

We negate.

Our sole contention is *Shifting the Indian Agenda*.

[Dabhade '17 of Nehru University](#) explains that India's current foreign policy is benevolent because it is based on appeasing the international community to minimize resistance against India's rise and maximize support. However, granting India international prestige, namely a seat on the Security Council, will shift the decision calculus of the Indian government, materializing in two ways.

First. *Damning Pakistan*.

[Bali '19 of the Conversation](#) explains that India is entering its general election in which the BJP party, led by Prime Minister Modi, is attempting to retain its grip on power and any escalation towards Pakistan serves to further Modi's narrative of Hindu nationalism and garner him political backing.

However, India has been holding back in hopes of attaining a seat on the UNSC. [Kim '12 of Hankuk University](#) writes that India has been utilizing "quiet-diplomacy" in an attempt to ease tensions with Pakistan because Pakistan vocally opposes India's membership to the international community.

Granting India membership now would reverse all progress. [Khan '15 of the Naval Postgraduate School](#) writes that granting India a seat on the council before peace has been established would tip the balance of power in South Asia to India because India will no longer need to reinforce its legitimacy. Consequently, India will carry out its interests in South Asia, all while blocking any intervention from the international community because of its new veto power on the UNSC. Indeed, [Nawaz '18 of the Institute of Strategic Studies](#) finds that granting membership now would destabilize the region and, as tensions rise, fuel confrontation and conflict between India and Pakistan.

[Khan '15](#) writes that India would incapacitate Pakistan's agriculture based economy by cutting off the water that flows from India to Pakistan. [Raza '18 of the Diplomat](#) finds that nearly 70% of Pakistan's population is either directly or indirectly affected by the agricultural industry. Thus, [Gettleman '19 of the New York Times](#) finds that a water war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic for hundreds of millions of people.

Second. *African Abandonment*.

[Mitra '17 of the Wire](#) explains that India has extended 52 lines of credit worth 34.2 billion dollars, funding various developmental projects to African countries designed to boost development and reduce impoverishment.

This production of capital in Africa helps the world poorest. [Kelbore '15 of the University of South Africa](#) writes that by promoting the growth of the private sector and expanding the goods available a one percent increase in domestic credit empirically reduces poverty by .24%. [Pattanayak '17 of Financial Express](#) finds that one line of credit has already helped 15 million poor individuals in Africa and India has committed to continuing these projects over the next five years. Moreover, [Panjetan of EXIM](#) explains another project supported by India's lines of credit are providing water to 2 million people in Tanzania.

Despite the seeming altruism of India's development with Africa, [Narlikar '10 of the University of Cambridge](#) writes that India is only willing to incur the costs of letting Africa "free-ride" on Indian support in exchange for Africa's political support on the international stage. In fact, [Kragelund '11 of the ISS](#) finds that India created their development initiatives in Africa to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council. Indeed, [Narlikar](#) finds that, currently, India enhances ties with Africa to maintain an African coalition of support for its bid to UNSC membership. Moreover, [Sidiropoulos '11 of Chatham House](#) explains that India's engagement in Africa is driven by India's desire to prove it is capable of shouldering the global responsibilities necessary for being of the Security Council.

Affirming, and granting India membership on the UNSC will reverse the trend of Indian support to Africa, obliterating decades of potential development. [Vira of the CSIS](#) explains that without a strategic interest in Africa, India would much rather focus on regional diplomatic and economic issues that require extensive resources. Unfortunately, [Taylor '12 of Chatham House](#) explains that as India's international standing increases India's interests further diverge from those of Africa. Taylor confirms that India maintains no vested interest in Africa besides their own. Thus, [Stuenkel '10 of Harvard University](#) concludes that upon gaining membership to the Security Council, India would shed its previous charitable display and end its support for developing nations.

Thus, we negate.

