# SV – TOC Aff – Rd 7 [Encirclement]

## Our Sole Contention is the String of Pearls

#### Ved Nanda explained on Friday that:

Ved Nanda, 4-25-2019, "Nanda: U.S. support for Sri Lanka is smart foreign policy," Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2019/04/26/sri-lanka-attack-isis-china-nanda/, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

As part of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, designed to link the country through land corridors and sea routes to Asia, Africa, and Europe, China is investing heavily in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has been facing a debt crisis. Finding itself unable to pay back Chinese loans, in 2017 the country handed over its Hambantota port, lying next to one of the busiest East-West shipping routes, and 1,500 acres of land to China for 99 years. China is developing facilities around the Indian Ocean in a “string of pearls” strategy for a line of ports stretching from Chinese waters to the Persian Gulf to secure its economic and military interests, and to counter India’s influence. China has now embarked on a Port City project to be built outside Colombo on an artificial island reclaimed from the ocean. Last month, Sri Lanka signed a $989 million loan with China’s Exim Bank to build a highway linking its center to the Hambantota port.

#### Giridharadas indicated in 2019 that:

Akshobh Giridharadas, 1-19-2019, "As China expands, India contracts," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/as-china-expands-india-contracts-47484/, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // JM

“India is a bit like Britain, a very closed system,” says the British diplomat who now finds a very distinct strategic foundation growing in New Delhi with its range of thinkers. “The Chinese hegemony is clearly not acceptable to the world and to India, but India is less clear about it wants than what it doesn’t want,” therein lies the problem echoes another diplomat. However, the core tenets of India’s foreign policy will always be consensus on non-intervention and sovereign equality of nationhood. “India needs to ask itself as what you do want as a country” reiterates my diplomat friend as India is increasingly worried about the [String of Pearls](https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/here-is-all-you-should-know-about-string-of-pearls-china-s-policy-to-encircle-india-324315.html) in the Indian Ocean. The real question for India is with its non-confrontational and pacifist approach is will it be a great power or just a great presence?

#### The String of Pearls strategy is being employed in two specific areas. First, the Indian Ocean. Stratfor indicated this past week that China is:

Stratfor, 4-19-2019, "Why the Belt and Road Fuels India's Fears of Encirclement," Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinas-belt-and-road-fuels-indias-fears-encirclement-cpec-saarc-bri, Date Accessed 4-26-2019 // JM

India might be a large trading partner in its own right, but the designs of the even-larger power on its[India’s] doorstep is fueling its [fears of encirclement](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-china-aid-neighbors-nepal-bhutan-sri-lanka-maldives-bangladesh-seychelles). The Belt and Road Initiative, the cornerstone of Chinese President Xi Jinping's foreign policy to blaze a trail of trade across Asia and Europe, includes five of India's neighbors: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal. But worried that the initiative will grant Beijing undue political influence in neighboring capitals — and that new ports and highways could one day aid China in a military conflict — New Delhi is searching for ways to remain a step ahead of China's activities in South Asia. For one, India has sought to promote its influence by dangling the prospect of greater investment. In so doing, India has scored a few important victories, but its quest for unrivaled dominance in the subcontinent is ultimately a long shot given the allure of Chinese largesse for the subcontinent's smaller countries.

#### Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean Region leads to an inevitable clash. Vivek Mishra writes in 2018 that

Vivek Mishra, 4-14-2018, "China Is Moving into the Indian Ocean," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href=<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-moving-the-indian-ocean-25380>, Date Accessed 4-23-2019 // WS

In the past few years, the Maldives has quintessentially exemplified the shortcomings of India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. But there is a larger geopolitical premonition that could be anticipated from the recent [crisis](https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-maldives-crisis-will-india-intervene/) in the Indian Ocean islands of the Maldives, one that points to the immediacy with which China and India are approaching towards a conflict in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). At the heart of this potential conflict lies slipping away of one of India’s important influence centers to the advantage of China. Since the current Yameen government took office, the Maldives has done a volte-face from an ‘India First’ policy, to openly ignoring India’s concerns and to embracing China. India’s readiness in countering China seems to be barely holding its neck above the water, with minimal functional capabilities. India currently has only one each functional aircraft carrier and submarine. However, India’s contestation with China in the Indian Ocean is not just a possibility of the conventional equipment-war, but an ongoing war of leverage. The most effective tool in this war is strategic hedging and for now China seems to be using it more deftly. In this regard, the recent trends have been an eye-opener for India. The Maldives, traditionally India’s sphere of influence, has already signed up for Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road initiative; Sri Lanka’s strategic Hambantota port is on lease with China for 99 years, China has considerably enhanced its above and sub-surface presence in parts of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea along with increasing Chinese sway with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. The recent functional Chinese base at Djibouti at the strategic Horn of Africa in the Indian Ocean has only compounded the overarching dilemma for India.

