# 1NC – Settler Colonialism

## Land Acknowledgement

**El Paso, Texas is on the land that belongs to the Manso, Suma, Piro, and Tigua tribes. The Tigua are still resisting settlers for their land.**

## K

### Framework/ROB

#### Fiat is illusory and stands to change nothing. All the debate actually generates is knowledge production so the 1AC must be able to justify its pedagogical position prior to evaluating its post-fiat substance. The judge should be a critical thinker, not a policymaker. Thus, the role of the ballot is to serve as a referendum on the validity of the entire aff, not just the fiated solvency—that’s a pre-req to evaluating their impacts.

#### Then, the debate is not about plan implementation vs. the alt but rather about the educational value of the plan vs. the K in spurring student change. Voting neg is an endorsement of an ethic of incommensurability and a personal alignment with the fight against native violence.

### Straight K

#### Nuclear power reactor’s ancillary process involves the violent exploitation of indigenous lands and labor while circumventing benefits to the settlers.

**Adebagbo 18 (aw-day-baw-gubado)**

Oluwaseun Adebagbo, 03-26-2018 “Environmental Injustice: Racism Behind Nuclear Energy.” Stanford University, <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2018/ph241/adebagbo1/>[Premier] (QUALS: Education Program Assistant at Stanford University School of Medicine)

**Nuclear power plant** (NPP) **reactors** **produce** low-level ionizing **radiation**, high level **nuclear waste**, **and** **are likely** **to lead to** catastrophic **contamination** events. Power generated from NPPs produce nuclear waste that should kept away from humans for thousands of years. [1] The key concern in NPP accidents is when radioactive elements escape from the core into the environment. [2] (See Fig. 1 for example of a power plant.) **Communities living near NPPs** **are** also **exposed** **to** possible **soil and water contamination**. [1] **[and] Risks** **presented** **by** NPP can **have** **multigenerational effects** on people and communities in close proximity to these power plants. There are three key forms of environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, and recognition justice. According to Rawls theory of distributive justice, it is unjust for disadvantaged populations to bear further harms from the placement of nuclear power facilities unless they derive special benefits. Communities where certain disadvantaged populations (such as low income and minority groups) reside are where the U.S. stations waste facilities. [3] **Environmental racism** **combines** public policies and industry **practices** **to** provide **benefit**s for **whites** **while** **shifting** the **costs** **to people of color**. [4] **Low**-**income and Minorities** Disproportionately **Impacted** In a study done by Kynes, there **was** a **larger** percentage of African Americans **living within the 50 mile radius of NPPs**, **while** **there was a larger percentage of whites living outside the 50 mile radius**. [1] An example of this can be found from **Warren County, the Savannah River nuclear facility**. This facility which is a **source of radioactive leaks**, is located in a **predominantly African American community in South Carolina**. [3] Minorities communities are unequally more impacted by the NPP than white communities. Minority and poverty-level communities often include higher percentages of women and children and both are more sensitive to ionizing radiation, yet most radiation standards are created to only protect adult males. [5] **Despite** the **lack** **of consent** **from Indigenous peoples**, **NPP** **use their lands for uranium** **mining**/**processing**. **Indigenous people have been harmed** **by** working in **unregulated** **uranium mines or** by **exposure** **to uncontrolled uranium wastes** **on native lands**. Uranium **mining and milling on reservation** **lands** **in** the **Black** **Hills** **and Four Corners regions**, **are** **primary examples of nuclear coloni[ali]sm and racism**. [4] In the U.S., **Native-American uranium miners**, **face 14 times** the **normal** **lung**-**cancer** **risk**, mostly **caused** **by** **their** uranium-**mining**, not smoking. [5] **US nuclear-facility** owners **are legally allowed** **to expose workers** **to** **annual radiation** **doses** up to **50** **times higher** **than** those allowed **for members** **of the public**. **Radiation** **workers** **typically do not receive hazard pay.** They often accept **dangerous nuclear jobs** because of **economic** **necessity**. [5] In the event of emergency evacuation, housing, job, and financial uncertainty can serve as barriers thus, heightening the stress associated with the inability to evacuate. Low-income and minority populations are more likely to lack financial resources and social networks to rely upon during emergencies. Further, low-income populations have the worst health and health care. People of color also have higher rates of illness and mortality, and lower usage rates of health care facilities and procedures. This becomes more problematic for people coping with associated health impacts of a nuclear accident. They are likely to suffer greater costs in the case of an accident and face more difficulties in recovery. Yet it is unclear whether these groups get any special benefits such as cheaper electricity.

#### The expansion of settler colonial sovereignty is based in an ontological securing of life as infinite futurist progression of desire against the shifting signifier of backwards deathly savages to be eliminated. The result is endless violence.

