We affirm, Resolved: The United Nations should grant India a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council

## Contention 1 is multilateralism

The U.N. is suffering from a credibility crisis. **Kofi Annon, former Secretary General of the U.N.**, wrote that the council must take in new permanent members or risk becoming irrelevant. They need to modernize - the current system has been widely criticized as outdated, setting in stone the politics of 70 years ago. Annon concludes that those in privileged positions will have to integrate new global powers such as India to ensure cooperation, and risk confrontation without doing so.

Addressing the U.N., **Sharma** cautioned against a delay in reforming the world body, saying it must begin today as tomorrow could be too late. She continued that the importance, influence, respect and value of the institution is beginning to diminish and warned that by refusing to accept the need for reform the U.N. could go the way of the League of Nations. She concluded that the whole concept of multilateralism could collapse precisely when it is needed the most without reform.

**The Council on Foreign Relations** writes that the issues facing the world in the twenty-first century—climate change, terrorism, economic development, nonproliferation —all demand a great deal of the multilateral system and require buy-in from new global powers. Without India’s addition it will become increasingly irrelevant and cease to be able to credibly function. 1

**Ian Goldin, Professor of Globalization at Oxford** writes these challenges reflect the rising potential for cascading risk. Climate change, cyber-attacks, pandemics, antibiotic resistant diseases and global financial meltdowns aren’t abstract specters, but the defining challenges of our time. Such challenges require coordination and agreements that mean ascribing to rules which bind different countries together. Piecemeal national efforts without coordination will continue to fail in the face of systemic threats. Without action, those could cause unprecedented destruction and devastation for life on our planet. Including essential global actors like India is vital.

## Contention 2 is peacekeeping

**Foreign Policy Magazine** reports that as Western powers retreated from U.N. peacekeeping over the past decade, India filled the gap, supplying the U.N. with the bulk of its more than 100,000 peacekeepers. India has more than twice as many peacekeepers in the field as the council’s five big powers combined. India stands apart from other developing countries because of its capacity to deploy advanced military gear. It concludes that the absence of Indian troops and combat technology will limit the U.N.’s ability to carry out responsibilities and may even force them to close outposts.

 **Vira explained in the Small Wars Journal** that even small reductions in India’s support would degrade the viability of existing missions and devastate peacekeeping capacity because it could trigger a cascading reaction. Vira continues that membership is key because as India’s ambitions grow, legacy attachments to UN peacekeeping are eroding in favor of more strategic assessments of the costs of participating in today’s complex operations relative to their tangible benefits to Indian interests. Indian leaders have come to realize that expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and stated that its future peacekeeping contributions will be less automatic, and instead tied to reform.

**Goldstein, professor at American University,** writes that peacekeeper presence significantly reduces the likelihood of a war's reigniting after a cease-fire agreement. In the 1990s, about half of all cease-fires broke down, but in the past decade the figure has dropped to 12 percent due to U.N. reforms. In many African operations, U.N. missions have brought stability and made a return to war less likely while working to limit the area and scope of the conflict.

**Hultman et. al write for the American Journal of Political Science**, that interventions drastically limit civilian casualties by dividing combatants and negating the battlefield as an arena for civilian targeting. By separating factions, the threat of one side advancing militarily on the other is reduced, and windows of opportunity open for ceasefires, peace negotiations, and demobilization. **According to the most recent Human Security Report**, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989.

**Georgetown University Law Professor Rosa Brooks** writes, the council has singlehandedly prevented the spread of war and the magnitude of conflict, saving millions of lives since WWII by avoiding potentially unprecedented disasters.

## Evidence

#### [Annon] UNSC needs to adapt by bringing on India or it will lose relevance

Grant 2015, Harriet, 9-23-2015, “UN security council must be revamped or risk irrelevance, Kofi Annan warns,” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/un-security-council-must-be-revamped-or-risk-irrelevance-kofi-annan-warns> (Quoting former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan)

The UN security council must take in new permanent members or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant on the international stage, former secretary general Kofi Annan has warned.

