

Rachel and I negate.

Contention One is Farmageddon.

NAFTA harms agriculture in two ways.

The first is killing corn.

USDA 08 explains that NAFTA increased agricultural trade between the US, Mexico, and Canada.

Edwards 18 finds that the US spends billions of dollars annually on farm subsidies, especially on corn, which is why **Vaughn 04** determines that US-grown corn is 27% cheaper than Mexican corn. Problematically, **Weisbrot 17** finds that this allows American farmers to flood the international market with their cheaper corn.

The second way is by spurring a water crisis.

Vaughan 04 finds that NAFTA created agreements between the US and Mexico over irrigation inputs for farming, especially from the Rio Grande River on the border. The **Carnegie Endowment** corroborates that drought conditions in Mexico have created a water deficit between the two countries, creating a major irrigation crisis.

The impacts of NAFTA on agriculture are twofold.

The first impact is displacing farmers.

Weisbrot finds that the influx of cheaply priced American crops, especially corn, displaced 19% of the Mexican agricultural workforce. **Gonzalez 17** adds that two million farmers were directly put out of work, which caused a ripple effect in related sectors, which is why **Weisbrot** ultimately quantifies that 4.9 million people were displaced.

The second impact is increasing prices.

Wallach finds that NAFTA increased US food prices by 65%. The **Huffington Post 14** adds that the cost of goods in Mexico has increased by seven times what it was pre-NAFTA.

Contention Two is Hurting the Environment.

NAFTA harms the environment in three ways.

The first is through increasing pollution.

Zarsky 04 finds that NAFTA has worsened the environment in Mexico, specifically increasing air pollution, water pollution, and toxins at a rate faster than GDP and population growth.

McAuliff 14 corroborates that greenhouse gas emissions increased by more than 1.3 billion metric tons over 15 years as a result of NAFTA.

Skidmore 10 furthers that NAFTA has caused a 97% increase in air pollution.

The second way NAFTA harms the environment is by increasing deforestation.

Vaughan determines that NAFTA caused Mexico to increase its deforestation rate, continuing that deforestation disproportionately harms poorer citizens.

But it's not just Mexico, because **Beyer 17** explains that, without significant tariffs, the Canadian lumber industry supplies between a quarter and a half of US lumber, spurring massive deforestation in Canada for trade purposes.

The third way is by increasing energy infrastructure.

NAFTA creates partnerships between countries that allow energy infrastructure to flourish, which is why **Davis 18** of **NGI** finds that "NAFTA has served as the essential framework that has allowed the oil and natural gas industry to see the growth and prosperity it has today."

Critically, **McKibben 18** writes that the methane natural gas emits actually make it more dangerous than people believe.

Ultimately, **Kent et al 18** concludes that NAFTA's arbitration panels have sided against environmental protections in support of US oil companies and the Keystone Pipeline consistently.

The impact of environmental damages are twofold.

The first is harming the economy.

Audley 04 quantifies that the pollution caused by NAFTA results in \$36 billion dollars per year of economic damages in Mexico alone.

The second impact is creating disease.

As **Domm 18** notes, NAFTA caused the United States to shift its infrastructure more towards hydraulic fracking, which **Rumpler** of **Environment America** finds contaminates drinking water, causing health problems and driving up health care costs.

Civitello et al 15 adds that poor environmental quality leads to disease and cyclical poverty.

Skidmore concludes that NAFTA-created pollution in Mexico has increased rates of asthma, cancer, and respiratory illnesses, and has doubled the rates of birth defects in children born near factories or roads that transport goods sold under NAFTA.

Thus, we negate.

Kent, Rachael D., et al. "Infrastructure Series: NAFTA Renegotiation: Energy Infrastructure and Investor-State Disputes." Wilmer Hale, 3 May 2018,

