

R2R

We negate, resolved: the United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our Sole Contention is preventing conflict over Kashmir.

Pakistan has a mortal fear of Indian aggression and sponsors terrorism as a survival strategy. According to a 2011 article in the Economist magazine: Pakistan was born from partition with India in 1947, a bloodbath that killed hundreds of thousands. Ordinary Pakistanis are conditioned to fret that India has still not come to terms with the existence of their country, and may one day simply come strolling in. Pakistanis sense that jihadis are a practical, if unconventional, means for a weak country to project power against a much bigger one.

India's accession to the UN Security Council will terrify the Pakistani government and force them to adopt a more aggressive terror strategy for two reasons.

1. India wants to cripple Pakistan's economy.

Pakistan needs IMF loans to shore up its crumbling economy. Jeffrey Gettleman writes in the New York Times in 2019: With barely enough foreign reserves to cover monthly bills, Pakistan's government needs a large bailout from the IMF. On the streets, discontent is rising. The Pakistani government's decisions to raise levies on fuel and collect more taxes from ordinary Pakistanis have made people even angrier.

However, as a member of the Security Council, India would cut off that lifeline to punish Pakistan. Aamir Khan at the University of Balochistan explains in 2015 in the UNSC: The economic power of India could be devastating for Pakistan. As a permanent member, India could use its influence over international financial institutions, such as the IMF to prevent Pakistan's access

This would deal a debilitating blow to Pakistan's economy.

2. India wants to shutter peace.

Pakistan sees UN mediation as the only long-term way to solve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Reddy 16 writes in the Hindu: the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is only possible through the realisation of the right to self-determination of the people of Kashmir, as per UNSC resolutions, through a fair and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices.

However, India opposes any UN involvement in Kashmir and would use a seat on the Security Council to make sure the UN works for its interests, destroying Pakistan's hope in a neutral actor. David Bosco at

Indiana University's school of Global and International Studies explains in 2009: a council with India as a permanent member that passed resolutions condemning Pakistan would look less legitimate than today.

This would convince Pakistan that there are no peaceful routes out.

Overall, Shamsa Nawaz at the Institute of Strategic Studies writes in 2017 that with India's presence on the Security Council, the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point.

India's seat on the Security Council would force Pakistan to double down on terrorism, striking at India's heart. As a comparison, the Brookings Institution explains in 2018: Pakistan's persistent acquiescence to safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and its vicious Haqqani branch has resulted in significant destabilization of Afghanistan.

India would be forced to respond with incredible aggression to a major terrorist attack. Similarly, after the September 11 attacks, policymakers in the United States had no choice but to invade Afghanistan to protect the country. Ragjai of Dissent Magazine writes in 03: Indian strategists have argued that India should be prepared to fight "limited war under nuclear conditions," that is, military operations of a limited conventional nature in response to Pakistani terror.

Pakistan fight back against India, and they have based their military strategy around deploying tactical nuclear weapons to counteract India's conventional superiority. Herrera of the Pacific Standard writes in February:

Pakistan could plausibly deploy a nuclear weapon in response to a conventional attack since they maintain a smaller army than India and would be overwhelmed if the Indian military invaded. Facing national collapse, Islamabad could launch a nuclear weapon to even the playing field.

An Indo-Pak war is uniquely dangerous because there are none of the checks that normally prevent nuclear escalation. Rising nationalism in both countries and a deterioration of dialogue between the two leads Foreign Policy magazine to conclude that if a Terrorist crisis were to occur *TODAY*, both India and Pakistan could not de-escalate a crisis on their own.

In addition, conventional deterrence doesn't work here, since Lendon of CNN writes this year that were the situation to deteriorate for them, nukes could be used before commanders in Islamabad could stop them. "Pakistan has a strategic policy of delegating nuclear release approval down to lower level tactical units,' lower-level bellicose commanders using tactical nuclear weapons if they see fit.

Shanker of the New York Times writes in 2002:

a full-scale nuclear exchange could kill up to 12 million people immediately. Even a "more limited" nuclear war would have cataclysmic results.

Because war is good for absolutely nothing, we negate.

CASE CARDS

We negate, resolved: the United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our sole contention is preventing conflict over Kashmir.

After British partition of India in 1947, Goel of the New York Times writes this March:

Vindu Goel, March 8 2019, "India-Pakistan Crisis: Why They Keep Fighting Over Kashmir," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/india-pakistan-crisis.html>

When the British finally gave up their colony of India in August 1947, they agreed to divide it into two countries: Pakistan, with a Muslim majority, and India, with a Hindu majority. (Bangladesh was initially part of Pakistan but gained its own independence in 1971 after a short war between India and Pakistan.) The sudden separation prompted millions of people to migrate between the two countries and led to religious violence that killed hundreds of thousands. Left undecided was the status of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state in the Himalayas that had been ruled by a local prince. Fighting quickly broke out, and both countries eventually sent in troops, with Pakistan occupying one-third of the state and India two-thirds. Although the prince signed an agreement for the territory to become part of India, the United Nations later recommended that an election be held to let the people decide. That election never took place, and both countries continue to administer their portions of the former princely territory while hoping to get full control of it. Troops on both sides of the "line of control" regularly fire volleys at each other. Muslim militants have frequently resorted to violence to expel the Indian troops from the territory. Pakistan has backed many of those militants, as well as terrorists who have struck deep inside India — most brutally in a four-day killing spree in Mumbai in 2008 that left more than 160 people dead.

This seven decade conflict has recently flared up. Nirupama Rao writes in the Washington Post in 2019:

Rao 19 Nirupama Rao [former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to the United States and China, is a global fellow at the Wilson Center and councilor at the World Refugee Council], 3-11-19, "How India and Pakistan can step back from the brink of war," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.671d0a078b86 //DF

These words seemed prescient in recent days, as the two nuclear-armed nations came closer to war than they have in decades. Last month, a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, left 40 Indian paramilitary personnel dead. The Pakistani terror group Jaish-e-Muhammad soon claimed responsibility. Less than two weeks later, the Indian Air Force launched a retaliatory strike deep inside Pakistani territory against a terrorist training camp in Balakot. The Indian foreign office called this "non-military preemptive" action. Pakistan responded by sending its Air Force planes across the Line of Control. In a subsequent dogfight, an Indian aircraft was shot down and its pilot captured, while India claimed it shot down a Pakistani F-16. This engagement elicited international calls for restraint. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan sought moral high ground by calling for peace and, in a clever diplomatic move, returned the captured pilot to India. Tensions have since slowed, though small-scale skirmishes have continued on the border. But in truth, there was darkness in the relationship between the two countries long before the recent escalation — darkness that will remain as we begin to look ahead. The relationship between India and Pakistan is defined by distrust, mutual suspicion and enmity.

Today, an India-obsessed deep state in Pakistan is chagrined to see its neighbor substantively moving ahead in the development race and fast becoming a frontrunner in the global economy. Meanwhile, India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is ready to flex military muscle against Pakistan's habitual support for terrorism as an instrument of sub-conventional war. There are domestic pressures at play: The hostilities boosted approval ratings for Modi before India's general elections in April and May. Attitudes in favor of conflict became even stronger as jingoistic Indian news channels, which have demonstrated an unseemly exuberance for war, exploited national anger and elevated cries for retribution to the level of irrational hysteria. Where do the two nuclear-armed countries go from here? Can a score-settling resort to military means substitute dialogue and diplomacy between the two nations? Has India's retributive strike fulfilled its goals? The jury is out. Each side has claimed victory. Indians believe their tough reaction forced the Pakistanis to seek de-escalation, and the Pakistanis feel that they did not let the Indian strike go unanswered. Both countries continue to be on edge.

India's seat on the UN Security Council would push them over the brink of war with Pakistan for two reasons.