Consequently, [Siddiqui '19 of the Financial Express](#) writes that India's trade policies have increased trade between the two nations by 22% in the last year, resulting in 63 billion dollars in annual trade. [Gil '18 of Brookings](#) highlights that India makes long-term investments in key areas of African infrastructure like water, electrification, construction, and agriculture with concessionary loans, coupled with capacity building investments like training and education.

Taylor

Uniqueness

Kragelund

<http://sci-hub.tw/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01695.x>

India's aid programme is by no means new either. It began in the 1950s, first targeting neighbouring countries with economic as well as military aid, and from the beginning of the 1960s — as a direct consequence of the competition with China — **India also began to target countries in Africa (P.K. Sinha, 2010). India lost interest in development aid in the 1980s and 1990s, but changed its perception of aid**

again in this millennium, now seeing it as an instrument to gain political and economic influence. Development aid, or rather, a shift from mostly being an aid recipient to also being a donor, was perceived by the then Minister of Finance Jaswant Singh as a means to acquire more international political leverage and ultimately obtain a seat in (an enlarged) UNSC. Essentially, aid and in particular the 'India Development Initiative' launched in 2003, was perceived as a means to brand India afresh: the world's attention had to be diverted away from India's internal problems of poverty and inequality towards its role as an emerging economy (Agrawal, 2007).

Narlikar Building Africa Coalition

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25767296.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A603ff4ba1a4cafde214fc4eb638d30e8>

The above pathway to power is not one where India can abdicate the responsibilities of leadership. But as was discussed in the first section of this paper, this leadership is indirect in that it is forthcoming not at the systemic level, but in coalitions in multilateral forums and in certain bilateral and regional relationships with other developing countries. **While reluctant to provide any public goods (e.g. multilateral free trade), India has shown considerable willingness to provide club goods to Africa (e.g. the Pan Africa E-Network, development assistance, technical assistance, preferential trading arrangements) and specifically to East Africa (trade, investment, FDI that creates greater employment in the region). The provision of this leadership is important for India in that it cultivates allies that can support its pathway to power, concretely for instance by supporting its bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council and also through the emergence of broad-based coalitions that back its agenda** (e.g. the G90 at the Cancun Ministerial that brought together members of the G20, G33 and the Africa Group). **Such leadership moreover also speaks to a wider audience, where responsible leadership in East Africa by India can help it gain greater legitimacy internationally.**

Note however, as was pointed out in the first section, that the ability to provide certain club goods can detract from a leader's ability to provide public goods. Just as India has successfully managed to lead strong coalitions in the WTO but found it (partly as a result of this leadership) difficult to make the concessions that are necessary if it takes on international leadership, its strategies in East Africa may result in a similar incompatibility between its role as a responsible international power versus a responsible power in Africa. Whether this will turn out to be the case depends on the vision of development and power that India brings.

Africa started backing India after signed bilat deals

<http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/african-union-backs-indias-unscl-bid/204068/>

Africa Key

<http://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1177/097492840506100401>

“The Africa Conundrum”

Warrant

Mitra

As per government figures, India’s lines of credit stood at about \$10 billion as of April 2014. Since then, another \$14.2 billion has been added with 52 new lines of credit.

This amount of \$24.2 billion, however, does not include the \$10-billion soft loan that Prime Minister Narendra Modi offered to African countries at the third India Africa Forum Summit in 2015.

PATANAYAK

Modi said India is also working with Japan and the US to support development in Africa. Indian and Japanese research institutions have come up with a vision document in consultations with think tanks from Africa. "The idea is that India and Japan, with other willing partners, would explore joint initiatives in skills, health, infrastructure, manufacturing and connectivity," Modi said.

DBT in cooking gas saves \$4 billion

The PM said India has saved over \$4 billion in the past three years by paying cooking gas subsidies directly to the poor rather than indirectly through price concessions — a strategy that is being replicated in other areas as well. Under the 'Give it up' campaign (which asks people to give up gas subsidy voluntarily so that that can be extended to the poor), over 10 million Indians have volunteered to do so. This has helped in giving more than 15 million connections to poor families.