www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179887992 // RM

Negotiations to reshape the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United States, Canada and Mexico have recently intensified as various factors—upcoming elections in Mexico in July and in the United States in November; the prospects of a trade showdown between the United States and China—have the three nations pushing to reach an agreement in principle in the coming weeks (although talks are presently on hold until May 7). One remaining sticking point is the future of NAFTA's **Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)** provision. ISDS provisions, **in NAFTA** as well as in other trade agreements, **allow companies with foreign investments to bring before an arbitration panel claims that a state actor has violated the treaty**, by, for example, expropriating their assets, discriminating against them, or denying them fair and equitable treatment. The United States negotiators have indicated that they wish to eliminate this provision from NAFTA. Mexico and Canada appear aligned in their desire to preserve ISDS (with some suggestion that they would bilaterally agree to ISDS if it falls out of NAFTA). **The US domestic energy industry has voiced strong support for retaining NAFTA's ISDS regime. Examples in both the oil and gas and renewables sectors illustrate the value that the energy industry places on ISDS and explain the vocal push to retain it in any NAFTA renegotiation. The Keystone XL pipeline provides a high-profile example of the use of ISDS in the oil and gas infrastructure context. In 2015, then-President Obama, acting through the US State Department, denied Canadian energy company TransCanada Corporation's application for a needed Presidential Permit to authorize construction of Keystone XL in the United States. TransCanada responded by filing a request for arbitration pursuant to NAFTA. TransCanada claimed that the denial violated**, among others, **NAFTA's requirements that states treat investors of other states as they would domestic investors and extend to all investors fair and equitable treatment.**¹ **TransCanada argued that the denial was arbitrary and designed to signal the Obama Administration's climate change bona fides, as opposed to being grounded in the merits of Keystone XL itself. TransCanada made some persuasive arguments to advance its position**, though the Trump Administration's decision to reverse the denial and authorize Keystone XL ultimately mooted the challenge. **Regulation of upstream oil and gas projects has been the subject of ISDS claims as well. For example, after Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador imposed requirements on offshore oil and gas producers to contribute a portion of their revenue to research, development, education and training in the Canadian province, affected US-based companies submitted claims alleging that such action violated NAFTA. An arbitration panel agreed with the US companies**, finding that the obligation to contribute to provincial interests violated NAFTA Article 1106's prohibition on requirements "to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory."²

Domm, P. (2018). Energy has best chance of bringing angry NAFTA nations back to their senses in a trade war . CNBC. Retrieved 29 May 2018, from

<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/02/energy-is-crown-jewel-of-nafta-nations-and-will-tie-them-together-regardless-of-trade-deals.html> //RM

The United States imports both Canadian and Mexican oil and sells natural gas and fuel to Mexico. Canada is the biggest U.S. supplier of foreign oil, and it buys some U.S. crude and sells it gasoline, natural gas and electricity. **The outlook for North America changed dramatically in the last decade. The push by the U.S. energy industry into hydraulic fracking and horizontal drilling unleashed an energy boom, making the United States the world's biggest producer of natural gas and just recently the second-largest producer of oil**, surpassing Saudi Arabia. **That has changed the situation for all of North America at a time when Mexico's oil and gas output was in decline and Canada found some of its potential oil output landlocked. The ties between the three countries go way back. In the early 1900s the United States began sharing electricity with its neighbors, and Canada is now a significant net exporter of electricity to the United States.**

Rumpler, J - The Costs of Fracking. (2018). Environmentamerica.org. Retrieved 29 May 2018, from

https://environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/exp/reports/costs_of_fracking.html // RM

Fracking damages the environment, threatens public health, and affects communities in ways that can impose a multitude of costs: Drinking water contamination – Fracking brings with it the potential for spills, blowouts and well failures that contaminate groundwater supplies. **Cleanup of drinking water contamination** is so expensive that it is rarely even attempted. In Dimock, Pennsylvania, Cabot Oil & Gas reported having spent \$109,000 on systems to remove methane from well water for 14 local households, while in Colorado, cleanup of an underground gas seep has been ongoing for eight years at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not more. The provision of temporary replacement water supplies is also expensive. Cabot Oil & Gas reported having spent at least \$193,000 on replacement water for homes with contaminated water in Dimock, Pennsylvania. **Health care costs – Toxic substances in fracking fluid and wastewater** – as well as air pollution from trucks, equipment and the wells themselves – **have been linked to** a variety of negative health effects. Residents living near fracking sites have long suffered from a range of **health problems**, including headaches, eye irritation, respiratory problems and nausea – potentially **imposing economic costs ranging from health care costs to workplace absenteeism and reduced productivity. Fracking and associated activities also produce pollution that contributes to the formation of ozone smog and particulate soot.** Air pollution from gas drilling in Arkansas' Fayetteville Shale region imposed estimated public health costs of more than \$10 million in 2008. **Habitat destruction and natural resources impacts** – Fracking converts rural and natural areas into industrial zones, replacing forest and farm land with well pads, roads, pipelines and other infrastructure, and damaging precious natural resources. The clearance of forest land in Pennsylvania for fracking is projected to lead to increased delivery of nutrient pollution to the Chesapeake Bay, which already suffers from a vast nutrient-generated dead zone. The cost of reducing the same amount of pollution as could be generated by fracking would be approximately \$1.5 million to \$4 million per year. Gas operations in Wyoming have fragmented key habitat for mule deer and pronghorn, which are important draws for the state's \$340 million hunting and wildlife watching industries. The mule deer population in one area undergoing extensive gas extraction dropped by 56 percent between 2001 and 2010. **Impacts on public infrastructure and services – Fracking strains infrastructure and public services and imposes cleanup costs that can fall on taxpayers.** The truck traffic needed to deliver water to a single fracking well causes as much damage to local roads as nearly 3.5 million car trips. The state of Texas has approved \$40 million in funding for road repairs in the Barnett Shale region, while Pennsylvania estimated in 2010 that \$265 million would be needed to repair damaged roads in the Marcellus Shale region. The need for vast amounts of water for fracking is driving demand for new water infrastructure in arid regions of the country. Texas' official State Water Plan calls for the expenditure of \$400 million on projects to support the mining sector over the next 50 years, with fracking projected to account for 42 percent of mining water use by 2020. **Fracking can leave lasting negative economic impacts Fracking can undercut the long-term economic prospects of areas where it takes place.** A 2008 study found that Western **counties that have relied on fossil fuel extraction are doing worse economically compared with peer communities and are less well-prepared for growth in the future.**

