# Berkeley Aff File

## Framing

### We defend cutting temporarily

The affirmative doesn’t have to defend cutting off arms sales forever but, rather, until Saudi Arabia ends the conflict. **Keating ’18 of Slate** explains that the proposal in Congress to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia only proposes doing so until they end the war.

Joshua Keating, 11-13-2018, "We’re Finally Seeing Real International Pressure Toward Ending the War in Yemen", Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/congress-yemen-ceasefire.html // JY
But even if it’s mostly a symbolic gesture at this point, the vote is a landmark in two ways: It marks the first time the Senate has voted to invoke the War Powers Resolution to end a conflict, and the first time the WPR has been applied to an assistance mission rather than the deployment of U.S. combat troops. The Senate is also not done with the Saudis yet: [Several other Saudi-related measures](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/congress-saudi-arabia-yemen.html) are currently up for debate, including one that would suspend U.S. arms sales to the kingdom for the duration of the Yemen conflict. Until recently, advocates called Yemen a “[forgotten war](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/),” a deadly but obscure conflict of little interest to the international media or policymakers in countries allied with Saudi Arabia. It’s taken far too long, and required an unexpected and unrelated event—the killing of Khashoggi—but at least the world is now paying attention to Yemen.

## Status Quo

### AT: General Squo Good

[insert rhetoric here specific to your case. It’s obviously not lol]

### AT: Cutting Aid Solves

1. **Delink –** Aid hasn’t been cut yet. This was just a joint Senate resolution; the concurring resolution in the House has yet to be voted on.

2. **Delink –** The JR isn’t enough, anyway. **Anderson of the Brookings Institute** writes in **January** that the language in the resolution is too vague and will most likely simply be skirted by the Trump administration, meaning the resolution will have no effect.

Scott R. Anderson [Scott R. Anderson is a David M. Rubenstein fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He previously served as an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State and as the legal advisor for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.], 1-19-2019, "Taking Stock of the Yemen Resolution", Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/taking-stock-yemen-resolution // JY
On Wednesday, Nov. 28, Congress took what may be its most important step to date towards openly opposing U.S. involvement in the Yemen war. By a vote of [63 to 37](https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00250), the Senate elected to discharge a joint resolution directing an end to U.S. involvement in Yemen out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on to the Senate floor. The resolution in question, [S.J. Res. 54](https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/sjres54/BILLS-115sjres54pcs.pdf), was introduced by Sens. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), and Mike Lee (R-Utah) in February 2018, and has remained in committee since that time. Wednesday’s vote sets up a possible Senate vote on whether to proceed to consideration on the joint resolution for next week, which could in turn lead to a vote on the resolution itself. This decision is an indisputable victory for those who oppose the Trump administration’s continued support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, whose military campaign against Houthi rebels is at the heart of the current conflict. But that victory is likely to prove more political than legal. There are many obstacles that S.J. Res. 54 must surmount before it can become law—and even then, it’s not clear that it will have the legal effect of ending U.S. participation in the Yemen war. That said, Wednesday’s vote may still be a significant step towards that objective. How did this happen? Molly Reynolds and I [first wrote](https://www.lawfareblog.com/putting-yemen-resolution-procedural-context) about S.J. Res. 54 for *Lawfare* in March 2018, when its supporters were facing a similar procedural vote—one they [eventually lost](https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-votes-down-yemen-resolution) on a vote of 55-44, with only five Republicans supporting continued debate. Between that vote and this past Wednesday, 19 senators effectively changed their positions on the matter. This includes eight Republicans, several of whom—such as outgoing Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)—are influential figures in the party. So what brought these senators around? Undoubtedly, the conflict in Yemen and its humanitarian consequences have continued to worsen. Since March, the Saudi-led coalition has been tied to several high-profile attacks resulting in substantial civilian casualties, including a deadly [August attack](https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/09/middleeast/yemen-bus-intl/index.html) on a school bus in which the Saudi-led coalition used [U.S.-supplied armaments](https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudi-yemen-bus-strike-intl/index.html). Meanwhile, widespread famine and disease—aggravated by the Saudi-led coalition’s embargo of Yemeni ports—led U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to label Yemen “[the world’s worst humanitarian crisis](https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/middleeast/yemen-worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-un-intl/index.html).” The situation has grown so dire that several leading humanitarian organizations recently released an [extraordinary statement](https://www.rescue.org/press-release/humanitarian-ceos-us-government-we-have-no-means-left-avert-catastrophe-please-act-now)calling for an end to hostilities by any means possible, on the grounds that “every humanitarian effort can no longer prevent mass starvation if the war is not brought to an end immediately.” That said, there are reasons to believe that those 19 senators changed their minds less because of Yemen and more because of Saudi Arabia. The October [murder](https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-international-law-tells-us-about-khashoggi-investigation) of Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents—an act widely believed to have been directed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, often referred to by the initials MBS, the architect of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and a close ally of the Trump administration—has triggered renewed skepticism of U.S. entanglements with Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration, however, has openly resisted calls to hold Saudi Arabia or the crown prince accountable in ways that might injure bilateral relations, limiting itself instead to [sanctions](https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-seek-tougher-u-s-sanctions-over-khashoggi-killing-1542318171) on lower-ranking individuals directly involved in the killing. Last week, President Trump went so far as to issue a [bizarre, seemingly hand-crafted statement](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/) expressing doubts about the crown prince’s involvement and making clear his position that “[t]he United States intends to remain a steadfast partner of Saudi Arabia.” This is in spite of the CIA’s [assessment](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/cia-saudi-crown-prince-khashoggi.html) that MBS most likely did order the killings, which CIA personnel briefed [congressional intelligence committees](https://twitter.com/mitchellreports/status/1063613780834213888) on just days before Trump’s statement. Two related developments just prior to Wednesday’s vote may have tipped the scales in support of the motion to discharge. The morning of the vote, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo published a Wall Street Journal [op-ed](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-saudi-partnership-is-vital-1543362363) dismissing concerns over the Khashoggi murder and Saudi Arabia’s human rights record as “Capitol Hill caterwauling and media pile-on.” Then, later that day, both Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia. But despite [requests](https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/11/27/corker-demands-cia-chief-join-senate-brief-on-saudi-controversy/) by Corker and others for CIA Director Gina Haspel to attend, Haspel was absent—reportedly [blocked from attending by the White House](https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/27/politics/cia-haspel-senate-briefing/index.html) in an apparent effort to avoid further discussion of the CIA’s Khashoggi assessment (though [White House](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/jamal-khashoggi-murder-senate-briefing-saudi-arabia-gina-haspel-white-house) and [CIA](https://twitter.com/davidgura/status/1067868991518138369) officials have disputed this account). Corker himself referenced the “very unsatisfactory” briefing that Mattis and Pompeo had provided in [explaining](https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/11/corker-votes-to-discharge-yemen-war-powers-resolution-from-senate-foreign-relations-committee) his vote supporting discharge, and Graham threatened [further obstruction](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pompeo-and-mattis-brief-senators-on-saudis-without-haspel-today-11-28-2018/) until Haspel testifies. Others may have been similarly motivated. What happens next? S.J. Res. 54 is expressly designed to take advantage of certain “expedited procedures” provided by an [amendment](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1546a) to the [1973 War Powers Resolution](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/chapter-33) (WPR) for bills and joints resolutions that “requir[e] the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside [U.S.] territory ... without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization ... .” The [practical effect of these procedures](https://www.lawfareblog.com/putting-yemen-resolution-procedural-context) is to allow supporters to force Senate votes on whether to discharge the measures from committee and proceed to consideration (i.e., vote on them). These procedures also limit the time available for debate on such motions, preventing filibusters and other procedural hurdles that opponents might otherwise employ. Wednesday’s vote in favor of the motion to discharge brings S.J. Res. 54 one step closer to consideration on the floor. Corker has [indicated](https://twitter.com/timkmak/status/1067883358305361923) that a vote on whether to proceed to consideration will take place next week, in what appears to be a timeline negotiated among supporters of the motion. If this passes, debate will begin and be limited to 10 hours. During this time, the Senate will also consider any amendments, which are permitted by the WPR and not expressly required to be germane. As a result, this debate could get [messy](https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/yemen-resolution-prompt-unruly-foreign-policy-floor-debate) and involve amendments on a variety of topics unrelated to Yemen. Supporters may seek to reach a negotiated agreement that moves S.J. Res. 54 to a final vote with no or only very limited amendments. A less likely outcome is a “[vote-a-rama](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/what-on-earth-is-a-vote-a-rama/274268/)” in which senators vote on a host of amendments once the time for debate on the resolution has expired. Regardless, once amendments and any procedural disputes are disposed of, the Senate will hold a final vote on whether or not to approve S.J. Res. 54 as amended. Then the resolution heads to the House, where the Republican leadership recently took steps to strip a similar Yemen-related proposal under the WPR of its privileged status, making the path to a final vote more difficult absent that leadership’s support. For this reason, companion legislation in the House may have to wait until January, when the House’s newly-minted Democratic leadership will take control. At that point, however, the Senate will also have to renew its approval of S.J. Res. 54, effectively restarting the process with a new assembly of Republican senators, some of whom may be less friendly toward the resolution. Regardless, if and when legislation is passed in the Senate and House, the separate measures will have to be reconciled and, if necessary, brought back to each chamber for final approval. At that point, the consolidated legislation will be presented to the president for a potential veto—an option that Trump has already [indicated](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/sapsj54s_20181128.pdf) he intends to exercise. If the House and Senate seek to override this veto with a two-thirds majority in both chambers, the WPR’s expedited procedures once again limit the time available to debate the president’s veto message in the Senate. Only if the veto override is successful will S.J. Res. 54 become law. What will the joint resolution do if it becomes law? The operative language of S.J. Res. 54 is short, simple, and to the point: It “directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen” within 30 days, except for those “engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces[.]” This parrots the language of the WPR’s [expedited procedures provision](https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1546a), ensuring that the joint resolution as a whole qualifies for the privileged status and limited debate periods for which that provision provides. Yet this narrow scope is a double-edged sword. The Trump administration has [argued](http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4391679-Acting-GC-Letter-to-Majority-Leader-Re-Sanders.html) that the activities it is pursuing in support of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen—namely, “defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties”—do not constitute “hostilities” for the purposes of the WPR. Even if S.J. Res. 54 were enacted, the Trump administration contends, it would have no legal effect. This interpretation may not be correct; indeed, in its preamble, S.J. Res. 54 expresses a contrary view of what constitutes “hostilities.” But it should be taken seriously. The Trump administration’s position is [consistent with long-standing executive branch practice](https://www.lawfareblog.com/putting-yemen-resolution-procedural-context) in regard to the WPR’s related reporting requirements. Moreover, it’s arguably consistent with certain [public positions](https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/569e5f54-06e3-4568-9fa2-f74f39bf75e0.pdf#page=18) adopted by the Obama administration. These factors—and the congressional acquiescence they arguably imply—may weigh heavily in the government’s favor, even if the federal courts were to overcome their usual [reticence](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf#page=2) and rule on the matter. And perhaps more importantly, by virtue of its constitutional authority over the military and law enforcement, the executive branch’s views on what constitutes “hostilities” are likely to remain operational unless and until a federal court holds to the contrary. As a result, it’s unclear whether S.J. Res. 54 will have the effect intended, even if it is ultimately enacted into law. What else could Congress do? Congress may be able to take additional steps that would have a more certain legal effect on U.S. participation in the Yemen conflict. But each poses its own substantial set of challenges. One option would be to amend S.J. Res. 54 in order to expressly prohibit those activities the United States is pursuing in Yemen, in addition to removing U.S. troops from hostilities—regardless of whether those activities formally constitute hostilities under the WPR. (Alternately, Congress could move the definition of “hostilities” that S.J. Res. 54 currently suggests in its preamble into its operative text, to similar effect.) That said, it’s still not entirely clear that an amended joint resolution that does more than just “remov[e] United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities” (as currently defined in the WPR) can still qualify for the WPR’s expedited procedures. Efforts to expand S.J. Res. 54 beyond this scope are likely to trigger procedural fights that may ultimately involve the Senate parliamentarian. The end result of these debates could be to [deprive S.J. Res. 54 of its privileged status](https://www.congress.gov/crec/2009/04/01/CREC-2009-04-01-pt1-PgS4112-3.pdf#page=4), once again making it vulnerable to filibusters and other procedural obstacles. At a minimum, such amendments could cost the support of senators who wish to preserve the WPR’s expedited procedures as a more tailored legislative gateway. Alternatively, Congress could simply pursue legislation independent of the WPR that expressly prohibits current U.S. activities in Yemen, without tussling over how to define hostilities. Congress adopted certain limitations along these lines in the [most recent National Defense Authorization Act](https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-new-ndaa) (“NDAA”), though these limitations were contingent on a certification requirement regarding Saudi humanitarian efforts—a certification that Pompeo ultimately issued, despite [concerns](https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-u-s-diplomat-backed-continuing-support-for-saudi-war-in-yemen-over-objections-of-staff-1537441200) among his State Department subject-matter experts that doing so was not credible. Other members of Congress have introduced free-standing bills that would establish even more concrete restrictions, such as the [Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2018](https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s3652/BILLS-115s3652is.pdf). Because much of the support the United States provides to the Saudi-led coalition is pursuant to statutory authorities, legislation explicitly limiting this conduct will impose real legal restrictions on what the Trump administration can do. And while the Defense Department has suggested that it might be able to continue certain activities in spite of a legislative prohibition, [this argument is for the most part unavailing](https://www.lawfareblog.com/putting-yemen-resolution-procedural-context). That said, any such legislation would have to overcome all the normal obstacles of the legislative process—including the need to secure the permission of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) to move it to the floor for a vote. Supporters of such legislation may be able to secure such authorization if they are willing to obstruct other aspects of McConnell’s agenda (such as judicial nominations) or if they are able to incorporate it into must-pass legislation (such as omnibus appropriations or authorization legislation like the NDAA). Even then, the legislation could potentially still be vetoed by President Trump, though the latter strategy could make it exceptionally more difficult for him to do so. At a minimum, if S.J. Res. 54’s supporters determine that their best route forward is to pursue the joint resolution as-is, then they may wish to take steps to strengthen their hand in any ensuing litigation that seeks to vindicate their view of “hostilities.” One way to do so may be for Congress, or even just the Senate, to explicitly authorize an individual legislator, committee, or other entity to pursue litigation on its behalf, either through an amendment to S.J. Res. 54 or a separate concurrent (or Senate) resolution. This [strategy](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42454.pdf#page=14), which senators have incorporated into other [recent bills](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/62/text&sa=D&ust=1543580745046000&usg=AFQjCNGlyif4A3RnP-TsSRUI5sfhmxUh9g), could help avoid certain [standing issues](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2803714193388437750&q=campbell+v.+clinton&hl=en&as_sdt=20006) that have proven fatal to other WPR-related legal challenges. Other obstacles, however, will still remain. **So why was Wednesday’s vote so important?** The conclusion that S.J. Res. 54 is unlikely to be enacted into law—and may have no legal effect even if it is—is likely to be discouraging for those wishing to end the conflict in Yemen (or U.S. involvement in it). But these legal shortcomings should not distract observers from the immense political significance of Wednesday’s vote. By allowing senators to force a vote on bills like S.J. Res. 54, the WPR’s expedited procedures provision serves as a powerful tool for political accountability. It required every senator to take a public position on whether Congress should consider a joint resolution that at least purports to direct an end to the Trump administration’s policies in Yemen, one for which they will be held accountable in future elections. And the fact that every Democrat and more than a quarter of Senate Republicans voted in favor of this motion is a damning sign of how little confidence members of Congress have in the president’s handling of this set of issues—something that should be of serious concern for the Trump administration (not to mention Saudi Arabia). Moreover, the fact that the bill gained enough votes for a filibuster-proof supermajority underscores the real possibility of additional hearings, investigations, and restrictive legislation, particularly once control of the House of Representatives shifts to the Democrats. Of course, the fact that senators supported Wednesday’s motion to discharge does not mean they will vote for the substantive resolution itself or future efforts to tie the Trump administration’s hands—a point Corker makes explicitly in his [statement](https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/11/corker-votes-to-discharge-yemen-war-powers-resolution-from-senate-foreign-relations-committee) explaining his vote.

