# KG TFA State 19’ Housing

**Resolved: The United States should promote the development of market rate housing in urban neighborhoods.**

## Topic Background

### Definitions

**The United States- The United States of America is the official name for the country in North America that consists of fifty states and the District of Columbia. It is bordered by Canada in the north and Mexico in the south.** (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/united-states>)

**Should- Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions.** (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should>)

**Promote- to help bring (something, such as an enterprise) into being** (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote)

**Development- the act, process, or result of developing** (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/development)

**Market Rate Housing- Market rate housing is an apartment that has no rent restrictions. A landlord who owns market-rate housing is free to attempt to rent the space at whatever price the local market may fetch.** (https://www.thespruce.com/market-rate-apartment-155986)

**Urban Neighborhoods- An urban neighborhood is usually found in the downtown core of a city. These neighborhoods are not exclusive to any particular state but will always be found in the heart of a major metro area.** (https://www.mybekins.com/blog/what-is-an-urban-neighborhood/)

### Theory

**Disclosure Theory- Good**

**A. Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page on the NDCA wiki with the school they attend, disclose the taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of any pieces of evidence read in their case which they have read in their case in a previous round at least thirty minutes before the round.**

**B. Violation: They have not posted cites.**

**C. Standards:**

**1. Research – disclosure increases research and gets rid of anti-educational arguments because debaters are forced to prepare cases knowing that people will have answers AND people get the opportunity to research answers to disclosed cases.**

Nails 13 - (Jacob [I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012.] "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)" [http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/) GHS//GB](http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/%29%20GHS//GB)

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information [this] could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. If [theory spikes] these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies. A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round. The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren’t likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I’ve learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation. That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the “better debaters” in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn’t incentivize better debating.

Research skills is a voter because it’s key to our ability to a) actually learn about the topic and become engaged in the real world and b) process large amounts of information, which is a necessary portable skill in the digital age.

2. Clash – Disclosure is the best method for increasing clash in debates because it allows debaters to substantively engage positions rather than relying on sketchy tricks to avoid the discussion. It also allows for more specific clash because debaters can see specific arguments disclosed instead of trying to link generic arguments in. That’s a voter because a) specific education also helps our ability to learn about the topic and engage in the real world and b) clash is key to advocacy skills since it forces us to defend positions, which we need to actually promote social change to fix screwed up things in the real world.

3. Argument quality –

a) Disclosure prevents the element of surprise. A world without disclosure rewards debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but because their opponents won't know how to respond. Disclosure forces debaters to commit to quality; under my interpretation, debaters would have to write cases knowing that their opponents will have the opportunity for thoughtful preparation.

b) Disclosure encourages increased research and cross-pollination—Argument quality is a voter because debate is a unique space in which we need to have in-depth education about these social issues.

Gary Alan Fine 01, [Professor of Sociology at Northwestern], “Gifted Tongues: High School Debate and Adolescent Culture”, Princeton University Press, 2001. RFK

Debate is justified as a learning tool, not merely as a means by which adolescents enjoy themselves. In a society concerned about the perceived failures of its educational institutions, high school debate is a voluntary activity in which some students--a small and highly select group--choose to engage in research, practice socially valued skills, and demonstrate these abilities in public settings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that students who participate in intermural debate do extremely well in their schoolwork and then (and as a consequence) are successful in college and in graduate or professional school, achieving occupational success. Since debate does not appeal to a random sample of the student body, causality is hard to establish, but the claim that debate is beneficial is surely plausible. Debate is one program through which an often shaky institution encourages adolescents to acquire culturally valued skills. While debate is not the only activity in which the adolescent attachment to competition is mixed with the acquisition of socially valued skills--Model UN, academic bowls, math teams, chess clubs, and mock trials also have these attributes--it provides an exemplary case in its organization, its longevity, and its intensity. High school debate potentially could produce curricular reform based on "teaching the conflicts"9: learning how to discuss contentious social issues can permit students to engage and confront moral ideals. Today many find America's school systems in disarray, attempting, often ineffectively, to solve seemingly insoluble social problems. If we cannot educate the masses effectively, some suggest that at least we should properly educate our "best and brightest." Gifted education is a concern for both educators and parents. High school debate teams are highly selective--sometimes self-selected, but often with the assistance of coaches, teachers, and principals who recruit their most energetic, brightest, and most articulate students. Debate helps to reproduce the class system. Most debaters--although not all--are high achievers. In general, debaters are young men and women from affluent homes in which education is valued and in which ideas are discussed. Many of these students have succeeded in school and have established, prior to their immersion in the world of debate, a record of achievement. High school debate magnifies these successes, providing an enriched atmosphere in which students expand their educational horizons. The competitiveness of debate motivates this achievement drive, particularly among those students who have already succeeded in academic competitions.

4. Inclusion – Disclosure is key to the inclusion of small schools – the current system just favors the “big” schools who bring more students who can scout more rounds.

Bietz 10, Mike (former President of the National Debate Coaches Association; debate coach at Harvard-Westlake School in Los Angeles.) “The Case for Public Case Disclosure.” May 2010.) GHS//GB

Since disclosure happens anyway, it ought to be open to all competitors regardless of the number of teammates, coaches or friends one has at any given tournament. **The current “system” is exclusionary and often makes tournaments hurtful situations. It benefits large teams who either 1) bring many kids to tournaments or 2) have many judges in the judging pool, both of which go hand-in-hand. Finally, open disclosure provides the academic check and peer-review of research that is common in all of academia.**

**D. Drop the debater –**

**1. It’s the same as dropping the argument since the argument is the entire case that wasn’t disclosed.**

**2. Voting for us sets a precedent in favor of a positive model of debate—wins and losses determine the direction of activity.**

**3. There’s no way to rectify the abuse — going and forcing them to disclose now won’t fix the lack of education we get from this round.**

**Disclosure Counter- Bad**

1. **You can never be sure that we violate, since there is no way he can say we haven’t posted unless he went on the internet, which one, merits disqualification because using the internet is forbidden according to this tournament’s rules and two, gives them access to unlimited arguments they can potentially read on us in the next speech. Also, using the internet is inherently bad because warrants and arguments should be developed in the round to avoid time skew.**
2. **We’ve been disconnected from the Internet so we literally could not post our cases, you shouldn’t vote us down for something that we can’t do. That’s like saying Kanye’s responsible for a bad rap album.**
3. **We meet because in between last round and this round we changed up our case with new arguments and cards so there was no way that we could have even disclosed a case we literally made less than 30 minutes ago.**
4. **We meet, because I don’t have a coach, we have a Speech teacher who volunteers to ride the bus with us to and from tournaments. This is a solvency deficit, because kids with more numerous and more active coaches will always have more prep than we do.**
5. **We meet, because they could have just asked us before the round to disclose, and we would have done it, we just don’t have access to the wiki but we do have access to them. Disclosure is an easy thing to ask someone for and they had to say the magic words before the round.**
6. **We meet. Their theory shells presume that everything we’re reading was updated 30 minutes before this round but that’s not true. We updated everything we’re reading 15 minutes before the round.**

**A) Counter interp – At tournaments where disclosure is not mandated explicitly in the rules, debaters can win the round without having disclosed their arguments**

**B) Violation – You can look at their off for this part, AND this tournament does not say anywhere that debaters need to disclose what they read.**

**C) Standards**

1. **Predictability, because we had no idea that we would have to disclose at this tournament when there is absolutely no rule that mandates or obliges us to do so. Forcing us to do something that we can’t anticipate is unfair because there’s no way for us to conduct prepare for something totally unpredictable whereas everything we are reading was predictable so it creates unfair research burdens.**
2. **Small school and disadvantaged debater’s participation- their interp literally makes the circuit more esoteric because it prevents small school debaters or those who don’t have as many resources on hand from participating. They require that debaters have regular access to the NDCA, which already has a membership fee that some schools either a) do not have or b) cannot afford to have, just like Milpitas High. If you vote on their interp, that means you perpetuate the perception that only the kids from top notch schools will ever get anywhere in this activity and you’ll exclude even more kids from doing PF than are already excluded.**
3. **Critical Thinking Skills- We increase critical thinking skills because we force thinking on the spot compared to debating a case which has already been disclosed which consequently makes it easier to debate. Furthermore, debaters can just get their coaches to prep out their opponent’s cases for them which ultimately means that they don’t have to do any thinking at all. This is the strongest internal link to education because the purpose of debate is the skills we gain from the round. We won’t remember some deep metaphysical justifications from the round but rather the skills we gained from debate.**

**D) Voters**

**It’s a voter for fairness, which precedes substance because unfair arguments arbitrarily skew your evaluation of the round towards the unfair debater. Voter for education as the only lasting impact of debate. Also, punishing the abusive debater with a loss deters future abuse. And give us the RVI because theory is a no risk issue for them while we are forced to answer it and theory without an RVI incentivizes debaters to read many theory shells in a round without any risk of dropping.**

**Internet Use- Bad**

**A. Interpretation: Debaters should not use or access the Internet in round to research.**

**B. Violation: They have used the Internet in round, which is conceded in cross. We can’t access Internet because we have it locked onto off.**

**C. Standards:**

1. **Research- Using Internet in round inherently damages research capabilities. Using Internet in round decreases research because people can just Google answers to non-stock arguments in round, giving them an advantage because people research outside of round but finding specified sources in round allows for better responses that we don’t have access to. On the other hand, requiring research causes people to use good ideas from each other and also be forced to prep and research for more arguments. That means it’s better for argument quality because people can clash more specifically instead of making bad, generic arguments.**
2. **Critical Thinking Skills- We increase critical thinking skills because we force on the spot debating instead of finding answers to argument during round. Debating a round in which there are no on the spot answers because they are found during round on the Internet sets a precedent to not think ahead, consequently making it easier for them to debate. This is the strongest internal link to education because the purpose of debate is the skills we gain from the round. We won’t remember some deep justifications from round, but rather the speaking skills and thinking abilities we gained from debate.**

**D. Voters**

1. **Fairness- Them using Internet decreases fairness as it sets a precedent to decrease research and increase round Internet use. Fairness precedes substance because unfair arguments arbitrarily skew your evaluation of the round towards the unfair debater.**
2. **Education- Decreasing critical thinking skills and finding information quickly in round decreases education. Vote for us because by voting for us, you set the precedent for other teams to learn about the topic ahead of time. Punishing abusive debaters with a loss deters future abuse, and remember that education is the only long term impact from debate.**
3. **RVI- We are forced to answer Internet abuse because it makes the round harder from us, but using Internet is no risk issue from them. There’s no way to rectify the abuse because turning of Internet now won’t fix the unfairness and lack of education from the round.**

# A/2: PRO

### A/2: Filtering

1. **The argument logically makes no sense; if developers build luxury apartments with 6 rooms and two stories it doesn’t matter how much the apartment deteriorates- no person in poverty is buying it.**
2. [**Delink. lpert**](https://ggwash.org/view/31177/will-filtering-keep-housing-affordable) **of The GGW gives two warrants.**
	1. **When new market rate housing comes in at a higher price, since more people will be drawn to those apartments, owners of old apartments try to renovate their apartments in order to be able to compete with those luxury apartments, consequently raising the value of the apartment and therefore the rent.**
	2. **Demand in the market is rising at all levels. This means, no matter how many housing units you build, there will always be people ready to bid on these apartments, keeping the price high.**
3. **Turn. Smith for the Berkeley Planning Journal find that attempting filtering pushes low-quality demand up and as a result households are forced to increase payments or reduce quantity and quality. Thus, Smith concludes that even if some people find houses, there are overall more vacancies created.**
4. **Huge timeframe issue. Chapelle of UC Berkeley finds that because rents decline extremely slowly at a rate of 0.3 percent a year, it would take 50 years for a chance of households earning half the median income to even hope for access affordable housing through filtering- we can’t wait half a century to try solve the housing crisis, we need help now. This is crucial, as Chapelle finds that because filtering takes so long the poor are forced to buy houses above their ability to pay leading to them.**
5. **All of this is why Badger of The Washington Post concludes filtering does not work at all with market rate housing.**

https://ggwash.org/view/31177/will-filtering-keep-housing-affordable

<http://pub-jschol-stg.escholarship.org/content/qt0tz5086h/qt0tz5086h.pdf?t=m7w1br&nosplash=e66519b73c642094f13b9a01703b8954>

Finally, while **filtering can accommodate the bidding of households within adjacent segments of the market,** **it is an ineffective vehicle to address the needs of those near the bottom of the market**. For instance, suppose that an upgrade in quality causes unit demolitions at the bottom of the market. At a future point, **in-migration of low-income households pushes low-quality demand up; prices will be bid up**. Unless units previously exiting the market have been saved, the **lowest income households will be unable to compete for shelter without increasing price or decreasing quality** or quantity (since lower quality is unavailable). Further, given **building and occupancy codes, the option of retrieving the old unit may not be feasible. The household will be forced to increase payments, or reduce quantity or quality. A price increase will ensue throughout the bottom of the market, awaiting newly created vacancies to absorb the demand.**

<https://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/udp_research_brief_052316.pdf>

Yet, Rosenthal finds that **rents decline by only 0.3% per year,** indicating that units become occupied by lower-income households at a faster rate than rents are falling, which could result in heightened housing cost burden. Furthermore, if we were to assume that developers are building housing for people at the median income, then **it would take approximately** 15 years before those units filtered down to people at 80% of the median income and closer to **50 years for households earning 50% of the median income.**5 Again, however, this does not mean that such units are actually affordable to the low-income households occupying them.

having severe financial difficulty paying the rent.

http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/udp\_research\_brief\_052316.pdf

Using the estimates of Rosenthal (2014) and an annual appreciation rate IGS Research Brief, May 2016 4 Housing Production, Filtering, and Displacement 5 of 3.3% over the last 20 years, the pace at which units filter down to lower-income households for the Bay Area’s rental market is estimated at roughly 1.5% per year. Yet, Rosenthal finds that rents decline by only 0.3% per year, indicating that units become occupied by lower-income households at a faster rate than rents are falling, which could result in heightened housing cost burden. Furthermore, if we were to assume that developers are building housing for people at the median income, then it would take approximately 15 years before those units filtered down to people at 80% of the median income and closer to 50 years for households earning 50% of the median income.5 Again, however, this does not mean that such units are actually affordable to the low-income households occupying them

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/19/how-to-make-expensive-cities-affordable-for-everyone-again/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.c463baf2e088

Filtering,” where older housing units trickle down to lower-income families as they age, can happen in the broader metropolitan context. But it can take decades for filtering do deliver truly affordable units to lower-income households. As apartments age, the rent of a typical unit – not in a hot area - declines an average of 0.31 percent per year so even after 30 years, the rent will have fallen by only 9 percent. Moreover, as apartment buildings get old – if they are not in hot neighborhoods – they can deteriorate to the point of becoming substandard units, as owners see little return in reinvesting in the properties. The result, eventually, is low-quality housing and neighborhood decline. In gentrifying neighborhoods, **filtering does not work at all**, because land values and rents rise as the neighborhoods become more desirable and developers bid up land values. So lower-income households must look in other neighborhoods where services and schools are likely to be much weaker. Hence the gentrification process can reconstruct economic segregation. One answer to all of this is to provide long-term affordable housing in neighborhoods poised for gentrification or already gentrifying. This will provide for some stable income diversity. In areas where land costs have increased, the amount of subsidy required per unit can be relatively high. However, subsidies can be stretched by combining them with inclusionary zoning, where developers set aside a portion of their units at below-market rents, and the subsidy is used to make those rents even lower, so that they are affordable to lower-income tenants. Such creativity and municipal leverage are needed to make our cities more than simply playgrounds for the affluent.

### A/2: Gentrification Good

1. **Delink. Yamamoto of the Boston College Law Review writes that self-interested whites who make the final decisions on how to alleviate poor conditions in minority neighborhoods have no incentive to make self-defeating decisions, as racial and classist subordination has kept them in office and served so their interests well.**
2. Autor of MIT finds **market rate housing leads to a 20% increase in residents leaving a neighborhood.**

**Yamamoto**, Eric K. "Racial Reparations: Japanese Americans Redress and African American Claims." William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. **Boston College Law Review**, Dec. 1998. Web. 16 Apr. 2016. <http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/35347/Yamamoto\_40BCLRev477.pdf?sequence=1

Even if Professor Bittker had devised a fool-proof legal theory for black reparations litigation, few judges or legislators would be moved in the absence of some dramatic event, major crisis, or tragic circumstance that conveyed the necessity or at least the clear advantages of adopting a reparations scheme. . . . . . . Legal analysis cannot give life to a [remedial program] that must evolve from the perceptions of those responsible for the perpetuation of racism in this country. n252 For Bell, the reason that such proposals fail is simple: **Self-interested whites who must make the ultimate decisions on whether or not to transfer property** (land or currency) **to African-Americans have no incentive to make such self-defeating decisions. Racial subordination has served so many white interests well** that the implicit consideration of "race" as a factor in public policy decisions is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. n254 Contrasting Black reparations demands with the Japanese-American case for reparations illustrates Bell's point about political incentives. One of the key distinctions between the two victim groups is the different political leverage they wield based on their ties to their respective homelands. For Congress, lingering animosity over the ill-treatment of Japanese-Americans [\*909] during World War II may have been viewed by some as a barrier to effective economic relations between Japan and the United States.

https://voxeu.org/article/does-gentrification-reduce-crime

In a recent paper, we study whether and by how much gentrification affects crime (Autor et al. 2017). Our approach analyses an unintentional policy experiment in neighborhood change that occurred when a stringent rent control regime that kept rental prices well below market for approximately one-third of Cambridge, MA residential rental properties rapidly and unexpectedly ended. Before 1995, much of Cambridge’s rental housing was rent controlled, with rents capped at unit-specific maximums. A state-wide ballot initiative narrowly ended rent control in Massachusetts on 1 January 1995. This initiative allowed rents to rise to market levels and set off a wave of neighborhood change in Cambridge. In an earlier paper, we show that in the years immediately following deregulation, neighborhoods with the highest rent-control shares experienced a 20% increase in residential turnover and a substantial increase in property values compared to neighborhoods with less rent control (Autor et al. 2014). This sudden change in the policy regime allows us to examine how neighborhood change affects crime (as opposed to the other way around), holding constant city-wide factors affecting overall criminal activity. We assemble geocoded detailed criminal incident-level data from 1992-2005 from the Cambridge Police Department archives. We then track the evolution of criminal activity through tight geographic comparisons across narrow slices of the city to contrast the experience of more versus less rent control-intensive neighborhoods in the post-control era. Figure 1 summarizes our main finding. In the years immediately following the end of rent control, crime fell significantly more in neighborhoods that were heavily rent controlled. By 1996, overall crime in gentrifying neighborhoods (blocks with one standard deviation higher rent control exposure initially) fell by 16% more than in neighborhoods relatively less exposed to rent control. Table 1 shows how effects differ across categories of reported crimes. Property crimes account for the largest decrease in the number of reported criminal incidents, although violent crimes account for the bulk of the value in averted crimes.

