

BLOCKS

R/T Power Vacuum

R/T Emboldening Iran

1. This concedes that Saudi Arabia gets weaker which gives us our link.
2. Weighing:
 - a) Saudi's kill more than Iran bc they have f-15's
 - b) Saudi being agro makes Iran more agro bc/ they hate each other
 - c) winning ceasefire means Iran no longer fights which pre-reqs their link

Juneau 16 Thomas Juneau, 5-2016, "Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment," University of Ottawa,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302064592_Iran's_policy_towards_the_Houthis_in_Yemen_A_limited_return_on_a_modest_investment //DF

Iran tends to intervene in national contexts characterized by two features: instability and the presence of dissatisfied actors. Typically, first, it seeks to take advantage of instability. As in Iraq since 2003 or in Lebanon since the 1980s, Iran tries to penetrate states where central authority is weak. It then tries to exploit divided elites by supporting like-minded factions.⁴ It will often try to do so outside, but parallel to, state structures, as in Lebanon, where it supports Hezbollah, and in Iraq, where it supports Shi'i militias. Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'i militias are not fully under the state's authority, and therefore undermine it. At the same time, they participate in many of the state's activities, for example by sitting in parliament, and even oppose other actors seeking to overthrow the state. Within unstable or fragmented states, Iran often seeks to develop partnerships with dissatisfied groups. These are elements that reject or oppose, through violent or non-violent means, the dominant domestic political order in their country or the US-dominated regional order, or both. They are dissatisfied for a variety of reasons, but essentially because they perceive—often rightly—that the constituents they represent are marginalized by a dominant group. In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah was born in the 1980s to better represent the interests of the Shi'is, who had long been marginalized by the country's Christian and Sunni elite. Dissatisfied groups also often oppose regimes supported by the United States or its regional allies, and repudiate foreign interference in their countries.⁵ As will be discussed below, this is the case of the Houthis in Yemen. Such positions are often popular, giving these groups a certain level of support. By extension, Iran gains in soft power by aligning itself with them, allowing it to position itself as the champion of the oppressed and marginalized.⁶ Contrary to a widespread misperception, Iran does not choose its partners on the basis of a common adherence to Shi'i Islam.⁷ To enjoy Iranian support, actors must oppose the status quo, defined by the regional order dominated by the United States and its local partners, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia; they do not necessarily have to be Shi'i. That is why Hamas and Islamic Jihad—Sunni nationalist groups opposed to Israel—have been Iran's partners in the Palestinian occupied territories. Iran even provides limited support to the Taliban, an extreme Sunni group in Afghanistan with which it has been in conflict in the past, as will be discussed below. A common opposition to the regional status quo is also the main factor shaping Iran's close relationship with its only state ally in the Middle East, Syria, where the Assad regime is dominated by Alawites, a distant offshoot of Shi'i Islam, but also includes other minorities and some Sunnis.⁸

Iran does not control the Houthis (Juneau - University of Ottawa)

Juneau, University of Ottawa, 2017, "Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A limited return on a modest investment"

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302064592_Iran's_policy_towards_the_Houthis_in_Yemen_A_limited_return_on_a_modest_investment (NK)

The conflict pits an alliance of the Houthis, a northern socio-political movement that had been fighting the central government since 2004, alongside troops loyal to a former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, against supporters and allies of the government overthrown by the Houthis in early 2015. The war became regionalized in March 2015 when a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of ten mostly Arab states launched a campaign of air strikes against the Houthis. According to Saudi Arabia, the Houthis are an Iranian proxy; they therefore frame the war as an effort to counter Iranian influence. This article will argue, however, that **the Houthis are not Iranian proxies; Tehran's influence in Yemen is marginal. Iran's support for the Houthis has increased in recent years, but it remains low and is far from enough to significantly impact the balance of internal forces in Yemen. Looking ahead, it is unlikely that Iran will emerge as an important player in Yemeni affairs. Iran's interests in Yemen are limited, while the constraints on its ability to project power in the country are unlikely to be lifted. Tehran saw with the rise of the Houthis a low cost opportunity to gain some leverage in Yemen. It is unwilling, however, to invest larger amounts of resources.**

Saudi Arabia is the destabilizing, tornado-like, force in the region, not Iran

Kizer and Depetris 18 Kate Kizer, Daniel Depetris, 11-29-2018, "The Senate Takes a Step to Void America's Blank Check to the Saudis," Defense One,

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/11/senate-takes-step-void-americas-blank-check-saudis/153143/?oref=d-river> //DF

The Senate will now have the chance to fully debate our role in the war in Yemen. This Yemen War Powers Resolution can be the first mile on the road to a more intellectually honest conversation about reorienting the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Bilateral ties between Washington and Riyadh are in significant need of a comprehensive, uncomfortable reevaluation that recognizes the United States does not need Saudi Arabia nearly as much as the Trump administration likes to claim. After more than three years of leadership under King Salman and his favorite son and heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Arabian government's true nature has been revealed, and for the first time in recent memory, its international reputation has taken a massive hit. **MbS' actions over the past year have** finally brought the war in Yemen out of the shadows and **made the Kingdom no longer synonymous with "stability."** Indeed, **from the abduction and forced resignation of the Lebanese prime minister and the economic embargo of Qatar to an unnecessary diplomatic crisis with Canada and the state-sanctioned murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia has made one self-inflicted mistake after another.** Despite the administration's intellectually dishonest claims to the contrary, **Riyadh is proving itself to be less a security partner and more like a menacing tornado leaving destruction in its wake.** For all the administration's bemoaning of Tehran's destabilizing activities in the region as the reason to stay allies with Saudi Arabia, MbS' tenure as crown prince has shown such justifications to be based on an agenda for regime change, rather than based in fact. The reality is **the United States needn't pick sides in a regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran – siding with Saudi Arabia serves no one's interests except Saudi Arabia.** The United States doesn't have to put up with such behavior from Saudi Arabia—and it certainly shouldn't enable its abuses at home and abroad as the United States has done for decades. A new approach is needed. When U.S. national security interests are at stake, Washington can continue working with Kingdom on shared priorities. But it should do so with eyes wide open to the fact that the Saudi government's words cannot be taken at face value, and never unquestioningly or unconditionally.

R/T Other Countries

Generic

The US astronomically outsells to the Saudis, meaning any large shift would happen over a long time

Dewan 18 Angela Dewan, Cnn, 11-23-2018, "These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html> //DF

Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from \$1.8 billion to \$3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from \$14 million to \$105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful. Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small," said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base."

SA does not want to switch arms dealers and that's why they have never threatened to

Guay 18 Terrence Guay [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University], 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998> //DF

While it's true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is "locked in" to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump's argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military

superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. **Any Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.**

Saudis have never threatened to buy from other suppliers because there is no way for them to continue their Yemen campaign without the constant flow of US arms

Hartung, November 2018, Center for International Policy, "US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen", https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf (NK)

In terms of Saudi Arabia's immediate ability to continue its military intervention in Yemen, the most important weapons are those already in the Saudi arsenal or part of signed deals for equipment that is now in the pipeline. These systems rely on U.S.-supplied spare parts and maintenance, which gives Washington considerable leverage over Riyadh with respect to its ability to continue to carry out military operations. The preponderance of U.S. equipment used by Saudi forces also **[this] makes it difficult for another supplier like Russia or China to replace the United States as a major supplier** to Riyadh. **It would take decades for the Kingdom to wean itself from dependence on U.S. equipment,** training and support, and **new equipment might not be easily interoperable with U.S.-supplied systems. Saudi Arabia could buy a Russian or Chinese system here or there to send a political message, but they could not easily replace the role of sales and support from the United States,** along with the United Kingdom, as the major bulwarks of its military capability.

SA only has access to advanced weapons systems with the US

Depetris 18 DANIEL DEPETRIS, 10-23-2018, "Want to get Saudi Arabia's attention? Let's stop selling arms to them," The Hill

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/412813-want-to-get-saudi-arabias-attention-lets-stop-selling-arms-to-them> //DF

Washington holds far better cards than the Saudis could ever hope to acquire. Saudi Arabia is entirely dependent on U.S. military training, maintenance, and spare parts in order to keep its fleet of F-15 fighter jets in the air. **U.S. defense manufacturers produce the world's most technologically sophisticated and effective weapons systems, platforms Riyadh would not be able to access if they decided to purchase more equipment from Russia or China.** And while the Saudis could technically decrease crude oil production and raise gas prices at the pump for American consumers in retaliation to U.S. pressure, such a move would be unsustainable for the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has yet to diversify its economy away from energy and its budget is financed through the sale of oil. Saudi Arabia simply can't afford to lose market share over the long-term.

Saudi Arabia's entire military apparatus is structured around US arms, so it would reduce its own military power for a generation to switch systems. Russia and China don't even have the weapons China wants

Caverley 18 Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Perhaps selling weapons "strengthens international partnerships," as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. Mr. Trump on Thursday cited "four or five alternatives" to American weapons, and the need to avoid "letting Russia have that

money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants. Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign apparently to avoid jeopardizing \$2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much as how cheaply the United States can be bought. Given these sales’ low domestic economic impact and the enormous costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

No way for SA to wean off US arms in the middle of the Yemeni war

Rogin 18 Josh Rogin, 10-16-2018, “Trump has it ‘totally and completely backwards’ on Saudi arms sales,” Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/10/16/trump-has-it-totally-and-completely-backwards-on-saudi-arms-sales/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.08072480afb4 //DF

Set aside that Trump’s claim of \$110 billion of arms sales to Saudi Arabia as announced last year is hugely exaggerated, considering that number mostly refers to deals struck during the Obama administration and new deals that haven’t yet materialized. The significant arms-sales relationship we do have with Saudi Arabia gives us enormous leverage over them, leverage Trump should use to pressure King Salman to reveal what his regime knows about Khashoggi’s disappearance. Saudi Arabia’s military is already built around U.S. and British defense platforms, meaning they can’t easily switch to Russian or Chinese systems. Riyadh is especially dependent on U.S. arms right now because their bloody war in Yemen requires a constant flow of U.S. munitions, not to mention U.S. intelligence, maintenance and refueling support. U.S. arms sales are not simply a financial deal or a jobs program; they represent a strategic advantage of the United States. Countries want U.S. weapons because they are the best. That gives us connections, influence and, yes, leverage over these countries. That’s how arms sales have always worked, until Trump flipped the script.

These are not legitimate arguments, but ones made by Trump

Spetalnick 18 Matt Spetalnick, 10-13-2018, "U.S. weapons makers rattled over Saudi Arabia deals," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-politics-dissident-arms/u-s-weapons-makers-rattled-over-saudi-arabia-deals-idUSKCN1MM1VF> //DF

Turkish reports that journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a vocal critic of Riyadh, was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and removed have hardened resistance in the U.S. Congress to selling weapons to Saudi Arabia, already a sore point for many lawmakers concerned about the Saudi role in Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia rejects the allegations in Turkey as baseless. U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday he was wary of halting arms sales to Riyadh because of Khashoggi as it would just shift its

weapons purchases to Russia and China. Saudi Arabia, where Trump last year announced a \$110 billion arms package, has been a centerpiece of his overhaul of weapons export policy in which he has gone further than any of his predecessors in acting as a weapons salesman. However, critics say the new approach gives too much weight to business interests versus human rights concerns.

R/T Russia Specific

Russia's tried to increase sales for the past 10 years but the Saudis haven't bitten

Dewan 18 Angela Dewan, Cnn, 11-23-2018, "These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html> //DF Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from \$1.8 billion to \$3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from \$14 million to \$105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. **"Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful. Saudi Arabia has acquired Russian rifles and may have bought some other items, but such deals have been very small,"** said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with SIPRI's arms transfers and military expenditure program. "China has made some more substantial inroads into the Saudi arms market, in particular selling armed drones," Wezeman said. "The details are shady and we may very well have underestimated China's role as an arms exporter to Saudi Arabia. But China doesn't come anywhere near the USA, UK or even France as arms suppliers. Still, the important point here is that Saudi Arabia has explored the possibility of diversifying its supplier base."

SA doesn't want to buy from Russia for two reasons:

1. SA doesn't trust Russia at all

Daniels 17 Jeff Daniels, 5-6-2017, "Russia tries to elbow its way into Saudi Arabia arms club," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html> //DF Russia helped Iran build its first civilian nuclear power plant in 2011 and have teamed with them on a second plant. Moscow also offered assistance to the Saudis as they embarked on an ambitious \$80 billion plan to build more than a dozen nuclear power plants. Then again, **the Saudis still view Russians with great suspicion given Moscow maintains close ties not only to the kingdom's archrival Iran but another adversary, Syria's leader Bashar al-Assad.** Saudi Arabia cut off relations with the Damascus regime back in 2012 and has been a major financier of the anti-Assad rebels. However, Russia has been a leading supplier of military arms to both Tehran and Damascus. **The Saudis also have learned Russia can't always be trusted when it comes to defense technology.** Earlier this year, the Kuwaiti press reported Iran's military had learned **the Russians essentially threw the Tehran government "under the bus" when selling an air defense system.** The Kuwaiti report indicated that **the Russians had provided the Israelis with so-called codes that would allow its planes to appear as friendly,** possibly on a defense system known as the S-300. **Similarly, the Syrians also were apparently sold the same air defense system, which may explain why Israel was able to fly its warplanes**

for so many years into Syrian space and defeat air defenses. The S-300 is a surface-to-air missile system developed during the Cold War in the late 1970s but updated and now sometimes compared to Raytheon's Patriot defense system. Tehran and Damascus reportedly fixed the "codes" issue to make the system less vulnerable. When Israeli warplanes attacked a Syrian military site about two months ago, they encountered anti-aircraft missile fire, according to Syria. For the Saudis, they have no need for Russian air defense systems; they have some of most advanced U.S.-made equipment, including at least two kinds of Patriot missile defense systems. In fact, the kingdom used the missile interceptors in March to shoot down rockets fired by Iran-backed Houthi rebels from Yemen.

2. Russia doesn't make weapons that SA wants

Caverley 18 Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Perhaps selling weapons "strengthens international partnerships," as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. Mr. Trump on Thursday cited "four or five alternatives" to American weapons, and the need to avoid "letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money." This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia's remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants. Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign apparently to avoid jeopardizing \$2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much as how cheaply the United States can be bought. Given these sales' low domestic economic impact and the enormous costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

3. They say that the Saudis have bought weapons from Russia, but they've only done that to act coy and get a better deal from the US (only read if they say this)

Daniels 17 Jeff Daniels, 5-6-2017, "Russia tries to elbow its way into Saudi Arabia arms club," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html> //DF

Up to now, American defense companies have been the top beneficiaries of foreign arms sales to Saudi Arabia and stand to reap billions of dollars more with President Donald Trump's upcoming trip to the kingdom. Yet Moscow is intensifying efforts to capture business from the Saudis, even as it continues to sell to long-time customers such as India and China. "The global arms market has changed where Saudi Arabia has explored other arms deals with U.S. competitors in Russia, China as well as Europe," said Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Last week, the Russian news agency TASS reported that Russia's deputy defense minister had a meeting with a top Saudi military official in Moscow. The Russian defense ministry played up the meeting afterward on the government's website with the headline: "Saudi Arabia wants to buy modern Russian armament." "It often conveys a very strong political message when certain meetings are announced," said Dalton, a former Pentagon official who served as a senior adviser for force planning. Also, Dalton said the disclosure of Saudi-Russia arms talks follows a strategy sometimes used by Riyadh: highlight alternative suppliers of weapons as a means of getting a better U.S. deal or even approval. The Saudis plan to increase military spending by nearly 7 percent this year, partly reflecting the war in Yemen and the rising military threat from Iran. The spending, almost 10 percent of the kingdom's gross domestic product, was disclosed in its 2017 budget released in December.

Tehran and Damascus reportedly fixed the "codes" issue to make the system less vulnerable. When Israeli warplanes attacked a Syrian military site about two months ago, they encountered anti-aircraft missile fire, according to Syria. For the Saudis, they have no need for Russian air defense systems; they have some of most advanced U.S.-made equipment, including at least two kinds of Patriot missile defense systems. In fact, the kingdom used the missile interceptors in March to shoot down rockets fired by Iran-backed Houthi rebels from Yemen. The Saudis are looking to buy the Lockheed Martin-made THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system, according to Reuters. The proposed arms deal also is said to include about \$1 billion worth of munitions from Raytheon, including armor-piercing warheads and laser-guided bombs. Also, U.S.-built warships are reportedly being sought by the Saudis. The Saudis, which also have bought warships over the years from France and the U.K., have been beefing up their navy for anti-submarine capability at a time when Iran's navy is becoming more aggressive in the region and testing new submarine technology.

R/T China Specific

1. China is a neutral actor in the Middle East who doesn't want to take sides

Al-Quiasy 18 [Ahmed Al-Quiasy [director general of the National Center for Investment Risk Assessment in Dubai, UAE], 2-2-2018 "Saudi-Chinese Rapprochement and Its Effect on Saudi-American Relations," The Washington Institute,

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/saudi-chinese-rapprochement-and-its-effect-on-saudi-american-relations> //DF

Security-wise, some analysts see Saudi Arabia as trying to create a strategic competition among the great powers to gain weapons and security support, especially after the U.S. appeared to respond weakly to Saudi security and military needs amidst security challenges. This might open the door to China and Russia to exert influence in the region, and coordinate their positions against Washington; thereby making the U.S. either an ineffective player or out of the game in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is aware that it is impossible in the short term to relinquish the U.S. role in national security to China, which compared to the United States and even Russia, remains less committed politically and militarily to its friends among the countries of the region. Washington can bear the burden of military deployment, military progress, and coalition building, while China has no such capacity nor the desire to clash with the United States in the Middle East. Rather, China wishes to benefit from American dominance there, which secures shipping routes for export oil to China without China having to make any major investments to protect the region. Amid the current Saudi-Iranian conflict, China is aware that there is no current alternative to American military presence in the Gulf to limit Iranian influence, particularly since relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States have progressed following the election of Donald Trump. Trump is partnering with Saudi Arabia to limit Iranian influence and supports Saudi reforms, whereby Saudi Arabia has begun to expand the number of American banks and other economic ties in the Kingdom. The goal of China's foreign policy approach is to keep on friendly terms with all the major players and to avoid continual hostility from several risks, including increasing Chinese involvement in the region's security that would affect American and Russian interests. Accordingly, the Chinese continue to work within their narrow economic self-interest, and they are likely to continue this strategy so long as regional conflicts do not pose a basic risk to Beijing's plans. In addition, the "Silk Road" initiative is considered a way for China to influence global transformations, and establish economic and cultural partnerships between Beijing and other countries; thereby, strengthening China's role as a main player in world affairs. Saudi Arabia is well aware that the role that China is playing in the Saudi-Iranian conflict is for China's self-interest only; thus, Riyadh is not satisfied that Beijing will abandon its relationship with Iran in the future in favor of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh also understands the dangers of a complete break from Washington and that this will not be in Saudi Arabia's long-term interest. Therefore, Saudi Arabia will try to benefit from its economic relationship with China, while also maintaining its functional and security relationship with Washington. Both Saudi Arabia and China are mindful that, given the

presence of American –military bases in the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Riyadh will be unable to remove the U.S. from its position as the dominant military actor in the Persian Gulf. The Kingdom will also benefit from diversifying its major markets for future oil exports. What seems likely is that China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will form a tripartite role in the Gulf that accommodates their shared interests without any party marginalizing the others or removing itself from the scene.