L1 – China

Pakistan's increasingly relies on China for its security as it loses other partners like the US

Abbas 18 Athar Abbas [retired Pakistani major general who served as director general of the Inter-Services Public Relations and a former Pakistan ambassador to Ukraine], 6-27-2018, "China tie is key to Pakistan's security and prosperity," Nikkei Asia Review

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-tie-is-key-to-Pakistan-s-security-and-prosperity> //DF

But people-to-people contacts and economic relations remain limited despite China's proximity and economic success. This is not only because of cultural and language barriers, but Pakistan's Western orientation when it comes to business and trade. Pakistan has also been distracted from developing closer economic ties with China as well as focusing on its own economic development due to its long-simmering dispute with India over Kashmir and internal political disorder that has made the state vulnerable to outside interference. But now Islamabad is rightly forging closer political and economic ties with Beijing in a move that represents an opportunity to advance regional peace and prosperity.

South Asia is a highly volatile region with the nuclear-armed powers of Pakistan and India at loggerheads. **Pakistan is faced with multiple security challenges**, both external and internal. **To the east is India, with an offensive posture to destabilize Pakistan through covert operations, to maintain tensions along the military Line of Control in Kashmir and to isolate Islamabad at the regional and international level. To the west is Afghanistan, wracked by lawlessness and insurgency**, with 3 million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. These developments have severely affected the internal security situation of Pakistan. **India is viewed as using Afghan soil to pose a threat to Pakistan with the help of state and nonstate actors**. The U.S. still refuses to acknowledge that the Afghan Taliban are a political entity and that the Afghan imbroglio is too complex to have a military solution. It cannot be settled without dialogue and political reconciliation. Pakistan is blamed by the U.S. for not doing enough to control the insurgency and rein in the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan believes that it has been made a scapegoat, a whipping boy for the failures of the U.S. and Afghan governments. **With India growing closer to the U.S., Pakistan has started looking for a strategic partner to counter the U.S.-India-Afghan nexus**. Pakistan's fears of isolation have been further enhanced by India's wooing of Iran. The efforts to negotiate a peace deal between the Taliban and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's government, with China and the U.S. as stakeholders, has not materialized due to the ill-timed release of the news in 2015 of the death of Mullah Omar, the former Afghan Taliban leader, and the killing in 2016 of Mullah Mansoor, another Afghan Taliban leader. It represented a lost opportunity for the U.S. and China, which had been actively supporting the peace process. The whole peace process has been derailed by foreign and Afghan intelligence services that want to dictate the outcome on their own terms. In addition, Pakistan's efforts to initiate dialogue with India has not made progress due to India's intransigence and U.S. indifference. **Pakistan's formal inauguration**

in 2013 of the Gwadar port, on the Indian Ocean well away from its borders with India, and China's subsequent support for it should be viewed in this context. Pakistan had wanted to develop the port for both security and economic reasons. Pakistan sought to address the vulnerability of relying on Karachi as its sole main port in a time of crisis, such as a conflict with India, and sought an alternative. In addition, the opening of Gwadar would help provide faster transportation connections for Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics with the Gulf region. The opening of the Gwadar port coincided with the announcement of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Pakistan, foreseeing Chinese interest in the region, decided to hand over the development and management of the port to the Chinese for 43 years until 2059. This decision also paved the way for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which was announced as the flagship project for the BRI, with an investment of \$46 billion. CPEC comprises four key components, including energy development (\$34 billion), infrastructure development (\$11 billion), the Gwadar port and the opening of 10 special economic zones. **Faced with a two-front threat on its borders, Pakistan believed that it had found an opportunity to not only enhance her economic prospects but redress her security concerns. Pakistan has strong defense ties with China. Pakistan has already developed its Al Khalid tanks and JF-17**

Thunder fighters in cooperation with China. With the magnitude of Chinese investment in CPEC and the Chinese presence in the country, Pakistan has now found breathing space in a tough security environment. CPEC may prove to be a game changer not only for Pakistan, but for the entire region. China is already doing business and trading with India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. With the presence of Chinese business groups in Pakistan, more countries in the region are likely to become involved with the CPEC, which will help improve security and economic conditions favorable to Pakistan. But Pakistan needs to take measures to build on the benefits of the Chinese initiative and minimize the risks associated with it.

India can only become a permanent member of the Security Council with the unanimous support of the other permanent members, meaning that China would have to support India's bid. This would kill Pakistan's relations with China.

Kaura '15 Kaura, Vinay (Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Security Studies at Sardar Patel University). "China on India's UNSC Bid: Neither Yes Nor No." *The Diplomat*, 3 June 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-on-indias-uns-c-bid-neither-yes-nor-no/>. [Premier] Chinese support for India's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) remains a distant dream. While addressing the students of the Tsinghua University during his recent China visit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi explicitly underlined the positive impact of China's support for a permanent seat for India at the UNSC. "China's support for India's permanent membership of a reformed UNSC and for India's membership of export control regimes like Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will do more than just strengthen our international cooperation. It will take our relationship to a new level. It will give Asia a stronger voice in the world." The joint statement signed that came out of the visit, however, only stated that China "understands and supports India's aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations including in the Security Council." In other words, India has no option but to wait for unambiguous Chinese support. It has become a customary feature during high-level official visits for the Chinese side to merely "understand and support" India's aspirations for a greater international role. As long as both nuclear-armed Asian rivals find themselves at odds in reshaping international institutions, including the UNSC, Asia can never hope to have a stronger voice in the world. The fate of India's bid is mainly in the hands of the veto-wielding permanent members of the UNSC, and China is the only veto-wielding permanent member that has yet to extend unequivocal support to India's bid to become a permanent member.

Any accommodative shift in China's position on permanent seat is likely to recalibrate Beijing's ties with Islamabad, as the latter has been vociferous in opposing India's entry to the SC. Beijing is not likely to upset its "all weather friend" at this juncture, undermining the centrality of Pakistan in the China's geopolitical calculus. Beijing also fears that India's entry into the UNSC would be a huge loss for China's current global status and prestige among the third world countries. Another factor for China is India's solidarity with Japan, China's arch rival, in making a joint bid for the UNSC membership.

L2 – Pakistan's economy

India would use a seat at the Security Council to punish Pakistan economically to weaken its rival.

Khan 2015 Aamir Hussain Khan [Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army M.A., University of Balochistan], 12- 2015, "UNSC'S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>.

The economic power of India backed by strong diplomatic weight could be devastating for Pakistan's economy. India could destroy Pakistan's economy by making Pakistan run dry by stopping the flow of western rivers, guaranteed to Pakistan under bilateral treaty between India and Pakistan—the Indus Water treaty (IWT). By disregarding the international binding of the World Bank as Guarantor in the IWT, India could obliterate the agro-based economy of Pakistan, which is a mainstay of Pakistan's economy. The permanent membership would afford India an enormous advantage to block resolutions brought before the UNSC by Pakistan. Furthermore, as a permanent member of the UNSC, India could use its influence over international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to prevent Pakistan's access to these institutions; this would greatly damage Pakistan's already weak economy.²²⁰ Likewise, all permanent members are represented on various committees.

Pakistan needs IMF loans to shore up its weak economy and quell social unrest.

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, 4-10-2019 "Economy in Tatters, Pakistan's Premier Calls for End to Armed Militias," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html> //DF

"You can't have the ruling elite siphoning off money and taking it abroad," he said. "If you don't hold them accountable, the country has no future." **With barely enough foreign reserves to cover the country's monthly import bills, Mr. Khan's government knows it needs a large bailout from the International Monetary Fund**, but those often come with painful austerity conditions. His finance team has been reluctant to turn to the I.M.F. but now promises that a deal will be announced in the coming weeks. **On the streets, discontent is rising.** People grumble about rising prices. Mr. Khan's government is trying to slow down demand to keep the trade deficit from growing even bigger. But **his government's decisions to raise levies on fuel and collect more taxes from ordinary Pakistanis**, even if necessary for the economy's long-term health, **have made people even angrier. Economic growth is forecast to slow further, leading to even more joblessness.** Nonetheless, Mr. Khan said, "my first priority is to take 100 million people out of poverty." Pakistani analysts say his priority is genuine but question how Mr. Khan can possibly pay for it. "I've been pretty consistent of my criticism of the P.M. going back a long time," said Mosharraf Zaidi, a newspaper columnist. "One thing that I cannot criticize him for is the core purpose of his being in public life, which is compassion." As far as India, Mr. Khan could not resist a few digs. He said that India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, had opted for airstrikes to please a domestic audience — India begins holding elections on Thursday.

