# 1NC

## C1: Political Pressure

### Keeping sanctions forces Maduro to exit – 2 warrants

### 1 – Negotiations

#### Sanctions make resignation more attractive for Maduro and push him towards leaving office

**Rendon 19**

Moises Rendon, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," Center for Strategic & International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

**There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro’s power**. Not only have **targeted** economic **sanctions limited his ability to finance** his regime’s antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained **his inner circle**. His control over state institutions **and** assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; **the** current **administration’s interminable** **threat** to impose further sanctions **leaves Maduro** **and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go**, **forcing** **them to fear the worst**. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets. That said, there are areas for improvement in sanctions strategy. The first important step is to encourage multilateral adoption of currently targeted sanctions. Unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. In addition to incorporating allied neighbors Colombia and Brazil, the United States should take advantage of the Lima Group, which has recently taken a strong stance on Maduro’s crusade against democracy. If this is successfully achieved, the strategy can be extended outward to the Organization of American States and perhaps even the United Nations (although Chinese and Russian veto power on the Security Council would make this difficult). The United States and its allies must use sanctions deliberately as a tool to shut down Maduro’s criminal activities. **By closing** off criminal sources of **revenue** **for him and his cohorts** in Venezuela**, Maduro’s** relative **exit costs can be** **lowered**, **which** will in turn **increase[s]** the **likelihood of** a **peaceful transition**. While barriers to exiting power are always high, **[Thus,] sanctions can isolate Maduro to the point where resigning is a welcome alternative.**

#### Intensifying sanctions have cut loopholes and access to wealth for the Maduro regime. Increasing pressure on finances has undermined key military support and forced the brutal dictator to the table

**Fedirka 19**

Allison Fedirka, 9-9-2019, "The New US Strategy to Remove Maduro in Venezuela," Geopolitical Futures, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-new-us-strategy-to-remove-maduro-in-venezuela/>

After months of little progress, it seems the United States may be getting closer to removing Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from office. Until relatively recently, Washington had been pushing to unseat Maduro by throwing its support behind opposition leader Juan Guaido, hoping that he could inspire an uprising that could overthrow the president. So far, that strategy hasn’t worked. So **Washington** **has** come up with **a new plan**: **[to] negotiate** a transition **directly** **with** **the Maduro government**. It’s been able to do this only because the **sanctions** imposed on Venezuela **have weakened the government enough to force it to the** negotiating **table**. Maduro’s departure **now** seems to be a question of when, not if. Increasing the Pressure Abrams downplayed the **negotiations**, saying that they were intermittent and normal communications, but they **appear** **to be getting close**r **to a resolution**. The **talks were possible** in the first place **because sanctions** have **put** **substantial pressure on the Maduro government. Over the past year, the U.S.** has significantly **restricted** **Venezuela’s access to U.S. dollars** **with sanctions** **against** Venezuelan **officials and companies**. Until recently, **the Maduro regime** **had been able to get by by finding** **loopholes** **and alternative ways of conducting business with other countries**. By late August, however, these lifelines **appear**ed **to be faltering**. One of Turkey’s largest banks, Ziraat Bank, would no longer do business with Venezuela’s central bank because of U.S. sanctions. And China’s National Petroleum Corporation, a leading buyer of Venezuelan oil, halted August oil loadings also because of sanctions. This is particularly notable given that China was one of the top consumers of Venezuelan oil. (click to enlarge) **Venezuela’s historical allies are** now **primarily concerned about** their own **business interests in Venezuela**. Russia, China **and** Turkey have all backed the Maduro regime, but **none could offer enough support to solve the** country’s **economic crisis or restore faith in the government**. They, too, now see that Maduro is likely on his way out. So long as their business interests are protected and Maduro isn’t forcibly removed from the outside, they too will get on board with a transition. But a transition agreement would also need the support of another critical partner: Cuba. Cuba has supported Venezuela and its security apparatus for over 20 years, and no transition could go ahead without its consent. It appears that Canada, a member of the Lima Group, is playing a key role here, since Ottawa can operate in Cuba in ways that Washington can’t. In late August, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland visited Cuba in part to discuss the situation in Venezuela, just a week after Freeland had met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to discuss the Venezuelan crisis. It marked the third time top Canadian and Cuban officials met in person since May. **Once diplomatic issues are settled, talks can turn to how to handle the Venezuelan military**, a key component of any transition as it would be needed to protect **and** defend the next Venezuelan government. It’s likely that **members of the military will** **be offered amnesty**; the opposition has already offered service members amnesty if they agree to support the opposition. There are signs that other important stakeholders are also preparing for a transition. The island of Curacao is trying to restore its refining facilities after years of decline in the Venezuelan oil industry. Curacao’s state-owned refining company RdK will not renew its contract with Venezuelan state-run oil giant PDVSA when it expires in December. Instead, RdK is holding exclusive negotiations with commodity company Klesch on a new agreement. In addition, a small group of dissident members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which has been operating across the Colombia-Venezuela border for years aided by the Maduro regime, has said it will take up arms again in Colombia. These dissident members may be preparing for a post-Maduro Venezuela in which the group can no longer rely on government support of its operations. There’s one more key issue that will need to be worked out before a transition agreement can be reached: when and how elections will take place. Maduro’s supporters are open to holding presidential elections in the coming months on the conditions that sanctions are lifted, that the vote is held in a year while Maduro is in power and that he can run as a candidate. Both the U.S. and the Venezuelan opposition have rejected these terms. The U.S. doesn’t want Maduro to run for reelection, and the opposition wants elections to be held sooner and for the elections council and supreme court (which are both packed with Maduro supporters) to be overhauled. Nevertheless, that negotiations are now dealing with specific details of an election is itself a sign of progress.