2. China also doesn't want to sell to SA because it doesn't want to raise tensions in the trade war

South China Morning Post, 10-22-2018, "Trump fears China could replace US in arms sales to Saudi. He shouldn't," <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-look-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms> (NK)

Simone van Nieuwenhuizen, an Australia-based researcher of China-Middle East relations at the University of Technology Sydney, said China would be "extremely unlikely" to follow US sanctions if they were levelled against Saudi Arabia, but may not necessarily increase trade with the country either. "I think China is likely to keep a low profile on this issue and see how it plays out before directly addressing it," she said. "While its technology is developing, China still lags behind the US in the sophistication and capability of its military equipment. It simply can't fill the gap." Saudis still denying journalist Jamal Khashoggi's murder despite reports he recorded torture and death Robert Mason, director of the Middle East Studies Centre at the American University in Cairo, said China would not want to get involved at this stage to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration. "I'm sure China will be interested to expand relations if and when US-Saudi ties deteriorate. However, Saudi policy looks set to shift to admitting to the accidental killing of Jamal Khashoggi inside its consulate in Istanbul, and I'm sure they will try to de-escalate during Secretary Pompeo's visit," he said. "It is unlikely the US will change a decades-old policy favouring close economic and security ties with the Kingdom, including considerable counterterrorism cooperation and the containment of Iran, over this one incident."

3. SA doesn't trust China because of their relations with Iran

Al-Quiasy 18 [Ahmed Al-Quiasy [director general of the National Center for Investment Risk Assessment in Dubai, UAE], 2-2-2018 "Saudi-Chinese Rapprochement and Its Effect on Saudi-American Relations," The Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/saudi-chinese-rapprochement-and-its-effect-on-saudi-american-relations> //DF

Security-wise, some analysts see Saudi Arabia as trying to create a strategic competition among the great powers to gain weapons and security support, especially after the U.S. appeared to respond weakly to Saudi security and military needs amidst security challenges. This might open the door to China and Russia to exert influence in the region, and coordinate their positions against Washington; thereby making the U.S. either an ineffective player or out of the game in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is aware that it is impossible in the short term to relinquish the U.S. role in national security to China, which compared to the United States and even Russia, remains less committed politically and militarily to its friends among the countries of the region. Washington can bear the burden of military deployment, military progress, and coalition building, while China has no such capacity nor the desire to clash with the United States in the Middle East. Rather, China wishes to benefit from American dominance there, which secures shipping routes for export oil to China without China having to make any major investments to protect the region. Amid the current Saudi-Iranian conflict, China is aware that there is no current alternative to American military presence in the Gulf to limit Iranian influence, particularly since relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States have progressed following the election of Donald Trump. Trump is partnering with Saudi Arabia to limit Iranian influence and supports Saudi reforms, whereby Saudi Arabia has begun to expand the number of American banks and other economic ties in the Kingdom. The goal of China's foreign policy approach is to keep on friendly terms with all the major players and to avoid continual hostility from several risks, including increasing Chinese involvement in the region's security that would affect American and Russian interests. Accordingly, the Chinese continue to work within their narrow economic self-interest, and they are likely to continue this strategy so long as regional conflicts do not pose a basic risk to Beijing's plans. In addition, the "Silk Road" initiative is considered a way for China to influence global transformations, and establish economic and cultural partnerships between Beijing and other countries; thereby, strengthening China's role as a main player in world affairs. Saudi Arabia is well aware that the

role that China is playing in the Saudi-Iranian conflict is for China's self-interest only; thus, **Riyadh is not satisfied that Beijing will abandon its relationship with Iran in the future in favor of its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh also understands the dangers of a complete break from Washington and that this will not be in Saudi Arabia's long-term interest.** Therefore, Saudi Arabia will try to benefit from its economic relationship with China, while also maintaining its functional and security relationship with Washington. Both Saudi Arabia and China are mindful that, given the presence of American –military bases in the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Riyadh will be unable to remove the U.S. from its position as the dominant military actor in the Persian Gulf. The Kingdom will also benefit from diversifying its major markets for future oil exports. What seems likely is that China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will form a tripartite role in the Gulf that accommodates their shared interests without any party marginalizing the others or removing itself from the scene.

4. Even if the Saudis did trust China, they have no interest in buying weapons from them

Caverley 18 Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Perhaps selling weapons "strengthens international partnerships," as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. Mr. Trump on Thursday cited "four or five alternatives" to American weapons, and the need to avoid "letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money." This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. **Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia's remaining exports come from Europe.** To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. **European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.** Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign apparently to avoid jeopardizing \$2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much as how cheaply the United States can be bought. Given these sales' low domestic economic impact and the enormous costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

China has a neutral position on the Yemen war and won't get involved with either side

Lee 15 Raymond Lee [specialist in Chinese affairs], 2015, "Implications of the War in Yemen on China," Aljazeera Center for Studies, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2015/6/10/201561011434739734War%20in%20Yemen.pdf> //DF

China has followed Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy, "lay low and bide our time", to pursue rapid modernization without causing hindrance from the great power politics since early 1990s.(20) The gist of this policy is to prevent China from being perceived as a threat or revisionist power. The rise of China in recent years, particularly after the global financial crisis in 2009, has already generated discussion of foreign policy changes among Chinese International Relations scholars(21) whether Deng's thinking still serves China's best interest. Discussion has gradually shifted to consideration of Beijing's new policy agenda, "a new model for relations between great powers."(22) While the new policy can be interpreted in different ways, it is distinct from Deng's policy. For, China will pursue a more assertive position when engaging in global politics. Some scholars even

suggest that Beijing needs to recognize its great power status and should act like a responsible player instead of denying its role.(23) After Xi Jinping rose to the top in 2013, Beijing has shown significant change toward incorporating this new thinking into its foreign policy. Three recent changes could manifest this new direction: first, China has sought to actively participate in the multilateral institutions such the United Nations to engage in international affairs;(24) second, China intends to amplify its international influence by proposing regional political and economic initiatives, such as "One Belt And One Road" and "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" (AIIB);(25) third, meanwhile, China becomes more assertive in the territorial issues, especially in the South China Sea by landfills and construction of the military-length runway.(26) Given this policy change, the more important interest associated with the Yemen Crisis is the secure supply of crude oil and political consideration in great power politics. In order to maintain its congenial relationship to all parties in the Middle East, China voted in support of UN resolution 2216 on Yemen that bans arms sales to the Houthi fighters,(27) but meanwhile, China also publicly urged the halt of Saudi-led airstrikes to balance the political impact of its UN vote.(28) The message conveyed is that China did not side with either camp but emphasized the importance of peaceful resolution through political negotiation in a multilateral setting. Regional Implications China pursued a balanced Middle East policy and sought to maintain a peaceful status quo in the region. One potential impact of the Yemen Crisis is related to China's relations with Pakistan, for its decline of Saudi Arabia's request to join the military intervention against the Houthis.(29) Despite the fact that Pakistan's refusal seems contradictory to China's attitudes toward the UN resolution against the Houthis, Pakistan and China converge on the eclecticism employed in dealing with this sensitive issue. Pakistan's decline to take part in Saudi Arabia's intervention is mostly associated with the divided domestic opinion and lack of political consensus on the fundamental issues behind the Yemen Crisis. The Shiite minority and domestic militant groups have different takes in reading the military conflict inside Yemen from the official viewpoint of the Pakistani Government. Pakistan's best strategy, therefore, is to avoid disentanglement in the proxy war between Riyadh and Tehran, while showing an empathic and supportive attitude toward Saudi Arabia without actual engagement. Such an effort can be found in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's speech when he emphasized that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are close strategic allies, and highlighted the right interpretation of the parliamentary resolution that "Pakistan will defend Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity" (if it is in danger).(30) Apparently, what Sharif suggests is that Pakistan remains a strong ally to Saudi, but it wants to stay neutral on this particular issue due to its domestic political landscape. Furthermore, Pakistan believes that the Yemen Crisis should be resolved politically in a peaceful way.

R/T Shift to UK or France

1. Their systems are based on the US

Hartung, November 2018, Center for International Policy, "US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen", https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf (NK)

In terms of Saudi Arabia's immediate ability to continue its military intervention in Yemen, the most important weapons are those already in the Saudi arsenal or part of signed deals for equipment that is now in the pipeline. These systems rely on U.S.-supplied spare parts and maintenance, which gives Washington considerable leverage over Riyadh with respect to its ability to continue to carry out military operations. The preponderance of U.S. equipment used by Saudi forces also **[this] makes it difficult for another supplier like Russia or China to replace the United States as a major supplier to Riyadh. It would take decades for the Kingdom to wean itself from dependence on U.S. equipment,** training and support, and **new equipment might not be easily interoperable with U.S.-supplied systems. Saudi Arabia could buy a Russian or Chinese system here or there to send a political message, but they could not easily replace the role of sales and support from the United States,** along with the United Kingdom, as the major bulwarks of its military capability.

2. UK and France are decreasing their sales now

Dewan 18 Angela Dewan, Cnn, 11-23-2018, "These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html>) //DF

Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a lot of exporters still selling to the Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated \$843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to \$436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth \$174 million in 2015 but dropped to \$91 million in 2016 and \$27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports.

R/T Ground Troops

Byman 18 Daniel L. Byman, 12-5-2018, "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/> //DF

By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen's already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen's ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen—has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine. Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh's point of view, Iran's position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis' dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there.

They won't, because Saudi leaders are fearful that a force too large will be used to overthrow them, which is why their ground forces are so minimal right now (Worth - NYT)

Robert F. Worth, 10-31-2018, "How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate — and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> (NK)

The Saudis' United States-supplied Patriot defense systems appear to have intercepted a vast majority of the missiles, but at least one exploded in Riyadh in March, killing an Egyptian resident and wounding several other people. The Saudis and Emiratis frequently cite these missile attacks as justification for continuing their campaign. They say the Houthis, left unchecked, could become an ever more powerful force bent on Saudi Arabia's destruction, perhaps with a network of missile batteries concealed in tunnels like those Hezbollah has built in Lebanon. But **the Saudi case for war has not been paired with any realistic strategy to win it.** Like many other Arab countries, **Saudi Arabia has never built a substantial land army, in part because its rulers fear that a strong military could be used to overthrow them.** For all the bombs being dropped on Yemen, **the Saudis lack the ability to push the Houthis back from the border;** instead, Houthi combat squads regularly attack and rout Saudi ground forces inside the kingdom. The Emiratis, the other main force in the coalition, have been more involved in training and supporting local Yemeni groups to fight against the Houthis.

Ben Brimelow, 12-16-2017, "Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-iran-yemen-military-proxy-war-2017-12> (NK)

Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet **the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces** — most likely **because the Saudi leadership knows that**, as Knights says, **they "suffer from significant weaknesses."** **These weaknesses include a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign. "They have no experience in an expeditionary operation,"** he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort. **Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good.** Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said **Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces "because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen."**

R/T Hardliners

MBS is not a reformer, but a hardliner who has led cracked down on opposition and gone on a bloodthirsty campaign

Tabatabai 18 Ariane M. Tabatabai, 11-15-2018, "Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?," The Rand Corporation,

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html> //DF

Despite these fractious issues, the ties between Riyadh and Washington have endured. This durability reflects the reasons behind the cooperation: A convergence of needs and interests that remain today: Oil in return for security. But these driving interests may be changing as the United States pursues renewable energy in a bid to become less dependent on petro states and as Saudi Arabia aspires to "go it alone" to ensure its security and that of its immediate neighbors. These opposing goals have placed pressure on the relationship without derailing it.

Since Crown Prince Mohammed consolidated power, however, divergent Saudi and U.S. interests and worldviews have come to the forefront. Initially, **many Americans praised the prince as a reformer, bringing the kingdom into the 21st century. But it soon became clear that the reforms were more limited than many had hoped and that the efforts were taking place against the backdrop of problematic policies at home and abroad.**

Several developments have garnered more scrutiny of Saudi policies: The manner in which **the prince has silenced those he views as his opponents—including Khashoggi**—coupled with international incidents, chiefly **the ongoing devastating Saudi-led efforts in the war in Yemen, creating the world's worst humanitarian crisis**, and the internecine rift among the Arab Gulf states.

MBS is no progressive reformer, but someone who has destabilized multiple countries and committed human rights violations on a mass scale

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen> //DF

The greatest challenge to U.S. policy in the region is royal stupidity in Saudi Arabia rather than Islamist hostility in Iran. The latter is outgunned, overmatched and badly stretched. Its influence in divided Lebanon and wrecked Syria is of limited value. An active opposition presses for change at home. In contrast, the Kingdom of **Saudi Arabia (KSA) is ruled by an immature authoritarian known mostly for his myopia, ruthlessness, brutality, recklessness, ambition and arrogance.** His misadventures are legendary:

the murder and dismemberment of a self-exiled journalist in a Saudi consulate; the brazen kidnapping of Lebanon's prime minister; a busted campaign to isolate and invade Qatar; and a promised speedy invasion of Yemen that transformed into nearly four years of war—so far. Riyadh underwrote radical jihadists in Syria and Yemen, after spending decades promoting fundamentalist Wahhabism around the world. The royal regime also backs tyranny in Bahrain and Egypt with money and troops. The outcome of these policies has been highly negative for America, often generating the opposite of the intended results. For instance, Iran is more influential, Washington is embarrassed, the Gulf States are divided, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is strengthened. All due to Mohammed bin Salman's (MBS) attempt to manipulate Washington into backing his effort to become a regional hegemon. With friends like the KSA America doesn't need enemies.

MBS is a total hardliner who has destabilized the region and is totally destructive; the only positive success he's had is that he's managed not to be ousted, yet

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof, 12-15-2018, "So, I Asked People in Saudi Arabia About Their Mad, Murderous Crown Prince," No Publication,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/opinion/sunday/saudi-arabia-yemen-khashoggi.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FYemen&action=click&contentCollection=world%2Fopinion%2Fstream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection //DF

Senior Saudis privately accept that M.B.S. ordered Khashoggi's death but insist that the Saudi-U.S. relationship is more important than one man's life. For the sake of stability in the region, they say, America should stand by Saudi Arabia. To which my answer is: The problem is not only that M.B.S. is a murderer, but also that he has destabilized the region, starved Yemeni children and undermined the interests of Saudi Arabia and the United States alike. Everything he touches, he breaks. President Trump and Jared Kushner have placed their bets on the prince, and in a narrow sense they may be right. King Faisal managed to oust his incompetent predecessor, King Saud, in 1964, but I saw no sign that M.B.S. is in jeopardy of losing power. My most interesting interaction was with a group of young professionals who believe that I am getting it all wrong.

R/T SA will use paramilitaries

1. That's what they're already doing

Ryan 18 Missy Ryan, 10-12-2018, "As crisis intensifies, what's at stake in America's military partnership with Saudi Arabia?" Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-crisis-intensifies-whats-at-stake-in-america-as-military-partnership-with-saudi-arabia/2018/10/12/3ce0994e-cd75-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a5cff1083ff8 //DF

The war in Yemen, where Riyadh is leading a coalition of nations battling Houthi militants linked to Iran, has laid bare those challenges as Saudi Arabia remains mired in an expensive war it started over U.S. objections more than three years ago. [Turks tell U.S. officials they have audio and video recordings that support conclusion Khashoggi was killed] The kingdom maintains a small force on the ground, relying on local and third-country forces to battle the Houthi troops. Saudi planes have repeatedly struck civilian sites, raising questions about their targeting practices and, for the first time, stirring a growing tide of opposition in Congress. Lawmakers have delayed one major sale because of concerns about civilian harm and have advanced proposals that could block U.S. military aid to the Yemen operation, which includes aerial refueling and intelligence sharing.

Saudi Arabia is fighting the war in Yemen with hired guns from Sudan, many of whom are fleeing the war there and some of who are children

Kirkpatrick 18 David D. Kirkpatrick, 12-28-2018, "On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html> //DF

The United Nations has called the war in Yemen the world's worst humanitarian crisis. An intermittent blockade by the Saudis and their partners in the United Arab Emirates has pushed as many as 12 million people to the brink of starvation, killing some 85,000 children, according to aid groups. Led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudis say they are battling to rescue Yemen from a hostile faction backed by Iran. But to do it, the Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to outsource the war, mainly by hiring what Sudanese soldiers say are tens of thousands of desperate survivors of the conflict in Darfur to fight, many of them children. At any time for nearly four years as many as 14,000 Sudanese militiamen have been fighting in Yemen in tandem with the local militia aligned with the Saudis, according to several Sudanese fighters who have returned and Sudanese lawmakers who are attempting to track it. Hundreds, at least, have died there. Almost all the Sudanese fighters appear to come from the battle-scarred and impoverished region of Darfur, where some 300,000 people were killed and 1.2 million displaced during a dozen years of conflict over diminishing arable land and other scarce resources. Most belong to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, a tribal militia previously known as the Janjaweed. They were blamed for the systematic rape of women and girls, indiscriminate killing and other war crimes during Darfur's conflict, and veterans involved in those horrors are now leading their deployment to Yemen — albeit in a more formal and structured campaign.

