

## **Democracy Impacts — 4-10x less internal violence, no genocide, and 5x economic growth**

Lynn-Jones, 1998. ["Why the United States Should Spread Democracy." Author: Sean M. Lynn-Jones | March 1998. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-united-states-should-spread-democracy>] GST

### 2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.<sup>27</sup>

These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel.

Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal **democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence.**

**The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian**

**regimes 1.48%.**<sup>28</sup> Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to

die at the hands of their governments. **Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been**

**responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in**

**the twentieth century.**

The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.<sup>29</sup>

[...]

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are

particularly persuasive explanations. **First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more**

**likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over**

**the long run.** Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia,

and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization

and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's

population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries

rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population.<sup>37</sup> A second recent study confirms the connection between economic

freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government

intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found

that **countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic**

**Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%.**

**In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in**

**"repressed" countries -1.44%.**<sup>38</sup> Of course, some democracies do not adopt market

economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to

pursue liberal economic policies. Cuban Collapse

## Cuban Collapse

## **No, Cuban's don't like their govt — 47% approve 48% don't, and they're skewed because of fear of retribution — means disapproval is probably higher**

**Clement 2015** [Scott Clement at the Washington Post, "Do Cubans like the Castros?", *Washington Post*, <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/09/do-cubans-like-the-castros/?utm\\_term=.b53ee02c552e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/09/do-cubans-like-the-castros/?utm_term=.b53ee02c552e)>] //CJC

Polls measure President Obama's **approval rating** every single day, but **such ratings are far less common in authoritarian nations due to restrictions on research or the press. Cuba is a polling black hole, where our search found only a single poll in the past decade testing Raul**

**Castro's popularity**, and this was conducted by an anti-Castro group. Filling that void, a new survey by television networks Univision and Fusion and conducted without government authorization asked residents of Cuba to rate both Castro brothers on a scale from "very positive" to "very negative."

**Cubans gave Raul a split rating of 47 percent positive and 48 percent negative**, while Fidel fared slightly worse with a 44-50 positive negative margin. The poll finds Raul Castro's popularity ranges across a number of demographic groups. He is most popular among the oldest Cuban residents, with 55 percent of those age 65 and older rating him positively. The current president also fares relatively well among those employed by the government, Catholics and people living in the western region, which encompasses Havana. He is less popular among younger Cubans - 43 percent are positive - as well as among those who identify their religion as Santeria (34 percent) and people living in the central region of the country (37 percent). Castro also receives particularly negative ratings from private sector workers - 55 percent negative. Fidel's image ranges in similar ways across demographic groups, with higher ratings from government employees and those in the Havana region. He is particularly disliked among those whose religion is Santeria - 69 percent negative.

**When surveys ask about leaders in countries with major restrictions on free speech, there is always a concern that respondents may give answers that they think are politically safe. For instance, if they are worried about their individual answers being given to the government, they may refrain from offering negative opinions of political leaders for fear of retribution.**

## **Perception of govt weakness causes civil war**

**Ruggeri 2010** [Andrea Ruggeri, Department of Government, University of Essex, "Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war", *Journal of Peace Research*, <<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343310362293>>] //CJC

Theories of mobilization suggest that **groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity structures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling governments.**

However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for violence and **civil war** empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict.

**When Bloc collapsed only had 6-103 dissenters. Now have unprecedented coordination and pose a threat. Only a lack of dissenters kept Cuba from collapsing when Soviet Bloc tanked their economy. S-Quo levels of dissent could prompt Civ War.**

**Pumar 1999** [Enrique S. Pumar is the Director of the Global Migration and Refugee Studies Program at The Catholic University of America, "THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND CIVIL

SOCIETY: AN ASSESSMENT,” *Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*,  
<http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v09-pumar.pdf>>]

“THE RISE OF INTERNAL OPPOSITION: FIRST VS. SECOND OPPONENTS **In Communist societies, the political arena is normally disguised until opponents of the regime find an opening** to articulate their demands in the public space. **In Cuba, this opportunity evolved gradually during the late 1980s and finally materialized in the early 1990s** when the opposition was emboldened by the fiscal crisis of the state and an unfolding legitimization crisis. Data collected by Juan Carlos Espinosa supports this assertion. **In 1987, 6 dissident and opposition groups were active in the public space.** This number grew to 103 in 1992, 330 in 1996, and 380 by 1998.8”

“**But perhaps what differentiates the more recent dissident movement from the early opposition is that these opponents continue to multiply in numbers and have also strengthened their organizational and articulation capacities.** During the first decade after Ricardo Bofill and a handful of associates organized the Comité Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos (CCPDH) in 1976, many of the dissident groups worked semi-independently from each other and their plight was the respects for human rights and the release of political prisoners. Starting around 1990, the character of the opposition changes. Not only does it proliferate substantially as previous stated, but it also becomes bolder in articulating numerous social, environmental, religious, and economic issues. For many observers this period marks the explosion of pluralism because of the wide scope and depth of opposition politics. Finally, **since the mid 1990s to the present, the internal opposition has widened its scope** to include independent labor unions, journalists, religious groups, and professional associations. **More importantly, these organizations are collaborating and supporting each other to a degree never witnessed before.** Umbrella associations such as the Asociación Nacional de Economistas Independientes de Cuba, Centro de Formación Cívica y Religiosa, Concilio Cubano, and the Grupo Cubano de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna are a few examples of the proliferation of groups witnessed during the late 1990s. During this period autonomous publications such as the magazines Palabra Nueva and Vitral and path breaking manifestos such as La Patria es de Todos were also published”

“CONCLUSION This paper has attempted to assess the state of the internal opposition to measure the strength of civil society in Cuba. Political sociologists believe that the strength of civil associations is the backbone of pluralism. The more leverage the opposition brings to the negotiating table during the transition process, the more concessions it can bargain away from the regime. Events in the Southern Cone illustrate this axiom well. As Alfred Stepan, among others, suggests, the opposition’s capacity to survive under an authoritarian regime is a measure of relative strength. **In Cuba, internal dissident groups have not only endured but multiplied as well. Whether the regime admits it or not, dissident groups are formidable opponents.** I am not saying the opposition should be complaisant. Dissents still have much to do to solidify their presence and prepare for the transition”

**Probability of civil war 1-->88% when gov gets destabilized**

**Rost 2005** [Nicholas Rost, "WEAK STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR, *University of North Texas*. Accessed at: [https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4748/m2/1/high\\_res\\_d/thesis.pdf](https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4748/m2/1/high_res_d/thesis.pdf).] //DNP

How do these effects combine in hypothetical cases? More specifically, what probabilities of civil war onset can be expected in the ideal types of a strong and a weak state, with and without repression (i.e. in the four subgames)? **The ideal type of a strong state**, in this simulation, refers to a fully consolidated democracy or a fully established authoritarian (not an anocracy), but not a military regime **with a maximum level of economic development**, but no or low-level oil exports. **The ideal type of a weak state** refers to an anocracy at Polity2 = 5, governed by a military regime, with oil exports and **a minimum level of economic development**. In this hypothetical case, the opportunity costs of rebelling are low and the potential spoils are high. For both cases, population, the percentage of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization are held at their respective means, and both are politically stable, since these variables were not significant in the Model 1. To represent the four subgames in Figure 1, both weak and strong states without (PTS = 1) and with high levels of repression (PTS = 5) are simulated. Strong states with no (or almost no) state-sponsored human rights abuses, as expected, are the least likely to experience a civil war; the probability reduces to .06%, only 12% of the probability of the 'average state.' **Strong states with high levels of repression [have]** are 17.67 times more likely to face a civil war, with **a probability of civil war onset of 1.06%** (2.06 times that of the 'average country'). The effect of state weakness, however, (combined with a low n, a high s, and no repression) is much more dramatic, increasing the likelihood to 29.96% (more than 58 times that of the 'average country' and 500 times that of a strong state with no repression). Clearly, while **repression has the single most substantial effect on civil war onset**, the combination of different aspects of state weakness, large potential spoils, and low opportunity costs, outweighs the impact of the single repression variable. The game suggests that state weakness is a necessary condition for a civil war to start, while state weakness and repression combined are sufficient. Accordingly, repression still increases the probability of civil war onset, even in weak states. **Combining state weakness and repression, the expected probability of civil war onset skyrockets to 88%**, almost three times higher than without repression, 170 times higher than the 'average country,' and 1,470 times higher than in a strong state with no government repression.<sup>39</sup> From these simulated probabilities, then, one can conclude that state weakness and repression come quite close to being sufficient conditions.

Table 2. Simulated effects of statistically significant variables.

	change in independent variable	probability of civil war onset this year	ratio of probability / probability of 'average country'	probability of civil war onset over 5 years	probability of civil war onset over 10 years
'average-country'		0.51%	1.00	2.55%	5.03%
personal integrity abuses	+1 (from 1 to 2)	1.04%	2.03	5.11%	9.97%
	+4 (from 1 to 5)	8.21%	15.95	34.85%	57.56%
Democracy/Anocracy	Polity2 = +5; anocracy	1.77%	3.44	8.54%	16.35%
	Polity2 = -5; anocracy	0.15%	0.29	0.74%	1.47%
	no anocracy	0.24%	0.47	1.21%	2.42%
No military regime	military regime	1.16%	2.25	5.65%	10.99%
GDP per capita	+ 1 std. dev. (1985 US \$2,933)	0.29%	0.56	1.42%	2.82%
	to max: 1985 US \$28,901 (UAE)	0.13%	0.25	0.65%	1.30%
	to min: US \$215 (DR Congo)	1.94%	3.77	9.34%	17.81%
No oil exporter	oil exporter	1.40%	2.72	6.80%	13.14%
strong state, no repression		0.06%	0.12	0.31%	0.62%
weak state, no repression		29.96%	58.19	83.14%	97.16%
strong state, high repression		1.06%	2.06	5.18%	10.09%
weak state, high repression		88.09%	171.09	100.00%	100.00%
lowest predicted chance in sample	United Arab Emirates, 1983	0.04%	0.09	0.22%	0.45%
highest predicted chance in sample	Uganda, 1981	57.21%	111.11	98.56%	99.98%

Note: The 'average-country' is a country with all dummies and Polity2 set to '0', PTS at '1,' and all other variables at their mean. A 'strong state' has an authoritarian, stable, and non-military government (Polity2 = -10, no anocracy), a high GDP per capita of \$28,901 (in 1985 US constant \$), is not an oil exporter, and has an average population size and average levels of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization. A 'weak state' is a stable anocracy (Polity2 = 5) that is governed by a military regime, has a low GDP per capita of \$215, is an oil exporter, shows an average population size and average levels of mountainous terrain, ethnic and religious fractionalization. 'No repression' refers to a low level of '1' on the PTS, 'high repression' to a level of '5.'

## Diaz Canel will take over in 2018

**Newsmax Dec 2016** [NewsMax, "Castro Heir Apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel to Shake Up Havana?", *Newsmax*, <<http://www.newsmax.com/TheWire/castro-heir-apparent-miguel-diaz-canel/2016/12/02/id/761798/>>] //CJC

**Castro heir apparent Miguel Diaz-Canel** is patiently awaiting his hour after Fidel Castro's death and his brother **Raul Castro's vow to step down as president within 15 months. Diaz-Canel**, an advocate for modernizing Cuba's state-run media and abysmal internet access, was elevated to the position of first vice-president in 2013, putting him **next in line for the presidency**, reported Reuters. At 56, he is a relative youngster in the ruling Communist Party's leadership and will need to appeal to younger generations if Cuban communism is to thrive beyond the Castro brothers. Fidel Castro died Nov. 25 at age 90 and the 85-year-old **Raul Castro, who took over as president in 2008, says he will step down in February 2018**, at the end of his second five-year term.

## Leader transitions cause civil war

**Ruggeri 2010** [Andrea Ruggeri, Department of Government, University of Essex, "Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war", *Journal of Peace Research*, <<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343310362293>>] //CJC

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[...]

We first illustrate **the relationship of civil war to irregular transitions** through some simple descriptive statistics. For our annual observations, we find that as many as **31% of the observations with irregular leader transitions in the current or previous year coincide with a civil war. This compares with an incidence rate of only 14% among the observations without irregular regime transitions, and strongly suggests that civil wars often go together with political turmoil or irregular transitions.** However, looking at how transitions go together with instances of civil war does not necessarily show that instability generates a higher risk of conflict, as it is conceivable that conflict also may generate a higher risk of transitions. In Table I, we restrict our attention to the initial onset of conflict, as coded by the Uppsala armed conflict data. Table I indicates that civil war onset is considerably more likely in instances where we have irregular transitions. **More specifically, we see civil war onset in about 12% of all the cases with irregular transitions, compared to less than 4% of the observations where we do not see irregular transitions.**<sup>8</sup> **This supports our argument that irregular transitions signaling state weakness and political opportunities can increase the risk of civil war through encouraging aggression against a regime from challengers or protestors.**

## **Venezuela oil cutoff now — 40% export decline starting in 2016**

Ulmer July 2016 [Alexandra Ulmer at Reuters, “Venezuela’s energy woes spread to its closest ally: Cuba”, *Reuters*, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-cuba-oil-idUSKCN0ZO0DI>>] //CJC

**Venezuela’s falling crude output and financial woes have left it struggling to maintain a 15-year-old oil assistance program to its closest ally, Cuba. State-run oil firm PDVSA has slashed its exports to Communist-run Cuba this year,** according to the company’s internal trade data, seen exclusively by Reuters. The shift signals an unraveling of the oil diplomacy pioneered by Venezuela’s late socialist leader Hugo Chavez and helps explain why Cuba, which generates electricity from fuels, recently ordered some joint ventures and state-owned firms to reduce power usage. It also comes as Cuba improves its relations with the United States after decades of antagonism and a U.S. economic embargo while Venezuela, mired in triple-digit inflation and acute product shortages, is in a prolonged standoff with Washington. **Cuba, long reliant on Venezuela as its top energy supplier, has received some 53,500 barrels per day (bpd) of crude from PDVSA this year, a 40 percent decline** from the first half of 2015, according to the company’s data. When it was flush with cash from oil exports, Venezuela’s socialist government won political support in Latin America and the Caribbean by sending oil on advantageous terms to allies.

## **Venezuela oil cutoff causes 7-10% GDP decline in Cuba**

**Greenberg 2014** [Jon Greenberg at Politifact, "CNN's Ana Navarro: Cuba's economy survives largely on Venezuelan aid", *Politifact*, <<http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/dec/18/ana-navarro/navarro-cubas-economy-survives-largely-venezuelan-/>>] //CJC

We found estimates that Venezuela sends about 80,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil per day. Luis R. Luis is the former chief economist with the Organization of American States, an international body with representatives of governments that span from Canada to Argentina. Luis told PunditFact the swap means a lot to Cuba. "Venezuelan oil and transfers play a key role in allowing the country to import essential foodstuffs, medicines and industrial inputs," Luis said.