Davis, C. 'Imperative' for U.S. to Remain in NAFTA, Says Texas Energy Industry Chief. (2018). Naturalgasintel.com. Retrieved 29 May 2018, from

<http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/113517-imperative-for-us-to-remain-in-nafta-says-texas-energy-industry-chief> // RM

The Texas Oil & Gas Association (TXOGA) on Tuesday urged the Trump administration to think twice before withdrawing the United States from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). TXOGA President Todd Staples laid out the industry group's agenda, noting that during fiscal year (FY) 2017, members together paid more than \$11 billion in state/local taxes and state royalties, up from \$9.4 billion a year earlier. "The remarkable and sustained recovery of the Texas oil and natural gas industry is benefitting our state and local economies, providing the equivalent of \$30 million a day for our schools, universities, roads and first responders," said Staples. "What's happening in Texas is the primary reason that our nation is a global power broker." During FY2017, Texas school districts received an estimated \$1.1 billion in property taxes from mineral properties producing oil and natural gas, pipelines, and gas utilities, while counties received \$336 million in mineral property taxes. Staples traced many of the energy milestones to the state's record production, expanding pipeline infrastructure and increased exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil. "Recently released data shows that Texas produced nearly 40% of the nation's crude oil when the United States crossed the 10 million b/d threshold," he said. "Our crude oil imports are down 20% from 2006 and last month, our crude oil exports were more than double the average in January 2017." The United States last year also became a net LNG exporter, "and those exports are expected to increase more than 10-fold in 2019, thanks in part to the seven LNG facilities planned or under construction in Texas," Staples said. What's happening in U.S. energy today was "unthinkable a decade ago," which he said was "a direct result of Texans' dedication to innovation and consistent regulations and policies." While the state's ability produce unprecedented amounts of oil and natural gas "is a major contributor to our global leverage, production is only part of the story. Policy that encourages growth in the entire oil and natural gas sector is key to the Texas success story and is the foundation of our energy future." TXOGA's priorities today are centered around pipeline growth, port expansions and refining, as well as lobbying for the United States to remain in NAFTA. "Smart policy will keep Texas on top," Staples said. "Maintaining state policies that allow us to expand our energy infrastructure – including pipelines, tanks, terminals, and refining capacity -- is the best way to increase energy reliability and security and to protect our fuel supply in the event of a natural disaster." The Trump administration's recently released budget included \$13 million for a planned expansion of the Corpus Christi Ship Channel in South Texas, a deepwater port that increasingly is carrying more oil exports and eventually is set to deliver LNG to overseas markets. NAFTA negotiations resumed this week in Mexico City. **American Petroleum Institute** chief Jack Gerard **and other industry groups have argued for the United States to remain in NAFTA, a partnership with Mexico and Canada that President Trump has questioned.** Staples described the importance of the trade agreement to Texas. "NAFTA has served as the essential framework that has allowed the oil and natural gas industry to see the growth and prosperity it has today, resulting in hundreds of thousands of jobs for Texans," he said. "We have a lot at stake as NAFTA negotiations continue because Texas is home not only

to the oil and natural gas and the pipelines that transport it to Mexico, but also the refineries and petrochemical plants that make the products we export to our neighbors.” Staples said it was “imperative to maintain the NAFTA provisions that enforce fair trade practices and allow our industry to remain competitive, grow jobs and invest with certainty.