2. Link-in: SA gives paramilitaries American weapons

Kirkpatrick 18 David D. Kirkpatrick, 12-28-2018, "On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html?module=inline> //DF

The Saudi payments to the soldiers have become increasingly significant to Sudan, where inflation has hit 70 percent and even in the capital residents line up for bread, fuel and bank withdrawals. At least nine people have been killed this month by security forces. Darfur has furnished mercenaries to other conflicts as well. Rebel groups who fought the Janjaweed have turned up fighting in Libya for the anti-Islamist Gen. Khalifa Hifter, according to the findings of a United Nations panel and other reports. But far more have fought in Yemen. The five fighters who had returned from Yemen and two brothers of fighters who died there all gave similar accounts. Sudanese jets departed Khartoum or Nyala, Darfur, carrying 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers at a time to Saudi Arabia. They were delivered to camps inside the kingdom, where some said they saw as many as 8,000 Sudanese gathered. **The Saudis issued them uniforms and weapons, which the Sudanese fighters believed were American made.** Then Saudi officers provided two to four weeks of training, mainly in assembling and cleaning their guns. Finally, they were divided into units of 500 to 750 fighters, they said. Then they traveled over land to Yemen, to battles in the Midi Desert, the Khalid ibn Walid camp in Taiz, or around Aden and Hudaydah. All said they fought only for money. They were paid in Saudi riyals, the equivalent of about \$480 a month for a 14-year-old novice to about \$530 a month for an experienced Janjaweed officer. They received an additional \$185 to \$285 for any month they saw combat — every month for some.

R/T Ceasefire Now

Spencer 19 Richard Spencer, 2-1-2019, "Airstrikes point to end of fragile Yemen ceasefire," The Sunday Times,

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/airstrikes-point-to-end-of-fragile-yemen-ceasefire-6p308fw0p> //DF

A ceasefire in the Yemeni civil war was close to collapse yesterday as jets of the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing round the crucial port of Hodeidah. The air attacks were necessary because Houthi rebels had refused to redeploy troops in line with a UN- negotiated ceasefire agreement signed in Stockholm in December, a coalition spokesman said. Anwar Gargash, foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, the other leading regional power fighting with the Saudis, said that the rebels had failed to meet an agreement to pull out of Hodeidah. "Still no Houthi withdrawal from Hodeidah city and ports, and militia blocking aid convoys from leaving Hodeidah and barring ships from entering ports," he said on Twitter. He added that the coalition had struck ten Houthi training camps outside Hodeidah and was "prepared to use more calibrated force to prod Houthi compliance with Stockholm agreement". Hodeidah is Yemen's main port and supply route for food and aid supplies. The United Nations and aid agencies say that millions of people are at risk of starvation if it remains closed. A Houthi spokesman said that they were committed to the ceasefire and accused the coalition, which is backed by the US and Britain, of breaching it. "If there is enough pressure to make it happen by the international community in general, the US and UK in particular, the ceasefire will hold as planned," he said. Under the agreed terms, both sides were to "redeploy" troops from Hodeidah, where there has been intense street fighting, and port operations were to be put under civilian control with UN supervision. However, the Houthis were accused of putting their fighters in civilian uniform and not pulling them back. They said that there was nothing in the agreement that meant they could not leave security officials in place. Patrick Cammaert, the retired Dutch general assigned by the UN to oversee the ceasefire's implementation, came under fire, apparently from Houthi fighters, while in the city. He is leaving after his initial one-month term and will be replaced by a Danish former general, Michael Lollesgaard. There have been some deadly attacks in other parts of Yemen not included in the deal. A Houthi drone exploded over a military parade, killing several Yemeni government officials. At the weekend a mortar strike, believed to be from the Houthi side, hit the grain silos on the Red Sea coast used by the World Food Programme. Peter Salisbury, Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that the ceasefire deal was imprecise enough to allow both sides to interpret its demands in accordance with their own wishes. "It feels like neither side wants the blame for the collapse of the agreement, but both are also trying to call the other's bluff," he said.

The Houthis are looking to void the ceasefire

Aldroubi 19 Mina Aldroubi, 2-4-2019, "UN monitoring chief in Yemen warns Hodeidah truce increasingly fragile," National,

<https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/un-monitoring-chief-in-yemen-warns-hodeidah-truce-increasingly-fragile-1.821769> //DF

The head of a UN monitoring mission in Yemen has warned that a ceasefire in the port city of Hodeidah remains fragile after a series of rebel violations. Retired Dutch general Patrick Cammaert met with Houthi and government representatives on Monday on a boat anchored in Hodeidah, just a day after another meeting in the Red Sea. Yemen's warring sides agreed to a ceasefire deal that includes the withdrawal of their respective forces from the port city during peace talks in Sweden last December. In Sunday's meeting, Mr Cammaert urged representatives of the two parties "to instruct their commanders on the ground to refrain from any further violations that would jeopardise peace in Yemen," according to a UN statement. The general underlined the importance of respecting the ceasefire that came into effect on December 18. "Both parties have reiterated their commitment to implementing the Hodeidah aspect of the Stockholm Agreement," the statement said, adding that the opening of the Hodeidah-Sanaa road to allow humanitarian access is also being negotiated. The meeting was a third of its kind and was seen as a major step towards ending the crisis. Mr Cammaert is set to be replaced former Danish general Michael Lollesgaard, whose mandate is yet to begin. "Talks are cordial and constructive," said the statement, which was followed by a similar message from the UN Security Council that stressed the "critical importance of the parties fulfilling the commitments they

made in Sweden". "The members of the Security Council called on the parties to seize this opportunity to move towards sustainable peace by exercising restraint, de-escalating tensions and moving forward with swift implementation," the council said. The Red Sea port of Hodeidah is a vital entry port for Yemen's imported goods and humanitarian aid, which is considered a lifeline for millions of civilians. Yet, a Yemeni government official told The National that Houthi representatives are attempting to sabotage the deal. "We have so far accepted all of General Cammaert's proposals but the Houthis have rejected them," the official, who asked to remain anonymous, said. "During the meeting Houthi officials suggested new requirements that were not discussed before in an attempt to prevent any progress from occurring," he said.

According to the Saudis, the Houthis have violated the ceasefire numerous times

Al Bawaba 19 2-5-2019, "1,080 Hodeidah Ceasefire Violations Since Yemen Accord," Al Bawaba
<https://www.albawaba.com/news/1080-hodeidah-ceasefire-violations-yemen-accord-coalition-spokesman-al-maliki-1248298> //DF

The Iranian-backed Houthi militia is using human shields and continues to violate a cease-fire in Yemen, a spokesman for the Arab coalition told a weekly press briefing in Riyadh on Monday. Col. Turki Al-Maliki showed the media videos featuring examples of the violations. Footage showed fighters threatening people and forcing them out of their homes, turning their properties into barracks and using them for military purposes. The cease-fire, brokered in Stockholm between Yemen's warring parties, went into effect on Dec. 13, 2018, in the strategic port city of Hodeidah. They were the first direct talks in more than two years between representatives of Yemen's internationally recognized government and the Iranian-aligned Houthis. The besieged Houthi-held city is an entry point for 70 percent of foreign humanitarian aid into the country, according to the UN, which has described Hodeidah as a "lifeline" for Yemen's war-ravaged population. There have been 1,080 violations since the cease-fire came into effect, including the Houthis setting up military camps in different provinces, Al-Maliki said. Coalition raids killed more than 270 Houthi fighters at a training site in Al-Mahwit on Jan. 23, he added. He showed photographs of Iranian-made drones that had been destroyed by the coalition, which was targeting drone warehouses near Sanaa. The Royal Saudi Air Force had intercepted and destroyed anti-civilian drones in Abha and the militia were hiding in pipes, digging trenches to store weapons and planting mines that threatened global maritime and commercial lines in the southern Red Sea. There have been 216 ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis toward Saudi Arabia between March 26, 2015, and Feb. 4, 2019, according to the coalition. The total loss of Houthi militia sites, weapons and equipment from Jan. 21, 2019, to Feb. 4, 2019, was 335. The number of Houthi militia killed was 1,129, the briefing heard.

The Houthis have violated the ceasefire numerous times, and the Saudis are ready to break the ceasefire because of those violations

Lederer 19 Edith M. Lederer, 2-1-2019, "Yemen coalition alarmed at Houthi cease-fire violations," Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemen-coalition-alarmed-at-houthi-cease-fire-violations/2019/02/01/22a3fb50-2682-11e9-b5b4-1d18dfb7b084_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c2094f1972dd //DF

Yemen's government and its key coalition partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates expressed "growing alarm" at what they say are "persistent, deliberate violations" by rival Houthi Shiite rebels of the December cease-fire agreement in the key port of Hodeida. Ambassadors of the three countries said in a letter to the U.N. Security Council obtained Friday by The Associated Press that they are also alarmed at the Houthis' refusal to redeploy troops from the port area and allow a free flow of humanitarian aid, as called for in the Dec. 13 agreement signed in Stockholm, Sweden. The coalition partners said they remain committed to the U.N.-facilitated deal and urged council members "to do everything in their power to demand that the Iran-backed Houthis comply with the terms of the Stockholm agreement."

They warned that if the Houthis fail to comply “they will be held responsible” for the collapse of the Stockholm agreement. The letter lists what it says were 970 Houthi violations between Dec. 18 and Jan. 29 that killed 71 people and wounded 534. The coalition’s assessment of the cease-fire differed sharply from the U.N.’s. Kuwait’s U.N. Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi said the U.N. envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, told the Security Council in a closed briefing Thursday that he “is optimistic” the cease-fire in Hodeida is holding despite some violations. He said Griffiths also cited statements from Yemen’s government and Houthi Shiite rebels that they are committed to redeploying their forces. U.N. spokesman Stephane Dujarric reiterated Friday that Griffiths and the outgoing head of the U.N. operation monitoring the cease-fire, Dutch Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, “have said publicly that the cease-fire is generally holding.” The coalition partners warned, however, that the Houthis’ failure to implement the Stockholm agreement could end prospects for peace. “The coalition believes that the Stockholm agreement should be the beginning of a series of agreements to end the conflict in Yemen,” they said. “If the purpose and spirit of the Stockholm agreement continue to be disregarded by one side in the conflict, the prospects for a peaceful solution will continue to remain elusive,” the ambassadors of the three countries said.

R/T US Leverage

US cannot influence Saudi Arabia while arms are still being sold to them

Raghavan 18 Sudarsan Raghavan, 7-26-2018, “U.S. allies have killed thousands of Yemeni civilians from the air. After 22 died at a wedding, one village asks, ‘Why us?’,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-allies-have-killed-thousands-of-yemenis-from-the-air-after-22-died-at-a-wedding-one-village-asks-why-us/2018/07/25/3c3e4801-164e-42ae-ac08-bec09044e52a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.359d91982d24 //DF

But visits to other bombed sites by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch confirm that U.S.-made munitions, including banned cluster bombs and Paveway bombs, have been used in attacks that have killed and injured civilians. The Post saw remnants of U.S.-made bombs in the capital, Sanaa, and in the southwestern city of Taiz. **After the Senate narrowly approved a \$510 million first installment of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia in June 2017, the kingdom said it would launch a training program to reduce accidental targeting of civilians. But in the year after that announcement, civilian deaths were 7 percent higher than the year before**, U.N. data shows. In April alone, there were 236 civilians killed and 238 injured — the deadliest month this year so far. A U.N. report last month found that 1,316 Yemeni children were killed or injured last year and that more than half of the casualties resulted from airstrikes. A Saudi government official disputed the U.N. figures and said the coalition is “implementing the highest standard measures to prevent civilian casualties,” including “continuous training” of its staff and efforts to improve rules of engagement. The attack on Raqah was under internal investigation, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity.

US cannot influence

Walsh 18 Declan Walsh, 12-18-2018, “Yemen Cease-Fire Takes Effect: Why Now and What’s Next?,” NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/world/middleeast/yemen-cease-fire.html> //DF

At times, coalition officers subverted their own chain of command. In one instance, a devastating strike that killed 155 people in a funeral hall was ordered by a junior officer who countermanded an order from a more senior officer, a State Department official said. **The Americans offered help. The State Department financed an investigative body to review errant airstrikes and propose corrective action. Pentagon lawyers trained Saudi officers in the laws of war.** Military officers suggested putting gun cameras on Saudi and Emiratis warplanes to see how strikes were being conducted. The coalition balked. **In June 2017, American officials extracted new promises of safeguards, including stricter rules of engagement and an expansion of the no-strike list** to about 33,000 targets — provisions that allowed the secretary of state, then Rex W. Tillerson, to win

support in Congress for the sale of more than \$510 million in precision-guided munitions to the kingdom. But those measures seemed to make little difference. Just over a year later, in August 2018, a coalition airstrike killed at least 40 boys on a packed school bus in northern Yemen. Still, American leaders insisted they need to keep helping the Saudi coalition. America's role in the war was "absolutely essential" to safeguard civilians, the general in charge of Central Command, Gen. Joseph L. Votel, told a charged Senate hearing in March. "I think this does give us the best opportunity to address these concerns," he said.

R/T Negotiations Soon

The Houthis have no reason to negotiate because the war has been good for them

Niarchos 18 Nicolas Niarchos, 1-22-2018, "How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse," New Yorker,

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/22/how-the-us-is-making-the-war-in-yemen-worse>

//DF

In the last months of the Obama Administration, Secretary of State John Kerry tried to mediate between the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the Saudi-backed government. Hilal and Ruwayshan were involved in efforts to negotiate peace. But the meetings collapsed, owing first to Houthi intransigence and then to Hadi's resistance to a U.N. road map to the negotiations. As Peter Salisbury, a fellow of Chatham House, the British policy institute, told me, the Houthis have few incentives to negotiate, because, "from their perspective, they're doing the best they've ever done." U.S. officials also noted Iran's open support for the Houthis. "They were basically waving at our surveillance aircraft," one official told me. In retrospect, this seems to have been a calculated move. "Remember that the Iranians in Yemen will always get a phenomenally high return on investments," Salisbury said. "Let's say they're spending ten, twenty, thirty million dollars a year on Yemen. The Saudis are spending billions of dollars a year."

R/T SA Will Win War

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/fp_20181025_yemen_war_transcript.pdf

But since the coalition intervened, the Houthi's have been effectively pushed back from many areas in Yemen. Initially they had 90 percent of the land. Now they control about 30 percent but that 30 percent is heavily controlled population centers so this is where you're seeing a lot of the mismanagement, a lot of the corruption, a lot of the images of the famine, the disease that are happening, they are mostly happening in Houthi areas. In, you know, liberated areas the situation really depends. It is not really prosperity. Every situation in Yemen is different so some areas in the north like Merib and Al Jawf have been a bit of success story. They have about over a million internally displaced people from Yemen including their own population and the economy there has been booming.

R/T Truce Solves

The airstrike that killed hundreds at a funeral happened during a “truce”— the Saudis don’t give a shit

Niarchos 18 Nicolas Niarchos, 1-22-2018, "How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse," New Yorker,

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/22/how-the-us-is-making-the-war-in-yemen-worse>

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As Hilal left for the funeral, Ammar Yahiya al-Hebari was preparing his d.j. mixing board at the community hall. Hebari is a solid-looking forty-year-old, with a white stripe in his hair. He is famous across northern Yemen as a funeral chanter. Like Hilal, Hebari thought there would not be a strike. The rebels and the Saudi government had just agreed to a U.N.-brokered truce, and the funeral “was not a political or political-party gathering,” he told me. In the early afternoon, the hall began to fill with men wearing white head scarves and the traditional curved daggers, called janbiyas, in their belts. Many were chewing high-quality khat, a mild stimulant leaf, which had been brought from Khawlan, the seat of the Ruwayshan family. At around one-thirty, Hebari started to chant. He estimated that some three thousand people had crowded into the hall. A rumor spread that the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Houthi ally, would soon arrive. Documents given to Nawal Al-Maghafi, a journalist who made a documentary about the day’s events for the BBC, show that informants were providing the Saudi coalition with updates on who was there. When Hilal arrived, Hebari noticed how relaxed he appeared. At one point, a beggar approached Hilal. His guards tried to shoo the man away, but Hilal reached into his shirt pocket and gave the beggar all his cash. “This was his last act,” Hebari told me. A little after three o’clock, one of Hilal’s guards heard a noise. It was a coalition jet, crashing eastward through the hot afternoon sky. “Boss, I heard a jet,” he said. Hilal looked at him and shook his head. The hall rumbled with the noise of an aircraft a second time, louder, lower. The guard turned nervously to Hilal. The Mayor grinned and said, “Son, I’m not going to leave.” The third time that the hall shook, Hilal’s guard heard the sound of air whistling against the tail fins of a bomb as it zigzagged toward them, its guidance system making corrections to its trajectory. “Sir, it’s a missile!” he shouted. Hilal was smiling. The floor erupted in flames. As the guard lost consciousness, he saw a wall collapse and crush Hilal. More than a hundred and forty mourners were killed and five hundred were wounded in the strike. Afterward, Yemeni investigators unearthed a tail fin of one of the bombs. The serial number indicates that the bomb, a Mark-82—a sleek steel case eighty-seven inches long, twelve inches in diameter, and filled with five hundred pounds of explosive—was produced by Raytheon, the third-largest defense company in the United States. The bomb had been modified with a laser guidance system, made in factories in Arizona and Texas, called a Paveway-II. The weapons are sometimes referred to as “dumb bombs with graduate degrees.” “They had been sold to the Saudis on the understanding that they would make their targeting more accurate,” Mark Hiznay, the associate arms director at Human Rights Watch, told me. “It turned out that the Saudis were failing to take all the feasible precautions in attacks that were killing civilians accurately.”

R/T Saudis Give Aid

Saudi aid doesn’t matter since the country is still mercilessly killing people; that’s like feeding a hostage victim so they can keep living and suffering

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof, 12-29-2018, "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/opinion/sunday/yemen-famine-war-saudi-arabia.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article> //DF

“The most important thing for us is national security,” the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jabir, told me. Dr. Abdullah Al Rabeeah, an adviser to the royal court and director of a fund that provides aid to Yemen, told me that Saudis don’t want to see hunger in Yemen but added: “We will continue to do what it takes to fight terrorism. It’s not an easy decision.” Saudi and U.A.E. officials note that they provide an enormous amount of humanitarian aid to Yemen. This is true, and it mitigates the suffering there. But it’s difficult to give the Saudis much credit for relieving the suffering of a country that they are bombing and starving. To avert a catastrophe in Yemen, the world needs to provide more humanitarian aid. But above all, the war has to end. “You’re not going to solve this long-term until the war is ended,” said David Beasley, the executive director of the World Food Program. “It’s a man-made problem, and it needs a man-made solution.” That solution will entail strong American backing for a difficult United Nations-backed peace process involving Yemeni factions and outsiders, aiming for a measure of power sharing. This diplomatic process requires engaging the Houthis, not just bombing them. It also means a cease-fire and pressure on all sides to ensure humanitarian access and the passage of food and fuel. The best leverage America has to make the Saudis part of the solution is to suspend arms sales to Riyadh so long as the Saudis continue the war.