**"The value of oil plus investments and grants from Venezuela to Cuba varies greatly from year to year largely because of oil price fluctuations. In 2008 it was over 10 percent of**

**GDP.** Last year some 6 percent of GDP. This year less." Former International Monetary Fund economist Ernesto Hernandez-Cata offered a slightly higher estimate of "just over \$7 billion, or 11 percent of Cuba's GDP," in 2011. Whatever the exact percentage, and even though the aid has been falling, Venezuela pulls a lot of weight in the Cuban economy. University of Maryland economist Roger Betancourt said that impact only grows when you factor in trade between the two nations. Betancourt, who co-founded the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, said Venezuela accounts for about 40 percent of Cuba's trade in goods. We found another estimate that put Venezuelan purchases at 20 percent of Cuba's GDP. Why would Venezuela stop helping Cuba? **Venezuela has seen the price it receives for**

**sending oil overseas fall 40 percent this year because of the drop of oil prices worldwide. And oil revenues account for about 95 percent of the country's export earnings,** according to the Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries. As such, Venezuela faces an economic collapse that include defaulting on its debts. "You only need to look at the economic disaster that is Venezuela, and clearly it's a bad bet to have all your chips in one basket," Christopher Sabatini, policy director at Council of the Americas, told Bloomberg. "That 100,000 barrels per day gift of oil is going to end very soon." Not a matter of life or death While the Venezuelan connection is hefty, its importance can be overblown. Hernandez-Cata

ran the numbers and found that **if the aid stopped, Cuba's real GDP would contract "somewhere between 7 percent and 10 percent" without Venezuelan oil.** Which would be no garden party for Cuba, but as Hernandez-Cata noted, the

country emerged from a fall of 38 percent in GDP when the USSR cut off its economic support in the early 1990s. And today, Cuba has been moving to diversify. "Current efforts to obtain financing at non-market terms from other countries, like Algeria, Angola and Brazil, would, if successful, diminish the magnitude of the shock," Hernandez-Cata wrote. A longtime critic of the Castro regime, Pedro A. Freyre, a partner in the law firm of Akerman LLP, is skeptical of the doom and gloom predictions of Cuba's precarious economy. "Cuba has turned surviving misery into an art," Freyre said. "Cuba has been diminishing expectations for decades. Everything collapsed in 1992. It was a disaster and they survived." For the record, Freyre, who lost a brother-in-law in the failed U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs assault on Cuba in 1961, now favors normal diplomatic relations. Our

ruling Navarro said a lot of **Cuba's survival depends on Venezuelan oil money,** and that it's drying up.

The data we found and the experts we reached back that up, to a point. **Venezuelan aid added**

**at least 6 percent to Cuba's GDP last year. Venezuela is also a major trading partner, buying as much as 40 percent of Cuba's trade in goods. The loss of direct support from Venezuela could cause a 7 to 10 percent drop in Cuba's GDP,** experts told us. While that

hasn't happened yet, it's certainly a strong possibility.

## **Economic collapse causes a Cuban failed state and refugee crisis**

Sergio Dickerson, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, 2010 (UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)

[bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518053)) //CJC

**While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a "failing" or "failed state" we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and**

**renewed security and stability issue in the region.** In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel

and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy. From 2004 – 2007,

131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in

2006. **Although it's mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question**

**where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into**

nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

## **Reforms fail — political inertia and pillaging the private sector — 21% implementation rate and the economy is structurally fucked**

**Chicago Tribune 2016** [Chicago Tribune editorial board, “Raul Castro presents grim portrait of failed reforms to Cuban Communist Party”, *Chicago Tribune*,  
<<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-raul-castro-cuba-reforms-20160416-story.html>>]  
//CJC

Cuban President Raul Castro delivered a grim report on the state of the country on Saturday, acknowledging that the communist bureaucracy he oversees has failed to implement most of the hundreds of changes launched five years ago to stimulate the stagnant centrally controlled economy. In a two-hour address to the twice-a-decade meeting of the Cuban Communist Party, Castro praised a new era of detente with the United States and an ensuing boom in tourism. He lamented that **his government remained unable to address a series of deeper structural problems** that have left millions of Cubans struggling to feed their families. **Cuba remains saddled by an overdependence on imports, slow growth, a byzantine double currency system, insufficient agricultural production and an inability or unwillingness among state employees to enact guidelines for change approved at the last party congress. Citing a government statistic that only 21 percent of the 313 guidelines approved in 2011 have been carried out.** Castro blamed the government's inability to turn goals into facts on the ground. **"The obstacle that we've confronted, just as we expected, is the weight of an obsolete mentality that takes the form of an attitude of inertia,"** he said. There was some irony to Castro's complaints. As president of Cuba and head of the party, he maintains near-total control of the country. And the slowness he derided is an essential part of his own policy. Castro repeated Saturday that Cuba's reforms would be "with neither haste nor pause" and that the country would never feel the "shock therapy" experienced by other socialist states. But Castro is also confronting problems inherent to the system he helped create. When his brother Fidel Castro overthrew dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, he put in place a state in which virtually every aspect of economic and political life came under control of the Communist Party. After taking over from Fidel in 2008, **Raul Castro began shrinking the state and allowing a private sector to flourish.** The number of Cubans working for themselves or other citizens has grown to include nearly a quarter of the working population, or roughly 500,000 people. And **as the private sector has grown, members of Cuba's massive and powerful bureaucracy have begun to treat it as either a resource to be pillaged or a threat to livelihoods long guaranteed by the state. Newly successful businesses find themselves hit by repeated inspections and long slowdowns in obtaining licenses and permits, problems often resolved with a quiet payoff.**

**Lifting embargo key to gradualism success — AND the Neg guarantees collapse because lack of US involvement guarantees eventual reversal of reforms, causing civil war**



**Katz 2016** [Evan Katz at University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, “Why the U.S. Should Lift Its Embargo on Cuba”, *POLITICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE*, <<https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/why-the-us-should-lift-its-embargo-on-cuba/>>] //CJC

**Another reason to lift the embargo is to aid Cuba’s transition** from total state control to a mixed economy. **Cuba’s president, Raúl Castro, has committed to gradually reforming his country’s economy** between now and when he passes the torch on to his likely successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in 2018. **However, the embargo severely impedes the transition.** **Because Cuba has no experience with a market economy, Castro’s reforms are targeted in all the wrong places, rendering them totally ineffective and potentially counterproductive.** **If the United States were to establish a normal trade relationship with Cuba, it could provide technical assistance and market expertise to the Castro regime to make the transition effective.** When the U.S. provided such assistance to China and Vietnam when both nations were undergoing similar processes, their transitions were successful. Cuba is no different. **Lifting the embargo and establishing normal trade relations would also enable American foreign direct investment in Cuba’s economy, which would provide the regime with access to the dollar to be able to sell its exports competitively on the global market.** This would provide a major boost to Cuba’s dying economy. **Absent U.S. involvement in the transition, Cuba could potentially collapse into a state of total chaos, which could have major security implications on the United States.** **The policy of gradual reform is proof that the regime is still reluctant to cede total authority over its citizens, which means the transition is unsustainable absent U.S. involvement, and Cuba will revert back to a totally state controlled economy.** **Such a crackdown would cause Cuban citizens to backlash, potentially triggering a major civil war on the island.**

Cuban collapse turns literally everything — terrorism, democracy collapse, instability, econ collapse, drug trade, US intervention, and anti-Americanism — seriously this card ends the round

**Gorrell, 5** - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim Gorrell, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074> //CJC

**When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility** if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, **thousands will flee the island.** During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 **125,000 fled the island.**<sup>26</sup> Many were criminals; this time the number could be **several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.**

Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, **the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems.** **Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia.** The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than

hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.<sup>27</sup> While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

### 1.1T in losses

**Latin Times 2014** [Latin Times, "Cuban Economic Embargo: Government Estimates Over \$1 Trillion In Lost Revenue", *Latin Times*, <<http://www.latintimes.com/cuban-economic-embargo-government-estimates-over-1-trillion-lost-revenue-260279>>] //CJC

Havana, Sep 9 (EFE).- The Cuban government on Tuesday denounced the "systematic worsening" of the U.S. economic embargo, the impact of which Havana calculated at more than \$1.1 trillion - taking into account the depreciation of the dollar against the international price of gold - since being imposed on the island in 1962. The embargo is a "genocidal and vile act ... (with) an extraterritorial dimension," given that the United States is trying to impose it on third countries, Deputy Foreign Minister Abelardo Moreno said in presenting the Cuban government's annual report to the United Nations on the U.S. sanctions. Moreno emphasized that the "extraterritorial character" of laws associated with the embargo "have a direct impact" on foreign trade and the promotion of foreign investment in the country. The damage to Cuban foreign trade between April 2013 and June 2014 amounted to \$3.9 billion, the report said, adding that without the embargo, Cuba could have earned \$205.8 million selling products such as rum and cigars to U.S. consumers. Moreno accused Washington of carrying out the "implacable persecution" of investors in Cuba and the country's financial transactions via the numerous sanctions that create substantial disincentives for establishing economic links with Havana.

### Lifting the embargo causes 500m→ 17B in FDI

**Bremmer 2015** [Ian Bremmer is a writer at TIME Magazine, "These 5 Facts Explain the Economic Upsides of an Opened Cuba", *TIME*, <<http://time.com/3828156/ian-bremmer-business-cuba-economy-embargo-lift/>>] //CJC

\*\*Math: 17 billion/500 million=34, meaning investment increases 34x

5. Foreign investment. Cuba currently attracts around \$500 million in foreign direct investment (FDI)—good for just 1% of GDP. Given its tumultuous political history and underdeveloped economy, it is difficult to accurately predict how quickly investors will flock once the embargo has been lifted. But a good comparison might be the Dominican Republic, another Caribbean nation with roughly the same size population as Cuba. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that Cuba could potentially attract as

**much foreign capital as the Dominican Republic, which currently receives \$17 billion in FDI (\$2 billion from the U.S).**

## **SOEs transitioning toward private sector**

**Ashby 13** – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs; served in the U.S. Commerce Department's International Trade Administration as Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean and as acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Western Hemisphere; a counsel with the international law firm Dentons; he has PhD, JD and MBA degrees (Dr. Timothy, "Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises," Council of Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13, <http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/>)/CJC

**U.S. policy** specifically **supports "a market-oriented economic system"** [3] **toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation** of any goods **of Cuban origin, whether from the island's potentially booming private sector**—including 300,000 agricultural producers—**or State-Owned Enterprises** ("SOEs"). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when **Cuba's private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers.** [5] **A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class—both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions.** Two-way trade must include both Cuba's private sector as well as SOEs. **Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition like other parts of the economy.** In December 2012, **the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs** in construction, transportation, and other industries. **Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops "will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity."** [6] **Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurship, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island's economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism.** In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, **co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business.** Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7] Ironically, **the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major U.S. policy goal.**

## Latin Rels

**Only changing Cuba policy solves** – it's highly symbolic of the US attitude towards the entire region

Sweig and Bustamante 13 - Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University (Julia E. and Michael J., Cuba After Communism, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92, Issue 4 <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991> //WGC

**The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba.** For five years now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position on Cuba. Rather than perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, **U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era, contributing to Washington's own marginalization.** Virtually all countries in the region **have refused to attend another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table.** Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the Americas. **But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S. -- Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy.**

To make such a shift, however, Washington must move past its assumption that Havana prefers an adversarial relationship with the United States. Raúl Castro has shown that he is not his brother and has availed himself of numerous channels, public and private, to communicate to Washington that he is ready to talk. This does not mean that he or his successors are prepared to compromise on Cuba's internal politics; indeed, what Castro is willing to put on the table remains unclear. But his government's decisions to release more than 120 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 and allow a number of dissident bloggers and activists to travel abroad this year were presumably meant to help set the stage for potential talks with the United States.

Meanwhile, the death of Hugo Chávez, the former Venezuelan president, and the narrow margin in the election of his successor, Nicolás Maduro, have made it clear that Havana has reasons of its own to chart a path forward with the United States. In the last decade or so, Cuba came to depend on Venezuela for large supplies of subsidized oil, in exchange for a sizable brigade of Cuban doctors staffing the Chávez government's social programs. Political uncertainty in Caracas offers a potent reminder of the hazards of relying too heavily on any one partner. Havana is already beginning to branch out. In addition to financing the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, the Brazilians have extended a line of credit to renovate and expand five airports across the island and have recently signed a deal to hire 6,000 Cuban doctors to fill shortages in Brazil's rural health coverage. Even so, in the long run, the United States remains a vital natural market for Cuban products and services.

Of course, as the 1990s proved, even a huge financial setback may not be enough to drive Havana to Washington's door. Half a century of U.S. economic warfare has conditioned Cuban bureaucrats and party cadres to link openness at home or toward the United States with a threat to Cuba's independence. Some hard-liners might prefer muddling through with the status quo to the uncertainty that could come from a wider opening of their country.

The best way to change such attitudes, however, would be for Washington to take the initiative in establishing a new diplomatic and economic modus vivendi with Havana. In the short term, the two countries have numerous practical problems to solve together, including environmental and security challenges, as well as the fate of high-profile nationals serving time in U.S. and Cuban prisons. Most of the policy-steps Obama should take at this stage -- removing Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, eliminating obstacles for all Americans to travel there, and licensing greater trade and investment -- would not require congressional approval or any grand bargain with Havana. Although it might be politically awkward in the United States for a president to be seen as helping Castro, on the island, such measures would strengthen the case that Cuba

can stand to become a more open, democratic society without succumbing to external pressure or subversion. **Deeper commercial ties, moreover, could have repercussions beyond the economic realm, giving internal reformers more leeway and increasing support on the island for greater economic and political liberalization.**

## **The embargo isolates US from Latin America**

Robert Creamer, Political organizer and strategist, 1/18/11

(Changes in U.S. Cuba Policy Good First Step -- But It's Time to Normalize Relations, [www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamier/changes-in-us-cuba-policy\\_b\\_810161.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamier/changes-in-us-cuba-policy_b_810161.html)) //CJC

Our failure to normalize relations with Cuba undermines American interests throughout the world -- and particular in Latin America. **U.S. policy towards Cuba has been a major sore point with other countries in Latin America, who view it as a vestige of Yankee paternalism toward the entire region.** And it is used by those who want to harm America as another piece of anti-American propaganda. **Far from isolating Cuba, we have isolated ourselves. Virtually all of America's major allies have normal economic and political relationships with Cuba.** Last year, the United Nations General Assembly voted for the seventeenth time -- in seventeen years -- to condemn our economic embargo of Cuba -- this time by a vote of 185 to 3. In December the thirty-three Caribbean and Latin American nations that are members of the Rio Group voted to give Cuba full membership and called on the U.S. to end the embargo.

### **Cuba Embargo especially key - plan is a symbolic action contrary to 50 years of sanctions and perceived imperialism**

Inter-American Dialogue, center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs. The Dialogue brings together public and private leaders from across the Americas to address hemispheric problems and opportunities, 4/2012, "Remaking the Relationship: the United States and Latin America," <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf> //CJC

**Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations.** Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, **Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement.** At the same time, Cuba's authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba's eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step.

#### **Lifting the Embargo is Symbolic — Move to multilateralism**

**Burgsdorff 2009** [Sven, "US Policy towards Cuba: Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration," *EU Commission*. Accessed at: <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>.] //DNP

6.3 How would the international community react? At **international** level all major **actors** **would** clearly **welcome an end to the embargo**. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American

countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. **Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework.** As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, **it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.**

**Anti-Americanism is growing in Latin America – extending an olive branch to Cuba is necessary to re-establish our regional soft power, solves coop**

Perez JD Yale Law School 2010 David “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” Harvard Latino Law Review lexis //CJC

Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.

The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.

Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.

[\*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the

region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. **Soft power**, on the other hand, **can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion**, but is limited by other factors.

**The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region.** n4

In order **to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.** **Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation.** Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5

When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "**keystone** species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, **function as lynchpins** for, or barometers **of, the entire system's stability.** **Cuba**, despite its size and isolation, **is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades.** n6 **As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries.** n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and **the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own.** n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, **warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.**

### **Lifting embargo delegitimizes anti-US politicians and signals understanding**

Lugar, '09 [2/23/09, Richard G. Lugar is an American politician who served as a United States Senator, representing Indiana from 1977 to 2013. A member of the Republican Party, Lugar twice served as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "CHANGING CUBA POLICY--IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST", <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT47260/html/CPRT-111SPRT47260.htm>] //CJC **Cuba is important for the United States because of proximity, intertwined history, and culture. Cuba is important in Latin America because it is a romanticized symbol of a small country that stood up to the most powerful country in the world.** The Cuban Revolution legitimizes some of the passions that fuel the outrage that many Latin Americans feel regarding the inequality of their own societies, and for 50 years, rightly or wrongly, Cuba has ably portrayed itself as having fought this fight for them, as well as for the downtrodden around the world. During the visit, a Cuban official stated to staff that "**U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America goes through Cuba.**" With the end of the Cold War, however, the GOC does not

represent the security threat to the U.S. that it once did. The USG still has significant grievances with the GOC--mostly, its human rights practices and the stifling of political pluralism and property rights as well as the lack of adequate compensation for expropriated assets of U.S. firms and individuals. The remaining security issues, on the other hand, are limited to the potential for a migration crisis provoked by political or economic instability on the island. While Cuba's alliance with Venezuela has intentions of influencing regional affairs, the GOC has not been positioned to ably export its Revolution since the collapse of the Soviet Union forced an end to Cuba's financial support for Latin American guerrilla movements. The GOC's program of medical diplomacy, which exports doctors to developing countries, bolsters the island's soft power, but does not represent a significant threat to U.S. national security. **Given current economic challenges, any revenue gained from economic engagement with the United States would likely be used for internal economic priorities, not international activism.** For these reasons, the United States' relationships with Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, have taken priority in Latin America. Cuba, too, has demonstrated that relations with the United States, though advantageous, are not necessary to its survival, having forged closer relationships around the globe. Venezuela, China, and Canada are Cuba's top three trading partners, and recent economic agreements with Brazil and Russia are examples of Cuba's resourcefulness in this regard. As one GOC official told staff, "We've endured much harsher conditions during the Special Period. We can survive with or without the United States."