#### As of last week, Maduro announced new preparation for negotiations with stabilization in mind

**Binner 20**

Beyza Binnur Donmez, 1-2-2020, "Maduro says Venezuela ready for talks with US," No Publication, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/maduro-says-venezuela-ready-for-talks-with-us/1690317>

Venezuela's President Nicolas **Maduro said** **he** **is** ready to set up talks with the U.S. after a year of tension. "I am a man of dialogue! With [U.S. President] Donald Trump or with whom the U.S. governs: whenever, wherever and however they want, we are **ready for** a **dialogue** **with the** **highest respect** and dignity **to establish new** basis of **relations that contribute to** the **stability** of the region," Maduro tweeted late Wednesday, **showing** his **will to open** a **new page in 2020 with** the **Trump** administration. Tension escalated between two countries after the U.S. threw support behind opposition leader Juan Guaido at a time when he engaged in a power battle with Maduro at the beginning of 2019. Washington has been focusing on economic and diplomatic strain against Maduro, including imposing sanctions against him, his top officials and several governmental departments as it seeks to increase pressure on Caracas. The U.S. also frozen all assets of the Venezuelan government in earlier August. No statement has yet been made by the Trump government on the issue.

### 2 – Military Support

#### Maduro relies on buying off the military to stay in power

**Schalk 19**

Jessica Van Der Schalk, 7-01-2019, "Why is Maduro still in power in Venezuela?," FreedomLab, <http://freedomlab.org/why-is-maduro-still-in-power-in-venezuela/>

Venezuela is now plagued by a rapid drop in living standards, frequent street protests, crippling sanctions, international pressure and an alleged coup. This raises the question how Maduro is still holding onto power. Indeed, commentators have predicted for Maduro’s regime to collapse for a long time. However, their narrative is too strongly focused on oil and autocratic rule. In fact, the oil industry is nearly nonexistent by now, and the Venezuelan state does not have any strong centralized institutions (unlike North Korea for example, which shares many of the features of Venezuela’s crisis). So how is Maduro able to hold onto power? **Maduro controls** the **key institutions of** **the Venezuelan state** **through** patronage (**loyalty created by financial aid**). Despite media attention for military officers that are “rising up” against Maduro, his grip on the military is strong. Only about 1000 members have defected (from a total of 100.000-200.000) – and nearly all of them chose to seek refuge in foreign countries, rather than stay and fight alongside the opposition. Besides the official state military, Maduro also finances paramilitary groups (the “colectivos”, which also act as leverage against the state military). **The** **most important reason for** **Maduro’s control of the military** **is** **that he is** **making them rich.** **He gave** control of **both PDVSA and the drug trade to the military**. Maduro also controls the political system by stacking the Supreme Court with his loyalists. Indeed, patronage is key to Maduro’s control of the state.