R/T Iran

**Saudis care about security, Iran about security and ideology (champion of muslim world, elitism etc.)
Thus, a shift in the balance of power towards Iran does not mean territorial expansion, as Iran is not primarily motivated from an offensive realist way of thinking**

Hameed, Spring 2017, “The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry: A Foreign Policy Analysis Approach”,

<https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2017/12/Saudi-Iranian-Article-Formatted-2an0f80.pdf> (NK)

The Americans then established bases in Saudi Arabia to more effectively protect its allies against future Iraqi aggression.⁵⁴ Thus, the balance of power shifted in Saudi Arabia’s favor and its rivalry with Iran became more strained given Iranian opposition to Western interference in the region. The increased U.S. presence served as fodder for Iran to paint Saudi Arabia as a puppet of the West. The reactions by Saudi Arabia and Iran to increased U.S. influence in the region illustrate each states’ theoretical motivations and concerns. Saudi Arabia’s reluctant acceptance of U.S. troops indicate that concerns for security were its top priority regardless of the U.S.’s negative image. Iran’s opposition to U.S. forces illustrates its own concerns for its geopolitical posture and security as well as its adherence to the anti-elitist narrative set forth in 1979 which opposes Western influence in the region. The 2003 Iraq War led to an intensification of the rivalry regarding both security and sectarianism. Prior to Hussein’s toppling by the U.S. in 2003, Iraq and Iran were the region’s two main powers. With the U.S. occupying Iraq, political space was created for the now much more powerful, U.S.-backed Saudi Arabia to fill and challenge Iran. The 2003 war galvanized sectarian tensions in Iraq by causing a breakdown of the previously existing social structures of coexistence between Sunnis and Shia and creating a power vacuum for sectarian factions to fill.

The presence of these militias in Iraq may allow Iran to buttress its security and greatly increase its political influence in Iraq should the PMUs establish a political infrastructure. The rise of the PMUs mimic that of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s, and leaders are hinting at their desire to transition the PMUs’ military structure into a political party in Iraq. The PMUs are also looked at as noble forces fighting against ISIS similar to how Hezbollah is looked at in its fight against Israel. One Iraqi commander remarked that the PMUs experience “huge popularity” in Iraq.⁵¹ The Iranian-backed fighters have reportedly “contributed to most of the fighting to secure the area around Fallujah.”⁵² Regarding issues of identity for Iran, it employs its anti-Western narrative to combat future American and Saudi influence in Iraq by buttressing the presence of the PMUs. The preservation of Iranian influence in Iraq allows Iranian officials to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah, both of which operate in opposition to Western objectives. In addition, Iran acts upon its self-view as the champion of the Muslim world by backing the PMUs, which skillfully utilize propaganda to further their image as liberators for all Muslims by releasing photos and videos showing PMU fighters rescuing Sunnis, Shia, and even Christians from ISIS. Saudi Arabia is motivated by security concerns, as it recognizes the advantages Iran enjoys from its military influence in Iraq and thus wishes to contain Iranian influence for its security. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, as stated previously, is opposed to the

Assad regime and Hezbollah as they support Iran's geopolitical prowess. Saudi Arabia is also concerned that the large presence of PMUs in Iraq will function as a detriment to Saudi security and regional stability in the future.

R/T War Would Continue

3. Ending arms sales would reduce civilian deaths and suffering, since airstrikes are responsible for the vast majority of casualties

The conflict has been marked by violations of the laws of war on both sides, including targeting of civilians, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, and other abuses. **There have been over 17,000 civilian casualties in the war, the majority of them via air strikes carried out the by Saudi-led coalition.**¹⁹ The Saudi-led coalition has undertaken over 18,000 air strikes since March 2015, a third of which have hit non-military targets.²⁰ Saudi bombing raids have targeted hospitals, marketplaces, civilian infrastructure, weddings, a funeral, health clinics, and a school bus carrying dozens of children. Independent human rights monitors, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have found fragments of U.S.-supplied bombs near the sites of strikes on civilians. The bombs identified have included cluster munitions, which are now banned by an international treaty, and guided bombs manufactured by specific U.S. companies – Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.²¹ Untold numbers of additional deaths in Yemen have been caused by a naval blockade and ongoing fighting on the ground that have hindered the distribution of food, clean water, and essential medicine. Over eight million Yemenis are at risk of famine, and bombing of civilian infrastructure, including water treatment plants, has sparked a cholera outbreak that has affected over 1 million people.²² In the wake of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi behavior, including its conduct in the Yemen war, has undergone intense scrutiny, and prominent members of both parties have suggested that arms transfers to Saudi Arabia should be halted. This debate will be discussed in more detail below.

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi, 11-20-2018, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/> //DF

The Saudis and Emiratis have largely ignored international criticism of civilian deaths and appeals for a political settlement—and the Trump administration's latest signal of support shows that strategy is working. **Investigations by the UN and other bodies have found both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition responsible for potential war crimes. But air strikes by the Saudis and their allies "have caused most of the documented civilian casualties,"** the UN concluded in a report last month. On August 9, the Saudi coalition bombed a school bus in the northern town of Dahyan, killing 54 people, 44 of them children, and wounding dozens, according to Yemeni health officials. For weeks, the coalition defended the airstrike, but on September 1—with the deadline looming for the Trump administration to certify Saudi and UAE efforts to reduce civilian casualties—the coalition admitted that the bombing was a mistake and that it would "hold those who committed mistakes" accountable. U.S. officials seized on that statement as evidence that the Saudi coalition is willing to change its behavior. But for three and a half years now, there has been "little evidence of any attempt by parties to the conflict to minimize civilian casualties," said Kamel Jendoubi, the chair of the UN investigation team that documented war crimes.

R/T Turak 18

Article concedes at the end that US support of SA is critical to its stability

Turak 18 Natasha Turak, 6-14-2018, "Threats of US sanctions could accelerate a Saudi shift," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/23/threats-of-us-sanctions-could-accelerate-a-saudi-shift-eastward.html> //DF

"In Riyadh, diversification of relationships and not putting all their eggs in Washington's basket has been a longstanding policy," Vakil told CNBC, describing energy deals with China dating back to the 1990s. "And it could be in their continued interest, because if there are forthcoming sanctions from the EU or the U.S. on human rights issues, obviously China's policy of non-interference would make sense for them, strategically speaking." Still, the nearly 90-year-old alliance — deemed a "special relationship" when diplomatic ties were first established in 1933 — remains paramount to the kingdom's stability, something Riyadh knows very well. "A break with the U.S., any obvious rupture in the relationship is also not in their interest," Vakil added. "So they're going to try to maintain these three different portfolios." "The House of Saud would be much weaker without U.S. support," said Eurasia Group's Kamel, acknowledging Washington's decades of military and diplomatic backing. But would it collapse? "Not necessarily immediately," the analyst said. "But it would certainly be much weaker than it is today."

R/T Houthis Don't Want to negotiate

They do (Sirgany - CNN)

Sarah El Sirgany, Tamara Qiblawi and Nicole Gaouette, Cnn, 11-19-2018, "Saudi-backed Yemen government agrees to peace talks," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/19/middleeast/yemen-government-peace-talks-intl/index.html> (NK) in a copy of the draft resolution seen by CNN, the UK does not directly criticize actions by the Saudi-led coalition, which is backed by the US and others, in its fight to expel Houthi rebels from Yemen. The draft welcomes the coalition's recently reported military de-escalation in the key port city of Hodeidah to relieve the humanitarian situation and calls on the Houthis to respond in kind. The document does condemn attacks by the Houthis against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and condemns those providing weapons to the Houthis, without directly mentioning Iran. Rebels in Yemen earlier said they would cease missile and drone strikes on Saudi coalition targets. **"We are willing to freeze and stop military operations on all fronts to reach a just and honorable peace if they really want peace for the Yemeni people,"** Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, head of Yemen's Houthi **Supreme Revolutionary Committee**, said in a statement Monday. Saudi Arabia is facing growing pressure to put a halt to the violence in Yemen after more than three years of devastating war.

R/T Ceasefire Working

Blockade rly bad (Sirgany - CNN)

Sarah El Sirgany, Tamara Qiblawi and Nicole Gaouette, Cnn, 11-19-2018, "Saudi-backed Yemen government agrees to peace talks," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/19/middleeast/yemen-government-peace-talks-intl/index.html> (NK) The Yemen conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels has killed at least 10,000 people. UN experts say the Saudi coalition's bombings of civilians are potential war crimes. **Saudi Arabia's partial blockade of the country has deprived 18 million people of reliable access to food, creating the conditions for the worst famine in 100 years, according to the UN.** The World Food Program said Friday that the country is "marching to the brink of starvation." Its executive director, David Beasley, who just returned from Yemen, told reporters he touched babies who felt like "ghosts" due to starvation

No, neither will leave bc/ they dont wanna cede control of the port (Hajali - Channel News Asia)

Hajali, Channel NewsAsia, 1-20-2019, "Saudi-led coalition launches air strikes on Yemeni capital,"

<https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/saudi-led-coalition-launches-air-strikes-on-yemeni-capital-11145394> (NK)

The deal was reached at U.N.-sponsored talks in Sweden last month, the first significant breakthrough in peace efforts in five years, to avert a full-scale assault on the port, the main entry point for the bulk of Yemen's commercial imports and aid. **The truce has largely held in Hodeidah, controlled by the Houthis with thousands of coalition-backed forces massed on the outskirts. But the withdrawal of forces by both sides has stalled over disagreement on who would control the Red Sea city. Western nations, including some which supply the coalition with arms and intelligence, have pressed Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to end the conflict that has pushed Yemen to the brink of famine.** Rights groups have criticised the coalition for air strikes that have killed thousands of civilians at hospitals, schools and markets since 2015. They also criticise the Houthis for missile attacks on Saudi cities, including the capital Riyadh.

R/T Egypt Shifted in two years

Lol (Colonna - Egypt Today)

EgyptToday, March 2018, "SIPRI: Egypt's arms imports skyrocket amidst greater security threats ,"

<http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/45059/SIPRI-Egypt%E2%80%99s-arms-imports-skyrocket-amidst-greater-security-threats> (NK)

The Middle East region accounted for 32 percent of global arms imports over the past five years, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia occupying the third and second positions, respectively, in the table of largest arms importers globally. Under Abdel Fatah al-Sisi's presidency, **Egypt's arms imports grew by 215 percent in the last five years.** Although this increase is drastic, it comes as no surprise. Threats to Egypt's national security have increased radically since 2013, and Egypt's "War on Terror" has been a defining feature of Sisi's presidency. The most recent campaign to rid Egypt's Sinai of terrorism began on February 9. Titled "Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018," the military operation aims to confront all terrorist organizations and elements in the region. Over the past five years, France has been the most successful country in forging a close relationship with Egypt in the arms industry. **Of Egypt's arms imports across this period, 37 percent came from France, 26 percent from the U.S. and 21 percent from Russia, according to data from SIPRI.** Egypt's major trade deals Since the June 30 Revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt has invoked a new strategy to diversify its foreign relations. Pushing aside the U.S. who traditionally had a monopoly on Egypt's military imports, Sisi has diversified the suppliers. France, Russia and Germany, among others, have received sizeable orders for military hardware from the Egyptian regime.

R/T Econ Impacts

No economic effect of arms sales outweighs the fact that we are directly responsible for the killing of Yemeni civilians

Hartung 18 William Hartung [director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute], 11-2018, "US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen," Center for International Policy, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf
//DF

The assassination of U.S. resident and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi national, at the hands of the Saudi regime has provoked a rethinking of U.S.-Saudi relations in general, and military relations in particular.¹ President Trump's declaration that he would not stop U.S. arms sales to the kingdom even if it is responsible for Khashoggi's death frighteningly suggests that contractor profits and a small number of jobs take precedence over the need to hold a murderous regime accountable.² The President's assertion that it is possible to balance benefits to the U.S. economy against the heinous behavior of an ally doesn't hold up to scrutiny. No economic benefit, no matter how large, can justify continuing to arm a regime that has not only killed a journalist in the most brutal way imaginable but has killed thousands of civilians in indiscriminate bombing attacks in Yemen, many of them with U.S.-supplied bombs and aircraft.³ But if economic arguments are to be brought into play, they should at least be accurate. This has not been the case. The president has claimed a sweeping range of jobs flowing from his alleged \$110 billion arms deal with Riyadh, from 40,000 to "over a million," in one case boosting his estimate by 400,000 jobs within just a few days' time. To be fair, it seems like the million jobs figure was meant to include some commercial deals as well as the purported arms sales, but the president's ad hoc utterances on the subject make it hard to know for sure.⁴

R/T Oil

We link in

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/why-yemen-matters/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.380e04bcefa0

Yemen occupies a strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea, next to some of the world's most crucial shipping lanes, and its instability could jeopardize global trade. Oil tankers bound for Europe pass just beyond Yemen's shores, through the narrow Strait of Mandeb and on to the Suez Canal. Houthi rebels have threatened to choke off this traffic if the Saudi-led coalition challenges their hold on the port of Hodeidah. The rebels also were blamed for a missile attack on a Turkish ship delivering wheat in March.

R/T Credibility

Ending arms sales to Saudi Arabia would enhance US credibility in the region and improve its ability to cooperate with allies

Weber 18 Emily Weber, 11-20-2018, "The United States Should End Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia," International Affairs Review at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, <http://www.iar-gwu.org/content/united-states-should-end-arms-sales-saudi-arabia> //DF

Additionally, the United States should focus on relieving the famine and disease ubiquitous throughout the country. The danger from both Saudi forces and terrorist organizations makes aidwork nearly impossible. The United States should try to create safe zones for aid organizations. These zones would be in a few areas throughout the country providing food and medical care to civilians caught in the crossfire. These areas would allow the United States to target aid depending on civilians' changing needs. Since the UN already provides designated refugee areas, safe zones could use existing UN aid management infrastructure. By limiting its interventions in Yemen to delivering humanitarian aid, the United States would create more stabilization in the region and work more effectively to end the civil war. U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia along with U.S.- led military interventions create chaos and unnecessarily involve the United States in a proxy war. Ending arms sales to Saudi Arabia would improve relations with other countries in the Middle East and would force other countries we consider our allies to ensure their actions were in line with international and U.S. norms. Overall, this action would improve our entire strategy for managing conflicts across the region.

R/T Iran

1. Iran is only reactive because of entrenched and historical security concerns of encirclement

Hameed, Spring 2017, "The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry: A Foreign Policy Analysis Approach",

<https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2017/12/Saudi-Iranian-Article-Formatted-2an0f80.pdf> (NK)

The Americans then established bases in Saudi Arabia to more effectively protect its allies against future Iraqi aggression.⁵⁴ Thus, the balance of power shifted in Saudi Arabia's favor and its rivalry with Iran became more strained given Iranian opposition to Western interference in the region. The increased U.S. presence served as fodder for Iran to paint Saudi Arabia as a puppet of the West. The reactions by Saudi Arabia and Iran to increased U.S. influence in the region illustrate each states' theoretical motivations and concerns. Saudi Arabia's reluctant acceptance of U.S. troops indicate that concerns for security were its top priority regardless of the U.S.'s negative image. Iran's opposition to U.S. forces illustrates its own concerns for its geopolitical posture and security as well as its adherence to the anti-elitist narrative set forth in 1979 which opposes Western influence in the region. The 2003 Iraq War led to an intensification of the rivalry regarding both security and sectarianism. Prior to Hussein's toppling by the U.S. in 2003, Iraq and Iran were the region's two main powers. With the U.S. occupying Iraq, political space was created for the now much more powerful, U.S.-backed Saudi Arabia to fill and challenge Iran. The 2003 war galvanized sectarian tensions in Iraq by causing a breakdown of the previously existing social structures of coexistence between Sunnis and Shia and creating a power vacuum for sectarian factions to fill.

The presence of these militias in Iraq may allow Iran to buttress its security and greatly increase its political influence in Iraq should the PMUs establish a political infrastructure. The rise of the PMUs mimic that of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s, and leaders are hinting at their desire to transition the PMUs' military structure into a political party in Iraq. The PMUs are also looked at as noble forces fighting against ISIS similar to how Hezbollah is looked at in its fight against Israel. One Iraqi commander remarked that the PMUs experience "huge popularity" in Iraq.⁵¹ The Iranian-backed fighters have reportedly "contributed to most of the fighting to secure the area around Fallujah."⁵² **Regarding issues of identity for Iran, it employs its anti-Western narrative to combat future American and Saudi influence in Iraq by buttressing the presence of the PMUs. The preservation of Iranian influence in Iraq allows Iranian officials to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah, both of which operate in opposition to Western objectives. In addition, Iran acts upon its self-view as the champion of the Muslim world by backing the PMUs, which skillfully utilize propaganda to further their image as liberators for all Muslims by releasing photos and videos showing PMU fighters rescuing Sunnis, Shia, and even Christians from ISIS.** Saudi Arabia is motivated by security concerns, as it recognizes the advantages Iran enjoys from its military influence in Iraq and thus wishes to contain Iranian influence for its security. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, as stated previously, is opposed to the Assad regime and Hezbollah as they support Iran's geopolitical prowess. Saudi Arabia is also concerned that the large presence of PMUs in Iraq will function as a detriment to Saudi security and regional stability in the future.