\17\ In hindsight, **the U.S. embargo has not served a national security agenda since Cuba** ceased to be an effective threat to the security of the United States. In the immediate post-Cold War era, the cost of maintaining this policy was negligible in comparison to the domestic political benefit derived from satisfying Cuban-American groups in the United States. The USG justified the embargo policy as an incentive or inducement for negotiations with the Cuban government, the rationale being that the U.S. would lift the embargo, or parts of it, in response to reform on human rights and democracy. This narrow approach, however, has not furthered progress in human rights or democracy in Cuba and has come at the expense of other direct and regional strategic U.S. interests. Today it is clear that a reform of our policy would serve U.S. security and economic interests in managing migration effectively and combating the illegal drug trade, among other interests. By seizing the initiative at the beginning of a new U.S. Administration and at an important moment in Cuban history, the USG would relinquish a conditional posture that has made any policy changes contingent on Havana, not Washington. **Reform of U.S.-Cuban relations would also benefit our regional relations.** Certain **Latin American leaders, whose political appeal depends on the propagation of an array of anti-Washington grievances, would lose momentum as a centerpiece of these grievances is removed.** More significantly, **Latin Americans would view U.S. engagement with Cuba as a demonstration that the United States understands their perspectives on the history of U.S. policy in the region and no longer insists that all of Latin America must share U.S. hostility to a 50-year-old regime.** The resulting improvement to the United States' image in the region would facilitate the advancement of U.S. interests. If reform in U.S.-Cuba policy were to occur in the direction of sequenced engagement, the impact on the region would be swift and to the benefit of the security and prosperity of the United States. In due order, we must correct the failures of our current policy in a way that enhances U.S. interests.

## **Cuba is key to US-Latin American Relations. Specifically spills-over to global coop on nuclear material transfers.**

Shifter '12

(Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America," April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>) //CJC



Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba's authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba's eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions. Because of this, the United States should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil, Mexico, and other countries of the region in world forums addressing shared interests. Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any Latin American nation. In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Iran's nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti. Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: As the world's lone nuclear-weapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in non-proliferation efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges. This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic. The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20. Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010. The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem.

## **Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material transfers is key.**

Ayson'10

Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, obtained via InformaWorld //CJC

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated

entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be "spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from."<sup>41</sup> Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abettors of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the "Chechen insurgents' ... long-standing interest in all things nuclear."<sup>42</sup> American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States

wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, **it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia**, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, **is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism**. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. **How would Washington view such a possibility?** Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? **In the charged atmosphere** immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, **how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind?** The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. **This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of reducing, but probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further international cooperation on the control of existing fissile material holdings**

## **No future summits unless the US reverses current Cuba policies**

**Miroff 12** – Pulitzer prize winning journalist, covers Cuba for GlobalPost (Nick Miroff, “America: Paying for it” Global Post, April 16 2012, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/120416/americas-summit-paying-for-it>) CJC  
Forget the allegations of a costly encounter between the Secret Service and Colombian hookers. It was **US diplomacy that paid the steepest price at** this weekend’s **Summit of the Americas** in Cartagena. While much of the media coverage narrowed in on allegations that a dozen of the president’s men had to be sent home for carousing with prostitutes prior to the arrival of US President Barack Obama, the real action took place once he got there. **Obama got an across-the-spectrum earful for the United States’ insistence that Cuba can’t attend the hemispheric meetings until it makes major democratic reforms. The meetings ended with a thud** Sunday, lacking a final declaration or statement of consensus, **because so many regional leaders said they won’t go to the next Americas summit** — in Panama in 2015 — **unless Cuba can be there too. That the usual “yanqui” bashers** like Bolivia’s Evo Morales **would criticize Washington’s Cuba policy was hardly a surprise. Far more significant was the degree to which key American allies, like Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and Colombian leader Juan Manuel Santos**, the summit’s host, **were willing to go to bat for Havana**. Never mind that Latin America has gone through a period of blistering economic growth in recent years, thanks in large part to Washington-backed trade policies. Or that US commerce with the region has surged 46 percent since 2009, as Obama told fellow leaders. **It was the US trade embargo against Cuba — not trade — that they wanted to talk about**. From left to right, **Latin leaders backed Cuba with a unanimity that was unimaginable** during the Cold War, or even as recently as **a few years ago, when the US could count on conservative governments in the region to support its Cuba policies**. This time, only Canada’s Stephen Harper sided with Washington in opposing Havana’s presence at the gatherings, hosted by the Organization of American States (OAS), which kicked out Cuba in 1961. Obama sought to deflect the criticism by suggesting that Cuba and the octogenarian Castros

were old news and not pertinent to the region's real problems. "Sometimes those controversies date back to before I was born," said the US president, born two years after Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution swept the island. But **with the American trade embargo against the island still very much alive after 50 years**, Latin leaders are tired of having to choose sides between Washington and Havana and hear their constituents complain of American bullying. **Isolation, embargo, indifference and looking the other way have shown their inefficiency**," Santos said Saturday in his remarks to open the summit, to hearty applause. **It is an anachronism that keeps us anchored in a Cold War era**." Santos, a moderate who nevertheless traveled to Havana last month to meet with Cuban President Raul Castro about the island's exclusion from the summit, **said future gatherings without Cuba would be "unacceptable."**

## **Latin America is watching US actions – even small shifts are the lynchpin to broader improvements in Latin American relations**

Carlos Pascual et al. 4/2009, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings institution

[http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\\_cuba.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf) //CJC  
**Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba.** By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time.

## **Relations with Cuba solve a host of impacts—environment, disease, and organized crime** Huddleston and Pascual, 2010

[Vicki and Carlos, Leaders of Advisory group for policy recommendations on Cuba, Vicki is deputy assistant secretary for Africa at the Department of Defense and Carlos is ambassador to Mexico, Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, Brookings Institutions Press 2010] /Wyo-MB

Finally, it is striking that debates on policy within the United States and at times with other governments have been more acrimonious than exchanges among professionals, including the military, when they have had the opportunity to engage directly. The United States, Cuba, and others in the hemisphere have a common interest in working together on issues that impact the hemisphere such as humanitarian emergencies, improving the environment, preventing disease, and dealing with organized crime. **The link between organized crime and drugs has become pernicious in the hemisphere, affecting every country on the supply or demand side of the chain or on transit routes; weaknesses at any point in the chain can provide a**

**safe haven for criminals. Depoliticizing cooperation on such issues is a practical necessity for all countries; practical and professional cooperation in these areas can then set the foundations for tougher discussions on politics.**

## Summits are the lynchpin of democracy

**Feinberg 10** — Professor of International Political Economy (Richard Feinberg, “Summitry in the Americas: The End of Mass Multilateralism?” Canadian Foundation for the Americas, March 2010,

[http://www.focal.ca/pdf/summit\\_Feinberg\\_summitry%20Americas%20end%20mass%20multilateralism\\_March%202010.pdf](http://www.focal.ca/pdf/summit_Feinberg_summitry%20Americas%20end%20mass%20multilateralism_March%202010.pdf)) CJC

Despite some serious shortcomings, **inter-American summitry has served** a number of **valuable purposes** and has made contributions to the welfare of the peoples of the region. Analytically, one must be careful regarding attribution: often a policy initiative or trend has multiple causes, and summitry may be part of a wider stream of contributions. With such cautions in mind, inter-American summitry has served these functions: **Adding legitimacy to democratic norms and**

**values.** 1. When modern summitry began in 1994, many countries were just emerging from the horrors of authoritarian military rule. **Summits** have **underscored that democracy is the only legitimate form of government in the region.** Importantly, the 2001 Quebec Summit gave impetus to the Inter-American Democracy Charter, signed by foreign ministers in Lima, Peru, on Sept. 11, 2001. Typically, **international relations are** understood as treating interactions among states.

However, it is in fact often **about relations among like-minded groups within different countries,** as they

seek to lend support to their brethren in their struggles against domestic foes. **The assertion by summitry of the hegemony of the democratic ideal,** therefore, **lends support to democratic forces within**

**member states.** Where democracy is under threat, the **pronouncements of summitry provide the norms for collective action in defence of democracy.** **Where democracy is gaining ground, summitry helps to lock in those gains.**

## Democracy

**Embargo increases the power of Cuba’s government, provides scapegoat — makes human rights worse**

Bilbao 2013 [Tomas Bilbao, “Restoring Executive Authority Over US Policy Toward Cuba,” *Cuba Study Group*. Accessed

at:[http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\\_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059.](http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7f2193cf-d2ef-45c8-91de-0b1f88d30059.)] //DNP

**Helms-Burton has failed to advance the cause of freedom and prosperity** for the Cuban people. This is not surprising, since **never in modern history has there been a democratic transition in a country under a unilateral sanctions framework** as broad and severe as the one codified in Helms-Burton. Its blanket sanctions *lack ethical or moral* consideration since they indiscriminately impact all levels of Cuban society, from senior Cuban officials to democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs. While it is no secret that **Cuban government policies** are primarily to blame for the Island’s economic crisis, their impact **has** only **been exacerbated and made disproportionately greater among the most vulnerable segments**

**of the population by** the blanket **sanctions** codified under Helms-Burton. In addition, **these sanctions deny Cuba access to the international financial institutions it would need to implement** the type of macroeconomic **reforms that U.S. policy has sought for more than 50 years**. Helms-Burton preconditions the lifting of its blanket sanctions on sweeping political change in Cuba. In practice, this “*waiting game*” has **strengthened the relative power of the Cuban government vis-à-vis the Cuban people while simultaneously giving the former a convenient scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders**. Cuban blogger and democracy advocate Yoani Sanchez best illustrated the impact of the “waiting game” enabled by Helms-Burton when she wrote: “The five decade prolongation of the ‘blockade’ [as the embargo is referred to in Cuba] has allowed every setback we’ve suffered to be explained as stemming from it, justified by its effects...To make matters worse, **the economic fence has helped to fuel the idea** of a place besieged, **where dissent comes to be equated with an act of treason**. The **exterior blockade has strengthened the interior blockade**.”<sup>ix</sup>Former political prisoner and independent economist Oscar Espinosa Chepe agrees, writing that Helms-Burton’s blanket **sanctions have only served** “...**to give the Cuban government an alibi** to declare Cuba a fortress under siege, **to justify repression** and to (pass) the blame for the economic disaster in Cuba.”<sup>x</sup>Conditioning our policy of **resource denial** on sweeping political reforms **strengthens the Cuban state because the scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and will continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby increasing the state’s relative power and its ability to control its citizens**. History has shown that the **negative effects of such isolation can be long lasting and counterproductive to change**. **During the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe** was not based on isolation or resource denial. Indeed, an analysis of these transitions reveals an extraordinary correlation between **the degree of openness toward former communist countries and the success of their transitions to democracies and market economies**.<sup>xii</sup>In recent years, ongoing political and economic reforms in Burma suggest that U.S. policy toward this Asian country could offer a viable model for the United States to follow in its policy approach toward Cuba. Since their enactment in 1990, Burma sanctions have allowed for unrestricted travel by U.S. citizens and travel-related financial services.<sup>xiii</sup>Burma sanctions have also allowed for the export of most U.S. goods and services and offer broad discretion to the President on which Burmese products it allows to be imported into the United States. The broad political reforms taking place in Burma today offer a sharp contrast to the narrow reforms that have taken place in Cuba during the same period and underscore the ineffectiveness of blanket unilateral sanctions.

## **1.5 million new tourists**

**Stone, 2015.** “U.S. hotel chains circle Cuba as visitors surge, restrictions ease.” Wed Sep 30, 2015 | 9:19am EDT. By Mike Stone and Mitra Taj | NEW YORK/LIMA, PERU.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-hotels-idUSKCN0RU0BZ20150930> GST

The race for Cuba's beach-front is on. Executives from major U.S. hotel chains have stepped up their interest in the Communist island in recent months, holding informal talks with Cuban

officials as Washington loosens restrictions on U.S. firms operating there. Executives from Marriott International, Hilton Worldwide and Carlson Hospitality Group, which runs the Radisson chain, are among those who have held talks with Cuban officials in recent months, they told Reuters. **"We're all very interested."** said **Ted Middleton, Hilton's senior vice president of development in Latin America.** **"When legally we're allowed to do so we all want to be at the start-line ready to go."** The United States wants to strike a deal that lets U.S. airlines schedule Cuba flights as soon as possible, a State Department official said last week, amid speculation that a U.S. ban on its tourists visiting Cuba could be eased. **U.S. hoteliers are not currently allowed to invest in Cuba,** and the Caribbean island officially remains off-limits for U.S. tourists unless they meet special criteria such as being Cuban-Americans or join special cultural or educational tours. Foreign companies have to partner with a Cuban entity to do business and U.S. hoteliers expect they will have to do likewise if and when U.S. restrictions are lifted. While they wait for the politicians to iron out their differences, U.S. hotel bosses are conducting fact-finding missions in Havana and holding getting-to-know-you meetings with government officials in Cuba and various European cities. **A recent relaxation of some of the restrictions on U.S. travelers has encouraged over 106,000 Americans to visit Cuba so far this year, more than the 91,254 who arrived in all of 2014,** according to data compiled by tourism professor José Lu s Perell  of the University of Havana. **Overall, tourist arrivals are up nearly 18 percent this year after a record 3 million visitors in 2014,** making Cuba the second-most popular holiday destination in the Caribbean behind the much-smaller Dominican Republic. **"If and when the travel ban is lifted. We estimate there will be over 1.5 million U.S. travelers on a yearly basis,"** said Laurent de Kousemaeker, chief development officer for the Caribbean & Latin American region for Marriott.

## Tourism leads to Democratic Change

**Pe alosa, 2013.** ["Tourism and Democracy: A Two Way Street." The World Bank. Enrique Pe alosa is the President of the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. July 2013. <https://handshake.pppknowledgelab.org/columns/tourism-democracy/> GST]

SEEDING DEMOCRACY. Finally, the vast number of tourists typically visit from more egalitarian societies. They see through local classist hierarchies, like India's caste system. All developing countries have local hierarchies and aristocracies that the outside visitor sees as they are: ludicrous. **When visitors share this view with their local hosts, it encourages equality.** **Ultimately,** these **travelers bring more democratic ideas and attitudes** to extremely unequal developing countries. **Tourists' views may seed democratic change, leading to a more just society**—because long after bags are packed and photos are developed, ideas remain.