L3 – Killing the prospect of peace

Reddy 16 B. Muralidhar Reddy, 9-18-2016, "UN resolution only way to resolve Kashmir issue: Pakistan," The Hindu,

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/UN-resolution-only-way-to-resolve-Kashmir-issue-Pakistan/article14481621.ece> //DF

A statement posted on the Foreign Ministry website said, "Such acts are a violation of fundamental human rights of Kashmiris and can not deter the people of Jammu and Kashmir from their demand for the realisation of the right to self determination." "Pakistan also has serious concerns over the detention of Kashmiri leadership in Indian Occupied Kashmir and calls upon the Indian government to fulfil its human rights obligations as well as its commitments under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions," the statement said. Reiteration of the demand by Pakistan for implementation of the 1948 U.N. Resolution, which envisaged a series of steps to create a conducive environment for a plebiscite through which people of Jammu and Kashmir could decide on whether or not they want to be part of India or Pakistan, is bound to annoy India. Since the signing of the 1972 Simla Agreement, India has contended that the U.N. Resolution has become redundant as both sides had agreed to resolve the Kashmir issue through mutual negotiations. "Pakistan reiterates that **the resolution of the Kashmir dispute is only possible through the realisation of the right to self-determination of the people of Kashmir, as per UNSC resolutions, through a fair and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices**", the Pakistan Foreign Office said.

Pakistan relies on support from the UN against India, a country that is much stronger and who it could not take on by itself. According to a 2018 article in Dawn News:

App, 4-6-2018, "Pakistan has sought UN's mediation in Kashmir dispute, India has opposed it: UN secy gen ," DAWN, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1399957> (NK)

"The secretary-general has expressed and will continue to express his concern at the situation [in Kashmir]," Dujarric said. "I think we spoke about it earlier in the week, reminding all parties of the need to protect civilians." Talking to the media during a routine briefing, Dujarric assured that the "good offices of the UN are available" for both countries to reach a peaceful solution to the dispute. He added that while **Pakistan has continuously sought UN's good offices to resolve the decades-old dispute, India has opposed the body's mediation.** The statement pointed out that concerned parties must be willing to solve the issue in order to avail UN assistance. Dujarric also clarified that the option was not exclusively for India and Pakistan, but for every nation involved in a dispute.

Pakistan turned to the UN for mediation after the latest attacks

Mackenzie 19 James Mackenzie, 2-19-2019, "Pakistan urges U.N. to intervene over Kashmir tension with India," U.S., Reuters

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan/pakistan-urges-un-to-intervene-over-kashmir-tension-with-india-idUSKCN1Q80EM> //DF

Pakistan's foreign minister appealed to the U.N. Secretary General on Tuesday to help ease tension with India that has escalated sharply following a suicide bomb attack in the Indian part of disputed Kashmir,

that India blamed on Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, facing an election by May, has warned Pakistan to expect a "strong response" to the bombing claimed by a Pakistan-linked militant group, raising fears of conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbors. "It is with a sense of urgency that I draw your attention to the deteriorating security situation in our region resulting from the threat of use of force

against Pakistan by India," Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi wrote to U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres. **"It is imperative to take steps for de-escalation. The United Nations must step in to defuse tensions,"** he wrote, **blaming**

India for deliberately ratcheting up its hostile rhetoric for domestic political reasons. The Pakistani appeal follows days of rising tension between the old rivals after a suicide bomber blew himself up near an Indian police convoy in Indian-controlled Kashmir on Thursday, killing at least 40 paramilitary police. Jaish-e Mohammad, a militant group said to be based in Pakistan which wants the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to be part of Pakistan, claimed responsibility but the Pakistani government has denied any involvement. "Attributing it to Pakistan even before investigations is absurd," Qureshi said. "India must be asked to conduct an open and credible investigation on Pulwama incident," he said. Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir, a former princely state on the border between India and Pakistan, has been in dispute since the partition of India in 1947. Control is split between the two countries but each claims the region in full. The neighbors have fought three wars since 1947, two of them over Kashmir. They have fought countless skirmishes along their de facto border, which the United Nations monitors, in the Himalayan region.

India would use a seat at the Security Council to make sure the UN works for its interests, not Pakistan's, destroying Pakistani hopes for UN neutrality. David Bosco at Indiana University's school of Global and International Studies explains in 2009:

Bosco 09 David Bosco [associate professor at Indiana University's School of Global and International Studies. He is the author of books on the U.N. Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and is at work on a new book about governance of the oceans], 9-23-2009, "Think Again: The U.N. Security Council," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/23/think-again-the-u-n-security-council/> //DF

"Expanding the Council Would Increase Its Legitimacy." Don't be so sure. It has become a constant refrain at U.N. headquarters that the Security Council is anachronistic. And in many ways, it is. Japan, the organization's second- largest financial contributor, deserves a permanent council seat, as do rising economic stars India and Brazil. In the near future, the British and French seats should be combined into a seat for the European Union, a change that would give a regular voice to Germany and boost the EU's aspiration for a common foreign policy. These reforms would help the council more accurately reflect the world's power distribution. But reorganization alone would not greatly increase respect for the body worldwide. Many of the crises and conflicts that the UNSC confronts spring from either rogue regimes or uncooperative non-state actors for whom the council's composition is all but irrelevant. Tyrants in Burma, militias in eastern Congo, and Al Qaeda disciples won't be impressed by a revamped council. And in some cases, an expanded council would even introduce new legitimacy problems. Imagine, for example, a council with India as a permanent member that passed resolutions condemning Pakistan. From Islamabad, the new council would certainly look less legitimate than it does today. Moreover, expansion of the UNSC requires the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly. Since small and mid-sized states often pool their votes, any reform package would have to compensate those blocs of power somehow. Most viable proposals for council reform envision adding five to 10 additional elected seats to compensate the broader U.N. membership for new permanent seats. All told, council membership might balloon to 25 states or more. Such a dramatic expansion could easily undermine the council's value as an important talking shop for major powers. A 25-member UNSC would often prove too large for the kinds of quiet, behind-the-scenes exchanges that have been one of the body's principal values — and contributions to security.

This would ruin any hope at peace in Pakistan's mind, posing an existential risk.

Shamsa Nawaz at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad writes in 2017:

Nawaz 17 Shamsa Nawaz [The author is Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad], 9-11-2017, "Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India's Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership," Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/10-SS_Shamsa_Nawaz_No-1_2018.pdf //DF

In order to echo its significance as a major power of South Asia, India desires for permanent membership of the UNSC. It is willing to let go of the veto power as well initially. So far, it has a support of 122 members out of 193 countries in the UN including the US.³² It has been blocked by China and Pakistan till now. The emerging strategic partnership between India and the US has the potential to change the course of events in Asia. The significance that the US assigns to India is primarily due to its burgeoning economy and trade-driven foreign policy. By the convergence of interests, both India and the US have evolved a strategic partnership since 2004, with the signing of civil-nuclear deal. It would help India in expanding its footprints in the region and the world to eventually get her a permanent seat in the UNSC. The permanent seat in the UNSC will also give India a formal status as a nuclear power with the greater legitimacy of initiatives, whether wrong or right. This would certainly have a potential to destabilise the region by fuelling regional confrontation and conflicts. Even the very existence of Pakistan would be endangered since the division of the Subcontinent remains a sore point in the Indian politics. The UNSC still upholds legitimacy for a worldwide action. It is crucial in maintaining the international order while looking after the super powers interests. However, it is difficult to see the role of the UN in such a world order more than a rubber-stamp. For example, the UN was emasculated when Iraq was invaded and Afghanistan was attacked. There is no doubt that the rise of China is very important and the rise of

India is also noteworthy. Similarly, resurgence of Russia is also an important development. However, the US still remains a major power in the world in terms of military, economics and technology. It would not hesitate to use the UN by the help of its close allies and for their interests. Though, Pakistan is an important ally of the US, particularly in the War on Terrorism (WoT), yet, the US would steer clear of using the UN identically as it did in other parts of the world.