#### Sanctions have cut Maduro’s contribution to the military by HALF

**Ellis 19**

Evan Ellis, 2-7-2019, "Beginning the Endgame in Venezuela," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/beginning-endgame-venezuela>

Such international positions go beyond mere critical words; domestic courts of law are generally obliged to follow the positions of their governments. With the United Kingdom’s recognition of Guaidó as the official leader of Venezuela, for example, Guaidó’s government has petitioned the Bank of England, to grant it (rather than the former Maduro regime) access to the $1.3 billion in gold in Venezuela’s official accounts. New sanctions against the Venezuelan oil company PdVSA, announced January 28 by the Trump administration, do not technically stop the United States from buying Venezuelan oil, but rather, stop payments to Maduro’s regime for that oil, since the U.S. government does not recognize the regime as the legal representative of Venezuela. With U.S. support, Guaidó has correspondingly appointed new boards of directors not only for PdVSA, but also its U.S.-based affiliate CITGO , as well as other Venezuelan assets abroad, over which it has announced it is “assuming control in an orderly fashion.” **The sanctions against PdVSA alone could** **cut** **in** **half** **the cash flow that** the **Maduro** regime **relies upon** **to** feed and otherwise **pay off the military**, **and** **less disciplined** pro-government **private armed groups** such as the “colectivos.”

#### Troops undergoing economic hardship are ready to flip and all the military needs is one general. Fortunately, a steady stream of mid-ranking officers have begun to defect. The longer Venezuela stays under sanctions the more likely a Maduro exit is

**Palmer 19**

Elizabeth Palmer, 2-6-2019. "Hunger pushing Maduro's troops to tipping point in Venezuela." CBS. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuela-crisis-nicolas-maduros-military-national-guardsmen-troops-fed-up/. Accessed 1-6-2020. //TP

Pictures broadcast by state TV almost daily make it look as if the armed forces are still firmly on the president's side, but **the truth is the troops -- most paid about $6 a month -- have had enough.** "Because they are tired," the guardsman said. "We are suffering just like the people are. My family, for example, my salary isn't even enough to buy food." Asked if he can discuss the complaints back in the barracks, he said, "Yes, we talk," but only with people they trust. The higher ranking officers are not privy to such discussions. He said that's why he insisted on wearing a mask -- "to protect myself. We have no freedom of expression." **The fact is soldiers can't feed their families**. Likemillions of their fellow citizens, **they're scraping along in an economy ruined by corruption, neglect and mismanagement***.* According to BBC news, some of the military's leadership is expected to remain loyal to Maduro because they themselves would be at risk of losing money and could face human rights violations. To try and convince the troops and their commanders to defect to the opposition, Guaidó has offered them amnesty. But the rank and file will need more than that. "In the National Guard, **all we need is a high-ranking general to lead the way**," the masked guardsman tells CBS News. One Air Force General did defect in a video posted online at the end of last week, but there has been very little visible sign yet that other top commanders are ready to switch sides. **There has been**, however**, a steady stream of mid-ranking officers defecting for months [and]**. They leave the country, to avoid being charged with treason. Off the record, we hear from military families that **the rank and file are ready to flip**, but they would be arrested if they breathed a word of it. Regular army soldiers have been confined to their barracks, not allowed any contact with the outside. No cell phones are permitted on bases, and no family visits are allowed. Many of the troops may not even know what's going on; the extent of the international condemnation of Maduro, or the recent huge demonstrations. The next big test for the armed forces will come as soon as this weekend, when humanitarian aid sent by the U.S. arrives on Venezuela's border. Maduro has ordered the army not to let it in. The national guardsman told CBS News there's every chance they won't obey that order.