## **Embargo lift will cause 9.3B in trade**

**Barnes 2015** [Michael Barnes of the Baltimore Sun, "Lifting Cuba trade embargo is good business", *Baltimore Sun*, <<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-cuba-embargo-20150823-story.html>>] //CJC

Rep. Tom Emmer, Republican of Minnesota, and Rep. Kathy Castor, Democrat of Florida, recently introduced a bill in the House that would lift the embargo, and last month the Senate Appropriations Committee passed amendments that would allow American citizens to travel to Cuba freely and ease some commercial activity. This is happening as Americans increasingly support eliminating the embargo. **A Pew Research Center poll released on July 21 showed that 72 percent of Americans, including 55 percent of conservative Republicans, favor ending the embargo.** A recent poll by Univision found that 40 percent of Cuban-Americans said they would back a candidate who favors completely normalizing relations, while 26 percent said they would not. The benefits of improved relations with Cuba, even in the short term, are manifold: **increased cooperation on hurricane tracking, environmental protection, fighting drug trafficking, combating illegal migration.** In the longer term, **allowing U.S. companies to compete for rights to energy exploration in the Cuban waters of the Florida Straits, currently monopolized by Asian and European competitors, would benefit our economy and contribute to increased energy independence.** A recent study predicts that **U.S. exports to Cuba would be \$4.3 billion, while Cuban exports to the U.S. would be \$5.8 billion per year.** The embargo has been in place in various forms since 1962. As Congressman Emmer has said, **"The embargo has benefited the Castro regime and hurt the Cuban people. We've given it plenty of time."** President Obama agrees, as does a strong majority of the American people. So what's the hang up?

## **Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x**

**CATO Institute**, January 9, **2004**, "How Free Trade Promotes Democracy" Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies]

<https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

"A new Cato study finds strong evidence that **free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights** in countries that open their borders to the global economy. Specifically, the research finds that **countries that are the most open to trade are three times more likely to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are nine times less likely to suffer under political tyranny.** Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba."



## **Lifting the Embargo is Symbolic — Move to multilateralism**

**Burgsdorff 2009** [Sven, “US Policy towards Cuba: Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration,” *EU Commission*. Accessed at: <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>.] //DNP

6.3 How would the international community react? At **international** level all major **actors** **would** clearly **welcome an end to the embargo**. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. **Ending the embargo would be perceived as** a decision carrying a momentum of **powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework**. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, **it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism**.

## **Multilateralism promotes cooperation, power sharing, avoids conflicts, creates better policies**

**Pouliot 2011** [Vincent, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” *International Studies Perspectives* 12, 18-26.] //DNP

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).<sup>2</sup> Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to “getting the right signal across.” The same goes with the practice of **multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects**, in turn, **allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events**. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of **multilateralism fosters** is the emergence of **a shared framework of interaction**—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—**that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways**. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be

taken, but at least they can **build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand**—sometimes even **before it emerges in acute form**. In today's pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls "political friendship among peoples." The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: "**While conflicts**, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, **will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within** a global background context of norms and **institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group" (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the **multilateral procedure** typically **ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies** adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d'horizon suggests that **actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making**. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly "naturally," moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants' preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, **multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails**. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the **large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions** on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.<sup>3</sup> From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. **The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields** for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, **multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction**. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

## Political Diversity

## **Heg decline inevitable — only abandoning aggressive unilateral democracy promotion and focusing on building multilateral international liberal order solves**

**Fujimoto 2012** [Kevin, "Preserving US National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct," *Strategic Studies Institute*. Accessed at:

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11.>] //DNP

**The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security.** Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its

geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, **China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power,** if not replace us as the global superpower.<sup>1</sup>

Although **China presents its rise as peaceful** and non-hegemonic, **its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict** that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, **the United**

**States should adopt a grand strategy of "investment," building legitimacy and capacity in**

**the very institutions that will protect our interests** in a liberal global construct of the future

**when we are no longer the dominant imperial power.** Similar to the Clinton era's grand

strategy of "enlargement,"<sup>2</sup> investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of

basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the **United States should concentrate on**

**the institutions** (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) **that**

**support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy** as a system of governance for other sovereign nations.

Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.<sup>3</sup> This three-part strategy involves: "(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments."<sup>4</sup> China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.<sup>5</sup> Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that "China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a "Sinic Zone" . . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia."<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare "the emergence

of China to the rise of . . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century."<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, **the rise of another peer**

**competitor on the level of the Soviet Union** of the Cold War ultimately **threatens U.S. global**

**influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy;** as well as

its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.<sup>8</sup> This **decline in influence,** while initially

limited to the Asia-Pacific region, **threatens to result in significant conflict** if it ultimately leads

to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand

strategy of investment **to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions,**

**addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism.** The United

States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one "core" nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.<sup>9</sup> For example, regional instability in South Asia<sup>10</sup>

threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, **the United**

**States,** as a global power, **must** apply all elements of its national power now to **address the**

**problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.**<sup>11</sup>

Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,<sup>12</sup> calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.<sup>13</sup> If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate.

**Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine which avoids the precepts of the previous administration: "preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,"<sup>14</sup> which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide.**

Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that "the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil."<sup>15</sup>

**American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance.**

Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists "support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . ." <sup>16</sup> and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order.

**Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional**

**powers** (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or "swing civilizations," in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.<sup>17</sup> These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.<sup>18</sup> Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.<sup>19</sup> In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.<sup>20</sup> Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe "the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order," which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders "want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,"<sup>21</sup> from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now,

**the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.**

**Elevating democracy instead of accepting diverse regimes causes policy failure and backlash against every U.S. priority**

Jones, 2011 (Bruce, Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, director of the Managing Global Order project and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at The Brookings Institution, senior external advisor for the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development, consulting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, "Managing a Changing World," Foreign Policy, March 14, 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/building\\_the\\_new\\_world\\_order?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/building_the_new_world_order?page=full)) //CJC

Finally, it is important to touch on what may be the most contentious of issues between the United States and the emerging powers, namely human rights. On basic human rights issues, the key dynamic will be between the West and China. Neither domestic reality, nor good strategy, will allow the United States to ignore the human rights issues with China. But U.S. diplomacy on the issue should be cognizant of the relatively limited impact that outside pressure will have on China's evolution and the broader context to the relationship—a balance admirably struck by

President Obama during President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to Washington. President Hu's acknowledgment that China had "issues" with human rights was a mild opening, but certainly one worth pursuing. More broadly, **using human rights standards or issues of democracy promotion as a yardstick for cooperation will backfire.** On both issues, **emerging power behavior combines a defense of sovereignty** (fundamental to their security) **with a tradition of resisting western interventionism.** Democratic India, Brazil and South Africa routinely vote with their NAM friends and against the West in the Human Rights Council. Moreover, while issues like "the responsibility to protect" are presumed to divide the "West from the rest," and do so in rhetoric, reality is more complex. India and South Africa spoke out strongly against NATO's action in Kosovo, which was supported by the Organization of Islamic Countries; France, Russia and Germany banded together to block U.S. action in Iraq. So, contentious, yes; neatly dividing the west from the rest, no. There is complexity not cleavage here. And **an effort to use human rights or democratic criteria to drive hard cleavages in the international system would likely provoke more serious banding together by the emerging powers-against, not in favor of, our strategy.** CONCLUSION America has rebounded from dips in its influence before. An oil price rise before economic downturn, a brewing crisis in Iran, a rising competitor, domestic divides and a Democratic president facing a resurgent right-welcome to 1978. Still, absent dramatic change, an economic shift to "the rest" will continue, and political influence will follow. If we foster cooperation where interests allow, and devote serious resources to global economic and energy diplomacy, we can balance the contentious dynamics of regional security and human rights. **Preparing for crises by investing in management tools can help de-escalate them when they arrive.**

### **The embargo is the symbol of failed American democratization- a full repeal is key to send an international signal of willingness to engage non-democratic states**

Hinderdael, 2011 (Klaas, M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment, "Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership", 6/11/2011, <http://www.saisjournal.org/posts/breaking-the-logjam>) //CJC

The two countries' histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere's protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro's revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies. In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, **the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement.** As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps **future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba,** however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. **By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island's political structure and human rights policies.** At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to \$4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to \$685 million a year.<sup>50</sup> While US-Cuban economic interests align, **political considerations inside America have shifted,** as "commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues."<sup>51</sup> Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country's approach to its neighboring island.<sup>52</sup> **At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations.** In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the United States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that **an**

**economic embargo**, combined with diplomatic isolation, **has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years**. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By **ending the economic embargo** and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama **would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America's traditional adversaries unclench their fists**.

**And, diplomatic commitment to Cuba without them having met democratization requirements sends a vast international signal of the US commitment to global engagement**

Colvin, 2008 (Jake, fellow with the New Ideas Fund, a group that seeks new approaches and paradigms for U.S. national security and foreign policy. He is also Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and oversees the Cuba initiative of USA\*Engage, "The Case for a New Cuba Policy", 12/23/2008, <http://web.archive.org/web/20120904201743/http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/Colvin%20-%20Cuba%20-%20Master.pdf>)  
//CJC

A signal to the world Beyond the domestic political benefit of acknowledging a changing Cuban American community, **a new approach to Cuba would send an important signal to the world**. While complex foreign policy issues from Darfur to Iraq will take years to resolve in cooperation with the international community, with respect to Cuba **it would be relatively easy to demonstrate clear, progressive change immediately through** a simple Federal Register notice and **a new diplomatic approach**. Even **small changes to policy and rhetoric would send a strong message to U.S. allies**, particularly in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, who will be looking for early signs from the next administration. The **United States' reputation in the world has slid dramatically** over the past eight years. Large majorities in key allies such as Canada (77 percent), France (75 percent), Mexico (66 percent), and the United Kingdom (67 percent) say that their opinion of the United States has gotten worse since the start of the Bush presidency. Less than one-half of respondents in Canada and the United Kingdom think that the relationship with the United States is a friendship.<sup>40</sup> A troubling number think that Bush and the U.S. presence in Iraq are greater threats to world peace than Kim Jong-Il and the Iranian nuclear program, and view Beijing more favorably than Washington.<sup>41</sup> **In order for the United States to improve its image** in the world, the next president will have to offer **new policies that demonstrate a commitment to working with allies and a pragmatic, engagement-oriented approach to foreign policy challenges. Cuba policy offers this opportunity. Embargo politics have kept the United States from pursuing easily attainable changes to policy**. With the stroke of a pen, the next president could unilaterally demonstrate that he is willing to try a different approach by allowing greater freedom of travel for U.S. citizens to Cuba. A diplomatic approach to Cuba would signal that the president is willing to pursue peaceful solutions to difficult problems, even if those initial efforts do not bear fruit immediately. Multilaterally, overtures to U.S. allies to promote rule of law, economic development, and human rights in Cuba **would be a welcome change from the unproductive criticism that has become the hallmark of recent U.S. policy. Compared with difficult challenges such as stabilizing Afghanistan or containing Iran, Cuba is an easy place to showcase change**. —The next administration needs to have an early win,<sup>42</sup> says former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Peter Romero. <sup>42</sup> Romero, who was a key player in the Clinton administration's second-term efforts to increase people-to-people exchanges, adds, —We've been on a losing streak for so long, **something that breaks the paradigm and shows bold strokes would have an enormous impact. I think you can do that with Cuba.**||

## **And, the plan's embrace of political diversity promotes U.S. interests more effectively in the multilateral international order than promoting a narrow democratic model**

Kupchan and Mount, 2009 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, "The Autonomy Rule," Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf>) //CJC

**Many American strategists recognize the inevitability of a more level global playing field**, but they have arrived at an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing the Western Order. According to G. John Ikenberry, a political scientist at Princeton University, "The United States' global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century." The West should "sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible" to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes.

**Such confidence in the universality of the Western order is, however, based on wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers**, which throughout history have sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that favor their own interests. **Presuming that rising states will readily take their seats at the**

**West's table is unrealistic and even dangerous, promising to alienate emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability** in the years ahead. Instead, the West will have to make room for the competing visions of rising powers and prepare for an international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary anchor. Sinking the roots of the West, founding a "league of democracies," and turning NATO into a global alliance of democratic states would be admirable visions in a politically homogeneous world. But **the Western model does not command widespread acceptance**. If the next international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather than competitive anarchy, **it will have to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of**

**political diversity rather than Western primacy and the single-minded pursuit of universal democracy**. To that end, the United States should take the lead in fashioning a more diverse and inclusive global order. Call it the "Autonomy Rule": **the terms of the next order should be negotiated**

**among all states, be they democratic or not**, that provide responsible governance and broadly promote the autonomy and welfare of their citizens. The West will have to give as much as it gets in shaping the world that comes next. This approach does not constitute acquiescence to illiberalism, but rather a more progressive understanding of America's liberal tradition. Just as it does at home, the United States should welcome diversity abroad, accepting that **liberal democracy must compete respectfully in the marketplace of ideas with other types of regimes**. Indeed, toleration of reasonably just alternative political systems will promote U.S. interests far more effectively than the hubris of neoconservatism or the narrow idealism of the current liberal consensus. Respect for responsible governments, toleration of political and cultural diversity, balance between global governance and devolution to regional authorities, and a more modest brand of globalization—these are the principles around which the next order is most likely to take shape.

## **Cross-regime-type cooperation causes broad global normative consensus---makes every power a stakeholder with an incentive to maintain stability (encourage stability)**

Kupchan and Mount, 2009 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, "The Autonomy Rule," Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf>) //CJC

**An order that welcomes political diversity would constitute a stark departure** from the norms and practices that have governed international politics since World War II. Western norms would no longer enjoy pride of place; **authority would not be concentrated in Washington**, nor legitimacy derived solely from a transatlantic consensus. Instead, **Western concepts of legitimacy would combine with**

**those of other countries and cultures, distributing responsibility to a wider array of states. By casting the net widely, a more inclusive order would encourage stability by broadening consensus, producing new stakeholders, and further marginalizing states that are predatory** at home or abroad.

The plan signals **U.S. acceptance of alternate forms of governance**---key to global cooperation across regime type and U.S. credibility

Kupchan, 2012 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn", Kindle edition (no page numbers) //CJC

As a starting point, **responsible governance**, rather than liberal democracy, **should be adopted as the standard for determining which states are legitimate and in good**

**standing**—and thus stakeholders in the next order.— Put simply, a state would be in good international standing if it is dedicated to improving the lives of its citizens and enables them to pursue their aspirations in a manner broadly consistent with their preferences. States that fall short of this standard would be those that aim primarily to extract resources from their citizens, wantonly expose them to widespread privation and disease, or carry out or enable the systematic persecution or physical abuse of minorities. Beyond these strict prohibitions, however, societies should have considerable latitude in how they organize their institutions of government and go about meeting the needs of their citizens. As long as they are **committed to improving the welfare and dignity of their people, states should enjoy the rights of good standing**. It is true that **equating good standing with responsible governance would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of states that do not adhere to Western conceptions of rights and liberties.**

But the **globe's inescapable political diversity necessitates this relaxation in standards**; different kinds of polities take different approaches to furthering the material and emotional needs of their peoples. In liberal states, citizens pursue their aspirations individually and privately. Other types of polities—China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, for example—put less emphasis on individual liberties in favor of a more collective approach to promoting the welfare of their citizens. Peoples with communitarian political cultures or a long history of deprivation may prefer a state-led brand of governance to a laissez-faire one that risks exposing them to political strife and poverty. Muslim societies may view a separated mosque and state as alien, and deem a fusion of the sacred and secular as not only acceptable, but obligatory. In patrimonial cultures, loyalty to tribe, clan, and family regularly take precedence over individual rights. To acknowledge that different kinds of polities can practice different forms of responsible governance is to respect diversity. In contrast, **to compel other societies to embrace a certain form of government would be to impose a type of unfreedom**. Clearing the way for **a more inclusive global order entails recognizing that there is no single form of responsible government**; the **West does not have a monopoly on the political institutions and practices that enable countries to promote the welfare** of their citizens. As long as other countries adhere to reasonable standards of responsible governance, **the West should respect their political choices as a matter of national discretion and as a reflection of the intrinsic diversity of political life**. These same standards should also apply to the conduct of foreign policy. **States in good standing must safeguard not only the welfare of their own citizens, but also those of other countries**. They must respect the sovereignty and political preferences of other states in good standing, and **they must refrain from actions that compromise the security and well-being of other states and their citizens**. Countries that commit aggression or engage in prohibited actions, such as systematically sponsoring terrorism or exporting weapons of mass destruction, should not be considered in good standing and should be denied the rights enjoyed by responsible states. Consistently **abiding by these standards for inclusion—in rhetoric as well as in policy—would increase the number of stakeholders in the international system**. It would also allow for the clear demarcation of those states that do not deserve such rights, and therefore **facilitate the delegitimation and**