#### This conflict would be disastrous as Kyle Mizokami writes in 2018 that

Kyle Mizokami, 6-12-2018, "Why a War Between China and India Is Not Unthinkable (And Would Be a Total Horror Show)," National Interest, <a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-war-between-china-india-not-unthinkable-would-be-total-26238", Date Accessed 4-20-2019 // WS

A hypothetical war between India and China would be one of the largest and most destructive conflicts in Asia.[and] A war between the two powers would rock the Indo-Pacific region, cause thousands of casualties on both sides and take a significant toll on the global economy. Geography and demographics would play a unique role, limiting the war’s scope and ultimately the conditions of victory. India and China border one another in two locations, northern India/western China and eastern India/southern China, with [territorial disputes in both areas](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-china_conflicts.htm). China attacked both theaters in October 1962, starting a monthlong war that resulted in minor Chinese gains on the ground. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war.

#### Second is European ports. Pelagidis writes that on April 15 that:

Theodore Pelagidis, 4-15-2019, "China’s backdoor to Europe," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/04/15/chinas-backdoor-to-europe/, Date Accessed 4-28-2019 // JM

BRI represents, in fact, three roads with vital subroutes (Figure 1). The first is over land and revives the ancient Silk Road from China’s Sinai to Rome. On its northern branch, the road reaches from China to Russia; a southern route connects China to Europe through Iran. Combined, these routes pass through Asia and Africa, linking East Asia with Europe and Russia. The maritime portion of the Silk Road links China’s seas with the Mediterranean through the Indian Ocean, the Arabian seas, and the Red Sea. An e-Silk Road exists as well, digitally linking not only countries and regions already engaged through the Silk Road, but also any country wanting to take advantage of Chinese investment and trade opportunities. In addition, a “String of Pearls” strategy focuses mainly on the acquisition of strategically valuable ports, including the Greek port of Piraeus in Athens. The next pearl along the route is set to connect to ports in Italy. This huge multipart undertaking will connect land and sea routes for the efficient ferrying of goods and services between East and West, focusing on creating transport and energy infrastructure as well as maritime investments in strategically important ports. These land and sea routes will undoubtedly affect Europe. Member states are divided over whether to cooperate with China on its giant project.

#### And this expansion is going to force Europe’s hand in choosing sides as Sheldon 18 writes that:

Alexandre Sheldon, 4-23-2018, "Blue China: Navigating the Maritime Silk Road to Europe," https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/blue\_china\_navigating\_the\_maritime\_silk\_road\_to\_europe, Date Accessed 4-28-2019 // JM

Europe’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific should focus on the defence of international law principles and on the promotion of peace in conflict resolution. In addition to the limited engagement with the PLAN described above, European countries should also step up their naval diplomacy and exercises with other regional actors. Europe already exerts influence through the sale of naval equipment to Australia, Singapore, India, South Korea, and Malaysia, although economic interests are arguably a more important driver for these exports than strategic considerations. Europeans should view their presence and defence cooperation as a contribution to preserving peace in the Indo-Pacific region through achieving strategic balance. This analysis of the Maritime Silk Road reveals that Europe will increasingly need to consider its approach to China as a matter of grand strategy, and not as a collection of specific policy responses around competition and cooperation with Beijing. Nothing has yet forced Europe to pick a side between China and a US-led counterbalancing coalition in the Indo-Pacific region. But the time will come when it will have to decide, and this may not be a time of Europe’s own choosing. With Xi Jinping in power for the foreseeable future, pursuing a national strategy transparently aiming for global leadership, the international environment is evolving inexorably towards more bipolarity. In this context, what happens on, by, and beneath, the world’s seas will be crucial in the international race for power and influence.