#### Because of this pressure, Maduro is 80% likely to be out of office by 2020.

**VSU 20**

Latin America Risk Report - 9 January 2020 Answering reader questions about Venezuela, Iran and regional protests. Boz. Venezuelan Stability Update. <https://boz.substack.com/> ///ahsAK

In February 2019, Hxagon’s model showed Maduro with a 70% possibility of leaving power before the end of 2019. That model remained steady for several months even aer Guaido’s failed eort on 30 April. While there were a number of factors involved in that analysis, the most important factor in the model was the rapid decrease in resources for the regime (something that didn’t change with the events in late April). Sectoral **sanctions** and declining oil sales **greatly limit the resources to buy out the inner circle**, much less feed the population. Individually targeted sanctions also play a role in creating internal tensions. At this point in mid-November, the chances of Maduro being tossed out this year are closer to the 5-10% range. That’s still incredibly high considering there are only about 50 days le in the year, but it’s an unlikely event. However, **with Maduro’s resources running out**, **pressure** **against Maduro is likely** **to increase** again in the January to May timeframe of next year. The likelihood of Maduro losing power in the next 14 months is going up, not down. Maduro is burning through resources to cling to power rather than consolidating control. As those resources run thin, his hold on power will face a number of challenges from inside and outside the regime. Hxagonʼs view: Maduro remains very vulnerable Hxagonʼs model has **[there is] an 80% chance Maduro falls before the end of 2020**, and that is once again **largely driven by resource constraints** BM Bigger protests are likely in early 2020, some coordinated by the Guaido-led government and others spontaneous and without well known leaders. Those spontaneous protests represent a significant threat to repression efforts as they will be harder to stop by taking down leadership.

### MPX: Intervention

#### Sanctions are used as a peaceful alternative to intervention

**Turak 19**

Natasha Turak, 12-15-2019, “US isn’t weaponizing the dollar; sanctions are the alternative to war, Mnuchin says,” CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/mnuchin-us-isnt-weaponizing-dollar-sanctions-are-alternative-to-war.html>

The Trump administration has imposed sweeping sanctions including on dollar trade with Iran, North Korea and others in an effort to pressure state actors to rein in behavior that Washington deems destabilizing and against its interests. According to the Treasury Department, there are 6,300 Specially Designated Nationals and more than 20 countries against which some type of U.S. sanctions are in place. WATCH NOW VIDEO04:58 Watch CNBC’s full interview with US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin This has stunted the ability of European allies and others to trade with Iran, among other countries and entities. So some states are therefore looking to euros and other alternatives — including Chinese renminbi and cryptocurrencies — to carry out trade free of U.S.-imposed restrictions. Earlier this year, France, Germany and the U.K. set up the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), which uses euros to bypass U.S. sanctions on Iran. While it’s not shown itself to be economically effective, it’s a sign that even allies are seeking dollar alternatives to rebel against U.S. policies they oppose. Russia’s central bank has also been trying to reduce the number of transactions conducted in U.S. dollars, either for domestic payments or foreign trade, since 2013. And in 2016, China’s renminbi was added to the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights basket in 2016, along with the dollar, euro, yen and British pound, something the IMF said “enhances the attractiveness of the RMB as an international reserve asset.” Still, just to highlight one sector, 80% of European energy imports are settled in dollars — something that European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2018 called “absurd.” An ‘alternative for world military conflicts’ **Sanctions** like those on Iran, Mnuchin said, **are used in order to avoid potential war. “**The reason why we’re using sanctions is **because they are an important alternative for** world **military conflict**s. And I believe it’s worked,” the secretary said. “So whether it’s North Korea, whether it’s Iran or other places in the world, we take the responsibility very seriously.” There is debate as to whether the administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran is working to meet U.S. objectives. While it has certainly crippled Iran’s economy, currency and its ability to export oil, its involvement in conflicts around the Middle East has not subsided, and provocative attacks the U.S. and its allies have attributed to Iran have increased.

#### Trump and his officials already support military intervention. Intervention fails and backfires as military intervention empirically causes civil war and allows for authoritarian scapegoating, thus solidifying the Maduro regime

**Rourke 19**

Lindsey Rourke, 1-30-2019, "U.S. Intervention Could Be Maduro's Lifeline," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/30/u-s-intervention-could-be-maduros-lifeline/>