**isolation of the world's most dangerous actors.** The West would enjoy the backing of democracies and nondemocracies alike in taking a principled stand against regimes that prey on their own citizens—such as Sudan, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. So too would **a broad coalition likely form to confront any state or non-state actor that consistently breaches international norms and commits acts of aggression against other states.** With membership in the community of nations inclusively defined, a consensus might well emerge on how to deal with states that are predatory at home and abroad, **providing legitimacy and widespread support for humanitarian and preventive intervention.** So too would this recasting of the **notion of legitimacy encourage the United States to moderate its over-zealous promotion of democracy.** Rushing to the ballot box in places like Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan has done more harm than good. In societies that lack experience with constitutional rule, expedited transitions to democracy often produce civil war. In immature democracies, winners usually take all, leading to the majority's exploitation and persecution of the minority. It is worth keeping in mind that the West's own transition to democracy was long and bloody. Promoting responsible and responsive governance promises to yield better results than insisting on a hurried transition to democracy. To be sure, some will legitimately question whether the moral authority of liberal democracies would be tarnished by this more pragmatic approach. But the costs of moral compromise would be more than offset by the likely gains in international security. Moreover, the West need not abandon efforts to promote democracy as it embraces a broader definition of legitimacy. On the contrary, it should continue to speak out against repression and use political and economic incentives to encourage democratization. Citizens in democratic societies have every reason to be confident that liberal democracy, from both a moral and material perspective, is superior to the alternatives. Nonetheless, the spread of democracy should be one component of a long-term vision rather than serve as a defining objective. If the West is right about the strengths of liberal democracy, it will spread of its own accord as a consequence of its appeal and effectiveness. In the meantime, **promoting responsible governance and respect for alternative approaches** to providing it **offers the most promise of advancing the international stability needed for democracy** to demonstrate its virtues. This redefinition of international legitimacy does not violate Western values, but instead draws heavily on the West's own experience. Compromise, tolerance, and pluralism were all vital to the West's rise. Along the way, regimes of differing types lived side-by-side, more often than not respecting each other's political, religious, and ideological choices. The West has long celebrated and benefited from pluralism at home, and should do the same in approaching the rest of the world. As Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson recognize, acknowledging the heterogeneity of political life "takes hold of the great diversity of human experience to turn it into a virtue not a vice, a source of new and recombinant ideas, not fear and hatred."<sup>1</sup> It is also the case that focusing more on eradicating tyranny than spreading democracy is entirely consistent with the Western experience. As John Gaddis notes, "the objective of ending tyranny ... is as deeply rooted in American history as it is possible to imagine.... Spreading democracy suggests knowing the answer to how people should live their lives. Ending tyranny suggests freeing them to find their own answers." In short, the West's own liberal tradition recognizes the diverse pathways available for promoting human dignity and well-being. As the world's dominant power, **the United States should take the lead in constructing this more pluralist approach to legitimacy.** The United States will be better off if it gets ahead of the curve and **helps craft a new order that enjoys support in most quarters of the globe than if it clings to an outmoded vision backed primarily by its traditional Western allies.** **Working with states that govern responsibly** rather than haranguing those who fail to govern democratically **would ultimately elevate America's moral authority and enhance its credibility abroad,** important assets as it works with rising powers to manage the global turn.

**Drug violence means people think gov doesn't protect them, erodes rule of law**

**Carreras 2013** [Miguel, "THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE ON REGIME LEGITIMACY IN LATIN AMERICA" *Latin American Research Review* 48. Accessed at: [https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol48no3/48-3\\_85-107\\_Carreras.pdf](https://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol48no3/48-3_85-107_Carreras.pdf).] //DNP  
In this article, I look into one potentially negative effect of the increase of violence on the health of democracy in Latin America. I analyze the impact of skyrocketing criminal violence on the legitimacy of democratic institutions in the region. It is essential to advance our understanding of the causes of political distrust in these new democracies, as it has been demonstrated that **a decrease in political support can lead to political instability.** In fact, **political distrust can be self-reinforcing and can pave the way for further dissatisfaction with political leaders and governmental institutions, which in turn can lead to public support for measures that would radically alter institutional arrangements** (Hetherington 1998). Moreover, low levels of system support can trigger unconventional and aggressive political behaviors that **pose a threat to the established political order,** especially if low regime support is accompanied by feelings of high personal influence and belief in the efficacy of past collective political aggression

(Muller 1977; Muller and Jukam 1977). On the contrary, citizens who trust political institutions are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation, including contacting public officials and being involved in political parties (Smith 2009). Finally, political trust drives compliance with the policies implemented by governmental authorities. As Tyler (2006, 375) lucidly points out, **“Because of legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation** rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward.” This compliance is essential because it eliminates the need to enforce policies through coercive and costly means, especially during times of crisis. In summary, people who trust political institutions become self-regulating (Gamson 1968; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2006).

[...]

The existing literature on system support has paid scant attention to the effects of violence on political trust. **This article has shown that criminal violence has a negative impact on system support in Latin America. Both victimization and a high perception of violence decrease the likelihood of support for political institutions.** This is an important finding, and given the **skyrocketing levels of criminal violence in Latin America,** it can have implications at the aggregate level. This article advances three explanations for this correlation. First, **Latin American citizens become disenchanted with a political system that is unable to respond efficiently to one of their main concerns (public security).** Second, individuals who are victims of violence or who perceive violence as high are dissatisfied with judicial systems that fail to punish those responsible for the increased violence. Third, exposure to criminal violence has a negative impact on interpersonal trust, which in turn negatively affects system support.

**And, cooperation with a plurality of governance models prevents great power war--- democracy promotion will cause unstable multipolarity, crush U.S. leadership, and prevent global solutions to warming and terrorism**

Kupchan, 2012 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn”, Kindle edition (no page numbers) //CJC

Although Western hegemony is in its waning days, it still provides a significant level of global stability. Teamwork between the United States and the EU continues to represent the world’s most important partnership. The EU’s aggregate wealth rivals America’s, and the U.S. economy will remain number one into the next decade. The American military will maintain its primacy well beyond the next decade, and Washington’s diplomatic clout will be second to none for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the **stability afforded by Western predominance will slip away in step with its material and ideological primacy.** Accordingly, **the West must work with emerging powers to take advantage of the current window of opportunity** to map out the rules that will govern the next world. Otherwise, **multipolarity coupled with ideological dissensus will ensure balance-of-power competition and unfettered jockeying for power, position, and prestige.** It is far preferable to arrive at a new rules-based order by design rather than head toward a new anarchy by default. The goal should be to forge a consensus among major states about the foundational principles of the next world. The West will have to be ready for compromise; the rules must be acceptable to powers that adhere to very different conceptions of what constitutes a just and acceptable order. The **political diversity that will characterize the next world suggests that aiming low and crafting a rules-based order that endures is wiser than aiming high** and coming away

empty-handed. What follows is a sketch of what the rules of the next order might look like—a set of principles on which the West and the rising rest may well be able to find common ground. Defining Legitimacy Under American leadership, **the West has propagated a conception of order that equates political legitimacy with liberal democracy.** If a new rules-based order is to emerge, **the West will have to embrace political diversity rather than insist that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government.** To be sure, nondemocracies currently have their say in global institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the G-20. But even as the West does business with autocracies in these and other settings, it also delegitimizes them in word and action. The United States leads the charge on this front. In his second inaugural address, George W. Bush stated that, "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture." Although of different political stripes, Barack Obama told the UN General Assembly in 2010 that "experience shows us that history is on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open economies, open societies, and open governments. To put it simply, **democracy**, more than any other form of government, delivers for our citizens." - Obama also made clear his commitment to democracy promotion in outlining the U.S. response to the Arab Spring: The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders.... Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest... **it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal.**<sup>2</sup> Europe generally shares this outlook. Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief, declared in 2010 that, "democracy, human rights, security, governance and sustainable development are intrinsically linked. Democratic principles have their roots in universal norms and values." - Such statements affirm Robert Kagan's observation that elites in the West "have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that other forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory." This stance is morally compelling and consistent with values deeply held among the Atlantic democracies. But the **equation of legitimacy with democracy undermines the West's influence among emerging powers.** Even countries like Brazil and India, both of which are **stable democracies, tend to view the West's obsession with democracy promotion as little more than uninvited meddling** in the affairs of others. The **backlash is of course considerably harsher in autocracies** such as China and Russia, which regularly warn the United States and the EU to stay out of the domestic affairs of other countries. In Putin's words, "We are all perfectly aware of the realities of domestic political life. I do not think it is really necessary to explain anything to anybody. We are not going to interfere in domestic politics, just as we do not think that they should prevent practical relations ... from developing. Domestic politics are domestic politics." For the West to speak out against political repression and overt violations of the rule of law is not only warranted but obligatory. But to predicate constructive relations with rising powers on their readiness to embrace a Western notion of legitimacy is another matter altogether. Senator John McCain is off course in insisting that "It is the democracies of the world that will provide the pillars upon which we can and must build an enduring peace."— On the contrary, only **if the West works cooperatively with all regimes willing to reciprocate—democracies and nondemocracies alike—will it be able to build an enduring peace. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security, water and food security, financial crisis**—these challenges are global in nature and **can be effectively addressed only in partnership with a wide array of countries.** It makes little sense for the West to denigrate and ostracize regimes whose cooperation it needs to fashion a secure new order; the stakes are too high. Western countries only harm their own interests when they label as illegitimate governments that are not liberal democracies. **Recognizing the next world's inevitable political diversity and thereby consolidating cooperation with rising powers of diverse regime type is far more sensible than insisting on the universality of Western conceptions of legitimacy—and alienating potential partners.** The West and rising rest must arrive at a new, more inclusive, notion of legitimacy if they are to agree on an ideological foundation for the next world.

**And, accepting political diversity's more likely to resolve every impact than aggressive democracy promotion---the current democratization strategy can only backfire and strengthen the resolve of the non-democratic states it attempts to isolate**

Kupchan and Mount, 2009 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, "The Autonomy Rule," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, Spring 2009, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf>) //CJC Critics from the right will see this call for toleration of political diversity as moral relativism, while critics on the left will label it as abandonment of a progressive agenda. For neoconservatives, non-democracies must be defeated; for liberals, they must be seduced. Both believe that Western values should be universal values—and that their dispersal represents the most important form of progress. Policies of impatient democratization, however, will do much more to impede than impel history's advance. From the Balkans to Iraq to the Palestinian territories, **a rush to the ballot box has undercut moderates and stoked sectarian and ideological cleavages, not furthered the cause of political stability.**

Washington should continue to promote democracy by example and incentive. But if the United States insists on universal adherence to the Western order it oversees, it will only compromise its persuasive appeal and its ability to help ensure that liberal democracy ultimately wins the long struggle against alternative systems of government. Instead, **the United States should take the lead in constructing a more pluralist international order.** Were Washington to orchestrate the arrival of this next order, it would not denigrate the accomplishments of democracy, but rather demonstrate an abiding confidence in the values the West holds dear and in the ability of liberal forms of government to outperform and ultimately prevail against authoritarian alternatives. Cultivating new stakeholders, carefully devolving international responsibility to regional actors, and placing the international economy on a more stable footing will also allow the United States the respite needed to focus on rebuilding the foundations of its own prosperity. **The United States will be better off if it gets ahead of the curve and helps craft a new order that is sustainable than if it fights a losing battle against tectonic shifts in global politics.** As Kissinger observes, "America needs to learn to discipline itself into a strategy of gradualism that seeks greatness in the accumulation of the attainable." The **United States can steward the onset of this more diverse and inclusive world** in a manner that remains consonant with the deepest American values. Doing so would help **restore America's moral authority as a leading member of the community of nations,** in the end **making it more likely that other nations would be as respectful of America's preferences as America should be of theirs.**

**China catching up to the US causes great power war — every historical example proves**

**Gilpin 2013** [Robert Gilpin is professor of international affairs at Princeton, "Theory of Hegemonic War", *Policytensor*, <<https://policytensor.com/2013/02/25/theory-of-hegemonic-war/>>] //CJC

What we can say is that China has tremendous war potential. **If China continues to grow rapidly and modernizes its military, China would be able to balance the US perhaps as early as 2025.** The world would then become bipolar. A necessary condition of this first step towards superpower status would be for China to secure its energy supply by becoming militarily preponderant in Central Asia. **If it continues to industrialize and grow for another decade or two it would emerge as a serious "peer competitor" to America.** The United States will try in vain to shore up its power position, perhaps launching a cold war when it finds itself in relative decline. Initial moves towards such a scenario have already begun with the Obama administration's initiative to "rebalance towards east Asia". I think Copeland is right: it will be America that initiates a hawkish containment policy as soon as US policymakers are certain about relative decline. **Once serious decline sets in the US, the governance of the international system will become weak and ineffective. There will most certainly be a struggle for hegemony.** Hopefully, it will be a series of localized wars and **no nuclear weapons will be used.** Once the Strait of Malacca comes under Chinese protection, everyone will know who the top dog is. **No dominant state in history has ever relinquished its power position without a**

**fight and no rising hegemon has ever established itself as the dominant state in the international order without fighting and winning a hegemonic war. There is no reason to believe that we have somehow passed into post-history** because of some ideational revolution in human consciousness. The rule of force in world affairs has not been transcended. The organizing principle of the international system is still anarchy. The international relations of states are still primarily characterized by power politics.

**Glickman, 2014.** “Why Normalized US-Cuba Relations Benefit Both Countries.” DECEMBER 17, 2014 • DAN GLICKMAN. The Aspen Institute.

<https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/why-normalized-us-cuban-relations-benefits-both-countries/> GST

**Almost all formerly communist nations have moved away from communist economic policies as a result of free market participation.** This has often also led to democratized societies and more freedom worldwide. Imposing sanctions can work in some circumstances, like in Apartheid South Africa, and recently bringing Iran to the nuclear negotiating table. But in Cuba all it has done is prevent the Cuban people from seeing and understanding the benefits of liberalized economic policies and free societies. **If the president can urge Congress to fully lift the embargo, there could be a huge boom in the tourism industry that would benefit consumers and businesses in both the US and Cuba.**

## Reforms

### **Reforms fail — political inertia and pillaging the private sector — 21% implementation rate and the economy is structurally messed up**

**Chicago Tribune 2016** [Chicago Tribune editorial board, “Raul Castro presents grim portrait of failed reforms to Cuban Communist Party”, *Chicago Tribune*, <<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-raul-castro-cuba-reforms-20160416-story.html>>] //CJC

Cuban President Raul Castro delivered a grim report on the state of the country on Saturday, acknowledging that the communist bureaucracy he oversees has failed to implement most of the hundreds of changes launched five years ago to stimulate the stagnant centrally controlled economy. In a two-hour address to the twice-a-decade meeting of the Cuban Communist Party, Castro praised a new era of detente with the United States and an ensuing boom in tourism. He lamented that **his government remained unable to address a series of deeper structural problems** that have left millions of Cubans struggling to feed their families. **Cuba remains saddled by an overdependence on imports, slow growth, a byzantine double currency system, insufficient agricultural production and an inability or unwillingness among state employees to enact guidelines for change approved at the last party congress. Citing a government statistic that only 21 percent of the 313 guidelines approved in 2011 have been carried out.** Castro blamed the government's

inability to turn goals into facts on the ground. **"The obstacle that we've confronted, just as we expected, is the weight of an obsolete mentality that takes the form of an attitude of inertia,"** he said. There was some irony to Castro's complaints. As president of Cuba and head of the party, he maintains near-total control of the country. And the slowness he derided is an essential part of his own policy. Castro repeated Saturday that Cuba's reforms would be "with neither haste nor pause" and that the country would never feel the "shock therapy" experienced by other socialist states. But Castro is also confronting problems inherent to the system he helped create. When his brother Fidel Castro overthrew dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, he put in place a state in which virtually every aspect of economic and political life came under control of the Communist Party. After taking over from Fidel in 2008, **Raul Castro began shrinking the state and allowing a private sector to flourish.** The number of Cubans working for themselves or other citizens has grown to include nearly a quarter of the working population, or roughly 500,000 people. And **as the private sector has grown, members of Cuba's massive and powerful bureaucracy have begun to treat it as either a resource to be pillaged or a threat to livelihoods long guaranteed by the state.** **Newly successful businesses find themselves hit by repeated inspections and long slowdowns in obtaining licenses and permits, problems often resolved with a quiet payoff.**