In an interview with the Guardian, Annan said Russia, China, the US, France and the UK should take advantage of the imminent 70th anniversary of the UN to modernise the pre-eminent global security body by welcoming in powers such as India and Germany.

“One should always take advantage of the accident of the calendar and really push for major reforms,” said Annan, who was secretary general from 1997 to 2006.

“I firmly believe that the council should be reformed: it cannot continue as it is. The world has changed and the UN should change and adapt. If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.

“I think those in privileged positions will have to think hard and decide what amount of power they are prepared to release to make the participation of the newcomers meaningful. If they do that, they will get cooperation; if they don’t, we risk confrontation.”

The security council has been criticised for its failure to deal with crises such as the wars in Syria and Ukraine, and for its impotence in longer term issues, including the situation in the Middle East and the banning of landmines.

The current system, which gives only five countries – China, France, Russia, the UK and US – a permanent seat and veto in the council, has been widely criticised as an anachronism, setting in stone the global politics of 70 years ago. Among the longstanding proponents of reform are India, Germany, Japan and South Africa, all lobbying for a permanent seat on the council.

Annan compared the situation to the recent failure of the US to carry out long-planned reforms to the International Monetary Fund, which was sharply criticised by countries such as China. “We have seen an example in the financial area where there was resistance to reform in the IMF. The Chinese government is [now] putting out its own version of a fund. We risk doing the same with the council.”

Successive secretaries general have attempted to push through reforms but have met resistance from the sitting powers, as well as stumbling blocks such as disagreement over which countries would be chosen to join the current five permanent members. Any reform of the security council would require the agreement of all five, and at least two-thirds of UN member states.

#### [Swaraj] Crushes multilateralism

Swaraj 2018, Sushma, 9-29-2018, New Indian Express, “Whole concept of multilateralism will collapse if UN remains ineffective: Sushma Swaraj at UNGA,” <http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2018/sep/29/whole-concept-of-multilateralism-will-collapse-if-un-remains-ineffective-sushma-swaraj-at-unga-1878865.html> (Sushma Swaraj is the Minister of External Affairs of India)

UNITED NATIONS: India on Saturday warned that the UN risks falling into irrelevance in the absence of fundamental reforms, saying multilateralism will collapse if the world body remains ineffective.

For long, India has been calling for the reform of the UN Security Council along with Brazil, Germany and Japan.

The four countries support each others' bids for the permanent seats in the top UN body.

"I began by highlighting the unique and positive role of the UN, but I must add that step by slow step, the importance, influence, respect and value of this institution is beginning to ebb," External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said in her address to the General Debate of the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly here.

Swaraj emphasised that the UN must accept it needs fundamental reform.

"Reform cannot be cosmetic. We need to change the institution's head and heart to make both compatible to the contemporary reality," she said.

Swaraj warned against a delay in reforming the world body, saying reform must begin today as tomorrow could be too late.

"If the UN is ineffective, the whole concept of multilateralism will collapse," she said.

At a time when there is much debate about multilateralism, which as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said is under fire precisely when it is needed the most, Swaraj said India will never weaken the multilateral mechanism.

"India believes that the world is a family, and the best means of resolution is shared discourse. A family is shaped by love and is not transactional; a family is nurtured by consideration not greed; a family believes in harmony not jealousy. Greed breeds conflict; consideration leads to resolution. That is why the United Nations must be based on the principles of the family. The UN cannot be run by the 'I', it only works by the 'We'," she said.

Drawing a parallel with the fate of the League of Nations, Swaraj said the League went into meltdown because it was unwilling to accept the need for a reform.

"We must not make that mistake. If 2030 is the agreed deadline for delivery on Sustainable Development Goals, then it also marks hundred years of the lapse of the League into irrelevance. Surely there is something to learn from this coincidence?" she said.

Swaraj stressed that India does not believe that the United Nations should become the instrument of a few at the cost of the many.

"India believes that we must move forward together or we sink into the swamp of stagnation," she said.

India has repeatedly reaffirmed the need for an early reform of the UN Security Council including the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories of membership to enhance its legitimacy, effectiveness and representativeness.