Narlikar

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25767296.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A603ff4ba1a4cafde214fc4eb638d30e8>

It is important to note that while all the above examples suggest a spirit of 'co-development' emanating from the Indian side, they should not be taken to mean non strategic behaviour. Indian willingness to incur the costs of freeriding (for instance through the grant of preferential market access to LDCs, or the support for the cause of African countries in the WTO via support for their coalitions, capacity building and technical assistance) is not driven by charity. One official in the Ministry of External

Affairs stated rather pragmatically, 'There is no such thing as unconditional aid,' but then went on to emphasise that India had consciously tried to veer away from the stigma accompanying Western aid by emphasising the importance of 'partnership' in the process and steering clear of good governance conditionalities akin to

those accompanying aid from the Bretton Woods institutions. Maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations with difficult regimes may fit in easily with India's commitment to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, but the fact that those relations also fit well with India's self-interest is not incidental.

Freeriding by Africa in trade, or aid and investment in East Africa, effectively form part of a bargain that brings important gains to India as well. Most concretely, and in the realm of hard power, an important benefit is improved maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region for India (a gain of considerable importance in the context of a rising China) (Vines and Oruitemeka 2007). Another important gain includes greater legitimacy and prestige in international institutions. Other concrete benefits include the support that India receives from the African politicians and bureaucrats that it trains who go on to occupy high-level positions in Africa. Moreover, there is also **the hope of future gain, for instance support for a seat for India in a reformed Security Council.**

Taylor

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af0f243d52061085ba569a507fd9b3c1d>

Of course, Indian aid to Africa is not an expression of altruism. India, like all other countries, actively uses its development assistance to promote specific political objectives. Indian aid not only helps to facilitate an increase in Indian economic activity across Africa, but also serves to project India as a major power and gain a support constituency. **Indeed, New Delhi views Africa as a source of potentially vital support (and important voting power) in international institutions. As part of this, Indian diplomacy seeks to encourage the belief that India is a long-time supporter of Third World interests. In this context, Indian policy makers are looking to portray New Delhi as the largest, wealthiest and most diverse non-western democracy.**⁸⁹

Yet paradoxically, as India develops, its interest in South—South solidarity declines (except as related to its desire to retain a support constituency for Indian global ambitions), and this trend may have some implications for Indo-African relations. Securing access to new markets is central, and in this, India is in competition not only with African capitalists and established external actors, but also with other ostensibly 'southern' players such as Brazil and China. **Equally, as India becomes more powerful and is received more regularly at the top table of global politics, its interests diverge from those of Africa.**¹⁴¹ How these tendencies develop will depend, of course, on whether adapting to international norms becomes a central plank of Indian foreign policy. Rhetorical allegiance to a Southern-oriented foreign policy certainly allows New Delhi to deflect domestic criticism of its international relations and dress up its linkages with regions such as Africa as being driven by a normative South—South agenda. **Yet if such a shift occurs and India's elites perceive their interests to lie in alignment with the current world order, then it would be more difficult to establish common positions with Africa, as well as to continue to assert India's importance in global governance as a leader and coordinator for the wider South.** Problematically for India if it adheres to a form of Third Worldism, the North—South agenda is in fact cross cut and permeated by a multiplicity of issues not adequately reflected in current alignments (as

exemplified by IBSA). And as India develops, the basis of a residual Indian foreign policy grounded in notions of Third World coalition-building dissipates as the significant structural heterogeneity and differentiated interests among this disparate group of states become ever starker. Management of this conundrum will be central to India's Africa policies, particularly as 'old strategies that have contributed to India's pathway to power cannot be c