#### Chinese influence in European ports devastate their principles of economic integration. Lee argues in late 2018 that:

John Lee, 11-29-2018, "China’s Trojan Ports," No Publication, https://www.hudson.org/research/14717-china-s-trojan-ports, Date Accessed 4-28-2019 // JM

Second, there is growing discomfort with the close funding arrangements between Chinese firms and government-controlled financial entities. This is at odds with the European Union’s relatively liberal notion of political economy, which depends on there being significant distance between the political and strategic objectives of the government on the one hand, and the objectives of commercial enterprises on the other. A case in point is COSCO Shipping Corporation, which was given over $26 billion by the China Development Bank to invest in BRI-sanctioned projects in 2017. These firms are given loose lines of credit to advance government policies and not just to maximize their commercial success. Even if one counters with the argument that European countries can dictate the laws and regulations that apply to assets in their sovereignty territories, the suspicion is that such assets can be used to benefit the Chinese economy disproportionately. For example, investment by the Chinese company COSCO Shipping in, and control of, Piraeus means the Greek port will cooperate with Chinese ports to boost synergies, as evidenced by a June 2017 agreement with Shanghai International Port Group to cooperate in project planning, staff training, and information exchange. As a complement to the Chinese purchase of Piraeus, Chinese banks provided loans to Greek shipping companies to build additional commercial vessels in Chinese shipyards. Furthermore, it would not be lost on Europeans that China’s “Made in China 2025” blueprint, and its associated industrial policies, are fundamentally mercantilist in nature: They are designed to enhance Chinese self-sufficiency in important strategic sectors and secure Chinese export dominance in the international market for these sectors. BRI networks promise to enhance the flow of goods, services, and information between China and BRI countries. In doing so, they serve to facilitate Chinese economic and industrial dominance. It is telling that China is promoting increased connectivity without undertaking significant domestic measures to remove what the European Union terms “significant market distortions.” These include CCP control over the financial system and policies offering preferential treatment of domestic companies over foreign competitors. Chinese businesses in BRI-related sectors receive land at artificially low prices along with access to cheap energy, preferential access to capital, suppressed borrowing costs, and beneficial pricing for raw materials and commodities. In terms of access to the Chinese market, it is worth noting that foreign investment in the most important and lucrative sectors of the Chinese economy is heavily restricted and restricted entry is via joint ventures—which leads to the new problem of large scale and state-sponsored intellectual property and trade secret theft. In addition to its still-closed capital account and discriminatory regulatory and antitrust laws, it is extremely difficult for foreign firms to gain permanent and meaningful footholds to thrive in Chinese industrial and consumption sectors, even as China is laying the ground for ever greater access to European markets. Indeed, Beijing has not made a convincing case that improved networks throughout Eurasia exist to evenly spread the opportunity of globalization and share the spoils of greater economic integration. The BRI and China’s interest in assets such as ports remain China-centric. China is paving the way to sell and buy what it wants, according to economic and strategic policies produced by the CCP. When Chinese firms negotiate opaque deals with European ones, the former begin with the largesse and non-commercial advantages that come from state assistance. The exchange is rigged from the start. Third, Chinese firms must ultimately obey directives from Beijing. The network of ports and other logistical facilities in Europe, Africa, and Asia provides China with a high degree of operational self-reliance and capacity. Control of international supply lines and logistical processes gives a country political leverage if that country is prepared to use these capabilities for political ends. While there are restrictions on European countries and other liberal democracies against using commercial and civilian assets to achieve political ends, no such limitations exist in China. Indeed, it is a crucial part of the CCP’s toolkit to use economic leverage to achieve both economic and non-economic ends.

#### Thomas Wright concludes that undermining these principles ensures economic depression that leads to conflict – Wright argues in 2012 that:

Thomas Wright, Summer 2012, “What if Europe Fails?” The Washington Quarterly, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerWright.pdf, Date Accessed 4-28-2019 // JM

Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger.¶ Would the failure of the Euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the disintegration of the European Union or the Eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world politics in the coming decade?¶ Thinking through and prioritizing the consequences of a failed Europe yield five of the utmost importance. First, the most immediate casualty of the failure of the European project would be the global economy. A disorderly collapse (as opposed to an orderly failure, which will be explained shortly) would probably trigger a new depression and could lead to the unraveling of economic integration as countries introduce protectionist measures to limit the contagion effects of a collapse. Bare survival would drag down Europe’s economy and would generate increasing and dangerous levels of volatility in the international economic order.¶ Second, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis depend not just on the severity of the crisis but also the geopolitical climate in which it occurs. Europe’s geopolitical climate is as healthy as can be reasonably expected. This would prevent a simple repeat of the 1930s in Europe, which has been one of the more alarming predictions from some observers, although certain new and fragile democracies in Europe might come under pressure.¶ Third, failure would cement Germany’s rise as the leading country in Europe and as an indispensable hub in the European Union and Eurozone, if they continue to exist, but anti-Germanism would become a more potent force in politics on the European periphery.¶ Fourth, economic downturn as a result of disintegration would undermine political authority in those parts of the world where the legitimacy of governments is shallow, and it would exacerbate international tensions where the geopolitical climate is relatively malign. The places most at risk are the Middle East and China.¶ Fifth, disintegration would weaken Europe on the world stage–it would severely damage the transatlantic alliance, both by sapping its resources and by diverting Europe’s attention to its internal crisis–and would, finally, undermine the multilateral order.¶ Taking these five implications in their totality, one thing is clear. Failure will badly damage Europe and the international order, but some types of failure–most notably a disorderly collapse–are worse than others. Currently, the pain is concentrated on the so-called European periphery (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland). Disorderly collapse would affect all European countries, as well as North America and East Asia. If a solution to the Eurocrisis is perceived as beyond reach, leaders of the major powers will shift their priorities to managing failure in order to contain its effects. This will be strenuously resisted on the periphery, which is already experiencing extremely high levels of pain and does not want to accept the permanence of the status quo. Consequently, their electorates will become more risk-acceptant and will pressure Germany and other core member states to accommodate them through financial transfers and assistance in exchange for not deliberately triggering a break-up. This bitter split will divide and largely define a failing Europe. Absent movement toward a solution, EU politics is about to take an ugly turn.

#### Granting India permanent membership solves these scenarios as it gives India the leverage to compel other nations to backslide on Chinese deals - Rajagopalan indicates in 2017:

Rajesh Rajagopalan, 9-14-2017, "India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia," Carnegie India, https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108, Date Accessed 4-4-2019 // WS

The third strategic tool at India’s disposal is multilateral diplomacy. India could potentially use multilateral institutions such as the United Nations to undermine the legitimacy of and constrain any aggressive Chinese behavior in the international arena. In addition, although India is not a permanent UNSC member, New Delhi could conceivably garner support on issues it deems important from other states, especially more powerful ones like the United States, in so doing, attempt to isolate Beijing and deter China from acting against India’s interests. Admittedly, China could opt to veto such proceedings in the UNSC, but it would likely pay a diplomatic cost for doing so, and such veto power does not extend to the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, in some situations, New Delhi could also conceivably partner with Beijing in such venues, in order to give China an incentive to be more accommodating of India’s interests.

#### This works in the Indian Ocean region as Yang Xiaoping writes in 2018 that:

Yang Xiaoping, 4-20-2018, "When India’s Strategic Backyard Meets China’s Strategic Periphery: The View From Beijing," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinas-strategic-periphery-the-view-from-beijing/, Date Accessed 4-26-2019 // JM

Indeed, increased interactions in the region so far point to the possibility of mutual learning. Already, China has realized that India [maintains the tools](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-election-india-insight/indian-spys-role-alleged-in-sri-lankan-presidents-election-defeat-idUSKBN0KR03020150118) to compete with it for influence in its neighborhood and, possibly, to coerce or hedge against China’s presence. For example, India could compel Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh to change the nature of their cooperation with China, can deter Pakistan, and may aspire to deny China’s further presence in the Indian Ocean through cooperation with the United States and alliances with Japan and Australia. All of this is to say that India, despite its fears, has the potential to manage China in the emerging areas of overlap. But the dynamics of U.S.-India defense cooperation threaten to disrupt this balance, especially technology transfer such as the lately approved [electromagnetic aircraft launch system](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-to-release-emals-technology-to-india-for-aircraft-carriers/articleshow/61129874.cms). For Chinese observers, this has the potential to become dangerous if India regards America’s substantial defense cooperation as a commitment to come to India’s aid in a potential conflict with China. This could set up a moral hazard problem, potentially entrapping the United States in future India-China standoffs or conflicts.