Along with the fellow nations in the G4 bloc, India has maintained that the current composition of the 15-nation Council does not reflect the changed global realities and stressed that UNSC reform is essential to address today's complex challenges.

#### [CFR] Reformed UNSC is key to addressing 21st century threats

Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick , December 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 59, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests,” <https://www.cfr.org/report/un-security-council-enlargement-and-us-interests> kegs

The UN Security Council remains an important source of legitimacy for international action. Yet despite dramatic changes in the international system over the past forty-five years, the composition of the Security Council has remained unaltered since 1965, and there are many who question how long its legitimacy will last without additional members that reflect twenty-first century realities. There is little agreement, however, as to which countries should accede to the Security Council or even by what formula aspirants should be judged. Reform advocates frequently call for equal representation for various regions of the world, but local competitors like India and Pakistan or Mexico and Brazil are unlikely to reach a compromise solution. Moreover, the UN Charter prescribes that regional parity should be, at most, a secondary issue; the ability to advocate and defend international peace and security should, it says, be the primary concern.

The United States has remained largely silent as this debate has intensified over the past decade, choosing to voice general support for expansion without committing to specifics. (President Obama's recent call for India to become a permanent member of the Security Council was a notable exception.) In this Council Special Report, 2009−2010 International Affairs Fellow Kara C. McDonald and Senior Fellow Stewart M. Patrick argue that American reticence is ultimately unwise. Rather than merely observing the discussions on this issue, they believe that the United States should take the lead. To do so, they advocate a criteria-based process that will gauge aspirant countries on a variety of measures, including political stability, the capacity and willingness to act in defense of international security, the ability to negotiate and implement sometimes unpopular agreements, and the institutional wherewithal to participate in a demanding UNSC agenda. They further recommend that this process be initiated and implemented with early and regular input from Congress; detailed advice from relevant Executive agencies as to which countries should be considered and on what basis; careful, private negotiations in aspirant capitals; and the interim use of alternate multilateral forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20) to satisfy countries' immediate demands for broader participation and to produce evidence about their willingness and ability to participate constructively in the international system.

The issues facing the world in the twenty-first century—climate change, terrorism, economic development, nonproliferation, and more—will demand a great deal of the multilateral system. The United States will have little to gain from the dilution or rejection of UNSC authority. In UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests, McDonald and Patrick outline sensible reforms to protect the efficiency and utility of the existing Security Council while expanding it to incorporate new global actors. Given the growing importance of regional powers and the myriad challenges facing the international system, their report provides a strong foundation for future action.

#### [Goldin] Global threats require multilat

Ian Goldin 13, Director of the Oxford Martin School and Professor of Globalization and Development at the University of Oxford, 7/17/13, “Divided Nations: Why global governance is failing, and what we can do about it,” http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/07/17/divided-nations-why-global-governance-is-failing-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/