Indian policy-makers are widely critical of short-term projects 'that rapidly unravel following the ending of the three- or five-year funding cycle'."7 Such a focus in India's aid programme is arguably more suited to the African situation than the simple delivery of infrastructure by China, irrespective of local conditions and ability to maintain such fixed assets. However, it is also possible that, seen from the African perspective, Indian and Chinese engagement in Africa is not best perceived as a zero-sum competition but may well be complementary, with Beijing supplying the hard infrastructure quickly and efficiently, while New Delhi offers skilled technical services and assistance at a much lower cost than that provided by the West. Indirectly, an emerging India within the international system is of great political significance for the developing world, as New Delhi increasingly uses its growing economic and political muscle to improve trading and political conditions not only for itself but also for developing nations more generally. Along with other developing nations, India is increasingly pushing for a reconfiguration of some of the institutions of global governance. **In this regard, African states are seen as useful, allies and a valuable support constituency for New Delhi's aspirations. Notably, almost all African countries back India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.** Currently, Indian activity in Africa may be said to constitute a middle ground between China's profit-maximizing and largely statist approach and the much resented intrusive conditionalities associated with western policies. 'The "softer Indian way" in Africa is in fact India's unique pathway to power',"8 with Indian policy towards Africa reflecting a 'strategic but nonetheless benign form of engagement, which involves greater costs to India and allows more free-riding for the poorer countries of ... Africa'."9 It is possible to acknowledge an ele

Vira

Vira, Varun. "India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications." N.d. Small Wars Journal. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with-grave-implications?fbclid=IwAR0NeTHIb7v7WiW_nMvy52PiqJBIFeKPdWQsjq7rWUa-unXW757MTuhkLGo

Ideals and traditions are, however, not easily abandoned, and peacekeeping is deeply engrained in India's perception of itself on the international stage. Moreover, as India's Security Council bid inches closer, there still remains an attachment to the sentiment best expressed by retired Indian Lt. Gen Satish Nambiar, a UNPROFOR force commander in former Yugoslavia who stated that, "India has no immediate interests in Sierra Leone. But that is not the point. We have to look beyond our immediate interests. As a great country we have certain commitments; if we aspire to be permanent members of the UN Security Council it cannot come on a platter – we must develop a stake in strengthening the Security Council set-up and such missions help do just that."^[8] The entrance of China as a peacekeeping power has also complicated Indian calculations. From once deeply opposed to international intervention on principle, China since the 2000s has rapidly expanded its UNPKO participation. [By 2011, China was the largest troop contributor among the P-5 countries](#), expanding from 120 military and police personnel in 2003 to 2,146 by 2008. Since the UNTAET mission in East Timor in 2000, China has allowed lightly armed peacekeepers, and since 2008 has pushed for the deployment of combat contingents. On one level India welcomes Chinese participation as helping plug key resource gaps, but on another resents the disproportionate attention Chinese contributions receive. Additionally, with China and India both competing heavily for influence and resources in Africa, where UNPKOs are concentrated, it cannot help but become part of a broader competition. **UNPKOs, however, now come with lowered expectations.** Expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and Indian planners now recognize the host of other obstacles affect India's bid – opposition from China, the Kashmir dispute, the Indian nuclear program etc. – and a growing body now favors alternative alignments outside the UN. The 'African soft power' argument too is not entirely convincing. **Africa is important to the Indian strategic interest** – the East African coastline is within India's 'near abroad,' Africa accounts for about a fifth of Indian oil imports, and trade ties are rapidly expanding, **but regional challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and southeast Asia – all more core to the Indian strategic interest – are growing ever more pressing.** In net terms, UNPKOs are but one component of Indian defense diplomacy with Africa, which in turn is a small component of India's total economic and political outreach. **That too must be seen in comparative terms; in FY2009-2010, India's Rs400bn of aid to Afghanistan was almost twenty times the size of its aid to the entire African continent – giving some indication of priorities.**^[9]

Taylor

Taylor, Ian. "India's Rise in Africa." Chatham House. July 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23255618.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af0f243d52061085ba569a507fd9b3c1d&loggedin=true>