### AT: Refueling Solves

1. **Delink –** Refueling doesn’t have any practical effect. Since such a small percentage of the Saudi aircrafts require in air fueling from the U.S., **Stewart ’18 of Reuters** writes that **American officials themselves** acknowledge that ending refueling has minimal effect.

Phil Stewart, 11-10-2018, "U.S. ends refueling support in Yemen war as pressure builds on...", U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/u-s-ends-refueling-support-in-yemen-war-as-pressure-builds-on-saudi-arabia-idUSKCN1NF06R // JY
Riyadh also has nine KC-130 Hercules aircraft that can be used, it added. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said the U.S. government was consulted on the decision and that Washington supported the move while continuing to work with the alliance to minimize civilian casualties and expand humanitarian efforts. Any co-ordinated decision by Washington and Riyadh could be an attempt to forestall action threatened in Congress next week by lawmakers over refueling operations. However, a halt to refueling could have little practical effect on the conflict, seen as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Only a fifth of coalition aircraft require in-air refueling from the United States, U.S. officials said.

### AT: Sanctions Solve

1. **Delink –** Gould ’18 of Defense News writes that sanctions are ineffective against Riyadh, because the royal family is so insulated.

Joe Gould, 10-18-2018, "Will Congress really cancel US-Saudi arms deals? It’s complicated, but let us explain", Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/18/will-congress-really-cancel-us-saudi-arms-deals-its-complicated-but-let-us-explain/ // JY
The Obama administration used arms-sale holds in an attempt to improve a customer nations' behavior on human rights, but to limited effect, said Becca Wasser, a researcher with the think tank Rand. "You have to ask the question: What end is the hold supposed to achieve? Is it intended to condition a partner’s behavior or punish them?” Wasser said. “I have a healthy amount of skepticism on both counts.” Wasser predicted that holding up arms sales is not going to massively impact the U.S. defense industry or bin Salman’s signature economic agenda, Vision 2030. As for Magnitsky sanctions, Wasser argued they’re more effective in Russia, targeting businessmen in the oligarch class who have reach with the Kremlin. “It is less likely to be effective in Saudi, where the royal family and upper echelons of government that may be implicated are insulated,” she said.

### AT: Hard Power k2 Peace

1. **Delink –** Hard power is ineffective, as **Lynch ’18 of Foreign Policy** writes that both Saudi and Houthi leaders are insulated from the conflict.

Colum Lynch, 12-13-2018, "Is Yemen’s Torment Finally Ending?", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/13/is-yemens-torment-finally-ending/ // JY
The crisis has increased congressional pressure on Saudi Arabia and its allies to strike a deal with the Houthis. But Yemen experts say there is relatively little domestic pressure on the warring parties to put down their guns and and hold off their fighter jets. “War is easier than peace for the parties,” said Gregory Johnsen, an American scholar of Yemen who recently served as a member of a U.N. panel monitoring sanctions violations in Yemen. As the Saudis have fought mostly from the skies, there are no “body bags” being returned to Riyadh, and the Houthis feel they are fighting an “existential war” that they can win if they just wait out the Saudis. “The Houthi leadership is largely insulated from the shortages of food and medicines in this war,” said Johnsen. “Houthi leaders aren’t being targeted and killed. It’s Yemen’s civilians who are paying the price.”

### AT: Talks/Ceasefire Solve

1. **Delink –** The ceasefire has produced a fragile peace that will inevitably give way to more conflict. **Lackner ’19 of Columbia University** writes that the agreement made in Stockholm is fundamentally flawed because both parties will still prioritize their victory over peace. Subsequently, in a sign that it’s simply a band-aid solution, **Trew ’19 of The Independent** writes that the ceasefire is continuously being broken, with new, more egregious violations coming every day.

Bel Trew [Middle East Correspondent for The Independent], January 31, 2019, "Residents in besieged Yemeni city forced to eat rubbish", Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-hodeidah-houthi-un-residents-eat-rubbish-red-sea-city-a8757491.html // JY
Residents of [Yemeni](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/Yemen) port city of [Hodeidah](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/hodediah) are so hungry they are eating from rubbish tips, while others are bleeding to death trapped in their bombed-out houses, as fighting has flared in the strategic port town after a UN-brokered truce collapsed. Describing life caught in the cross-fire, [Ashwaq Moharram](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-hodeidah-doctor-plea-un-hospital-missiles-a8635911.html), a Yemeni doctor from the area, said families were starving to death or dying trying to secure medical help as the conflict continues to cut off parts of the city. Speaking to *The Independent* during a brief trip to Egypt to see sick family members, the trained gynaecologist said she has watched injured civilians perish in ambulances trying to navigate treacherous mountain roads to safety. Despite assurances that a ceasefire deal between the Houthi rebels and the recognised government would allow aid to flow into the port city, she said the truce failed before it even started. Hodeidah, the main entry point for Yemen’s food and medical supplies, is still under sporadic fire.

Helen Lackner [Helen Lackner has worked in all parts of Yemen since the 1970s and lived there for close to 15 years. She works as a freelance rural development consultant in Yemen and elsewhere. Her latest book *Yemen in Crisis: autocracy, neo-liberalism and the disintegration of a state* was published by Saqi Books in October 2017.] The Equal Times, 1-18-2019, "What are the prospects for peace in Yemen in 2019 and beyond?", https://www.equaltimes.org/what-are-the-prospects-for-peace#.XEI8189Khao // JY
Following the Stockholm agreement, a very watered down UNSC resolution (2451) was finally passed on 21 December. In addition to endorsing Stockholm, its main contribution was to authorise the Guterres to deploy a UN team to monitor the implementation of the agreements. However, since the ceasefire came into force on 18 December 2018, predictably, there have been multiple breaches, some more serious than others. The Houthis skilfully stage-managed the apparent handover of the port of Hodeidah to the Coast Guard, but it was a Houthi-managed entity who took over – a model which is likely to be reproduced in future as both groups have parallel institutions. To what extent either party is able to persuade UN monitors that their apparent implementation of the agreement is genuine will largely depend the monitors’ actual detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground and, the persuasive capacity of the members of the committee and other official spokesmen (there are no women involved, as usual). Regardless of its weaknesses, the Stockholm agreement is a first sign of hope for 29 million Yemenis who are desperately waiting for peace and have been surviving war for close to four years, and in particular for the 20 million who are facing ‘severe acute food insecurity’ which is UN-speak for starvation. However, the likelihood of peace in 2019 is extremely low: history has shown on multiple occasions that such talks are the beginning of very long and protracted processes and, at this point, there is no indication that any of the warring parties has come to the conclusion that negotiations and peace are a better option than continuing to fight in anticipation of victory, regardless of the suffering of the population.

The New Arab, 1-28-2019, "Eight killed in attack on Yemen refugee camp: UN", alaraby, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/1/28/eight-killed-in-attack-on-refugee-camp-in-yemen // JY
The Red Sea mills located in eastern Hodeida appeared to have been hit by mortar fire, a UN statement said. "This is the first time we are seeing conditions like this. We need this wheat," said Lise Grande, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen. Stephen Anderson, World Food Programme country director, said access is needed to transport what's left. The mills are housing 51,000 metric tons of wheat, almost a quarter of the World Food Programme's stock of wheat. The fighting was the biggest breach yet of a fragile ceasefire in the city reached in UN-sponsored talks in Sweden last month. The Yemen conflict has killed more than 10,000 people since a [Saudi-led military coalition](https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/1/24/satellite-images-raise-suspicions-of-saudi-ballistic-missile-factory) intervened in support of the beleaguered government in March 2015 - according to the World Health Organisation - though human rights groups say the real death toll could be five times as high. The war has pushed 14 million Yemenis to the brink of famine in what the United Nations describes as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

Helen Lackner [Helen Lackner has worked in all parts of Yemen since the 1970s and lived there for close to 15 years. She works as a freelance rural development consultant in Yemen and elsewhere. Her latest book *Yemen in Crisis: autocracy, neo-liberalism and the disintegration of a state* was published by Saqi Books in October 2017.] The Equal Times, 1-18-2019, "What are the prospects for peace in Yemen in 2019 and beyond?", https://www.equaltimes.org/what-are-the-prospects-for-peace#.XEI8189Khao // JY
Following the Stockholm agreement, a very watered down UNSC resolution (2451) was finally passed on 21 December. In addition to endorsing Stockholm, its main contribution was to authorise the Guterres to deploy a UN team to monitor the implementation of the agreements. However, since the ceasefire came into force on 18 December 2018, predictably, there have been multiple breaches, some more serious than others. The Houthis skilfully stage-managed the apparent handover of the port of Hodeidah to the Coast Guard, but it was a Houthi-managed entity who took over – a model which is likely to be reproduced in future as both groups have parallel institutions. To what extent either party is able to persuade UN monitors that their apparent implementation of the agreement is genuine will largely depend the monitors’ actual detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground and, the persuasive capacity of the members of the committee and other official spokesmen (there are no women involved, as usual). Regardless of its weaknesses, the Stockholm agreement is a first sign of hope for 29 million Yemenis who are desperately waiting for peace and have been surviving war for close to four years, and in particular for the 20 million who are facing ‘severe acute food insecurity’ which is UN-speak for starvation. However, the likelihood of peace in 2019 is extremely low: history has shown on multiple occasions that such talks are the beginning of very long and protracted processes and, at this point, there is no indication that any of the warring parties has come to the conclusion that negotiations and peace are a better option than continuing to fight in anticipation of victory, regardless of the suffering of the population.

The National, 1-3-2019, "Yemen's Houthi rebels are undermining Hodeidah ceasefire, Security Council warned", National, https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/yemen-s-houthi-rebels-are-undermining-hodeidah-ceasefire-security-council-warned-1.809214 // JY
Houthi rebels violated the UN-brokered ceasefire in Hodeidah more than 200 times in less than two weeks since it went into effect and do not show signs of preparing to abide by the truce, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have told the Security Council. The rebels killed 23 coalition forces and wounded 163 in 268 attacks between December 18 and December 30, according to a detailed list submitted by the permanent UN representatives of the theree countries to the Council president on December 31, along with a letter calling for international pressure on the Houthis to cease [hostilities that threaten the peace process.](https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/uae-s-anwar-gargash-slams-houthi-rebels-for-breaching-yemen-peace-agreement-1.808021) The rebel attacks in and around the port city ranged from sniper fire and artillery barrages to the launching of medium range ballistic missiles in attacks lasting up to an hour. “The missile strikes in particular show that this vast number of violations cannot be attributed of individual ill-disciplined Houthi fighters, but that these actions are part of a deliberate strategy of provocation … designed to undermine the Stockholm Agreement,” the letter said. The truce agreed at UN-brokered talks in December requires the Houthis to withdraw from Hodeidah's ports before rebel and government forces pull out of the city and surrounding areas. Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for Yemen, had prioritised a halt to fighting in Hodeidah as the entry point for the bulk of Yemen's food and humanitarian aid shipments that 14 million Yemenis on the brink of famine are reliant upon. However, the Houthis are not only violating the truce but also entrenching themselves in the city, the letter to the Security Council says. A map attached to the letter shows where the Iran-backed rebels have dug 51 new trenches around the city and set up 109 new barricades on city streets. Patrick Cammaert, head of the UN ceasefire monitors in Hodeidah, met with rebel and government representatives on Wednesday as chair of the joint Redeployment Co-ordination Committee to discuss security after both sides withdrew their forces. However, Mr Cammaert “expressed anger over the charade put on by the militias over their redeployment of militia members disguised as security forces tasked to maintain the peace", Col Waddah Al Dubeish, spokesman of the pro-government Amalikah Brigades, told The National. “This charade is rejected, and you need to know the stipulations of the ceasefire and both sides need to follow them,” Col Al Dubeish quoted Mr Cammaert as saying.

### AT: Food Aid Solves

1. **Delink –** Food aid doesn’t reach the people who need it. **Zeyad ‘18 of Farsnews** writes that U.S.-backed soldiers steal any food aid that makes it in the country.

No Author, 1-2-2019, Farsnews, No Publication, http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13971012000872, // ZMC
While the world celebrates the New Year, report after report reveal that amid famine and rampant disease, food aid pouring in from across the globe, meant to curb the world's worst humanitarian crisis, is in fact "being snatched from the starving" by armed forces allied with the US-backed, Saudi-led coalition. The warmongers block food aid from going to the besieged areas, divert it to front-line combat units, or sell it for profit on the black market. The United Nations and observers on the ground attribute the near-famine conditions in much of the country to the Saudi blockade of ports. The UN World Food Program says it has already documented food aid diversion "at a time when children are dying in Yemen because they haven't enough food to eat; that is an outrage." Save the Children also says some 85,000 children under age five have starved to death since the brutal war began. This shouldn’t happen at a time when peace talks and a ceasefire agreement are still in place. The talks in Sweden have led to a reduction in fighting and this should ease the challenges of getting food aid into and out of Hodeida, the port city that is a gateway to the north. Donors should be able to get more food in. But here is the smell of blood still: - The futile bombing campaign continues apace. The Saudis and their allied forces have been killing around a hundred civilians a week for more than three years now. The harshest criticism of the Saudi-led war has focused on the airstrikes that have killed thousands of civilians at weddings, funerals and on school buses, aided by American-supplied bombs and intelligence. The war in Yemen has killed upwards of 57,000 people since March 2015, left 8.4 million people surviving on food aid and created a cholera epidemic. - International aid experts and United Nations officials say a more insidious form of warfare is also being waged in Yemen, an economic war that is exacting a far greater toll on civilians and now risks tipping the country into a famine of catastrophic proportions. - The punitive economic measures are allegedly aimed at undercutting the Ansarullah fighters who control vast parts of Yemen. Tight blockades, stringent import restrictions and withholding the salaries of about a million civil servants have landed on the backs of civilians, laying the economy to waste and driving millions deeper into poverty. - Infrastructure destroyed, jobs lost, a weakening currency and soaring prices are the clear results. But in recent weeks the economic collapse has gathered pace at alarming speed, causing top United Nations officials to revise their predictions of famine. - The US government has been the key supporter of the Saudi-led coalition, providing arms, intelligence, logistics, military training and diplomatic cover. This has made the Trump administration complicit in Saudi war crimes. More recently, an attempt to push through a UN resolution calling for an end to the war was stalled by the US, reportedly after a lobbying campaign by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. - The US government claims to have one of the most rigorous arms control regimes in the world, yet evidence of attacks on medical facilities and schoolchildren in Yemen is clear. War is the primary cause of death, injury, famine and disease in Yemen; and American arms are causing twice as many civilian casualties as all other forces fighting. Sadly, the UN is yet to hold the Saudis and their American partners to account. They bear primary responsibility for Yemen’s humanitarian disaster. They are attacking civilians, aid and humanitarian actors, and attempts to disavow their responsibility for war crimes simply don’t stand up. The time has come for the UN and the international civil society to call for an embargo on Saudi Arabia and an end to Washington’s complicity and deceit.

### \*AT: Switching to Russia Now

### \*AT: Switching to China Now

### \*AT: Self-Sufficient Soon

1. **Delink –** Saudi Arabia will still be reliant on U.S. companies. **Stratfor ’18** explains that the regime isn’t moving toward self-sufficiency; it’s simply asking that the final assembly of arms are done within the country’s borders.

2. **Timeframe Weighing – Guay ’18 of Pennsylvania State University** explains that, unlike the U.S., Saudi Arabia doesn’t have an arms industry, which is why **Stratfor** finds that, even in a decade, the Saudis will still be extremely dependent on the United States.