The financial crisis that started in 2008 was the first of the systemic crises of the 21st Century. It will not be the last. The collapse of a relatively small asset market spread with alarming speed and ferocity; the contagion swept across the world, reaching areas only tangentially connected to the financial hubs of New York and London.¶ Shortly after the global financial meltdown, the first case of Swine Flu (H1N1) was recorded in Mexico. A month later, there were confirmed cases in the US, Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, and New Zealand. By June 2009, less than three months after the first case, more than 25,000 documented cases were recorded in 74 countries and at least 15,000 deaths were confirmed. The Center for Disease Control in Atlanta estimates that as many as 300,000 people died from the strain worldwide. We were lucky. Had the disease been more like Spanish Influenza of the early 20th Century, millions or hundreds of millions would have perished.¶ These globalised challenges reflect the rising potential for cascading risk. This is the underbelly of globalisation. Climate change, cyber attacks, pandemics, antibiotic resistance and global financial meltdowns—to name a few—are no longer abstract specters, they are the defining challenges of our time. Now, more than ever, we inhabit a global village. Yet we lack competent village elders to guide us. While an alphabet soup of regional and global organisations exists, an effective system of global governance that is prepared to deal with 21st Century challenges does not. This must change.¶ Such change does not imply the end of national sovereignty or a radical challenge to local autonomy and legitimacy. For local problems that can be confined and dealt with inside borders, the intervention of global entities is unwarranted and unwelcome. But we live in an era that does involve problems that have no regard for national boundaries. Such challenges require coordination and agreements that invariably mean giving up some national sovereignty and ascribing to rules which bind different countries together. Piecemeal national efforts without coordination have been and will continue to be impotent in the face of systemic threats that transcend national borders.¶ As I argue in my book, Divided Nations, the stakes for getting it right have never been so high. But the omens are not good. If past decades provide a guide, new problems will simply be thrown at old institutions, created for other purposes. The UN, IMF, World Bank, and others are overloaded and cannot deliver on their mushrooming mandates. We need to redesign global governance, ensuring that well-defined manageable mandates are applied to existing organisations, that new institutions are established when old ones cannot cope, and that coordination across governing bodies from local to regional or global is both constant and effective. The establishment of a shared system of rules to promote inclusive and sustainable globalisation is urgently needed.¶ The past offers cause for pessimism. Far too often, the push to establish new institutions or reform global governance is born in the wake of tragedy—just as the UN and Bretton Woods institutions rose phoenix-like from the ashes of World War II. In too many instances, global tragedy is the currency paid to invest in global governance reform.¶ I am an optimist and believe that increased physical and virtual connectivity has led to the most rapid economic and social progress humanity has ever known. It provides unprecedented opportunity to collaborate and innovate. From the crumbling of ideological and economic walls could come a century which, for the first time, is characterised by a world free of poverty and disease, resting on a shared commitment to manage our global commons. Without action, however, those same avenues for cooperation and collaboration could prove to be the infrastructure for unprecedented destruction and devastation—not only for the progress of recent centuries, but also the environment that underpins life on our planet.¶ Yesterday’s structures are not equipped to deal with today’s problems, but thankfully it is not too late. Aggressive action must be taken, and such action would be effective if it incorporates five core principles which I have developed together with my Oxford colleague, Ngaire Woods. First, global action is only required on global problems. Local jurisdictions matter and should continue to address local and national problems on their own terms. Second, while not everyone must be included in global negotiations, inclusion of key actors is essential. It is an obvious point that if the biggest polluters are left out of climate change agreements, the agreement is useless—but this principle must be central to any reform efforts.¶ Third, efficiency is essential. Unwieldy bodies that include everyone are worse than nimble, exclusive bodies that involve the key players. Who are the key players? It depends on the issue. The small island nation of the Maldives, sinking from rising sea levels, should not be included in questions about regulating climate change but must be included on negotiations about mitigating its impacts. If small groups of key countries with much at stake are involved, gridlock can be broken.¶ Fourth, legitimacy is required for effective global governance. A system must be in place wherein countries may disagree with certain rules of the game, but accept the referees. Fifth, enforceability is paramount. None of these principles matter if they cannot be enforced.

#### [Foreign Policy Mag] India peacekeeping

Colum Lynch, 2011, Foreign Policy, “India threatens to pull plug on peacekeeping,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/14/india-threatens-to-pull-plug-on-peacekeeping/

As the United States and other Western powers have retreated from U.N. peacekeeping over the past decade, India and a handful of other developing and emerging powers have filled the gap, supplying the U.N. with the bulk of its more than 100,000 peacekeepers needed to run the world’s second-largest expeditionary force, after the U.S. military. India, however, has stood apart from other developing countries because of its capacity to deploy combat helicopters and other advanced military gear in Africa and the political will to use them.

India’s decision to scale back its military commitment in Congo comes as France is preparing to introduce a Security Council resolution calling on the U.N. peacekeeping mission there to play a greater role in ensuring the protection of civilians in the months leading up to the election. But the absence of combat helicopters will limit the mission’s ability to carry out such responsibilities, and may even force the U.N. to close some of its more remote outposts in eastern Congo, according to human rights activists and U.N. officials.

“I am obliged to note that [the U.N.’s] military operations are being negatively impacted by the shortage of military helicopters,” Roger Meece, the U.N. Special Representative in Congo warned the Security Council last week. “This problem will become worse absent new contributions.”