**Lifting embargo key to gradualism success — AND the Neg guarantees collapse because lack of US involvement guarantees eventual reversal of reforms, causing civil war**

**Katz 2016 [Evan Katz at University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, "Why the U.S. Should Lift Its Embargo on Cuba", *POLITICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE*, <<https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/why-the-us-should-lift-its-embargo-on-cuba/>>] //CJC**

**Another reason to lift the embargo is to aid Cuba's transition from total state control to a mixed economy. Cuba's president, Raúl Castro, has committed to gradually reforming his country's economy** between now and when he passes the torch on to his likely successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, in 2018. **However, the embargo severely impedes the transition.** **Because Cuba has no experience with a market economy, Castro's reforms are targeted in all the wrong places, rendering them totally ineffective and potentially counterproductive.** **If the United States were to establish a normal trade relationship with Cuba, it could provide technical assistance and market expertise to the Castro regime to make the transition effective.** When the U.S. provided such assistance to China and Vietnam when both nations were undergoing similar processes, their transitions were successful. Cuba is no different. **Lifting the embargo and establishing normal trade relations would also enable American foreign direct investment in Cuba's economy, which would provide the regime with access to the dollar to be able to sell its exports competitively on the global market.** This would provide a major boost to Cuba's dying economy. **Absent U.S. involvement in the transition, Cuba could potentially collapse into a state of total chaos, which could have major security implications on the United States.** **The policy of gradual reform is proof that the regime is still reluctant to cede total authority over its citizens, which means the transition is unsustainable absent U.S. involvement, and Cuba will revert back to a totally state controlled economy. Such a crackdown would cause Cuban citizens to backlash, potentially triggering a major civil war on the island.**

## **Economic stability from lift — transition to open market and private sector**

**Ashby 13** – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs; served in the U.S. Commerce Department's International Trade Administration as Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean and as acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Western Hemisphere; a counsel with the international law firm Dentons; he has PhD, JD and MBA degrees (Dr. Timothy, "Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises," Council of Hemispheric Affairs, 3/29/13, <http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby//CJC>)

**U.S. policy** specifically **supports** "a market-oriented economic system" [3] **toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island's potentially booming private sector—including 300,000 agricultural producers—or State-Owned Enterprises** ("SOEs"). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to U.S. interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when **Cuba's private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers.** [5] **A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class—both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions.** Two-way trade must include both Cuba's private sector as well as SOEs. **Cuban SOEs are in a state of gradual transition** like other parts of the economy. In December 2012, **the Cuban government authorized a wide range of co-ops that will allow workers to collectively open new businesses or take over existing SOEs** in construction, transportation, and other industries. **Considered a pilot program that is a prime candidate for an expansion, the co-ops "will not be administratively subordinated to any state entity."** [6] **Many Cuban officials, well aware of the limits to small-scale entrepreneurship, appear to harbor hope that co-ops could shift a large portion of the island's economy to free-market competition from government-managed socialism.** In other transitional states, particularly in post-socialist economies, **co-ops have served as commercial bridges between state-owned and privatized business.** Of the 300 largest co-ops in the world, more than half are in United States, Italy, or France. [7] **Ironically, the outputs of such co-ops, including agricultural products which could find strong demand in the American market, are barred by short-sighted federal regulations, thus hampering, if not defeating, what could be a major U.S. policy goal.**

## **Better IFI Link Card**

Gordon 2015 [Joy Gordon, Professor of International Law, "ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS 'NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT': THE CASE OF CUBA," *Journal of International Development*, February 8, 2015 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.3061/abstract>] //WGC

### "2 THE SANCTIONS REGIME

It is often noted that the US sanctions imposed on Cuba do not seem to be particularly effective in achieving their goal of bringing about regime change. Fidel Castro was Prime Minister of Cuba from 1959

to 1976 and was President from 1976 to 2008. Raul Castro has been President of Cuba since then. Thus, the sanctions have been in place for over half a century without achieving their stated goal. Indeed, there are ways in which the sanctions in fact support Cuba's regime. In Cuba, the government invokes the sanctions often as evidence that the USA continues to maintain a posture of aggression towards the island. This, in turn, is used to justify restrictions on expression, association, internet access, and political diversity. However, while the political effectiveness of the embargo is questionable, the economic impact is substantial.

It is difficult to measure the impact of the embargo on Cuba's economy. There is little direct empirical data available, and it is also difficult to disaggregate the effect of the embargo from other external shocks or from internal inefficiencies. (Palacios, 2013, p.18) However, there is evidence that the impact is substantial.

**The US sanctions regime on Cuba is multifaceted. It entails more types of sanctions than any other sanctions regime currently in force**, whether imposed by the USA or any other nation or international body. **These sanctions** prohibit travel by US nationals, transactions in US currency, trade with US companies, trade with foreign subsidiaries of US companies, and export of software and technology. They **block Cuba's access to international financial institutions (IFIs)**, and **they also impose restrictions on third countries concerning their manufacture of goods with Cuban raw materials.**"

"Also, **the unilateral US measures function in effect as global measures in blocking Cuban access to IFIs.** The Helms-Burton Act interferes with Cuba's access to global financial institutions, **including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank**, by requiring the US representatives on their boards to oppose Cuba's admission to the organization. (Helms-Burton Act, Sec. 104(a)(1)) Because there is weighted voting, this makes it extremely unlikely that any of these organizations would ever admit Cuba. If any of these institutions were to somehow override the will of the USA and approve a loan or other assistance to Cuba, the Helms-Burton law provides that the USA will withhold its payments owed to that institution in the same amount. (Helms-Burton Act, Sec. 104)

**This has been particularly damaging during Cuba's economic crisis because, as UN officials note, it "limits the possibilities of Cuba's access to global settlement mechanisms for a possible rescheduling and/or restructuring of its external debt."** (UN Resident Coordinator, 2001, p.37) Cuba's debt is considerable, totalling some \$32bn, as of 2008; although (as of 2007) Cuba recognized only \$9bn as 'active external debt'. (Feinberg, 2011, p.14) At various points, Cuba has suspended payments on debt service and frozen transfers of foreign exchange. (Feinberg, 2011, p. 189) This has further undermined its access to international capital markets. The UN coordinator in Cuba noted that denying Cuba access to Bretton Woods institutions "has the secondary effect of increasing the difficulties of negotiating debt settlements and credit with public and commercial creditors, including Paris Club creditors... **Cuba is one of the few countries in the world facing a deep restructuring of its economy without assistance from international financial institutions.**" (UN Resident Coordinator, 1997)"

## **Cuba Would Accept IFI Frontline Link Card**

Feinberg 11 - professor of international political economy at UC San Diego, nonresident senior fellow with the Latin America Initiative at Brookings (Richard E., "Reaching Out: Cuba's New



Economy and the International Response”, November, Brookings,  
[http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118\\_cuba\\_feinberg.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/11/18%20cuba%20feinberg/1118_cuba_feinberg.pdf) //WGC

“When asked by the author for the Cuban position regarding IMF membership, **a senior official of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded: “Cuba has no principled position against relations with the IMF or World Bank.”**<sup>83</sup> To the author’s knowledge, this is the first such official Cuban statement **suggesting an openness to engaging with the Bretton Woods agencies**. The use of the term “principled position” is especially meaningful in the Cuban context, as Cuban officials frequently cite the importance of acting in ways that are consistent with “revolutionary principles.” Unlike in U.S. parlance, where “in principle” can mean ethically sound but not practical, in the Cuban official idiom affirming that a statement is a “principled position” amounts to a straightforward endorsement.

**The senior Cuban diplomat went further and noted that Cuba can be a member of an international organization without necessarily agreeing with all of its activities**, as is the case with Cuban membership in the United Nations. (As a founding member in 1948 of the Geneva-based General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Cuba is also a member of the successor World Trade Organization, where it questions whether U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba violate WTO norms.) **The Cuban diplomat went on to remark that the World Bank, with its broad international experiences, might be better able to assess the Cuban experience** than would be individual governments that inevitably see things through their own experiences. The Cuban diplomat had been impressed by a World Bank official he had met with broad experience in Syria, Tunisia, and Iran, as well as throughout the Caribbean.”

## **MASSIVE IFI CUBA IMPACT CARD Will Separate Later**

Vidal and Brown 2015 [Pavel Vidal and Scott Brown, “Cuba’s Economic Reintegration: Begin with the International Financial Institutions,” *The Atlantic Council of the United States: Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center*, July 2015] <http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba> //WGC

“US policy toward the island is in transition.

In light of the President's executive orders in December, we are now seeing movement in Congress. Support is growing for removal of the travel ban. Trade, telecommunications, finance, and compensation for nationalized property will all be part of the agenda, as will human rights—a key point of contention given the lack of democratic freedoms for the Cuban people.

**Cuba is also in a historic period of transition. President Raúl Castro plans to step down in 2018. To jumpstart Cuba's economy, he will need to accelerate the fiscal and monetary reforms started in 2008. International financial institutions (IFIs), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), hold the key to easing Cuba through a tough transition to a more stable economic model that will better the lives of its people.** Cuba's reintegration will inevitably spur unprecedented economic change. **As this paper discusses, this transformation is precisely what occurred in previously closed economies that chose to rejoin the global economy.**

**But significant obstacles exist to Cuban admission to the IFIs. A series of US laws require US representatives to the IFIs to oppose such admission as well as any multilateral funding for Cuba.** Castro himself has been an outspoken critic of the IFIs, long-seen by the Cuban government as agents of imperialism and neoliberalism. Still, signs point to the potential of a new mindset around rejoining these institutions, with Castro greatly diminishing his vitriol against the IFIs in recent years.

**US policymakers should recognize the tremendous value of Cuban membership in the IFIs for bilateral relations with Cuba and the United States' international position.** The United States is the only major country that continues to impose economic sanctions against Cuba, a point that has consistently hindered its image and stature abroad. **Supporting Cuban participation in the IFIs, or even the less politically-toxic option of simply avoiding vocal opposition, will do much more than just strengthen partnerships with democratic allies around the globe. IFI monies and technical advice to modernize sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, banking, and tourism will be critical to renewing the island's economic vibrancy and creating new possibilities for Cubans to improve their lives.**

**“Engagement will be critical to buttressing the government's appetite for reform. After twenty- five years of post-Soviet adjustment and patchy results from limited reforms, a consensus exists that the economic system and old institutions require a fundamental overhaul. The Cuban government is cognizant of the imperative to allow the “non state,” or private sector, to grow. It is the only way to slim down the public sector without massive unemployment.**

Now that Cuba has caught the eye of foreign investors and the international community, it is a good time to reignite discussion on Cuba's reintegration into the global economy. **As with so many other countries before, the critical first step will be to regain access to the international financial institutions (IFIs),** with a particular focus on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Accession would serve the interests of Cuba and its citizens, the United States, and the international community. **In Cuba, the process of economic reform is at a pivotal moment, and more progress is needed** to lift the economy on to a new growth trajectory **before** President Raúl Castro is to step down in **2018**. Accession will require adjustments: improving data and transparency, aggressively working to unify the two currencies, and shifting official attitudes. But in the context of the new relationship with the United States, these should not be difficult."

"For the international community, Cuba's accession is long overdue. Still, in the United States, agreement to Cuban accession could face objections. However, those objections rest on discredited assumptions that sanctions can bring political change and that international support will help only the government and not the people of Cuba. **US backing of Cuban membership in the IFIs** would be consistent with the new policy of helping to **support economic reform. This is a unique opportunity to stimulate further transformations in Cuba.**"

"Since 2008, when Raúl Castro took office as President, Cuban society has been changing. The economy is undergoing market liberalizations and macroeconomic adjustments. While the process may be at an early stage, **reforms have already tripled the number of private and cooperative businesses**, state lands have been distributed to farmers, the purchase and sale of vehicles and houses is now permitted, and consumer options (including hotels and cell phones) continue to grow.

From a macroeconomic perspective, the government has advanced toward reestablishing fiscal and balance of payments equilibriums, maintained low inflation, and promoted a more rational public expenditure. **Cuba is now diligently fulfilling international financial commitments and making progress in renegotiating its international debts. Raising the level of aggregate investment is** a top priority—in fact, it is **the primary objective of the strategy for reviving GDP growth.**

A seismic shift is underway in two of the fundamental mechanisms long used to exert control over the Cuban people: restrictions on the freedom of movement and economic activity. Cubans no longer need the permission of the state to leave the island—temporarily or permanently—and the expansion of nonstate activity means that fewer families now depend on the state for their income. Citizens have greater freedom to invest and spend money.

Cuban authorities have also announced an increase in Internet availability, which means greater access to information. Although relaxing restrictions does not mean dismantling them. The Cuban state continues to exert considerable control over society and the economy through extensive state ownership and command of the main economic activities. Still, the reform process is clearly understood as part of a journey toward a mixed economy.

The process of transformation was confirmed by the VI Congress of the Communist Party in April 2011, when five-year economic policy guidelines were laid out. This five-year period will end in April 2016. The VII Communist Party Congress will then set out the next stage of the Cuban reform agenda, where ongoing changes are expected to be deepened. Two years later, **in 2018, Raúl Castro will end his presidency.** These two moments will **mark a turning point in Cuban development. Collaboration with international financial institutions could allow the global community to seize this opportunity to support Cuba's economic transformation.**"

**"Despite a host of reforms introduced since 2008, Cuban economic growth has been weak.** From 2008-2014, **average annual GDP growth reached only 2.8 percent.** While this is close to the Latin American and Caribbean average, it is only around half the originally anticipated 5.1 percent forecast by the Cuban government. Growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors fell particularly short of expectations, with average annual rates of only 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent respectively, while private household consumption registered only 2.6 percent growth—**well short of the amount needed to provide the hoped-for, and long-awaited, improvement in living standards.**

Over the past decade, growth has been led by the export of professional (principally medical) services, which have become the primary source of foreign currency income. **Cuba's dependence on** this activity—tied to its reliance on **oil imports from Venezuela** under very favorable terms—**has become a cause for deep concern** in Cuba as the economic and political crisis in Venezuela worsens.

One fundamental problem of the Cuban economic model is its inability to generate sufficient investment. The level of aggregate investment, according to official figures, has languished at around 10 percent of GDP for the past two decades: only half the regional average and less than a quarter of China's rate.

**The government has accepted that it needs more foreign investment.** In 2014, in the hope of attracting an estimated \$8 billion in new foreign investment, a foreign direct investment law was introduced, a "Special Development Zone" at the upgraded and expanded Mariel port was inaugurated, and a prospectus of proposed projects was published. Although the targets for new contracts have yet to be met, foreign business interest has grown. A major factor in this renewed attention appears to be the rapprochement with the United States"

**"The IFIs are in a position to leverage the capacity of the Cuban economy to attract investment and raise the rate of capital formation.** Development loans from IFIs would allow Cuba to carry out much-needed improvements to its depleted infrastructure and would reduce the cost of doing business. **Benefits from IFI support include:**

- **An international vote of confidence in the Cuban economy. This would influence attitudes toward Cuba in global financial markets.** Reducing country risk perceptions would support greater economic integration, including the possibility of Cuba's inclusion in international companies' global value chains. **It would also enable Cuba to gain access to lower interest rates for international financing,** easing its balance of payments constraint and therefore enabling stronger economic growth.
- **Access to technical assistance and training. Cuban entrepreneurs and policymakers would benefit from this assistance and the adoption of international best practices.** Agriculture could be modernized. Communications, Internet, and telephony improvements can begin. Enhancement of the tourism sector could also draw on international training, quality standards, and marketing expertise. Still, the banking and financial services sector needs to be strengthened and legitimized before companies can have a serious presence in Cuba."