Statfor, 11-9-2018, "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own", Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030 // JY
Saudi aspirations for an indigenous defense industry are certainly ambitious. In its overarching [Saudi Vision 2030 economic strategy](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabias-vision-2030-plan-too-big-fail-or-succeed), Riyadh wants to produce locally at least half of the equipment it will need for security and military use by 2030. To move toward that goal, when Saudi Arabia negotiates major arms contracts with trade partners, it increasingly insists that component manufacturing and final assembly be done in the kingdom.

Terrence Guay [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University], 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair", Conversation, https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998 // JY
[Saudi Arabia spent](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/yb_18_summary_en_0.pdf) US$69.4 billion on military expenditures in 2017, according to the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://www.sipri.org/), the world’s leading research organization on conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Only the U.S. and China spent more. But since it doesn’t have an arms industry – like the U.S. and China – Saudi Arabia must import most of that from other countries. That’s why, over the past decade, Saudi Arabia [has imported](http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php) more armaments than every country but India. And U.S. companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have benefited most from all that spending, making up the [55 percent](http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php) of its weapons imports from 2008 to 2017.

Statfor, 11-9-2018, "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own", Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030 // JY
Saudi Arabia has sought to lower its dependence on arms imports by building up its own defense industry, a process still in its infancy. Saudi Arabia has also considered diversifying the sources of its arms and has looked to suppliers in countries such as Russia and China. While the Saudis will make progress on building a defense industry that will provide economic benefits and increase their autonomy in the decade ahead, they will remain heavily dependent on their partnership with the United States.

## Saudi Relations

### AT: Sales k2 Relations

1. **Non-unique –** The U.S. will preserve its relationship with Saudi Arabia through other means. **Ernst of the Council on Foreign Relations** writes that the U.S. has an interest in being involved with Saudi Arabia, as it has been since 1933, in order to protect its oil interests. Even if it’s not oil, **Boucek ’11 of the Carnegie Endowment** finds that the relationship will remain strong between the two countries because the two countries hold unique strategic positions, and need one another’s support.

2. **Delink –** Saudi Arabia won’t jeopardize its relationship with the U.S. over arms sales – in fact, **Wald ’18 of the New York Times** explains that Riyadh’s threats are empty, as they face skyrocketing unemployment rates and are entirely reliant on the United States for their capital and management experience.

Chrstopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, June 21 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il> // JY
Are U.S.-Saudi relations in decline? **We have seen the emergence of greater tensions between Washington and Riyadh as a result of the Arab Spring**. This comes in large part because **in Saudi Arabia there is a belief that Washington has not managed this process very well, doesn’t know what it’s doing, and is putting issues of political reform ahead of security and stability** in the region. This is a part of the world where personal relationships, friendship, and loyalty are more important than anything else and we’ve seen the United States support the removal of former friends, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. **The Saudis feel that there is a likelihood that this is not going to stop.** Saudi Arabia and Saudi foreign policy generally loathe instability or uncertainty and that’s exactly what we see right now. **Riyadh feels that the United States is more concerned about being on the right side of history, instead of standing by its friends and working to advance stability** in the region—**this is very concerning to the Saudis**. Whereas the United States and Saudi Arabia historically differed over domestic Saudi political issues, the two countries usually agreed on foreign and regional policy issues. But increasingly, this is not the case. **Increasingly it seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interests do not overlap with the United States** and Washington’s security interests. Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests. **All that said, at the end of the day, the relationship remains very strong.** In the region, **there are several special relationships for the United States and one of them is with Saudi Arabia**. Despite all of the difficulty and tensions, the relationship remains strong and it will remain strong. The two countries need each other **and** there is no one else who can provide for Saudi Arabia what the United States does and no one that can provide for the United States what Saudi Arabia does**. The two will be forced to work together.** What’s needed is better management of the relationship, especially on the American side. Washington needs to learn how to engage the Saudis in a productive way to advance mutual interests, not just American interests.

Jonathan Ernst, 12-7-2018, U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations> //ZS
The **United States, first through its oil industry and then through government contacts, established a relationship with Saudi Arabia’s** founder, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, and his successors that evolved into a close alliance despite a stark clash in values. U.S. businesses have been involved in Saudi Arabia’s oil industry since 1933, when the Standard Oil Company of California (now Chevron) won a sixty-year concession to explore eastern Saudi Arabia. It made its first oil discovery there in 1938. Balancing the oil market, or making the price “fair” [PDF] for both producers and consumers, is the stated goal of Riyadh’s energy policy. However, more recently, the kingdom has manipulated oil prices to try to keep U.S. shale from becoming a viable competitor in the global market. In 2014, **facing a glut in supply, Saudi Arabia and OPEC once again faced calls to curb production. But the Saudi oil minister at the time, Ali al-Naimi, persuaded OPEC to keep pumping to force high-cost producers—those exploiting shale, oil sands, and deep-sea resources—to reduce their output. Another Saudi aim was to undercut Iran’s economy. The policy also put heightened pressure on Russia, which was sanctioned by the United States and others after its invasion of Crimea.**

Ellen R. Wald, 10-18-2018, "Saudi Arabia Has No Leverage”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-economy-united-states.html // JY
As the fallout continues over the disappearance of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the government in Riyadh is putting on a tough face. If there are sanctions over the alleged murder of Mr. Khashoggi, the Saudis want the world to know, they will fight back. On Sunday, the Saudi government [released](https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1827989#1827989) a recalcitrant statement: “The Kingdom also affirms that if it receives any action, it will respond with greater action, and that the Kingdom’s economy has an influential and vital role in the global economy and that the Kingdom’s economy is affected only by the impact of the global economy.” These are empty threats. Saudi Arabia is not in a position to harm the United States. In fact, when it comes to relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Washington has all of the leverage. American policymakers shouldn’t forget that. One of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s primary objectives is to diversify the Saudi economy and wean his country off its dependence on oil. Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is at more than 12 percent, and [some 70 percent of employed Saudis](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/young-saudis-see-cushy-jobs-vanish-along-with-nations-oil-wealth.html?module=inline) work for the government. The Saudi [labor ministry estimates](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-labour-jobs/saudi-arabia-needs-1-2-million-jobs-by-2022-to-hit-unemployment-target-official-idUSKBN1HW1CO) that the economy needs to create 1.2 million jobs by 2022 to lower unemployment to a still dismal 9 percent. But because the country lacks business experience and special expertise outside of the oil and petrochemical industries, that won’t be possible without foreign — and particularly American — participation. That’s why the Saudis have been making so many deals recently: The Public Investment Fund has [partnered with AMC](https://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/saudi-arabia-s-pif-signs-cinema-deal-with-us-based-amc-entertainment-1.683714) to open and run movie theaters across the country because AMC knows how to manage cinemas. Saudi Arabia is pursuing deals for [Snap](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/03/snap-is-in-talks-to-set-up-shop-in-saudi-arabia.html) and [Amazon](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/13/saudi-crown-prince-woos-amazon-lockheed-and-others-to-build-a-tech-hub.html)to open facilities in the kingdom because they can offer tech opportunities. It’s not just the private sector. The Saudi government bureaucracy also relies heavily on American management expertise. Riyadh has been hiring American consultants since the 1950s, and in recent years American firms like McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group and Oliver Wyman have [worked on hundreds of projects](https://www.consultancy.uk/news/12082/saudi-arabia-a-lucrative-battleground-for-management-consultants) for the kingdom. In some cases, Saudi government bureaucrats work side by side with these consultants to implement government programs.

### AT: Sales k2 Influence

1. **Non-unique –** Regardless, the United States will have influence over Riyadh. **Wald ’18 of the New York Times** explains that Saudi Arabia faces skyrocketing unemployment rates and are entirely reliant on the United States for their capital and management experience.

2. **Analytical link turn –** Arms are only influence insofar as we’re willing to wield that influence against the regime.

**Weighing:** uniqueness controls the direction of the link – a world of arms sales is unequivocally failing at accomplishing anything.

3. **Link turn –** Arms sales reduce the United States’ influence, not increase it. **O’Connell ’12 of the New York Times** explains that American culture is so heavily militarized that the military industrial complex is able to effectively control all of the government’s actions, because the alternative is political suicide. Essentially, United States continuously prioritizes preserving its Saudi arms sales over threatening Riyadh.

Thus, in an analysis of nearly 200 empirical relationships over 15 years, **Sullivan ’15 of the University of Georgia** writes that, when the U.S. begins selling arms to a country, it actually becomes more belligerent and cooperates less.

**Weighing:** Uniqueness controls the direction of the link – a world of arms sales is unequivocally failing at accomplishing anything.

4. **Internal link defense/weighing –** **Thrall ’18 of the Cato Institute** explains that arms sales are one of many concerns for most leaders, and often take a backseat to other interests. This is why he finds, historically, arms sales don’t increase the leverage of the U.S.

A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy // JY
Arms for (Not That Much) Influence. Successful foreign policy involves encouraging other nations to behave in ways that benefit the United States. As noted, the United States has often attempted to use arms sales to generate the sort of leverage or influence necessary to do this. History reveals, however, that the benefits of the arms for influence strategy are limited for two main reasons. First, the range of cases in which arms sales can produce useful leverage is much narrower than is often imagined. Most obviously, arms sales are unnecessary in situations where the other country already agrees or complies with the American position or can be encouraged to do so without such incentives. This category includes most U.S. allies and close partners under many, though not all, circumstances. Just as clearly, the arms for influence strategy is a nonstarter when the other state will never agree to comply with American demands. This category includes a small group of obvious cases such as Russia, China, Iran, and other potential adversaries (to which the United States does not sell weapons anyway), but it also includes a much larger group of cases in which the other state opposes what the United States wants, or in which complying with U.S. wishes would be politically too dangerous for that state’s leadership.[59](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor059) In addition, there are some cases in which the United States itself would view arms sales as an inappropriate tool. The Leahy Law, for example, bars the United States from providing security assistance to any specific foreign military unit deemed responsible for past human rights abuses.[60](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor060) More broadly, arms sales are clearly a risky choice when the recipient state is a failed state or when it is engaged in a civil conflict or interstate war. Indeed, in such cases it is often unclear whether there is anyone to negotiate with in the first place, and governments are at best on shaky ground. At present the United States bars 17 such nations from purchasing American arms. As long as these nations are embargoed, arms sales will remain an irrelevant option for exerting influence.[61](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor061) Apart from these cases, there is a large group of nations with tiny defense budgets that simply don’t buy enough major conventional weaponry to provide much incentive for arms sales. On this list are as many as 112 countries that purchased less than $100 million in arms from the United States between 2002 and 2016, including Venezuela, Jamaica, and Sudan. Lest this category be dismissed because it includes mostly smaller and less strategically significant countries from the American perspective, it should be noted that each of these countries has a vote in the United Nations (and other international organizations) and that many of them suffer from civil conflicts and terrorism, making them potential targets of interest for American policymakers looking for international influence. By definition, then, the arms-for-influence strategy is limited to cases in which a currently noncompliant country might be willing to change its policies (at least for the right price or to avoid punishment). The second problem with the arms for influence strategy is that international pressure in general, whether in the form of economic sanctions, arms sales and embargoes, or military and foreign aid promises and threats, typically has a very limited impact on state behavior. Though again, on paper, the logic of both coercion and buying compliance looks straightforward, research shows that leaders make decisions on the basis of factors other than just the national balance sheet. In particular, leaders tend to respond far more to concerns about national security and their own regime security than they do to external pressure. Arms sales, whether used as carrots or sticks, are in effect a fairly weak version of economic sanctions, which research has shown have limited effects, even when approved by the United Nations, and tend to spawn a host of unintended consequences. As such, the expectations for their utility should be even more limited.[62](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor062) A recent study regarding the impact of economic sanctions came to a similar conclusion, noting that, “The economic impact of sanctions may be pronounced … but other factors in the situational context almost always overshadow the impact of sanctions in determining the political outcome.”[63](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor063) The authors of another study evaluating the impact of military aid concur, arguing that, “In general we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of the recipient state. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of U.S. aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior.”[64](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor064) Perhaps the most explicit evidence of the difficulty the United States has had exerting this kind of leverage came during the Reagan administration. Sen. Robert Kasten Jr. (R-WI) signaled the concern of many when he said, “Many countries to whom we dispense aid continue to thumb their noses at us” at the United Nations, and Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to limit aid to any state that repeatedly voted in opposition to the United States at the UN.[65](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor065) In 1986, the Reagan administration began to monitor voting patterns and issue threats, and, in roughly 20 cases in 1987 and 1988, it lowered the amount of aid sent to nations the administration felt were not deferential enough. An analysis of the results, however, found no linkage between changes in American support and UN voting patterns by recipient states. The authors’ conclusion fits neatly within the broader literature about the limited impact of sanctions: “The resilience of aid recipients clearly demonstrates that their policies were driven more powerfully by interests other than the economic threat of a hegemon.”[66](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor066) The U.S. track record of generating influence through arms sales specifically is quite mixed. U.S. arms sales may have improved Israeli security over the years, for example, but American attempts to pressure Israel into negotiating a durable peace settlement with the Palestinians have had little impact. Nor have arms sales provided the United States with enough leverage over the years to prevent client states such as Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco from invading their neighbors. Nor have arms sales helped restrain the human rights abuses of clients like Chile or Libya, or various Middle Eastern client states. Although the United States has used the promise of arms sales or the threat of denying arms successfully from time to time, the failures outnumber the victories. The most rigorous study conducted to tease out the conditions under which arms for influence efforts are successful is a 1994 study by John Sislin.[67](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor067) Collating 191 attempts between 1950 and 1992, Sislin codes 80 of those attempts (42 percent) successful. Sislin’s analysis is incomplete, however, since he looks only at the immediate benefits of arms sales and does not consider the long-term consequences. Furthermore, a close look at the supposedly successful attempts reveals that many of them are cases in which the United States is in fact simply buying something rather than actually “influencing” another nation. Thirty of the cases Sislin coded as successful were instances of the United States using arms to buy access to military bases (20 cases) or to raw materials (5 cases) or to encourage countries to buy more American weapons (5 cases).[68](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor068) Without those in the dataset, the U.S. success rate drops to 31 percent.

Aaron B. O’Connell, 11-4-2012, "Opinion", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/05/opinion/the-permanent-militarization-of-america.html?\_r=0 // JY
In his farewell address, Eisenhower called for a better equilibrium between military and domestic affairs in our economy, politics and culture. He worried that the defense industry’s search for profits would warp foreign policy and, conversely, that too much state control of the private sector would cause economic stagnation. He warned that unending preparations for war were incongruous with the nation’s history. He cautioned that war and warmaking took up too large a proportion of national life, with grave ramifications for our spiritual health. The military-industrial complex has not emerged in quite the way Eisenhower envisioned. The United States spends an enormous sum on defense — over $700 billion last year, about half of all military spending in the world — but in terms of our total economy, it has steadily declined to less than 5 percent of gross domestic product from 14 percent in 1953. Defense-related research has not produced an ossified garrison state; in fact, it has yielded a host of beneficial technologies, from the Internet to civilian nuclear power to GPS navigation. The United States has an enormous armaments industry, but it has not hampered employment and economic growth. In fact, Congress’s favorite argument against reducing defense spending is the job loss such cuts would entail. Nor has the private sector infected foreign policy in the way that Eisenhower warned. Foreign policy has become increasingly reliant on military solutions since World War II, but we are a long way from the Marines’ repeated occupations of Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic in the early 20th century, when commercial interests influenced military action. Of all the criticisms of the 2003 Iraq war, the idea that it was done to somehow magically decrease the cost of oil is the least credible. Though it’s true that mercenaries and contractors have exploited the wars of the past decade, hard decisions about the use of military force are made today much as they were in Eisenhower’s day: by the president, advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, and then more or less rubber-stamped by Congress. Corporations do not get a vote, at least not yet. But Eisenhower’s least heeded warning — concerning the spiritual effects of permanent preparations for war — is more important now than ever. Our culture has militarized considerably since Eisenhower’s era, and civilians, not the armed services, have been the principal cause. From lawmakers’ constant use of “support our troops” to justify defense spending, to TV programs and video games like “NCIS,” “Homeland” and “Call of Duty,” to NBC’s shameful and unreal reality [show](http://www.nbc.com/stars-earn-stripes/about/) “Stars Earn Stripes,” Americans are subjected to a daily diet of stories that valorize the military while the storytellers pursue their own opportunistic political and commercial agendas. Of course, veterans should be thanked for serving their country, as should police officers, emergency workers and teachers. But no institution — particularly one financed by the taxpayers — should be immune from thoughtful criticism. Like all institutions, the military works to enhance its public image, but this is just one element of militarization. Most of the political discourse on military matters comes from civilians, who are more vocal about “supporting our troops” than the troops themselves. It doesn’t help that there are fewer veterans in Congress today than at any previous point since World War II. Those who have served are less likely to offer unvarnished praise for the military, for it, like all institutions, has its own frustrations and failings. But for non-veterans — including about four-fifths of all members of Congress — there is only unequivocal, unhesitating adulation. The political costs of anything else are just too high.