India’s international identity has long been shaped by its role in U.N. peacekeeping, with more than 100,000 Indian troops having served in U.N. missions during the past 50 years. Today, India has over 8,500 peacekeepers in the field, more than twice as many as the U.N.’s five big powers combined. In supporting India’s bid for a permanent seat on an enlarged Security Council last November, President Barack Obama cited “India’s long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping mission.”

#### [Vira – India reduction cascade, transaction] India has stated furture UNPKO contributions are less automatic

Varun Vira, *Small Wars Journal,* (Varun Vira writes on Middle Eastern and South Asian security affairs. Most recently, he coauthored Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability with Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).) <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with-grave-implications> dpet

An Indian departure from UNPKOs would be devastating. The UN for all its blemishes works on second-order security issues where the rest of the world is unwilling to help, and even small reductions in India’s support – its reduction of helicopters for example – can degrade the viability of existing missions. All-out departure would devastate UNPKO capacity, particularly as it could trigger a cascading reaction. The size and nature of Pakistan’s deployments closely mirror India’s, which given Pakistan’s India-centric calculus may be no coincidence. As one example, Pakistani troops with UNOSOM in Somalia are speculated to have persevered in part because withdrawal would have drawn unflattering comparisons with India, whose troops were performing well in the south.[11] As such, Indian reductions could reduce Pakistani contributions, robbing the UN of two of its largest three contributors. Yet, it would be wrong to see India and Pakistan as wholly linked; Pakistan draws its own unique benefits from participating and has its own long tradition of honorable service across many missions. The Indian attachment to the ideal of UNPKOs is rapidly evolving. Increasingly, **India has stated that its future UNPKO contributions will be less automatic, and more tied to a reform of the peacekeeping process that includes improvements in burden sharing and greater involvement of troop contributors in the mandate generation process**. India is pushing to expand the base of troop contributing countries and to reduce the mismatch between the meager resources the UNSC allocates and the ambitious mandates it hands down – all goals shared by the US. More controversially, India has also pushed for change in core peacekeeping principles regarding the use of force. In 2011, Indian deputy ambassador to the UN Manjeev Puri stated that “principles of consent by host government, neutrality, and use of force in self-defense acquire different connotations” when faced with today’s peacekeeping environments and armed groups, and India has since pushed for more clarity on use of force regulations. The stance, moderate as it is, aligns India closer with the US, but places it at odds with many other troop contributors, who prefer risk-averse deployments and oppose enforcement missions on principle. The US would benefit greatly from supporting India in its quest to reform peacekeeping. UNPKOs are estimated to cost roughly 12 percent of a comparable US operation, and Indian participation in UNPKOs can help relieve the US global burden, while providing critical capabilities for global humanitarian assistance and intervention. India’s attitude towards peacekeeping fundamentally mirrors that of the US, and cooperation can help cement a growing political and military partnership. Unfortunately, India itself has squandered opportunities by rehashing existing complaints in discussion forums and providing little in the way of clear planning and leadership to pressure reform. This is particularly unfortunate, as the conditions are ripe to pressure change. In 2012, for one year, both India and Pakistan – two of the top three troop contributors – will be sitting in the Security Council at the same time on a rare issue of convergent interest.

####  [Vira recognition of squo problems] India realizes that expcting a seat as a reward is unlikely

Varun Vira, *Small Wars Journal,* (Varun Vira writes on Middle Eastern and South Asian security affairs. Most recently, he coauthored Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability with Dr. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).) <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with-grave-implications> dpet