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi, 11-20-2018, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/> //DF

In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly this week, President Donald Trump signaled to Saudi Arabia that he would avoid criticizing its destabilizing actions in the Middle East. Instead, he blamed only Iran, the kingdom's regional rival, for funding "havoc and slaughter." Trump praised Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for pledging billions in aid and "pursuing multiple avenues to ending Yemen's horrible, horrific civil war." **He failed to mention that Yemen's current conflict escalated dramatically in early 2015, when Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab countries to intervene in the war.** That war has long since devolved into a humanitarian catastrophe. The United Nations stopped counting its civilian death toll two years ago, when it hit 10,000. An independent estimate by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which tracks conflicts worldwide, found that nearly 50,000 people, including combatants, died between January 2016 and July 2018. The war has also left more than 22 million people—75 percent of the population of Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the world—in need of humanitarian aid. As public anger over America's role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America's longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking "demonstrable actions" to avoid harming civilians and making a "good faith" effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis. Like the Saudis and Emiratis, the Trump administration sees in the Houthis the same sort of threat as other Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to help Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. In late August, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations tweeted a photo that had circulated in the Arab press of a meeting in Beirut between the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Houthi officials. U.S. officials claimed it showed "the nature of the regional terrorist threat," and added: "Iranian proxies in Lebanon & Yemen pose major dangers to peace & stability in the entire Middle East." But **beyond recent missile attacks on Saudi Arabia—in retaliation for Saudi air strikes—the Houthis have displayed little regional ambition. Ironically, as the war drags on, the Houthis will grow more dependent on support from Iran and its allies.** By accepting the coalition's cosmetic attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the Trump administration is signaling to Saudi and Emirati leaders its apparent belief that a clear military victory in Yemen remains possible. And as long as the coalition believes it can crush the Houthis, there's little incentive for it to negotiate. Trump, then, has bought into Saudi Arabia's zero-sum calculation: that a military win in Yemen for the kingdom and its allies would be a defeat for Iran, while a negotiated settlement with the Houthis would be a victory for Tehran. Blinded by its obsession with

Iran, the Trump administration is perpetuating an unwinnable war and undermining the likelihood of a political settlement. This current phase of the conflict in Yemen began in September 2014, when the Houthis, a group of Shia rebels allied with Yemen's ousted dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, forced most of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi's government to flee to Saudi Arabia, and threatened to take over much of the country. In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition went to war in Yemen to restore Hadi to power and roll back the Houthis. Since then, despite thousands of air strikes and an air and naval blockade at a cost of some \$5 to \$6 billion a month for Riyadh, the Saudi-led alliance failed to dislodge the Houthis from the capital, Sanaa. **While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers, including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada's Department of National Defense, have shown that the Houthis did not receive significant support from Tehran before the Saudi intervention in 2015. Iran has stepped up military assistance to the Houthis since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival.**

2. Security guarantee links in

3. No capacity to increase support

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen> //DF

Most important, the major factions competing for power have little ability and no incentive to halt oil shipments through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Otherwise the essentially permanent Yemeni crisis always has been internal. **From modern Yemen's beginning six decades ago conflict has stalked its existence.** Part independent kingdom, part British colony, nationalist revolutionaries eventually took control of both. At one point Egyptian and Saudi troops faced off. **For years there were two Yemens, with strained relations. Even after the two became one in 1990, with Ali Abdullah Saleh as president, Yemen was enveloped in strife. In 2004 the Houthis, a movement dominated by Zaydi Shia, rose against Saleh.** Along the way, Riyadh periodically intervened, including promoting Sunni Wahhabism in Yemen. **The 2011 Arab Spring led to Saleh's ouster. However, four years later he was back, working with his former antagonists, the Houthis, against vice president-turned-president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The latter's fragile government resigned in January 2015. Yemenis continued to battle one another:** As Ecclesiastes in the Bible says, "There is nothing new under the sun." Two points that regional specialists agreed on: **Iran had little to do with the latest political permutations in Sanaa** and Houthis were interested in taking power in Yemen, not attacking the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, **the Saudis and Emiratis launched a campaign** to reinstate Hadi. Riyadh predicted a short campaign. However, the "coalition," backed by military contributions from friendly states, such as Sudan, among others—though not Egypt, which apparently had had enough during its earlier military misadventure—found itself locked in an interminable conflict which achieved little other than to cause mass civilian casualties and wreck the country's primitive infrastructure. After signing the Iran nuclear deal, the Obama administration sought to prove Washington's friendship, demonstrating "our deep loyalty to our allies," in the words of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dafna Rand. **Unsurprisingly, the Houthis welcomed aid from Iran, which equally appreciated the opportunity to bleed the blundering royals. Hence the coalition and its chief backer turned Yemen's endless internal conflict into an international sectarian proxy fight.** Nearly four years later Washington still has no security interest at stake. The arguments typically made for U.S. involvement are bootstrapped from responses to Riyadh's and Abu Dhabi's initial aggression, which was entirely unnecessary since, historically, money and patronage had guaranteed Saudi interests. Houthi missile attacks on cities in Saudi Arabia and ships in the Gulf of Aden are retaliation for the coalition's incessant attacks on Yemeni targets, many civilian. Tehran's increased influence, such as it is, results from the Houthis' need for assistance against rich combatants backed by America. AQAP and other radical groups are stronger—because the Saudi/Emirati attack diverted the Houthis, while Hadi and his Saudi benefactors turned radicals into allies. Long-term impacts of U.S. involvement are entirely ill. Washington has turned many Yemenis into enemies and potential terrorists while rewarding Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's worst impulses. The Pentagon's claim that aiding Riyadh's war reduces civilian casualties is risible: Some sixty thousand civilians have been killed, most in coalition airstrikes. Nearly half

the population needs aid; a million people have contracted cholera; famine stalks much of the land; civilian infrastructure, primitive to start, has been wrecked. The number of dead from malnutrition approaches one hundred thousand. Emirati and Saudi interests are diverging, with Abu Dhabi promoting separatism in the south, making a peaceful, stable settlement even more difficult. Which has left the administration and its congressional servants, paraphrasing Secretary Pompeo, to caterwaul about Iran. The ever-blinkered Wall Street Journal complained about a vote to "abandon an ally in a proxy war with Iran." Yet Riyadh started the war without considering America's interests. Moreover, **Tehran has never controlled the Houthis, did not start the present conflict, and has only limited influence even now. With its own economy in crisis, Iran could not afford to underwrite even a victorious Houthi regime.** Tehran also would have little reason to do so: Yemen will remain in desperate crisis for years, neither able nor willing to challenge Riyadh or Washington. Yemen is a problem for Riyadh primarily because of Mbs' hubris. He is likely to acknowledge his blunder only if the United States stops trying to protect the crown prince from his own folly.

1. Most arms the US sells to Saudi Arabia are offensive and don't protect against Iran, nor do they deter them from aggressive action

Hartung 10 William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF "Congress and the public should think twice before signing off on what may be the first stage of a new Mideast arms race." Is the Middle East really suffering from a dearth of advanced weaponry? In the past three years alone, the United States has offered over \$30 billion in armaments to Persian Gulf states, counterbalanced by offers of a similar amount to Israel. The United Kingdom and Russia have supplied billions more to the Persian Gulf states. Attempting to create a balance at higher and higher levels of weaponry is both dangerous and unnecessary. In addition, how stable is Saudi Arabia? In the short run, there may be no major cause for concern, but the combat planes, helicopters, missiles, and bombs that are part of the deal will last for decades. Would anyone have predicted in the mid-1970s that the heavily armed regime of the Shah of Iran would be toppled by a group of Islamic fundamentalists? The Saudi deal will no doubt go through, but it shouldn't. It consists primarily of offensive weapons--fighter planes, attack helicopters, and guided bombs--that serve no constructive purpose. Fighter planes and guided bombs aren't relevant to addressing the potential threat posed by Iranian missiles, nor are they likely to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters might be used in Saudi strikes against terrorists and separatist groups in northern Yemen, but doing so would be counterproductive, more likely to inflame passions against Riyadh than to solve its border security problems. Congress and the public should think twice before signing off on what may be the first stage of a new Mideast arms race.

2. Iran's power and threat is that they spread their influence and ideology, something that arms won't stop; weapons won't stop words

Gause 10 F. Gregory Gause III [Professor and chair of political science department, University of Vermont], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF The Saudi arms sale will not buy much security in the long run in the Persian Gulf. But there are no good reasons not to sell the Saudis those weapons, and there are some potentially positive results (besides the economic benefits to the U.S.) that might come from the sale--most importantly U.S. leverage on Riyadh on nuclear proliferation issues. The Iranian regional challenge is based on the political and ideological links with important state and sub-state actors in the region: Hezbollah, Hamas, various Iraqi parties, the Syrian regime, and Shia activists in the Gulf monarchies. Better fighter jets and attack helicopters will not help the Saudis to contain or roll back this kind of Iranian ideological influence. Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence.

3. SA is a much bigger threat than Iran

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen> //DF

The greatest challenge to U.S. policy in the region is royal stupidity in Saudi Arabia rather than Islamist hostility in Iran. The latter is outgunned, overmatched and badly stretched. Its influence in divided Lebanon and wrecked Syria is of limited value. An active opposition presses for change at home. In contrast, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is ruled by an immature authoritarian known mostly for his myopia, ruthlessness, brutality, recklessness, ambition and arrogance. His misadventures are legendary: the murder and dismemberment of a self-exiled journalist in a Saudi consulate; the brazen kidnapping of Lebanon's prime minister; a busted campaign to isolate and invade Qatar; and a promised speedy invasion of Yemen that transformed into nearly four years of war—so far. Riyadh underwrote radical jihadists in Syria and Yemen, after spending decades promoting fundamentalist Wahhabism around the world. The royal regime also backs tyranny in Bahrain and Egypt with money and troops. The outcome of these policies has been highly negative for America, often generating the opposite of the intended results. For instance, Iran is more influential, Washington is embarrassed, the Gulf States are divided, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is strengthened. All due to Mohammed bin Salman's (MbS) attempt to manipulate Washington into backing his effort to become a regional hegemon. With friends like the KSA America doesn't need enemies.

The United States should seek a regional balance, not Saudi hegemony. The KSA has proved far more brutal and destabilizing than Iran: invading one neighbor; kidnapping the leader of another; launching a diplomatic offensive, backed by the threat of military action, against a third; and supporting radical insurgents against a fourth. Washington should end all support for the Yemen war and terminate further weapons sales until the kingdom draws down that conflict.

R/T Yemen Impact

Iran feeds and thrives off of instability; ending the war is the best way to reduce their influence

Guzansky 18 Yoel Guzansky, 3-25-2018, "Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen Has Been a Disaster," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064> //DF

Washington should see President Trump's close relationship with Crown Prince MbS and the Saudi royal's visit to Washington as an opportunity to end this disastrous war: The Saudi-led coalition cannot win this war but it can settle the conflict on favorable terms, and the U.S. should help it do just that. In exchange for increased U.S. support for the Saudi campaign for a limited period, President Trump should demand that the Saudis take further precautions to prevent civilian casualties and increase the aid provided to Yemeni civilians at risk of disease or hunger. Knowing that U.S. support will be withdrawn should incentivize the Saudis to reach a political solution as soon as possible, while dealing a blow to the Houthis and the momentum that U.S. support provides (and keeping the "deadline" secret) will place pressure on the Iranian-backed group to end a war that's tides appear to be turning. With both sides incentivized to end the war, it seems possible that some sort of political agreement can be reached. The war in Yemen has been a disaster for all involved parties, and so ending it is both the smart thing to do as well as the right thing to do. And because Iranian interference is most successful in regions that suffer from conflict

or insecurity, ending the war has the added benefit of potentially weakening the Islamic Republic's ability to meddle in regional affairs.

R/T Yemen

R/T Hodeidah

The Saudis have been unable to retake the port of Hodeidah

Wintour 18 Patrick Wintour, 12-13-2018, "Yemen: ceasefire agreed for port city of Hodeidah," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/yemen-ceasefire-agreed-for-vital-port-city-of-hodeidah> //DF

He said the outcome of the talks in the Swedish town of Rimbo would mean "concrete results in the daily lives of Yemenis". **The UN-backed Yemeni government lost control of Hodeidah and Sana'a to Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in 2015. Despite heavy military support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate, the government,** which is based in Aden, **has been unable to take back either city.** Western backing for the Saudi-led war has frayed in the face of mass casualties, starvation and, more recently, allegations that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, was instrumental in organising the killing of the Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi. The agreements, sealed with a handshake between the two sets of negotiators but not any signatures, include the shoring up of the country's central bank, which should eventually enable the payment of salaries to 1.2 million public sector workers.

R/T US Economy

R/T Oil Dependence

SA will not influence global oil prices b/c of strong US shale production – Iran and Venezuela supply decreases prove there's no threat

Sheppard 19 David Sheppard, 2-13-2019, "Oil market's 'shock and awe' isn't coming from Saudi Arabia," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/65ba7494-2fa8-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8> //DF

So should investors line up with the world's top oil exporter and one of the most influential banks in commodities to bet it all on the black stuff? You could be forgiven for thinking there is easy money to be made when two powerhouses of physical and financial oil align. Not so fast.

The oil market has already absorbed a remarkable amount of bullish news over the past month, from sanctions on Venezuela to signs Washington will try to squeeze Iran's oil exports harder this year. The oil price has responded by bobbing around in a narrow range just above \$60 a barrel, with last year's highs of more than \$86 now a distant memory. So why is oil so flat? Well, quite simply, **not everybody buys the bullish narrative.** The primary reason remains the US shale industry, whose rapid production growth triggered crude's

40 per cent peak-to-trough slide late last year. Traders have reason to be wary. The US Energy Information Administration this week raised its forecasts for average US production in 2019 to 12.4m b/d, an annual increase of 1.45m b/d. It is also 350,000 b/d higher than predicted three months ago, despite warnings from some quarters that shale is slowing down. Twelve months ago the EIA forecast 2019 growth would be just 590,000 b/d. Goldman itself acknowledges more US oil will reach international markets later this year as pipeline bottlenecks in Texas ease, and say they are "cautious" on further price gains. Even their second-quarter forecast is just \$67.50 a barrel. Little wonder then that the Commodities Trading Corporation, a hedging consultancy run by veterans of Morgan Stanley, says oil producers are lining up to sell into rallies.

If Saudi Arabia did succeed in pushing prices up, it could prove shortlived with even stronger shale growth on the horizon. Shock and awe in the oil market? Maybe, but US investment banks might find it's actually happening a lot closer to home.

Oil prices in free fall — a barrel of West Texas Intermediate crude now sells for \$52, down a third since October — has been good news for American consumers, but it's bad news for countries with oil-dependent economies. That is why leaders from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have been meeting in Vienna and trying to agree on a production cutback to push up prices. But they haven't been able to reach an agreement. These days, OPEC tries to coordinate with Russia, which isn't an OPEC member, because the group doesn't believe it can affect global oil prices enough through the actions of its own members. And the Persian Gulf countries that dominate OPEC want a larger cutback than Russia is willing to agree to. As Bloomberg describes, this split is partly driven by conflicting interests: The Gulf producers are mostly concerned about how low oil prices affect their government budgets, but Russia doesn't want prices to rise too much. Bloomberg cites a Kremlin official who worried higher gasoline prices could upset consumers and reduce political support for Vladimir Putin's economic policy. But a broader reason OPEC control of oil prices isn't working anymore is that the world oil market has changed in ways that make a cartel strategy less effective. The usual idea behind a cartel is: You agree to limit production, and that means you sell less oil, but you make more profit per barrel because prices have to rise to bring demand in line with the reduced supply. Historically, constraining supply has been an effective way to change the oil price, because non-OPEC countries had limited flexibility to increase their production when OPEC production declined, and because consumer behavior is inelastic, especially in the short term. High oil prices might eventually cause you to buy a smaller car or live closer to work, but probably not right away.

The US will soon become an energy exporter, meaning higher oil prices are good

Riegg 17 Ryan Riegg, 3-17-2017, "What is Saudi Arabia going to do with its arms buildup?," Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/what-saudi-arabia-going-do-its-arms-buildup-569277> //DF

That the U.S. political elite lack backbone. For the past several years, the Saudis have funneled guns and weapons to ISIS and bombed the near-defenseless country of Yemen with impunity. Therefore, the Saudis may believe that they can do whatever they want and the U.S. will not react, especially given Barack Obama's failure to enforce his "red line" in Syria and speeches by Donald Trump indicating an isolationist worldview that would keep the U.S. out of the Middle East. That **the U.S. is becoming a net energy exporter. Any event that raises oil and gas prices is partially in America's interest.** If Saudi Arabia starts a war in the Middle East by invading a neighbor (Yemen, Qatar, Iraq, etc.), the biggest loser outside of the region will be Europe, which will have a significant quantity of its energy supply cut off. And, unless Europe wishes to increase its already substantial dependence on Russian oil and gas, it will have few options but to import more energy from the U.S. Thus, it is not entirely within America's interest to go to war with Saudi Arabia, regardless of the kingdom's actions.

The US is not dependent on Saudi oil

Hurlburt 17 Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html> //DF

"A permanent breach with Saudi Arabia is not an acceptable outcome." That was the blunt assessment of former State Department official and longtime GOP foreign policy maven Marc Thiessen in the *Washington Post* this week. That's more true than many would like to think, even amidst bipartisan disgust over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, apparently by Saudi security forces in Istanbul (on Friday night the Saudis finally confirmed Khashoggi's death, but claimed he died in a fist fight). The United States and Riyadh are deeply entangled, both economically and around core security goals. Undoing those ties would be a slow process, but it may be a better bet than trying to change Saudi behavior. **A popular American stereotype is that the U.S. is dependent on Saudi oil. We're not. Saudi Arabia accounts for 13 percent of global crude oil production, while the U.S. produces 12 percent.** While we're debunking outdated ideas, many Americans — including President Trump — still believe that the Saudi-led Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) controls world production and prices. While its members control about 40 percent of oil production, and 80 percent of proven petroleum deposits, it has been decades since its members have been able to agree on measures stringent enough to inflict pain on developed nations like the U.S. In fact, in recent years the Saudis have usually chosen to live with lower oil prices for political reasons.

1. The US is already energy independent of Saudi oil because of the crude and fracking boom

Palicz 18 MIKE PALICZ, 10-20-2018, "America's energy dominance is a remarkable achievement," *The Hill* <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/412332-americas-energy-dominance-is-a-remarkable-achievement> //DF

In March, the authoritative International Energy Agency forecasted that the United States would surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the world's largest crude oil producer by 2023. However, there was a major flaw in the IEA's prediction; it underestimated the United States' growth rate by five years. **The United States has overtaken Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the largest global crude oil producer**, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. EIA's preliminary estimates indicate that, after exceeding the production of Saudi Arabia this year, the United States surpassed Russia in crude oil production in June and August for the first time since early 1999. Now, the United States is the world's largest producer of crude oil for the first time since 1973, producing nearly 11 million barrels per day. This is a remarkable, previously unthinkable, achievement for American energy happening under President Trump and a Republican Congress's leadership. It wasn't long ago that we all were told energy independence could be achieved only by heavily subsidizing alternative forms of energy. While on the campaign trail in 2012, President Obama avowed, "We can't just drill our way to lower gas prices." President Obama wrongly believed that creating an energy independent America required a drastic shift away from oil as a source of energy for Americans. It was the pursuit of this policy that for years hindered the growth of our nation's energy sector. Now, we've finally recognized the obvious: **if we want to achieve true energy independence from hostile foreign governments, we must produce the energy our nation relies on here. By doing so, we've learned that we can indeed drill our way to energy independence. In less than a decade, the United States has become the world's largest producer of natural gas and crude oil, increasingly less reliant on oil imports from Russia and the OPEC cartel.** For those concerned about the boom's impact on the environment, it should be noted that the United States currently is leading the world in reducing carbon emissions, thanks largely to fracking and clean-burning natural gas.