#### And in the European region as Kumar 17 explains that

Sunaina Kumar, 11-6-2017, “What India Thinks of Europe,” <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_what_india_thinks_of_europe7167>

On the surface, India and Europe have every reason to get along very well. They share a similar worldview, both have enormous cultural and linguistic diversity, and share values of democracy and a vision of a stable world order. They both constitute large-scale economies and face similar security issues, like the rising threat of terrorism. And this is, of course, not to mention their vigorous people-to-people ties: Indians represent the second largest diaspora group in Europe. In 2004, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership. Yet, this strategic element of the partnership exists only on paper. “It is a disappointing relationship precisely because there are such high expectations from it,” suggests Britta Petersen, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi. “But, there are structural problems on both sides which are difficult to overcome”. Both have complex bureaucracies and find each other opaque and difficult to deal with. Both are also consumed by more immediate priorities, like domestic affairs and their respective neighbourhoods. Give and take Often, India sees the EU as an institution that is fixated on rules and regulations, which brings no added value to its existing bilateral relations that India has with member states. It enjoys strong one-on-one relations, particularly with France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Just recently, India and France inked a $7.87 billion deal for the purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets. France is also developing three Indian cities for the Smart Cities programme launched by the Indian government to make cities more sustainable and livable. India finds its strongest European ally in Germany. It is the biggest partner of Germany’s development cooperation programme. For example, Germany is collaborating with India on the Smart Cities programme and has offered technical know-how and investment for the Clean Ganga initiative, a project to clean up the river Ganges, that the Indian government is greatly invested in. Trade-offs In it comes to trade with the EU, representatives from the business lobby in India are worried that a hard Brexit and the falling pound could impact the future of the 800 Indian businesses operating in the UK. Last year, India became the second largest global job creator in Britain and the third largest source of foreign direct investment. During May’s visit, India is likely to bring up the issue of a liberal visa policy for its students and businessmen – the number of students enrolled in UK universities has halved in the last five years. Still, India largely feels fairly indifferent to the matter of Brexit. Or, rather, it feels secure in the conviction that Brexit will make little difference to its ties with either Britain or Europe. Apart from seeing it as yet another crisis that threatens the future of a waning EU, policymakers in India have chosen to take an optimistic view of the consequences of Brexit for their country – that it could prod it to forge closer ties with other EU member states, outside of its relations with the UK. Germany is seen as the natural partner of choice by foreign policy experts, and one that supports India’s aspirations for a more central role in global governance. So while bilateral ties are thriving, India and the EU still need a new script. Could it be found through the deadlocked Free Trade Agreement? Today, India is the EU’s ninth largest trading partner while the EU as a bloc is India’s largest trading partner and largest source of foreign direct investment. The India-EU Free Trade Agreement was proposed in 2007, and there have been 16 rounds of talks since. Among other things, Europe wants tariff cuts on automobiles and wines and spirits, and India wants greater access for its labour market to enter Europe. The EU's struggle to conclude the CETA has been followed carefully in India, not just for its implications for the India-EU FTA (which few in India set much store by), but also for its larger resonance with the debate on globalisation. Seeking security During the cold war, Europe represented a “third option” for India, in the choice between the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe continues to be India’s third option, with the choice now between the US and China. India is seeking support for the increasing threat it perceives from China and Pakistan, as tensions escalate with both neighbours. At a recent seminar on India-EU cooperation in Delhi, a representative of the Ministry of External Affairs pointedly brought up the EU's "muted response" to the attack on an Indian Army camp in Uri by militants from Pakistan. Modi himself has reinvigorated India’s foreign policy and is seeking alliances to help secure a greater international role for the country. Climate security also presents itself as an area of mutual interest. Both India and the EU recently ratified the Paris agreement on climate change. India accounts for about five percent of global emissions, which are likely to grow. As a developing nation, it has maintained that it does not see itself as under any obligation to take on more responsibility for climate protection. But there is recognition that developing nations are the most vulnerable to climate change, which has led to a slight shift in stance. A future together? Despite the difficulties faced by both partners, there should be more that brings the two together than pulls them apart. Ties of history, culture and the economy and a similar commitment to democracy mean that together India and the EU could forge an important alliance. From both sides, more stakeholders need to be brought in, and one small win, even a symbolic one, could bring new energy to the relationship. But greater and more sustained commitment is what is needed if India and Europe are to forge a stronger, lasting and dynamic relationship.