IL

Pakistan uses terror to compensate for the power imbalance (Shah - ORF)

Kriti M. Shah, 2018, "Pakistan's use of terror as a tool," ORF, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-use-terror-tool-45691/> (NK)

The Mumbai attack of 26/11 was a clear demonstration by Pakistan's jihadist organisations' and its military-intelligence establishment's strategic culture of causing hurt and harm to India. **Pakistan uses jihad, conducted by subnational groups (with state support) as an instrument that allows it to punch above its geopolitical weight. [1] Part of the country's strategic thinking is believing in the false idea that the only way to preserve its own security is by ensuring India is weak, defeated or kept in a constant state of chaos.** Pakistan believes it can achieve this imperative by supporting militant actors, thereby ensuring the Pakistani State has plausible deniability when the militant group strikes. Pakistan's strategy of 'bleeding India by a thousand cuts' has been implemented by exploiting religious sentiments and whipping up passions on communal and sectarian lines. **Before launching its proxy war in Kashmir in 1989, it exploited the tribal areas in Northeast India, and exploited discontented youth in Punjab to fight for the creation of Khalistan, a new Sikh nation-state.** By supporting the Sikh militancy in Punjab, it hoped to tie down Indian security forces and divert them from the defence of Kashmir. When India crushed the Khalistani separatist movement, Pakistan turned its attention once again to Kashmir, fomenting instability in the state to check India's power.

India respond to terror with escalation (Bjpai - Dissent Magaine)

Kanti Bajpai, 2003, "An Indian 'War on Terrorism' Against Pakistan?," Dissent Magazine, <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/an-indian-war-on-terrorism-against-pakistan> (NK)

Since the events of September 11, 2001, many in India have argued that if the United States can justify its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, destroying weapons of mass destruction, and changing regimes, then India is justified in attacking Pakistan. Indian external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha is reported to have said, "India has a much better case to go for preemptive action" against Pakistan than the United States had in Iraq. The massacre of more than twenty Hindu men, women, and children in Nadimarg, Kashmir, in late March 2003, renewed calls for sterner action against Pakistan. And yet, Indian anger notwithstanding, military action against Pakistan would be both ineffective and dangerous. **Ever since the Kargil War of 1999, influential Indian strategists have argued that India should be prepared to fight "limited war under nuclear conditions," that is, military operations of a limited conventional nature. This is the only way, they believe, to respond to Pakistan's strategy of sub-conventional warfare-terrorism, and, as in 1999, incursions across the line of control in Kashmir.** Pakistan can only be dissuaded from continuing its sub-conventional warfare, in this view, by the threat of military punishment. This new Indian thinking challenges the Pakistani conviction that its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation. There are probably two reasons for the new Indian thinking on limited war. The first is the belief that India, with its bigger nuclear forces, has "escalation dominance" and can up the ante at every level of violence. To the extent that India has the whip hand, Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons against a punitive Indian strike would be neutralized. Islamabad would be dissuaded from resorting to nuclear weapons by the fear of massive retaliation.

Pakistani terrorist attacks on India are destabilizing and force India to respond, leading both countries down the war path

Rao 19 Nirupama Rao [former Indian foreign secretary and ambassador to the United States and China, is a global fellow at the Wilson Center and councilor at the World Refugee Council], 3-11-19, "How India and Pakistan can step back from the brink of war," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.671d0a078b86 //DF

Where do the two nuclear-armed countries go from here? Can a score-settling resort to military means substitute dialogue and diplomacy between the two nations? Has India's retributive strike fulfilled its goals? The jury is out. Each side has claimed victory. Indians believe their tough reaction forced the Pakistanis to seek de-escalation, and the Pakistanis feel that they did not let the Indian strike go unanswered. Both countries continue to be on edge. No government in New Delhi can advocate diplomacy when terrorist groups in Pakistan flourish. Pakistan cannot afford to play catch-me-if-you-can on terrorism. If it keeps the terrorism tap flowing, it will only trigger a heightened military response from India to enforce deterrence. That would dramatically increase the threat of outright war. Some analysts say India-Pakistan relations are living on borrowed time. Terrorist strikes on India from Pakistan-based terrorist groups will no longer go unanswered. The repercussions are foreboding. International diplomacy must shift to top gear to ease tensions and firmly convey to Pakistan that inaction on terrorism could have serious consequences. In the past, Pakistani governments have shown that they can clamp down upon infiltration by militants and terrorists from their territory into India. They must do so now. It is only through such sustained, effective action that the resumption of comprehensive bilateral dialogue can become a possibility. For its part, India should further strengthen counter-terrorism measures. Pulwama pointed to breaches in its security and how it transports security personnel through risk-saturated terrain. It should also strengthen its own diplomatic campaign to internationally proscribe Pakistani terrorist groups and individuals. In particular, China — which has blocked proposals in the U.N. Security Council to list Jaish-e-Muhammad leader Masood Azhar as a proscribed global terrorist — should not brush aside Indian concerns in order to protect Pakistan.

Terror crisis -> war

Lalwani, 2018, Foreign Policy, "why india pakistan can't handle another terrorist crises," <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/india-and-pakistan-arent-ready-for-another-terrorist-crisis/> (NK)

Furthermore, South Asian crisis behavior continues to be shaped by perverse incentives with both parties driving recklessly, relying on external actors to draw them back from the brink. Third parties Thus, were not, principally the United States, played an active role mediating and de-escalating several nuclear-tinged South Asian crises from 1990 to 2008 through a mix of deft diplomacy, assurances, and threats to get both sides to back down. While the United States was essential in the past, today Washington may be reluctant to intervene as a crisis manager given its declining footprint and exposure in Afghanistan, as well as an "America First" ideology driving U.S. foreign-policy decision-making. China, which generally followed the U.S. lead, possesses substantially more influence over Pakistan than in previous decades. While Beijing has incrementally increased its role in crisis management, it remains reluctant to seriously pressure Pakistan the way Washington has, and it may introduce a coordination problem with the United States. The diminution or complication of third-party crisis managers raises serious risks if, as war games suggest, both India and Pakistan cannot de-escalate a crisis or conflict on their own. Not all interstate provocations necessarily result in crises. There is a degree to which countries can "select into" and escalate crises. When U.S. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy was asked about the crisis that triggered the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, he replied that crisis events are like streetcars: One will come along eventually if you wait long enough. Some research suggests there is a degree of selectivity at work in South Asian crises as well, built on a

political calculus, particularly if provocations are complex, protracted, and amplified by the media during a period of strained relations and limited dialogue.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are dangerous because they are controlled by lower level commanders (loose nukes) and because they enable terrorism with impunity

London 19 Brad Lendon, Cnn, 3-4-2019, "Crisis may be easing, but nuclear threat still hangs over India and Pakistan," CNN,

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/01/asia/india-pakistan-military-balance-intl/index.html> //DF

One area where Indian and Pakistan are evenly matched is the area that raises the most worry whenever hostilities spike between the two -- nuclear weapons. Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute last year show Pakistan with 140 to 150 nuclear warheads and India with 130 to 140. Layton worries that if the situation gets dire for Pakistan -- something that's far from what we're seeing at the moment -- they could be used before commanders in Islamabad could stop them. "Pakistan has a strategic policy of delegating nuclear release approval down to lower level tactical units," he said. "There is a real danger of 'loose nukes,' that is lower-level bellicose commanders using tactical nuclear weapons if they see fit." Motwani said Pakistan wants India to know that nuclear threat is always there. That leads back to how the current spike in hostilities began, when a Pakistan-based terror group struck an Indian military convoy in Indian-administered Kashmir on February 14, killing 40. "Pakistan can use terrorist groups. That's a military strategy it has used for decades as a way to bridge the military gap with India," Motwani said. And every time India contemplates retaliation, the nuclear threat is there. "It uses its nuclear weapon capability as a firewall that it uses to carry out terrorist strikes in India with impunity," he said.