### A/2: Supply

1. **Bulldozing completely takes this out- proves a net decrease in the supply.**
2. **Delink.**
	1. **Redmond of the STU finds building more market rate housing would actually increase housing prices and make the crisis worse. The reason is that when rich people move into a neighborhood, demand to move into the neighborhood increases by the middle class who wish to open businesses in the area. The result is that the poor get outcompeted by the middle class resulting in them losing their housing and prices on net increasing. Melo of The Pioneer Press writes that new buildings replace less expensive housing and draw in higher end amenities, causing landlords to raise rents as the value of land increases.**
	2. **Delink. The Federal Reserve reports a 20% increase in housing would only decrease rent prices by 1%. The impact is so marginal.**

https://www.sftu.org/2018/04/market-rate-housing-makes-crisis-worse/

Building Market-Rate Housing Makes Crisis Worse 04/04/2018 By SFTU [0](https://www.sftu.org/2018/04/market-rate-housing-makes-crisis-worse/#respond) By [Tim Redmond](https://48hills.org/author/tim/) – June 14, 2015 The city’s own studies show that building luxury units causes more problems than it solves. Why is this not the defining issue in housing policy? Opponents of market-rate housing have a point, according to a city study: Luxury units do more harm than good JUNE 15, 2015 – Peter Cohen and Fernando Marti at the Council of Community Housing Organizations have dropped a bombshell on the standard City Hall analysis of affordable housing. In an [oped in Sunday’s Examiner,](http://www.sfexaminer.com/dont-believe-the-hype-affordable-housing-does-not-depend-on-market-rate-development/) the two explain how market-rate housing construction is NOT the main source of financing for affordable housing. In fact, they note, the money that market-rate developers pay to subsidize affordable units doesn’t even cover the housing impacts that their projects create. Let me say that again, because it’s critical (and not easily understood, and should have a profound impact on policies like the Mission Moratorium): If you require less than about 40 percent affordable housing, the net impact of high-end construction is to make the housing market worse. How is that possible? How could building more housing (at any level) be a net problem for the housing market? Doesn’t more housing trickle down and make things better for everyone? Well, no – not according to a City Planning Department study that is largely ignored in the debate. Cohen and Marti mention it, but I want to go into more detail. The document is called a nexus study, [and you can read it [see p. 25] here](https://www.sftu.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Residential_Nexus_Analysis_City_and_County_of_San_Francisco.pdf). It’s not that complicated: When you build a new luxury housing complex, new resident move into it. For the most part, they result in net additions to the number of people in the city: If the person who buys a new condo moves out of a rental unit, someone else will move into that rental. Quickly. The people with high disposable incomes who fill those condos or luxury rentals will spend money in town, creating a demand for jobs – restaurant workers, grocery clerks, cops and firefighters, bank tellers … and those people will also need a place to live. (Sup. Scott Wiener notes that the city’s police force hasn’t kept up with the population growth. Perfect example – bring in 5,000 new wealthy residents, and the city faces pressure to hire more cops to protect them. Those cops cost tax money – but they also need places to live. And that puts pressure on the housing market). So according to the study, by Keyser Marston Associates, every time the city allows 100 new high-end housing units, it needs to build between 20 and 43 new affordable units – just to keep the housing balance the way it is now. Put the affordable units in the main complex and the impact is lower (because fewer millionaires move in). Built them, as is common, somewhere else and the impact is greater. In summary, for every 100 market rate condominium units there are 25.0 lower income households generated through the direct impact of the consumption of the condominium buyers and a total of 43.31 households if total direct, indirect, and induced impacts are counted in the analysis. If the city demands 15 percent affordable set-asides, then every market-rate building adds more demand for affordable housing than it supplies. That means every new building makes the housing crisis worse. Again: This isn’t me and some crazy leftists saying that. It’s the city’s own studies, done by a respecting economic consulting firm. If anything, the numbers are way worse than they were when the study was done in 2007. The prices of housing are much higher, the wealth of the new residents much higher, the job-creations demands much higher – and the need for more affordable housing much higher. We’re probably talking 50 percent here – half of all new units need to be affordable, not to make the crisis better but to keep it from getting even worse. Market-rate housing not only doesn’t solve the problem – it helps create the problem. Now, in the case of affordable units, it’s far more likely that they will go to existing residents – people who are currently homeless, or live in substandard conditions, or a packed five to a room. So building affordable housing doesn’t generate the kind of demand that market-rate housing does. At the [debate over the Mission Moratorium,](http://48hills.org/2015/06/02/the-mission-moratorium-goes-down-narrowly-but-the-fight-has-only-begun/) Sup. Scott Wiener argued that stopping market-rate housing would cut off essential funding for below-market rate units. But the city’s own studies show that that money is sucked up just mitigating the impacts that the luxury housing itself creates. So it creates no net new affordable housing.

https://www.twincities.com/2018/02/11/will-luxury-housing-boom-help-stabilize-minneapolis-st-paul-rents/

The boom in luxury units may be creating a higher new-housing price point in middle-income neighborhoods such as St. Paul’s Lowertown and Selby-Snelling neighborhoods, or Prospect Park in Minneapolis. Not only do the **new buildings often replace less expensive housing, they also draw flashy new restaurants and other amenities, raising concern they could be putting pressure on area landlords to raise rents, even in modest, traditional housing stock.** It’s clear that, so far, the uptick in St. Paul’s housing volume hasn’t significantly lowered rents. Are new luxury units inflating rents for the traditional housing around them, or drawing renters from an entirely different market? Will new units eventually meet demand for new housing, helping to stabilize and even lower rent prices that would otherwise continue to soar?

<https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018035pap.pdf>



### A/2: Jobs

1. **Mitigate their impact in three ways.**
	1. **First, Sherk of the Center for Data Analysis reports that most workers hired on new federal construction projects would come from existing projects, not unemployment lines.**
	2. **Second, Sherk adds that construction employs only 0.2% of all workers. He writes that even doubling the number of jobs in the sector would have a nominal effect on overall employment.**
	3. **Third, USA Today writes that part-time workers are filling most new job openings due to the volatility of labor demand. These workers have less job security and disappear in the long-term.**
2. **Turn. Marshall of the Governing Institute writes that infrastructure would demand a huge amount of sophisticated workers and skilled labor. This is problematic because Gillespie of CNN explains that the poor have no way of bridging this skills gap, and most jobs would simply go to the rich and educated.**
3. **Turn. Haplin of UC Davis writes that low-wage employment may worsen inequality by trapping the poor and making upward mobility impossible. Liu of the Public Research Organization observes that, compared to other sectors, infrastructure employers are twice as likely to keep workers unclassified on official payrolls. Unfortunately, these informal workers earn half of what their formal counterparts do and are three times more likely to live in poverty. Bacchetta of the WTO furthers that informal workers have fewer opportunities for formal education and human capital growth, creating a poverty trap. He concludes that an 3% increase in the size of the informal economy raises income inequality by 8%.**

**Sherk**, James. "Additional Infrastructure Spending Would Employ Few New Workers." Senior Policy Analyst in Labor Economics in the **Center for Data Analysis.** Research Fellow, Labor Economics, 7 Nov. 2013. Web. 26 Apr. 2016. <http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/IB4081.pdf>.

Supporters argue increased infrastructure spending would create jobs and boost the economy. These arguments have little empirical justification. Infrastructure projects require more physical and human capital than brute labor. Consequently, most workers hired on new federal construction projects would come from existing projects—not unemployment lines. Additional infrastructure spending would do little to reduce unemployment. In fact, America’s infrastructure quality has improved markedly over the past two decades. Unsurprisingly, then, very few unemployed workers have the skills necessary to work on infrastructure projects. Just 8.5 percent of the unemployed previously worked in an occupation heavily utilized in highway, street, or bridge construction.[[6]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/impact-of-additional-infrastructure-spending-on-jobs-and-unemployment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6) Even fewer worked in the most highly skilled construction occupations. One-fifth of workers on highway, street, and bridge projects operate heavy construction equipment. Less than one in 200 unemployed workers previously worked in such jobs. Similarly, Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows just 13,500 unemployed cement masons, concrete finishers, and terrazzo workers in the entire country.[[7]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/impact-of-additional-infrastructure-spending-on-jobs-and-unemployment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn7) The vast majority of the unemployed would require retraining before working on infrastructure projects. Additional infrastructure spending would consequently employ relatively few unemployed workers. Instead, federal construction contractors would hire the skilled workforce they need away from private construction projects. New jobs created would come primarily at the expense of other jobs in the private sector. […] These calls misunderstand the nature of infrastructure construction work.[2] Infrastructure projects are capital intensive, not labor intensive. Road and bridge construction requires a relatively small number of highly skilled workers using advanced equipment and machinery. Across the U.S., just over 300,000 Americans work in highway, street, or bridge construction—less than the population of Wichita, Kansas.[3] In total, **such construction employs just 0.2 percent of all workers**.[4] This includes less skilled employees on the worksites. Even doubling the number of jobs in the sector would have only small effects on overall employment. [5] Infrastructure construction requires significant human capital as well as physical capital. Many workers on these jobs need advanced skills to effectively and safely use construction equipment. An unemployed residential drywall installer cannot simply start building bridges or highways.

No Author. "Temporary Jobs on Rise in Shifting U.S. Economy." **USA Today.** The Associated Press, 24 May 2014. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/05/24/temporary-jobs-on-rise-in-shifting-us-economy/9273921/>.

WASHINGTON — While the U.S. economy has improved since the Great Recession ended five years ago, part-time and "contract" workers are filling many of the new jobs. Contract workers made up less than half of one percent of all U.S. employment in the 1980s but now account for 2.3%. Economists predict contract workers will play a larger role in the years ahead. They are a diverse army of laborers, ranging from janitors, security officers, home-care and food service-workers to computer programmers, freelance photographers and illustrators. Many are involved in manufacturing. Many others are self-employed, working under contracts that lay out specific responsibilities and deadlines. Labor leaders and many economists worry. Contract workers have less job security and don't contribute to the economy through spending as much as permanent, full-time workers. Nor do they have the same job protections. Few are union members. "It is not hugely clear that we're coming into a temp-worker, contract-worker, contingent-worker nation. But it's something to keep an eye on," said Heidi Shierholz, an economist with the labor-oriented Economic Policy Institute. "There's definitely been an increase in the share of those working part time."

**Gillespie**, Patrick. "America's Persistent Problem: Not Enough Skilled Workers." CNNMoney. **CNN**, 7 Aug. 2015. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/07/news/economy/us-economy-job-skills-gap/>.

America has millions of jobs openings -- more than any point since 2000. On the surface, that's a good thing. It means employers are hiring and the economy is growing. Deeper down though, a high number of job openings raises red flags because it means companies aren't finding the right people to fill the jobs. It signals a persistent problem in America's economy: the skills gap. Vacant jobs can cost companies hundreds of dollars a day in lost profits, research shows, and ultimately the job skills gap hurts America's economic growth. The skills gap is a weak spot that you can expect the Republican presidential candidates to hammer in their 2016 campaigns. "It's definitely a concern, and it should be a concern for anyone who cares about the future of U.S. workers," says Chris Tilly, an economics professor at U.C.L.A. There are a number of factors preventing these jobs from getting filled. Experts say that job training programs in the U.S. remain lackluster compared to the country's global peers in Europe and Asia. Are employers asking too much? But the onus isn't only on unskilled workers to become better prepared. Some employers are arguably raising the bar too high. They want employees who won't require any job training.

**Marshall**, Alex. "For Infrastructure's Sake, America Needs Skilled Workers." **Governing Institute**. The Regional Plan Association, Apr. 2014. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <http://www.governing.com/columns/eco-engines/gov-learning-to-build.html>.

The United States lags behind other countries when it comes to sophisticated infrastructure in part because it lacks the workers to build or maintain it. […]I’m not just talking about splashy mega projects such as the Millau Viaduct in France; I’m talking about simple city bridges. Here in the U.S., we often just pour out big bases of concrete on each bank, and slap some steel girders between them. It’s not subtle. “The skills of the designers and workers are certainly part of the equation,” says Kenneth Kruckemeyer, a former instructor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a self-titled transportation strategist. “For example, we throw material at a problem by using girders of constant thickness for the entire length of the beam—where a variable thickness or more complicated design would place the material only where needed through skilled design and careful workmanship.” The need for skilled laborers is a tough subject in the era of No Child Left Behind. But there are many good jobs waiting to be developed that rely on high skills that aren’t learned as much in a standard classroom. Maybe a savvy city or state would zig while its brethren zag, and invest in serious worker training centers, what used to be called vocational education. A decade ago I interviewed David Gunn, then head of Amtrak. Gunn is a railroad man’s railroad man, and had won fame for turning around New York City transit and then the London Underground. He said this country wasn’t ready for high-speed rail because we didn’t have the workers to build or maintain it. His words still read fresh: “It is not helpful, in my opinion, to engage in these flights of fancy where you’re going to build TGVs [France’s high-speed rail system] all over the United States. We do not have the technical capabilities for doing it, we don’t have the manufacturing to support it anymore and you don’t have the people to run it. [France has] been working on their train system since the war. For 60 years, they’ve been incrementally creeping up speeds on electrification, on catenary design, or locomotive design. In the United States, which was the leader at the end of World War II, you can’t even buy a coupler that is made in the United States. You can’t just take this super sophisticated technology from over there, and bring it here and make it work. Because, I mean, you have to have people who actually have a toolbox and can stand there and make it work. This is what the big thinkers—planners and other people—often don’t get. This is not a detail. It is a critical component of having a good operation.” Or maybe we don’t need skilled workers anymore. China famously built the new San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge span that opened last year. Americans assembled and installed it. Is this the way of the future? Can we import workers for standard maintenance as well? China and South Korea are examples of countries that in a generation or two have leapt from third-world standards, with little advanced infrastructure, to being well ahead of this country in several sectors. (Korea has a national high-speed rail system, ubiquitous high-speed broadband service and clean, quiet subways.) Can we leap as well, or must we, as Gunn says, walk before we run? Whatever the exact stages, we will need skilled labor and management, and the production of both should be a national priority.

Smith, Victoria, and Brian **Halpin**. "Low-wage Work Uncertainty Often Traps Low-wage Workers." Professor of Sociology at **UC Davis**. UC Davis Center for Poverty Research, 9 May 2014. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. <http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/policy-brief/low-wage-work-uncertainty-often-traps-low-wage-workers>.

Some policy analysts, policymakers and scholars argue that low-wage workers should “work their way out of poverty” by acquiring the human capital that would enable them to leave poverty-level jobs. A new study interviewing 25 low wage immigrant workers by Center for Poverty Research Affiliates Vicki Smith and Brian Halpin finds that while many of these low-wage workers recognize the need to enhance their skills and educational credentials, the conditions of their employment trap them, making it nearly impossible to escape. Key Findings: The precariousness of low-wage employment limits these workers’ time to search for better jobs, learn new skills, take classes or obtain credentials. Low-wage workers in this study put considerable effort into maximizing paid hours with multiple jobs, additional one-time jobs, working overtime without overtime compensation, guarding their reputations and continually scanning for opportunities within their networks. The barriers to building human capital suggest that policy makers should focus on improving the conditions of low-wage work rather than expecting workers to move out of this labor market on their own. Research about turbulent employment in today’s economy often focuses on how people keep up their ability to find new jobs. Steps people take to improve their employability include acquiring new skills, continual learning and taking advantage of personal networks. Most research on employability has focused on well-paid professionals who have high levels of human capital and considerable labor market leverage. Research is scarce on low-wage workers’ attitudes about maintaining employability and their efforts to increase their human capital in light of job precariousness. In this study, researchers examine the efforts these workers make to stay employable and to move out of low-wage jobs. Interviews conducted for this project reveal that erratic scheduling, low pay and arbitrary managerial treatment leave these workers unable to improve their employability for better-paid and higher-skilled jobs. Precarious low-wage work forces them to maximize the number of paid work hours they can find in similar occupational niches and limits the time they have to search for different and better work. This study supports the call to improve the conditions of low-wage work.

**Liu**, Yvonne Len. "Sinking Underground: The Growing Informal Economy in California Construction." Economic Roundtable, **Public Benefit Research Organization** (n.d.) Underwritten by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 2014. Web. 24 Mar. 2016. <http://www.smartcitiesprevail.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Sinking\_Underground\_2014-1-5-2.pdf>.

Major Findings More than 143,900 jobs in California’s construction industry were informal in 2011. That’s one out of six construction jobs in the Golden State or 16 percent. More than 104,100 jobs were C 2 SINKING UNDERGROUND: Informal Construction in California unreported by employers in 2011. More than 39,800 employees were misclassified as independent contractors. Construction employers were twice as likely not to report their workers than to misclassify them. The share of workers unreported on payrolls or misclassified as independent contractors increased by 400 percent from 1972 to 2012. Informal construction workers earn half of what their formal counterparts bring home. For every dollar earned by a worker in the formal sector, an unreported worker makes 52 cents and a misclassified worker 64 cents. The total informal wage gap was $1.2 billion in 2011. Specialty trades, such as drywall, have the highest level of informality, over 25 percent employed informally in 2012. Building construction was next, with 20 percent estimated to be informal. Little evidence of informality was found in heavy and civil engineering. Construction has difficulty recruiting and retaining young workers. Many younger, lower paid workers are churned, entering and then leaving the industry after short stints. The median age for those who stayed in the industry was 38 while those leaving and entering were 4 to 6 years younger. From 1968 to 2012, an annual average of 20 percent of construction workers were not employed. Between 1988 and 2013, half of the unemployed lost their jobs involuntarily. Informal construction contributes to the hollowing out of the middle class. Thirty percent of households with an income earner working informally in construction earned below-poverty wages. Households supported by an informal construction worker were three times more likely to live in poverty than households supported by a formal construction worker. The informal tax gap in 2011 was estimated to total over $774 million. The federal government lost $301 million in taxes and California lost $473 million. California unemployment insurance was cheated of $63 million, state disability $146 million, and workers’ compensation $264 million. These are conservative estimates, which only include unpaid payroll taxes and not income taxes. If the wage floor for informal construction was raised to the level of formal workers, California would benefit from $1.5 billion in economic stimulus. The federal government would receive $120 million in additional tax revenue, state and local government $100 million. Unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and state disability would receive $1.6 million.