1. Saudis will keep selling the US oil b/c it's strategic 2. Even if they don't the US has plenty of its own oil

Chollet 18 Derek Chollet, Ilan Goldenberg, 11-30-2018, "The United States Should Give Saudi Arabia a Choice," Foreign Policy,

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/saudi-arabia-should-be-given-a-choice-stop-the-surprises-or-suffer-the-consequences-mbs-khashoggi/> //DF

Trump has already decided. Yet his exclamation point-filled statement proclaiming the essentiality of the relationship got it backward: The United States matters much more to Saudi Arabia than Saudi Arabia does to the United States. The administration claims it needs Saudi Arabia in order to counter Iran. But it is Saudi Arabia that needs the United States, not the other way around. The United States is a global superpower that can cope with a threat by a country halfway around the world with a GDP similar in size to Maryland's. For Saudi Arabia, Iran is a country three times its size right across the water with a long history of strategic competition. So, who needs whom more? Then there is the economic relationship. There's no need to shelve American values and bend to Saudi requests because of their oil reserves. They're not going to stop selling oil if Washington drops its patronage of Riyadh. It's in their interest to sell oil, and the United States is better insulated from fluctuations in the energy markets than it has ever been. If the United States needed Saudi Arabia that desperately, then Trump would certainly not be picking trade fights with China and the European Union, whose impact on the U.S. economy dwarf that of Saudi Arabia. Of course, Saudi money can be good for the U.S. economy and helps the U.S. defense industry. But it is not uniquely vital. One can only speculate why Trump sticks to his mistaken assumptions—maybe it is his personal financial interests, or his contrarian instincts, or the fact that most of his views on geopolitics seem stuck in the 1970s and '80s, or simply because the House of Saud's gilded, autocratic patriarchy feels very familiar to the House of Trump. Whatever the reason, the green-light policy has proved to be a failure. The United States has not ended up with a close partner in the Middle East but with a rogue ally drawing America into unnecessary quagmires and hurting its interests. The question is what to do about it.

SA will never stop selling the US oil because the regime needs it to enrich themselves and preserve stability (the rhetoric in this card is crazy)

Bandow 18 Doug Bandow, 12-18-2018, "It's Time to End U.S. Support for the Saudi War on Yemen," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/its-time-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen> //DF

However, the administration continues to treat the KSA as the superpower, needed far more by America than Riyadh needs Washington. Indeed, the president, who asserts his divine negotiating skills, tossed away his leverage when he announced that the United States was lost without Saudi Arabia's aid. So obsequious has he been in dealing with the Saudis that some critics presume he is protecting private business interests. Yet **the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no choice but to sell its oil; otherwise, the crown prince and his thousands of relations won't be able to afford their palaces, yachts and vacations. Worse, without funds to spread at least a little largesse among the population, the royals would end up hanging from lamp posts.** Riyadh could shift to other weapon suppliers, but its investment in American arms makes that difficult: requirements for training, spare parts and interoperability would continue to push the KSA toward the West.

Spiking oil prices would be, at best, a short-term ploy because SA would also hurt since their economy relies so much on oil

Depetris 18 DANIEL DEPETRIS, 10-23-2018, "Want to get Saudi Arabia's attention? Let's stop selling arms to them," The Hill

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/412813-want-to-get-saudi-arabias-attention-lets-stop-selling-arms-to-them> //DF

U.S. defense manufacturers produce the world's most technologically sophisticated and effective weapons systems, platforms Riyadh would not be able to access if they decided to purchase more equipment from Russia or China. And **while the Saudis could technically decrease crude oil production and raise gas prices at the pump for American consumers in retaliation to U.S. pressure, such a move would be unsustainable for the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has yet to diversify its economy away from energy and its budget is financed through the sale of oil. Saudi Arabia simply can't afford to lose market share over the long-term.** As Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) astutely put it on Fox News Sunday, "The Saudis need us [the U.S.] much more than we need them." The White House has a number of options at its disposal to reprimand the Saudis for the murder of a journalist.

The US could just get oil from other nations if Saudi Arabia cut off oil

Wells 16 Charlie Wells, 11-16-2015, "Why the U.S. Should Not Want Energy Independence," WSJ, <https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/16/why-the-u-s-should-not-want-energy-independence/> //DF

There are two problems, however, with this isolationist approach to energy independence that misunderstands today's realities. First, **it doesn't reflect the highly integrated global energy market in which we now live. Saudi Arabia, for example, from which the U.S. still imports 1.2 million barrels a day, couldn't cut off oil supply to the U.S. even if it wanted to.** Unlike in the 1970s, where a disruption in contracted shipments could result in a physical shortage for the buyer, **today's oil market is the largest and most liquid commodity market on earth. That means that if Saudi Arabia stopped sending oil to the U.S., companies would just buy it from other suppliers.** Second, and more important, we are more secure, not less, when energy markets are interdependent. When Hurricanes Rita and Katrina disrupted much of the Gulf Coast's vast production and refining capacity, fuel shortages were averted by the ability to import supplies quickly from the global market. When U.S. refiners lost access to large volumes of imports from Venezuela in 2002 and 2003 during a worker strike there, they replaced the disrupted supplies and avoided shortages with imports from other countries. In both cases, free trade in a highly integrated global energy market made us more secure. During the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan was more energy secure because it could import other sources of fuel, like oil and gas, from the global market to meet electricity generation demand. In that case, energy security was also improved by the ability to use multiple fuels to generate electricity. Such substitutability of fuels barely exists for oil in the transportation sector, however, creating added energy security vulnerabilities for oil use. In Europe today, it is both unrealistic and unwise to try to get off Russian gas. Russia is Europe's largest gas supplier and is a source of low-cost gas. Moreover, Russia needs the European market, too, creating a mutual dependence that wouldn't exist if Europe forced Russia to turn east for its gas market instead.

Control of another country's energy doesn't give it any influence, as recent examples with Russia and Saudi Arabia demonstrate

Lynch 18 Michael Lynch, 5-4-2018, "As American Energy Independence Grows, Global Impact Remains Limited," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelylynch/2018/07/06/our-energy-dependence-lessons-but-global-impact-is-limited/#30696e486cab> //DF

Many point out that Richard Nixon proposed to make America energy independent, but few seem to recall that the report of Project Independence concluded that such independence had little value. Making the country free of energy imports would be extremely expensive, we would still feel an obligation to our allies to protect the world's energy supplies, and given our extensive ties to the world economy, the U.S. would remain vulnerable to an oil shock, as such would probably trigger a global recession. Like energy independence, **the value of energy dominance is much exaggerated. Russian natural gas exports to the Ukraine (and much of Europe) have not availed it much in its dispute over the Crimea, and certainly did not deter the application of economic sanctions against it.** Similarly, **the large role of Saudi Arabia in world oil markets**

has not prevented, for example, the Trump Administration from moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, among many other pro-Israeli moves by U.S. presidents. MORE FROM FORBES In terms of markets, the Saudis have the greatest influence on oil prices of any nation, but can only pressure other producers with (threats of) a price war, and consumers tend to have more power over the long-term price of oil. U.S. oil exports are to be applauded because they are profitable and efficient; otherwise industry wouldn't make them. And U.S. shale oil producers, by choosing whether or not to invest, do influence prices over the longer term, this is hardly dominance. The one area where the U.S. might prove to be a decisive factor is the trade in global natural gas. It has long been dominated by the use of oil price-indexed contracts, keeping natural gas prices at uncompetitive levels and reducing displacement of oil and coal in industry and power generation in many parts of the world. There is no economic justification for setting oil and gas prices at equivalent levels, based on heat content, any more than coffee and tea prices should be equivalent based on caffeine content. Because U.S. LNG exporters are more competitive-minded (or have more animal spirits perhaps) than most of those involved in the trade (think Gazprom), they might break down this long-standing but ill-advised contract practice, which could have a beneficial effect on the global economy and environment.

R/T Big Arms Sales

US arms sales aren't nearly as expensive as is believed

Hartung 18 William Hartung [director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute], 11-2018, "US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen," Center for International Policy, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf //DF

But if economic arguments are to be brought into play, they should at least be accurate. This has not been the case. The president has claimed a sweeping range of jobs flowing from his alleged \$110 billion arms deal with Riyadh, from 40,000 to "over a million," in one case boosting his estimate by 400,000 jobs within just a few days' time. To be fair, it seems like the million jobs figure was meant to include some commercial deals as well as the purported arms sales, but the president's ad hoc utterances on the subject make it hard to know for sure.⁴ **The biggest flaw in President Trump's ever-growing estimate of the U.S. jobs at stake in arms sales to Saudi Arabia is that the size of the alleged \$110 billion U.S.-Saudi arms deal – in some cases referred to as if it is a single transaction -- is wildly exaggerated. The White House has issued a list of deals adding up to \$110 billion, but most of them were either notified to Congress during the Obama administration, or are projections far into the future of potential sales that are unlikely to ever occur.**⁵ In hard numbers, the State Department estimates that **the Saudi regime has signed \$14.5 billion in letters of offer and acceptance (LOA's) for new weaponry and support equipment since President Trump took office.**⁶ That's a little over 10% of the much touted \$110 billion figure. And **these letters of offer and acceptance represent only one step in a longer process, not signed contracts.**⁷ Another way of looking at the issue is that Congress has received \$20 billion in notifications of potential new arms sales to Saudi Arabia since President Trump took office. There have also been roughly \$2 billion in deals licensed by the State Department, for a total of \$22 billion.⁸ Most of these have not reached the stage of a letter of offer and acceptance being signed, and the largest one, a \$13.5 billion deal for a Lockheed Martin Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, is still under discussion.⁹ A September 30, 2018 deadline for Saudi Arabia to take advantage of a 20% discount on the deal is long past. **All of the major Saudi arms sales in the pipeline are based on arrangements made during the Obama years,** when that administration notified Congress of a record \$117 billion in arms offers to Saudi Arabia over its eight years in office.¹⁰ Over those same eight years, there were \$65 billion worth of formal agreements signed with Saudi Arabia and roughly \$18 billion in deliveries made.¹¹ **The discrepancy between offers, agreements and deliveries is a result of the fact that a significant number of offers don't eventuate in agreements or**

sales. In addition, deliveries generated by completed deals are often spread out over many years. And finally, the value of some deals is reduced between the time of the initial offer and the final agreement.

Saudis actually spend less on US arms than the Swiss

Hurlburt 17 Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html> //DF

But like OPEC, the influence of Saudi money gets exaggerated awfully fast — and popular debate over Saudi doings can be quick to take on a racist tinge. Let's look at what Trump claims is a deal to supply \$110 billion worth of weapons to Riyadh, maintaining profits and priceless manufacturing jobs here in the U.S. CNN reports that, 18 months after the deal was announced, the Saudis have only followed through on about one-eighth of the purchases. Bloomberg crunches some numbers to point out that, although the Saudis have been weapons customers for decades, their total purchases of U.S. goods annually are dwarfed by ... Switzerland. And about those defense manufacturing jobs? They do matter, tremendously, to the manufacturing communities where they are clustered, the unions who represent the well-paid workers, and members of Congress in states like Ohio, Missouri and Washington. Over all, though, the entire private sector defense industry represents .5 percent of U.S. employment.

R/T US Defense Jobs

These jobs are concentrated and represent a small part of the overall job market

Hurlburt 17 Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html> //DF

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Ending arms sales would affect a negligible amount of jobs

Caverley 18 Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply," *NYT*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

And contrary to President Trump's statement, exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively few American jobs. **Based on Commerce Department figures, releasing the billion dollars of munitions currently on hold in the Senate would "create or sustain" fewer than 4,000 jobs.** Here's a more specific example: **Publicizing a recent \$6 billion helicopter deal with Saudi Arabia, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would "support" 450 American**

jobs. To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia.

Saudi Arabia doesn’t buy enough weapons or support enough jobs to make a dent in defense employment. No one even knows how many jobs depend on arms sales!

Fernandez 18 Alexia Fernandez, 11-20-2018, "Trump says selling weapons to Saudi Arabia will create a lot of jobs. That’s not true.," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17967510/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-sales-khashoggi> //DF

The US doesn’t sell that many weapons to MBS **Canceling weapons sales to Saudi Arabia won’t really hurt US jobs much. There aren’t that many American workers making weapons for the Pentagon, much less Saudi Arabia, and MBS isn’t buying enough weapons to put a dent in the US economy anyway.** Overall, the private US defense industry does directly employ a lot of US workers — about 355,500 in 2016, according to the most the recent estimates from the Aerospace Industries Association. **But private-sector defense workers make up less than 0.5 percent of the total US labor force,** and that includes every person whose job depends directly on the sale or production of airplanes, tanks, bombs, and services for the entire US military. **It’s unlikely that many of them, if any, depend directly on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, and its also unlikely that those jobs would vanish if Saudi money disappeared.** “The relationship between arms sales and jobs is exaggerated,” William Hartung, an expert on US weapons exports for the Center for International Policy, told me last month. Beyond this, Hartung points out, **Saudi Arabia isn’t actually even spending a massive amount of money on American weapons. The kingdom buys the ammunition and bombs it needs to keep waging a bloody war in Yemen, but nothing even close the \$110 billion deal Trump touted.** So despite what the president says, there is no real threat of US job losses to justify continued American support for a repressive regime that is likely responsible for the gruesome murder of a journalist in Turkey — and that is also killing thousands of civilians with American-made weapons in Yemen.

But instead of reprimanding MBS, Trump has continued to push for arms sales to the kingdom, touting the supposed economic benefits for the United States. When MBS visited the White House in March, Trump was effusive about it. He even held up a US map highlighting all the states that would get jobs from the arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The map stated that 40,000 jobs would be created, though the administration didn’t cite the source for that number (In recent days, Trump has thrown out even more ludicrous numbers). **He doesn’t say where he got these estimates because no one knows exactly how many US jobs depend on arms sales. The federal government doesn’t keep data on that, and it doesn’t even break down how many total jobs are related to manufacturing military equipment.** That’s because it’s a tiny fraction of the US labor force. Here’s what we do know: The private-sector defense industry directly employed a total of 355,500 in 2016, according to the most the recent estimates from the Aerospace Industries Association. That includes manufacturing jobs, but also every other job in the defense industry, even those who are supplying uniforms for soldiers. This entire group makes up less than 0.5 percent of the total US labor force. And their main client is the US military, not the Saudi military.

Does not support many jobs, and those jobs would not be lost, they would just be shifted to other projects as the pentagon is already backlogged on arms sale orders (Hartung - Center for International Policy)

Hartung, November 2018, Center for International Policy, "US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen", https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf (NK)

Saudi arms sales **support at most tens of thousands of jobs in the United States**, not hundreds of thousands or "a million," as President Trump has claimed. Actual, paid-for deliveries of U.S.-produced arms for Saudi Arabia have averaged about \$2.5 billion per year over the past decade, enough to support at most 20,000 to 40,000 jobs, some of which are located overseas (see below). In addition, **a significant number of the jobs sustained or created by Saudi arms deals would not be at risk if specific deals were cancelled. Many of the workers now involved in producing arms for Saudi Arabia would be shifted to other projects by firms that have record backlogs for existing contracts with the Pentagon.** And an analysis by Reuters has revealed that most U.S. defense contractors expect "relatively minor additions to their U.S. workforce and [a] more significant buildup in Saudi Arabia" as a result of arms deals now in the works.¹²

R/T Silicon Valley

It wouldn't matter if Saudi money left Silicon Valley because tech is in such high demand that other investors would make up for the shortfall

Hurlburt 17 Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html> //DF

And about those defense manufacturing jobs? They do matter, tremendously, to the manufacturing communities where they are clustered, the unions who represent the well-paid workers, and members of Congress in states like Ohio, Missouri and Washington. Over all, though, the entire private sector defense industry represents .5 percent of U.S. employment. In recent years, the Saudis' heavy investment in Silicon Valley has led some observers to warn that the same government that apparently killed one of its own citizens on foreign soil could decide to turn the screws on the U.S. high-tech industry. But in fact, for every dollar the Saudis want to pull out, there's still an American, Chinese or other global investor's dollar eager to get in. U.S.-Saudi economic ties are important — and convenient for whichever party is in power, as both Republican and Democratic presidents have found over the years. But the ties that hold Washington and Riyadh the closest are political.

R/T US Influence Saudis

Promises to pressure SA to stop killing civilians hasn't worked

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi, 11-20-2018, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," *Atlantic*, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/> //DF

As public anger over America's role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America's longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking "demonstrable actions" to avoid harming civilians and making a "good faith" effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air

force. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis.

US cannot influence Saudi Arabia while arms are still being sold to them, and the fact that civilian deaths have increased despite claims at reducing them shows this

Raghavan 18 Sudarsan Raghavan, 7-26-2018, "U.S. allies have killed thousands of Yemeni civilians from the air. After 22 died at a wedding, one village asks, 'Why us?'," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-allies-have-killed-thousands-of-yemenis-from-the-air-after-22-died-at-a-wedding-one-village-asks-why-us/2018/07/25/3c3e4801-164e-42ae-ac08-bec09044e52a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.359d91982d24 //DF

But visits to other bombed sites by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch confirm that U.S.-made munitions, including banned cluster bombs and Paveway bombs, have been used in attacks that have killed and injured civilians. The Post saw remnants of U.S.-made bombs in the capital, Sanaa, and in the southwestern city of Taiz. **After the Senate narrowly approved a \$510 million first installment of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia in June 2017, the kingdom said it would launch a training program to reduce accidental targeting of civilians. But in the year after that announcement, civilian deaths were 7 percent higher than the year before**, U.N. data shows. In April alone, there were 236 civilians killed and 238 injured — the deadliest month this year so far. A U.N. report last month found that 1,316 Yemeni children were killed or injured last year and that more than half of the casualties resulted from airstrikes. A Saudi government official disputed the U.N. figures and said the coalition is "implementing the highest standard measures to prevent civilian casualties," including "continuous training" of its staff and efforts to improve rules of engagement. The attack on Raqah was under internal investigation, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue's sensitivity.