Patricia Sullivan [assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia], Foreign Policy Analysis, 2011, http://plsullivan.web.unc.edu/files/2011/09/Sullivan\_FPA\_Military-Aid-Cooperation.pdf // ZS
“We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.”

Patricia Sullivan [assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia], Foreign Policy Analysis, 2011, http://plsullivan.web.unc.edu/files/2011/09/Sullivan\_FPA\_Military-Aid-Cooperation.pdf // ZS
“In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient’s ‘‘security value’’ directly **by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.”**

Patricia Sullivan [assistant professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia], Foreign Policy Analysis, 2011, http://plsullivan.web.unc.edu/files/2011/09/Sullivan\_FPA\_Military-Aid-Cooperation.pdf // ZS
“We present the results of our analyses in tables two through four.13 Because we structured our investigation around three competing theoretical models, this section presents results as they apply to the separate hypotheses that are relevant to each model. **While the Arms for Influence model anticipates a positive and reciprocal relationship between levels of military aid and recipient state cooperation with the United States**, the second twoR models highlight potential perversions in the aid-influence connection. The Lonely Superpower model predicts that increasing dependence on **US military aid will create incentives for leaders to be less overtly cooperative with the United States in an effort to counter any perception that their foreign policy is dictated by a foreign power. The Reverse Leverage model anticipates that military aid recipients will exploit the fact that the United States relies on them to provide some specific good—and the availability of alternative arms suppliers—to defy the broader interests of the United States with impunity”**

### B/L: Energy Independent

1. **Blum ’18 of the Houston Chronicle** finds we still rely on OPEC countries, because they still control a large part of the global oil market.

Jordan Blum, 12-6-2018, "Reporter's notebook: U.S. oil industry still depends on OPEC", HoustonChronicle, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Like-it-or-not-U-S-oil-industry-still-depends-13444871.php // JY
As the U.S. seizes global market share, top producers such as Russia and Saudi Arabia are in the position to curb output to stabilize prices. The United States is again proving it can churn out enough crude to flood the world with oil, forcing other producers with central control of the industry to cut back to avoid the type of collapse that pushed scores of companies into bankruptcy and cost Houston tens of thousands of jobs in recent years. Despite the talk of energy independence, today’s situation shows that the United States and its oil industry still very much depend on Saudi Arabia, Russia and OPEC. Oil remains a global commodity that is subject to shifts in the world economy and geopolitics. Maybe the only true certainty is that the cyclical nature of oil will continue, ebbing and flowing with the volumes of crude coming on the market.

### AT: >> Human Rights

1. **Delink –** This influence has obviously failed. Even aside from the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, **Dixon ’18 of The Guardian** writes that Saudi Arabia has one of the worst human rights records in the world. This is because, as **Guay ’18 of Penn State** writes, the U.S. makes a trade: they won’t criticize Saudi human rights abuses and, in exchange, the flow of arms will continue.

Terrence Guay [Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University], 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair", Conversation, https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998 // JY
As president, Trump clearly hopes that the money continues to pour in and helps him with his “[America First](https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38698654/donald-trump-america-first-america-first)” campaign, intended to create jobs for Americans. It’s no surprise, then, that he made [his first foreign trip](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/trump-arrives-saudi-arabia-foreign-trip-170520063253596.html) as president to Saudi Arabia in May 2017. During the trip, he reportedly [struck a bargain](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-deal.html) with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Trump wouldn’t lecture his kingdom on human rights, and Saudi Arabia would buy more American weapons. Unfortunately, Trump’s claim to have secured $110 billion in arms sales has not materialized. Although the Saudis signed numerous letters of intent and interest, some of which had been [approved](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-news/) by the Obama administration, no new [contracts](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/10/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-to-the-saudis-are-essential-leverage/) have resulted, due mainly to lower oil prices and the Saudis’ costly war in Yemen. So in the Khashoggi affair, it appears that Trump is eager to keep to his end of the bargain. He has avoided criticizing the Saudi government over its alleged role in Khashoggi’s disappearance to curry favor with the monarchy over arms sales. Even in the face of [Turkish reports](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/europe/turkey-saudi-khashoggi-dismember.html) that Saudi agents tortured Khashoggi and dismembered his body and [U.S. intelligence supporting](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/middleeast/pompeo-khashoggi-murder.html) those allegations, Trump has preferred to [blame “rogue killers”](https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657522089/rogue-killers-may-have-murdered-saudi-journalist-trump-suggests) for any crime. In defending this course of action, Trump [claimed](https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/411271-trump-defends-110-billion-us-arms-sale-to-saudi-arabia) that “if they don’t buy [weapons] from us, they’re going to buy it from Russia or they’re going to buy it from China or they’re going to buy it from other countries.”

Rodney Dixon, 10-15-2018, "The world can no longer ignore Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/15/saudi-arabia-human-rights-jamal-khashoggi-disappearance // JY
The thoroughness of the Saudi regime in silencing opponents has significantly increased since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to power in 2017. I investigated this increase in detentions in [a report I co-authored](http://tgchambers.com/news-and-resources/news/legal-report-human-rights-situation-saudi-arabia-released/) in January this year. We were requested by the families of some of those detained to release our findings in an attempt to get governments and the United Nations to act to have them released. The report found that more than 60 perceived opponents of the Saudi government had been arrested – including prominent human rights defenders – in a major crackdown by the Saudi authorities. To date, no concrete steps have been taken to free them. They remain detained, with the exact whereabouts of many still unknown. This was followed in May by the [targeting of well-known female activists](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/21/further-arrests-saudi-arabia-womens-rights-activists-driving-ban)who had long been campaigning for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, including the right to drive. In June, just before the world hailed the lifting of the ban on women driving as a key sign that Bin Salman was “reforming” the kingdom, over a dozen of these activists were imprisoned. More arrests followed, including that of [Samar Badawi](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/saudi-arabia-seeks-its-first-death-penalty-against-a-female-human-rights-activist) – a recipient of the US International Women of Courage award – in early August. Those arrested have all been smeared and labelled as “traitors”. They face trial and long prison sentences on bogus “security” charges that are completely unsubstantiated. Their situation is profoundly desperate and hopeless. It is scandalous that so little has been done to end their detentions. They are plainly unlawful and contrary to all well-established international standards. Other female activists from [Saudi Arabia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/saudiarabia) who have managed to escape arrest have explained to me that they cannot speak out and be named in articles such as this one for fear of retribution. They have asked me as a lawyer representing Saudi victims to promote their voices, which are constantly silenced by their state, and to support their efforts for more rights in their own community. One has expressed her deep frustration at the double standards of many governments: “They talk of the importance of women being equal, and being respected in the workplace, but when women are thrown in prison, and discriminated against in the most blatant ways possible by a regime who they regard as an ally and make huge profits from, they suddenly fall silent and lose their courage.” Another has said: “I am at a total loss as to why world leaders will not stand up for women who have sacrificed everything for freedom; their bravery should embarrass the cowardice of politicians and businessmen who continue to deal with the Saudi authorities as though all is normal.” At an event in Washington DC last week, aimed at questioning the idea that there was any kind of reform happening in Saudi Arabia, experts and human rights lawyers were [making these exact points](https://www.saudiarabiaconference.com/) to the US government and policymakers. The timing was eerily telling: the event took place at the same time as the news broke about Khashoggi, who was also meant to have been speaking.

### AT: >> Prolif

1. **Delink –** Saudi Arabia won’t proliferate. **Fitzpatrik ’15 of the Journal for Global Politics and Strategy** writes that Riyadh doesn’t have the tech to enrich uranium, and no one will sell it to them.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. (2015). *Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Nuclear Rumour Mill. Survival, 57(4), 105–108.*doi:10.1080/00396338.2015.1068562
Wanting enrichment technology, however, is a far cry from possessing it. How would the Saudis acquire the technology? Their nascent nuclear industry is at a rudimentary stage. They have no facilities relating to enrichment, and no known research programme or specialists in this field. Developing uranium enrichment on their own would take 15 years or more. If they really want to match Iran’s enrichment programme, they naturally would want to buy the technology, but who would sell it? The 49 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have agreed not to transfer any nuclear technology that would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no standard interpretation of this clause, but clearly it would apply to a Saudi enrichment programme that was initiated to contribute to a weapons option. Although the NSG guidelines are voluntary, the ‘non-proliferation principle’, as it is called, has become an entrenched norm.6 Any inclination to violate it would put the would-be exporter under intense international pressure. Five nations that possess enrichment technology are outside the NSG: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran obviously would not empower its Gulf rival in this way, and neither would Israel. India, which seeks NSG membership, prides itself on not allowing proliferation-sensitive exports and has strong reasons to keep its export record clean. North Korea may have no compunction against selling nuclear technology to any wouldbe buyer, but it has no connections with Saudi Arabia and every major intelligence agency is watching to ensure that none develop. Pakistan is the usual suspect. It has close ties with Saudi Arabia, and benefited from Saudi munificence when its nuclear-weapons programme was getting off the ground. Every couple of years a media scoop alleges that Pakistan is on the verge of transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. A thinly sourced article in the Sunday Times on 15 May 2015 is a recent example, claiming that Saudi Arabia has taken a ‘strategic decision’ to acquire ‘offthe-shelf’ nuclear weapons from Pakistan.7 Whatever the Saudis may have decided, however, a transfer requires a willing supplier. As I argued last year in my Adelphi book, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, Pakistan has strong strategic, political and economic incentives to keep its nuclear weapons to itself.8 Just as the Pakistanis resolutely refused Saudi Arabia’s request for aircraft and ground forces to support the Yemen intervention,9 so too they would refuse a nuclear-weapons transfer. Very little in the Sunday Times article is credible. Take this line, purportedly from a US intelligence official: ‘We know this stuff is available to them off the shelf.’ The US intelligence community includes 17 separate agencies and over 800,000 US officials hold top-secret clearances.10 No doubt reporters can find at least one of them whom they can quote repeating what has been in previous press reports.11 But responsible intelligence officials do not speak that way. Those who know something about Pakistan’s nuclear programme know that it has no nuclear weapons ‘on the shelf’ waiting for delivery to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is focused entirely on India. Opening up a second front on its west by becoming involved in the Saudi–Iran dispute would be a strategic blunder.

### AT: >> Prolif (nuke power)

1. **Delink –** **Malek ’18 of Arab News** writes that Saudi Arabiaplans to diversify away from oil, named Vision 2030, uses nuclear energy and is the reason for the recent enriching of uranium.

Caline Malek, August 04, 2018, "Saudi Arabia’s path to nuclear power", Arab News, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1351311/saudi-arabia // JY
DUBAI: Faced with surging energy demand for economic growth, Saudi Arabia is turning to nuclear power to meet a twin challenge — how to diversify its electricity-generating mix while reducing reliance on fossil fuels. And with electricity demand in the country growing by 8 to 10 percent annually, compared with less than 1 percent in Europe, experts say the move is timely. Last week, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts concluded a 12-day mission to the Kingdom to review its development of infrastructure for a nuclear power program. The review, which ended on July 24, was carried out at the invitation of the Saudi government. “Nuclear is an important way to meet the fast-growing demand for energy in the region, taking into consideration a wish to diversify the energy sources and not rely solely on oil and gas,” said John Bernhard, former Danish ambassador to the IAEA. “Besides, the use of nuclear power is a significant element in an energy strategy which considers the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and implement commitments concerning climate change. Renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar, are beneficial from a climate change point of view, but will often not be sufficient to cover large energy demands.” The Kingdom plans to build two large nuclear power reactors as part of a program delivering as many as 16 nuclear power plants over the next 20 to 25 years at a cost of more than $80 billion. It has projected 17 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear capacity by 2032 to provide 15 percent of the power then, along with more than 40 GW of solar capacity.

## Oil

### AT: Oil Embargo

1. **Delink –** **Khoury ’18 of the Atlantic Council** writes that an oil embargo would be impossible to pull off today, as Arab states would never cooperate with Saudi Arabia and Russia would simply increase its oil exports to compensate.

Nabeel Khoury, Oct 23, 2018, "Oil, Arms, and Counterterrorism: A Look At Saudi Options and How Far the Kingdom May Go", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/oil-arms-and-counterterrorism-a-look-at-saudi-options-and-how-far-the-kingdom-may-go // JY
The long-term impact, however, did not necessarily favor the Arab oil producers. Israel never pulled back to the pre-1967 borders, as most Arab countries had demanded, and the Nixon administration announced a new energy strategy to boost domestic oil production in order to reduce US dependence on oil imports. These measures included the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a national 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on US highways, and later, an imposition of fuel economy standards that have grown more stringent over the years. An oil embargo would be difficult, if not impossible, to pull off today. Iran, Qatar, and Iraq, for a start, would not necessarily go along with such a policy, nor would they accept Saudi leadership in any confrontation with the West. [Russian oil exports](http://bit.ly/2EHk9Z8), which were not a factor in 1973, have increased dramatically and would today counteract any reduction in the oil flow from the Gulf. To boot, the United States and Europe are working on replacing oil with other forms of energy. An embargo would only speed the process of weaning modern economies off oil.

### AT: Cut Off Oil to U.S. (Charlie)

1. **Delink –** Saudi Arabia won’t cut off oil to the United States. **Egan ’18 of CNN** writes that Saudi Arabia would simply be encouraging a faster shift away from its oil supplies and toward renewables and other sources. Thus, **Khrennikova ’18 of Bloomberg** writes that the Saudis’ own energy minister said they have no plans to repeat oil crises past.

Matt Egan, 10-15-2018, "Saudi Arabia is No. 2 supplier of oil to the United States", CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-oil-imports-united-states/index.html // JY
But energy analysts warn that such a move would backfire. **By spiking prices, Saudi Arabia would only be encouraging more investment in US shale, renewable energy and electric vehicles. In other words, Saudi Arabia would be shooting itself in the foot. "That would be a self-defeating strategy," said Vincent Piazza, an energy analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence. "Demand erosion due to higher prices would create a negative feedback loop." Khalid al-Falih, Saudi Arabai's oil minister, sought to ease fears about the kingdom taking any drastic actions. "I want to assure markets and petroleum consumers around the world that we want to continue to support the growth of the global economy, the prosperity of consumers around the world,"** he said in a speech in India on Monday, according to Bloomberg News.

Dina Khrennikova, 10-22-2018, "Saudi Arabia Has No Plans to Repeat 1973 Oil Crisis, Falih Says", Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-22/saudi-arabia-has-no-plans-to-repeat-1973-oil-crisis-falih-says // JY
Saudi Arabia has no intention of using its oil wealth as a political tool in the controversy over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and the kingdom plans to boost crude output again soon. "For decades we used our oil policy as a responsible economic tool and isolated it from politics," Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih said in an [interview](http://tass.com/economy/1026924) with Russia’s TASS news agency published on Monday. "So let’s hope that the world would deal with the political crisis, including the one with a Saudi citizen in Turkey, with wisdom," he said.

### AT: OPEC Anything

1. **Delink –** Mann ’12 of Harvard University writes that, as other countries increased their oil reserves, Saudi Arabia lost its ability to truly control its fellow OPEC states.