**Bacchetta**, Marc, Ekkehard Ernst, and Juana P. Bustamante. “Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization,” 2009. Economic Research and Statistics Division **World Trade Organization**, 2009. Web. 24 Mar. 2016. <https://www.wto.org/english/res\_e/booksp\_e/jobs\_devel\_countries\_e.pdf>.

Over the past decade, world trade has expanded signiﬁ cantly. By 2007, global trade had reached more than 60 per cent of world GDP, compared with less than 30 per cent in the mid-1980s. Few would contest that increased trade has contributed to global growth and job creation. However, strong growth in the global economy has not, so far, led to a corresponding improvement in working conditions and living standards for many. Absolute poverty has declined, thanks to the economic dynamism of recent years, the efforts of private companies, migrant workers and their remittances and the international development community. Nevertheless, in many instances, labour market conditions and the quality of employment growth have not improved to the same degree. In many developing economies job creation has mainly taken place in the informal economy, where around 60 per cent of workers ﬁ nd income opportunities. However, the informal economy is characterized by less job security, lower incomes, an absence of access to a range of social beneﬁts and fewer possibilities to participate in formal education and training programmes – in short, the absence of key ingredients of decent work opportunities. Nevertheless, such an aggregate picture masks differences among informal workers at the microeconomic level as the measured wage gap varies substantially between different segments and tiers of the informal economy (Bargain and Kwenda, 2009). Indeed, depending on the type of informal work – informal employer, self-employed, casual worker or home worker – informal employment is remunerated at vastly different levels, further contributing to distributional concerns (Carr and Chen, 2002). The correlation that may be drawn from these studies is, however, no proof of causality. Indeed, recent analyses demonstrate that the link between inequality and informality is running in both directions. A higher incidence of informal employment is raising the degree of income inequality through a composition effect. At the same time, a higher degree of income inequality is increasing the size of the informal economy as individuals are prevented from joining the formal economy, due to a lack of either human or fi nancial wealth (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). In cross-country regressions an increase in the size of the informal economy by 3 percentage points can be shown to raise income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient by as much as 8 percentage points. Chong and Gradstein (2007) also show that the strength of this link depends on institutional quality, such as the degree of corruption, the integrity of the rule of law, government stability and democratic accountability. This result is also confi rmed by earlier studies which looked only at transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Rosser et al., 2000). Looking beyond the static picture of unequal income distribution, one can also draw inferences from studies analysing earnings mobility for workers transiting between different segments of the labor market.

### A/2: Infrastructure

1. **What type of investment.**
	1. **Public- Delink impact. Plumer of Vox writes the USFG has thrown mass amounts of funding towards infrastructure improvements. For instance, Obama invested $500 billion, yet infrastructure conditions continue deteriorating. The problem is that most of the funding ends up misdirected towards areas which don’t improve conditions. For instance, the SGA found most states generally spend federal dollars towards building new roads and highways rather than fixing the deteriorating ones. Forbes writes that because any spending in infrastructure would lead to cuts in things like entitlements, there would be no net growth.**
	2. **Private- only goes to rich and goes to gentrification.**
2. **Turn. Delgadillo of Governing News finds that high-end infrastructure increases the pull factor of housing and causes the mass influx of higher-income families displacing the lower-income families. Unfortunately, Chong of Georgetown University finds this gentrification excludes low income families and people of color who are often targeted, and also cut federal housing assistance- this traps those at the bottom in poverty.**

Brad **Plumer**, 2-10-**2015**, "It doesn't matter how much we spend on infrastructure if it just gets wasted," **Vox**, https://www.vox.com/2015/2/10/8012211/infrastructure-crumbling-more-spending

By now it's become a cliche to say that America's infrastructure is in disrepair. Cue that famous stat about how 24 percent of bridges are either structurally deficient or obsolete. With that in mind, many **politicians argue that the US needs to spend a lot more money on transportation. President Obama has proposed $478 billion over six years to upgrade the nation's roads, bridges, transit, and freight — a big bump from current levels.** The American Society of Civil Engineers wants to go further, asking for $1.6 trillion between now and 2020. But in many ways, calls for more money misdiagnose the problem. **One reason America's transportation infrastructure is faltering is that the considerable amount of money we *do* spend is often misdirected — leading to bloated costs and excessive sprawl while doing little to alleviate traffic congestion or deterioration.** Over at Streetsblog, Angie Schmitt recently wrote an excellent piece on this theme titled "More Money Won’t Fix U.S. Infrastructure If We Don’t Change How It’s Spent." Her basic, crucial point is that **we don't pay nearly enough attention to where all this transportation money actually goes.** Take those "crumbling" roads and bridges we hear so much about. **Right now, the federal government kicks about $50 billion a year to state transportation agencies — with roughly 80 percent going toward roads and highways (another fifth goes to public transit).** Surely that should fix the problem? Except that, **historically, states have used the majority of their money to build brand-new roads and highways rather than fix their existing ones. Between 2009 and 2011, Smart Growth America found, states spent 55 percent of road funds on new construction — even though this represents just 1 percent of the overall system.** (The amounts vary by state: North Dakota tilts heavily toward repairs, whereas Mississippi mostly focused on new building.) The remaining 45 percent of funds went to fix the other 99 percent of roadways. If all these new roads were beneficial, that might make sense. But, as Schmitt points out, that's not always the case. One study by the Center for American Progress found that 50 percent of US roads don't even generate enough traffic to pay for themselves in gas taxes. With driving on the decline and the National Highway System reaching the end of its natural lifespan, there's a good argument for devoting more scarce resources to repairing the expensive and dilapidated system we already have. Back in 2011, UCLA economist Matthew Kahn and the University of Minnesota's David Levinson made the case that Congress should devote most or even all federal gas-tax revenue toward repairs (and set up a separate infrastructure bank for new projects). For starters, they note that the productivity gains from expanding the road system were huge back in the 1950s, but those returns have diminished over time. Meanwhile, there's a good economic case for focusing on repairs. Poor road conditions are a "significant factor" in one-third of all traffic fatalities and cause extra wear-and-tear on cars. What's more, because of how pavement deteriorates, it’s much cheaper to fix a road early on, when it’s still in "fair" condition, than when it drops down to "serious" condition:

Using third quarter numbers to illustrate, the added spending would have made the reported growth of 2.8% close to 3.3%. Putting that in perspective, the average nominal growth of the U.S. economy from 1980 until just before the last recession was 6.2%. Thus, new infrastructure spending would help, but it would not get us markedly closer to the average historical rate of growth. Bear in mind, too, that for **the economy to receive the full benefit of the $275 billion investment there can be no offsetting spending cuts in other areas.** For example, **cutting the entitlement programs to do more infrastructure spending would generate no additional economic growth.**

Natalie **Delgadillo**, 9-28-**2017**, "How Cities Can Protect Poor People and Minorities From Climate Change," **Governing**, <http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-climate-change-environmental-justice-cap-report.html>

To that end, the report recommends measures like a Washington, D.C., job training program, D.C. Water Works, which is meant to boost efforts to hire locally for D.C. Water’s biggest projects. It's a dual win, CAP says: While the city makes itself more resilient to climate change, it's also helping residents do the same. **The report also mentions affordable housing and the serious equity problems that can result from city efforts to increase sustainable infrastructure. As neighborhoods become more "green," they tend to become more desirable to middle- and upper-income residents and displace the low-income residents originally living there**. Los Angeles’ Measure JJJ is an example of what cities can do to mitigate these problems. The measure set affordable housing mandates for new developments near public transit and set local hiring standards for developers and construction companies building new units. Perhaps most crucially, the report stresses the importance of outreach and communication with low-income and minority communities. “These people know what a hot day feels like, they know what a flood looks like, they know they’re vulnerable,” says Kelly. “They’re in the best position to identify risks and offer solutions.”

**Chong**, Emily. “Examining the Negative Impacts of Gentrification.” Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy, **Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy**, 17 Sept. **2017**, gjplp.org/2017/09/05/examining-the-negative-impacts-of-gentrification/#\_ftnref19.

In addition to displacement due to rising property values and coercive techniques, **low-income individuals and people of color also can face exclusion from the newly planned spaces in the gentrifying location**.[16] Common in gentrification efforts is the urban planning shift from “fostering community formation” to “investing the city with money and consumption-oriented spaces that resemble suburban shopping malls that exclude low-income and people of color.”[17**] Instead of community integration, there is selective development and enforcement of distinction between different areas.[18] Moreover, when developers do build houses, they are not building these houses for low income families. There are frequent cuts in low-income housing federal assistance**, and so new buildings are usually intended for upper-income families.[19] These spaces are societally problematic because they disproportionately exclude people of color and low-income individuals.

### A/2: Transit

1. **Infrastructure development creates a poverty trap. Glaeser of Harvard asserts that the primary cause of central city poverty is public transportation.**
	1. **According to Snow of Brown University, transportation infrastructure plays a key role in influencing changes in the spatial distribution of the population in US metropolitan areas, with each new highway causing central city population to decline by about 18 percent.**
	2. **The warrant is simple. Kuswa of the Wayne State University explains that highways and other transportation structures serve as escape hatches for wealthy citizens to live outside of the city. Because the underprivileged are unable to afford migrating out of the urban landscape, minorities in lower income neighborhoods are predominantly excluded from the suburbification process.**
	3. **Locking the poor up in inner-city ghettoes worsens inequality. Riddick of Duke University warns that there is a robust connection between infrastructure expansion and the concentration of poverty. Glaeser corroborates that regions within a mile of transit construction have poverty rates 4% higher, while Riddick confirms that a 1 standard deviation decrease in city population causes a 0.85% increase in poverty.**
2. **Building new transportation worsens the price burden on the poor.**
	1. **Bluestone of the Northeastern University writes that transportation projects trigger increases in the cost of living. When infrastructure connects cities to external regions, prices rise to accommodate increased movement through the area. Subsequently, in 74% of neighborhoods studied, transit investment caused rent prices in that area to rise faster than in the rest of the city. Joan Campbell of the Urban Land Institute adds that proximity to public transit projects leads to a 30% increase in living costs.**

**Glaeser**, Edward L., and Matthew E. Kahn. "Why Do the Poor Live in Cities? The Role of Public Transportation." Professor of Economics at **Harvard University**,. University of Chicago, Professor at the UCLA Institute of the Environment, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/2958224/why%20do%20the%20poor%20live%20in%20cities.pdf?sequence=2>.

We follow LeRoy and Sonstelie [23] and argue that the primary reason for central city poverty is public transportation. The large financial costs of automobiles make them unattractive to the poor; public transportation offers a time-intensive alternative that will be more appealing to those with low incomes. Public transportation relies on high densities, so if inner cities have public transportation and suburbs do not, then this can explain the urbanization of the poor.3 This view does not require a monocentric model. If suburbs are a complete urban environment built around the car, and inner cities are rival areas built around public transportation, then it is easy to understand why the poor live and work in inner cities. After revisiting the multiple mode model in Section 3, Section 4 calibrates the model to see whether it can explain the centralization of the poor. We use data from the 2001 National Household Transportation Survey to estimate the time costs of taking public transportation and driving. We estimate that public transportation is two to three times more important than the income elasticity of demand for land in explaining the central location of the poor. Indeed, including transport modes suggests that we should always expect the poor to centralize, at least at US levels of income inequality. The first five rows describe urbanization of poverty in the US and in the four major census regions. In the US as a whole, the poverty rate is 19.9 percent in central cities and 7.5 percent in metropolitan areas outside of the central city. The poverty rate outside of metropolitan areas is also high, but that is not the focus of this paper. The second and third rows show that the biggest city–suburb poverty gaps are in the Northeast and the Midwest. In the Northeast, the poverty rate is 14.2 percent higher in the central cities than it is in the suburbs. In the Midwest, the poverty rate is more than 14.2 percent higher than it is in the suburbs. The fourth and fifth rows show the poverty gaps for the West and the South. In both of these areas, the city–suburb poverty gap remains, but the gaps are lower. In particular, the city–suburb poverty gap in the West is only 8.6 percentage points. Any theory about the location of the poor should also be able to explain these regional differences. In the next rows of the table, we examine the possibility that the connection between city residence and poverty is treatment (i.e., cities make people poor) not selection (i.e., the poor disproportionately move to central cities). While ghettos may exacerbate poverty, these four columns show that the selection of the poor into the city is intense. The city–suburb poverty rate gap for recent movers is generally larger than the city–suburb poverty rate gap for long-term residents. Among people who came to their MSA in the last five years, the poverty rate is 21.3 percent in the central city and 10 percent in the suburbs. Among people who switched homes within the same MSA in the last five years, the poverty rate is 21.8 percent in the city and 10.4 percent in the suburbs. The natural explanation of these facts is that cities are attracting the poor, not just making them. In this regression, the key explanatory variable is a dummy that equals one if a census tract is within one mile of rail transit. In estimating this regression, we exploit a tract-level panel dataset where we observe each census tract in 1980, 1990 and 2000. In regression (1), we include metropolitan area fixed effects, year fixed effects, and MSA by year fixed effects. Tracts that are within a mile of rail transit have 4 percentage points higher poverty rates. In columns (2) and (4), we include tract fixed effects, and thus we are examining how tract poverty rates change as some census tracts are “treated” with increased access to rail transit due to city-level rail transit expansions.We find small but statistically significant results. Based on the results in columns (2) and (4), a treated tract experiences a 0.004 percentage point increase in poverty relative to nontreated tracts in the same metropolitan area that are equidistant to the CBD. While the results in Table 5 are modest, they continue to suggest the positive impact of access to public transportation on the location of the poor. Anecdotal information also suggests that changes in public transportation can lead to increased poverty. For example, Harlem’s evolution into a ghetto begins with the extension of the subway into that area (see Osofsky [31]). As public transportation came to Harlem, African Americans moved from less-segregated, less-attractive areas closer to the city center into this newly accessible place.

**Baum-Snow**, Nathaniel. "Urban Transport Expansions, Employment Decentralization, and the Spatial Scope of Agglomeration Economies." **Brown University**. National Bureau of Economic Research, Feb. 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://www.econ.brown.edu/Faculty/Nathaniel\_Baum-Snow/baumsnow\_emp\_decent.pdf>.

Table 3 quantifies the associated changes in commuting patterns for the full sample of 100 large SMSAs. It shows that while 43 percent of SMSA workers or jobs involved commutes within central cities in 1960, this share fell to just 16 percent by 2000. Over the same period, the fraction living and working in the suburban ring rose from 28 percent to 43 percent of the total. Particularly notable is that the only types of commutes with declining shares of the total were those within central cities and those from suburbs to central cities. This evidence, coupled with the slight uptick in reverse commute shares, is consistent with declines in the types of agglomeration forces that keep firms in central cities. Urban transportation improvements are an important element in explaining post-World War Two suburbanization in the United States. This paper uses unique data to estimate the effect of new highway rays on suburbanization using a 1947 plan of the interstate highway system as a source of exogenous variation. Taken together, long-difference and panel results imply an effect of one new highway ray on the change in log constant geography central-city population of about -0.09. Population in large1950 definition central cities fell on average by 28 percent between 1950 and 1990. If the average city had not received one exogenously assigned highway (2 rays), estimates thus indicate that its population decline would have been cut by more than half. Empirically, cities received 2.6 rays on average between 1950 and 1990, though not all of these were randomly assigned.” In addition, I examine the extent to which highways can explain different rates of suburbanization across decades within MSAs. To account for the potential endogeneity of highway assignment, I instrument for the total number of highways built with the number of highways in a 1947 national interstate highway plan. The measure of highways used is the number of “rays” emanating from central cities. This measure is convenient in that it is somewhat comparable across urban areas with different spatial structures and is easily observed by inspecting a map.1 This paper demonstrates that innovations to the urban transportation infrastructure played a key role in influencing changes in the spatial distribution of the population in U. S. metropolitan areas between 1950 and 1990. Empirical estimates in this paper imply that each new highway causes constant geography central city population to decline by about 18 percent, all else equal. Using this estimate, I calculate that had the interstate highway system not been built, instead of declining by 17 percent, aggregate central city population would have grown by 8 percent. Table I documents the evolution of the spatial distribution of the population in metropolitan areas between 1950 and 1990. Panel A presents trends in aggregate population growth within large MSAs and panel B presents analogous trends for large MSAs with central cities located at least 20 miles from a coast, major lake shore or international border. Table I shows that at 26 percent, the decline in 1950-definition aggregate central city population was considerably more pronounced in inland central cities than in the more complete sample. These declines came despite considerable net migration to metropolitan areas and sizable increases in total central city population. Aggregate population in central cities as defined by their political boundaries grew by 38 percent in inland MSAs and 14 percent in the full sample. Trends at the median in each of the two samples follow similar patterns as the aggregates.

**Semuels**, Alana. "The Resurrection of America's Slums." **The Atlantic**. Atlantic Media Company, 9 Aug. 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/more-americans-are-living-in-slums/400832/>.

The number of people living in high-poverty areas—defined as census tracts where 40 percent or more of families have income levels below the federal poverty threshold—nearly doubled between 2000 and 2013, to 13.8 million from 7.2 million, according to a new analysis of census data by Paul Jargowsky, a public-policy professor at Rutgers University-Camden and a fellow at The Century Foundation. That’s the highest number of Americans living in high-poverty neighborhoods ever recorded. The development is worrying, especially since the number of people living in high-poverty areas fell 25 percent, to 7.2 million from 9.6 million, between 1990 and 2000. Back then, concentrated poverty was declining in part because the economy was booming. The Earned Income Tax Credit boosted the take-home pay for many poor families. (Studies have shown the EITC also creates a feeling of social inclusion and citizenship among low-income earners.) The unemployment rate fell as low as 3.8 percent, and the first minimum wage increases in a decade made it easier for families to get by. Programs to disassemble housing projects in big cities such as Chicago and Detroit eradicated some of the most concentrated poverty in the country, Jargowsky told me.