Yet paradoxically, **as India develops, its interest in South—South solidarity declines** (except as related to its desire to retain a support constituency for Indian global ambitions), and **this trend may have some implications for Indo-African relations. Securing access to new markets is central, and in this, India is in competition** not only **with**

African capitalists and established external actors, but also with other ostensibly 'southern' players such as Brazil and China. Equally, **as India becomes more powerful and is received more regularly at the top table of global politics, its interests diverge from those of Africa.**¹⁴¹ How these tendencies develop will depend, of course, on whether adapting to international norms becomes a central plank of Indian foreign policy. Rhetorical allegiance to a Southern-oriented foreign policy certainly allows New Delhi to deflect domestic criticism of its international relations and dress up its linkages with regions such as Africa as being driven by a normative South—South agenda. **Yet if such a shift occurs and India's elites perceive their interests to lie in alignment with the current world order, then it would be more difficult to establish common positions with Africa, as well as to continue to assert India's importance in global governance as a leader and coordinator for the wider South.** Problematically for India if it adheres to a form of Third Worldism, the North—South agenda is in fact cross cut and permeated by a multiplicity of issues not adequately reflected in current alignments (as exemplified by IBSA). And as India develops, the basis of a residual Indian foreign policy grounded in notions of Third World coalition-building dissipates as the significant structural heterogeneity and differentiated interests among this disparate group of states become ever starker. Management of this conundrum will be central to India's Africa policies, particularly as 'old strategies that have contributed to India's pathway to power cannot be less abandoned ... if India is to continue its march to great power'.¹⁴²

India's diplomatic strategy can no longer be said to be fundamentally grounded in an idealism predicated on South—South solidarity. Contemporary Indian foreign policy is more pragmatic than previous incarnations, and although New Delhi retains an interest in non-alignment and rhetorical notions of South—South commonality, the focus these days is very much on the importance of national interests, particularly economic in nature, 'even while India lacks a unifying strategic vision'.⁴⁶ A wider move within India away from socialist-inclined economic policies to those more in line with neo-liberalism has left Indian diplomacy somewhat up in the air. However, in the policy realm, India might be said to be following in the economic (and hence geopolitical) footsteps of China, a position that tends to occupy the minds of India's policy-making and intellectual community.⁴⁷ Initial hopes that China and India had a great deal in common, captured in the neologism 'Chindia',⁴⁸ have somewhat dissipated. A surging economy within India requires new markets and new sites for Indian investment opportunities. Indeed, 'since 1991 ... India has begun to liberalize its economy in a belated effort to achieve the growth and investment seen in China, as well as to stave off bankruptcy'.⁴⁹ Competition with Chinese companies for productive investment locations is almost certainly providing the stimulus for recent Indian efforts. This takes place within a broader context in which China and India are likely to remain locked in a 'great power contest' contending for economic and political influence.⁵⁰ As Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi asserted, 'India is massively playing catch-up to China in Africa, and only in recent years is it trying to engage the continent in a serious way'.⁵¹ This point will be developed further below.

Sidiropoulos

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bp0311_sidiropoulos.pdf

India and South Africa are both competitors and potential partners; they are developing countries playing a leadership role in the South, but in fact also display substantial differences in interests compared with other, smaller developing countries, for example in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or climate change negotiations. **Their engagement in Africa can be explained as much by the shifts in global power and realpolitik as by their desire to be seen to be playing a positive developmental role, exerting influence and shouldering global responsibilities – which many in the United States and**

elsewhere in the North regard as an essential criterion for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. 1

Development cooperation is important for India but is a by-product of its engagement in Africa, rather than a central driving force. Like South Africa, India recognizes the value of development cooperation as a soft-power tool of influence. South Africa sees India's engagement in Africa in a positive light, especially its focus on human-resource development, IT and agriculture. President Zuma encouraged the two business communities to work together to establish partnerships in Africa within the NEPAD framework. Yet Indian officials sense a degree of 'prickliness' from the South African side on some of the initiatives proposed by India at the continental level, remarking on the fact that South Africa has yet to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the Pan-African e-network, which brings tele-education and tele-medicine to remote parts of Africa. India's support of the e-network in the context of NEPAD was an early undertaking made by the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, in an address to the Pan African Parliament in 2006. Some 30 countries have already signed. However, South Africa has argued for the specific agreement with itself to be redrafted to take into account its particular infrastructural environment, which is very different from that of, say, Ethiopia. South Africa has argued that given the existence of other bilateral agreements with India, especially in science and technology, there is no special need for South Africa to sign the agreement.