Yossi Mann 12, 6-1-2012, "Saudi Arabia's Policy Toward non-OPEC Countries," Taylor &amp; Francis, <https://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/09592296.2012.679496>

In the latter half of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia’s status in OPEC weakened, and a situation attributed to Saudi inability to enforce the organisation’s decisions and to ensure a pragmatic oil policy. Although the oil crises of 1986 and 1998 proved that Saudi Arabia was capable of exercising authority over recalcitrant member-states, in the long term, it proved ineffective in enforcing production discipline. From 2002, that ineffectiveness deepened with the significant decrease in both Saudi Arabian and other OPEC member state spare capacity. As a result, having in the past inundated the oil market when it wished to demonstrate its displeasure with recalcitrant states, Saudi Arabia now had a weakened deterrent capacity. At this stage, in the face of a sharp increase in demand and an inability to penalise, agreements were more frequently violated and Saudi Arabia was perceived as much weaker than before.

### AT: Raise Oil Prices

1. **Delink –** Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to increase oil prices. **Mrza ’19 of Arab News** writes that Saudi Arabia actually wants to stabilize oil prices, not increase them, because it’s in their and the global economy’s best interest.

2. **Non-unique –** Absent any action from Saudi Arabia, **Amadeo ’19 of the Balance** confirms that prices fluctuate on a variety of other factors.

Kimberly Amadeo, 1-19-2019, "Learn Why Gas Prices Rise and What You'll Be Paying at the Pump", Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/why-are-gas-prices-so-high-3305653 // JY
At the beginning of 2019, gas prices were [relatively low](https://www.npr.org/2019/01/17/685826699/whats-driving-low-gas-prices-a-global-oil-glut). Prices fluctuate often, however, depending on many factors. High [gas prices](https://www.thebalance.com/best-apps-for-cheap-gas-4153833) are caused by high [crude oil prices](https://www.thebalance.com/crude-oil-prices-trends-and-impact-on-the-economy-and-you-3305738). In November 2018, oil costs accounted for [54 percent of the price of regular gasoline](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/). The remaining 46 percent comes from [distribution and marketing, refining, and taxes](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=gasoline_factors_affecting_prices), which are more stable. When oil prices rise, you can expect to see the price of gas to [eventually rise](https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2014/rockets-and-feathers-why-dont-gasoline-prices-always-move-in-sync-with-oil-prices) at the pump. Geopolitical events impact oil prices, which in turn affect gasoline prices. On May 10, 2018, [global oil prices reached $80 per barrel](https://www.wsj.com/articles/brent-crude-hits-80-amid-concerns-over-iran-supply-1526553197). It followed the U.S. decision to pull out of the [Iran nuclear agreement](https://www.thebalance.com/iran-s-economy-impact-of-nuclear-deal-and-sanctions-3306349) and reinstate sanctions. Production in [Iran dropped through the end of 2018](https://www.forbes.com/sites/daneberhart/2019/01/07/oil-markets-are-in-for-wild-ride-in-2019/#65884e78485e). In addition, [Libya](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=LBY) and [Venezuela faced limited production](https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN). Oil prices also rose after the November 30, 2017, [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-opec-its-members-and-history-3305872)’ meeting. The members agreed to [keep production cuts through](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-30/opec-signals-oil-supply-cuts-will-be-extended-until-end-of-2018) 2018.

Faisal Mrza,1-29-2019, Saudi Arabia seeks stable, not soaring, oil prices, Arab News, [http://www.arabnews.com/node/1376251/business-economy, // ZS](http://www.arabnews.com/node/1376251/business-economy%2C%20//%20ZS)
The oil price outlook might be raised as a result of this upward tendency and the continuing tight oil market. For instance, with the latest numbers in hand, HSBC has revised its oil price forecast upward with Brent to average $80 per barrel in 2019 and $85 in 2020, before settling at about $75 in 2021. Bloomberg was inaccurate about Saudi Arabia’s comfort with a Brent price above $80 per barrel. The Kingdom has never been among the bulls when it comes to oil prices. Again **and again, Saudi Arabia has been a major advocate for stable oil prices, not increasing oil prices, which it views as unsustainable and damaging to the global economy**. Bloomberg is also predicting that Saudi Arabia will follow its allegedly bullish nature and refrain from ramping up production to compensate for the oil lost once the US sanctions on Iran come into effect. US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry has confirmed that Saudi Arabia, Russia and the US are well able to add enough crude oil supply into the market to compensate for Iran. Indeed, the Kingdom has begun to increase output to adjust for market needs, from 9.87 million barrels per day (bpd) in April to 10.42 million bpd in August.

### AT: 1973 Example

1. **Delink –** This only worked in 1973 because the oil industry worked on long term contracts. Now, however, **Rahman ’18 of Gulf News** writes that it’s easy to switch suppliers and other countries can increase production to meet demand.

Fareed Rahman 18, 10-24-2018, "Saudi Arabia still has influence in oil markets but a repeat of 1973 can’t happen," No Publication, <https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/saudi-arabia-still-has-influence-in-oil-markets-but-a-repeat-of-1973-cant-happen-1.2293400>

But analysts point out that oil market is fundamentally different than it was during the 1973 Arab-led oil embargo in which Saudi Arabia and several regional allies squeezed supplies to the US and Europe in retaliation for their support for Israel.

In 1973, the oil market mostly worked upon long term contracts, however, currently, it mostly utilises the spot market (a buyer can easily find oil from another country), Justin Dargin, an international energy expert from Oxford University said. “Therefore, if Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the US, then the US would be able to source its oil from another country. Due to the shale oil production boom, the US currently produces more than half the oil it consumes.” “The United States also has a massive Strategic Petroleum Reserve. It holds three months’ worth of US imports from all countries and Saudi Arabia represents less than 10 per cent of those imports. If needed, the United States could calm market jitters by releasing oil from the reserve,” Colgan wrote in an article in The Washington Post last week.

### \*High Oil Prices Good

## Houthis Win Now

### AT: Houthis Lose Now

1. **Delink –** No matter how much money the United States funnels into Saudi weaponry, **Heistein** and **Guzansky 18** of the **National Interest** write that, due to Iranian support and Houthi determination, Saudi Arabia is unable to defeat the Houthis. Indeed, **Worth ’18 of the New York Times** confirms that the war in Yemen has become a “bloody stalemate”.

At that point, we should **rip off the band-aid** – either the Saudi Coalition and the Houthis are going to do each other in like Eteocles and Polyneices, or we end the conflict now and avoid the continuation of that stalemate.

**Heistein**, A. & **Guzansky**, Y. *Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen Has Been a Disaster*. (**2018**). *The National Interest*. Retrieved 30 January 2019, from [https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064 //](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-war-yemen-has-been-disaster-25064%20//) RM
For the Saudis, Yemen is a historical target of influence, but also a critical arena for security and stability, if only because Yemen shares a long and porous border with it and also commands the entrance to the Red Sea. For Iran, on the other hand, Yemen is a secondary arena, certainly when compared to Iraq and Syria. However, **for a relatively low investment in the Houthi militia, Iran was able to exact a significant economic, military, and diplomatic price from its main regional rival. In its campaign against the Houthis, Saudi Arabia enjoys intelligence and logistical aid from the Americans, and has the fourth largest security budget in the world as well as advanced weaponry at its disposal. Yet, the kingdom is finding it difficult to defeat a determined enemy on its doorstep. In fact, in addition to holding on to the Yemeni capital Sanaa and other key areas, the Houthis have fired over one hundred missiles—allegedly manufactured in Iran—deep into Saudi territory and have captured over one hundred square miles within the kingdom.** The gap between the investment in security and military performance led the Saudi king Salman and his heir, Crown Prince Mohammed, to replace the top level of the security establishment, including the chief of staff, the commander of the ground forces and the commander of air defense. These replacements were presented as part of a modernization process, but actually reflect growing frustration in the Saudi elite with the army's performance. It is too early to say whether these personnel changes will also bring about essential changes in strategy, and what effect, if any, they will have on the continued fighting.

Worth 18
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/31/magazine/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> [The article title: “How the War in Yemen Became a Bloody Stalemate – and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World”.]

### AT: Houthis Win (Ruby)

1. **Delink –** Ending the violence doesn’t mean the Houthis win. **Karman ‘18** of the **Washington Post** outlines that 80% of Yemen’s territory is in the hands of the coalition – territory that, with the end of fighting – would return to democratically elected government.

2. Delink –

3. **Internal link defense –** They want to paint the Houthis as evil and the Saudi coalition as perfect, but neither is better than the other. **Watson ‘18** of **Defense One** explains Saudi control would be no different from Houthi control, as it would merely mean replacing a militia with another militia. Saudi Arabia does not have any better plans to rule Yemen than do the Houthis.

No matter who wins the war, crisis ensues. Let’s rip the bandaid off now and

4. **turn –** the fighting is non-unique, but the US is only making the situation worse. **Porubcansky 18** notes that despite spending billions, the Saudis are coming no closer to victory. However, the United States presence is making the situation worse, continuing that while Houthi fighting has been happening for decades, the entrance of Saudi Arabia and the US has a) brought the Houthis much closer to Iran, crafting a dangerous alliance and b) entered the war with more sophisticated weaponry, in fact causing far greater casualties than the Houthis could. This is why **Porubcansky** concludes that in their involvement in the Yemeni war, the United States has committed a number of war crimes with no retribution, and entered a war only to make the situation worse.

5. **turn/nuq –** It’s not at all unique, according to **Childress 15** of **PBS,** bombings and human rights abuses have long existed in Yemen, from Houthis and other parties. However, by getting involved, she furthers that Saudi Arabia is only exacerbating human rights abuses and neglecting civilians. In fact, **Childress** continues that Saudi bombing has proven a distraction from the real issues of poverty, water shortages, and food crisis.

**Karman**, Tawakkol. “Enough Is Enough. End the War in Yemen.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 21 Nov. **2018**, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/11/21/enough-is-enough-end-the-war-in-yemen/?utm\_term=.ff66e83e456d](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/11/21/enough-is-enough-end-the-war-in-yemen/?utm_term=.ff66e83e456d). // RM

Since then, the members of the coalition have expanded their military involvement far beyond this original mandate. Exploiting their control of the air, they have conducted airstrikes that wreaked widespread damage and killed countless civilians. Instead of reestablishing a unified Yemeni army under national command, they have formed militias loyal to their own governments in the territories liberated from the Houthis, completely bypassing the legitimate government on whose behalf they claim to be waging the war. Though **about 80 percent of Yemeni territory is**[**now free**](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/01/06/transcript-interview-with-muhammad-bin-salman)**from Houthi control**, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi is still outside the country. He has spent most of the past four years in Riyadh, where he is being held under conditions approximating [house arrest](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/yemen-president-hadi-house-arrest-riyadh-171107082638642.html). He has not been allowed to return to the territories restored by the coalition, let alone Sanaa. Since this futile and disastrous war began in 2014, neither the Security Council nor the western backers of the coalition have troubled to question the logic of the conflict. **Why have the Saudis and their allies refused to allow the legitimate government to return to the liberated territories? Why all these massacres against civilians — in markets, refugee camps and**[**hospitals**](https://www.msf.org/yemen-msf-hospital-destroyed-airstrikes)**, at**[**wedding**](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/world/middleeast/yemen-wedding-bombing.html)**and funeral ceremonies, in**[**schools**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-airstrike-hits-a-school-in-northern-yemen-killing-10-children/2016/08/13/07039cf2-617c-11e6-84c1-6d27287896b5_story.html?utm_term=.fa73f02efc10)**and civilian neighborhoods? Why has the country been under air, land and naval blockade all this time? Why have Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two of the wealthiest countries in the world, allowed this humanitarian crisis to continue? Saudi Arabia has blocked Yemenis from leaving or entering Yemen. Instead of receiving Yemenis and treating them well,**[**it has deported**](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-migrant-workers-saudi-arabia-deported-1860613236)**tens of thousands of workers and businesspeople who sustained millions of others. It is hard to escape drawing a comparison between the Saudis’ brutal prosecution of the war in Yemen and their horrific murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Saudi regime commits its crimes with extraordinary brazenness and then does everything it can**[**to dodge responsibility**](https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-plans-to-admit-khashoggi-murder-scapegoat-general-report-2018-10)**. When held to account, Saudi leaders shift the blame to scapegoats and away from those who are truly responsible.**

Watson, B. *The War in Yemen and the Making of the Chaos State*. (2018). *Defenseone.com*. Retrieved 29 January 2019, from <https://www.defenseone.com/feature/yemen-making-chaos-state/> // RM
To many Yemenis, “**even if there is a military victory and Houthis was just kicked out of any governorate, they replaced these places with fanatic armed groups,**” said Radhiyah. “So what do we do? **We just pay all this prize just to replace a militia with another militia? And this is all happening in Yemen.**” At a minimum, of course, Yemenis really just need the basics, Craig said. “And that's food, water and electricity. I mean that’s when you go around Yemen and you speak to people, that’s what they want. Added luxuries are a judicial system, an education system that is functioning.” If past is prologue**, security won’t come to Yemen for a long time. And it may be even longer before even a fraction of repairs and infrastructure developments become a reality.** After all, Craig said, **food, water and electricity are “pretty basic needs and even before the war, a lot of Yemenis weren’t getting that.”**

Porubcansky, M. (2018). *The U.S. is making the humanitarian crisis in Yemen worse — and it’s not even clear why we’re involved there | MinnPost*. *MinnPost*. Retrieved 30 January 2019, from <https://www.minnpost.com/foreign-concept/2018/08/us-making-humanitarian-crisis-yemen-worse-and-it-s-not-even-clear-why-we-re/> // RM Riedel reports that **the Saudis are spending $6 billion a month on the war. They seem no closer to success than they were three years ago. It’s an open question how close the Houthis are to Tehran, but not unreasonable to think that the conflict has pushed them closer together.** The Houthis have fired missiles at Saudi Arabia, and targeted U.S. warships in international waters with missiles three times in 2016. They missed. Most observers have concluded that **both sides have committed war crimes. But it is the Saudis and their allies who have deployed the far heavier firepower.**[**Amnesty International**](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/) **says at least 36 air strikes by the Saudis and their allies, killing more than 500 people, appear to have violated international law**. U.S. justification for backing the Saudis has never been clearly explained, either by the Obama or Trump administration. The most logical explanations are that the Saudis are our friends and the Iranians are not; or that the Saudis and their allies would be acting even worse if they were on their own. Secretary of Defense James Mattis argued in a [letter to Congress in March](http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/defense-secretary-jim-mattiss-letter-to-congressional-leaders/2837/) that U.S. involvement helps limit civilian casualties. Last summer, the Senate narrowly approved the sale of $500 million of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia. Selling bombs is mighty profitable. The [U.S. has allocated a lot of money for humanitarian assistance in Yemen](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/yemen_ce_fs10_08-10-2018.pdf), as well. [Foreign Policy columnist Micah Zenko](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/america-is-committing-awful-war-crimes-and-it-doesnt-even-know-why/) suggests that because administrations of both parties have followed the same policy, there is no partisan advantage to challenging it. So even though many in Congress are unhappy with the policy, it goes on. [Human Rights Watch](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/04/us-officials-risk-complicity-war-crimes-yemen) says that **U.S. officials may be guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes** if they are aware of a “substantial likelihood” U.S. aid would assist unlawful attacks, and that Saudis and their allies were intending to commit war crimes. It quotes the State Department’s top human rights officer in the Obama administration as acknowledging the possibility U.S. officials could face legal jeopardy. Few Americans have an appetite these days for involvement in regional conflicts. Perhaps a conflict involving Saudi Arabia and Iran is serious enough to be an exception. If so, **Washington is helping the Saudis destroy Yemen**, and at the same time spending millions to ameliorate the suffering. **It would be far better to** recognize the Saudi quagmire for what it is, and **focus exclusively on finding a way to end the conflict.** If the U.S. is going to be involved, can we at least try not to make things worse?