Ambrose. Renewed NAFTA has potential to be a big three-way win for energy. (2018). Calgary Herald. Retrieved 29 May 2018, from <http://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/ambrose-renewed-nafta-has-potential-to-be-a-big-three-way-win-for-energy> // RM

Importantly, President **Trump cannot achieve global energy dominance or North American energy integration without Mexico being part of the equation. Energy security is probably the number one reason we should work to keep Mexico at the table.**

McKibben. Why natural gas makes global warming worse. (2018). GreenBiz. Retrieved 29 May 2018, from <https://www.greenbiz.com/article/why-natural-gas-makes-global-warming-worse> // RM

No, the single most annoying failing is a more technical one, but with huge consequence: **Public opinion** — and especially elite opinion — still **accepts natural gas as a cleaner replacement for other fossil fuels**. And this acceptance — nearly as strong among Democrats as Republicans — has **mean[ing]t that we've seen huge increases in the use of natural gas. In fact, our essential global warming strategy in America has been to replace coal-fired power plants with ones that run on fracked gas. The idea that natural gas combats climate change is a sleight of hand.** But explaining why appears to be just slightly too technical for it ever to get across, in the media or on Capitol Hill, in statehouses or city halls. Still, I'll try one more time. **It's true that when you burn natural gas in a power plant, you emit less carbon dioxide than when you burn coal** — for simplicity's sake, let's say half as much. **That sounds good**, as carbon is the main contributor to climate change. It's what allowed President Barack Obama to boast in his 2014 State of the Union address, “Over the past eight years, the United States has reduced our total carbon pollution more than any other nation on Earth. ... One of the reasons why is natural gas — if extracted safely, it's the bridge fuel that can power our economy with less of the carbon pollution that causes climate change.” In fact, his administration was so fond of fracking that the State Department set up an entire agency whose only task was to spread the technology to other countries. **Here's the trouble: Carbon dioxide is the main greenhouse gas, but it's not the only one. Another one** — present in smaller amounts, but **far more potent** — is **CH4, otherwise known as methane, the primary component of natural gas. If you burn natural gas, you get less carbon dioxide than with coal. But any methane that escapes unburned into the atmosphere on the way to the power plant warms the planet very effectively — so effectively that if you leak more than 2 or 3 percent, it's worse for climate change than coal.**

Scott **Beyer**, 8-3-20**17**, “Taken To The Woodshed: The Effect Of Trump's Timber Tariffs,” <https://marketurbanismreport.com/taken-woodshed-effect-trumps-timber-tariffs/> // RH

The problem is that shutting off Canada, in particular, will inflict costs on many more Americans who don't work in the timber industry. **Canada is the world's largest exporter of lumber. The U.S. is by far its largest market, accounting for 80 percent of these export sales, most of which go towards home construction.** Depending on the year, **Canadian lumber accounts for between a quarter and a third of the lumber used in the U.S.** Only a few percentage points of America's timber supply comes from overseas. And while some parts of the U.S.—namely the Pacific Northwest and northern California—have strong production, many other parts—such as the aforementioned southwest—are practically barren. Given these figures, it's easy to see how the duties on Canada could affect timber prices—and home prices at large. In fact, it's already happening. According to a recent report by the National Association of Home Builders, **timber prices began skyrocketing at the beginning of 2017. This was in response to a U.S.-Canada trade agreement between 2006 and 2016 that had just expired, raising fears about possible retroactive duties.** Prices have continued to climb following the Trump tariffs. Between January and mid-May, reports Bloomberg, **timber prices jumped 18 percent**, to \$369.70 per 1,000 board feet. **The price surge has not been because Canadian timber supply fell off the market in response to the regulatory barriers but because the timber overcame these barriers, and is being bought at a premium by builders. “You're seeing the U.S. consumer really bear the brunt of the tax at this point in time,** more so than the Canadian producers,” said Mason, “because we've seen the lumber prices go up quite a lot, and basically offset the cost of the duties.” **Considering that lumber accounts for roughly 10 percent of construction costs already, these higher prices are significant. They come at a time of high housing demand in America, when all the more lumber is needed.** Median home prices at the national level, and in many major metros, have risen from their 2012 dropoff, back up to around their pre-recession levels. After bottoming out in 2009, the number of new housing permits has increased each year since then. Goldman Sachs estimates that housing starts will jump by another nine percent this year. The tariffs also come at a time when other regulations make the housing market that much more competitive and expensive than it already needs to be. These regulations range from lengthy approval periods, to zoning that limits supply, to immigration laws that cause construction labor shortages. Trump's tariffs, while saving some jobs, will likely add to this government-imposed state of distortion, and to increased costs. **“Any time you add a tariff,”** concluded Williamson, **“the end consumer gets a bigger bill.”**