**Riddick**, Winston. "The Impact of Suburbanization on Poverty Concentration: Using Transportation Networks to Predict the Spatial Distribution of Poverty." **Duke University**. Duke Department of Economics, 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://econ.duke.edu/uploads/media\_items/winstonriddickdjepaper.original.pdf>.

 “The results of the empirical analysis undertaken in this paper have established a robust causal connection between Federal Highway System expansion and poverty concentration. Accordingly, since we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that highway transportation networks increase both the demand for and supply of land for suburbanization, it has been argued here that it is the residential segregation induced by suburbanization that has led to increases in poverty concentration. Across the multitude of poverty concentration models established, and across the various measures of highway expansion employed, the result remains robust—as highway systems allow for decentralization in metropolitan areas, we can expect to see more neighborhoods suffering from concentrated poverty. Moreover, these models account for a significant proportion of the variation in poverty concentration rates, furthering the case for the importance of suburbanization processes as a concern in urban economics.”

**Kuswa**, Kevin Douglas. "Article: Suburbification, Segregation, and the Consolidation of the Highway Machine." The Journal of Law in Society. **Wayne State University**, Winter 2002. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=3+J.L.+Soc%27y+31&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=d2a1f9de3362e083129cff09272c9b51>.

How did the Census explain the increase in population that was taking place? Mainly, it augmented the old definition of urban with the notion of the urban fringe. The emergence of an urban fringe marked an explicit separation between two types of urbanization: primarily urban and peripherally urban. Primarily urban regions-once utopian places of commerce and leisure free from the hardships of rural existence-took on new characteristics of social malaise, such that the urban fringe became a flight away from the poverty, crime, and inadequate social services of the city. These judgments were not explicit in the Census definition and neither was the source of the momentum propelling the changes. In a way, the addition of an urban fringe that might or might not be considered urban was a reflection of two competing views of the city. n32 Shifts in the classification of urban were not expected to convey preferences for one form of settlement over another. Other historical factors indicate that highways and automobiles were serving as (and creating the need for) escape hatches for wealthy citizens to live outside of the city. It is more than coincidence that the urban fringe took on a life of its own at the very same time that highway construction into urban areas was fully funded by federal revenues. n33 The two inclusions of urban fringe-one being the densely settled regions outside the city and the other being the very densely settled regions on the city's edge-took different angles, setting up the transition from fringe to suburbia. The first inclusion required places to be unincorporated, implying that eventual incorporation would open the possibility of suburban autonomy. The second inclusion, bypassing concerns of incorporation, referred to a type of fringe that was densely settled. A dense fringe allowed the Census to distinguish between differing forms of suburban growth. In both instances, the fringe was poised to take on life of its own, weaning itself away from the city as a maturing juvenile leaves an aging parent. The fringe worked to segregate itself, with an emphasis on gate, from fears of the city. The trope of segregation must travel with the suburb, because the fear of segregation "was not spoken by government officials responsible for administering the nation's social programs." n34 National trends and sweeping generalizations of the suburb are difficult to defend. No matter how many theoretical frameworks are applied, "suburbs differ much in the circumstances of their creation, in price, size, durability, institutional complexity, and in the income, [\*44] educational level, and life style of their residents." n35 Despite all these variables, formations crop up that transcend the particulars of a given suburb. A few such formations begin to work through segregation and geographic racism (apartheid) by uniting urban highways with the suburb as a place of white privilege. The suburb was not a consequence of white people feeling as though they needed to leave the city (although that could be a factor); rather, institutional forces supported land and transportation policies that benefited certain groups at the expense of others. B. Highway and Housing Displacements: How Suburbia Contributed To Racial and Economic Inequality An auto journal in the 1920s noted: "illiterate, immigrant, Negro and other families" remained predominantly outside the market for motorcars. The fact that automobiles were available to some American families and not others had severe ramifications on class and race politics. Configurations of automobile ownership and automobile use joined with the newly entrenched terrain of the suburb to legitimize and perpetuate the marginalization of certain groups. It is important that we expand our focus to include the areas affected by the suburb and not just the suburb itself. Many minority and lower income neighborhoods were excluded from the suburbification of America; instead occupying limited land replete with collapsing infrastructure and urban pollution. These conditions, especially the segregation and differentiation of social status based on borders within the city, are not new phenomena. When horses performed many of the transportation roles in the city, pollution was just as extreme in the form of excrement and disease. […] Mumford's articulation of a regimented urban reality was compounded by the massive expansion of road building following World War II and the 1956 solidification of the highway machine. The rise of the suburb-a place partially produced by (and fueling) the highway's ability to connect the pristine periphery to the central business district-temporarily resolved Mumford's concerns of density and congestion, only to displace those problems with more severe environmental and human costs. Regardless of the organization of the suburb, the construction of highways in urban areas was a traumatic and oppressive event for the people uprooted by the highway's swath. The suburb also exacerbated the human displacement wrought by the highway because the resources necessary to soften the blow of urban construction were being consumed by suburban areas. The suburbs were typically beyond the reach of the poorest residents of the city, a barrier to entry that widened the gap between the rich and the poor**,** particularly when the poor neighborhoods were often the same neighborhoods torn up by the highway.

**Riddick**, Winston. "The Impact of Suburbanization on Poverty Concentration: Using Transportation Networks to Predict the Spatial Distribution of Poverty." **Duke University**. Duke Department of Economics, 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://econ.duke.edu/uploads/media\_items/winstonriddickdjepaper.original.pdf>.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of concentrated poverty, a phenomenon where socioeconomically deprived groups are heavily concentrated in particular neighborhoods in a metropolitan area. Drawing on Land Use Theory and the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, I develop a theory that identifies suburbanization as a principal cause of poverty concentration. Using interstate highway expansion as a source of exogenous variation in suburbanization rates, I evaluate this relationship in 240 U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1960-1990, with concentrated poverty measured at the tract level using U.S. Census data from Brown University’s Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB). Panel regressions with MSA Fixed Effects find a positive and significant relationship between highway expansion and increased poverty concentration under a variety of specifications, including alternative measures of highways and an instrumented measure of urban population decline. Results suggest that one additional highway running through an MSA increases the percentage of tracts suffering from concentrated poverty at least 0.35 points, while regressions using highway-instrumented measures of urban population as the explanatory variable find that a one % decrease in urban population increases the percentage of concentrated poverty tracts at least .05 points. […] In Long-Difference model (2), a one standard deviation decrease in the log of central city population—that is, a decline of approximately 1%—is associated with a 0.054-point increase in the percentage of tracts suffering poverty concentration 2. Model (3) adds a dummy variable to the Long-Difference model for whether an MSA’s population was below 100,000 in 1950 in order to determine if the explanatory variable is robust when considering only metropolitan areas with a “critical mass” to begin largescale suburbanization; the dummy was not significant at the .05 level and did not affect the significance or magnitude of the coefficient on central city population. In the panel regression, a decrease of one standard deviation in central city population causes an approximately 0.085-point increase in the percentage of MSA tracts with poverty rates above 40%. These results clearly indicate that suburbanization leads to more concentrated poverty, at least during the 1960-1990 period of interstate highway expansion […] Table 1 below displays the results of panel regressions using MSA fixed effects under multiple specifications. In models (1)-(3), the primary explanatory variable is the number of rays running within 1 mile of the central city’s CBD. All three models account 18 for a significant proportion of the variation in poverty concentration, with the lowest adjusted R2 equal to .255 and highest equal to .523. Moreover, change in highway development is a statistically significant (p< .001) determinant of change in poverty concentration in the models using the 40%+ or 30%+ thresholds. In Model (1), the coefficient on highway rays is 0.480. By multiplying this coefficient by the standard deviation of highway rays, it is possible to examine the “economic effect” of highway change in this model, as standardizing coefficients by the variable’s degree of variation allows us to make comparisons across the coefficients of multiple variables. After a one standard deviation increase in the number of MSA highway rays, the model predicts an increase of 0.71 points in the percentage of MSA tracts with poverty concentration above 40% (for example, from 3.0% to 3.71%). Model (2) uses a lower threshold (30%+), but the coefficient on highways has a very similar magnitude (0.654) and remains significant at the .001 level. As expected, highways are not a statistically significant predictor of poverty concentration when employing the 20%+ threshold (Model 3), as tracts with 20%+ poverty are likely influenced by a much larger number of factors. […] Figure 4 Panel A graphs coefficients on radial highways in regressions identical to those reported in Table 6 Panel B Column 1 except that log central city working population for different central city radii are the outcomes. If the central city radius is between 2 and 11 km from the CBD, each radial highway is estimated to cause decentralization of 17 to 20 percent of central city resident workers. Beyond 11 km, the addition of each km in central city radius reduces the estimated effect of each highway by about 0.01. No coefficient on true 1960 central city radius is statistically significant in these regressions. Also evident in Figure 4 is how similar coefficients are when total SMSA working population is excluded (top, blue line) versus included (bottom, red line) in the regression. Under reasonable assumptions discussed in Section 4, true causal effects of highways are bounded by these two lines. […] Figure 4 Panel B presents similar coefficient estimates but when central city radius is determined separately for each SMSA such that 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 percent of SMSA employment in 2000 is within the given radii, as calculated separately for each SMSA. The typical central city jurisdiction hosted 34 percent of SMSA employment in 2000. This normalization indicates that the drift upwards in coefficient as a function of central city size seen in Panel A begins at radii below which 10 percent of employment is in the central city, for which each radial highway causes about 25 percent of central city working residents to move to the suburbs. The highways coefficient levels off at -0.16 for radii containing 40-50 percent of year 2000 employment, which is the same estimate reported in Table 6 Panel B. Figure A3 shows similar results using data from the larger sample of 154 SMSAs of over 100,000 in population in 1960 for which some 1960 census tract data exist.16 Unfortunately, an analogous exercise for job location is not possible because of data limitations in 1960. Attempts to use data only from 2000 for such an exercise were unsuccessful and highlight the importance of first differencing in order to control for unobserved fixed factors that influenced the location of planned highways.

**Pollack**, Stephanie, Barry Bluestone, and Chase Billingham. "Maintaining Diversity In America’s Transit-Rich Neighborhoods: Tools for Equitable Neighborhood Change." Dukakis Center for Urban and Regional Policy at **Northeastern University**. The Rockefeller Foundation, Oct. 2010. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://www.reimaginerpe.org/files/TRN\_Equity\_final(2).pdf>.

This report is divided into four parts. The first chapter documents the diversity of the transit-served metropolitan areas and TRNs in the United States and explores the symbiotic relationship between diverse neighborhoods and successful transit. The second chapter reviews the most recent literature on neighborhood change, gentrification and displacement, both in general and in TRNs, and highlights the different ways in which gentrification can occur and the importance of understanding who moves into gentrifying neighborhoods. The third chapter presents the results of our new research on patterns of neighborhood change in 42 neighborhoods in 12 metropolitan areas first served by rail transit between 1990 and 2000**,** and draws conclusions about the likely mechanisms underlying the observed patterns of change in those neighborhoods. […] The average American family spends 19 percent of its monthly budget on transportation, the second highest item after housing.Using transit can create substantial savings: living in location-efficient neighborhoods (with a good mix of uses and access to public transportation) can provide a 16 percent cost savings compared to living in an automobile-dependent exurban neighborhood (CTOD, 2007). A recent Brookings Institution analysis similarly found that the working poor (those with incomes less than twice the federal poverty threshold, with a median income of $20,280 in 2003) spent 8.4 percent of their income just on commuting to work, if they commuted by driving, compared to 5.8 percent if they used public transit (Roberto, 2008). A final important group when assessing transit ridership is renters. With a disproportionate amount of rental housing located in transit-served metros and transit-rich neighborhoods,it should come as no surprise that renters are disproportionately represented among transit riders. While only 29 percent of all workers 16 years and older live in rental households, according to 2006-2008 American Community Survey data, 58 percent of those who report that they commute to work using public transportation are renters. A recent Brookings analysis of this data found that two-thirds of transit commuters in the principal cities of the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, as well as more than 40 percent of those living in the suburban portions of those metros, are renters(Istrate, Puentes & Tomer, 2010). Like members of low-income households and people of color, renters are far less likely than homeowners to own a car. The 2006-2008 American Community Survey data indicates that while 95 percent of American homeowners own one or more motor vehicles, nearly 20 percent of renter households own no motor vehicle. Household Income (see Figure 3.4) While the racial and ethnic composition does not seem to have changed in any consistent way within the new TRNs, the economic composition of those neighborhoods did**.** Median household income increased more than in the surrounding metro area in more than three-fifths (62 percent) of the TRNs.The proportion of households with incomes exceeding $100,000 a year also rose more sharply than their metro areas in 60 percent of the TRNs. Housing Costs (see Figure 3.5) The increase in incomes in these neighborhoods is reflected in the cost of housing. Median gross rent increased faster than in their metro areas in nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of the TRNs. The impact on home prices was even more dramatic, with nearly nine out of ten (88 percent) TRNs experiencing an increase in median housing values greater than the increase in home prices in the metro area. Racial and Ethnic Composition (see Figure 3.11) In about half (52 percent) of the TRNs we did not find a difference of 20 percentage points or more between the TRN and its metro area in the relative rate of change in the nonHispanic white population. Indeed, where the relative change was substantial, the non-Hispanic white population in the new TRNs was nearly twice as likely (31 percent versus 17 percent) to experience a much larger decrease in its representation in these new transit-rich neighborhoods (or a much lower increase) than the surrounding MSA. The results for non-Hispanic blacks appear to confirm this finding. Relative to their MSAs, the non-Hispanic black populations in the new TRNs were actually a bit more likely to experience an increase (29 percent) in their ranks than a decrease (19 percent). Three-fourths (75 percent) of the TRNs experienced a substantial percentage change in their Hispanic representation, but the number experiencing a substantial growth relative to their MSAs was about the same as the number experiencing a relatively lower growth rate (38 percent versus 36 percent). These results are consistent with the findings of the initial analysis that, whatever else a new transit station may portend for its neighborhood, neighborhood racial and ethnic composition does not change substantially.

**Campbell**, Joan. "ULI Research Roundup: The Impact of Transit on Property Values." **Urban Land Institute**. ULI Center, 7 Aug. 2013. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://uli.org/infrastructure-initiative/uli-research-roundup-the-impact-of-transit-on-property-values/>.

ULI’s research team often gets asked whether transit investments have resulted in increases in property values for nearby communities. As you can imagine, this is a complicated question to answer. Below are five recent reports that shed some light on this question. (And if you want the short version, the answer seems to be: yes, to a certain degree, in most cases.) The Center for Housing Policy’s 2011 report, Public Transit’s Impact on Housing Costs: A Review of the Literature, written by Keith Wardrip, concludes that the overall consensus among the studies and reports reviewed is that “proximity to public transit does lead to higher home values and rents in many cases.” But, he points out that the level of impact is debatable and is based on a number of factors, including the transit system’s level of service and dependability; housing market conditions; and the type of nearby development. The New Real Estate Mantra: Location Near Public Transportation, released in March 2013, was a team effort among the American Public Transit Association, the National Association of Realtors, and the Center for Neighborhood Technology. The report, a study of property values near transit, finds that housing values near transit facilities fared 41.6 percent better than homes that were farther away. Furthermore, a look at the issue of price resilience noted that properties with greater transit access had retained their property values. Findings are presented for five study regions—Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Phoenix, and San Francisco. The 2013 Knight Frank report, Action Stations: The Impact of Crossrail on Residential Property in Central London, takes a look at the impact of Crossrail—London’s most significant transit investment project—on property values. The researchers measured price premiums in walk zones—namely, areas within a ten-minute walk from station entrances. Results showed that since 2008, when the Royal Assent approved the Crossrail project, property prices have jumped more than 30 percent. By 2018—the year the Crossrail is scheduled to open—anticipated price performance is expected to vary by station. For example, the level of regeneration around stations will have a major impact on property values. Knight Frank, at set intervals, plans to continue monitoring prices up to the opening of Crossrail and thereafter. A study of Charlotte-area single-family home prices was conducted from 1997 through 2008. The 2012 report, The Impact of a New Light Rail System on Single-Family Property Values in Charlotte, North Carolina, presented in the Journal of Transport and Land Use last year, shows results were varied among pre−station plans, planning, construction, and operating phases. Negative price impacts were reported before the train became operational. However, after the train opened the homes located near the station began seeing positive appreciation in prices.