Pakistan retaliate with nukes (Herrera - pacific)

Jack Herrera, 2-27-2019, "Could the Conflict Between Pakistan and India Lead to Nuclear War?," Pacific Standard,

<https://psmag.com/news/could-the-conflict-between-pakistan-and-india-lead-to-nuclear-war> (NK)

In 1999, Pakistan's foreign minister explained why the country refused to adopt a No First Use policy, declaring that Islamabad would use "any weapon" in its arsenal to defend the country. Today, experts believe that, unlike India, Pakistan could plausibly deploy a nuclear weapon in response to a conventional attack. Pakistan maintains a smaller army and less weaponry than India, and would likely be overwhelmed if the Indian military invaded Pakistani territory with its full force. Facing loss of territory and national collapse, Islamabad could decide to launch a nuclear weapon against India in an attempt to even the playing field. In an analysis of his country's nuclear doctrine in 1999, Sardar F.S. Lodi, a former Pakistani lieutenant general, wrote:

Impact

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would kill 12 million people instantly

Shanker 02 Thom Shanker, 5-27-2002, "12 Million Could Die at Once in an India-Pakistan Nuclear War," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/27/world/12-million-could-die-at-once-in-an-india-pakistan-nuclear-war.html> //DF

An American intelligence assessment, completed this week as tensions between India and Pakistan intensified, warns that **a full-scale nuclear exchange between the two rivals could kill up to 12 million people immediately** and injure up to 7 million, Pentagon officials say. **Even a "more limited" nuclear war** -- as measured in number of warheads -- **would have cataclysmic results, overwhelming hospitals across Asia and requiring vast foreign assistance**, particularly from the United States, to battle radioactive contamination, famine and disease, officials said. **"The humanitarian crisis that would result would be so great that every medical facility in the Middle East and Southwest Asia would be quickly overwhelmed,"** one Defense Department official said. "The American military would have no choice but go in and help with the victims and to clean up." American estimates of the number of warheads in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals, and their capacity, remain classified. But Pentagon and administration officials, speaking in general terms, said Pakistan has "a couple of dozen" nuclear warheads and India "several dozen."

An Indo-Pakistan nuke war is a nightmare scenario

Sha 19 Saeed Shah, 2-27-2019, "A Brief History of the Kashmir Conflict," WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-brief-history-of-the-kashmir-conflict-11551302856> //DF

India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. But then both countries acquired nuclear weapons, which has deterred them from pursuing an all-out war that could threaten mutual annihilation. A smaller, short-lived conflict erupted in 1999, but that was confined to Kashmir. A 2013 report by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War warned that **a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would set off a global famine that could kill two billion people, "entering something that is clearly the end of civilization."** Faced with a bigger foe and the potential devastation of war, Pakistan turned in the 1990s to supporting jihadist groups that launched attacks on India-controlled Kashmir. That strategy continues, with those militant groups based in Pakistan. The jihadist groups have also attacked beyond Kashmir. In 2008, 10 gunmen traveled from Pakistan, killing more than 160 people in Mumbai, India. Pakistan denies giving any official help to the Mumbai attackers.

FRONTLINES

India-Pakistan Conflict

UN Mediation helped end the last conflict (US office of the historian)

US office of the historian, "India Pakistan war of 1965", <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war> (NK)
After Pakistani troops invaded Kashmir, India moved quickly to internationalize the regional dispute. It asked the United Nations to reprise its role in the First India-Pakistan War and end the current conflict. **The Security Council passed Resolution 211 on September 20 calling for an end to the fighting and negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir problem, and the United States and the United Kingdom supported the UN decision by cutting off arms supplies to both belligerents.** This ban affected both belligerents, but Pakistan felt the effects more keenly since it had a much weaker military in comparison to India. **the UN resolution and the halting of arms sales had an immediate impact. India accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on September 22.** The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of Kashmir, and both sides accepted the Soviet Union as a third-party mediator. Negotiations in Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with both sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies from the disputed territory. Nevertheless, although the Tashkent agreement achieved its short-term aims, conflict in South Asia would reignite a few years later.

Case Overview

India poses an existential threat to Pakistan that they must use terrorism and increasingly risky strategies to combat

Economist 11 5-19-2011, "A rivalry that threatens the world," Economist,

<https://www.economist.com/briefing/2011/05/19/a-rivalry-that-threatens-the-world> //DF

Many Pakistanis, however, cannot see things as Americans do. On Abbottabad, for example, they care little that bin Laden was there, and much more about the ease with which American forces swooped in. A poll a week after the raid of 2,500 people found that only 26% believed bin Laden had been killed. Around half, 49%, reckoned the event had been faked, and nearly as many thought bin Laden, if dead, was anyway a martyr. Around 68% were most bothered that an outsider had violated

Pakistan's sovereignty. The Abbottabad affair was especially galling because the town sits close to the border with the Indian-run bit of Kashmir, supposedly a well-guarded frontier. Ordinary Pakistanis are conditioned to fret that India has still not

come to terms with the existence of their country, and may one day simply come strolling in. It is no surprise that a resident in a house across from bin Laden's, describing the raid, said: "We first thought the Indians were invading." At a joint session of the Pakistani parliament on May 13th, attended by army chiefs, the real concern was India. India's army chief, foolishly, had boasted just after the bin Laden raid that his special forces had the means to do something similar. Pakistan's spy chief, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, told MPs that the Pakistani army had not only picked targets in India for retaliation but had also rehearsed striking them. The usefulness of jihad Amid all

the threats, MPs did not bother to ask questions about bin Laden. That may have been pride, or it may have reflected Pakistanis' sense that jihadis are less snakes in the yard than a practical, if unconventional, means for a weak country to project power against a much bigger one. India's population and its economy are now both eight times bigger than Pakistan's, and growing fast (see table). Whereas Pakistan relies on aid and begs foreigners to equip its army, India, by contrast, races on, is now an aid-giver and has America eager to be its friend. As a longstanding, stable democracy, it has moral power. It sits on the United Nations Security Council, shares intelligence closely with America and plans to spend tens of billions of dollars a year on defence. Pakistan's relative insecurities have been intensified over the years by natural disasters, such as huge floods in 2010, and self-inflicted wounds such as frequent military coups. But they are all the more deeply felt because they are not new.

The country was born from partition with India in 1947, a bloodbath that killed hundreds of thousands

(both Muslims and Hindus) and displaced many millions. That, and Islam, helped forge a sense of nationhood. But the wounds of partition also caused Pakistanis to fear for their existence. For a weak country, using proxy armies and jihadis has often seemed a good idea. Just after partition, late in 1947, fierce Pushtun tribesmen poured into Kashmir to seize territory for Pakistan from India. Where they reached is still, more or less, the territory's line of control (see map). Later, with American help, the then ruler of Pakistan, General Zia al Haq, sent jihadis to take on the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan. His eventual successor as dictator, General Pervez

Musharraf, recently admitted what everyone knew, that militants had then been sent to stir trouble in Indian-run Kashmir. Deploying jihadis is cheap, easy and somewhat deniable if things go wrong. It occupies men who might otherwise make mischief at home, and may also help foster a sense of national unity in Pakistan, as jihadis fight in the name of Islam. But as Ijaz