Zarsky, Lyuba, and Kevin P. Gallagher. “NAFTA, foreign direct investment, and sustainable industrial development in Mexico.” *Americas Program Policy Brief 28* (20**04**). <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AmerProgFDJan04.pdf>

Many environmental trends are worsening in Mexico. Between 1985 and 1999, **the estimated economic costs of environmental degradation—including rural soil erosion, municipal solid waste and urban air pollution—amounted to 10% of annual GDP.** Mexico's environmental problems cannot be laid solely at the feet of industry. **However, predicted improvements from FDI-led growth have been elusive. Recent studies conclude that, since the 1980s, overall levels of industrial pollution, particularly air pollution, water pollution, and toxics, have increased faster than population growth and faster than the GDP of the economy as a whole.** Moreover, the failure to create manufacturing jobs has not alleviated the pressure on rural areas or increased municipal revenues that could be channeled to environmental infrastructure.

Skidmore 10 Skidmore, Thomas E, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Companion website by Cameron Parsons. Skidmore graduated in political science and philosophy in 1954 from Denison University. He received a Fulbright Fellowship to study philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford where he met his wife Felicity. He received a second B.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics in 1956 and a master's degree in 1959. He obtained his Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1960 with a thesis on the German Chancellor Leo von Caprivi.[2] His attention shifted to South America after the Cuban Revolution. His Harvard post-doctorate focused on Brazil. In 1967 he published Politics in Brazil: 1930-64, An Experiment in Democracy.[2] In 1966, Skidmore joined the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He became a full professor in 1968. In 1986, Skidmore moved to Brown University.[2] <https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-12-strategies-for-economic-development/nafta-free-trade-and-the-environment-in-mexico/> // RH Since the implementation of NAFTA, environmental degradation in Mexico has worsened as trade has increased. The number of factories in the maquiladora doubled (see graph at left), and by 1994 the zone was responsible for 58% of Mexican exports, as opposed to only 12% eleven years earlier. (ATTAC 2000) **As a result, from 1985 to 1999, municipal solid waste production in Mexico grew by 108%, water pollution by 29%, and urban air pollution by 97%. (Gallagher 2004) Only 12% of the eight million tons of hazardous waste produced in the maquiladoras is properly treated and disposed, and 70% of it remains within Mexico's borders. (Sierra Club 2004) Toxic emissions and particulate matter produced as a byproduct of the manufacturing and transportation industries—note that 70% of all NAFTA goods are transported by trucks whose emission standards do not meet U.S. regulations—have been connected to increased threats of cancer, asthma and respiratory diseases, as well as a number of serious birth defects near the border.** (Ibid) Indeed, one study conducted in four Texas border counties found that between 1993 and 1996 **(three years following NAFTA) the number of babies born with anencephaly (a birth defect that causes partial development of brain and skull) jumped to more than twice the U.S. national average** (Bolterstein 1999). The timing of the increase can in no way be coincidental. While all these problems have been mounting, the Kuznets Curve belief of free traders has not come to fruition because although Mexico's manufacturing has increased and its GDP/capita has risen, investment in pollution abating technology and waste storage and treatment facilities has remained scarce. (World Bank 2010)

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

Notwithstanding the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, the greatest environmental pressure associated with NAFTA is transmitted through the scale effects of economic growth, to which trade liberalization contributes. In the manufacturing sector, environmental regulations—as strong as they were on paper with the passage of NAFTA—did not keep pace with rates of economic growth. Mexico's manufacturing sector has grown by 4 percent per annum since enactment of NAFTA, but real spending on pollution monitoring and on-site inspections has fallen by 45 percent over the same period. **Overall, air pollution has increased 10 percent per year in the manufacturing sector of Mexico since NAFTA took effect.**

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

In the manufacturing sector, which due to its pollution intensity has been subject to closet scrutiny, **NAFTA has contributed directly to an increase of between 1 and 2 percent in annual gross emissions of carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, due to changes in the petroleum, base metals, and transportation equipment sectors. NAFTA has also contributed directly to air pollution spikes in the Canadian-U.S. and U.S.-Mexican border regions, as 80 percent of total NAFTA trade is transported via truck-transport passing through increasingly congested border points. NAFTA Chapter 6 energy provisions have contributed to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions arising from increased U.S.-Canadian trade in electricity, as well as increased Mexican exports of electricity to the United States**