Impacts

!Peacekeepers

<https://qz.com/india/1384301/is-narendra-modis-africa-policy-working/>

Peacekeeping has been a vital element of the India-Africa partnership since 1960. Over 6,000 Indians currently serve in peacekeeping operations in African countries. About 70% of 163 Indians, who lost their lives while on duty, did so in Africa.

New Delhi's decision to open 18 new diplomatic missions in Africa in the next few years, which will take the total number to 47, reflects its new Afro-centric approach.

<http://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2014.908836>

Second, the involvement in UN peacekeeping puts a strain on domestic military missions such as border defence or counter-insurgency operations. India's active two-front posture against Pakistan and China, as well as the existence of three separate internal insurgencies, are worth remembering in this regard.

Since India has more than a million soldiers under arms, the deployment of a few thousand peacekeeping soldiers is certainly not diminishing the army's combat readiness. Yet there are other capacity restraints in terms of advanced material, specialized personnel and command functions. The fact that three times as many officers are deployed with UN peace missions than with units at home underlines that these opportunity costs are more than trivial.⁵⁹ Again, it is worth looking at India's past peacekeeping record also in this regard. After all, it was at the height of its confrontations with both China and Pakistan in the 1960s that India maintained its military deployment to UN missions in the Sinai and the Congo.⁶⁰ This is, of course, not to say that political priorities have remained unchanged. The unequal provision of peacekeeping forces and material is clearly an issue from the perspective of Indian diplomats: There are enough troops, enough policemen, enough civilian experts, enough capacities and enough helicopters available to the international community. That is not the problem. The problem is that there is reluctance on the part of Member States to make these available to the United Nations.⁶¹

!Lines of Credit

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/03/01/is-trade-with-india-changing-africas-health-care-landscape/>

Through its various agencies, the government of India has been expanding its engagement in multiple African countries by creating avenues to speed up the two-way trade between India and Africa. Examples include the triennial India-Africa Forum Summit, the Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme, and the Pan African e-Network (PAeN). Launched in 2009, PAeN aims to share India's growing expertise in tele-education, telemedicine, and other information and communications technology (ICT) services with several African countries. The project includes setting up an e-network that connects remote hospitals in 53 African countries to 12 Indian hospitals by installing infrastructure such as satellites and fiber-optic links. As of 2015, 460 telemedicine consultations have taken place and an additional 4,168 continuing medical education sessions were held.

<https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/indias-lines-of-credit-to-africa-touches-8-billion/682818/>

15 million

<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Are-Economic-Relations-with-India-Helping-Africa.pdf>

India's capital inflows into SSA—both of debt and equity—are miniscule in comparison to China's. Most investments have been in the mining and infrastructure sector. Similarly, the soft loans extended by the Indian Government to SSA, through its concessionary loan scheme, are concentrated in electrification, construction, agriculture and water infrastructure. But these inflows are important. These areas sorely require long-term investments. Additionally, India's hard infrastructure investments are often coupled with investment in capacity building through trainings, and in corporate social responsibility activities. India is not a big player like China, but its focus on capacity building and skill development in SSA can be complementary to China's emphasis on big infrastructure projects in the region. SSA nations can leverage their association with both Asian economic behemoths to further their development interests. As aid from multilateral financial institutions (MFIs) shrinks, economies in SSA can tactically build economic relations with India, China and other large and dynamic economies to meet its finance and investment requirements.