### A/2: Deregulation

1. **Need to contextualize/spec what kind of regulations are going away; or they have no clarity of impat on lowering the prices.**
2. **Renyolds of Next City- increases value of land makes it destination- more amentie increases displacement pressure. Upenn analyzes 67 rezonings- finds that they led to worse situation for the poor**
	1. **This circumvents the investment args they make- people get pushed out BEFORE houses are built**
3. Mitigate their solvency on face for two reasons
	1. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html> - rent control on net is what increases the prices not the zoning laws
	2. Even if you could build an entire property for free, an apartment meant for extremely low-income renters (those making 30 percent of area median income or less) probably wouldn't work at the end of the day. Those apartments could still cost more to maintain over time than the families living in them would yield in rent. That's basically the story of [what's broken with public housing today](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/nyregion/new-york-city-public-housing-has-pileup-of-repairs-comptrollers-audit-finds.html).- mitigatory defense on dereg claims
4. Huge ass delink - if supply or space  was the issue then the aff is NU, 19 million homes are already present, opening the restrictions on space isnt gonna do anything for prices or low income people
5. Turn the solvency on face as it literally contradicts what they are trying to achieve
	1. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/16/realestate/as-rents-rise-so-does-deregulation.html> aye don't put the year, this shit is 15 years old lol, phrase it as a holistic analysis - AS the New York City housing market flourished in much of the period between 1999 and 2002, the pace of apartment deregulation quickened in the most desirable neighborhoods of Manhattan and **market rents rose sharply in much of the city,** especially in Brooklyn and Queens, where median rents exceed $1,000 for the first time in some neighborhoods.
	2. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/02/realestate/the-boston-area-adjusts-to-rent-deregulation.html> holy shit - 3 different studies saying increase in prices by 75, 68, and 31

**https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&context=jlasc**

**On the one hand, some say more housing is needed to accommodate influxes of new residents and businesses to growing communities. On the other hand, others say rezoning that allows for new development can inadvertently drive out low-income residents and local businesses and — with little warning or time to adjust — alter the character of neighborhoods. “Jurisdictions are beginning to understand that up-zoning in order to absorb growth has unintended consequences — it increases the value of the real estate and therefore increases displacement pressures,” says Nora Liu, northwest regional manager for the Government Alliance on Race and Equity, a national initiative spearheaded by the nonprofit Race Forward that is working with jurisdictions around the country to pioneer equitable development strategies.**

### A/2: IZ Good

1. **Turn. Hamilton of The Strong Towns Foundation gives three warrants why inclusionary zoning is terrible.**
	1. **Inclusionary zoning creates incentives to build luxury housing and raise prices, because then developers are able to offset losses from their projects’ below-market-rate units.**
	2. **Inclusionary zoning also reduces construction because it lowers the profit margin for developers. This is incredibly important, because reducing construction means that it becomes much harder to build more houses to solve the crisis.**
	3. **Inclusionary zoning also provides very few units for a city’s most vulnerable residents. Empirically, only one affordable housing unit is made for every one hundred residents that need it.**
2. **All of this is why Stringham of Trinity College empirically found that inclusionary zoning increased prices by 20 percent and lead to 7 percent less homes overall.**
3. **Schneider of City Limits- 2 percent to poor that’s structural; 0.1 percent of housing stock**
4. **Knaap of the National Center for Smart Growth found that neighborhoods that adopted inclusionary zoning saw prices increase 2-3% faster than other neighborhoods. This is because inclusionary zoning forces housing developers to pay more which leads them to pass the prices on to middle-class house buyers.**
5. **Turn- more incentivized to go into subsidized housing- cause now they divert to whats profitable**
6. **Ow- Abello in 2017 reports how 80% of cities that use inclusionary zoning laws are just located in 3 states. In fact, only 4% of cities in the U.S. use inclusionary programs overall, their impact is a lot smaller than they’re telling you.city lab says they won’t build- take Montgomery whos population doubled but they DECREASED total IZ units- it wont pass in hard right states they cant just fiat the policy because its gotta be passed on a loal and state level.**
	1. **Density bonuses still aren’t enough. The NRIE finds that density bonuses don’t provide enough of an actual compensation for builders to actually do more compact construction. That’s why the Curbed in 2017 finds that only 329 affordable units were created in 6 years due to density bonuses, in LA.**

<https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/4/10/is-inclusionary-zoning-creating-less-affordable-housing>

<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638698>

Inclusionary zoning, also known as below-market housing mandates, is now in place in one-third of California cities and is spreading around the united states. Supporters of this policy advocate making housing more affordable by placing price controls on a percentage of new homes. But if almost all economists agree that price controls on housing reduce quantity and cause shortages, why do so many policymakers or voters support them? Ellickson [1981] argued that inclusionary zoning may be popular precisely because, contrary to the expressed goals of the program, it actually restricts supply and leads to higher prices. incumbent homeowners and policymakers catering to them can benefit from restricting new supply. using panel data and a first difference model, we test how the policy affected the price and quantity of housing in California cities between 1980, 1990, and 2000. under various specifications we find that cities adopting below-market housing mandates end up with higher prices and fewer homes. Between 1980 and 1990, cities imposing below-market housing mandates end up with 9 percent higher prices and 8 percent fewer homes overall**. Between 1990 and 2000 cities imposing below-market housing mandates end up with 20 percent higher prices and 7 percent fewer homes overall**. Consistent with Ellickson’s hypothesis, the program may not be about increasing the supply of housing or making it more affordable overall.

Gerrit-Jan **Knaap**, Antonio Bento, Scott Lowe, National Center for Smart Growth Res earch and Education, "Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning", 2008, http://smartgrowth.umd.edu/housingmarketimpactsofiz.html

We also found that **housing prices in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased about 2-3 percent faster than cities that did not adopt such policies**. In addition, we found that housing price effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced markets. That is, housing that sold for less than $187,000 (in 1988 dollars1) decreased by only 0.8 percent while housing that sold for more than $187,000 increased by 5.0 percent. These findings suggest that **housing producers** did not in general **respond to inclusionary requirements by** slowing the rate of single family housing construction but did **pass the increase in production costs on to housing consumers**. Further, housing producers were better able to pass on the increase in costs in higher priced housing markets than in lower priced housing markets.

Anti-poverty advocates: For those who live in these units, inclusionary zoning can provide an incredible socioeconomic uplift. But IZ policies are also criticized from the left due to their inability to generate substantial amounts of housing for very low-income people. One study found that only 2 percent of IZ programs target households making less than 50 percent of the AMI. And even those that do represent a tiny percentage of the need: Another study concluded that units produced via IZ represent just 0.1 percent of America’s housing stock. As the case of Washington, D.C., demonstrates, IZ is just one policy in a broad menu of options that cities have to deal with their affordable housing challenges.

https://la.curbed.com/2017/1/24/14365408/density-bonus-program-affordable-housing-report?fbclid=IwAR2LOZz\_k8h-Pt1PHgLLM0KD76V5K9PJ-WVyLaS2r2OXM9EpIMs85PH1Qus

Arguably the most successful inclusionary zoning program is in Montgomery County, Maryland, outside DC. Montgomery County’s IZ program, the first in the country, has created over 14,000 affordable units since 1974, or more than 350 a year. But while that’s relatively impressive, it’s hardly met the need: according to the County itself, there are at least 78,000 households that are still cost-burdened. Moreover, Montgomery County’s relative success has been predicated on truly massive population growth, nearly doubling from 564,000 to over a million people from 1974 to 2013. Without that kind of growth, the County would be unable to produce as many IZ units—and, indeed, as population growth has slowed, so has the number of new units. While Montgomery County produced an average of 441 units per year from 1976 to 1999, from 2000 to 2013, it has averaged just 245. **Cities that are unable or unwilling to accommodate very rapid market-rate housing construction won’t be able to replicate these results—which still haven’t come close to solving the problem.**

That said, 80 percent of jurisdictions with inclusionary housing programs are located in just three states: New Jersey, California and Massachusetts. It’s due largely to state laws or judicial decisions, the paper notes. ABELLO

### A/2: Mobility

**Richard of City Lab explains that removing housing restrictions and promoting market-rate housing in urban areas “would draw people and jobs away from the Rust Belt and Sunbelt, worsening the already bad economic situation of those states,” as workers would capitalize on the new, urban housing and move away from the Rust Belt.**

**This is bad for two reasons.**

1. **First, economic inequality. By maintaining employment growth in poorer areas, Florida concludes that strict restrictions on market-rate housing in urban areas are the “most effective restraint” on regional inequality in America. In other words, restricting market-rate housing balances growth between the Rust Belt and technology-based coastal cities, decreasing overall inequality. Phillip Longman of the Atlantic explains that, historically, wealth inequality in America dropped by 30 percent when regional inequality fell to its lowest levels - when regions grew at similar rates, national income inequality plummeted, even if inequality increased within particular regions. Because it prices out the poor, Lopez ‘04 of the World Bank quantifies that a 1 percent increase in income inequality increases poverty by 5 percent.**
2. **Second, allowing an economic transition. Building more housing in urban areas would decrease the number of workers living in the Rust Belt, thus undermining economic growth. While the media often hypes cities such as San Francisco as hubs of economic growth, Curbed News reports that the Rust Belt is transitioning away from its historical roots of manufacturing, and towards the innovative tech sector and knowledge economy. However, the Harvard Business Review finds that the Midwest needs a constant pipeline of skilled, educated workers to revitalize its economy. Benjamin Hernandez of Forbes explains that growth in the Rust Belt could be responsible for 10 million jobs in the long-term. Promoting market rate housing would undermine this, as Florida confirms that while areas as California or New York may see more growth, more vulnerable regions would see significant negative impacts, quantifying that the removal of such regulations could decrease employment growth in Rust Belt cities by as much as 300 percent, holding back the development of an entire region.**

<https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/10/the-flip-side-of-nimby-zoning/543930/>

<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/cities-economic-fates-diverge/417372/>

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPGI/Resources/342674-1119450037681/Part_1-Poverty_growth_and_inequality.pdf>

<https://www.curbed.com/2016/4/18/11453292/from-rust-belt-to-brain-belt-can-former-industrial-cities-turn-into>

**https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/13/to-save-the-american-rust-belt-stop-looking-backward/**

### A/2: Property Taxes

1. **The FBF in 2014 finds 2 things a) property taxes are used for a lot of local things such as municipal services and things such as school funding not public housing b) because so much PPT goes towards schools, the more PPT in an area the more valued the land becomes and prices start to rise. qThis is another link into a displacement. Read a)Clarity of Link impact weighing and b) the neg is just a much more direct link to poor people and their housing.**
2. **Misused- prove actual use**
3. **Bulldozing takes the arg out**

**https://freefrombroke.com/what-do-your-property-taxes-pay-for/**

### A2: Recession

1. They are muddling two different parts of the market together, the housing recessions have always been causes by the flipping houses in suburbs and defaults on mortgages to buy houses. They have never been caused by the collapse of urban neighborhoods rental market. Affirming means more rentals not new houses that are made in suburbs, they don’t solve.
2. Crash coming for alternative reasons. [Chicago Tribune in 2019](https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-recession-economists-survey-20190225-story.html) finds that most economists predict that a slowdown in global growth and the trade wars are the most significant causes of the next recession.
3. The [New York Times in 2019](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/business/economy/housing-recession.html) finds that the housing sector is literally already in a recession, it still has construction levels below 1990 when the bust started to occur, and is actually decreasing GDP in the status quo. This why they conclude the sector is bad right now, it might get worse, but it won’t cause a recession.
	1. This means you turn the argument because by voting for them you cause the housing sector to actually recover in the first place, which causes the ability of the recession to happen in the first place.
4. Then T[he Balance in 2018](https://www.thebalance.com/is-the-real-estate-market-going-to-crash-4153139) gives even more reasons the status quo is not a bubble in housing.
	1. Demand will be low because the past recession destroyed the capitol of many young people people. In fact the GPG this month finds that demand and construction activity are falling, with lowest homebuilder sentiment in more than 3 years.
	2. The Price Increases once adjusted for inflation are still significantly below what they were before the last recession, where prices rose by 16% just in one year, 2005.
	3. There is zero speculation in the status quo, things such as easy credit and buyer speculation which caused the 2008 recession, are being cracked down on in the status quo.
5. Even if the recession does happen **Rogic** finds that this period won’t last for too long allowing the market to take an upward turn soon afterward towards a recovery. {INCORPORATE WEIGHING}.

https://www.globalpropertyguide.com/North-America/United-States/Price-History

After six years of strong house price growth, the U.S. housing market is now cooling. House price rises are decelerating gradually. Demand and construction activity are falling, amidst rising interest rates. Homebuilder sentiment is also at its lowest in more than three years.

# A/2: CON

### A/2: Gentrification

1. **Turn. Gonzalez of The GFKD writes that the reason gentrification happens is because of rising costs of living due to zoning laws. She explains that deregulation stops these restrictions and stops the process. Richardo of New York University thus concludes the chance of displacement is only 1% for neighborhoods with new market rate with gentrification housing and displacement is neighborhoods without market rate housing is 15 times higher.**
2. **Turn. Gentrification good for poor for three reasons.**
	1. **The Economist reports New York neighborhoods with new market rate housing have less displacements than in areas without new market rate housing. The reason is because gentrification brings closer sources of employment to the unemployed, local businesses gain more costumers, and residents can enjoy new amenities.**
	2. **The Washington Post writes that gentrification often leads to new construction or to investment in once-vacant properties, causing poverty to drop by 18 percent without displacement.**
	3. **Hurst of the University of Chicago reports that poorer neighborhoods 1 mile away from rich one experienced 23% lower poverty rates, 11% higher incomes, and 25% higher college graduation rates due to increasing the monetary circulation within neighborhoods with gentrification.**

<https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/06/21/in-praise-of-gentrification> (https://outline.com/kaWXwP)

The anti-gentrification brigades often cite anecdotes from residents forced to move. Yet the data suggest a different story. An influential study by Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi found that poor residents living in New York’s gentrifying neighbourhoods during the 1990s were actually less likely to move than poor residents of non-gentrifying areas. A follow-up study by Mr Freeman, using a nationwide sample, found scant association between gentrification and displacement. A more recent examination found that financially vulnerable residents in Philadelphia—those with low credit scores and no mortgages—are no more likely to move if they live in a gentrifying neighbourhood. These studies undermine the widely held belief that for every horrid kale-munching millennial moving in, one longtime resident must be chucked out. The surprising result is explained by three underlying trends. The first is that poor Americans are obliged to move very frequently, regardless of the circumstances of their district, as the Princeton sociologist Matthew Desmond so harrowingly demonstrated in his research on eviction. The second is that poor neighbourhoods have lacked investment for decades, and so have considerable slack in their commercial and residential property markets. A lot of wealthier city dwellers can thus move in without pushing out incumbent residents or businesses. “Given the typical pattern of low-income renter mobility in New York City, a neighbourhood could go from a 30% poverty population to 12% in as few as ten years without any displacement whatsoever,” noted Messrs Freeman and Braconi in their study. Indeed, the number of poor people living in New York’s gentrifying neighbourhoods barely budged from 1990 to 2014, according to a study by New York University’s Furman Centre. Third, city governments often promote affordable-housing schemes, such as rent control or stabilisation, in response to rising rents. Gentrification has been so thoroughly demonised that a mere discussion of its benefits might seem subversive. That does not make them any less real. Residents of gentrifying neighbourhoods who own their homes have reaped considerable windfalls. One black resident of Logan Circle, a residential district in downtown Washington, bought his home in 1993 for $130,000. He recently sold it for $1.6m. Businesses gain from having more customers, with more to spend. Having new shops, like well-stocked grocery stores, and sources of employment nearby can reduce commuting costs and time. Tax collection surges and so does political clout. Crime, already on the decline in American city centres, seems to fall even further in gentrifying neighbourhoods, as MIT economists observed after Cambridge, Massachusetts, undid its rent-control scheme. Those who bemoan segregation and gentrification simultaneously risk contradiction. The introduction of affluent, white residents into poor, minority districts boosts racial and economic integration. It can dilute the concentration of poverty—which a mountain of economic and sociological literature has linked to all manner of poor outcomes, including teenage pregnancy, incarceration and early death. Gentrification steers cash into deprived neighbourhoods and brings people into depopulated areas through market forces, all without the necessity of governmental intervention. The Trump administration is unlikely to offer large infusions of cash to dilapidated cities. In these circumstances, arguing against gentrification can amount to insistence that poor neighbourhoods remain poor and that racially segregated neighbourhoods stay cut off.

**Gonzalez** How Zoning Regulations May Be Accelerating Gentrification, [FKD], [http://www.genfkd.org/how-zoning-regulations-may-be-accelerating-gentrification,//ZS](http://www.genfkd.org/how-zoning-regulations-may-be-accelerating-gentrification%2C//ZS)

Regardless of your opinion on gentrification, **one thing is becoming clearer – strict land-use regulations, including housing and zoning requirements,** can **accelerate the proc**ess. When there is a sudden increase in demand in an area, **housing developers need to be able to quickly respond by building more housing units. Some zoning limits delay, or block, development which distorts the market and limits the number of units. "When paired with rising demand pressure, laws such as these are a recipe for disaster.**" When paired with rising demand pressure, laws such as these are a recipe for disaster. They restrict supply and cause prices to rise artificially. If supply were allowed to operate freely, prices would not rise so drastically. **When restrictions are imposed on how many housing units can be built**, or how tall they can built, **this significantly limits the ability for markets to adjust to fluctuations in demand**. It holds back the young workers looking to move to a new city for a new job and **it ties the hands of housing developers who want to build more. Most importantly, it accelerates the very process the policies are meant to alleviate – the destruction of local communities due to rising costs of living.**

What distinguishes gentrification is not who moves out; it’s who moves in. In a gentrifying neighborhood, new residents are more likely to be well-off . **As a result, the neighborhood’s poverty makeup can shift, even if no one leaves. In 2004, I found that a neighborhood’s poverty rate could drop from 30 percent to 12 percent in a decade with minimal because. That’s gentrification often leads to new construction or to investment in once-vacant properties.**

https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/the-complicated-link-between-gentrification-and-displacement/404161/

Perhaps the foremost student of gentrification and displacement is Lance Freeman of Columbia University. His 2004 study with Frank Braconi found that **poor households in gentrifying neighborhoods of New York City were less likely to move than poor households in non-gentrifying neighborhoods**. This of course may have to do with the fact that there are less poor households in gentrifying neighborhoods to begin with. Still, the authors concluded that “a neighborhood could go from a 30% poverty population to 12% in as few as 10 years without any displacement whatsoever.” In a subsequent 2005 study, Freeman found that **the probability that a household would be displaced in a gentrifying neighborhood was a mere 1.3 percent**. A follow-up 2007 study, again with Braconi, examined apartment turnover in New York City neighborhoods and found that the probability of displacement declined as the rate of rent inflation increased in a neighborhood. **Disadvantaged households in gentrifying neighborhoods were actually 15 percent less likely to move than those in non-gentrifying households**. And, in a 2009 study, Freeman found that gentrifying neighborhoods are becoming more racially diverse by tracking neighborhood change from 1970-2000 (although he does note that cities overall are becoming more diverse as well). Freeman also discovered that changes in educational diversity were the same for both gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas. Ultimately, while some residents were displaced from 1970-2000, gentrifying neighborhoods were generally more diverse when it came to income, race, and education as opposed to non-gentrifying neighborhoods.