R/T Proliferation

Generic

Turn: close ties between the US and Saudi Arabia mean that any US demand to not proliferate isn't credible; only cutting off arms sales will provoke real action

Miller 18 Nicholas L. Miller [assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College], 2018, "Abstinence or Tolerance: Managing Nuclear Ambitions in Saudi Arabia," The Washington Quarterly, <http://spearheadresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Managing-Nuclear-Ambitions-in-Saudi-Arabia.pdf> //DF

At this early stage of nuclear development in the Kingdom, it is conceivable that Washington may be able to put lucrative enough rewards on the table to induce Riyadh into forfeiting enrichment.⁴⁷ **The United States has long used military arms sales and security assurances as tools to dampen the nuclear ambitions of allies.**⁴⁸ However, Saudi Arabia already

receives significant outlays of arms and support from the United States, so Riyadh might use the 123 negotiations as an opportunity to push again for an enhanced or even formal U.S. defense commitment.⁴⁹ Such a request would be politically controversial in Washington, the Trump administration's pro-Saudi stance notwithstanding. **The close strategic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia also makes it difficult for U.S. officials to make arms sales conditional on Riyadh accepting the [nonproliferation] Gold Standard; the threat is simply not credible.**⁵⁰ While the United States did threaten to withhold military assistance from nations in actual pursuit of enrichment or reprocessing technology in the past, it would be an unprecedented move to coerce Riyadh into publicly and prospectively renouncing its unrealized enrichment options. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has argued that a legal pledge to forgo ENR represents "an unacceptable infringement on its national sovereignty."⁵¹ In fact, the United States and Saudi Arabia have been in periodic discussions since 2012 over the terms of a nuclear cooperation agreement. In the past, according to Reuters, Saudi officials flatly refused to "sign an agreement with Washington that would deprive it of enriching uranium."⁵² With foreign suppliers such as France, Russia, South Korea, China, or perhaps even Pakistan once again cued up to bid on Saudi nuclear energy contracts, U.S. negotiators face a herculean task to persuade Saudi Arabia to accept the full Gold Standard.⁵³

Saudi Arabia is already building missile facilities, as evidence of their desire to develop nuclear weapons and of an already present arms race

O'Connor 19 Tom O'Connor, 1-24-2019, "Saudi Arabia may be building its first weapons for a "missile race in the Middle East," experts say," Newsweek,

<https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-missile-race-middle-east-1304535//DF>

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I – R/T Nuclear Terrorism Generic

1. Tons of operational hurdles, like making sure the group isn't big enough, moving the weapon around without detection or loss, and if they should transport the weapons themselves and risk capture

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master's in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, "Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?," The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

In addition to the actual manufacturing of a device, operational security would be one of the terrorist groups' major challenges. The more people involved in what most likely would be a terrorist organization's most sensitive operation, the more the risk of detection and disruption by law enforcement or intelligence personnel. If the group is not adequately walled off or quarantined (for what likely would be an extended period of time), some might brag or even just hint at the importance of the project, and this might be detected. Another operational consideration that terrorists would have to contend with is the physical movement of the device to its intended target, from the safe haven in which it was manufactured. Dozens of national and international programs have been created after the attacks on September 11, 2001, to monitor the trade routes that supply goods to markets around the world. Terrorists would have to conduct "complex international operations involving training, travel, visas, finances and secure communications" to be able to accomplish such an operation.²¹ Even if

mechanisms can be thwarted or bypassed, the mere perception of a concerted international effort to find nuclear weapons in the global commons might be expected give a terrorist group pause as they consider how best to move their weapon. Finding a pathway to move a nuclear device potentially around the world is not without significant risk of losing physical control of the cargo, or having it detected and stopped. Using black market smuggling routes and facilitators could be one possible option, but terrorists would face the attendant risks of losing the shipment to criminal interlopers who might not know anything about the cargo other than it had high value to the shipper, and thus could be stolen from the terrorists. A related logistics question is whether the terrorist group would choose to accompany their cargo throughout the path to its destination. This would inevitably raise the profile of the shipment for the necessity of it being monitored. Accompanying the shipment will create risks for the terrorists themselves, as they could be identified in transit by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Throughout the journey, anyone whom the terrorists might consider as “trusted” accomplices would create more vulnerabilities, as more people become aware of the importance of the cargo. Knowing these risks, if the terrorists decided to send the cargo without physical accompaniment, they would thus be putting their most valuable cargo into the international shipping system and hope that the system delivers the weapon to their designated far-end, witting, recipient for final preparations and movement to the intended target.

2. Terrorists groups would almost certainly lack the ability to test the weapons before use, which runs the very high and dangerous risk that they don’t work

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master’s in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, “Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?,” The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

For the first question, without a testing program, the production of even a crude gun-type device may not produce a functioning device.²² Terrorists want to be seen by their audience as being successful in executing a nuclear attack. Their sponsors’ confidence would be eroded, and the confidence of the intended audience could be enhanced, by the production of a device that did not work. Without the involvement of skilled engineers and scientists throughout the process, a terrorist group could not be sure that whatever instructions they received were accurate, or even adequate to create a working nuclear device. Regarding the second question, it is useful to consider that if terrorists only acquired the material for one bomb, “they would still lack an arsenal—and a single mistake in design could wreck the whole project.”²³ Moreover, a terrorist group should certainly recognize that after exploding a nuclear weapon, the combined efforts of the world’s law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic and military resources would be deployed to find them and bring them to justice. If the terrorists claimed to have additional nuclear weapons, the hunt would be even more urgent and unrelenting until the terrorists and their weapons were found. While terrorists may employ suicide bombers, the terrorist leadership itself surely would want to live to guide the organization and likely would see the need to develop a good plan for staying hidden and alive for a lengthy period of time. The security of terrorists’ operations from

leaks or the disruptive effect of counterterrorism missions, combined with the challenges of coordinating and executing secure shipment, add extra elements of risk and uncertainty to the major challenges terrorists face in trying to acquire the nuclear material itself.

3. There would also be the risk that only one bomb wouldn't be enough since anything could go wrong, but also that multiple bombs would only enhance the already massive effort to find the terrorists that would inevitably form

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master's in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, "Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?," The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

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Deterrence DOES work for terrorists when it comes to the extremely high-risks of nuclear attacks

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master's in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, "Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?," The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

While there have been very few nuclear terrorist attacks from which conclusions can be drawn, it also is not possible to rule out the extent to which terrorists are being deterred or disrupted from conducting a nuclear attack. Although deterrence has historically been associated with nation states, the

organizations and aims that present themselves as factors in a comprehensive deterrence calculus are fundamentally the same for states and nonstate actors.³² Indeed, despite the popular belief (although not one held by many terrorism analysts ³³) that terrorist organizations and leaders are irrational and even suicidal, it may be that the United States and partner nations fighting terrorism are successfully deterring nuclear terrorism even now. Key to this proposition is the decision making framework, i.e., what influences them to make the decisions they take, within which terrorist organizations tend to operate. For example, the leadership itself, or the support structure components, might be capable of being influenced, while the operatives themselves may not be dissuaded from attacking a target. It is generally agreed by analysts that suicidal terrorists are difficult to deter, based on their beliefs in the rewards they will attain upon being “martyred.” Yet Jenkins notes that “[n]ot all terrorists welcome death,”³⁴ and even the most committed might be dissuaded by the idea of their “reward” being long-term confinement in a prison cell.³⁵ Similarly, it may be possible to influence a terrorist leader’s ability, or his perception of his ability, to achieve his political goals. In addition to the active international cooperative efforts to prevent access to nuclear materials, noted above, the disruptive effects of steady counterterrorist attacks on known terrorist bases and safe havens serve to highlight the risk of operational failure for terrorists. A failure to accomplish its mission of a devastating nuclear attack, either because of technical difficulties or the active measures to disrupt terrorist operations, would in turn undercut the stature or prestige of the group.³⁶ **This need to successfully accomplish what would be the ultimate terrorist mission could drive terrorist leaders to not take some of the risks that may be acceptable at lower levels of violence.** The anticipated overwhelming retaliation for conducting an attack—a prime example of deterrence by punishment—could give some terrorists pause. As Jenkins notes, “An effective deterrent can reinforce existing self-imposed constraints by suggesting that any terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons will not only provoke retaliation but will leave the terrorist group isolated from its constituents, its hosts—those upon whom it depends for sanctuary and support”.³⁷

I – R/T Terrorists Make Nukes

1. No threat because the technology required to refine the uranium would be impossible to acquire

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master’s in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, “Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?,” The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

The “supply” side of nuclear weapons production likewise poses significant technical and operational challenges for terrorists pursuing a nuclear weapon from raw fissile materials. The simplest nuclear device to assemble would be a crude “gun-type” weapon with a quantity of highly enriched uranium

(HEU).⁸ The concept is simple enough: by means of high explosives, drive one mass of HEU into another one, causing the now super-critical mass of HEU to release its energy in a nuclear explosion.⁹ Even so, substantial technical hurdles exist to getting the HEU into the right physical state, size, shape, and with the necessary chemical properties to be useful in a gun-type device.¹⁰ A possessor of uranium would have to refine the ore to metallic form, understand any impurities within its composition, cast it, and then machine it to precise specifications of size and shape.¹¹ Terrorists would need access to highly specialized machinery and equipment in order to manufacture the necessary HEU for a nuclear device. Much of the equipment necessary is specifically designed for the particular purpose of nuclear weapons production (such as numerous sensitive high-speed gas centrifuges configurable into cascades) and not generally available on the open market. Indeed, the infamous nuclear program supplier Abdul Qadeer Khan needed years to assemble the equipment necessary to manufacture centrifuge parts for the state nuclear programs to which he sold. A terrorist group that chooses to pursue a large centrifuge plant for enriching uranium as its path to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon would be taking on a very long timetable to achieve its aims. Even committed states spend years acquiring, manufacturing and testing centrifuge cascades. “The equipment is so specialized, and the suppliers so few, that a forest of red flags would go up.”¹² Customs and export licensing officials in most countries would take notice of the equipment and materials being transferred, ask questions, and possibly prevent the shipment from being sent or received. Plutonium, a by-product of uranium in nuclear power plant operations, is available in hundreds of reactors around the world.¹³ Here again, however, the weaponization process is not a simple one. Weapons-ready plutonium must be chemically reprocessed in order to be suitable for an implosion-type device, in which exactly shaped high explosives rapidly compress a mass of plutonium into itself and create a nuclear explosion.¹⁴ To accomplish this, terrorists would need “precision machine tools to build the parts, special furnaces to melt and cast the plutonium in a vacuum ... and high-precision switches and capacitors for the firing circuit.”¹⁵ Plutonium is harder to handle than HEU due to its high heat and radioactivity and requires more restrictive physical protective measures to prevent radioactive sickness or death. Terrorists would have to observe the “absolute need of foreseeing, preparing for, and observing all the necessary precautions” of working with plutonium.¹⁶ If terrorists had access to a nuclear reactor that produced plutonium, they would need a “special, shielded chemical plant to chop up its radioactive fuel, dissolve it in acid, and then extract the plutonium from the acid.”¹⁷

2. Incredibly difficult to assemble the needed production team of highly-skilled scientists without raising eyebrows

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Unless a state that was a nuclear power provided terrorists with an already manufactured warhead, terrorists would need time, a secure space, and a talented team of engineers, chemists, metallurgists, and physicists. Highly trained personnel such as these, ideally with experience in a state’s nuclear

weapons program, might be able to be identified as potential recruits to the terrorist organization, either for money or ideology. It is even quite possible that a few former weapons designers and engineers would be susceptible to being recruited by a terrorist group. However, it is far from certain that an entire weapons design and manufacturing team could be assembled securely by a terrorist group at one time. In addition to the actual manufacturing of a device, operational security would be one of the terrorist groups' major challenges. The more people involved in what most likely would be a terrorist organization's most sensitive operation, the more the risk of detection and disruption by law enforcement or intelligence personnel. If the group is not adequately walled off or quarantined (for what likely would be an extended period of time), some might brag or even just hint at the importance of the project, and this might be detected.

I – R/T States Give Terrorists Nukes

This will never happen; giving a terrorist a nuke would be suicidal

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The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism noted that as proliferation of WMD programs continues, the risk grows that some state, friendly to terrorist groups, will permit or enable the transfer of WMD material to terrorists.²⁴ On the other hand, states that possess nuclear material are not likely to transfer a weapon or weapons-usable material to a terrorist or non-state actor without a great deal of confidence that the transfer would go undetected, and attribution would remain undetermined. This would mean that "a state seeking to orchestrate a nuclear attack by proxy would be limited to collaboration with well established terrorist organizations with which it had existing relationships, simplifying the task of connecting terrorist perpetrators to their state sponsors."²⁵ Moreover, "no state would be likely to give its nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist organization with which it did not have a long record of cooperation and trust."²⁶ "Few states trust their proxies," comment one analyst, "and indeed they often gravely weaken movements they support in order to control them."²⁷ A terrorist group "might use the weapons or materials in ways the state never intended, provoking retaliation that would destroy the regime."²⁸ For example, "Iran lacks deniability for the groups to which it might transfer more-advanced systems, but lacks the trust that would make it more likely to transfer advanced systems."²⁹ Terrorists should expect intense retribution, whether they had a "return address" or not. A nuclear terrorist attack would prompt an immense, "unprecedented,"³⁰ international effort to determine the source of the material, and attribution efforts likely would continue for as long as it took for responsibility for the attack to be judged. Simply, the risk of being held responsible would seem very high for a state that provides nuclear material to a terrorist group. Brian Jenkins notes, "It would require a government to take enormous risks. ... [E]ven state

sponsors of terrorism have become more cautious when engaging in larger-scale, higher-risk operations.”³¹

I – R/T Terrorists Steal Nukes

No chance because states guard them to closely

Melley 17 Brendan G. Melley is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He received a master’s in WMD Studies as a National Defense University Countering WMD graduate fellow, 2017, "Nuclear Terrorism –Imminent Threat?," The Simon Center, <http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IAJ-8-3-2017-pg52-61.pdf> //DF

Nuclear terrorism threats could take shape in three general pathways: the deliberate transfer of nuclear material from a state to a terrorist group or non-state actor; the sale of nuclear materials to a non-state actor on the black market, which may end up in the hands of a terrorist group; and, the theft or “leakage,” or unintentional diversion of nuclear material from a state program.⁵ The question of whether terrorists would be able to steal an actual nuclear weapon from a nuclear-armed state, while conceivable, is highly problematic due to the extraordinary security afforded nuclear weapons. Attention usually is drawn to those nuclear states with perceived less than-optimal security over their stockpiles and weapons; and many analysts point out that the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea, and potentially Iran, increases the risk of terrorists getting access to nuclear material or weapons through collusion with regime officials, or lack of effective oversight or security. Allied to this is the fear that presently non-nuclear states will pursue a nuclear weapons program in Asia or the Middle East to counter North Korea’s and Iran’s (apparently suspended) nuclear weapons programs. This possibility would, of course, offer terrorists potentially more opportunities to acquire a weapon or the necessary material. However, the same reasons why existing nuclear states feel dis-incentivized to share nuclear weapons with terrorist would apply to these nuclear aspirants as well.

R/T Regional Arms Race

Saudi arms sales risk creating an arms race in a region already oversaturated with weapons

Hartung 10 William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

Or so it would seem. But the reality is much more complicated. First, to the extent that the deal is about jobs, as Boeing and the Obama administration claim, that is the wrong criterion for making a major arms sale. Security considerations must come first. And on this front, there are serious questions that have not been addressed by the boosters of the deal. By throwing weapons at Saudi Arabia with one hand while giving them to Israel with the other, are we not simply arming both sides of a nascent arms race? Is Iran likely to be cowed by the Saudi mega-deal, or will it simply seek a way to ratchet up its own military capabilities? Is the Middle East really suffering from a dearth of advanced weaponry? In the past three years alone, the United States has offered over \$30 billion in armaments to Persian Gulf states, counterbalanced by offers of a similar amount to Israel. The United Kingdom and Russia have supplied billions more to the Persian Gulf states. Attempting to create a balance at higher and higher levels of weaponry is both dangerous and unnecessary. In addition, how stable is Saudi Arabia? In the short run, there may be no major cause for concern, but the combat planes,

helicopters, missiles, and bombs that are part of the deal will last for decades. Would anyone have predicted in the mid-1970s that the heavily armed regime of the Shah of Iran would be toppled by a group of Islamic fundamentalists? The Saudi deal will no doubt go through, but it shouldn't. It consists primarily of offensive weapons--fighter planes, attack helicopters, and guided bombs--that serve no constructive purpose. Fighter planes and guided bombs aren't relevant to addressing the potential threat posed by Iranian missiles, nor are they likely to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters might be used in Saudi strikes against terrorists and separatist groups in northern Yemen, but doing so would be counterproductive, more likely to inflame passions against Riyadh than to solve its border security problems. Congress and the public should think twice before signing off on what may be the first stage of a new Mideast arms race.

Saudi Arabia is already building missile facilities, as evidence of their desire to develop nuclear weapons and of an already present arms race

O'Connor 19 Tom O'Connor, 1-24-2019, "Saudi Arabia may be building its first weapons for a "missile race in the Middle East," experts say," Newsweek,

<https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-missile-race-middle-east-1304535//DF>

Saudi Arabia is reportedly building its first known ballistic missile factory amid a regional push for new weapons capabilities and increased efforts by the United States and Israel to counter their mutual foe Iran. In a report published

Wednesday by The Washington Post, leading experts said satellite imagery dating back to November appears to show Saudi Arabia's debut

ballistic missile factory located at an existing missile base near the central town of Al-Watah. While the kingdom was already known to possess foreign-made ballistic missiles, this would reportedly be the first known instance of Riyadh manufacturing the weapons indigenously.

Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and founder of the Arms Control Wonk blog, and his team discovered the photos, raising "the possibility that Saudi Arabia is going to build longer-range missiles and seek nuclear weapons," according

to The Post. Lewis said that "we may be underestimating their desire and their capabilities." The findings were further confirmed by Michael Elleman of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and Joseph Bermudez of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. Fabian Hinz, who worked alongside Lewis and fellow researcher David Schmerler, told

Newsweek that their analysis "shows we are already seeing a missile race in the Middle East" as "Saudi Arabia has had missiles since the 1980s, but originally it was a very limited capability of doubtless military utility." He added:

"Then they began expanding it. And now, the fact that they build a factory and the sheer size of their missile force shows they are really strategically committed to missiles."