India serves UNPKOs in service of an ideal of the UN as a strengthened international body for international peace and security. Many see peacekeeping as a reward unto itself, but growing undercurrents question engagement with a UN that has provided few tangible benefits to the Indian strategic interest. Despite its growing power, India still lacks clout in first-order international security decision-making, has made little tangible progress toward a permanent Security Council seat, and despite a large engagement in African UNPKOs still lags in influence and access on the continent. Moreover, India increasingly faces acute domestic security shortages. As a result, growing sympathy now trends for the view held by retired Indian Lt. Col. A K Sharma that, “If India needs to flex its muscles, pretensions to which it is credited with, or our diplomacy wants to strut and do its stuff, it should be done in the immediate neighborhood where its writ is likely to run, where it will be of some benefit to at least a portion of its citizenry. Not halfway around the world in some remote corner of Africa.”[7] Ideals and traditions are, however, not easily abandoned, and peacekeeping is deeply engrained in India’s perception of itself on the international stage. Moreover, as India’s Security Council bid inches closer, there still remains an attachment to the sentiment best expressed by retired Indian Lt. Gen Satish Nambiar, a UNPROFOR force commander in former Yugoslavia who stated that, “India has no immediate interests in Sierra Leone. But that is not the point. We have to look beyond our immediate interests. As a great country we have certain commitments; if we aspire to be permanent members of the UN Security Council it cannot come on a platter – we must develop a stake in strengthening the Security Council set-up and such missions help do just that.”[8] The entrance of China as a peacekeeping power has also complicated Indian calculations. From once deeply opposed to international intervention on principle, China since the 2000s has rapidly expanded its UNPKO participation. By 2011, China was the largest troop contributor among the P-5 countries, expanding from 120 military and police personnel in 2003 to 2,146 by 2008. Since the UNTAET mission in East Timor in 2000, China has allowed lightly armed peacekeepers, and since 2008 has pushed for the deployment of combat contingents. On one level India welcomes Chinese participation as helping plug key resource gaps, but on another resents the disproportionate attention Chinese contributions receive. Additionally, with China and India both competing heavily for influence and resources in Africa, where UNPKOs are concentrated, it cannot help but become part of a broader competition. UNPKOs, however, now come with lowered expectations. **Expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and Indian planners now recognize the host of other obstacles affect India’s bid** – opposition from China, the Kashmir dispute, the Indian nuclear program etc. – and a growing body now favors alternative alignments outside the UN. The ‘African soft power’ argument too is not entirely convincing. Africa is important to the Indian strategic interest – the East African coastline is within India’s ‘near abroad,’ Africa accounts for about a fifth of Indian oil imports, and trade ties are rapidly expanding, but regional challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and southeast Asia – all more core to the Indian strategic interest – are growing ever more pressing. In net terms, UNPKOs are but one component of Indian defense diplomacy with Africa, which in turn is a small component of India’s total economic and political outreach. That too must be seen in comparative terms; in FY2009-2010, India’s Rs400bn of aid to Afghanistan was almost twenty times the size of its aid to the entire African continent – giving some indication of priorities.[9]

#### [Goldstein] Intervention solves war

Goldstein 11

Joshua S. Goldstein is professor emeritus of international relations at American University and author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Policy, September/October 2011, "Think Again: War", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?page=full

"Peacekeeping Doesn't Work."

It does now. The early 1990s were boom years for the blue helmets, with 15 new U.N. peacekeeping missions launched from 1991 to 1993 -- as many as in the U.N.'s entire history up to that point. The period was also host to peacekeeping's most spectacular failures. In Somalia, the U.N. arrived on a mission to alleviate starvation only to become embroiled in a civil war, and it quickly pulled out after 18 American soldiers died in a 1993 raid. In Rwanda in 1994, a weak U.N. force with no support from the Security Council completely failed to stop a genocide that killed more than half a million people. In Bosnia, the U.N. declared "safe areas" for civilians, but then stood by when Serbian forces overran one such area, Srebrenica, and executed more than 7,000 men and boys. (There were peacekeeping successes, too, such as in Namibia and Mozambique, but people tend to forget about them.)

In response, the United Nations commissioned a report in 2000, overseen by veteran diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, examining how the organization's efforts had gone wrong. By then the U.N. had scaled back peacekeeping personnel by 80 percent worldwide, but as it expanded again the U.N. adapted to lessons learned. It strengthened planning and logistics capabilities and began deploying more heavily armed forces able to wade into battle if necessary. As a result, the 15 missions and 100,000 U.N. peacekeepers deployed worldwide today are meeting with far greater success than their predecessors.