## Extra

#### Specifically, this idea of multipolarism is the best way to solve for the Indian Ocean Region –Bayuni concludes that:

Endy Bayuni, Jakarta Post, 4-4-2019, "Is multipolarism replacing containment of China?," https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/04/04/is-multipolarism-replacing-containment-of-china.html, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

Multipolarism, or the idea that the region is ruled or managed not by one or two powers, but several of them working in concert, offers an alternative proposition without antagonizing the big powers. While multipolarity is the desired outcome, bipolarity is what we are likely to get, given the growing China-US rivalry. There is the possibility of a “uni-multipolar” Asia, where a single power, meaning China, reigns but does not control the region, similar to the post-Cold War US, which controlled much of but not the entire world. India is pushing for multipolarism given its position as Asia’s second-biggest power. If power is measured by economic strength, India ranks fifth in the world. Independent predictions say China will replace the US as the largest economy before 2030, with India tailing second. India has aspirations to be a major power and wants to project itself as leading South Asia. However, it has seen its influence undermined by the building of ports in neighboring Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan with large Chinese investments. These ports give China access in the Indian Ocean, strategic to its economy and national security, India may have the military might to claim itself as an emerging power, but unlike China, it lacks the ability to dispense loans and aid. Sri Lanka turned to China to build the Hambantota deep-sea port after India said it did not have the US$1 billion needed to build it. China had no problem with money and now has full control over the port’s operation for the next 99 years. In Indonesia, multipolarism is not in its foreign policy lexicon, but as an aspiring middle power, it will find the concept appealing as it struggles to place itself between the two competing powers without being seen as aligning with either of them. It is back to the “rowing between two coral reefs” all over again as it did during the height of the Cold War. Today, it is in a much better position to keep its distance between the two powers. Indonesia is rising in world’s economic rankings, currently 16th-largest (seventh in purchasing power parity terms); it will become the fourth-largest economy by 2030, according to a Standard Chartered report. Most Asian countries count on China as their biggest trading partner but they rely on the US for security arrangements. But this is changing. Some initiatives appear to be clearly aimed at containing China. The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership, which took effect in December, involves 11 countries led by Japan but not the US after President Donald Trump pulled out of the deal. Most of the initial concepts for an Indo-Pacific security architecture addressed concerns about the rise of China. India, which is promoting its own Indo-Pacific concept, is part of the Quad security alliance with the US, Australia and Japan. Since Quad’s membership is based on shared values, it automatically excludes China. Asia needs a new security arrangement that takes into account the evolving geopolitical and geo-economic environments. The days of the US as the sole underwriter for the security umbrella in Asia are over. A new one must emerge that takes into account not only the rise of China, but also other Asian countries, mainly India and Indonesia, as well as the role of the US. A multipolar Asia is in the interests of all countries in the region, and also the US, which will continue to play a role in providing security in the region, but far less than it had done in the past. Multipolarism is less confrontational than the old game of containment. The question is how soon it will gain traction before everyone sits down and discuss Asia’s future for the benefit of its people.

# To-Do For Sunday Morning

## Probability Outweighs

Hugh White, 7-7-2016, "'The Pivot': Yes, it is all about China," No Publication, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/the-interpreter/pivot-yes-it-all-about-china, Date Accessed 4-27-2019 // AS

Moreover, as long as US-China rivalry in Asia is unresolved, the risk of war — including a major and even nuclear war — will remain high and perhaps continue to grow. This is by far the most serious risk that Asia faces, and Kurt is quite right to say that I take it very seriously. I believe that minimising this risk must be a first-order priority for everyone engaged in debating, deciding and executing strategic policy in Asia. And frankly, for all the talk of the Thucydides Trap, I do not think enough people in the US policy community recognise the scale of the risk or the imperative to avoid it.

## UNSC = Great Power Status

Jose Guzzardi, University of Arkansas, 2008

<https://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2011/05/3_Guzzardi_and_Mullenbach.pdf>

The membership and structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have been among the most controversial and intractable issues considered by UN member-states since the establishment of the organization in the mid-1940s. **The importance of the UNSC, particularly the council’s permanent seats, stems from the status and prestige associated with its decision-making authority on questions of global peace and security. In fact, permanent membership is equated with “great power” status in the international political system** (Tillema, 1989, 182). **As a consequence, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of emerging global and regional powers throughout the world – including** Japan, Germany, **India**, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt – **have sought permanent seats on the UNSC during the past few decades.** Despite a tremendous amount of discussion and debate, there has been little consensus on the matter of UNSC restructuring, including to what extent the council ought to be enlarged, how many new permanent and non-permanent members ought to be added, whether the new members ought to be extended the veto privilege, and which specific countries ought to be added as permanent members (Malik, 2005, 19).