Media reports of a Saudi ballistic missile base in Al-Watah first surfaced in the form of an article published in July 2013 by IHS Jane's Defense Weekly. The site revealed satellite imagery that appeared to show surface-to-surface missile sites being constructed to accommodate the deployment of Chinese Dongfeng DF-3A

intermediate-range ballistic missiles, purchased in the 1980s during a brutal war between regional foes Iraq and Iran. Just two years after that conflict ended in 1988, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting a massive U.S. military response as an incursion into oil-rich Saudi Arabia was feared and Iraqi forces fired missiles at the kingdom. The U.S. later toppled the Iraqi government in 2003 on the pretext—later proven false—that it

possessed weapons of mass destruction, a move that spurred a violent Sunni Muslim insurgency and, as the U.S. Army acknowledged in a recent report, deeply empowered Iran. Revolutionary Shiite Muslim Iran and conservative Sunni Muslim Saudi

Arabia have for decades contended for influence across the Middle East and the former has managed to build the largest missile arsenal in the region. As tensions between the two played out in various proxy

wars, Saudi Arabia publicly unveiled its DF-3A arsenal for the first time during a military parade in April 2014. That same year, Newsweek reported that the CIA helped facilitate a secret deal to allow Saudi Arabia to buy improved Chinese DF-21 missiles in

2007. By early 2015, a Zaidi Shiite Muslim group known as Ansar Allah (or the Houthis) took over the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, sparking a Saudi-led military campaign in support of the Yemeni government's attempts to retake the country from rebels suspected of receiving Iranian support. The Houthis have fired short-range ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia on multiple occasions,

potentially accelerating Riyadh's desire for its own domestically-built missile force as the war there continues to stagnate.

While Saudi's intervention in Yemen initially brought Riyadh and Washington together, persistent reports of the kingdom committing war crimes have begun to foster deep opposition to the Pentagon's involvement there, especially after journalist and

Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi's slaying by government agents at Istanbul's Saudi consulate in October. Though President Donald Trump and his top officials have stood by their Saudi ally, the Senate has already moved to halt military assistance to Saudi Arabia, which has already expressed its potential to graduate from conventional to strategic means of defense.

R/T Saudi Arabia Instability

Giving lots of weapons to a nation that could go belly up, like Iran, is a big risk

Hartung 10 William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation], in an article written by Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea> //DF

"Congress and the public should think twice before signing off on what may be the first stage of a new Mideast arms race." Is the Middle East really suffering from a dearth of advanced weaponry? In the past three years alone, the United States has offered over \$30 billion in armaments to Persian Gulf states, counterbalanced by offers of a similar amount to Israel. The United Kingdom and Russia have supplied billions more to the Persian Gulf states. Attempting to create a balance at higher and higher levels of weaponry is both dangerous and unnecessary. In addition, how stable is Saudi Arabia? In the short run, there may be no major cause for concern, but the combat planes, helicopters, missiles, and bombs that are part of the deal will last for decades. Would anyone have predicted in the mid-1970s that the heavily armed regime of the Shah of Iran would be toppled by a group of Islamic fundamentalists? The Saudi deal will no doubt go through, but it shouldn't. It consists primarily of offensive weapons--fighter planes, attack helicopters, and guided bombs--that serve no constructive purpose. Fighter planes and guided bombs aren't relevant to addressing the potential threat posed by Iranian missiles, nor are they likely to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters might be used in Saudi strikes against terrorists and separatist groups in northern Yemen, but doing so would be counterproductive, more likely to inflame passions against Riyadh than to solve its border security problems.

R/T Don't Need Congress approval

Need congressional approval for arms sales (Hennigan - Times)

W.J. Hennigan, 10-18-2018, "What Makes the U.S.-Saudi Relationship So Special? Weapons, Oil and 'An Army of Lobbyists'," Time, <http://time.com/5428669/saudi-arabia-military-relationship/> (NK)

The Pentagon has a team of U.S. service members based out of the capital Riyadh wholly dedicated the "management and administration of Saudi Arabian Foreign Military Sales." It serves as a direct pipeline to move weapons from U.S. arms manufacturers into the arms of the Saudi military. The U.S. military's Joint Advisory Division works alongside commanders in each branch of the Saudi military to help fill their weapons needs. **Once the Saudis commit to what they want — tanks, attack helicopters, missiles, ships, laser-guided bombs — the arms packages must be OK'd by the U.S. Defense and State Departments, and approved by Congress.** The arrangement falls under the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which is led by a two-star American general. The mission is primarily designed to bolster Saudi Arabia against arch-rival Iran in order to assert power and influence in the Middle East.

Congress has the power to stop arms sales under the 1976 Arms Control Export Act

Weisgerber 18 Marcus Weisgerber, 10-15-2018, "Khashoggi Situation Won't Stop Saudi Arms Sales, But Could Slow Them," Defense One,

<https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/10/khashoggi-situation-wont-stop-saudi-arms-sales-it-could-slow-them/152046/> //DF

President Trump has shown little appetite to hold Saudi Arabia at all accountable for Khashoggi's disappearance — let alone halt defense exports, whose growth has been a focus of his presidency. Under a policy issued in April, the Trump administration treats arms exports in part as a means of creating domestic manufacturing growth through increased jobs and production. On Sunday, he told "60 Minutes" that slowing or halting exports would be a "very foolish" move that would harm the U.S. defense industry. U.S. lawmakers have the power to halt such sales under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act, an effort to bring transparency and accountability to the executive-driven process. But they have never done so. From time to time, they have brought enough pressure that past administrations have withdrawn proposed sales. In the 1970s, the U.S. refused to deliver C-130 cargo planes purchased by Libya. To this day, they sit parked in a field on a U.S. Air Force base in Marietta, Georgia.

R/T US Tradeoffs

R/T Military Assistance

The Senate has already withdrawn it

O'Connor 19 Tom O'Connor, 1-24-2019, "Saudi Arabia may be building its first weapons for a "missile race in the Middle East," experts say," Newsweek,

<https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-missile-race-middle-east-1304535/> //DF

While Saudi's intervention in Yemen initially brought Riyadh and Washington together, persistent reports of the kingdom committing war crimes have begun to foster deep opposition to the Pentagon's involvement there, especially after journalist and Saudi critic Jamal Khashoggi's slaying by government agents at Istanbul's Saudi consulate in October. Though President Donald Trump and his top officials have stood by their Saudi ally, the Senate has already moved to halt military assistance to Saudi Arabia, which has already expressed its potential to graduate from conventional to strategic means of defense. Last year, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and now-former Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir both warned that the kingdom would seek nuclear weapons if Iran did. Tehran has long argued that its own nuclear program was never intended to be weaponized and has abided by the terms of a 2015 deal restricting its production, but this agreement was threatened last year by the Trump administration's decision to leave the accord and reinstate sanctions.

Means stuff like mid-air refueling and intelligence assistance

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi, 11-20-2018, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/> //DF

As public anger over America's role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America's longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking "demonstrable actions" to avoid harming civilians and making a "good faith" effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed

war crimes. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis.

R/T Sanctions

Sanctions reduce the chance of a country starting a future military dispute by 8% (Petrescu - U Maryland)

Petrescu, 2010, University of Maryland, "Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents"
<https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2011/retrieve.php?pdfid=433> (NK)

Table 5 column (1) reports results for equation (1). The table shows the marginal of the probit model estimating probability that the same country will participate in another dispute in the following 5 years. The standard errors are presented in parentheses and they are clustered at country level. Economic sanctions reduce the probability that Ti will participate in another militarized dispute, however the sanction variable not statistically significant. In column (2), **I interact with big, and obtain that sanctions imposed by large countries have a negative and statistically significant effect on p. A sanction imposed by a large country decreases the probability of a large dispute by 8%.** The results also show that sanctions imposed by small countries do not have a deterrent effect, they have a very small (1%) embolden effect. In (3), I interact sanction with gnp ratio and show that a sanction imposed by a sender with a large GNP relative to the target has a deterrent effect as well. A sanction imposed sender with GNP as share of the target's GNP higher than 100 decreases the probability that the target is involved in another dispute. The mean gnp ratio in my sample is 563.01 and the deterrent effect for a sanction imposed by such a mean sender on such a mean target is of 9%.

Won't be effective given Saudi Arabia's government structure

Gould 18 Joe Gould, 10-18-2018, "Will Congress really cancel US-Saudi arms deals? It's complicated, but let us explain," Defense News,

<https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/18/will-congress-really-cancel-us-saudi-arms-deals-its-complicated-but-let-us-explain/> //DF

The Obama administration used arms-sale holds in an attempt to improve a customer nations' behavior on human rights, but to limited effect, said Becca Wasser, a researcher with the think tank Rand. "You have to ask the question: What end is the hold supposed to achieve? Is it intended to condition a partner's behavior or punish them?" Wasser said. "I have a healthy amount of skepticism on both counts." Wasser predicted that holding up arms sales is not going to massively impact the U.S. defense industry or bin Salman's signature economic agenda, Vision 2030. **As for Magnitsky sanctions, Wasser argued they're more effective in Russia, targeting businessmen in the oligarch class who have reach with the Kremlin. "It is less likely to be effective in Saudi, where the royal family and upper echelons of government that may be implicated are insulated," she said.**

Economic sanctions empirically fail

Depetris 18 DANIEL DEPETRIS, 10-23-2018, "Want to get Saudi Arabia's attention? Let's stop selling arms to them," The Hill

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/412813-want-to-get-saudi-arabias-attention-lets-stop-selling-arms-to-them> //DF

It could do what Sen. Dick Durban (D-Ill.) recommended and officially expel the Saudi ambassador back to the Kingdom, but this move would be tantamount to a symbolic expression of anger. **The administration could utilize the Magnitsky Act or issue a standalone executive order in which sanctions are placed on Saudi officials it believes are involved in**

Khashoggi's murder. The White House could also enact U.S. travel restrictions on senior Saudi royals or ministers. But while these measures would be satisfying on an emotional level, it is an open question whether a few blocked bank accounts or VISA limitations would force Riyadh to engage in the comprehensive retrospection that is ultimately required; according to an analysis conducted by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, sanctions are hardly a foolproof policy response in terms of effectiveness. If the administration wishes to get Saudi Arabia's attention, President Trump could take a page out of Chancellor Angela Merkel's playbook and indefinitely end arms sales to the Kingdom.

R/T Houthis Want to Negotiate

While taking some losses, the Houthis are more committed to the war effort than ever (Worth - NYT)

Robert F. Worth, 10-31-2018, "How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate — and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> (NK)

The Houthis, who are named for their founding family, **have lost much of the southern territory** they once ruled, **but in most ways the war has made them stronger. Battle has sharpened their skills and hardened their resolve. It appears to have deepened their hold over a population that is weary of revolt and desperate for order of any kind. Some families**, I was told, **keep donation boxes with the words** "In the Path of God" printed on them; **everyone, young and old, contributes what cash they can to the war effort**. Just before I arrived, members of a northern tribe not far from Sana, the capital city, packed up several hundred vehicles with grapes, vegetables, sheep, calves, cash and weapons. The convoy drove some 170 miles, across mountains and deserts — at constant risk of Saudi airstrikes — to support Houthi fighters on the front line near the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. It is tempting to see a certain poetic justice in the Houthis' vengeful rage against Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis are fearless and barbaric - fighting on a divine mandate using tactics similar to those of the Vietcong. They're not going away any time soon (Worth - NYT)

Robert F. Worth, 10-31-2018, "How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate — and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> (NK)

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Their movement was born, three decades ago, largely as a reaction to Riyadh's reckless promotion of its own intolerant strain of Salafi Islam in the Houthi heartland of northwestern Yemen. Since then, **the Saudis** — with the help of Yemen's former ruler, Ali Abdullah Saleh — **have done all they could to corrupt or compromise every political force strong enough to pose a threat. The Houthis are a result: a band of fearless insurgents who know how to fight but little else. They claim a divine mandate, and they have tortured, killed and imprisoned their critics, rights groups say, just as their predecessors did. They have recruited child soldiers, used starvation as a weapon and have allowed no dissenting views to be aired in the media. They have little will or capacity to run a modern state, and at times have seemed unwilling or unable to negotiate for peace**. But this, too, is partly a measure of Saudi Arabia's fatal arrogance toward its neighbor, a long-term policy of keeping Yemen weak and divided. That policy may now be bringing the Saudis' worst fears to life. **Houthi officials say they have studied the Viet Cong's tactics, and routinely refer to the war as the quagmire that will bring down the House of Saud**. "We expect this war to be very long," I was told by the de facto Houthi foreign minister, Hussain al-Ezzi. "It is a war of bone-breaking — they break us or we break them."

R/T Houthi Takeover

1. Ending arms sales ends the Houthi intent to fight and makes them want to negotiate

The Houthis would stop the violence if SA laid off

Niarchos 18 Nicolas Niarchos, 1-22-2018, "How the U.S. Is Making the War in Yemen Worse," New Yorker,

<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/22/how-the-us-is-making-the-war-in-yemen-worse>
//DF

President Houthi, a large, confident man with a traditional dagger at his belly, was friendly to me but also suspicious of the United States and full of conspiracy theories. He suggested that Washington was secretly arming Al Qaeda and that the United States was calling the shots for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, at the behest of Israel. Still, **he said that he wanted peace and that although the Houthis have fired missiles at Saudi Arabia, his side would pose no threat to Saudi Arabia if the Saudis would only end their assault on Yemen.** "There's no need for enmity with the United States," he told me in Arabic, and that seemed a message he wanted me to convey to Washington and the American people.

2. Ending arms sales ends decreases Houthi capacity to fight

a. because support from Iran will end

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi, 11-20-2018, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>

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In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly this week, President **Donald Trump signaled to Saudi Arabia that he would avoid criticizing its destabilizing actions in the Middle East. Instead, he blamed only Iran,** the kingdom's regional rival, for funding "havoc and slaughter." Trump praised Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for pledging billions in aid and "pursuing multiple avenues to ending Yemen's horrible, horrific civil war." **He failed to mention that Yemen's current conflict escalated dramatically in early 2015, when Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab countries to intervene in the war.** That war has long since devolved into a humanitarian catastrophe. The United Nations stopped counting its civilian death toll two years ago, when it hit 10,000. An independent estimate by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which tracks conflicts worldwide, found that nearly 50,000 people, including combatants, died between January 2016 and July 2018. The war has also left more than 22 million people—75 percent of the population of Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the world—in need of humanitarian aid. As public anger over America's role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America's longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking "demonstrable actions" to avoid harming civilians and making a "good faith" effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis. Like the Saudis and Emiratis, the Trump administration sees in the Houthis the same sort of threat as other Iranian-backed groups

such as Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to help Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. In late August, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations tweeted a photo that had circulated in the Arab press of a meeting in Beirut between the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Houthi officials. U.S. officials claimed it showed "the nature of the regional terrorist threat," and added: "Iranian proxies in Lebanon & Yemen pose major dangers to peace & stability in the entire Middle East." But **beyond recent missile attacks on Saudi Arabia—in retaliation for Saudi air strikes—the Houthis have displayed little regional ambition. Ironically, as the war drags on, the Houthis will grow more dependent on support from Iran and its allies.** By accepting the coalition's cosmetic attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the Trump administration is signaling to Saudi and Emirati leaders its apparent belief that a clear military victory in Yemen remains possible. And as long as the coalition believes it can crush the Houthis, there's little incentive for it to negotiate. Trump, then, has bought into Saudi Arabia's zero-sum calculation: that a military win in Yemen for the kingdom and its allies would be a defeat for Iran, while a negotiated settlement with the Houthis would be a victory for Tehran. Blinded by its obsession with Iran, the Trump administration is perpetuating an unwinnable war and undermining the likelihood of a political settlement. This current phase of the conflict in Yemen began in September 2014, when the Houthis, a group of Shia rebels allied with Yemen's ousted dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, forced most of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi's government to flee to Saudi Arabia, and threatened to take over much of the country. In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition went to war in Yemen to restore Hadi to power and roll back the Houthis. Since then, despite thousands of air strikes and an air and naval blockade at a cost of some \$5 to \$6 billion a month for Riyadh, the Saudi-led alliance failed to dislodge the Houthis from the capital, Sanaa. **While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers,** including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada's Department of National Defense, **have shown that the Houthis did not receive significant support from Tehran before the Saudi intervention in 2015. Iran has stepped up military assistance to the Houthis since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival.**

Hartung 19 Interview conducted by Daniel Fernandez of William Hartung [director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. He has also served as a Senior Research Fellow in the New America Foundation's American Strategy Program, and is former director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute], 2-10-2019 "Interview with William Hartung," Topic Expert Interviews

<https://sites.google.com/polyprep.org/fernad19topicexpertinterviews/february/william-hartung?authuser=0>

Daniel, On the first point, my argument is that Russia and China are not capable of replacing the U.S. as a pillar of the Saudi military, even should they want to. Saudi Arabia has invested tens of billions of dollars in U.S. weapons, training, and logistical support for their military over decades. To replicate that from another source would likely take decades as well, and it would mean letting considerable parts of its U.S.-supplied arsenal go to waste. It's really about leverage. An end to U.S. bomb sales and a commitment to stop supplying maintenance and spare parts until Saudi Arabia stops indiscriminate bombing of civilians and engages in good faith negotiations to end the war would be a powerful lever for peace in Yemen. **The Houthi are a fairly low-tech army compared to the Saudis,** although they do have anti-tank missiles, crude drones, and some ballistic missiles that they occasionally fire into Saudi Arabia. **But they lack an Air Force of any kind,** for example. **If the Saudis were not able to bomb civilians** and run a blockade that is hindering the provision of humanitarian aid **it would help end widespread suffering of people in Yemen, but it wouldn't necessarily strengthen the Houthi to the point that they could take over the country, given the internal opponents they face.** In any case, enabling Saudi actions that independent monitors have described as war crimes may if anything help the Houthis and Iran by alienating large parts of the Yemeni population from the Saudi/UAE-backed government (and from the United States, which is widely blamed by Yemenis for enabling Saudi and UAE violations of the laws of war). Hope this helps. Feel free to send follow up questions if the above doesn't cover it. Best, Bill Hartung

b. Decreases popular support

3. Arms sales make it easier for the Houthis by increasing civilian support for them

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3. Houthis have stolen 65% of aid that comes, but the Saudi blockade has stopped almost all aid.

The vast majority of deaths have been caused by SA bombings

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof, 12-29-2018, "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/opinion/sunday/yemen-famine-war-saudi-arabia.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article> //DF

However, the Houthis operate a police state and are hostile to uncovered women, gays and anyone bold enough to criticize them. They recruit child soldiers from the age of about 12 (the Saudi- and American-backed forces wait until boys are about 15), interfere with food aid, and have engaged in torture and attacks on civilians. Still, **the civilian loss of life has overwhelmingly been caused not by the Houthis but by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and America, through both bombings and starvation.** It's ridiculous for the Trump administration to be exploring naming the Houthis a terrorist organization. And while the Houthis are allies of Iran, I think the Saudis exaggerate when they suggest that the Houthis are Iranian pawns. The foreign minister on the Houthi side is Hisham Sharaf Abdalla, a congenial American-educated official.