Childress, S. *In Yemen, Everyday Life Goes from Bad to Worse*. (2015). *FRONTLINE*. Retrieved 30 January 2019, from <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-yemen-everyday-life-goes-from-bad-to-worse/> // RM“**The root of the problems are Yemeni problems,**” said Ali Soufan, a former FBI counterterrorism agent and CEO of the Soufan Group, a security research firm. “**They didn’t suddenly erupt.” Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world, with**[**more than half**](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview)**of the country — 54 percent — living in poverty,** according to the World Bank. At the same time, **it has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. It’s an oil-based economy, but the revenues don’t flow to the people**. According to Transparency International, **Yemen is considered one of the**[**most corrupt countries**](https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results)**in the world. Two of Yemen’s greatest problems are also the most basic: food and water.** Many citizens in the capital, Sanaa, get tap water only a few times each week, and access in rural areas can be even worse. Sanaa [may be the first capital in the world](http://www.irinnews.org/report/96093/yemen-time-running-out-for-solution-to-water-crisis) to run out of a viable water source, according to the U.N. With [access to clean water dwindling](http://www.who.int/gho/countries/yem.pdf?ua=1), the risk of diseases like dengue fever and cholera has also increased. The water shortage is due in part to a dependence on growing qat, a plant that, when chewed, produces a mild high. Qat requires tons of water — [more than half](https://www.american.edu/cas/economics/ejournal/upload/global_majority_e_journal_1-1_glass.pdf) of what the country uses — but it’s also incredibly popular, and more lucrative for farmers than growing food. Which brings us to another problem. **Before the latest crisis, 10.6 million people — a full**[**41 percent**](https://www.wfp.org/countries/Yemen/Overview)**of the population — were considered “food insecure,” by the World Food Program, meaning they can’t regularly obtain or afford enough to eat. The country**[**must import**](http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp230278.pdf)**most of its food. Dwindling resources have fueled tension along sectarian fault lines, deepening the country’s political instability. Yemen is the**[**eighth most fragile country**](http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/)**in the world, according to a ranking by Foreign Policy magazine.** The nation of nearly 25 million was considered more unstable than Haiti, Pakistan and even ISIS-plagued Iraq. That ranking was [actually an improvement](http://foreignpolicy.com/slideshow/postcards-from-hell-2/). Over the past few years, observers had regarded Yemen with guarded optimism. The Arab Spring had brought signs of promise to the Gulf nation. In Nov. 2011, after months of popular protests, longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned, handing power to his vice president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in exchange for immunity. Hadi was elected president a little over a year later, and began holding negotiations to draw up a new constitution. But the new government was weak. And after decades under Saleh, local grievances quickly festered. In the north, rebels from the Houthi movement, who follow an offshoot of Shiite Islam, wanted justice after years of violent repression. Saleh had also plundered the oil-rich south, and some Sunni tribes there demanded secession. Some of the Sunni tribes also [remained allied with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula](https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/frontline-fight-for-yemen/whos-who-in-the-fight-for-yemen/)(AQAP). The Yemen-based Al Qaeda franchise has waged attacks overseas and against the Yemeni government. Now, it also battles the Houthis, who control the capital. **Today’s conflict has only made Yemen’s local problems worse. Airstrikes by Saudi Arabia  — which are supported by the U.S. — have destroyed homes, hospitals, schools and infrastructure**, [according](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15776&LangID=E) to Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights. Hundreds of people have fled their homes and [more than 500 people](http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=50506) have been killed, the U.N. said, including an estimated 19 in a strike on a camp for displaced people in northern Yemen. “**The killing of so many innocent civilians is simply unacceptable,” al Hussein said. In the meantime, Yemen’s longterm concerns — the poverty, the water shortages, the food crisis — have all been pushed aside, even as the crisis deepens. Last week, Saudi forces**[**began a naval blockade**](http://www.wsj.com/articles/airstrikes-hit-yemen-refugee-camp-says-doctors-without-borders-1427739278)**of Yemeni ports to keep weapons from getting into Houthi hands, which will also make it difficult for critical food shipments to get through.**

### AT: Iranian Influence

1. **Delink –** Just because Saudi Arabia loses doesn’t mean Iran wins. **Menon ’18 of The Nation** writes that there are significant differences between the Houthis’ variant of Shia and that of Iran; in fact, Iran is barely able to supply any aid to the Houthis.

Rajan Menon, 9-18-2018, "The War From Hell—Supported by the United States", Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-war-from-hell-supported-by-the-united-states/ // JY
The commonplace rendition of the war in Yemen pits a US-backed Saudi coalition against the Houthis, cast as agents of Iran and evidence of its increasing influence in the Middle East. Combating terrorism and countering Iran became the basis for Washington’s support of the Saudi-led war. Predictably, as this cartoonish portrayal of a complicated civil war gained ground in the mainstream American media and among Beltway pundits (as well, of course, as in the Pentagon and White House), inconvenient facts were shunted aside. Still, all these years and all those dead later, it’s worth considering some of those facts. There are, for instance, significant [differences](https://www.merip.org/mero/mero012718) between the Houthis’ Zaydi variant of Shia Islam and the Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran—and some similarities between Zaydis and Sunnis—which makes the ubiquitous claims about a Iran-Houthi faith-based pact shaky. Moreover, Iran did not jump into the fray during the violent 2004-2010 clashes between Saleh and the Houthis and did not have longstanding ties to them either. In addition, contrary to the prevailing view in Washington, Iran is unlikely to be their main source of weaponry and support. Sheer distance and the Saudi coalition’s naval blockade have made it next to impossible for Iran to supply arms to the Houthis in the volume alleged. Besides, having pillaged various military bases during their march toward Aden, the Houthis do not lack for weaponry. Iran’s influence in Yemen has undoubtedly increased since 2015, but reducing the intricacies of that country’s internal crisis to Iranian meddling and a Tehran-led Shiite bloc expanding from Syria to the Arabian Peninsula amounts to, at best, a massive oversimplification. The obsession of Trump and his key advisers with Iran (a remarkable number of them are [Iranophobes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/07/is-regime-change-in-iran-part-of-trumps-agenda/?utm_term=.45f1e432f282)) and The Donald’s obsession with plugging American arms makers and [hawking their wares](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176421/tomgram%3A_ben_freeman_and_william_hartung%2C_a_saudi_love_affair_in_washington) helps explain their embrace of the House of Saud and continuing support for its never-ending assault on Yemen. (Jared Kushner’s [bromance](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-jared-kushner-forged-a-bond-with-the-saudi-crown-prince/2018/03/19/2f2ce398-2181-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html) with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman undoubtedly played a part as well.) None of that, however, explains the full-scale American backing for the Saudi-led intervention there in the Obama years. Even as his administration denounced Bashar al-Assad’s slaughter of Syrian civilians, his officials seemed unmoved by the suffering war was inflicting on Yemenis. In fact, the Obama administration offered [$115 billion](http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-arms-transfers-saudi-arabia-and-war-yemen) worth of weaponry to Riyadh, including a [$1.15 billion](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-permits-saudi-arms-sale_us_57e2cb6ee4b08d73b82f07c1) package finalized in August 2016, when the scale of Yemen’s catastrophe was already all too obvious. In recent years, opposition to the war in Congress has been on the rise, with [Senator Bernie Sanders](https://theintercept.com/2018/02/28/yemen-war-bernie-sanders-saudi-arabia/) and [Representative Ro Khanna](https://khanna.house.gov/media/press-releases/release-rep-khanna-leads-urgent-bipartisan-call-sec-mattis-avert-famine) playing prominent roles in mobilizing it. But such [congressional critics](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/yemen-saudi-arabia-obama-riyadh/501365/) had no effect on Obama’s war policy and are unlikely to sway Trump’s. They face formidable barriers. The mainstream narrative on the war remains powerful, while the Gulf monarchies continue to buy vast quantities of American weaponry. And don’t forget the impressive, money-is-no-object Saudi-Emirati [lobbying operation](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/us/politics/george-nader-elliott-broidy-uae-saudi-arabia-white-house-influence.html) in Washington. That, then, is the context for the Pentagon’s gentle warning about the limits of US support for the bombing campaign in Yemen and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s subsequent [certification](https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/12/pompeo-certifies-saudi-military-actions-815802), as required by Congress, that the Saudis and Emiratis were taking perfectly credible action to lower civilian casualties—without which the US military could not continue refueling their planes. (Mattis “[endorsed](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/12/pompeo-certifies-saudi-arabia-uae-protecting-civilians.html) and fully supported” Pompeo’s statement.) As the fifth anniversary of this appalling war approaches, American-made arms and logistical aid remain essential to it. Consider President Trump’s much-ballyhooed [arms sales](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-04/news/trump-touts-saudi-arms-sales) to the Saudis, even if they don’t total [$100 billion](https://abcnews.go.com/International/truth-president-trumps-110-billion-saudi-arms-deal/story?id=47874726) (as he claimed): Why then would the Saudi and Emirati monarchs worry that the White House might actually do something like cutting off those lucrative sales or terminating the back-end support for their bombing campaign?

### AT: Red Sea

1. **Delink –** **Bandow ’18 of the Cato Institute** explains that the Houthis don’t want to cut off freedom of navigation. Obviously, they, too would be hurt by obstructing shipping routes. In fact, the only reason the incident to which my opponents are referring happened is because the Houthis were being attacked by Americans. Prior to the war, the Houthis didn’t pose a threat to us at all.

Doug Bandow, 5-15-2018, "America Should See Saudi Arabia's War on Yemen for the Horror It Really Is," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/america-should-see-saudi-arabias-war-yemen-horror-it-really>
Secretary Mattis claimed that ending U.S. combat support would allow the Houthis to use ballistic missiles to threaten “vital shipping lanes in the Red Sea.” Alleged proof of this was an earlier Houthi missile attack on an American warship. That attack led other administration officials to express concern about navigational freedom, especially in the Bab-el-Mandeb waterway. But Yemenis attacked the U.S. vessel because Washington is helping their killers, Saudi Arabia. Before this war, Houthis did not target Americans and they had no reason to. In peace the Yemenis rely on Gulf trade and they would never want to impede it. Yet now the Saudi-led coalition has blockaded Yemen and its access to the Gulf. By internationalizing the war Riyadh has also internationalized the weapons. As U.S. Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan complained and noted, previously “there was no explosive boat that existed in the Yemeni inventory.”

## Advocacies

### It’s Offensive Weapons

A. That’s what arms are – weapons.

B. **Hartung ’10 of the Council on Foreign Relations** confirms that the 2010 deal was offensive weapons.

[William Hartung](http://newamerica.net/user/22), Director of the Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?", Council on Foreign Relations, 9-24-2010, https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea // JY
The Saudi deal will no doubt go through, but it shouldn’t. It consists primarily of offensive weapons--fighter planes, attack helicopters, and guided bombs--that serve no constructive purpose**.** Fighter planes and guided bombs aren’t relevant to addressing the potential threat posed by Iranian missiles, nor are they likely to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters might be used in Saudi strikes against terrorists and separatist groups in northern Yemen, but doing so would be counterproductive, more likely to inflame passions against Riyadh than to solve its border security problems.

### AT: Missile Defense

1. This is just blatantly untopical – it’s not a weapon lol

2. **Delink –** even if given the option, **Myre ’18 of NPR** writes that Saudi Arabia’s not even looking to buy missile defense.

Greg Myre [NPR National Security Correspondent], 10-15-2018, "Fact Check: How Much Does Saudi Arabia Spend On Arms Deals With The U.S.?", NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657588534/fact-check-how-much-does-saudi-arabia-spend-on-arms-deals-with-the-u-s // JY
KELLY: And look ahead with me, Greg. Have the Saudis made any kind of comments in terms of what arms deals they're looking for in future? MYRE: The big one that's sort of been under some sort of discussion is a missile defense system. But again, they've spent an awful lot of money on the war in Yemen. And they're not necessarily seen as being in the market for a big new contract right now. Second point, the U.S. Congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has to approve these contracts. And the Democrats and some Republicans are quite upset with the way the Saudis are prosecuting the war in Yemen. And for the past year or so, they've really been reluctant, and it doesn't look like it would be an easy go for the Saudis to get a new contract.

### AT: Cutting Down Solves

1. **Delink –** half-assing it makes the problem worse. Bisaccio ’18 of Northeastern University writes that small punishments signal weakness and anger Riyadh, encouraging them to double down on their behavior.

Derek Bisaccio [Researcher of Peace and Conflict Studies at Northeastern University], 10-23-2018, "Examining U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia", http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/196962/us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia%3A-policy-options.html // JY
But if the Trump administration’s goal in the present is to isolate Iran and concretely address its nuclear and missile programs as well as foreign policy in the region, coordination of efforts with Saudi Arabia will prove essential. Critics of the Crown Prince regularly paint him as reckless, which, if an accurate depiction, should prompt consideration of whether reducing America’s ability to influence Saudi policy choices is the wisest course of action for Washington to take. Depending on how severely the U.S. was to act, cutting defense cooperation could produce the opposite effect than intended with respect to Saudi policies: Saudi Arabia could well double-down, or in any case refuse to budge, rather than concede to Washington. Should the U.S. cut only a few deals, or refuse to sell a few systems, the pressure will be so miniscule as to hardly register in Riyadh. A more aggressive approach, however, would not be guaranteed to produce a better effect on Saudi policy. A useful comparison may be the U.S. response to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s overthrow of Egypt’s previous government and the subsequent massacre of protestors in Rabaa. The U.S. criticized the government of President Sisi and cut a significant amount of arms cooperation pending improvement toward a more democratic system. Two years later, the U.S. rescinded the policy, having made little to no progress.[iv] Bahrain hardly moved on its domestic policies despite the U.S. temporarily enacting a hold on the sale of F-16s to the country until it improved its human rights record.

## Alternatives

### AT: General Alts

1. **Delink –** **Riedl ’18 of the Heritage Foundation** explains that the Saudi military systems are interdependent and communicate with one another, meaning the Saudis are entirely dependent on the United States for weaponry. This would cripple the Saudi coalition, as **Stratfor ’18** writes that the Saudi military is known for its failing maintenance and professional ability.

2. At the very least, **Caverly ’18 of the New York Times** confirms that it would take a fortune and years of retraining to replace the United States, concluding that cutting arms sales would cripple Riyadh’s military power for a **generation**.

Bruce Riedel, 10-15-2018, "Fact Check: How Much Does Saudi Arabia Spend On Arms Deals With The U.S.?", NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657588534/fact-check-how-much-does-saudi-arabia-spend-on-arms-deals-with-the-u-s // JY
RIEDEL: If tonight President Trump told the king he was cutting off spare parts to the Saudi Air Force, the Saudi Air Force would be grounded tomorrow morning. MYRE: And the president has said that if the U.S. doesn't sell weapons to the Saudis, then Russia or China would step in and do it. But it's really not that simple. Riedel noted that you can't simply strap a Chinese bomb on an American F-15. The - all the systems have to talk to one another. So the Saudis really would be in a tough spot if the United States were to use that leverage and cut them off.

