian University in New Delhi, “Monumental failure in an interconnected world,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 4, <http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-detonations-contemplating-catastrophe/monumental-failure-interconnected-world>)

The prospect of a nuclear detonation anywhere in the world is horrifying but, for a variety of reasons, it is not entirely implausible. The suspect logic of deterrence that pertains among nuclear adversaries could unravel amid changing geopolitical circumstances. Disgruntled non-state actors could gain access to the know-how and materials needed to fashion a nuclear weapon. Or a simple accident might result in a detonation. In any of these situations, a single detonation could create a spiral of retaliation.

Nuclear winter causes extinction

SHULMAN 2013 (Carl Shulman is a Research Fellow at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Some notes on existential risk from nuclear war, December 9, http://lesswrong.com/lw/jb9/some_notes_on_existential_risk_from_nuclear_war/)

If harm from explosions, fire, radiation, and the collapse of infrastructure were the only causes of death, then at least some humans would be able to survive, even in a much reduced state: the damage would be non-uniform, and survivors could sustain a population at some level. The damage would also spare some countries and regions.

Nuclear winter makes civilizational collapse and extinction more plausible because it provides a mechanism for nuclear weapons to disrupt food supplies worldwide. If survivors of initial damage find themselves unable to produce or collect food to sustain themselves anywhere, then human extinction would result as soon as stockpiles were exhausted. Nuclear winter would result from burning cities under the right conditions propelling material into the upper atmosphere and blocking solar radiation, cooling the Earth to a degree dependent upon the number and magnitude of firestorms (among other things). The effect would decay over time, most rapidly at first, as the material gradually fell.

PMCs are good.

David **Isenberg**, senior research analyst with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), The Good, the Bad, and the Unknown: PMCs in Iraq, **2006**, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/2006PMC.pdf>.

PMCs have done reasonably well in fulfilling their contracts in Iraq. They have performed difficult missions under trying circumstances. Generally, their personnel have conducted themselves professionally and are more in tune with the local culture than are regular U.S. military forces. In several, little noted cases, they performed above and beyond the call of duty. On the whole they are culturally more sensitive than the military. We need to remember that to be able to operate they have to mix with locals thus getting to know the local culture. Such integration is

done professionally and during periods of relaxation. While one can't eliminate the possibility of getting an ill-trained or unqualified person working for a company on the whole the level of professionalism compares favorably with, and in many cases exceeds that of regular military forces. For the sake of comparison consider the hapless reservists who were tasked with guarding inmates at Abu Ghraib, a task for which they were not trained.

Obama passing reforms reducing PMCs

Lendman, 1/19/10, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, RENSE, "Outsourcing War - Rise Of Private Military Contractors (PMCs)", <http://www.rense.com/general89/outs.htm>, 7/2/10

In February 2007, Senator Obama introduced the Transparency and Accountability in Military Security Contracting Act as an amendment to the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, requiring federal agencies to report to Congress on the numbers of security contractors employed, killed, wounded, and disciplinary actions taken against them. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, it never passed. Then in February 2009 as president, Obama introduced reforms to reduce PMC spending and shift outsourced work back to government. of dollars He also promised to improve the quality of acquisition workers - government employees involved in supervising and auditing billions spent monthly on contracts. Even so, PMCs are fully integrated into national security and other government functions, as evidenced by the massive numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan alone.

Military Cuts -> More PMCs

Erek Sanchez 15 [Erek Sanchez is an author for your-poc.com, the largest online resource for contractors that work abroad, "Private Military Contractors: The good, the bad, the ugly myths", [your-poc.com, http://www.your-poc.com/private-military-contractors-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly-myths/](http://www.your-poc.com/private-military-contractors-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly-myths/)] //BS

The draw down and the cutbacks of the military have actually increased the need for armed security in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Remember, there are a number of non-military projects that are being done in country and have no military value, such as construction of civilian-use airfields, roads, power and water treatment, just to name a few. These projects are still in a very volatile environment and the threat of violence against the workers and locals, in addition to sabotage to equipment, is an ever-present danger.