Overall, the presence of peacekeepers has been shown to significantly reduce the likelihood of a war's reigniting after a cease-fire agreement. In the 1990s, about half of all cease-fires broke down, but in the past decade the figure has dropped to 12 percent. And though the U.N.'s status as a perennial punching bag in American politics suggests otherwise, these efforts are quite popular: In a 2007 survey, 79 percent of Americans favored strengthening the U.N. That's not to say there isn't room for improvement -- there's plenty. But the U.N. has done a lot of good around the world in containing war.

"Some Conflicts Will Never End."

Never say never. In 2005, researchers at the U.S. Institute of Peace characterized 14 wars, from Northern Ireland to Kashmir, as "intractable," in that they "resist any kind of settlement or resolution." Six years later, however, a funny thing has happened: All but a few of these wars (Israel-Palestine, Somalia, and Sudan) have either ended or made substantial progress toward doing so. In Sri Lanka, military victory ended the war, though only after a brutal endgame in which both sides are widely believed to have committed war crimes. Kashmir has a fairly stable cease-fire. In Colombia, the war sputters on, financed by drug revenue, but with little fighting left. In the Balkans and Northern Ireland, shaky peace arrangements have become less shaky; it's hard to imagine either sliding back into full-scale hostilities. In most of the African cases -- Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ivory Coast (notwithstanding the violent flare-up after elections there in late 2010, now resolved) -- U.N. missions have brought stability and made a return to war less likely (or, in the case of Congo and Uganda, have at least limited the area of fighting).

Could we do even better? The late peace researcher Randall Forsberg in 1997 foresaw "a world largely without war," one in which "the vanishing risk of great-power war has opened the door to a previously unimaginable future -- a future in which war is no longer socially-sanctioned and is rare, brief, and small in scale." Clearly, we are not there yet. But over the decades -- and indeed, even since Forsberg wrote those words -- norms about wars, and especially about the protection of civilians caught up in them, have evolved rapidly, far more so than anyone would have guessed even half a century ago. Similarly rapid shifts in norms preceded the ends of slavery and colonialism, two other scourges that were once also considered permanent features of civilization. So don't be surprised if the end of war, too, becomes downright thinkable.

#### [Hultman] Best data

Hultman et al 13

Lisa Hultman is Assistant Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Jacob Kathman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo, Megan Shannon is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Florida State University, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 00, No. 0, 2013, "UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN CIVIL WAR", http://meganlshannon.weebly.com/uploads/1/6/6/9/16697614/ajps12036.pdf

Discussion and Conclusion

We provide evidence that UN peacekeepers prevent civilian killings when they are appropriately tasked and deployed in large numbers. UN military troops achieve this by dividing combatants and negating the battlefield as an arena for civilian targeting. By separating factions, the threat of one side advancing militarily on the other is reduced, and windows of opportunity open for ceasefires, peace negotiations, and demobilization (Fortna 2008). The security dilemma between the belligerents becomes less debilitating, as the buffer of peacekeepers removes each faction’s threat of subjugation by the other (Walter 2002; Walter and Snyder 1999). By quieting the guns on the battlefield, the destabilizing violence that results from fighting is muted. The UN has the ability to reduce civilian killings by increasing the number of military troops to a mission.

We also find that an increasing number of UN police is associated with fewer civilian deaths. Even if violence on the battlefield is reduced by PKO troops, the sides still have reason to shape civilian loyalties through violence behind the front. Violence can be used to forcibly recruit new combatants, extract more resources, and improve a faction’s relative power in preparation for renewed conflict. However, the costs to predatory factions for targeting civilians increase when UN police forces patrol civilian communities behind the frontlines. Police forces thus play an instrumental role in reducing the belligerents’ opportunities to commit atrocities. Increasing UN police by just a few hundred can make a substantial difference in protecting civilian lives.

Our findings indicate that military observers are not adequate for civilian protection, as they are associated with an increased level of civilian casualties. This can be interpreted as a version of the moral-hazard problem of humanitarian interventions identified by Kuperman (2005). Observers may in fact create incentives for civilian targeting, without having the ability to offer protection. However, all in all, our findings show there is reason for optimism regarding peacekeeping as a tool for civilian protection. If adequately composed of military troops and police, PKOs are effective at stifling anti-civilian violence and saving innocent lives.