Stratfor, 11-9-2018, "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own", Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030 // JY
While there are certainly potential benefits for the Saudis in diversifying arms sources, there are considerable limits as well. For one thing, neither Russia nor China is in the position to replace the United States as a present and powerful guarantor of Saudi security against Iran. Even more important, because the Saudi military is equipped chiefly with Western weapons, a major forcewide shift toward non-Western equipment would create serious logistical and training problems in a force already not well-known for its maintenance capabilities or its professional acumen. For those reasons, the Saudi state will have no choice but to continue to rely on its alliances with the United States and, to a lesser extent, European states. This will extend to its arms-purchasing relationship as well.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html // JY
To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen,Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia. Perhaps selling weapons “strengthens international partnerships,” as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. [Mr. Trump on Thursday cited](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-reluctant-to-curb-arm-sales-to-saudi-arabia-in-response-to-missing-journalist/2018/10/11/85c71212-cd4a-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.933692054307) “four or five alternatives” to American weapons, and the need to avoid “letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

### AT: Switch to Russia

1. **Delink –** Russia doesn’t have the technology. **Caverley ’18 of the New York Times** writes that Russia doesn’t have the technology to replace the United States.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html // JY
To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen,Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia. Perhaps selling weapons “strengthens international partnerships,” as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. [Mr. Trump on Thursday cited](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-reluctant-to-curb-arm-sales-to-saudi-arabia-in-response-to-missing-journalist/2018/10/11/85c71212-cd4a-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.933692054307) “four or five alternatives” to American weapons, and the need to avoid “letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

### AT: >> Russia Worse

1. **Internal link non-unique –** Russian and Saudi relations are already strong**. Borshchevskaya ’17 of Foreign Policy** writes that Salman and Putin are closer than ever, agreeing on a variety of energy, trade, and defense deals at a recent summit. Riyadh even reaffirmed its commitment to Moscow by investing $10 billion in Russia, the largest foreign direct investment in the country.

[Anna Borshchevskaya](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/anna-borshchevskaya), Oct 10, 2017, "Will Russian-Saudi Relations Continue to Improve?", https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2017-10-10/will-russian-saudi-relations-continue-improve // JY
On October 5, [King Salman](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2017-03-06/why-king-salman-went-asia) became the first ever Saudi monarch to visit Russia. President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-10-10/putin-losing-control-russias-conservative-nationalists), who first invited the king to Moscow more than two years ago, [hailed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-05/saudi-king-seeks-oil-pact-extension-on-epochal-russia-visit) the visit as a “landmark event.” Billboards lined city streets welcoming the king in Arabic and Russian, and Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov [had strong words of praise](https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2017/09/29/n_10630970.shtml) for Saudi Arabia’s leadership. After the summit, Salman and Putin [signed](http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5236) a packet of documents on energy, trade, and defense, and agreed to several billion dollars’ worth of joint investment. In addition, there are reports that Saudi Arabia [agreed](https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.815867) to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system, making it the second U.S. ally to do so. (Turkey was the first.) The summit is just one more milestone in the trend of warming Russian-Saudi ties. In June 2015, then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman [attended](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/06/19/saudis-star-prince-keeps-rising-visits-putin-in-st-petersburg/) the annual St. Petersburg Economic Forum—the first time the prince became publically involved in energy issues [according](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/saudi-crown-prince-russia-deals.html) to press reports at the time—where he met with Putin. The following month, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund [committed](https://www.ft.com/content/0205a0d6-2412-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c?mhq5j=e7) to invest $10 billion in Russia over five years, the largest-ever foreign direct investment in the country according to the Russian Direct Investment Fund. During a visit to Moscow this spring, meanwhile, Bin Salman [said](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/russian-saudi-rapprochement-iran-170817154056810.html) that “relations between Saudi Arabia and Russia are going through one of their best moments ever.” Given the two countries’ opposite orientations dating back to the Cold War, these recent developments are remarkable. Whether the rapprochement will last is unclear. What is certain, however, is that Russia’s new Saudi ties show Putin’s sway in the Middle East remains on the upswing.

### AT: Switch to China

1. **Delink –** China can’t fill the gap. **Caverley ’18 of the New York Times** writes that China has never produced the advanced weaponry the U.S. currently does, as it lacks the technology to do so.

2. **Delink –** Even if they had the capacity to do so, China has no interest in challenging America. **Ahmed ’18 of The Washington Institute** confirms that China needs the U.S. to secure its safe shipping routes the region, without having to make significant investments of their own.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html // JY
To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen,Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia. Perhaps selling weapons “strengthens international partnerships,” as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. [Mr. Trump on Thursday cited](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-reluctant-to-curb-arm-sales-to-saudi-arabia-in-response-to-missing-journalist/2018/10/11/85c71212-cd4a-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.933692054307) “four or five alternatives” to American weapons, and the need to avoid “letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

Ahmed Al-Quiasy, 2-2-2018, "Saudi-Chinese Rapprochement and Its Effect on Saudi-American Relations ", No Publication, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/saudi-chinese-rapprochement-and-its-effect-on-saudi-american-relations // JY
Security-wise, some analysts see Saudi Arabia as trying to create a strategic competition among the great powers to gain weapons and security support, especially after the U.S. appeared to respond weakly to Saudi security and military needs amidst security challenges. This might open the door to China and Russia to exert influence in the region, and coordinate their positions against Washington; thereby making the U.S. either an ineffective player or out of the game in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is aware that it is impossible in the short term to relinquish the U.S. role in national security to China, which compared to the United States and even Russia, remains less committed politically and militarily to its friends among the countries of the region. Washington can bear the burden of military deployment, military progress, and coalition building, while China has no such capacity nor the desire to clash with the United States in the Middle East. Rather, China wishes to benefit from American dominance there, which secures shipping routes for export oil to China without China having to make any major investments to protect the region. Amid the current Saudi-Iranian conflict, China is aware that there is no current alternative to American military presence in the Gulf to limit Iranian influence, particularly since relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States have progressed following the election of Donald Trump. Trump is partnering with Saudi Arabia to limit Iranian influence and supports Saudi reforms, whereby Saudi Arabia has begun to expand the number of American banks and other economic ties in the Kingdom.

### AT: >> China Worse

1. **Internal link non-unique –** China is already gaining influence over Saudi Arabia. **The South China Morning Post ’18** writes that China and Saudi Arabia are already increasing their trade ties and stepping up their engagement with one another.

South China Morning Post, 10-22-2018, "Trump fears China could replace US in arms sales to Saudi. He shouldn’t", https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms // JY
China may continue to engage more with Saudi Arabia if Washington imposes sanctions over the disappearance and presumed murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, but it cannot supplant US arms sales as President Donald Trump believes, analysts say. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday as Washington weighs actions against Riyadh over the fate of Khashoggi, a US resident and vocal critic of the Saudi regime who vanished two weeks ago. But Trump has been reluctant to support sanctions, citing the impact to a US$110 billion arms deal he helped broker last year. “I don’t like the concept of stopping an investment of US$110 billion into the United States because you know what they’re going to do?” Trump told reporters last week. “They’re going to take that money and spend it in Russia or China or someplace else.” Saudi Arabia has long sought to diversify away from its reliance on the US and has increasingly stepped up its engagement with China, its largest trading partner with US$42.36 billion in bilateral trade in 2017. Last March, the two countries also signed US$65 billion worth of deals in areas ranging from energy to space technology. The Arab nation could turn to countries such as China and Russia to help fulfil its military needs if US sanctions were imposed, a step that would “create an economic disaster that would rock the entire world”, according to a widely cited opinion piece by the general manager of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news channel. In the editorial, Turki Aldakhil said Saudi Arabia – the world’s largest oil exporter – was considering more than 30 countermeasures to be taken against the US, including trading oil in yuan instead of the US dollar. But in the military realm, China’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia lag far behind those of the US and its European allies. Beijing exported only around US$20 million in arms last year compared to US$3.4 billion from Washington, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Jonathan Fulton, assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, said China had grown more serious in its regional arms relationships with Gulf states in recent years, with the potential to serve as a “wedge” as US-Saudi relations frayed.

### AT: EU

1. **Delink –** The EU agrees with the United States. **Iddon ’18 of Alaraby** writes that Western arms deals have hit their peak to Saudi Arabia, as the EU becomes increasingly frustrated with Riyadh’s behavior.

Paul Iddon, 12-21-2018, "Have Western arms sales to Saudi Arabia peaked?", alaraby, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/12/21/have-western-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-peaked // JY
This doesn't necessarily mean that the US will cease arming or supporting Riyadh any time soon. Nevertheless, mounting criticism in Washington and other Western capitals may indicate that Western arms deals with Saudi Arabia may finally have reached their peak. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau [said](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/17/canada-saudi-arms-deal-justin-trudeau) this week that his government was looking into pulling Canada out of an arms deal with Saudi Arabia worth C$14 billion for armoured vehicles. Germany, Denmark and Finland [also halted future arms deals](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/11/24/jamal-khashoggi-finland-denmark-germany-arms-sales/2101874002/) with the kingdom.

### AT: Pakistan (Nukes)

1. **Delink –** Pakistan won’t sell its nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. **Zakaria ’15 of the Washington Post** writes that Pakistan won’t take the risk of selling to Saudi Arabia and being heavily sanctioned.

Fareed Zakaria, 6-11-**20**15, "Why Saudi Arabia can’t get a nuclear weapon," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabias-nuclear-bluff/2015/06/11/9ce1f4f8-1074-11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html>
Its most recent international activism, the air campaign in Yemen, has badly backfired. Bruce Riedel, a former top White House aide, says that damage to civilians and physical infrastructure “has created considerable bad blood between Yemenis and their rich Gulf neighbors that will poison relations for years. Yemenis always resented their rich brothers, and now many will want revenge.” He notes that the air campaign is being directed by the new defense minister, the king’s 29-year-old son, who has no experience in military affairs or much else. **But couldn’t Saudi Arabia simply buy a nuclear bomb? That’s highly unlikely.** Any such effort would have to take place secretly, under the threat of sanctions, Western retaliation and interception. Saudi Arabia depends heavily on foreigners and their firms to help with its energy industry, build its infrastructure, buy its oil and sell it goods and services. Were it isolated like Iran or North Korea, its economic system would collapse**. It is often claimed that Pakistan would sell nukes to the Saudis. And it’s true that the Saudis have bailed out Pakistan many times. But the government in Islamabad is well aware that such a deal could make it a pariah and result in sanctions. It is unlikely to risk that, even to please its sugar daddy in Riyadh**. In April, Pakistan refused repeated Saudi pleas to join the air campaign in Yemen. So let me make a prediction: Whatever happens with Iran’s nuclear program, 10 years from now Saudi Arabia won’t have nuclear weapons. Because it can’t.

### AT: Trades off w/ Troops

1. **Delink –** Sending troops into Yemen is political suicide. **The International Rescue Committee ’18** confirms that 82% of Americans are against the U.S. supporting the war in Yemen.

2. **Timeframe weighing –** you know you cut off arms sales immediately, but the amount of time it takes to pass a declaration of war through Congress, train and recruit a significant increase in soldiers, set up infrastructure, etc., means a war would be very far off in the future.

International Rescue Committee, 11-26-2018, "Americans agree—it's time to stop fueling the war in Yemen", International Rescue Committee (IRC), https://www.rescue.org/article/americans-agree-its-time-stop-fueling-war-yemen // JY
Of those expressing an opinon, the majority of Americans (75%) are opposed to U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, according to a [new YouGov survey commissioned by the IRC](https://www.rescue.org/press-release/new-ircyougov-poll-pressure-mounts-yemen-ceasefire-us-opinion-united-end-support-war). The survey results also reveal a clear bipartisan consensus on ending U.S. military support: 82% of respondents agree Congress must vote to end or decrease arms sales, with 98% of liberals and 63% of conservatives in agreement. “Americans of all political stripes reject the U.S. policy of fueling the war in Yemen,” said Miliband. “They agree that by continuing to provide military and diplomatic support for one side of the conflict, the U.S. is fueling a crisis that has severe consequences for millions of civilians.”

### AT: Worse Tech Bad

1. **Weighing –** This is a very small difference, as Kapoor ’18 of NewsPressed writes that the U.S. is already selling outdated weaponry to Saudi Arabia.

Ajay Kapoor, 1-20-2018, "The United States Is Selling Useless, Outdated Weapons To Saudi Arabia", NewsPressed -, http://www.newspressed.com/united-states-selling-useless-outdated-weapons-saudi-arabia-84388 // JY
This is interesting as regards nothing much changes, having spent many years working in the Middle East including over 10 years in Saudi Arabia… The same old story the big US arms manufacturers always sell old models – outdated and even obsolete arms to many countries outside the USA. But the reality is that it makes good sense to do this for many reasons not least what if an ally as in a US friendly nation buys arms from the States and then at a later date turns those very same weapons on the US in open warfare. In that case both sides would have the same hi tech armory, meaning the likely winner would be the side with the better equipment operators and more fire power. That scenario would and/could develop into a US defense department nightmare! That is never going to happen the US government is too smart and politically savvy to ever sell the very latest very best hi tech weapons to any country whether ally or foe. There are other factors in selling useless, outdated weapons it enables arms manufacturers to get extended ROI financial gains as in keeping existing machinery and techniques in production. Facts reveal that by extending the life of old original production lines helps increase profits – make millions more dollars. Everyone knows that all US companies focus on profit – profit – profit! That is the name of the game making money – nothing more – nothing less!

### AT: Ground War Worse

1. **Delink –** A ground war means the end of the conflict. **Lynch ’18 of Foreign Policy** writes that, as they fight from the skies, the Saudis are insulated from the effects of war. When this is no longer true and they’re forced to face the human consequences of their own actions, this insulation disappears.

Colum Lynch, 12-13-2018, "Is Yemen’s Torment Finally Ending?", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/13/is-yemens-torment-finally-ending/ // JY
The crisis has increased congressional pressure on Saudi Arabia and its allies to strike a deal with the Houthis. But Yemen experts say there is relatively little domestic pressure on the warring parties to put down their guns and and hold off their fighter jets. “War is easier than peace for the parties,” said Gregory Johnsen, an American scholar of Yemen who recently served as a member of a U.N. panel monitoring sanctions violations in Yemen. As the Saudis have fought mostly from the skies, there are no “body bags” being returned to Riyadh, and the Houthis feel they are fighting an “existential war” that they can win if they just wait out the Saudis. “The Houthi leadership is largely insulated from the shortages of food and medicines in this war,” said Johnsen. “Houthi leaders aren’t being targeted and killed. It’s Yemen’s civilians who are paying the price.”

## Yemen

### AT: Embolden Houthis

1. **Delink –** The Houthis are only able to recruit insofar as they can portray the Saudis as aggressing.

Stratfor, "The Latest Failed Attempt at Peace Talks Means More of the Same in Yemen", Stratfor, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/latest-failed-attempt-peace-talks-means-more-same-yemen // JY
The Houthis, meanwhile, could imperil the legitimacy they have gained in northern Yemen if supporters perceive that they are responsible for prolonging the conflict. So long as they manage to portray the Saudi-led coalition as the aggressors, they can keep up their recruitment numbers and preserve their standing with the many tribes of north Yemen. But maintaining that buy-in will require the Houthis to deliver results, like food security and an improved economic situation, that may be beyond their reach.

## Terrorism

### AT: General Terror

1. **Case turn –** A world with arms sales has more terror, not less. **Collier ‘07 of the World Bank** writes that when economic growth slows down, citizens become more desperate and the state grows weaker, making the poorest likely to join terrorist groups.

Indeed, **McKernan ‘18 of The Independent** explains that, even absent ideological reasons or a desire to fight, young, unemployed Yemeni men have joined the war as soldiers.

Overall, **Horton ’18 of the National Interest** concludes that terrorism is tightening its grip on Yemen.