The military's manpower and resources are limited to designated and specific posts, and unable to be physically present and provide the needed protection to all sectors 24/7. Private security companies like Triple Canopy, S.O.C, Osen-Hunter, Blackwater, Xe and Academi are able to meet that gap, and with an ample amount of veterans they have no trouble in filling that need.

MIC Controls Congress in SQ

Turley 15 [Jonathan Turley is Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University, “Big money behind war: the military-industrial complex”, *Al Jazeera*, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html>] //BS

There are **thousands of lobbyists in Washington** to **guarantee the ever-expanding budgets for war** and homeland security. One such example is former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff who pushed the purchase of the heavily criticised (and little tested) full-body scanners used in airports. When Chertoff was giving dozens of interviews to convince the public that the machines were needed to hold back the terror threat, many people were unaware that the manufacturer of the machine is a client of the Chertoff Group, his highly profitable security consulting agency. (Those hugely expensive machines were later scrapped after Rapiscan, the manufacturer, received the windfall.)

Lobbyists maintain pressure on politicians by framing every budget in "tough on terror" versus "soft on terror" terms. They have the perfect products to pitch - products that are designed to destroy themselves and be replaced in an ever-lasting war on terror.

MIC profits >> lobbying

Boehm 14 [Eric Boehm is the national regulatory reporter for Watchdog.org, “Defense contractors spent millions lobbying Congress, get billions in new budget”, *The Washington Examiner*, <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/defense-contractors-spent-millions-lobbying-congress-get-billions-in-new-budget/article/2542747>] //BS

Military contractors spent millions lobbying Congress last year, and it seems to have worked. They stand to get billions in return.

The military-industrial complex has emerged as one of the big winners in the budget deal working its way through Congress, but headed for approval.

The omnibus spending bill basically **eliminates \$22 billion in proposed cuts to the Department of Defense** -- cuts that were once part of the much-feared “sequester” that took effect in March 2013 due to the lack of a federal budget bill -- and hands the Pentagon nearly \$500 million for 2014.

An analysis by The Hill says the defense budget was supposed to be around \$475 billion before Congress decided to repeal the sequester cuts, bringing the final total to about \$497 billion.

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The Defense Department also is getting \$85 billion -- an increase of \$5 billion from last year -- for the ongoing war in Afghanistan, which is not included in the baseline budget because wars are funded in a separate and sterile-sounding part of the budget known as “overseas contingency operations.”

Congress made a deal to cut spending in exchange for raising the debt ceiling," said Veronique de Rugy, a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center and a Washington Examiner columnist.

"But some of the biggest and loudest voices calling for the restoration of the sequester was the defense contractors — as if the world would be in grave danger if their profit margins were cut," de Rugy said.

According to lobbying information released Jan. 21, **major defense contractors spent** more than **\$65 million influencing Congress during 2013**, with much of that effort likely aimed at rolling back the sequester cuts.

Trump ends MIC

Greider 16 [William Greider is defense establishment expert for The Nation, " Donald Trump Could Be the Military-Industrial Complex's Worst Nightmare", March 2016, *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trump-could-be-the-military-industrial-complexs-worst-nightmare/>] //BS

"I do think it's a different world today and **I don't think we should be nation-building anymore,** **Trump said.** "I think it's proven not to work. And we have a different country than we did then. You know we have \$19 trillion in debt. We're sitting probably on a bubble, and, you know, it's a bubble that if it breaks is going to be very nasty. And I just think we have to rebuild our country."

Will anybody give him an amen? Yes, lots of folks. People who read The Nation (myself included) have been saying something similar for a long time. So have libertarian Republicans on the right. But **this** sort of thinking **is mega-heresy among the political establishment** of both parties. The foreign-policy operators consider themselves in charge of the "indispensable nation."

This new Trump talk is definitely career-threatening for the military-industrial complex. It was particularly playful of Trump to choose The Washington Post as the place to drop his bomb; after all, it's the Post that has made itself such a righteous preacher for endless war-making.

The Donald, usually bellicose in style and substance, is singing, "Give peace a chance." What does his detour portend for national policy? We can't know for sure, since Trump also has a tendency to casually contradict himself before different audiences. Later on the same day, he addressed AIPAC's convention and sounded like a warrior for Zion. He got thunderous applause after making the ritual promises that candidates from both parties always make at AIPAC meetings.