Not only are properly constituted missions effective at preventing civilian deaths, but PKOs are also a costeffective form of intervention (Collier and Hoeffler 2006). For instance, the 8,000 troops needed to substantially reduce civilian killings in a given conflict month cost slightly more than $8 million, according to the flat monthly reimbursement rate for troop-contributing countries.11 To pay an additional 100,000 troops to serve would cost the UN approximately $1.2 billion. This would be a radical troop increase, more than doubling the number of UN military troops serving worldwide in 2011. But the cost of this increase is less than 1% of global military spending, which was $1.6 trillion in 2010 (Stockholm Peace Research Institute 2001).

The cost of peacekeeping is also likely to be lower relative to other military intervention options. Consider the spending on UN peacekeeping troops worldwide in 2008 compared to the spending on U.S. troops in Iraq in 2008. The UN allocated $6.7 billion to peacekeeping for fiscal year 2007–2008 and deployed 91,172 personnel worldwide. The United States was responsible for 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget in 2008, accounting for $1.74 billion, or about $19,000 per blue helmet. Comparatively, the United States deployed approximately 145,100 troops to Iraq in fiscal year 2007–2008, and the Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States spent $127.2 billion on military operations in the country for a total of approximately $877,000 per troop (Belasco 2011).12 Considering the extreme human cost and the negative externalities caused by civilian atrocities, UN military troops and police units can be regarded as fairly economical options for the UN to enhance human security. Further research should investigate the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping relative to other instruments available to the international community, including coercive measures like sanctions and other approaches like diplomacy and economic aid.

#### [HSP] Military interventions are highly effective

Western and Goldstein 11

JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age?page=show

To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before. Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day. Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.” Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was “morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, international actors did not abandon intervention or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, amid the violence, major intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection. A key turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions, the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999 by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the criticisms formulated in response to the botched campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are outdated. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force. Conversely, a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against civilians. This is because, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, interventions aimed at preventing mass atrocities often force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign, means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities. Yet the statistical record shows exactly the opposite. Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined. During the Arab Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in maintaining order and restoring justice. Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed. And because of successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a marked decline in violence resulting from civil war. According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989. Still, although international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing, demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.

#### **Brooks**

Brooks 14 — Rosa Brooks, Law Professor at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America/Arizona State University Future of War Project, Previously Served as A Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department, 11-14-2014, Date Accessed: 7-19-2018, "Embrace the Chaos" Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on…. That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?

#### [examples] Empirics prove

Slaughter 11

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie Slaughter is currently the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Financial Times, August 24, 2011, "Why Libya sceptics were proved badly wrong", http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18cb7f14-ce3c-11e0-99ec-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1W1l269ak

The first is that, against the sceptics, it clearly can be in the US and the west’s strategic interest to help social revolutions fighting for the values we espouse and proclaim. The strategic interest in helping the Libyan opposition came from supporting democracy and human rights, but also being seen to live up to those values by the 60 per cent majority of Middle Eastern populations who are under 30 and increasingly determined to hold their governments to account. This value-based argument was inextricable from the interest-based argument. So enough with the accusations of bleeding heart liberals seeking to intervene for strictly moral reasons.

We also now know how different intervention looks when we help forces who want to be helped. East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya – all cases where force evened out odds between a brutal government and a widespread and legitimate social or national movement. It is difficult to know when a state has failed in its responsibility to protect its people, particularly when secession is involved. This is why international authorisation is both required and difficult to obtain. But the contrast with Iraq and Afghanistan, where external invasion saw the US often labelled as an enemy, is enormous.

Another clear lesson: the depiction of America as “leading from behind” makes no sense. In a multi-power world with problems that are too great for any state to take on alone, effective leadership must come from the centre. Central players mobilise others and create the conditions and coalitions for action – just as President Barack Obama described America’s role in this conflict. In truth, US diplomacy has been adroit in enabling action from other powers in the region, and then knowing when to step out of the way.