According to the Wall Street Journal, Guaidó coordinated his announcement with the United States beforehand as part of a concerted effort by the United States and its Latin American allies to force Maduro out. The Trump administration appears to have been debating regime change in Caracas for some time. In August 2017, **Trump surprised the Pentagon by announcing** that **a “military option”** was on the table **for Venezuela**—a claim he allegedly repeated to several alarmed South American leaders a few weeks later. In September 2018, the New York Times reported that Trump administration officials had met with disgruntled Venezuelan military officers multiple times to discuss the possibility of a coup. Although Washington ultimately decided not to support the coup plotters, Maduro jumped on the story and continues to blame the United States for his country’s political upheaval. This highlights the dangers of the Trump administration’s loose language when it comes to regime change. While **administration officials** may **see regime change as a morally sound response to the** humanitarian **crisis unfolding within Venezuela**, many in the region are skeptical of Washington’s intentions—for understandable reasons. When Maduro warned his supporters last week “don’t trust the gringos,” he evoked a long history of U.S. meddling in Latin America dating back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Gunboat diplomacy drove U.S. policy in the early 20th century. Indeed, as the historian Greg Grandin once summarized, “by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal.”**The** academic **literature** on regime changes **paints an overwhelmingly negative picture of the prospects of success**: Studies have shown that **foreign-imposed regime changes** do not improve political or economic relations between the intervening and target states. They **rarely lead to democracy**, **and**, regardless of whether they are conducted covertly or overtly, they **increase the likelihood that the target state will experience a civil war**. Yet however ineffective a tool regime change has been, it’s one that the United States has often resorted to. Following World War II, covert action replaced gunboat diplomacy as its preferred form of intervention in the hemisphere. For instance, my recently released book, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, documents 18 U.S.-backed covert regime change attempts in Latin America during the Cold War—10 of which saw U.S.-backed forces assume power. Because Washington’s role in most of these missions was quickly exposed, many of these covert operations have become lasting symbols of U.S. imperialism in the region: the 1954 Guatemalan coup that ousted the democratically elected leader Jacobo Árbenz, the 1961 failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1964 Brazilian military coup, the 1973 Chilean coup that gave rise to Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, and the Reagan administration’s support for anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. In April 2002, Maduro’s predecessor and mentor, Hugo Chávez, was ousted for two days in a military coup before regaining power. Afterward, Chávez accused the United States of playing a role in the coup and later claimed that the United States was trying to assassinate him. (Declassified U.S. government documents later revealed that while the CIA was aware of the 2002 coup beforehand, Washington did not back the coup and instead issued “repeated warnings that the United States will not support any extraconstitutional moves to oust Chávez.”) **Nevertheless**, Chávez continued to use the **allegations of U.S. meddling** as to **paint** himself **a socialist** folk **hero and undermine** his **political opponents** for the rest of his presidency. Given this history, many Venezuelans remain suspicious of Washington’s motives, and only 36 percent hold a favorable view of the United States. Consequently, the Trump administration’s recognition of Guaidó is likely a double-edged sword: While it may increase his stature in the eyes of U.S. allies, it is also likely to undermine his legitimacy among Venezuelans wary of U.S. meddling.

**A US intervention would cause domestic chaos with crime exploding, a refugee crisis, AND 400,000 troops engaging in conflict. The pure economic destruction nullifies the benefits of incoming reforms**

**Rourke 19**

Lindsey Rourke, 1-30-2019, "U.S. Intervention Could Be Maduro's Lifeline," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/30/u-s-intervention-could-be-maduros-lifeline/>