Audley 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. John J. Audley. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. John J. Audley directed the Trade, Equity, and Development Project. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, Audley was the trade policy coordinator at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). There, he was responsible for developing and presenting EPA's positions on U.S. trade policy. He won a silver medal from the agency for his work on two documents: "Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements," an executive order, and "The White House Policy Paper on Trade and Environment." Before he served at the EPA, Audley was international affairs director of the National Wildlife Federation, where he worked for two years. He has taught on environment, public policy, and other subjects at Georgetown University, Purdue University, and the University of Maryland. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

The fear of a "race to the bottom" in environmental regulation has proved unfounded. At this point some elements of Mexico's economy are dirtier and some are cleaner. The Mexican government estimates that **annual pollution damages over the past decade exceeded \$36 billion per year. This damage to the environment is greater than the economic gains from the growth of trade and of the economy as a whole.** More specifically, **enactment of NAFTA accelerated changes in commercial farming practices that have put Mexico's diverse ecosystem at great risk of contamination from concentrations of nitrogen and other chemicals commonly used in modern farming. Mexico's evolution toward a modern, export-oriented agricultural sector has also failed to deliver the anticipated environmental benefits of reduced deforestation and tillage.** Rural farmers have replaced lost income caused by the collapse in commodity prices by farming more marginal land, a practice that has resulted in an average deforestation rate of more than 630,000 hectares per year since 1996 in the biologically rich regions of southern Mexico.

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

The average deforestation rate in the biologically rich southern regions of Mexico has exceeded 630,000 hectares per year since 1993. The leading cause of deforestation in Mexico remains poverty, with slash-and-burn clearing and tree felling by poor households in need of fuel remaining the leading causes of forest clearing. In addition, small-scale, **rain-fed maize production has increased by 18 percent in marginalized areas, as poor farmers respond to falling prices.** The environmental costs of deforestation and changes in land use in Mexico are staggering. **That country is one of the planet's leading centers of "megadiversity," home to 10 percent of all known species, of which 30 to 50 percent are endemic.** Mexico has the world's second-highest number of reptile species, and ranks fourth for amphibians and fifth for mammalian diversity in the world. However, the geography of this biological diversity coincides exactly with Mexico's geography of extreme poverty. Trade theory scarcely hides the unhappy fact that there are winners and losers from trade liberalization. However, people—**especially indigenous peoples in the poorest regions of southern Mexico—maintain an enduring allegiance to their ancestral homes, community ties, and traditional knowledge, which date back 6,000 years. Given that these ties reach deeper than economically rational decision making, millions of poor farmers who are clearly losers on the ledgers of free trade remain committed to their lands, despite structural changes in the farm sector that increasingly lock them out of commercially viable markets.**

McAuliff 14 Michael McAuliff covers Congress and politics for HuffPost, where he started working in 2011 after eight years at the New York Daily News. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/nafta-environment_n_4938556.html // RH

The report estimates that a significant jump in pollution can be linked to NAFTA, with greenhouse gas emissions in the region increasing from 7 billion metric tons in 1990 to about 8.3 billion in 2005.

Broad evidence for the dilution effect hypothesis. David J. **Civitello**, Jeremy Cohen, Hiba Fatima, Neal T. Halstead, Josue Liriano, Taegan A. McMahon, C. Nicole Ortega, Erin Louise Sauer, Tanya Sehgal, Suzanne Young, Jason R. Rohr Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jun 20 **15**, 201506279; DOI:10.1073/pnas.1506279112. Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved May 15, 2015 (received for review March 30, 2015) Halstead Education M.S. Biology, University of South Florida, 2007 B.S. Biology, University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point, 2001 <http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/06/10/1506279112> // RH

We can use the estimated coefficients from SI Appendix, Table S7 to evaluate policy scenarios, such as **the expansion of strict PAs between 1990 and 2010 by 63%**, for example. Our estimates suggest that this expansion **reduced ARI, diarrhea, and malaria by 1.5%, 2%, and 6%, respectively**, in an average municipality. It is difficult to benchmark these findings against (i) other conservation actions because the empirical evidence does not exist and (ii) public health interventions because they have different designs and contexts (e.g., targeting specific groups, not general populations). Nonetheless, our modeling of multiple drivers would also allow conservation planners to consider scenarios such as combining strict PAs with the complementary strategy of reducing roads, which together would have a much larger impact on malaria, for example.