Gilani, a Gallup pollster in Islamabad, points out, national feeling is also fuelled by hostility to India. Many Pakistanis are quick to explain away, or even actively support, jihadis who strike even at soft, civilian, targets in India, such as the attack in Mumbai in 2008 when 170 people died. A trial that started on May 16th in America may test this idea. Prosecutors in Chicago accuse a businessman of Pakistani descent, Tahawwur Hussain Raina, of helping the Mumbai attackers, among whose victims were six Americans. A government witness has already said that an ISI officer, a "Major Iqbal", helped to fund and guide the Mumbai attackers. If Pakistan's unhealthy tolerance of jihadi groups is the result of an obsession with India, what of its disruptive behaviour in Afghanistan? It lets America drive three-quarters of its war supplies from Karachi, and goes along with immensely unpopular drone strikes against extremists in its own tribal areas. Yet it also diverts funds to its Pushtun brethren, the Afghan Taliban, and resists any ground attack on another group connected with al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network (active in Afghanistan, based in Pakistan), though it is said to be pressing them to join Afghan peace talks. Seen from Kabul, Pakistan's ISI is behind the growing activity of Afghan insurgents. Researchers there totted up 12,244 attacks in the country last year, a more than five-fold increase since 2006. "Those connected to the insurgency say to us that ISI activities have increased [especially] over the past 18 months," reports a well-connected observer. The Pakistanis deny that they are actively helping the Taliban. They also refuse to

accept that they are duplicitous in their dealings with America. Yes, they say, they agreed to back America's war: refusing would have made an enemy of a superpower. But that does not mean they are adopting America's aspirations in Afghanistan. Pakistanis plainly see quite different national interests there—again, largely, because of India. Where America broadly hopes to clamp down on Islamic extremists, impose some sort of order and find a way to get its soldiers home, Pakistan, by contrast, does not want to see a strong Afghan state—particularly one where ethnic groups such as Tajiks, traditionally friendly to India, tend to predominate in positions of power. Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, drove home the point on a rare visit to Kabul on May 13th. In Afghanistan's parliament he made much of India's impressive \$1.5 billion aid schemes, which have built roads, set up power lines and fostered ties between the two countries. He promised another \$500m as he cheered the emerging “strategic” partnership. A senior Indian government official says India has “no endgame” in Afghanistan; all it wants is a country that is “moderate” and “stable”. But even that makes insecure Pakistanis jumpy. Afghanistan has been hostile to Pakistan for much of its history: opposing, alone, Pakistan's membership of the UN, refusing even now to recognise Pakistan's external borders. Separatists in Pakistan, notably the Baluchis and perhaps even Pushtuns, might also grow more active if war ended next door. Pushtuns are a large minority in Pakistan and the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has never recognised the “Durand line”, the Afghan-Pakistan border that the British drove through Pushtun tribal lands, and the idea of an independent “Pushtunistan” has never entirely vanished. Pakistan fears encirclement by India and its ally. The Pakistanis have long accused India, via Iran and Afghanistan, of arming the Baluchi separatists. Suspicion runs deep. An ISI official in Islamabad spins a theory that Indian road-building in Afghanistan is really a cover for shipping enormous quantities of explosives there for use by terrorists inside Pakistan, including, supposedly, the 2008 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. Pakistan therefore wants influence in Afghanistan for the sake of “strategic depth”. That variously means having control of territory to which its leaders, soldiers or even nuclear weapons could move in case of war with India, or simply having close Afghan allies across the border, who can help keep Indian meddling at bay. Either way, Pakistan wants Afghanistan weak, divided, or once more ruled (at least in part) by a pliant Pushtun proxy; though some generals say they are less keen on the Taliban, now they have seen what they are like. Armed and dangerous To Indians Pakistan's existential fears are exaggerated, blown up by the army to scare the people. India has never been the aggressor, they point out. Even when India intervened to help split Pakistan in two, in 1971, it only did so late, after seeing mass flows of refugees and atrocities on a horrific scale by the army against civilians in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Instead, say Indians, Pakistanis' own paranoia is the root of their instability. M.J. Akbar, an eloquent Indian journalist and author of a new book on Pakistan, sums up the place as dangerous and fragile, a “toxic jelly state”. He blames the army, mostly, for ever more desperate decisions to preserve its dominance. “Pakistan is slipping into a set of contradictions that increasingly make rational behaviour hostage to the need for institutions to survive,” he says. Others, including liberal Pakistanis, add that Pakistan cannot shake itself from military men obsessed with India. “We have become delusional, psychotic, fearing how to protect ourselves from the rest of the world,” says one. India's most senior security officials say that Pakistan is still, in essence, a state run by its army. That army, the world's seventh-largest, bleeds the state of about a sixth of all public funds with almost no civilian oversight. All that is grim enough. Then consider how Pakistan is rapidly expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons. That programme was born out of the country's humiliating loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Six years earlier, around the time of a previous defeat by India, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's foreign minister, had declared: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.” Pakistan may now have between 70 and 120 usable nuclear devices—and may be unusually ready to use them. Some in the West believe Pakistan started preparing nuclear-tipped missiles in the midst of the 1999 Kargil war against India, after Pakistan invaded a remote corner of Kashmir. Nobody doubts that Pakistan, in the midst of its anxiety over India, is trying hard to get more. Its nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of about 15-20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The country produces about 100 kilograms of that a year, but is rapidly expanding its nuclear infrastructure with Chinese help. And with production long-established, the price of adding weapons has fallen to almost nothing. A nuclear physicist in Pakistan, Pervez Hoodbhoy, now suggests that “you can have a working nuke for about \$10m, or the cost of a nice big house in Islamabad.” The new push seems, as ever, to be a response to two developments next door. Pakistan was badly spooked by India's deal on civil nuclear power with America, completed in 2008. This not only binds America and India closely; it also lets India buy uranium on international markets, and probably means it will soon build many more reactors. By one panicky Pakistani estimate, India could eventually be making 280 nuclear weapons a year. The other change is over doctrine and delivery. India has long held a position of “no first use” of nukes. Pakistan, by contrast, with weaker conventional forces, refuses to rule out the option of starting a nuclear war against India, and is now taking steps that could make such first use more likely. Last month it test-fired a new missile, the Hatf IX, with a range of just 60km and specifically designed for war-fighting. Two missiles are carried in tubes on a transporter and can be fired, accurately, at short notice. The warheads are small, low-yielding devices for destroying large tank formations with relatively little explosive damage or radiation beyond the battlefield. Pakistan's generals say their new tactical weapons will meet a threat from India's Cold Start doctrine, adopted in 2004, that calls for rapid, punitive, though conventional thrusts against Pakistan. But by rolling out tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan is stirring fears of instability. Previous efforts to reassure observers that terrorists or rogue army officers could not get hold of nukes rested on the fact that warheads and delivery systems were stored separately and were difficult to fire—and that final authority to launch a strike requires “consensus” within the National Command Authority, which includes various ministers

and the heads of all three services, and is chaired by the prime minister. **But tactical nuclear weapons deployed close to the battlefield pose new risks. Command-and-control protocols are likely to be looser and more delegated. If field officers retreating in the face of a conventional attack by India were forced to decide between using or losing their nuclear weapons, a border incursion could swiftly escalate into something very much bigger and more lethal.** Talking, not shooting Trouble on the border is not a theoretical problem; it is commonplace. Exchanges of fire between Pakistanis and Indians over the border in Kashmir killed an Indian soldier this weekend. This time it did not escalate, in part because the two countries are in the midst of diplomatic efforts. But India's prime minister, Mr Singh, ordered a review by his security chiefs.

Link – R/T no veto

1. The resolution says that India would become a permanent member, which by definition have vetoes. It is impossible to know whether they will get one or not, so it most education to go by the current definition and debate on whether that veto is good or bad.

Foreign minister Swaraj says they want to be treated equally, and get a veto. Prefer this analysis because the entire reason India wants to be on the council is for power and fairness; no veto would destroy these things.

2. Abusive because members without a veto have no power. Gillman 17 writes that members with vetoes are 10-100x more powerful than those without; no veto, no intervention prevention or need to be listened too.

3. Not an educational debate because there are so many different reform possibilities. When the UN secretary general asked for members to submit reforms to the Security Council they had 101 different ideas. We shouldn't be speculating about what any number of those reforms should look like.