Frank **Braconi**. "Housing, Planning and Economic Development in New York: Gentrification and Displacement." Professor of Planning, Columbia University. Community Preservation Corporation and Chase Manhattan Foundation, Jan.-Feb. 2002. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://www.chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/UP\_Gentrification\_Displacement1.pdf>.//ZS

The growth of an affluent professional class in a number of the nation’s cities during recent decades has been perceived as a mixed blessing by many social scientists, policymakers, and community activists. Most recognize t**he beneficial effects, which include renewed housing investment, improved retail services and a revived tax base**. Some even hope that the gentrification of urban neighborhoods can be managed to promote greater racial and economic integration than currently exists. But there is also a backdrop of suspicion: some see gentrification as a new type of “land grab” that will work to the disadvantage of the poor and the powerless. Our research sheds new light on the gentrification process. Although it does not prove that secondary displacement of the poor does not occur in gentrifying areas, it suggests that demographic transition is not predicated on displacement. Low-income households actually seem less likely to move from gentrifying neighborhoods than from other communities. improving housing and neighborhood conditions appear to **encourage the housing stability of low-income households to the degree that they more than offset any dislocation resulting from rising rents.** Using logit regression, a type of statistical analysis that allows a researcher to evaluate the probability of an event occurring, we analyzed renter mobility. When compared to poor households not residing in one of the seven gentrifying neighborhoods identified above, poor households residing in those neighborhoods were found to be **24 percent less likely to have moved** during the 1991-1999 period. When we use the lack of a four-year degree as our measure of disadvantage, this relationship is still evident. Households without a college degree were 15 percent less likely to have moved if they lived in a gentrifying neighborhood. Based on this analysis it appears that gentrification actually suppresses, rather than raises, the probability that a disadvantaged household will move out of its apartment.

Guerrieri, Veronica, Daniel Hartley, and Eric **Hurst**. "Endogenous Gentrification and Housing Price Dynamics." University of Chicago. National Bureau of Economic Research, 28 Jan. **2013**. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. <http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/erik.hurst/research/gentrification\_jpube\_final\_publish.pdf>.//ZS

The results from estimating (21) are shown in Table 7. In response to a city-wide housing demand shock, it is the poor census tracts that are in close proximity to the rich census tracts that are much more likely to experience rising incomes, declines in the poverty rate, and rising educational attainment of residents relative to poor census tracts that are farther from the rich census tracts. Specifically, in response to a one-standard deviation instrumented income shock, poor census tracts that were 1 mile from rich neighborhoods experienced income growth that was 1.7 percentage points higher than poor neighborhoods that were 4 miles away. Given that the average census tract in our sample experienced income growth of 14.9 percent during the decade, this represents an increase in income of 11 percent for poor neighborhoods that are close to rich neighborhoods in response to a one standard deviation instrumented income shock. Likewise, **poor neighborhoods that are 1 mile from the rich neighborhoods experienced 23 percent lower increases in the poverty rate and 25 percent higher increases in the fraction of residents with a college degre**e or more relative to otherwise similar poor neighborhoods that are 4 miles from the rich neighborhoods.

### A/2: Displacement

1. **Turn. Taylor for The Legislative Analyst Office reports that finds that because building more market rate housing decreases rents and creates long term affordable housing, it significantly reduces displacement pressures on communities. For this reason, Kinney of Next City quantifies that the probability of displacement in a high construction neighborhood is 50 percent less than of that in a low construction one.**
2. **Building more housing solves for 2 reasons.**
	1. **Hertz of City Observatory writes that market rate housing helps to increase supply which leads to more affordability.**
	2. **Wagner of New York University finds that because there is a deficient supply of middle-income housing , the privileged move to lower income areas, causing gentrification. More market-rate housing allows for these Americans to be more evenly distributed through the city and reduce levels of gentrification**
3. **No net impact. Elkind of the University of Boulder provides 3 benefits of housing development for low income tenants in particular:**
	1. **First, it increases the supply of housing, reducing displacement pressures.**
	2. **Second, it acts as future low-income housing without subsides as properties age and deteriorate in attractiveness.**
	3. **Third, it increased tax revenue for local governments to spend on subsidized housing.**

https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3345

Encouraging additional private housing construction can help the many low–income Californians who do not receive assistance. Considerable evidence suggests that **construction of market–rate housing reduces housing costs for low–income households and, consequently, helps to mitigate displacement in many cases.** Bringing about more private home building, however, would be no easy task, requiring state and local policy makers to confront very challenging issues and taking many years to come to fruition. Despite these difficulties, these efforts could provide significant widespread benefits: lower housing costs for millions of Californians.

Another analysis published by Trulia draws similar conclusions. It found that between 1990 and 2014, the median price per square foot in various tech-industry-intensive cities was, again, directly tied to construction permit numbers**. Raleigh and Austin, which had about six times the permits as San Francisco, had 1/6th the prices.** Even trendier metros like Seattle and DC had double the permit numbers, but a third of the costs.

Daniel **Hertz**. "Report: Market-rate housing construction is a weapon against displacement". **City Observatory**, 9-2-**2016**, http://cityobservatory.org/report-market-rate-housing-construction-is-a-weapon-against-displacement/

That finding comes from California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office, which just released [a new report on the state’s ever-growing affordability crisis](http://www.lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3345). Using a broad definition of displacement—any decline of a neighborhood’s low-income population relative to its total population—the LAO shows that, even controlling for other demographic factors, Bay Area **communities with the greatest expansion of market-rate housing also see the least low-income displacement.**

The effect is strong: **changing from a low-construction neighborhood to a high-construction neighborhood was associated with a decline in the probability of displacement from 46 percent to 26 percent.**

Ethan **Elkind**,2 -7-**2018**, New Market-Rate Housing Reduces Displacement &amp; Gentrification Pressure, ColoradoBoulevard.net, [https://www.coloradoboulevard.net/new-market-rate-housing-reduces-displacement-gentrification-pressure/,//ZS](https://www.coloradoboulevard.net/new-market-rate-housing-reduces-displacement-gentrification-pressure/%2C//ZS)

But the study also indicates that new market-rate housing may have three primary benefits for low-income tenants: **It can reduce displacement pressure overall** (although less so than new affordable units). **This housing stock eventually “filters” over the coming decades into low-income housing, as it gets older and therefore less desirable to higher-income earners. As a result, it provides an investment in the unsubsidized housing of the future (most low-income residents live in market-rate housing, not subsidized units). New market-rate development can provide local governments with the revenue they need to fund new subsidized units, via impacts fees, inclusionary zoning, or higher tax revenue.** There’s no denying that displacement is a genuine concern, and policies to promote new housing need to take that concern into account. But opposing new market-rate housing, particularly near transit, is not a solution. In fact, it’s part of the problem

Nyu **Wagner**,11-29-**2017**, Gentrification: It's complicated, No Publication, [https://wagner.nyu.edu/news/story/gentrification-its-complicated,//ZS](https://wagner.nyu.edu/news/story/gentrification-its-complicated%2C//ZS)
“The government should not stop gentrification,” countered Dr. Freeman, saying new **market-rate housing can have broad, positive results.** But, he said, "That doesn’t mean that governments should do nothing”– and suggested a designated tax to create affordable housing and dampen displacement. Any city would be hard-pressed at the same time to halt gentrification, considering so many people are seeing cities as attractive places to live, said Freeman. Greenberg readily embraced the addition of a tax, perhaps in the form of a sales tax, to create affordable housing in cities like New York, where "hyper-investment," dislodgement, and homelessness have all grown. The problem with alternate approaches to the problem, like special tax abatement programs to require affordable units within new, market-rate housing, is that they can often end up touching off gentrification and displacement throughout the surrounding neighborhood. Even public/private partnerships in affordable housing development rarely work: "Developers demand way too much, the city capitulates, and designated affordable units are often more expensive than the people in those neighborhoods are used to paying or can pay,” he said. Dr. Freeman responded, “I agree with a lot of sentiment that Michael is expressing regarding some of the problems that happen..." and mentioned the need for government to take active steps to preserve affordable units. But, he contended, discouraging market-rate housing in lower-income areas across the board is not the wisest public policy to follow. **“People want to move into the city, it’s driving gentrification,” Freeman said. If we don't build the market-rate housing, then “where are those people going to go? They will eventually look for housing that is currently occupied by moderate-income households….It won’t necessarily stop the problem; it might indeed accelerate gentrification in some neighborhoods.”**

M

### A/2: Bulldozing

Second, the Washington Post reports **there is still plenty of room in urban areas for new housing. In fact, San Francisco and Los Angeles have room for 30% more people if empty land near train tracks and train stops were used. There is space Manhattan proves- 25 percent less dense.**

**SMASH THE ARGUMENT CASUE` Bachrach of UCLA writes in analysis of 104 developments that 13 times as many units build and 22 percent were affordable- 6 times as many before. Wash posts writes specifcalyy in LA when we remove regulations u cause the hift to more high density building homes- take down single family homes to build multifamily which is why they write there’s an increase in 2 million houses.**

Third, deregulation solves. Palo Alto News reports removing zoning laws to increase housing production would allow higher density housing such as apartments in be created in more areas of cities saving room.

Finally, recognize the first houses that would be bulldozed would be the abandoned ones that create crime. These empty houses would be bulldozed rather than the ones that have people living in them because abandoned houses would be cheaper to purchase. Why would companies bulldoze existing housing which is expensive when you can build housing on empty land which is cheaper.

**https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2018/10/11/to-spur-housing-production-palo-alto-rewrites-zoning-rules**

After years of sluggish residential growth, Palo Alto officials are preparing for a significant revision to the city's zoning code with the goal of lowering some of the highest hurdles facing housing developers. The changes, which the City Council will consider and could potentially approve this year, touch on everything from parking standards and density limits to open-space requirements and new "minimum density" standards for zones that allow multi-family housing. The Planning and Transportation Commission, which has been discussing the rule changes over a series of six meetings, on Wednesday gave its seal of approval to the zoning reforms, voting 5-1, with Doria Summa dissenting and William Riggs absent, to forward them to the council.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/06/there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-city-that-has-run-out-of-room/> (https://outline.com/w7mMTA)

And the real question for any community is whether those costs have grown so steep that they overwhelm all the benefits. "For the vast majority of U.S. cities," says Berkeley economist Enrico Moretti, "we’re far from the point." That's true of the Bay Area, he says, where a [housing crisis](http://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/S-F-Mayor-Ed-Lee-proposes-deal-to-spur-more-6536271.php?t=a45718a5a6&cmpid=twitter-premium) has grown out of the fear that the region can't bear all of the people who want to live there.

What is at stake, he says, is all the housing the Bay Area could add without substantially altering its character, without turning it into Hong Kong. Just replace the surface parking lots, and the under-developed land near train stops, add a story or two here and there without paving over the scenic hills, and Moretti estimates the Bay Area has space for 30-40 percent more people. In the city of Los Angeles, **replacing single-family homes with modest four-unit buildings would make room for nearly 2 million new housing un**its, says Devin Bunten, a Ph.D. student working with Kahn. "It’s hard to think that we’d have [a rent crisis facing our city](http://projects.scpr.org/longreads/high-rent-few-options/)," Bunten says, "if we allowed that kind of thing to happen."

104 new multifamily developments, we found that more than 13 times as many units were constructed across the city than were demolished (see Table 1). We also found that 22 percent of the new units were affordable — income-restricted and/or permanent supportive housing for formerly homeless people. There were 460 such units, which is more than six times greater than the number of multifamily units lost to demolitions

Mark Twain said, “Buy land, because they’re not making it anymore.” And along those lines, it’s easy to assume that many cities are out of space to build. It’s also an incorrect assumption. Consider that Manhattan’s density was 25% higher in 1910 than today.

### A/2: Segregation

First, The US Economic Service reports **market rate housing creates attractive housing for middle class black households.**

Second, **Slate reports black households benefited the most from the investment brought by market rate housing.**

Third, City Lab reports **market rate housing actually increases diversity of race, income and education creating better communities.**

1. **ALL OF THIS IS WHY Market rate housing does not lead to segregation. According to Hellstrom of the Royal Institute, market rate housing did not increase economic segregation in Sweden.**
2. **Zoning Policies exacerbate segregation even more by restricting of housing that appeal to certain types of minorities. In fact Resseger of Harvard in 2013 empirically finds that ½ of the difference in segregation between strictly regulated Massachusetts and loosely regulated Houston can be attributed solely to zoning regulations. Increase upward mobility and economic growth, reduce inequality actual ways to help people organically rise out of these situations.**

[**http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/resseger/files/resseger\_jmp\_11\_25.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0nF1AXVbDIdnlrBLf80FDYtDpHCdCxGCpZ6ew\_0i\_qX523Z6Il46vRriU**](http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/resseger/files/resseger_jmp_11_25.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0nF1AXVbDIdnlrBLf80FDYtDpHCdCxGCpZ6ew_0i_qX523Z6Il46vRriU)

https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/09/the-complicated-link-between-gentrification-and-displacement/404161/

Disadvantaged households in gentrifying neighborhoods were actually 15 percent less likely to move than those in non-gentrifying households.And, in a 2009 study, Freeman found that gentrifying neighborhoods are becoming more racially diverse by tracking neighborhood change from 1970-2000 (although he does note that cities overall are becoming more diverse as well). Freeman also discovered that changes in educational diversity were the same for both gentrifying and non-gentrifying areas. Ultimately, while some residents were displaced from 1970-2000, gentrifying neighborhoods were generally more diverse when it came to income, race, and education as opposed to non-gentrifying neighborhoods.

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802068/#R10> (gov source from US Department of Agriculture)

This is consistent with the in-migration results reported in [Table 5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802068/table/T5/). Our findings suggest that rather than dislocating non-white households, gentrification of predominantly black neighborhoods creates neighborhoods that are attractive to middle-class black households, particularly those with children or with elderly householders. One reasonable interpretation, particularly given recent work by [Bayer and McMillan (2006)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802068/#R2) and [Bayer, Fang and McMillan (2005)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802068/#R1), is that because these neighborhoods are experiencing income gains, but also more racially diverse than established middle-class neighborhoods, they are desirable locations for black middle-class households.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/01/the-gentrification-myth-its-rare-and-not-as-bad-for-the-poor-as-people-think.html

In 2010, University of Colorado–Boulder economist Terra McKinnish, along with Randall Walsh and Kirk White, examined gentrification across the nation as a whole over the course of the 1990s. McKinnish and her colleagues found that gentrification created neighborhoods that were attractive to minority households, particularly households with children or elderly homeowners. They found no evidence of displacement or harm. While most of the income gains in these neighborhoods went to white college graduates under the age of 40 (the archetypical gentrifiers), black high school graduates also saw their incomes rise. They also were more likely to stay put. In short, black households with high school degrees seemed to benefit from gentrification. McKinnish, White, and Walsh aren’t the only researchers whose work suggests that blacks often benefit from gentrification. In his book, Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial Equality, sociologist Patrick Sharkey took a close look at black neighborhoods that saw significant changes to their ethnic composition between 1970 and 1990. He found that when the composition of black neighborhoods changed, it wasn’t because whites moved in. That rarely happens. For black communities, neighborhood change happens when Latinos begin to arrive. Sometimes these changes can be difficult, resulting as they often do in new political leaders and changes to the character of the communities. But Sharkey’s research suggests they also bring real benefits. Black residents, particularly black youth, living in more diverse neighborhoods find significantly better jobs than peers with the same skill sets who live in less diverse neighborhoods. In short, writes Sharkey, “There is strong evidence that when neighborhood disadvantage declines, the economic fortunes of black youth improve, and improve rather substantially

**https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616710600787718?scroll=top&needAccess=true**

### A/2: Recession

1. **Two warrants as to why they have no solvency.**
	1. **Lauren of Fortune finds that there is “near certainty” that the economy falls into a recession in 2020 as a result of global jitters, heightened political tensions, and the actions of the federal reserve.**
	2. **Marterson of Seeking Alpha explains that the Housing Bubble is in the process of begninng to pop anyways.**
	3. **They provide zero contextualization about how much worse it gets in an AFF world- if anything, we have the only risk of solvency because they’re guaranteed a debt disaster.**
2. **Thoma of CBS writes that before the next recession we need to spend majorly on infrastructure such as housing to boost interest rates higher, so the Fed has more room to deal with the recession. This pre-requisites their entire impact. Prefer it on historical analysis, CBS does the analysis and finds that we should have done this back in 2008, where it would have brought sustained economic growth.**
3. **aff prev pop bc u slowly lower price w supply and demand rather than allow a sudden drop in price thats inevitable in squo when ppl sell off like crazy**

**Laursen**, Lucas. “What Are the Odds of a U.S. Recession by 2020? Larry Summers Says They're Pretty High.” **Fortune**, Fortune, 16 Nov. **2018**, fortune.com/2018/11/16/larry-summers-recession-by-2020/.

The former U.S. treasury secretary told CNBC Thursday that **an economic retraction was a “near certainty” because of jitters within global finance, heightened political tensions worldwide and the actions of the Federal Reserve.** A survey this summer of business economists revealed that a majority also think the next recession will arrive by 2020. If these theories are proved correct, it will bring an end to a lengthy period of economic expansion that started in June 2009. Indeed, should the U.S. economy continue to expand until July 2019, it would become a record-breaking streak, according to the nonprofit National Bureau of Economic Research.

**Thoma**, Mark. “How Congress Can Help Fight the next Recession.” **CBS News**, CBS Interactive, 31 May **2016**, www.cbsnews.com/news/how-congress-can-help-fight-the-next-recession/?fbclid=IwAR0fm\_elXIhx5YVAfCXkQ1Gcc-UK7ueleN6Pd2TUSB-0L6bvxSidXM\_xQZs.