"Two areas of **reform will be the focus of the Cuban government in the next few years:** reform of state-owned companies and currency unification. Though **access to IFIs** does not guarantee the success of these reforms, it **would certainly help.**

The state-owned companies that continue to hold a monopoly over most sectors in the Cuban economy have already been undergoing deep changes, with new regulations and procedures implemented. But progress on decentralization, reorganization, restructuring, and rationalization has been painfully slow, and technological deficiencies and low productivity continue to impede growth. **Through the IFIs, Cuba could have access to research and evaluation in the reform of state enterprises.**

**The dual currency system remains an enormous burden on the Cuban economy, distorting all decision-making, negatively affecting the management of companies and increasing financial risk.** The over-valued official exchange rate of the Cuban peso, artificially pegged to the American dollar, has warped corporate balance sheets, skewed prices, and reduced competitiveness. **Currency unification** has been predicted and postponed countless times, contributing to uncertainty on the future value of the exchange rate and inflation levels. But unification **is imminent.** The result is that—no matter the attractiveness of foreign investment laws—the dual exchange rate creates a high level of risk for foreign investors.

**IFI support could be particularly important for Cuba as it contemplates the replacement of this dual-currency system** with a single adjustable exchange rate. **There are risks of monetary instability inherent in this process,<sup>3</sup> and Havana might welcome guidance on the design and construction of a monetary and exchange system that establishes both financial stability and contributes to economic growth. The IFIs are well-equipped to support such a process.**

“Cuba is not the first country to undertake an accession process to the IFIs. Many others have done so with **Albania and Vietnam providing two useful examples.** Although their conditions differ in important ways from those faced by Cuba, **each provides relevant experience** from which lessons can be drawn when considering the Cuban process. **In both cases, acceding to the IFIs was a significant turning point, in terms of both providing a boost to economic performance and giving support to a process of structural transformation.**”

“To what extent might Albania’s experience presage what might be expected if Cuba were to pursue economic reform and membership in the international financial institutions? **The following appear to be key lessons:**

- Reengagement is likely to yield benefits for Cuba and for the rest of the world (including the United States), stemming from new opportunities for trade and investment, greater regional stability, and reduced risk of a migrant crisis.
- The gains from IFI membership will depend both on success in catalyzing other external support, and (even more) on the progress of economic reforms that improve its economic performance and investment climate.
- **An increase in international economic integration can accelerate the process of economic and political liberalization.**
- The replacement of a centrally-planned economy with one based on free markets typically needs a long period of training, education, and restructuring of public institutions. The IMF and other external sources (including the US government) can play an important role in facilitating the learning process.
- **Popular expectations may outrun the benefits of reform and reintegration, especially if citizens have limited familiarity with market mechanisms. New opportunities and improvements in the availability of consumer goods and essential inputs will emerge. But establishing a modern and stable financial sector, restructuring and rationalizing public enterprises, and becoming a strong international competitor will likely take time. Improving the availability and quality of public information can help to dispel uncertainty and encourage public participation in domestic policy debates.**

## “What Is the Best Way to Help the Cuban People?”

**Engagement should be more successful in helping the Cuban people than previous policies of isolation, particularly at a moment when the country is going through a process of far-reaching economic and institutional reforms.** **The government has acknowledged that to increase public-sector wages, it needs to boost the productivity of state companies and reduce a glut of workers in the public sector.** This requires meaningful measures of productivity and profitability that imply decentralization of decision-making, with prices and markets replacing the old system of centralized planning. **To slim down the public sector without creating an unacceptably high unemployment rate, the Cuban government has accepted the need to allow the domestic nonstate sector to grow and attract more foreign investment.**

**The appetite for reform is strong. After twenty-five years of post-Soviet adjustment and patchy results from limited reforms, there is a consensus that the economic system and old institutions require a fundamental overhaul.** A profound sense of frustration, with real wages remaining below 1990 level and the pillars of the socialist model (strong health, education, and social services) deteriorating, has created a moment of opportunity for new ideas.

**The overhaul of the public sector and opening to nonstate enterprise has won the enthusiastic backing of most Cubans, but not all. Engagement can help to consolidate support for reform.** Resistance to reform comes not only from those who fear a loss of power, status, and privilege, but also from economically vulnerable groups whose livelihoods might be threatened. **The degree of resistance will be inversely related to the extent to which the reform process can deliver improvements**—in wages, public services, infrastructure, a social safety net for the vulnerable, and economic prospects for the ambitious. **The legitimacy of the reform process will be reinforced by improvements in the Cuban economy. As part of this engagement, Cuban membership in the IFIs, by supporting economic growth, would help to underpin economic reform.**

**The IFIs' experience of reform has involved not only liberalization but also the construction of the necessary institutional architecture**—including financing instruments and mechanisms, procedures for project management, monitoring and evaluation, regulatory systems, contract laws, taxation regimes, payment mechanisms, insurance, accountability and labor, and consumer and environmental protection. **Solid institutions replace centralized control with a system based on free markets, competition, and transparency. The benefits go not only to large foreign investors but also to small businesses, farmers, employees, and consumers. The wider the benefits of reform are spread, the more popular they will be; once in place, reversal will be increasingly difficult.**

**“Cuba is at a moment of profound economic transformation** and the openings in US policy—with more movement expected from Congress—have recast both the bilateral relationship as well as Cuba’s broader international engagement. **Economic reform and full reintegration into the global economic community will provide further momentum for a nascent Cuban private sector while improving the lives of everyday Cubans.**

Isolation is increasingly a policy of the past; Cuba, the United States, and the international financial institutions must catch up to this reality. To do so, each must



rethink outdated policies. **The end goal is to understand that joining the IFIs is a critical step in the long-term process of full economic reintegration."**

## **The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition — leverage, influence, redirect reform, scapegoat**

**Koenig, 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, "Time for a New Cuba Policy"  
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>) //CJC

The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally:

**.Lift completely the economic embargo.** Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to achieve normal trade relations between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.<sup>36</sup> **The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban**

**government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights**

in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the "Cinco Heroes" and their plight is well known.<sup>37</sup>

So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. "The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms." <sup>38</sup> The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base.

Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. "Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba's commitment to the organization's values."<sup>39</sup> These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights.

The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The

combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. **The United States would**

**gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro influence wanes.**

Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, **but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.**

There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes **without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government.** From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study

Group, "We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United

States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook." <sup>40</sup> The United States needs **to take the initiative**

**away** from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of

the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome.

**One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy.** "... the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external."<sup>41</sup> This situation may present the **United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don't have a scapegoat.** Conclusion The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world

are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. **The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy.** The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.<sup>42</sup> **The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser** in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can't stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

### **The plan creates leverage to foster political reform**

Hinderdael 2011- M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, B.A in History and Economics from University of Virginia (Klaas, "Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership", 6/11/11, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>.) //CJC

**Ending the embargo** would also help Cubans, lowering the cost of consumer goods and raising the standards of living, while simultaneously challenging Raúl's assertions of American imperialism. In realizing that **the embargo is too insignificant to have a fatal impact on the Cuban government, and that the usage of sanctions and practice of isolation are no way to be seen as a credible advocate of democratic reform, American policymakers should realize that the economic embargo only diminishes the United States' ability to influence change in Cuba. Furthermore, over time, increased economic ties can provide the leverage needed to push for political reforms.**

As a result, with regard to economic and political return, there is little reason to keep the economic embargo in place. Its repeal should be easy to sell to the American people given popular domestic support, recent Cuban internal reforms, and the precedent set with Vietnam and China. **It would also provide the United States with a more united front when confronting**

key Cuban issues by not drawing the ire of the UN for its policies toward the island. Most importantly, repealing the embargo could guide the two countries toward improved relations by employing economic policies that are mutually beneficial.

## **Removing the perception of US confrontation causes Cuban elites to accept greater reform**

**Lopez-Levy 11** – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of “Raul Castro and the New Cuba” (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, [http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\\_all\\_cuba\\_reform\\_final.pdf](http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf))/EK

**If the goal is to promote marketization and political liberalization in Cuba, economic sanctions and the travel prohibitions fail to further that goal. If companies follow adequate programs of corporate social responsibility, American investment in Cuba can provide leverage and support to the reform process.**

Good jobs in industries that treat Cuban workers with respect can do more for them than any abstract political rhetoric about “liberation”. American, Canadian, Latin American, and European businesses and travelers to Cuba would do more to further reform on the island through their operations, internet connections, attitudes and interactions with Cubans, than speeches from Radio Marti or selective engagements with the government’s opponents.

It is also important to recognize changes to the United States’ Cuban population, brought about by the migration agreements of 1994 and 1995. More than 20, 000 Cubans arrive every year to the United States legally, mainly as a result of a U.S. visa lottery. At this rate, there could be close to 400,000 Cubans in the United States by the end of 2012, all of whom will have arrived without the label of political refugees. As compared to previous waves of migrants, these individuals have a different relationship with Cuba and, in most cases, a different vision about how to bring greater freedom to the island. Many Cubans recently resettled in the United States would gladly invest in Cuba, hoping to profit from their knowledge of the Cuban and American markets and trusting that the progress of a market economy would undermine the basis of the one party system.

A realistic assessment of the current post-revolutionary elite is also useful. The top echelon of Cuba’s communist leadership is

a cohesive group composed by mature, seasoned, interests-driven power seekers. They are not the sadist anti-American ogres depicted by many pro-embargo propagandists. Neither are they U.S.-loving democrats who have merely been mistreated. The primary objective of this group is to remain in power; they are not

going to make concessions unless they have to or find it to be convenient. True, they might be paranoid and helping to reproduce some structures of hostility but many in Cuba perceive their suspicion as legitimate. Their feelings are shared by many given the past confrontations between Cuban nationalism and United States’ intrusive, paternalistic and imperial attitude, and the lack of normal communication between the two countries in the last fifty years.

**The logic behind dismantling structures of confrontation is powerful because it creates a wedge between the leadership and the population, particularly its own bases. The most powerful argument the Cuban leadership has used to impose restrictions on the civil liberties of the population is that the country is under a national emergency due to long-standing hostility of the United States. If there is a thaw in U.S.-Cuba relations, it would create pressure for a re-assessment of the nature of the perceived threat,**

and foment discussion about the many political projects that exist within Cuba’s nationalist camp and its population in general.

The worst case scenario for both Cuban authorities and also for U.S. policy toward Cuba is not the continuation of the current situation, but a failure of the reforms now underway.

## **Embargo lift will cause 9.3B in trade**

**Barnes 2015** [Michael Barnes of the Baltimore Sun, “Lifting Cuba trade embargo is good business”, *Baltimore Sun*, <<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-cuba-embargo-20150823-story.html>>] //CJC

Rep. Tom Emmer, Republican of Minnesota, and Rep. Kathy Castor, Democrat of Florida, recently introduced a bill in the House that would lift the embargo, and last month the Senate Appropriations Committee passed amendments that would allow American citizens to travel to Cuba freely and ease some commercial activity. This is happening as Americans increasingly support eliminating the embargo. A Pew Research Center poll released on July 21 showed that 72 percent of Americans, including 55 percent of conservative Republicans, favor ending the embargo. A recent poll by Univision found that 40 percent of Cuban-Americans said they would back a candidate who favors completely normalizing relations, while 26 percent said they would not. The benefits of improved relations with Cuba, even in the short term, are manifold: increased cooperation on hurricane tracking, environmental protection, fighting drug trafficking, combating illegal migration. In the longer term, allowing U.S. companies to compete for rights to energy exploration in the Cuban waters of the Florida Straits, currently monopolized by Asian and European competitors, would benefit our economy and contribute to increased energy independence. A recent study predicts that **U.S. exports to Cuba would be \$4.3 billion, while Cuban exports to the U.S. would be \$5.8 billion per year.** The embargo has been in place in various forms since 1962. As Congressman Emmer has said, **"The embargo has benefited the Castro regime and hurt the Cuban people. We've given it plenty of time."** President Obama agrees, as does a strong majority of the American people. So what's the hang up?

## **Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x**

**CATO Institute**, January 9, **2004**, "How Free Trade Promotes Democracy" Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies]

<https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

"A new Cato study finds strong evidence that **free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights** in countries that open their borders to the global economy. Specifically, the research finds that **countries that are the most open to trade are three times more likely to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are nine times less likely to suffer under political tyranny.** Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba."

## **U.S. should ease sanctions- expedites Cuban economic reform**

**Bandow 2012**—J.D from Stanford University, special assistant to President Reagan (Doug, "Time to End the Cuba Embargo", Cato Institute, 12/11/12, [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+\(Cato+Recent+Op-eds\)](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)) //KW

Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as \$1.2 billion annually.

### **Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform.**

So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro's decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.

Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an impact. Argued trade specialist Dan

Griswold, "American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate

restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers

markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food vendors, and other entrepreneurs."

The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history's dustbin. But it will continue to cause much human hardship along the way.

The Heritage Foundation's John Sweeney complained nearly two decades ago that "the United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade

embargo against the communist regime." But the dead hand of half a century of failed policy is the worst

breach of faith with the Cuban people.

Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread liberty. As Griswold argued, "commercial engagement is

the best way to encourage more open societies abroad." Of course, there are no guarantees. **But lifting the embargo would have a greater likelihood of success than continuing a policy**

**which has failed.** Some day the Cuban people will be free. Allowing more contact with

Americans likely would make that day come sooner.

### **Plan's economic reform fosters political changes- inequality from economic reforms mandates political counterpart**

Lopez-Levy 11 – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of "Raul Castro and the New Cuba" (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, [http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\\_all\\_cuba\\_reform\\_final.pdf](http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf))/EK

Although the current phase of party debate is focused on the economic and social dimensions

of reform, and while the party would like to prevent the economic changes from

producing pressure for a transition to multi-party democracy, **it would be naive to**

**assume that these economic changes will not have profound political**

**implications.** It is clear that the **economic reform would foster political changes on which**

**the opposition could capitalize.** Workers in state sectors, particularly health and education, **would not**

**remain passive if their salaries remain stagnant while others prosper.** Economic reform

and the growth of the private sector would create opportunities for new america foundation page 10 the legitimization of

different types of wealth. Cubans would engage in conspicuous consumption, as some already do, and inequities and corruption would

necessarily create social tensions.

### **Removing sanctions and allowing greater engagement makes the democratization process stable**

Lopez-Levy 11 – PhD candidate at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, coauthor of "Raul Castro and the New Cuba" (Arturo, New America Foundation, May 2011, [http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf\\_all\\_cuba\\_reform\\_final.pdf](http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/naf_all_cuba_reform_final.pdf))/EK

Diplomacy, not sanctions, must be the primary tool for resolving differences with

Havana and advancing U.S. interests. It is worth remembering that since the 2008 presidential campaign in which President Obama proclaimed the value of negotiating

with countries like Cuba, without preconditions, engagement was never defended on the basis of sympathy for the interlocutors but rather, on how best to promote American

values and interests. American repudiation of the Castros' conduct may or may not be well earned, but it should not be an excuse for constraining American influence with Cuban society and elites.

Sanctions, if used, should be "smart", with the objective of influencing Cuban policy (particularly when such policies are under serious debate and transformation), not affecting regime change. While Cuba's elite do harbor disagreements about how extensive the reform

process should be, all factions are united against changes that would render Cuba in any way vulnerable to external efforts at regime change.

Different from the model of "Fidel in Command", the emerging model of bureaucratic politics under Raul is not insulated from elite sensitivities. To the extent that postrevolutionary elites are threatened by U.S. policy (The conditions of the Helms-Burton Act, for instance), they are going to oppose policy changes. To the extent that their interests in a market-oriented reform are advanced by political concessions such as the release of the political prisoners, they will advocate for them.

**The processes of marketization and political liberalization create an opportunity for the U.S. to initiate actions that could lead to a proliferation of meaningful changes in Cuba**

American support for both a democratic and an economically stable Cuba are far from mutually exclusive. As the experience of other countries demonstrates, **economic and political reforms are intertwined**.