"The Veto : UN Security Council Working Methods : Security Council Report," Security Council Report, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php> //DF **Beyond permanency itself, the veto power is probably the UN Charter's most significant distinction between permanent and non-permanent members. Article 27 (3) of the Charter establishes that all substantive decisions of the Council must be made with "the concurring votes of the permanent members"**. The veto has been addressed regularly during the annual working methods debates and is among the topics most frequently raised in the context of almost all discussions of Council working methods. Permanent members use the veto to defend their national interests, to uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to promote a single issue of particular importance to a state. Since 16 February 1946—when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) cast the first veto on a draft resolution regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops

from Lebanon and Syria (S/PV.23)—the veto has been recorded 290 times. In the early years, the USSR cast most of the vetoes, with a considerable number of these used to block the admission of a new member state. Over the years, the USSR/Russia has cast a total of 141 vetoes, or close to half of all vetoes. The US cast the first of its 83 vetoes to date on 17 March 1970 (S/9696 and Corr. 1 and 2). The USSR had by that point cast 107 vetoes. Since 1970, the US has used the veto far more than any other permanent member, most frequently to block decisions that it regards as detrimental to the interests of Israel. The UK has used the veto 32 times, the first such instance taking place on 30 October 1956 (S/3710) during the Suez crisis. France applied the veto for the first time on 26 June 1946 with respect to the Spanish Question (S/PV.49) and has cast a total of 18 vetoes. China has used the veto 14 times, with the first one, on 13 December 1955 (S/3502), cast by the Republic of China (ROC) and the remaining 13 by the People's Republic of China after it succeeded ROC as a permanent member on 25 October 1971.

Press Trust of India, 4-6-2017, "India Will Become Permanent Member Of UN Security Council: Sushma Swaraj," NDTV,

<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-will-become-permanent-member-of-un-security-council-sushma-swaraj-1678206>

NEW DELHI: Expressing confidence that India would become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj today said the country expected that the new members would have the same rights, including the veto power, as the existing permanent members. During the Question Hour in Rajya Sabha, Ms Swaraj said India has all the credentials to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and four permanent members, US, UK, France and Russia have all extended support. The fifth member, China, has also "not publicly opposed it", the External Affairs minister said. "I am confident that if not this time, then next time, India would become a permanent member of the UN Security Council," she said. **To a question whether India would also get the 'veto' power**

[India's External Affairs Minister], Ms Swaraj said the country wants the same responsibilities,

prerogatives as well as obligations as the current permanent members. "We don't want any discrimination

between old and new members. **We don't want two classes - that there is a first class and a second class of permanent members. This should make it clear that India wants the same responsibilities, prerogatives and obligations as the current permanent members,**" she said. She also said India has been making diplomatic efforts to ensure not only expansion, but also reform in the Security Council. She said India wanted expansion of its permanent as well as non-permanent membership of the council. In her reply tabled in the House, Ms Swaraj said on the issue of extending veto powers to new permanent members in their submission during the inter-governmental negotiation process of the 69th General Assembly, USA and UK opposed extension of veto to new members. France supported the extension while Russia and China did not make any submission on the issue, she said.

Blum 05 Yehuda Z. Blum [Hersch Lauterpacht Professor of International Law (Emeritus), The Hebrew University], June 2005, "Proposals for UN Security Council Reform," Cambridge University Press,

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1602295.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4c99e9c2fcb3f4ef41cddb280ff2cb64> //DF

On December 2, 2004, United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan circulated the report submitted to him by a sixteen-member high-level panel that he had appointed to address "threats, challenges and change" confronting the United Nations in the coming years.¹ The secretary-general **had requested that the panel, inter alia, "make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century."**² **A list of 101 recommendations** are summarized in Annex I of the panel's report³ and deal with a wide range of problems facing the international community. Of them all, the recommendation **concerning the enlargement of the Security Council** (with two alternative models envisaging such enlargement)⁴ **has attracted the greatest attention internationally,** despite the caveat contained in the transmittal letter of the panel's report that "it would be a major error to allow the discussions needed to move towards a decision between the two options [concerning the enlargement of the Security Council] to divert attention from decisions on the many other necessary proposals for change

IMF Link – R/T Chinese loans

<https://www.deccanherald.com/international/world-news-politics/prevent-imf-bailout-to-pakistan-to-repay-chinese-debt-727504.html>

In a letter to Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the bipartisan group of three lawmakers – Ted Yoho, Ami Bera and George Holding – expressed their **"deep concern" over the likely use of IMF's bailout package to repay the massive Chinese debt that Pakistan has accumulated under China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)**. "We write to express our deep concern over attempts made by the **Government of Pakistan to seek a bailout deal with the International Monetary Fund to retrieve debts incurred from predatory Chinese infrastructure projects,**" the Congressmen said in a letter dated April 5. China, they said, is investing USD 62 billion in Pakistan under CPEC. "Its debt repayment and profit repatriation terms are not transparent and have understandably raised concerns inside Pakistan," they said. "Illustrative of the dangers of **China's debt-trap diplomacy**, Sri Lanka became unable to make payments on the Chinese debt it had taken for the Hambantota Port Development Project," the letter said.

Under "heavy pressure" from China, Sri Lanka ultimately handed over 1,500 acres of land around the port for a 99-year lease, they said. "The impact of Chinese predatory financing in Pakistan, as already seen in the case of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, cannot be ruled out," the letter said. Asserting that there is a "critical need for transparency in projects" including loan terms and contractual details, **the Congressmen said "unless the terms are subjected to strict scrutiny" the Islamabad may use the IMF bailout package to repay Pakistan's debt obligations to China.** Noting that Pakistan's history with the IMF gives further cause for concern, the US lawmakers said having spent 22 of the past 30 years in a dozen different IMF bailout programs, Pakistan has failed to carry out necessary structural economic problems. "Another bailout that fails to provide transparency and address issues of balance of payment, high fiscal deficit, and unsustainable debt will again be doomed to fail, instead enriching China," the three Congressmen warned. They said it is critical that **the US continues to work to counter China's attempts to hold "hostage countries that are unable to repay unfavourable loans" in an attempt to further their geostrategic goals.**

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-31/pakistan-s-bailout-is-really-china-s>

In all likelihood, Pakistan will seek a \$12 billion [bailout](#) from the International Monetary Fund this week, its 12th since the 1980s and the largest one yet. This time, the IMF should think twice: **Pakistan's debt crisis isn't the result of an economic shock. It's the result of reckless Chinese lending.** Any new aid package will only worsen the risk of similar problems arising elsewhere. Under its Belt and Road

Initiative, China extends lavish loans to support infrastructure projects overseas. The catch is that these deals typically require that the money be spent on Chinese goods, services, and labor, and the repayment terms are generally opaque and often onerous. Pakistan shows how things can go wrong. China is investing some \$62 billion across a [range](#) of projects there, including roads, ports, energy plants and business parks. It sounds great -- until you look at the details. One Pakistani concession guarantees Chinese power plants annual returns of up to [34 percent](#) for 30 years, all backed by the government. By comparison, Pakistan's 10-year government bond yields have generally fluctuated between 8 and 9 percent over the past year. Worse, China is lending in U.S. dollars, so Pakistan must run an increasingly large surplus to repay its loans. **Unable to export enough to generate a trade surplus, it has rapidly been depleting its foreign-exchange reserves, thus leading it into the arms of the IMF yet again.** Other recipients of China's largess have come under similar strain. Venezuela secured Chinese loans with oil, then found that it couldn't sell enough additional crude on global markets to generate the hard currency needed to expand production. After Sri Lanka was unable to repay loans, China took a 99-year concession on one of its ports. Malaysia, Myanmar and Nepal are all reconsidering major Chinese investments, and no wonder. **Belt and Road projects are so risky because their rationale is political, not economic. Enshrined in the [Communist Party constitution](#) in 2017, the program is a cornerstone of China's plans to expand its influence and soft power globally.** Most Belt and Road lending is channeled through state-owned policy banks that are more concerned with advancing foreign-policy goals -- such as winning over new allies -- than with turning a profit. **One result is that credit is often extended with little regard for financial viability or [international lending standards](#).** This helps explain why so many of the early Belt and Road recipients have ended up in financial distress. As China expands the program around the world, other projects will almost certainly end in tears. (Laotian [high-speed rail](#) comes to mind.)