**Renewing America's commitment to improving its infrastructure -- which has provided proven economic benefits in the past -- would help to create jobs, increase GDP growth above its currently stubborn low rate and help ensure against the possibility that low growth will continue**. In addition, with interest rates as low as they are now, the cost of borrowing the money needed to make infrastructure investments is extraordinarily low, and the longer we wait to make the necessary investment the more costly it will be. During the period from 1982-2007, known as the Great Moderation, fluctuations in output and employment were relatively mild, and the Fed was able to stabilize the economy without the need for assistance from fiscal policymakers. The country became used to relying on the Fed, and fiscal policy was all but forgotten. But in a severe recession, fiscal policy must be part of the response, and Americans ought to be able to expect economic needs to trump political gamesmanship. In any case, **we should certainly expect Congress to meet the country's infrastructure needs, especially when it helps fight a current or future recession.**

[**https://seekingalpha.com/article/4224702-ben-jones-housing-bubble-popping-right-now**](https://seekingalpha.com/article/4224702-ben-jones-housing-bubble-popping-right-now)

### A2: Vacancies

http://eyeonhousing.org/2019/02/what-do-vacancy-rates-tell-us-about-the-shortage-of-housing/

### A2: Housing Bubbles

www.businessinsider.com/housing-market-prices-about-toplummet-

Worldwide-2018-7

<https://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/39966-mortgage-experts-agree-there-is-no-housing-bubble>

https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/america-isnt-housing-bubble-some-cities-might-be

<https://www.marketwatch.com/story/no-bubble-7-reasons-why-its-still-a-great-time-to-buy-a-house-2018-04-27>

https://economyandmarkets.com/markets/real-estate/this-bubble-is-all-about-supply-not-demand/

### A2: Recession

1. We are already reaching the trend. [**Business Insider**](https://www.businessinsider.com/housing-market-prices-about-to-plummet-worldwide-2018-7)finds that we are already on the path towards the bubble being popped, as there is a predictable trend in housing bubbles. First, some force in the market drives prices to unsustainably affordable levels. Then, homeowners perceive that prices can only peak so far that they start selling homes. According to Business Insider, we are already in stage two as the supply of homes for sale during the "all important" spring market rose at 3x last year's rate, 30 of america's 100 largest cities already have more inventory than they did a year ago, and mortgage applications for new homes dropped Year over Year by 9%
	1. They have no uniqueness, recession gonna happen anyways.
	2. **Harry Dent** finds that this time around, it’s not demand that has created the bubble, rather its the insanely low supply. The peak of the bubble is when supply becomes so bad that prices are unsustainable - aff has only risk of offense
2. Even if the recession does happen **Rogic** finds that this period won’t last for too long allowing the market to take an upward turn soon afterward towards a recovery. Indeed [Marketwatch in 2018](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/were-probably-at-peak-housing-heres-what-that-means-2018-06-27) finds that we are already at peak housing, the correction in the market that occurs now would just be gradually decreasing prices, and that if there was a recession it would be a modest one, not one that collapses the real estate industry.{INCORPORATE WEIGHING}.

https://theoofy.com/37406/housing-bubble-predictions-will-housing-market-crash-soon-in-2019-again-wed-mar-13/

According to Lisa Sturtevant, the chief economist of Virginia Realtors and housing consultant, recession is less likely to happen although house sales and prices have been experiencing bear trends for quite some time. Sturtevant further stated in one of her most recent interviews that even if recession does take place, the proportions of the depression should be small, adding that “most people won’t lose their homes”. A great number of economists believe that the recession will come after all, especially in case the housing market continues at a downward trend, predicting that the recession is more likely to happen at the end of 2019, or the beginning of 2020. Even if the recession was to happen, according to analysts, this dreadful period won’t last for too long, allowing the market to take an upward turn soon afterward towards a partial recovery.

### A2: Construction Shortage

1.       **Turn-** we are the only ones who can possibly solve, **Breech ’17 of City Metric[1]** explains that because rent control, and current zoning restrictions prevent companies and cities from being able to attract workers, meaning when more projects are taken on that increases that incentive to recruit, and fill the current labor shortage

[1] Anthony Breach,10-18-2017, Here’s why rent control might make the housing crisis worse, No Publication, [https://www.citymetric.com/politics/here-s-why-rent-control-might-make-housing-crisis-worse-3412,//ZS](https://www.citymetric.com/politics/here-s-why-rent-control-might-make-housing-crisis-worse-3412%2C/ZS)

As such, rent controlled luxury apartments in elite neighbourhoods in Manhattan have been rented out for decades at less than £100 a month, but average one-bed apartments without rent control in working class parts of Brooklyn cost upwards of £1,300 a month. Rent control in Stockholm sees locals wait decades for new rent-controlled flats. And Berlin’s experience of rent control has not achieved their stated goal of stopping gentrification and has caused some rents to spike as landlords respond to the new incentives. All **the international evidence shows that rent controls divide renters into the privileged and the outsiders. Those already in rented flats when controls are introduced do well, but the city’s young people and migrants from the rest of the country and abroad are penalised as they need the new homes that are not being built. The shortage of housing then makes it harder for cities to attract the workers and firms they need to be successful.** Expensive cities like Cambridge have to manage the costs of growth by building more housing and using the new tax revenues to fund more infrastructure in the key locations that have lots of jobs and opportunities. Rent controls will make this more difficult and worsen the inequality of growth within successful cities. Labour is also promising a big expansion of social housing, and it could be argued that this would balance out any negative effects of introducing rent control on the private housebuilding industry. This is unlikely. London needs roughly 50,000 homes a year, and is currently building 20,000, mostly privately. Even at the peak of municipal social housing in the 1960s London Boroughs were not building

Leverage Stuff: Market Housing Increases Shortage

First, Terminal Defense: [Rothstein of Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/bisnow/2017/08/09/the-construction-labor-shortage-needs-major-institutional-fixes/#467cd3544749) in 2017 finds that construction shortages happen cyclically because recessions happen cyclically. When a recession triggers, construction workers move out of the industry. Just as they tell you in case, the 2008 recession is the reason for the current worker shortages. This means they don’t get long term solvency because another recession is gonna drive workers out as soon as they come back.

Then, delink them: Status quo isn’t solving. [Rothstein of Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/bisnow/2017/08/09/the-construction-labor-shortage-needs-major-institutional-fixes/#467cd3544749) continues that we will never be able to solve the construction shortage because of major institutional barriers like the lack of the existence of training programs. Trump already cut technical college funding by 15% this year.

Then, another piece of terminal defense: Rothstein concludes that the construction worker shortage puts the most pressure on projects that require skilled workers.

[Consigli](https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/311785) elaborates saying that the worker shortage really only exists when it comes to building things that require high skill and training like laboratories and hospitals.

Second, market-rate housing better than affordable housing.

While we can’t solve for the shortage because recessions are inevitable, it is preferable to develop market-rate housing because it’s cheaper to build. [Frank 17](http://www.capoliticalreview.com/capoliticalnewsandviews/why-is-affordable-housing-so-expensive-to-build/) gives the warranting as he concludes that the government mandates that labor on government projects be unionized which increases the overall costs of government projects by 20%. The pro team actually decreases rent for this very reason - if it is cheaper to build a market rate house, the input costs are lower, thus rents decrease. Additionally, the worker wages argument is a non-issue because of this response.

“The scarcity is felt the most on larger developments, rather than single-family homes, due to their complexity and the skill required to complete them.” - Rothstein about worker shortage of high skilled

“This diminished supply of construction workers will ultimately have a significant impact on the development and renovation of buildings that house critical infrastructure like laboratories, hospitals, schools, dormitories, businesses and more. So, as the supply gap begins to impact other industries, how can the construction industry move forward in order to prevent negative effects on the overall economy? Here are some ways.” - Consigli on labratories and stuff

<https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1052&context=plr>

### A/2: Luxury Market

1. **Evans of The Financial Times gives two reasons why luxury housing won’t be built.**
	1. **First, for every 100 luxury houses created only 8 are being sold leading to a severe surplus as supply is far exceeding demand.**
	2. **Second, mayors of major cities are facing large political pressure by people to stop the construction of luxury housing while there is a shortage of affordable housing even going so far as cities increasing taxes on luxury housing.**
	3. **Jacobus of Berkeley thus finds because all demand for luxury housing is being met right now, any increase in the amount of housing development will by necessity mean only affordable housing is built.**
2. **Herrigenes of The Strong Towns Organization explains that current regulations- things like zoning laws or bans on certain types of housing- have set an artificial cap on the development industry’s ability to build which is why they gravitate towards more expensive homes to make more profit. Herrgienes explains that the problem is not greed and he gives the example- auto firms like Toyota were only to build a handful of cards a year, they would sell upper end cars like Lexuses. However, because there is an unconstrained market for cars, Toyota reaches to more people and cheaper cars like Corollas and Camrys dominate because when they sell more units, ever if they are cheaper, there is a larger profit. Similarly, if there was market rate housing which definitionally removes regulations developers could buy more land and find it profitable to build cheaper housing. Hertz of City Observatory thus concludes that when we build at market rate- meaning we take out regulations- the vast majority of homes that are sold or rented are affordable to lower income people.**

https://www.ft.com/content/c8bae1f4-3898-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23

High-end developers in other cities are feeling the chill, too. The five-year global boom in ultra high-end property that has transformed cities from Vancouver to Shanghai appears to be ending in a global glut. In New York and London alone, agents are trying to sell tens of thousands of high-end apartments amid sharply falling prices. “We are in unprecedented territory with the number of large homes. No one knew how many billionaires and oligarchs were going to come, but in fact it was a very limited market,” says Andrew Gerringer, managing director at the New York residential consultancy The Marketing Directors. The luxury construction frenzy has produced too many buildings, and political factors have turned against the sector. China has attempted to clamp down on money flowing out of the country, while low oil prices and sanctions have curbed sales to Russian buyers. Cities around the world are imposing new taxes on overseas property buyers, and there is increased scrutiny of money laundering through high-end property. The mayors of London and New York have pointed to gleaming residential towers as symbols of inequality amid chronic shortages of affordable housing. Gary Barnett, president of Extell, hopes that for high-end property developers, the party is not over.
The result was an overhang of newly built homes just as demand retreated — and a sprouting of cranes on the skylines of cities such as New York that brought home to potential buyers their new bargaining power with developers.  Mr Miller estimates that Manhattan has more than 12,300 unsold condominiums either built, under construction or planned, against sales of about 1,400 a year. The numbers in London are similar: according to the data provider Molior London, since 2014 construction starts in London have exceeded sales by 13,500 units.
Extell, developer of One57 and other New York projects, saw a spike in its Tel Aviv-listed bond yields last year, forcing Mr Barnett to travel to Israel to reassure investors. Developers also have another problem: the use of their creations as visual symbols of inequality and corruption. In Vancouver and Sydney, local administrations have responded with taxes to de er foreign buyers. The US has taken measures to counteract money laundering in the sector: luxury New York apartments have been linked to Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal, for example. In March, the mayor, Bill de Blasio, chose 432 Park Avenue, the world’s tallest residential building, as the backdrop to a press conference calling for a statewide “mansion tax” on apartment sales above $2.5m. Standing beside a pensioner who spoke of her inability to afford a home in the city, Mr de Blasio said the building was “an example of ostentatious wealth”.

https://shelterforce.org/2017/02/22/housing-regulations-are-for-neighbors-not-residents/

Real estate industry stakeholders often try to make the point that if we simply built more housing, it would benefit everyone. I think a lot of skeptics hear those claims and picture the industry building more luxury housing, and surmise that it would make little difference. But because the luxury market is a relatively small niche, and we are already close to fully meeting demand in that segment, any increase in the volume of development will necessarily involve moving down market to serve more middle-income households. I, too, [remain cynical](http://www.shelterforce.org/article/4408/why_we_must_build/) about whether this would significantly benefit low-income and very-low income people, especially if they are displaced from their neighborhoods to make way for all the new housing. This strategy is not a low-income housing one, but it seems like an appropriate housing goal on its own. Building more middle-income housing would make a very big difference to the millions of working-class and middle-income families who are currently cost burdened and, done right, could help take some pressure off the lower end of the housing market in a way that luxury building doesn’t.

**Yglesias**, Matthew. “Everything You Need to Know about the Affordable Housing Debate.” **Vox**.com, Vox Media, 11 May **2015**, www.vox.com/2014/4/10/18076868/affordable-housing-explained.

This is unlikely.If you were to only build one building, you might well want to make it a high-priced, high-margin luxury project. **But there are only so many millionaires in the country. As the number of projects increases, developers need to reach further down the market to reach a larger base of customers.** Think about car companies. Most **auto firms do try to sell high-margin luxury vehicles.** But **they also make plenty of ordinary vehicles for middle-class car buyers, because there are only so many rich people to sell cars to.** If you forced **Toyota to only build a handful of cars per year, they would probably try to make them Lexuses rather than Corollas**. But **in an unconstrained market, Corollas predominate.** What's more, even luxury projects help address housing scarcity. In a marketplace with no new luxury projects, rich people don't forget that they enjoy fancy houses in appealing neighborhoods. They simply snap up older properties and renovate them (or house-flippers do it), thus blocking the process of filtering and taking middle-class residences off the market.

**Herriges**, Daniel. “‘Why Are Developers Only Building Luxury Housing?".” **Strong Towns**, Strong Towns, 25 July **2018**, www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/7/25/why-are-developers-only-building-luxury-housing.

**By limiting what can be built where, zoning and other land-use regulations may well restrict the total number of new homes** in a given neighborhood, city, or even region to far fewer than the market would otherwise provide. Rick Jacobus, in this fantastic 2017 piece at Shelterforce, explains how this leads to the "luxury only" phenomenon by comparing developers to car manufacturers: So no, **the problem is not greed**. The **development industry is**... **behaving exactly the way we would expect any industry to respond to an artificial cap on their production volume.** The same thing would happen in the auto industry: **if we limited Toyota to only 100,000 cars per year, they might well choose to keep the Lexus and scrap the Camry, even though, at volume, the Camry is more profitable. If land costs could be kept low—either by buying marginal, cheap land, or buying expensive urban land but distributing its cost over a large number of homes—developers might well find it profitable to build middle-income "Camry" housing at scale.** But the first option, expansion on the suburban fringe, is fiscally ruinous for our communities, largely because of the colossal mismatch between the new public infrastructure those homes on the suburban will need and the tax actually generated by new suburban construction. And the second option**, building more homes on the same amount of land, often can't happen because the zoning code says it can't.**

**Hertz**, Daniel. “What Filtering Can and Can't Do.” **City Observatory**, 17 Nov. **2015**, cityobservatory.org/what-filtering-can-and-cant-do/.

But “affordable housing” also suffers from an ill-defined relationship to the market. Typically, the phrase “affordable housing” means “below market rate,” as in a home that receives some sort of subsidy, private or public, to be cheaper than what the owner could otherwise charge. (Of course, even this distinction—subsidized versus unsubsidized—is problematic, or just plain incorrect, given the massive subsidies to middle- and upper-income homeowners through mechanisms like the mortgage interest tax deduction.) But **in most of the country, the vast majority of homes that are actually “affordable” to lower-income people are sold or rented at market rate.** They just happen to have some characteristics—size, appearance, or location in a less-desired neighborhood—that make their market prices relatively low.

### A/2: Public Housing

1. **There’s no public housing in status quo- they don’t get to fiat its creation; not even close to the resolution.**
2. **Delink. Elkin of The Urban Institute finds that the truth is that affordable housing is not affordable because there is a huge gap between what these buildings cost to construct and maintain and the rents most people can pay.**
3. **Delink. Poethig of The Urban Institute reports that only 24 percent of the 19 million eligible households receive assistance. This means: a) they have no solvency to majority of homeless and b) their advocacy is leave 75 percent of the homeless or needy population out to the wolves.**
4. **Turn. Goldberg of Politico explains that market rate housing can increase tax revenue for the government to use and spend more on subsidized housing.**

Maria **Elkin**"What Everyone Gets Wrong About Affordable Housing". New America, Aug. 24, **2017**, https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-174/what-everyone-gets-wrong-about-affordable-housing/. (JL)

Yet this still doesn’t get at the image people typically conjure when they think about low-income or **affordable housing**:the **projects**. Indeed, you might be imagining those high-rise public housing developments—subsidized apartment buildings where residents pay below-market rent. These were built in the mid- to late-20th century with HUD funds and authorization. But the once-preferred method of increasing public housing, “the projects,” as they came to be known, **soon** [**created a number of social issues**](http://www.urban.org/research/publication/distressed-public-housing/view/full_report)**. As time went on, insufficient funding and poor management caused many developments to fall into disrepair. Distressed housing developments intensified racial and economic segregation, concentrated poverty and crime, and even led to more health problems and deaths among the residents because the buildings were often of substandard quality** to begin with**.**

Erika C. **Poethig**. "One in four: America’s housing assistance lottery". Urban Institute, 5-28-**2014**, https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/one-four-americas-housing-assistance-lottery. (JL)

**Unfortunately, affordable housing is a scarce resource in many cities.** America’s housing policy has never fully met the demand for affordable rental housing, and the number of households served by federal rental assistance has essentially plateaued. Today, **only 24 percent of the 19 million eligible households receive assistance—basically, only one in four households wins the housing assistance lottery.**

Sally **Goldenberg**,11-19-**2018**, Mayor hints at plans for more market-rate development on unused NYCHA land, Politico PRO, <https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/11/19/mayor-hints-at-plans-for-more-market-rate-development-on-unused-nycha-land-704679>
De Blasio indicated a desire for more development on the vacant lots adjoining some of the housing authority’s 2,418 buildings, many of which are infested with vermin and plagued by broken boilers and elevators. In total, the agency needs $32 billion over five years to make necessary repairs. “We need development to achieve the most we can for the residents of the immediate areas. So what you will see is … much greater focus on any new development benefiting the surrounding houses in the maximum way,” de Blasio said at the 1,088-unit Betances Houses complex in the Bronx Monday. "We’re going to get our hands on everything we can,” he added. The plan is for a 70-30 split of market-rate to rent-regulated housing in private developments on public land, according to several sources who have been briefed, but would only speak on background. **Market-rate housing would yield more revenue for the housing authority than apartments for lower-income tenants, which the city subsidizes.**

### A/2: LITECH

1. **Delink. Been of New York University gives multiple warrants as to why this doesn’t happen.**
	1. **Where land is limited in supply, it is not the case that the proposed where market-rate housing is proposed would otherwise be used for affordable housing.**
	2. **Affordable Housing is not provided in larger quantities because the lack of land and inadequate funding to pay for construction, financing, and operation costs**
	3. **Land can be used more intensely under deregulation, such as building with higher densities.**
2. **Investors go to both areas to maximize profit.**
3. [**NPR in 2017**](https://www.npr.org/2017/08/01/540960951/housing-program-worth-billions-lacks-basic-accountability-says-gao) **finds that since there is little oversight into the actual program, there is rampant corruption, with many reported instances of developer stealing from the problem itself, in fact even though the subsidy costs more than 50% of tax credits it is leading to less and less units every year.**
4. **The Journal of Real Estate Economics Finds that only 35% of the tax credit actually goes to low income renters. Economist Ed olsen furthers that at most 24% of the subsidy goes to tenants for low income renters.**

 **Because the low income tax credit The CATO Institute finds 4 main issues with the low income tax credit. First, it slows construction. the low income tax credit has over 80 pages of dense rules with hyperspecific guidelines for construction such as ceramic floor tiling required for bathrooms with roll-in showers”.**

**Due to the excessive regulations from the low income tax credit, it takes twice as long to create a house under the low income tax credit than under market rate housing.**

**Second, it increases costs. Because of the excessive regulations that have to be followed, it costs twice more to create a house under the low income tax credit than to create a market rate housing resulting in less housing being built.**

**Third, it creates unaffordable housing. Because of widespread abuse and corruption in the program, houses built are not affordable by the poor. For example, in Minnesota the average house built under the program costs $250,000 and in Seattle it was $400,000.**

Let’s look more closely at the LIHTC process. The first step is for state housing agencies to prepare annual plans for using their credits, called Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs), which they submit to the federal government. QAPs can run more than 80 pages of dense rules that micromanage LIHTC projects regarding tenant mix, project locations, environmental and historic preservation features, and other criteria. Virginia’s QAP specifies such items as “ceramic floor tiling required for bathrooms with roll-in showers” and “composite material required at some portions of exterior doors.”9 It also includes detailed rules on how community rooms in LIHTC buildings may be used. Experts agree that these LIHTC complexities increase project costs and delays.12 A study on the costs of affordable housing projects by the state of Washington found, for example, that “it generally takes twice as long to assemble the financing as market-rate projects, and contributes to increased legal and other transaction costs.”13 A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that the syndication process consumes 10 to 27 percent of the equity on LIHTC projects.14 Smart Growth Seattle noted that “affordable housing projects have many unique costs, and often cost more because of financing, construction, and labor requirements. Affordable housing projects can be more expensive than market-rate due to some of these unique costs.”15 The head of that group, who is an expert on affordable housing, estimates that the per unit costs of LIHTC projects “can be more than double that of market rate housing.”16 He points to a 112-unit LIHTC complex in Seattle completed last year that cost $45 million, or $400,000 per unit Minnesota is a rare state that is trying to tackle the costbloat problem in LIHTC housing. It models the elements of proposed projects to find the excesses. Recent LIHTC projects in the Twin Cities cost $253,136 per unit, which was 29 percent more than for non-LIHTC projects in the cities.17 Both the “hard” costs (construction) and the “soft” costs (financing, services, etc.) of projects are higher in LIHTC projects, according to the Minnesota data.