But **Trump has**, in his usual unvarnished manner, **kicked open the door to an important and fundamental foreign-policy debate.** It is far more profound than the disputes we usually hear between hawks and doves. He's proposing a radical standard for testing US policy abroad, both

in war and peace: Is it actually in America's interest? Or has US global strategy become a dangerous hangover from the glory years, when Washington armed and organized nations for the Cold War?

Trump Eliminates DoE

Ragland 16 [Will Ragland is Director of Education Policy at American Progress, "Trump's Plan to Eliminate the Department of Education is Yet Another in a List of Terrible Ideas", *American Progress*,

<https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/education/news/2016/09/01/162258/trumps-plan-to-eliminate-the-department-of-education-is-yet-another-in-a-list-of-terrible-ideas/>] //BS

During recent campaign stops, Republican presidential nominee **Donald Trump is** again **proposing to eliminate** or drastically cut **the U.S. Department of Education**. Earlier this month, in Florida, he said "there is so much waste" at the department that he plans to cut it—along with the Environmental Protection Agency—down to "shreds" to help pay for his "billionaires-first" tax plan. But, according to new analysis from the Center for American Progress Action Fund, Trump's proposal could mean that more than 8 million low-income students—roughly the population of New York City—would lose millions of dollars for college.

DoE -> Pell Grants

Turner 16 [Cory Turner is an Education Editor for NPR, "Donald Trump's Plan For America's Schools", *NPR*, <http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/25/494740056/donald-trumps-plan-for-americas-schools>] //BS

It's not clear if **Trump, in cutting the Department, would also cut the services that it provides**, but, since his conversation with Wallace was in the context of broader spending cuts it's reasonable to assume he would.

Those services **include** providing roughly \$15 billion in Title I funds to help schools that educate at-risk students, more than \$12 billion for students with special needs, and some **\$29 billion in Pell Grants** to help low-income students pay for college (all according to 2016 Congressional appropriations).

Trump Won't Cut Welfare (AT: Non-Unique)

Gajanan, 2017. ["Bernie Sanders Brings Giant Printout of Trump Tweet to Senate Floor." The Atlantic. Mahita Gajanan. January 4, 2017. <http://time.com/4622703/bernie-sanders-donald-trump-senate-tweet/>] GW

Bernie Sanders spoke on the Senate floor on Wednesday to urge Donald Trump to veto any cuts to Social Security, Medicare or Medicaid—and used one of the President-elect's own tweets to prove his point.

As lawmakers debated the repeal of Obamacare, Sanders pointed out that **Trump had previously said he would not cut the services** through a giant printout of a tweet dating to May 2015.

"I was the first & only potential GOP candidate to state there will be no cuts to Social Security, Medicare & Medicaid," Trump claimed at the time. "Huckabee copied me."

China is comparatively worse – promotes less sustainable development, accelerates resource exploitation

Tiffen 14 (Adam, "The New Neo-Colonialism in Africa" August 19 2014,

[http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/08/2014/new-neo-colonialism-africa\)](http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/08/2014/new-neo-colonialism-africa)