Schotten 16 – associate professor of political science @ UMass (C. Heike, “Queering Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire.” Mills College. Carnegie Hall, Oakland, California. 4 March 2016. Spatializing Sovereignty organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial Theory, and Everyday Life. Conference Presentation. http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/84081898. 8:07 - 19:56 Transcribed by Tabatha R. at rev.com)

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation and I’m arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and content of life itself. For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature, in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time — like if it is an era or an epoch — it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern childhood. Savagery is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war, life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into its very structure. Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment — possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point — we're almost done — is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation, undertaking a perpetual reference to an unknown future. Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an underlying logic of desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes' understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive warfare, the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order, as well as the obviously imperial investments of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism, however, helps explicate just how and why this anxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling impulse is definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words – and these are his words — "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies, as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, ever beyond the initial moment of settlement, it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. Settler societies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failing, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. Yet this anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself. Settler sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. The native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler. And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

#### The affirmative’s ethos disavows the ontological prior in achieving freedom. This erases agency and freedom of indigenous peoples

Byrd 11

(Jodi A., Associate Professor of English and American Indian Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism, 2011, p. xxiv-xxv DH)

As civil rights, queer rights, and other rights struggles have often cathected liberal democracy as the best possible avenue to redress the historical violences of and exclusions from the state, scholars and activists committed to social justice have been left with impossible choices: to articulate freedom at the expense of another, to seek power and recognition in the hopes that we might avoid the syllogisms of democracy created through colonialism. Lisa Lowe provides a useful caution as she reminds us that “**the affirmation of** the desire for **freedom is** so **inhabited by the forgetting of its condition of possibility** that every narrative articulation of freedom is haunted by its burial, by the violence of forgetting.” **The ethical moment before us is to comprehend** “the particular loss of the intimacies of four continents, to engage **slavery, genocide**, indenture, **and liberalism as a conjunction**, as an actively acknowledged loss within the present.”19 In attempting to people the intimacies of four continents, Lowe activates the Chinese indentured laborer in the Caribbean just after Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807 as the affective entry point into “a range of connections, the global intimacies out of which emerged not only modern humanism but a modern racialized division of labor.”20 Her turn to the colonial racialized labor force in the Americas helps to reveal the degree to which intimacy—here tracked through the spheres of spatial proximity, privacy, and volatility—among Africa, Asia, and Europe in the Americas has served as the forgotten and disavowed constitutive means through which liberal humanism defines freedom, family, equality, and humanity. In fact, **liberal humanism**, according to Lowe, **depends** **upon the** “‘**economy of affirmation and forgetting’**” **not just of** particular **streams of** human **history, but of** the loss of their **geographies, histories, and subjectivities**.21 In the indeterminacies between and among freedom, enslavement, indentureship, interior, and exterior, the recovered Asian contract laborer, functioning as historical site for Lowe, can reveal the processes through which liberalism asserts freedom and forgets enslavement as the condition of possibility for what constitutes “the human.” “Freedom was” Lowe stresses, “constituted through a narrative dialectic that rested simultaneously on a spatialization of the unfree as exteriority and a temporal subsuming of enslavement as internal difference or contradiction. The ‘overcoming’ of internal contradiction resolves in freedom within the modern Western political sphere through displacement and elision of the coeval conditions of slavery and indentureship in the Americas.”22 But **what seems** to me to be further **disavowed**, even in Lowe's important figuration of the history of labor in “the intimacies of four continents” **is** the **settler colonialism** that such labor underwrites. **Asia, Africa, and Europe** all **meet in the Americas to labor over** the dialectics of **free and unfree, but what of the Americas themselves and the prior peoples upon whom that labor took place?** Lowe includes “native peoples” in her figurations as an addendum when she writes that she hopes “to evoke the political economic logics through which men and women from Africa and Asia were forcibly transported to the Americas, who with native, mixed, and creole peoples constituted slave societies, the profits of which gave rise to bourgeois republican states in Europe and North America.”23 By positioning the conditions of slavery and indentureship in the Americas as coeval contradictions through which Western freedom affirms and resolves itself, and then by collapsing the indigenous Americas into slavery, **the fourth continent of settler colonialism** through which such intimacy is made to labor is not just forgotten or elided; it **becomes the very ground through which the other** three continents **struggle** intimately for freedom, justice, and equality. Within Lowe's formulation, the native peoples of the Americas are collapsed into slavery; their only role within the disavowed intimacies of racialization is either one equivalent to that of African slaves or their ability to die so imported labor can make use of their lands, “thus, within the “intimacies of four continents,” **indigenous peoples in the new world cannot, in this system, give rise to any historical agency or status** within the “economy of affirmation and forgetting,” **because they are the transit through which the dialectic of subject and object occurs**.