Broad evidence for the dilution effect hypothesis. David J. **Civitello**, Jeremy Cohen, Hiba Fatima, Neal T. Halstead, Josue Liriano, Taegan A. McMahon, C. Nicole Ortega, Erin Louise Sauer, Tanya Sehgal, Suzanne Young, Jason R. Rohr Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jun 20 **15**, 201506279; DOI:10.1073/pnas.1506279112. Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved May 15, 2015 (received for review March 30, 2015) Halstead Education M.S. Biology, University of South Florida, 2007 B.S. Biology, University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point, 2001 <http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/06/10/1506279112> // RH

Recent approximations attribute as much as 24% of the global burden of disease (GBD) to poor environmental quality, including land-use patterns (9, 10). Ecosystem degradation and infectious diseases are central elements of a vicious cycle of rural poverty traps in the developing tropics (11[–]13). Although these problems are not new, they continue to be of global

concern and significance, especially in the context of climate change. Thus, there is renewed attention to the environmental drivers of health (2, 6, 14, 15), which requires stepping back from a purely biomedical and molecular view of health to examine community and environmental drivers using a landscape epidemiology or ecoepidemiology perspective (16, 17). The desire to make the case for conservation has led to broad claims regarding the benefits of nature conservation for human health; these claims must be tested and substantiated with rigorous empirical analysis (3, 8, 18–20).

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada).

<https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

Irrigation inputs for export crops have been linked to the U.S.-Mexican dispute over water flows and quotas of the Rio Grande. The United States and Mexico have established water-sharing quotas for that river, under a 1994 treaty administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission. Since 1992, Mexico has run a deficit with the United States that now exceeds 450 billion gallons of water. Mexican authorities blame severe drought conditions for their decision to withhold northward water flows from Mexico into Texas. **In turn, farmers in Texas have faced acute water shortages**, leading to a 15 percent decline in crop output in some regions. Some of these farmers, and state and other officials in the United States, allege that some of the 450 billion gallon deficit has been diverted to water intensive agricultural production in Mexico, with exports destined for the United States. (In early September 2003, the two countries announced a timetable for Mexico to begin paying down the water deficit.)

USDA 2008, Foreign Agriculture Service, NAFTA Agriculture Fact Sheet, https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/nafta1.14.2008_0.pdf // RH

The final provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were fully implemented on January 1, 2008. Launched on January 1, 1994, **NAFTA** is one of the most successful trade agreements in history and has **contributed to significant increases in agricultural trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico** and has benefited farmers, ranchers and consumers throughout North America.

Chris **Edwards**, 4-16-20**18**, "Agricultural Subsidies," Downsizing the Federal Government, <https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies> // RH

The federal government spends more than \$20 billion a year on subsidies for farm businesses. About 39 percent of the nation's 2.1 million farms receive subsidies, with the lion's share of the handouts going to the largest producers of corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice.

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf> // RH

The increase in U.S. corn imports also risks weakening in situ conservation involving some or all of the forty races of maize that are grown in Mexico, with some varieties dating their origin back 6,000 years. While there has been an absolute contraction in maize production in Mexico since the enactment of NAFTA, led by a free fall in commercially harvested crops, production of rain-fed maize has remained stable. To date, there is little evidence that NAFTA has undermined in situ conservation of maize. **However, the price difference of approximately 27 percent between U.S. corn and Mexican varieties suggests that over time the price wedge may result in U.S. imports crowding out rain-fed varieties.** This substitution will eventually present small-scale farmers with three choices: exit farming altogether; diversify the composition of crop output; or concentrate on fledgling but potentially high-growth market niches that award a price premium for traditional, organic, and sustainable produce such as traditional maize. Each presents formidable obstacles to small-scale farmers. As noted in chapter 1, there are few economic and employment alternatives for millions of farmers in Mexico. At the same time, the quality of soil in marginal lands makes crop switching very unlikely. Finally, even if market niches for sustainable produce expand dramatically, this will not alleviate all pressures on in situ conservation. Therefore, **the long-term erosion of the knowledge base on which traditional maize growing is based is one of the greatest conservation threats directly posed by NAFTA.**

Weisbrot 17 "Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Update After 23 Years" By Mark Weisbrot, Lara Merling, Vitor Mello, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut* Updated March 2017

(Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC. Lara Merling is a Research Assistant, Vitor Mello is an International Program Intern, Stephan Lefebvre is a former Research Assistant, and Joseph Sammut is a former International Program Intern at CEPR.)