In the worst-case scenario, **a precision strike** operation **would** last for months, **kill**ing possibly **thousands of civilians**, **destroying** much of **what remains of Venezuela’s economy**, **and** **wiping** **out** the **state security forces. The result would be anarchy**. Militias and other armed criminal groups would roam the streets of major cities unchecked, **wreaking havoc.** More than eight million Venezuelans would likely flee. The **chaos** **would** likely **lead** **the United States to** **send** in **ground** **troops in order** either **to** finally **dislodge the regime** **and** its security forces or to provide security once the dictatorship had collapsed. Such a scenario is not improbable. Indeed, the most likely outcome of a campaign of air strikes is that the Venezuelan armed forces would disintegrate. The United States, perhaps with international partners, **would** then **have no option** but to send troops **to neutralize** Venezuela’s **irregular armed groups** and restore order while a new government and security apparatus established themselves. How long such a peacekeeping occupation would last is hard to say, but the difficulty of the project and **the complexity** **of** **the country's geography** **suggest** **that** **troops would stay in Venezuela** **for** a lot longer than the few **months** for which they might initially be sent. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, for example, lasted 13 years in a much smaller country. GROUND INVASION Rather than launching precision strikes and getting sucked into a ground war later, the United States might choose to go all-in from the beginning. **That** **would** **mean** a **major** **intervention**, **including** both **air strikes** **and** the **deployment of** at least **150,000 ground troops** to secure or destroy airfields, ports, oil fields, power stations, command and control centers, communications infrastructure, and other important government facilities, including the president’s residence, Miraflores Palace. **The invading army would** **face 160,000** regular **Venezuelan troops and** more than **100,000 paramilitaries**. The most recent large-scale U.S.-led military interventions, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, both required U.S. troops to remain after the initial invasion for nearly 20 years. By 2017, the two interventions had involved more than two million U.S. military personnel and cost more than $1.8 trillion. More than 7,000 U.S. service members have died in Afghanistan and Iraq. The costs of an intervention in Venezuela, which is free of the kind of sectarian divides that plague Afghanistan and Iraq, would likely not come near those numbers, but they would likely be significant. There’s no such thing as risk-free military action. But in this case, the social, economic, and security costs of intervening far outweigh the benefits. Whether the United States launched limited air strikes or a full ground invasion, it would almost certainly get sucked in to a long, difficult campaign to stabilize Venezuela after the initial fighting was over. Such an engagement would cost American lives and money and hurt the United States’ standing in Latin America. An extended occupation would reignite anti-Americanism in the region, particularly if U.S. soldiers committed real or perceived abuses, and it would damage U.S. relations with countries outside the region, too. Finally, a war-weary American public is unlikely to stand for yet another extended military campaign

**We negate**

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## Overviews

### OV: Debt Restructuring

#### The opposition refuses to partake in debt restructuring while Maduro is in office. Their intent to restructure post Maduro makes sanctions the only try or die solvency

**Smith 19**

Colby Smith, 7-3-2019, "Venezuela’s opposition sets out debt restructuring plans," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/f8c70f3a-9d18-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb>

**Venezuela’s opposition** **plans** **to** **treat** equally **creditors ensnared** **in the country’s** $150bn **web of defaulted debt** **if** President Nicolás **Maduro is removed** — after weeding out inflated, fraudulent, or corrupt claims. In a new policy paper, advisers to US-backed opposition leader Juan Guaidó sketch out how his administration would go about restructuring Venezuela’s huge and varied stock of debt, which includes unpaid supplier invoices, expropriation claims and defaulted bonds, among other instruments. Given the complexity of the claims, **the opposition** government **plans to hold all** its **foreign creditors** **to** **the same terms** no matter the kind of debt held, which public entity issued it, **and** **whether** **or not the creditor had previously** gone to a courthouse and **received a judgment**. “What the government is offering is an orderly process in which we can recognise the claims on the government and restructure them so they are in line with the country’s capacity to pay,” Ricardo Hausmann, an economic adviser to the opposition, said. Mr Guaidó is setting out plans to deal with the stock of debt because he considers himself to be the legitimate interim president of Venezuela, arguing that Mr Maduro has usurped the title on the basis of bogus elections. He says that under the constitution, he has the right to assume the presidency because he is the head of the National Assembly, Venezuela’s democratically elected Congress. With the backing of the US and most major countries in Latin America, he has been trying to unseat Mr Maduro since the start of this year, without success. Mr Maduro retains the control of the armed forces and controls most state institutions. The policy paper, to be published on Wednesday, indicates that Mr Guaidó’s team would make two exceptions to the equal-treatment principle. The country’s bilateral debts with Russia and China would be negotiated separately, as would commercial claims secured by property of the Venezuelan state or its public sector entities. That latter exception could eventually include holders of bonds issued by the state-run oil company PDVSA due in 2020, should the country miss payment on what is its last remaining bond not yet in default. The debt is backed by a majority stake in Citgo, the PDVSA-owned but Texas-based, energy business. Beyond the 2020 bond, the beleaguered Latin American country has been in default on almost all of its debts since 2017. Current US sanctions prohibit trading in the securities of Venezuela and PDVSA, hampering any attempt at a restructuring and leaving bondholders and other creditors in the dark about their chances of eventually recouping their capital.

## FL: Negotiations

### AT: Sanctions Disrupt Talks

**They say that Maduro ended talks over sanctions, but their evidence is outdated. The Binner 20 evidence very clearly states how Maduro has returned to the table BECAUSE OF SANCTIONS. This was literally last week which only confirms the VSU 20 evidence accuracy**