The truth is **the Chinese approach in Africa is a new form of colonialism. Chinese interests in Africa are motivated solely for China's benefit;** by combining government action with corporate interests, the Chinese are locking up rights to billions of dollars of valuable commodities. African **nations**, facing political pressure to show some development progress, **are induced to barter** what are often **their only significant sources of potential wealth for mediocre infrastructure** that does little to develop their economies and is worth a tiny fraction of the total value of the resources they sign over to the Chinese. The lack of sustainability in this trading partnership creates an inevitable African dependence upon Chinese largess for future maintenance and rehabilitation of this infrastructure. Corruption and graft, rampant throughout African politics, has also enabled Chinese government backed businesses to influence political decision makers in their economic favor. Needless to say, **Chinese construction on the African continent is also undertaken with little regard for environmental and cultural sustainability.** The resultant **destruction of rainforests, unrestricted mining, and pollution of fresh water supplies will have a lasting negative impact** on the economic and security situation. By contrast, **the United States** and the European Union **have taken a more measured approach.** Motivated in part by economic necessity, but also by **the desire to help build local capacity within their African trading partners, the U.S. and E.U. have conditioned much of their economic assistance on social and economic reform.** In countries like the South Sudan, the contrast is stark. While the U.S., Britain, and Norway are South Sudan's biggest donor countries in terms of economic assistance, they do not have any stakes in South Sudanese oil production. By **requiring** political, economic and social **reform as a pre-condition** of much of U.S. and E.U. assistance, **the true costs of development aid are apparent up-front.** Preconditions are designed to work to the long-term benefit of local governance and indigenous populations, and excesses are often tempered by social and environmental restraints. **While not perfect, this focus on investment (as opposed to exploitation) creates far less excessive imbalances and stands to benefit Africa to a far greater degree over the long term.** China's approach in Africa is a new form of **economic colonialism.** Chinese state-backed companies will continue to extract precious natural resources with **little to no benefit derived by indigenous populations.** China's expanding economic influence will result in an increasing dependence that will dominate African economies and politics. **This approach is unsustainable, and likely to have dire consequences.** The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit provided a perfect venue for the United States to reengage in smart, principled investment in Africa that can benefit all parties involved—an opportunity that couldn't come at a more critical moment.

Current Decrease in Military Spending

Salmon, Diem. "A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget." *The Heritage Foundation*. The Heritage Foundation, 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 12 Jan. 2017.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/a-proposal-for-the-fy-2016-defense-budget>

In total, since FY 2010, the defense budget, including overseas contingency operations (OCO) spending, has been cut **25 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.**[\[10\]](#)

Trump lays out non-interventionist U.S. military policy

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-military-idUSKBN13W06L> (Steve Hollad, December 2016)

"President-elect Donald Trump laid out a U.S. military policy on Tuesday that would avoid interventions in foreign conflicts and instead focus heavily on defeating the Islamic State militancy."

Taiwanese Strait Defense

Forsythe, 2017 [MICHAEL FORSYTHE and CHRIS BUCKLEY, "Taiwan Responds After China Sends Carrier to Taiwan Strait," *The New York Times*, 10 January 2017,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-strait-aircraft-carrier-trump.html>

HONG KONG — [Taiwan](#) scrambled F-16 fighter jets and dispatched a frigate to the Taiwan Strait on Wednesday after [China](#) sent its sole aircraft carrier into the waterway, Taiwan's official Central News Agency reported.

Waste gets solved for

Garamone 2016 [Jim, "Comptroller Says DoD Will Continue Audit Accountability Plan," *US Department of Defense*. Accessed at:

[https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/801055/comptroller-says-dod-will-continue-audit-accountability-plan.\] //DNP](https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/801055/comptroller-says-dod-will-continue-audit-accountability-plan.)

The **Defense Department is getting closer to full audit accountability** and will stick to its plan to achieve it, DoD's chief financial officer told the House Armed Services Committee yesterday.

Comptroller [**Mike McCord told legislators that achieving auditability is an important part of Defense Secretary Ash Carter's reform agenda.**](#)

One of the four pillars of Carter's strategy is to reform the way the department does business, which is where audit effort and acquisition reform come in. The military services' chief financial officers accompanied McCord at the hearing.

"Our focus on the audit has yielded substantial and measurable results over the last couple of years," McCord said. "For the first time ever, the military services audited their annual budgets for [fiscal year] 2015. Combined with the successful recurring audits of other parts of the department that we've had for several years, about 90 percent of our [fiscal] '15 budget was audited. Those audits did not produce a clean opinion the first time out for the services, but still, we learned a great deal from our initial effort and will be back at it for ... [fiscal] '17."

McCord said the department is putting contracts in place to audit the department's full financial statement in fiscal 2018, the long-term goal of this effort.

A financial audit examines the department's financial and business processes, and a successful audit confirms that the information on the financial statements is clearly and fairly presented, McCord said. "A financial statement audit does not necessarily tell you that those funds were spent wisely," he added.