<http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/nafta-mexico-update-2017-03.pdf?v=2>

NAFTA removed tariffs (but not subsidies) on agricultural goods, with a transition period in which there was a steadily increasing import quota for certain commodities. The transition period was longest for corn, the most important crop for Mexican producers, only ending in 2008. Not surprisingly, **US production**, which is not only subsidized but had higher average productivity levels than that of Mexico, **displaced millions of Mexican farmers.** Table 2 shows agricultural employment in Mexico in 1991 and 2007, according to census data.

GRAPH OMITTED

As can be seen, **there was a 19 percent drop in agricultural employment, or about 2 million jobs.** The loss was in family labor employed in the family farm sector. Seasonal (less than six months employment) gained about 3 million jobs, but it was not nearly enough to compensate for the **4.9 million jobs lost in the family farm sector. Proponents of NAFTA of course knew that family farms in Mexico would not be able to compete with subsidized US production** but argued that displaced workers would shift to higher productivity agriculture (mainly vegetables and fruits for export), as well as industrial jobs. Although vegetable and fruit production did expand considerably (from 17.3 million tons in 1994 to 28.2 million in 2012), and presumably accounted for many of the 3 million seasonal jobs created, it was clearly not enough in terms of employment.

Gonzalez 17

Josue Gonzalez, 10-4-2017, "NAFTA's Economic Impact," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact> // RH

Mexican unemployment also rose, which some economists have blamed on NAFTA for exposing Mexican farmers, especially corn producers, to competition from heavily subsidized U.S. agriculture. A study led by CEPR economist Mark Weisbrot estimates that **NAFTA put almost two million small-scale Mexican farmers [PDF] out of work, in turn driving illegal migration to the United States.** (Migration to the United States, both legal and illegal, more than doubled after 1994, peaking in 2007. However, the flow reversed after 2008 as more Mexican-born immigrants began leaving the country than arriving. Experts attribute this to stricter border enforcement, changing demographics in Mexico, and the combination of fewer available jobs in the United States along with more in Mexico.) **Many analysts explain these divergent outcomes by pointing to the "two-speed" nature of Mexico's economy, in which NAFTA drove the growth of foreign investment, high-tech manufacturing, and rising wages in the industrial north, while the largely agrarian south remains detached from this new economy.** As University of Pennsylvania economist Mauro Guillen argues, **Mexico's rising inequality stems from NAFTA-oriented workers in the north gaining much higher wages from trade-related activity.**

Lori **Wallach**, 1-6-20**14**, "NAFTA at 20: One Million U.S. Jobs Lost, Higher Income Inequality," HuffPost,

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/nafta-at-20-one-million-u_b_4550207.html // RH

The average annual U.S. agricultural trade deficit with Mexico and Canada under NAFTA stands at \$800 million, more than twice the pre-NAFTA level. U.S. beef imports from Mexico and Canada, for example, have risen 130 percent since NAFTA. This stands in stark contrast to the promises made to U.S. farmers and ranchers that NAFTA would allow them to export their way to newfound wealth and farm income stability. **Despite an overall 188 percent rise in food imports from Canada and Mexico under NAFTA, the average nominal price of food in the United States has jumped 65 percent since NAFTA went into effect.** The reductions in consumer goods prices that have materialized have not been sufficient to offset the losses to wages under NAFTA. **U.S. workers without college degrees (63 percent of the workforce) likely have lost a net amount equal to 12.7 percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade even after accounting for gains from cheaper goods. This net loss means a loss of more than 3,300 per year for a worker earning the median annual wage of 27,500.** The export of subsidized U.S. corn did increase under NAFTA, destroying the livelihoods of more than one million Mexican *campesino* farmers and about 1.4 million additional Mexican workers whose livelihoods depended on agriculture. The desperate migration of those displaced from Mexico's rural economy pushed down wages in Mexico's border maquiladora factory zone and contributed to a doubling of Mexican immigration to the United States following NAFTA's implementation. Though the price paid to Mexican farmers for corn plummeted after NAFTA, the deregulated retail price of tortillas - Mexico's staple food - shot up 279 percent in the pact's first 10 years. Facing displacement, rising prices and stagnant wages, more than half the Mexican population, and more than 60 percent of the rural population, still falls below the poverty line, despite the promises that NAFTA would bring broad prosperity to Mexicans. **Real wages in Mexico have fallen significantly below pre-NAFTA levels as price increases for basic consumer goods have exceeded wage increases. A minimum wage earner in Mexico today can buy 38 percent fewer consumer goods than on the day that NAFTA took effect. Despite promises that NAFTA would benefit Mexican consumers by granting access to cheaper imported products, the cost of basic consumer goods in Mexico has risen to seven times the pre-NAFTA level,** while the minimum wage stands at only four times the pre-NAFTA level.