Paul Collier, 2007, "The Bottom Billion", Oxford University Press, https://www.sfu.ca/content/sfu/dean-gradstudies/events/dreamcolloquium/SpringColloquium/Readings/Readings/\_jcr\_content/main\_content/download\_47/file.res/Paul%20Collier // JY
The first link we found was between risk of war and initial level of income. Civil war is much more likely to break out in low-income countries: halve the starting income of the country and you double the risk of civil war. One might ask whether we got the causality mixed up—is it just that war makes a country poor, rather than that poverty makes a country prone to war? In fact, both relationships hold simultaneously. While civil war reduces income, low income indeed heightens the risk of civil war. The clearest evidence for this arises because during colonialism many countries experienced decades of enforced peace; the near-simultaneous decolonization of many countries with very different income levels provided a natural experiment for the effect of income on civil war. The relationship between low income and civil war may seem obvious— if you read the newspapers, you will see that the countries where there is conflict are far more likely to be poor—but not all theorists of civil war have based their work on empirical data. Some social scientists, particularly the most politically engaged, know what they want to see in civil war and duly see it. What else makes a country prone to civil war? Well, slow growth, or worse, stagnation or decline. As an approximation, a typical low-income country faces a risk of civil war of about 14 percent in any five-year period. Each percentage point added to the growth rate knocks off a percentage point from this risk. So if a country grows at 3 percent, the risk is cut from 14 percent to 11 percent; if its economy declines at 3 percent, the risk increases to 16 percent. On this point too, one might ask whether we have the causality backward—might it be the case instead that it is the anticipation of civil war that causes decline? After all, when a civil war looks to be in the cards, investors flee, and the economy declines. It looks like decline causes war, but actually it’s the anticipation of war that causes decline. This objection can be dealt with by looking at a factor that affects growth but has no direct connection to civil war, and seeing whether the subsequent effects make civil war more or less likely. In low-income countries rainfall shocks (too much or too little rain) affect economic growth, but they do not directly affect the risk of civil war—that is, prospective rebels do not say, “It’s raining, let’s call off the rebellion.” The effects on growth of rainfall shocks are thus clean of any ambiguity: they are not caused by anticipation of civil war. Yet setbacks to growth caused by rainfall shocks make civil war much more likely. So if low income and slow growth make a country prone to civil war, it is reasonable to want to know why. There could be many explanations. My guess is that it is at least in part because low income means poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small chance of riches. In 2002 a little gang of rebels in the Philippines managed to kidnap some foreign tourists. A French woman among the kidnapped later described how she wrote down their demands for transmission to the authorities. “What do you want me to write?” she asked. “A million dollars per tourist” was what they wanted. She wrote it down, then asked, “Anything else?” A long pause, then a political thought: “Sack the mayor of Jolo.” The last demand: “Two divers’ wristwatches.” That was the list of “totally justified” grievances from that particular rebel group. Kidnapping tourists was just an unfortunate necessity to secure social justice. Anyway, the United States refused to pay up for the American hostage, but the European governments paid up, with Muammar Qaddafi of Libya as a go-between, and in short order there was a surge of young men wanting to join the rebels. This sort of recruitment to a rebellion is a bit like joining drug gangs in the United States. A now famous study of a Chicago drug gang found that young men were attracted into the gang and willing to work for practically nothing because of the small chance of big money if they managed to climb up the hierarchy of the gang. On top of that, if the economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult. Rebel leader Laurent Kabila, marching across Zaire with his troops to seize the state, told a journalist that in Zaire, rebellion was easy: all you needed was $10,000 and a satellite phone. While this was obviously poetic exaggeration, he went on to explain that in Zaire, everyone was so poor that with $10,000 you could hire yourself a small army. And the satellite phone? Well, that takes us to the third and final economic risk factor in civil war: natural resources. Dependence upon primary commodity exports—oil, diamonds, and the like—substantially increases the risk of civil war. That’s why Kabila needed a satellite phone: in order to strike deals with resource extraction companies. By the time he reached Kinshasa he reportedly had arranged $500 million worth of deals. There have been several cases where international companies have advanced massive amounts of funding to rebel movements in return for resource concessions in the event of rebel victory. That is apparently how Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the present president of the Republic of the Congo (not to be confused with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire), came to power. So natural resources help to finance conflict and sometimes even help to motivate it. One example is “conflict diamonds.” The UN defines them as “diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments.” In the case of conflict diamonds, the attention that has been drawn to the problem by the NGO Global Witness has paid off. After years of denying that there was a problem, De Beers, the world’s largest diamond producer, has made amazing changes that have gone a long way toward addressing the problem and have turned the company into a corporate role model. So low income, slow growth, and primary commodity dependence make a country prone to civil war, but are they the real causes of civil war? I hear the phrase “root causes” a lot. It is bandied about at many of the conferences on conflict to which I am invited. Surprisingly frequently, a hypothesized root cause turns out to be predictable if you already know the hobbyhorse of the speaker. If the individual cares about income inequality, he or she imagines that that is what rebels are concerned about; someone strongly engaged with political rights assumes that rebels are campaigners for democracy; if someone’s great-grandparents emigrated to escape from some oppressive regime, the person imagines that the descendants of those who did not emigrate are still being oppressed in the way that folk memory tells them once happened. Partly in response, the rebel groups generate a discourse of grievance that feeds these concerns, in effect inviting fellow travelers to imagine themselves wearing bandoliers on the barricades. Unfortunately, you simply can’t trust the rebel discourse of concern for social justice: what else do you expect them to say?

Bethan McKernan, March 11, 2018, "Saudi Arabia is expelling Yemeni workers. Some of them may be joining the Houthis and al Qaeda", https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-saudi-arabia-houthi-yemeni-workers-expel-deport-fighters-recruitment-al-qaeda-a8248506.html // JY
Accurate figures are impossible to come by, but estimates given by several sources for this story were usually that around 10 per cent of the 100,000 returnees so far could have joined a fighting force. One million Yemenis are currently thought to live in Saudi Arabia and remittances sent home by workers abroad are a lifeline for their families. Three-quarters of the 22 million-strong population has become reliant on aid to survive since the conflict began and eight million people now live on the brink of famine in the world’s [worst humanitarian disaster](https://www.irinnews.org/news/2017/12/14/world-s-worst-humanitarian-crisis-about-get-worse-again). That money drying up “could destroy Yemen”, said Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemeni non-resident fellow at London’s Chatham House. “It will be worse than the war.” In a country where GDP reached a record low of £515 in 2016 and has only decreased since, the prospect of steady wages has already led thousands of men with little desire or understanding of the reasons for the violence to join a fighting side. “The declaration from Mohammed Ali al-Houthi was really scary,” said Faizah al-Sulimani, who left Yemen for Saudi Arabia in 2015 and works on aid projects remotely. “We haven’t had salaries paid in Yemen for two years. It’s already caused a crisis where people feel like they have no choice but to fight to put bread on the table,” she said. “I personally know five young men who were students in other countries and got deported and joined the Houthis and other militias like the Southern Transitional Council. It’s very frustrating.” Houthi fighters are paid $100 (£72) a month to defend the front lines against a coalition of Yemeni soldiers, tribal forces local to the exiled Yemeni government and Saudi and UAE troops. [Al-Qaeda](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/al-qaeda) and [Isis’s](https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/isis) Yemeni branches offer similar remuneration

Michael Horton, 8-15-2018, "Terrorists are Tightening Their Grip on Yemen", National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/terrorists-are-tightening-their-grip-yemen-28842> // JY
A recent investigation by the Associated Press revealed that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may have been bought off by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni forces they back. The investigation cites instances of deals having been made between AQAP, the UAE, and their proxy forces. The investigation also points out something that was already widely known among those who follow Yemen: AQAP is fighting alongside some of the Emirati and Saudi backed militias that are battling the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia rebel group that controls much of northwest Yemen. For many of these armed groups and possibly for Saudi Arabia and the UAE (both close U.S. allies), defeating the Houthis, a sworn enemy of AQAP, takes priority over concerns about working with Al Qaeda. The *Associated Press* investigation, which appears to have been based on extensive in-country interviews, paints a picture of AQAP as an organization that remains as formidable as it is capable. This stands in contrast to the assessment being put forward by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and some Yemen analysts who argue that AQAP is a fragmented organization that has been greatly weakened by coalition backed counterinsurgency operations in southern Yemen. This view of AQAP as a weak and fragmented organization may reflect a misunderstanding of AQAP’s strategy in Yemen. Rather than being weak and fragmented, AQAP is drawing on the lessons that it has learned from the past six years of failures and successes. Chief among these is that it is adopting a more pragmatic strategy that embraces a decentralized or nodal structure. Such a move away from centralization could easily be mistaken for fragmentation. However, it is more likely that AQAP is merely adapting to and taking advantage of the ever-shifting contours of Yemen’s three-year-old war. The leadership of AQAP recognized early on that enmeshing itself within local communities was key to expanding its influence and guaranteeing its long-term survival. It has, at least on some level, been doing this since its inception. However, the focus on enmeshment gained momentum after its near defeat in 2012 by a combined offensive by the Yemeni Army and popular militias that enjoyed well-coordinated and precise support from the United States. AQAP learned many lessons from what was a calamitous year. First, they adopted a gradualist approach to enforcing their radical interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) so as not to alienate locals who by in large find such an interpretation to be an anathema. Second, they focused on indigenizing their organization. The foreign fighters, many of whom were from Somalia, that they had incorporated into their ranks caused resentment and left AQAP open to charges of being a foreign force bent on occupation. AQAP has learned from its own mistakes and it has also learned from the mistakes of Al Qaeda central. Al Qaeda failed—at least for many years—to indigenize its forces and enmesh itself within its host country’s sociopolitical context. AQAP, and other newer militant Salafi groups, however, appear to be more inclined to model the Taliban than Al Qaeda Central. The Taliban are woven into the fabric of much of Afghan society and they are first and foremost an organization that patiently pursues long-term strategic goals. The seizure of Sana’a, the Yemeni capital, by the Houthis in September 2014 and their subsequent offensive in which they briefly and brutally occupied Aden and other parts of southern Yemen was a shot in the arm for AQAP. The Houthi offensive and the resulting Saudi and Emirati led incursion, dubbed “Operation Decisive Storm,” which began in March 2015, provided AQAP with the perfect environment in which to test new approaches and strategies that in many respects mirror those of the Taliban. In the same month that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their coalition partners launched Operation Decisive Storm, AQAP seized the port of Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest city. AQAP occupied and governed the city through proxies for a year. In April 2016, Emirati-led forces seized the city from AQAP without a fight. AQAP’s yearlong occupation and governance of a major city was in many ways a success for the organization. It learned that governing and operating through proxies was a viable strategy that provided it with the political and tactical cover that it required. Most importantly, such a strategy allowed it to more fully enmesh its operatives within very specific local contexts. At the same time that AQAP was occupying Mukalla, its fighters were also deployed to those areas where various forces were battling the Houthis. It is on the frontlines of the battle with the Houthis that AQAP has really found its footing. In many fiercely contested areas like the city of Taiz and the governorate of al-Bayda, AQAP’s operatives and foot soldiers are deeply involved in the fight against the Houthis where they are valued for their discipline and fighting skills. Similar to the strategy it employed in Mukalla, AQAP has deprioritized its emphasis on the implementation of Sharia and the waging of transnational jihad in favor of inserting itself into a variety of sociopolitical and martial contexts. AQAP’s strategy has shifted from one that was ambitious, uncompromising, vocal, and, at least to some degree, global in its outlook, to one that is intensely local, relatively quiet, and pragmatic. This could make it appear that the group is fragmenting and thus weakening. However, rather than fragmenting, it is far more likely that AQAP is adopting and employing a nodal structure that eschews centralized decisionmaking and authority. When such a structure is employed in a war as complex as Yemen’s, it makes it very difficult to determine who and who is not a member of AQAP. At the same time, Yemen is host to a growing number of Salafi militias whose ideological underpinnings are almost indistinguishable from those of AQAP. This combined with what are clearly efforts by AQAP to “go dark” in response to a U.S.-led drone campaign that relies heavily on signals intelligence means that AQAP is going to be far harder to accurately target. The war in Yemen has devastated the country’s infrastructure, further impoverished what was already the poorest country in the Middle East, and flooded an already heavily armed country with advanced weaponry. It is unlikely that a militant organization like AQAP, which has proved itself to be resilient and adaptable, would somehow fail to continue to exploit such an environment. Add to this the very real possibility that, at a minimum, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have turned a blind eye to AQAP, and it is all but certain that AQAP’s future in Yemen is secure.

### AT: Link: Arms Sales Solve

1. **Delink –** Arms sales don’t address the problem of terrorism. **Thrall ’18 of the Cato Institute** explains that the U.S. sells weapons are ill-suited to combat terrorism: because terrorist groups don’t advertise their location or assemble in large groups, they are unable to effectively be attacked.

A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 3-13-2018, "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy", Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy // JY
Moreover, even if one believed that the benefits would outweigh the potential costs, arms sales still have almost no value as a tool in the war on terror for several reasons. First, the bulk of arms sales (and those we considered in our risk assessment) involve major conventional weapons, which are ill suited to combatting terrorism. Many U.S. arms deals since 9/11 have involved major conventional weapons systems such as fighter jets, missiles, and artillery, useful for traditional military operations, but of little use in fighting terrorists. Insurgencies that hold territory, like the Islamic State, are one thing, but most terrorist groups do not advertise their location, nor do they assemble in large groups. Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism. Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”[50](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor050) This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.[51](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor051) Given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates will reduce terrorism, much less anti-American terrorism specifically. Relatedly, many arms deals since 9/11, made in the name of counterterrorism, were irrelevant to U.S. goals in the global war on terror because they provided weapons to governments fighting terrorist groups only vaguely (if at all) linked to al Qaeda or ISIS. Although selling weapons to the governments of Nigeria or Morocco or Tunisia might help them combat violent resistance in their countries, terrorist groups in those countries have never targeted the United States. As a result, such arms deals cannot be justified by arguing that they advance the goals of the United States in its own war on terror in any serious way. Finally, arms sales are completely useless to combat the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland — lone wolf attackers already living in the United States. As noted, none of the successful attacks in the United States since 9/11 resulted from operations directed by al Qaeda or ISIS. And in fact only two foiled attempts since then — the underwear bomber and the printer-bomb plot — can be ascribed to al Qaeda.[52](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor052) Instead, in almost all cases, persons already living in the United States, inspired by Islamist groups, decided to carry out attacks on their own. Clearly, arms sales to foreign nations won’t help with that problem; rather, as many analysts have suggested, amplifying conflicts abroad may well make the problem worse.[53](https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy#_idTextAnchor053) In sum, the strategic value of arms sales for the United States is very low given today’s security environment. Different circumstances would produce a different analysis. Although today there is little reason for the United States to worry about the Russian threat to Europe, during the Cold War foreign policy experts agreed that preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the European continent was critical to American security. As a result, the United States sensibly provided NATO allies with advanced weapons. This strategy greatly enhanced the fighting capability of NATO, thereby bolstering deterrence and ensuring European security. Today, happily, the United States faces no such threats. For this reason, the argument in favor of arms sales cannot rest on national security grounds but must rest instead on “national interest” grounds, that is, on the benefits gained from helping other nations improve their own security, and from maintaining conditions generally believed to be in the national interest, such as regional stability or the prevention of war. This is already a much weaker position than the conventional wisdom acknowledges. Even worse for such sales’ advocates, however, is the fact that arms sales are notoriously uncertain tools for achieving those objectives.

## American Interests

### AT: General Capacity

1. **Analytical delink –** the U.S. can conduct an operation to address this problem.

## Misc

### AT: PMCs

1. **Terminal Nonunique –** This is already happening. **Gregg ’18 of the Washington Post** explains that for the 2019 and 2020 year, Lockheed Martin has a $900 million dollar deal. And in the third quarter of 2018, it made $14.38 billion off sales to Saudi Arabia.

Gregg 18, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/23/lockheed-martin-executives-break-silence-over-khashoggi-killing-their-business-with-saudi-arabia/?utm\_term=.27bac0e3e067 // ZS](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/23/lockheed-martin-executives-break-silence-over-khashoggi-killing-their-business-with-saudi-arabia/?utm_term=.27bac0e3e067%20//%20ZS)
Defense analysts say it is unlikely that the U.S. government will halt those sales or future ones unless the political situation changes significantly. President Trump said on CBS' “60 minutes” that he wants to continue selling arms to the kingdom in order to protect U.S. jobs. “I don’t want to lose an order like that,” he said. And in Tuesday’s earnings call, Lockheed chief financial officer Bruce Tanner said the financial benefits of the THAAD sale are already “very much pushed to the right," meaning the won’t materialize until much later, because the system depends on a Saudi radar update that won’t happen for years. He expects the system to be operational in Saudi Arabia by 2023. He noted **that the company’s sales in Saudi Arabia for 2019 and 2020 add up to about $900 million. Lockheed Martin made about $14.3 billion in the third quarter of 2018.**