[https://sci-hub.tw/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00287.x](https://sci-hub.tw/https%3A/onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6229.2010.00287.x)

The rent savings is only 26.7%–51.3% as large as the magnitude of the tax credit costs, with the overall rent savings/cost ratio of 35.1%. Framing the results in a per-unit basis is illustrative. The present value cost, on average, is nearly $40,000 per unit, whereas the present value rent savings stream is just under $14,000. Also, for reasons discussed previously, the $40,000 figure likely represents an extreme lower-bound measure of the programs costs, potentially moving the ratio for the program in an even more unfavorable manner. This is 92 Burge disturbing when combined with the previously described literature that suggests neither of the other two sources of benefits to low-income households of the program (stimulation of additional rental housing production and the possibility that affordable rental housing will be built in better areas) are very large

<http://eoolsen.weebly.com/uploads/7/7/9/6/7796901/olsenaeihousingaffordabilityconferencepanel12rev.pdf>

The best evidence available also indicates that occupants of tax credit projects capture a small fraction of the subsidies provided to developers. Burge (2011, p. 91) finds that the present value of the rent saving to tenants (the difference between the market rent of the unit and the rent paid by its tenant) is only 35% of the present value of the tax credits provided to developers. Combining this result with Cummings and Di Pasquale’s finding that tax credits account for about two-thirds of development subsidies for tax credit projects leads to the conclusion that tenants capture at most 24% of the development subsidies.

Vicki **Been** ,8-20-**2018**, No Publication, [http://furmancenter.org/files/Supply\_Skepticism\_-\_Final.pdf,//ZS](http://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf%2C//ZS)

Some argue that the normal rules of supply and demand don’t apply to housing because housing is tied to a specific plot of land, and unlike other inputs into the production of housing that may be in plentiful supply, the supply of land is limited in many jurisdictions by existing development and by geographical constraints like coasts or mountains (Angotti & Morse, 2016). Indeed, critics argue that because land is inherently limited, the development of market rate housing consumes scarce land that could otherwise be used for affordable housing. 4 The argument often is accompanied by demands that high percentages (such as 50 percent or more) of all housing developed on private sites should be restricted as affordable housing (Durkin, 2016). Whereas **land is limited in supply, it is not necessarily the case that the land where market-rate housing (or a mixture of market rate and affordable housing) is proposed would otherwise be used entirely for affordable housing. The land might continue to be too costly to support affordable housing, even if the land could not be used for housing for higher income households, because there are other uses competing for the land**. Also, the **reasons affordable housing is not provided in larger quantities go far beyond the lack of land and include the inadequacy of funding to pay for construction, financing costs and operating costs. Further, programs like mandatory affordable housing can ensure that developments using land for market-rate housing also include some affordable housing, although no inclusionary program imposes requirements as high as 50 percent of the units** (Thadden & Wang, 2017). M**ore fundamentally, although it is surely true that land is constrained, especially in certain markets (Saiz 2010), land can be used more intensively to allow for more housing. The limits on the land with which housing is bundled make housing different from many goods, but the difference is one of degree: the supply of housing can and does increase even in constrained markets, and prices should generally fall in response** (see the review by DiPasquale, 1999; Mayer & Somerville, 2000).

### A/2: Rent Control Good

1. **Two reasons why this doesn’t respond to the resolution.**
	1. **The resolution asks us to say yes or no to more houses- their side has to defend the status quo which is not building houses**
	2. **They can’t just fiat the most favorable parts of the resolution- no point in affirming.**
2. **They can’t just fiat rent controls. The NHMC finds that there are only 4 states that legally allow rent controls in the US. This means they bottleneck their own impact on scope- which means we always outweigh no matter the net benefits because we affect the entire nation. They can’t just run part of the AFF and change a certain subsection- the NEG must truth test the resolution.**
3. **Turn. Diamond of The NBER finds that that landlords respond to an increase in rent control by reducing rental housing by 15 percent, which causes an on net 5.1 percent city wide rent increase. This outweighs on scope- even if they help a subsection of the city it increases prices overall.**
4. **Turn. Fallis of The American Economic Review writes that rent controls in Los Angeles sectors led to a 13.7 percent rise in price in controlled sectors and rose uncontrolled rent prices by 46 percent. This turn outweighs on magnitude- the study accounts for the net impact of rent controls and finds that they hurt sectors all round.**
5. **Turn. Dubb of The NPQ explains that per each rent control that is removed, there is a 1.1 percent decrease in the vacancy rate. This means market rate housing and getting rid of restriction solves because it decreases homelessness, and having a home is better than nothing.**
6. **Turn. Misra of City Lab finds that rent-controlled properties were 10 percent more likely to be converted into condos or renovated drastically to be exempt from rent control. Thus, Misra finds that landlords increased the prices of properties by removing them from the market or buying out poor tenants, leading to a 25 percent decline in those living in rent controlled units after rent control. This outweighs on probability- it happened before and the warrants prove rent controls kick the poor out which is more likely to happen again.**
7. **Turn. Beyer of Forbes explains that rent controls lead to the underproduction of regulated units and price spikes for unregulated units because landlords make less money. This is why a BLS study calculated that the three costliest metro housing areas in the nation belong to cities with rent controls. This links in better than they do- they create much more expensive units than cheap ones.**

<https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/>

https://www.nber.org/papers/w24181

We exploit quasi-experimental variation in assignment of rent control to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the overall rental market. Leveraging new data tracking individuals’ migration, we find rent control increased renters’ probabilities of staying at their addresses by nearly 20%. **Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase.** Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control offered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.

https://econjwatch.org/File+download/238/2009-01-jenkins-reach\_concl.pdf?mimetype=pdf

[Los Angeles, California 1969-1978:] **[A]fter two years, controlled rents had risen an average of 13.7 percent and uncontrolled rents had risen an average of 46.2 percent**. (Fallis and Smith 1997, 199)

**Beyer**, Scott. “How Ironic: America's Rent-Controlled Cities Are Its Least Affordable.” **Forbes**, Forbes Magazine, 24 Apr. **2015**, www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/04/24/how-ironic-americas-rent-controlled-cities-are-its-least-affordable/#38227d1048c6.

In these respects, **rent control causes the same misfortunes as other price controls: it leads to underproduction of the units that are regulated, and price gouging for the units that aren’t.** The biggest reason rent control endures is that, rather than looking at the issue economically, those who benefit view it politically (electing leaders who will maintain it), while even those who don’t benefit view it emotionally. The case against ending it often comes alongside anecdotes about how otherwise some grandma would live on the street. But there are numerous programs that could be used to help people in dire situations—from housing vouchers, to government-run senior living—and perhaps minor levels of rent control for them could be in the mix. That doesn’t mean, however, that a fundamentally bad policy should apply to large percentages of a city’s housing stock. Many people benefiting from rent control could compete in the private market, and some are flat rich, since in places like New York City, those making up to $200,000 qualify. Such people are being subsidized by landlords, and forcing higher prices for everyone else. In New York, LA, DC, San Francisco, San Jose—and even some parts of Oakland—this has had the preserve effect of creating luxury cities.

According to Landlord.com, there are six cities among the nation’s 50 largest with rent control. In New York City, nearly half of units are rent controlled or stabilized, with annual increases determined by the Rent Guidelines Board. Los Angeles has almost the same number of rent-regulated units, at 880,581. In Washington, DC, a majority of units are rent-controlled, and the policy exists in the Bay Area cities of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. In such cities, rent increases are generally tied either to inflation, or some other metric that ensures annual increases of a few percentage points. Most of these laws began in the 1970s, in response to rising housing prices. The commonality between all these cities—despite differences in geography, demographics, and land use—is their expense. **According to a 2012 BLS study that calculated annual household expenditures on housing, the nation’s three costliest metro areas are DC, San Francisco (a metro area that includes Oakland and San Jose), and New York City.**

Preston and Singh also highlight a 2014 MIT study which finds that, “When rent control was eliminated in Massachusetts, costs of all housing in Cambridge, formerly rent controlled and uncontrolled units, rose dramatically.” And, as Jake Blumgart wrote in 2015, in nearby Boston, “**Census data shows that Boston’s vacancy rate was four percent before the regulations were phased out and 2.9 percent four years after they were done away with**—scrapping rent control had, at the very least, not generated a measurable effect on apartment availability. The median price for a two-bedroom apartment doubled in the meantime.”

# Indicts

### A/2 16% decrease crime

First, Very outdated. From 1996

https://voxeu.org/article/does-gentrification-reduce-crime

 Figure 1 summarises our main finding. In the years immediately following the end of rent control, crime fell significantly more in neighbourhoods that were heavily rent controlled. By 1996, overall crime in gentrifying neighbourhoods (blocks with one standard deviation higher rent control exposure initially) fell by 16% more than in neighbourhoods relatively less exposed to rent control. Table 1 shows how effects differ across categories of reported crimes. Property crimes account for the largest decrease in the number of reported criminal incidents, although violent crimes account for the bulk of the value in averted crimes.

Second, Study looks at suburbs not cities. Not topical to resolutoin

(camrbridge population 100k)

Third, Concedes poor gain no benefits. It says prices go up 20% for the poor and there was major increases in poor people

Gentrification raises property values, but is likely to produce both winners and losers. Cambridge’s experience was no exception. We find that rent de-control caused overall crime to fall by 16% - approximately 1,200 reported crimes annually – with the majority of the effect accruing through reduced property crime. This overall reduction in crime created $200 million in economic value for the city of Cambridge. These estimates provide rigorous evidence that improvements in public safety are an important part of the gentrification process. At the same time, they suggest that the process need not benefit all residents. The neighbourhoods that had the most rent control prior to 1995 saw the most turnover after de-control, suggesting that incumbent renters of controlled units were priced out of existing units. It’s likely that many of these residents left Cambridge altogether and moved to less-expensive municipalities. While the ensuing influx of new renters probably increased city tax collections and landlords’ bottom-lines, those displaced by gentrification did not necessarily benefit from improvements in neighbourhood safety and other amenities.

### A/2 1.3% Freeman Braconi/displacement decreases

First, the study falsified their analysis. [Atkinson](https://journals.sagepub.com/action/doSearch?target=default&ContribAuthorStored=Atkinson%2C+Rowland) of Cornell repeats Freeman and Braconi’s study using same data and methods and finds market rate housing does in fact lead to displacement. Specifically they find 10% of people leave neighborhoods in which market rate housing is being built due to increases in rent.

https://www.ahuri.edu.au/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0007/2122/AHURI\_Final\_Report\_No160\_Gentrification\_and\_displacement\_the\_household\_impacts\_of\_neighbourhood\_change.pdf

Newman and Wyly (2006) set out to question Freeman and Braconi’s assertion (2004) that gentrification does not play a large role in displacing low-income households. They employed both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to yield a rich analysis of both the numerical level of displacement and the impacts on displacees. Employing a logit analysis, the authors found that between 6.2 and 9.9 per cent of all local moves among renter households in New York City were due to displacement and that most displacees were driven to move by the increases in rents. The authors concluded that: ‘Cost drives the overall trend, with fluctuations in unemployment, income and rental inflation combining to force households into various relocation or adjustment strategies’ (Newman & Wyly 2006, p.30). Of relevance to the Australian situation, an important statistical outcome was that households living in low rent units were more likely to have been displaced compared with those in higher rent dwellings

Second, evidence uses data from the 1990s, completely outdated. Prefer Professor Autor of MIT in 2017 who finds market rate housing leads to a 20% increase in residents leaving a neighborhood.

Third, in 2008 he went back on his conclusion and stated neighborhoods with market rate housing will force their poor to leave due to rising housing prices.

But the fact that lower socioeconomic status households are no longer moving into these neighborhoods implies a diminishing of housing opportunities for some.” In 2008 [testimony](http://www.prrac.org/projects/fair_housing_commission/atlanta/freeman.pdf) to the [National Commission on Housing and Fair Opportunity](http://www.prrac.org/projects/fairhousingcommission.php), he warned that rising housing prices meant that, over time, “gentrifying neighborhoods will either lose their poor and often minority residents or poorer residents will be forced to pay undue portions of their income for housing,” a trend that he said should drive more equitable policies.

Fourth, Toppin of Berkeley reports the study based on faulty assumptions such as measuring poverty through credit scores.

The main argument offered is that most analyses do not demonstrate that gentrification results in displacement. The article cites studies by Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi that conclude–by using low credit scores and no mortgages as indicators of poverty–that poor residents generally do not move out as wealthier newcomers move in. But these findings are based on faulty assumptions. Not only has extensive research by the [UC Berkeley Urban Displacement Project found that gentrification leads to exclusionary displacement](http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/urban_displacement_project_-_executive_summary.pdf), such an aggregated approach to research that the Economist cites does not allow for differences by race to be taken into account.

Fifth the study concedes prices increase by 20%.

Are those conclusions still valid, given that Freeman analyzed neighborhoods starting more than two decades ago, from 1986 to 1999? The neighborhoods were in the central parts of cities, and featured a relatively low median income, an older housing stock, an increase in housing prices, and a disproportionate increase in educated residents. In gentrifying tracts, rent rose barely 20 percent adjusting for inflation, from a base of $411 between 1980 to 1990, and actually declined in the following decade. The median rent in 2000, adjusted for inflation (presumably back to 1980), was reported at $450.

### A/2 LAO Report

Chapple of UC Berkey reports the report purposely omitted data from their analysis to skew their results.

http://www.urbandisplacement.org/sites/default/files/images/udp\_research\_brief\_052316.pdf

While numerous critiques of the LAO report have circulated,6 we believe that the omission of subsidized housing production data from the analysis has the greatest potential to skew results.7 We have reanalyzed the data on housing production, including that of subsidized housing, and show that the path to reducing displacement is more complex than to simply rely on market-rate development and filtering. Following, we present our analysis that replicates the LAO analysis with the addition of subsidized housing data.

The LAO report is correct that there is a housing shortage across California. It’s also correct that existing affordable-housing programs are inadequate. But the report errs in several ways, and for that reason we should think twice before taking its results seriously. Most importantly, the report claims that constructing market rate units will protect low-income communities against displacement. But it relies upon a single imperfect definition of displacement and doesn’t distinguish between parts of the Bay Area that are growing rapidly and where land is cheap from the tight housing markets in San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose. These three cities account for about a third of new market-rate units in areas the report focuses on. But other top producers include cities on the urban fringe as well as unincorporated areas where displacement pressures are minimal. Grouping together these very different places can make it appear as though new market-rate units prevent displacement, when in fact the opposite might be true.

### A/2 Scott Weiner/Medium/ArtPlusMarketing

Received hundreds of thousands from Real Estate companies to push for higher home prices and against market rate housing.

https://votesmart.org/candidate/campaign-finance/129655/scott-wiener#.XGnAeehKgdU

### A/2: LAO Study (MRH Needed for Housing Crisis)

The LAO study our opponents cite is highly flawed. According to a UC Berkeley report by Miriam Zuk and Karen Chappel, the very people who provided the LAO study’s data, it "omitted" affordable housing production data from its study. The agency was unable to see how new market-rate housing can both alleviate housing pressures while at the same time causing displacement and gentrification in specific neighborhoods. The LAO also failed to compare market-rate and affordable housing to see which type is better suited to reduce displacement of low-income people.

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### A/2: Diamond, McQuade, and Qian Study (RC Decreases Supply 15%, Increases Rent 5.1%)

Our opponents cite a paper by Stanford professors Diamond, McQuade, and Qian, but there’s a problem. David Preston and Shanti Singh write, “the Stanford paper is part hard data, part flawed methodology, and part misguided editorializing.” The hard data, Peterson and Singh write, supports facts long well-known by rent control proponents: “rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent” and saved city-wide tenants over $7 billion. As one example of the flawed methodology, the professors ignored other causes of the city-wide rent increase they cite while employing false assumptions that would see everything blamed on rent control.

### A/2: 2.5 Million Affordable Housing Units Lost Since 1990 (indict either Amee Chew or Harvard JCHS)

They’re citing the Amee Chew study that says that 2.5 million affordable housing units have been lost since 1990. Here’s the problem with their analysis. The original study defines an affordable housing unit as one with a price below $800. Here’s the problem. They totally forget to account for inflation. Cumulative inflation since 1990 is 93% So the $800 figure they cite is worth half as much as in 1990. We wouldn’t expect to pay half as much and receive the same quantity of affordable housing.