Democracy in the long run tends to produce stable governments but the process of getting there is inherently destabilizing. Multiparty elections, for instance, in the absence of a stabilizing economic and social environment tend to be destabilizing and often violent. A

growing, market-oriented Cuban economy that enjoys substantial participation from the Cuban Diaspora **will be a major deterrent against violence**.

There are numerous examples, world-wide, of the positive repercussions a transition to a market economy (the Cuban non-state sector would jump from 15% of GDP today to 35% in 2015) has for the independence of civil society. The United States should support such a course in Cuba.

## **Democracy Impacts — 4-10x less internal violence, no genocide, and 5x economic growth**

**Lynn-Jones, 1998.** ["Why the United States Should Spread Democracy." Author: Sean M. Lynn-Jones | March 1998. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-united-states-should-spread-democracy>] GST

### **2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.**

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.<sup>27</sup>

These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel.

Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal **democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence.**

**The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian**

**regimes 1.48%.**<sup>28</sup> Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to

die at the hands of their governments. **Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been**

**responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in**

**the twentieth century.** The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.<sup>29</sup>

[...]

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run.

Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population.<sup>37</sup> A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found

that **countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%.**

**In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.**<sup>38</sup>

Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.

## **Economic Liberalization Increases Freedom House Score**

Fish 2007 [Steven, "Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist World," *Comparative Political Studies* 40. Accessed at:

[http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3833/Fish\\_ChoudhryDemoc\\_EconLib.pdf](http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3833/Fish_ChoudhryDemoc_EconLib.pdf).] //DNP

Again, we must control for initial conditions. Doing so does not change the result. In a partial correlation controlling for Gini scores in the base year, **economic liberalization has no significant effect on the change in socioeconomic inequality.** The **correlation is actually negative, suggesting that faster economic reform is associated with more favorable change in equity,** though the relationship is not statistically significant ( $r = -.24$ ;  $p = .30$ ). The data provide no evidence that shock therapy induces a greater rise in inequalities than does gradualism.

[...]

The claim that economic liberalization stands in tension with, or is unrelated to, democratization in the postcommunist region is untenable. The Engle-Granger analysis used in this article demonstrates that although economic liberalization has no discernible impact on democratization in the short term, **Freedom House scores adjust in the direction of a long-term equilibrium to which economic liberalization contributes substantially.** Comparing the extent of economic reform with socioeconomic outcomes further reveals that **more liberalization is associated with higher measures of welfare.** Many writers have claimed that economic liberalization damages, or at least does not advance, democratization. But the empirical evidence shows that economic liberalization, far from impeding popular rule, may be its ally.

## **Economic liberalization boosts growth**

**Fidrmuc 2000** [Jan, "Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during Transition," *Center for European Integration Studies*. Accessed at: <http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/zei/b00-05.pdf>.] //DNP

The **effect of liberalization on growth is also economically significant**. Full **liberalization** (increase in the value of the index from zero to unity) **is associated with average growth higher by 16.2 percentage points during the contraction** (based on the non-linear relationship) and **22.6 percentage points during the recovery** (based on the linear relationship, the non-linear relationship predicts a gain of 16.9 percentage points).

[...]

### **Economic performance has strong effects on electoral outcomes.**

Unemployment reduces the support for pro-reform parties, and increases the support for left wing and nationalist parties. **One percentage point of unemployment transforms into a gain of nearly two percentage points for the left-wing and nationalist parties and a corresponding loss for the reformers.** **Economic growth shows positive effect on the votes for pro-reform parties and negative effect on the votes for left wing and nationalist parties** (however, both effects are only significant, if at all, in the regressions that include also the indices of liberalization and democracy). The higher is the level of real output compared to 1989, the greater is the support for the pro-reform parties and lower the support for the left-wing and nationalist parties.

The effect of inflation is somewhat surprising—apparently, **inflation increases support for the pro-reform parties and reduces support for the left wing and nationalist parties**. A plausible explanation of this result is that the support for the pro-reform parties rises when inflation is high, as these parties have established a record of reigning in inflation.

The magnitude of these effects is economically (and politically) significant. An **increase in the unemployment rate by 4 percentage points** (as was, for example, the case in the Czech Republic between the 1996 and 1998 elections) **implies** an expected **loss of** some **8 percentage points in support of the reformers** and a corresponding gain in support for the left wing and nationalists. A recession causing the GDP to fall by 3 percent in the election year implies a loss of one percentage point of support for the reformers and a similar gain for the left wing and nationalist. Inflation, on the other hand, has only sizeable effects on electoral outcomes when it approaches three-digit levels.

[...]



The U-shaped pattern of the relationship between liberalization and growth during early transition helps to explain why some post-communist countries resumed growth after two or three years of economic declines whereas others continued to muddle through much longer. **Intermediate reforms deliver worse economic performance than either no reforms at all or more wide ranging reforms.** As Fidrmuc (2000c) argues, the growth prospect of the countries experiencing continuous declines could be improved dramatically if they caught up with the more reform-enthusiastic countries in terms of economic liberalization. If, on the other hand, they will sustain low levels of liberalization, their economic decline is likely to continue.

### **Cuba's political changes are due to economic liberalization**

**Thomas 2016** [Duncan, "The Cuban Experiment: A 50+ Year Embargo as a Failed Means of Promoting Economic and Political Development." Accessed at: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract\\_id=2773693.](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2773693)] //DNP

While there is an abundance of research to suggest that sanctions in general do not tend to work (Griswold 2005; Napier 2010; Pape 1997), there is also over 50 years of evidence to suggest that sanctions do not work in the individual case of Cuba. If the stated goal of the policy is to create an environment of political change, it may be worth looking at other solutions for achieving this goal. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 84) argue "**[e]conomic growth and technological change are accompanied by what the great economist Joseph Schumpeter called creative destruction...The **process of economic growth** and the inclusive institutions upon which it is based **create winners as well as losers in the political arena and in the economic marketplace**. Fear of creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to inclusive economic and political institutions". Research by Barro (1996a, 1996b) indicates that **increases in democratic and political freedoms are the result of economic freedoms**, rather than the opposite. This direction of causality would indicate that **increasing trade**, and thus increasing the opportunity for beneficial economic activity, may **begin to destabilize existing oppressive institutional regimes through the process of political creative destruction** (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Acemoglu, Laibson, and List 2015: 178-184). The marginal **incremental improvements of Cuba's political institutions that have already occurred as a result of liberalization of the economy suggest that trading with the country is the optimal method** towards achieving the stated ends of the US. In particular, the increase in property rights and access to online communication empower the Cuban people at the expense of the Castro regime.**

The topic of inclusive and extractive institutions as they relate to Cuba must be taken into consideration when considering alternative policies towards the country. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 81) explain, "[e]xtractive [economic]

institutions...naturally accompany extractive political institutions. In fact, they must inherently depend on extractive political institutions for their survival.” As long as the **Castro regime is in power, economic sanctions are unlikely to cause significant changes** in the economic institutions of Cuba. **Ending the embargo would** provide Cuba with a large tourist market and lower transaction costs in trade. This would in turn **increase the wealth of Cuban citizens and raise the opportunity cost of tolerating extractive economic institutions. If the economic institutions of Cuba became less extractive and more inclusive, the extractive political institutions in place would lose their foundation.** As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 82) explain, **“inclusive economic institutions will neither support nor be supported by extractive political ones. Either they will be transformed into extractive economic institutions to the benefit of the narrow interests that hold power, or the economic dynamism they create will destabilize the extractive political institutions, opening the way for the emergence of inclusive political institutions.”** This implies that the **US has nothing to lose by ending the embargo.** In the worst case scenario, the Castro regime remains in power as it has for over fifty years. In the best case scenario, the **improved economic institutions would continue to draw power away from the ruling elite and improve the welfare for the Cuban people.** Through international trade, in particular via the tourism industry, **the country has already begun the process of transferring power from the Castro regime to the people.**

### **Cuba wants reforms, embargo can't be blamed, need more access to stuff**

**Kline 2010** [Michael, “Economic Reforms in Cuba?,” *American Diplomacy UNC*. Accessed at: [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline\\_cuba.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline_cuba.html).] //DNP

U.S. relaxation of the embargo presents yet another potential risk. The purpose of Fidel Castro's Revolution was to eliminate all aspects of U.S. political and economic domination. **Removing trade and other restrictions could improve the plan's chances for success in the short term by reestablishing access to Cuba's most natural source of finance, supplies, and entrepreneurial skills for the private sector.** Over the longer term, however, Cuba risks political and economic penetration by the U.S., and increased "Yankee contamination" by, for example, U.S. tourists whose purchases are necessary if small businesses are to succeed.

Notwithstanding such risks, **the Cuban government has begun a major diplomatic offensive to overturn remaining international sanctions. One aspect of this offensive is a campaign to convince the European Community to repeal its Common Position on Cuba,** which was adopted in 1996 "to encourage a process of transition to pluralistic democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms” and seeks “the reform of internal legislation concerning political and civil rights, including the Cuban criminal code, and consequently the abolition of all political offences, the release of all political prisoners, and the ending of the harassment and punishment of dissidents.” **Convincing the EU to drop the Common Position probably is seen as a major step to increase pressure on the U.S. to lift its 50-year embargo.**

The Council of the European Union will meet in October to evaluate the Common Position. In advance of the meeting, **Cuba released 54 political prisoners to show Europeans that basic reforms have been or are being enacted.** By releasing all or the majority of its political prisoners, Cuba is attempting to whitewash its human rights record, thereby making its point that there is no further justification to maintain the Common Position. Cuba also will have a strong ally at the October meeting in Spain’s Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, who negotiated the prisoner release, and who plans to press Cuba’s case.

*Increasing US ties by removing the embargo is critical to Cuba’s transition*

**CSG ’13** (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, [http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\\_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032](http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032))

**Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuba policy.** Over time, U.S. policies toward Communist countries with poor human rights records and histories of adversarial relations—such as China and Vietnam—have evolved toward diplomatic normalization and economic engagement. Policymakers in both parties have rightly judged that **engagement**, rather than isolation, **better serves U.S. national interests and lends greater credibility to calls for political and economic reform.** The Cuba Study Group believes **the most effective way to break the deadlock** of “all-or-nothing” conditionality and remedy the ineffectiveness of current U.S. policy **is by de-codifying the embargo** against Cuba **through** the **repeal** of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions that limit the Executive Branch’s authority over Cuban policy.<sup>xviii</sup> Repealing Helm-Burton and related statutory provisions would shift the primary focus of U.S. Cuba policy away from the regime and toward empowering Cuban people. **It would** also **enhance the leverage of the United States to promote a multilateral approach toward Cuba**, as well as **embolden reformers, democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs** inside the island **to press** their government **for greater change.**

www.CubaStudyGroup.org 8 De-codifying the embargo would allow the Executive Branch the flexibility to use the entire range of foreign policy tools at its disposal—diplomatic, economic, political, legal and cultural—to incentivize change in Cuba. The President would be free to adopt more efficient, targeted policies necessary for pressuring the Cuban leadership to respect human rights and implement political reforms, while simultaneously empowering all other sectors of society to pursue their economic wellbeing and become the authors of their own futures.<sup>xix</sup> **Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework.** Repealing the extraterritorial provisions of Helms-Burton would allow the United States greater leverage in persuading the international community, especially key regional partners, to adopt a multilateral and targeted approach toward focusing on the advancement of human rights in Cuba. This would fundamentally transform the international dynamic that has long helped the Cuban government stifle dissent, since its efforts to isolate critics at home would

increasingly lead to its own isolation from the international community. While it is difficult to prove a direct causal connection between economic reforms and an open society, modern history has taught us that it is increasingly difficult for dictatorial governments to maintain political control the more prosperity their people enjoy.xx Repealing Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions would allow the U.S. the ability to efficiently promote and provide direct support to Cuba's private sector. Such support would empower a greater plurality within Cuban society, including government reformers, democracy advocates, Cuban entrepreneurs and society as a whole by increasing their access to the resources and expertise of the world's most prosperous private sector (and largest Cuban diaspora), located a mere 90 miles from Cuba's shores. In turn, this would enhance the relative power of Cuban society to that of the state, while stripping the latter of its preferred scapegoat for its oppressive practices and economic blunders. U.S. policy should also seek to incentivize the Cuban government to end state monopolies on economic activities and allow greater private participation in the economy. The Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in HelmsBurton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island. The U.S. should pursue this course of action independent

### **Middle class → democracy**

**Arzeno 2003** [MARIO A. ARZENO, MAJOR, USA, "THE U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA: A TIME FOR CHANGE?" *US Army*, 2003 [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416135](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA416135)] //WGC

### "CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

The President's National Security Strategy encourages promoting change throughout the world as we did in Central and Eastern Europe, Belgrade, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea through free markets and free trade. **The National Security Strategy promotes the idea that a strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing freedom and prosperity. These same principles should be extended to the Cuban people.** The United States maintains diplomatic and economic relations with China and Vietnam who have long standing repressive regimes and greater human rights violations than Cuba. **That same principle should be applied to Cuba without partisan politics that influence and deter from the freedom of the Cuban people and ultimately Cuba's stability and prosperity.**

Critics argue free markets do not promote democracy. However, **free trade and open markets do promote open economies and societies with greater freedom for their people, with better opportunities and less poverty.** Less poverty equals stability. Charles William Maynes, President of the Eurasia Foundation and a leading political scientist in the United States calls this idea of free markets promoting democracy "Liberal Internationalism." He argues **open markets lead to the formation of a middle class; the middle class then brings pressure on non-democratic governments to open the political process; once that opening occurs, democracy develops.**

**With Cuba's proximity to the United States, democracy is inevitable.** It will be a slow process. Nevertheless, it will happen, as it has in countless other countries like the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and the other thirty-one out of thirty- two countries in the Latin American region.

**The first step before any real change happens in Cuba must be engagement within our own borders** with the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). The CANF is without question the center of gravity for this issue. The CANF is single handedly preventing progress in the Cuba policy. Clausewitz defines a center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed." The United States should focus its energy on encouraging the CANF to reform its uncompromising stance against Castro.

Several actions, or decisive points, must occur for the CANF to compromise and ultimately create change in Cuba; **beginning with the** review of the Torricelli Bill and the Helms-Burton Act, followed by the **opening of economic trade, and the lifting of restrictions on the travel ban and the sale of food and medicine.**"

**Smith 2015** [Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter, Professors of Finance, New York University Stern School of Business, *Understanding a Cuban Transition*, March 26, 2015 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646700>] /WGC

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Understanding a Cuban Transition By Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter<sup>1</sup>

The joint announcement by Presidents Castro and Obama in December 2014 that Cuba and the United States would begin efforts to “normalize” diplomatic relations - after eighteen months of negotiations - came as a surprise. It was greeted as a sign that normalization of economic relations was likely to follow, and that Cuba’s half-century experiment with Communism would end in transition to some form of market-oriented mixed economy.

Indeed, **beginning around 1990 all of the world's other Communist states** except North Korea **transitioned to economic systems that rely to a significant degree on market-orientation and a central role for the private sector.** The Soviet Union and its Central European bloc have disappeared, and China and Viet Nam have transitioned to pragmatic forms of socialism that co-exists with robust forms of market capitalism. All

now have for-profit private corporations that benchmark the performance of state-owned enterprises, stock exchanges, foreign direct investors in stand-alone or joint ventures, portfolio investors in local equities and bonds, and provide (often debatable) legal protection for private property.

**Cuba now faces the kind of existential crisis that other Communist countries faced twenty-five years ago** - to abandon its political ideology in an effort to generate sufficient economic growth and prosperity for the system to survive and adapt. **The transitions in the former Communist countries have all been successful**, but they have taken time and had their ups and downs. But **economic liberalization has invariably encouraged political liberalization and demands for key elements of a civil society. This has been most evident in countries like Poland, Latvia and more recently, the Ukraine.** In countries like China and Vietnam, the political transformation has been more gradual but nevertheless is perceptible.

**Economic transition will force Cuba down the same path**, but it will come at a price – political transition that could undo much of the fifty-year legacy of “Fidelismo,” which the government now led by Raul Castro is likely to resist. Fidelismo, however, is more than socialism – it has also embraced a passionate desire for independence from the United States.”