!Pharma

http://ris.org.in/pdf/India_Africa_Partnership_in_Healthcare.pdf

In 2002, the Government of India launched an integrated programme named as 'Focus Africa' to boost up bilateral trade and investment between India and Africa. This initiative specifically focused on seven major trading partners of the Africa, namely, Nigeria, South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Ghana which contribute around 69 per cent of India's total bilateral trade. In April 2003, the programme was broadened to cover 17 more countries in Africa, namely, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Madagascar, Seychelles, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria, Libya and Morocco. Major products for exports are broadly identified as textiles, drugs & pharmaceuticals, machinery & instruments, transport equipments and telecommunication and IT. The programme-supplemented LoC (Lines of Credit) was extended to Tanzania, and Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Seychelles, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Ghana .

Apart from the traditional trade and investment route, India took some initiatives in the health care sector in Africa recently through the Pan African e-Network Project (PAENP) conceived by the late Dr A P J Abdul Kalam in 2009. This was launched on 26 February, 2009 with a project cost of Rs. 5420 million. The project envisages setting up of an e-network connecting Indian institutions with 53 countries of Africa through satellite and fibre optic links, and providing tele-education and telemedicine services to them. The existing commitment on India side is to maintain the facilities created in each country for a period of five years after commissioning them.

Stuenkel '10 - India won't protect dev nations once seat

At the same time, Brazil and India are the most active advocates for UN Security Council expansion. This creates a dilemma for both actors. Allied to, and many times the leaders of, developing countries without any perspective to be included into a powerful international institution such as the UN Security Council, both Brazil and India profess to defend the disenfranchised. Their effort to become permanent members, however, is likely to turn them into status quo powers, and it is unclear in how far they would continue to support the voice of the poor once they form part of the ruling oligarchy class. In fact, several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent Brazil and India from entering the UNSC as permanent members, and African countries –arguably the most disadvantaged and the least integrated into international structures – have been the most obstinate with regard to expansion.

New Impact

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/the-rise-of-indias-soft-power/>

India is also expanding its development assistance to African countries beyond its traditional relationships within the Commonwealth in an effort to secure access to natural resources as well as serve its broader strategic aims. Through its state-owned companies, it has significantly increased oil imports from

African countries like South Sudan — where India recently sent a special envoy to negotiate a peace agreement with Khartoum. At the 2011 India-Africa Forum Summit, India pledged \$5 billion in aid to Africa in the form of concessional loans — an amount similar to India's current annual health-care budget. In addition, it pledged \$700 million to help establish new institutions and training programs in consultation with the African Union and \$300 million for the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway line. It also promised 10,000 new scholarships for the India-Africa Virtual University, 2,500 training slots under the ITEC program, and 22,000 scholarships for studying in India over the next three years. Additionally, it announced the introduction of an India-Africa Business Council, as well as other smaller programs such as government-supported cultural and artisanal exchanges.

New Uq.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/08/the-rise-of-indias-soft-power/>

But as the Indian foreign assistance program increases in size and breadth, it will change how traditional donors view their own foreign aid to India and may well lead to increased questioning among Indians themselves of why a country with a larger number of poor people than all of sub-Saharan Africa is spending its money on foreign aid. For now, however, it seems like international aid to India will keep flowing: Britain recently announced a revamped aid program to India, focusing on the poorest states and most vulnerable groups, with a plan to move from an aid-based relationship to a two-way partnership. And, for once, India's legendarily opaque bureaucracy could have an unintended benefit: Because the country lacks a centralized aid agency with data on the full breadth of Indian foreign assistance — and because at least a quarter of the population remains illiterate and poor — it will probably take a while longer for Indians to start questioning their

government's aid abroad. So far, this has perfectly served the Indian government, enabling it to distribute aid to serve its larger foreign-policy goals, without having to be held accountable. But with even the richest foreign countries questioning the utility of foreign aid in an age of austerity, Indian leaders may soon have to justify their increasing generosity to voters.