### ALT: Cartography of Refusal

#### **The alternative is a cartography of refusal**

Day 15

Iyko Day, xx-xx-2015, “Being or Nothingness: Indigeneity, Antiblackness, and Settler Colonial Critique”, Critical Ethnic Studies, [https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.2.0102.pdf?seq=1](https://sci-hub.tw/https%3A/www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.2.0102.pdf?seq=1)

And so the potential relations that Wilderson sets up through a critique of sovereignty are at best irrelevant or at worse false in Sexton’s absolute claim that slavery stands alone as the “threshold of the political world.”45 I suggest that this wavering relation/nonrelation of antiblackness and Indigeneity exhibited in Wilderson’s and Sexton’s work reveal the problem in any totalizing approach to the heterogeneous constitution of racial difference in settler colonies. Beyond this inconsistency, the liberal multiculturalist agenda that Wilderson and Sexton project into Indigenous sovereignty willfully evacuates any Indigenous refusal of a colonial politics of recognition. Among other broad strokes, Sexton states, “as a rule, Native Studies reproduces the dominant liberal political narrative of emancipation and enfranchisement.”46 This provides a basis for Wilderson’s assertion that Indigenous sovereignty engages in a liberal politics of state legitimation through recognition because “treaties are forms of articulation” that buttress “the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea.”47 But such a depoliticized liberal project is frankly incompatible with Indigenous activism and scholarship that emerges from Native studies in North America. The main argument in Glen Sean Coulthard’s book Red Skin, White Masks is to **categorically** **reject** “the **liberal recognition-based approach** **to Indigenous selfdetermination**.”48 **This is not** a **politics of legitimizing Indigenous** nations **through state recognition but** rather **one of refusal**, a refusal **to be recognized and** thus **interpellated by the settler colonial nation-state**. Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard describes the “**necessity** on the part of the oppressed **to ‘turn away’** **from** their other-oriented **master-dependency**, **and** to **instead** struggle for **freedom** **on their own terms** and in accordance **with their own values**.”49 It is also difficult to reconcile the depoliticized narrative of “resurgence and recovery” that Wilderson and Sexton attribute to Indigenous sovereignty in the face of Idle No More, the anticapitalist Indigenous sovereignty movement in Canada whose national railway and highway blockades have seriously destabilized the expropriation of natural resources for the global market. These are examples that Coulthard describes as “**direct action**” **rather than negotiation**—in other words, **antagonism**, **not conflict resolution**: The [**blockades**] **are** **a** **crucial** **act of negation** insofar **as** **they** seek to impede or **block** **the flow of resources** currently being transported to international markets from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills, mining operations, and hydroelectric facilities located **on the dispossessed** **lands** **of Indigenous nations.** **These modes of direct action** . . . **seek** to have a **negative impact** **on** the **economic** **infrastructure** that is **core to the colonial accumulation** of capital **in settler-political economies** like Canada’s.50 **These** **tactics** **are** part of what Audra Simpson calls a “**cartography of refusal**” **that** “**negate**s the **authority** **of the other’s gaze**.”51 It is impossible to frame the blockade movement, which has become the greatest threat to Canada’s resource agenda,52 as a struggle for “enfranchisement.” Idle No More is not in “conflict” with the Canadian nation-state; it is in a struggle against the very premise of settler colonial capitalism that requires the elimination of Indigenous peoples. As Coulthard states unambiguously, “For Indigenous nations to live, capitalism must die.”

## 2NC

**Fiat is not real – this round is about knowledge production not the post plan world that the aff**

### 2NC – K

#### The settler subject maintains coherency through the disappearance of the native—a continual clearing from Space and Place—the aff’s increase of nuclear power through the state enforces the American empire and causes direct violence to natives on top of circumventing all the benefits to them. Nuclear power is parasitic to natives – every part of the process drains energy from native lands and gives it to the settler, uranium mining kills and toxifies native land. They also endorse the state and use it which is independently enough to negate – violence against natives is intrinsic to the use of the state because it proliferates biopolitical domination over natives

#### In response we endorse Cartography of refusal— we directly refuse the settler’s ability to invade indigenous autonomy through resource exploitation and power. This includes decolonization because it’s an instance of refusal. Every instance of settler society needs to be sabotaged and that’s what the alt does

#### The role of the judge is to resist the pull towards comfortability—any reason you think they’re winning to vote aff is just the settler structure trying to cohere itself against destabilization—you should actively invert that calculus and feel uncomfortable voting affirmative

### 2NC – Nuclear Link