The IMF needs to be wary of this dynamic. Although [it has issued warnings](#) about China's ever-expanding debt load, it has also repeatedly acceded to Chinese demands. It allowed the yuan to become a reserve currency in 2015, for instance, even though it violated essentially every criterion of a reserve currency. If the IMF fails to take a stand on Pakistan, it will be encouraging moral hazard across the Belt and Road countries. In considering its aid package, then, the fund should exclude any repayment of Chinese debt or demand an exceptional haircut on it. It must make clear that it distinguishes between commercial projects gone awry and foreign-policy ventures that look an awful lot like a debt trap. If China's leaders want to splurge overseas on dubious projects, that's their business. But the IMF shouldn't have to clean up when things go wrong.

Pakistan is still aiming for an IMF bailout as of the 15th and hope to finish by June

<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/imf-may-delay-bailout-package-to-cash-strapped-pakistan-report/article26843679.ece>

Pakistani daily Dawn quoting official sources said the visit of the IMF mission to Islamabad for finalising the bailout package may be delayed as both sides are still engaged in an "intense discussion" on the final details of the deal. "So, the IMF mission is now more likely to visit Islamabad in May, not April," the sources told the daily. The finance minister, who led the Pakistani delegation at the meetings, went to New York on Friday but his team, which includes senior officials of his ministry and other government agencies, stayed in Washington for further talks. Umar during a press conference on Thursday said **the two sides had "more or less, reached an understanding" on the bailout package and "in a day or two, we hope to reach a full agreement"**. An official familiar with the

Pakistan-IMF talks said, “**Islamabad still hopes to conclude the agreement before June, as they believe the bailout package would help budget prospects.**” If concluded, it would be the 14th IMF aid package for Pakistan. The sticking points, however, are the demands for market-determined exchange rates and sharing details of Chinese loans which Pakistan is reluctant to do so. The sources said that IMF officials were also seeking details of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), along with a written guarantee from both Pakistan and China that the IMF assistance will not be used to repay loans to China.

China Link – R/T need CN alliance

1. Pakistan views security concerns first, before economics, that’s why they allow terrorist attacks on India and even China!

2. Pakistan is also skeptical of China’s economic manipulation

IL – R/T No more Pakistani terror

Pakistan will always use terrorism in spite of international backlash because it costs India dearly

Krepon 19 Michael Krepon, 2-19-2019, “The conflict between India and Pakistan is about to get uglier,” Washington Post,

[//DF">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/19/conflict-between-india-pakistan-is-about-get-uglier/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cce57f5c9aa9">//DF](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/19/conflict-between-india-pakistan-is-about-get-uglier/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cce57f5c9aa9)

The sound you are about to hear is India administering a black eye to Pakistan after a string of attacks in Kashmir. You can then expect the Pakistan military to give its “befitting response.” And then what? There are many good reasons for leaders in both countries to try to avoid serious escalation, but **we are entering into new territory in the tit-for-tat choreography of settling grievances between neighbors that just can’t get along.** Pakistan has a matching set of black eyes. The first resulted when

Jaish-e-Muhammad, a terrorist outfit active in Kashmir, carried out a suicide bombing on Feb. 14. **The government of Pakistan, now as always, denies involvement, but there is ample evidence that Jaish-e-Muhammad is linked to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI. The Kashmir insurgency is now largely homegrown, thanks to terrible Indian decisions in Kashmir. But local militants still need external support.** As long as the Jaish leadership remains ensconced in Pakistan, denials of complicity won’t be convincing. Jaish’s titular head is Masood Azhar, who was sprung from an Indian jail in 1999 in return for the release of a hijacked Indian Airlines plane, passengers and crew. This was a time of brazen operations by ISI, then flush with success after helping expel Soviet troops from Afghanistan and backstopped by Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998. With support from the ISI, the newly created Jaish-e-Muhammad carried out a stunning attack on the state assembly building in Srinagar, the summer capital of Indian-controlled Kashmir, and then an even-more-stunning attack on the Indian Parliament building in 2001. About a million troops mobilized for war afterward, which was narrowly averted. Ever since, a succession of Pakistani governments has professed an arm’s-length relationship to Jaish-e-Muhammad. After each flash-point, it has rounded up the usual suspects for polite detention, including Azhar, but no Pakistani court has dared to convict him. He lives in a compound in Bahawalpur, a city in Punjab 270 miles from the Indian border. The Indian Air Force must know his address. The last spectacular attack by a terrorist group based in Pakistan against a high-profile Indian target was in 2008, when locations including luxury hotels, the central train station and a Jewish center were struck in Mumbai. Again, Azhar was rounded up and released (though Pakistan has denied it), but evidence of collusion between the perpetrators and ISI, including intercepted telephone conversations during the siege, was incontrovertible — but not admissible in Pakistani courts, according to experts. Ever since, terrorist attacks against India have centered on Kashmir with much lower casualty counts. There was a feeling-out period to clarify when the body counts would prompt Indian retaliation. That threshold was crossed in 2016 at Uri, when an Indian post along the Kashmir divide was attacked, killing 19. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi then publicized “surgical strikes,” claiming to have inflicted roughly double the

number of Pakistani casualties. Pakistani officials denied Indian claims, and everyone moved on. Cross-border attacks are not an uncommon occurrence; publicizing them is. The Feb. 14 massacre, which killed 40 members of India's security forces, goes well beyond the killings at Uri, so Modi, now in the run-up to national elections, has announced his intention to strike back more forcefully than before. One big question is where: Will Indian forces confine their retaliation to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir or take more dramatic action by striking Pakistan's Punjab province, where Jaish and another major anti-Indian jihadi group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, led by Hafiz Saeed, have their headquarters? Strikes into Punjab would be a whole new ballgame, likely to prompt counter-strikes by missiles, aircraft, or both. Why would the ISI and Jaish up the ante now, when Pakistan is in dire economic straits? Strikes against Indian targets usually occur under two sets of circumstances — when relations with India are improving, to throw sand in diplomatic gears, or when New Delhi gives Pakistan the cold shoulder. The most recent attack conveys a message of local defiance, as well as the message that Pakistan won't be ignored. Modi has rejected Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan's sincere overtures to improve ties. Many hoped that progress might occur after the Indian elections later this year. These hopes now appear dashed. And why would Pakistan's military and intelligence services keep backing groups that ruin its international standing and prospects for economic recovery? Because these outfits reinforce an insurgency that costs India dearly. Plus, to shut them down could be quite difficult and costly. No civilian government has changed the Pakistan military's calculus or diminished its bloated share of the budget pie, which is based on enduring enmity with India. Besides, Beijing will continue to have Pakistan's back. So stay tuned. This could get ugly.

Impact - Pakistan can rely on China sec

They can't - China has not extended their umbrella to India, nor do they have any mutual defense pact or even any defence treaties. (Sadiq - National Interest)

B.J. Sadiq, 3-8-2018, "China and Pakistan: Friends or Not?," American Interest, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/03/08/china-pakistan-friends-not/> (NK)

Chinese engineers lodged at Kahuta's palatial guesthouse where together they studied American and Russian bomb designs. There were also regular Islamabad-bound flights from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, bringing in useful material for the bomb. The United States intelligence community knew about Pakistan's camouflaged nuclear build-up and considered it an irritant, yet they tolerantly looked the other way, given the role of the Pakistan Army in the Cold War alliance forged to contain the Soviets. Despite this Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, though, China never declared or boasted of its military alliance with Pakistan, preferring to keep the association as incubated and indifferent as possible. That is why the Chinese have never subscribed to any joint defense pacts or treaties with Pakistan, and never committed its soldiers to Pakistani border brawls with India. When Bhutto proposed a defense agreement to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in 1974, it was tactfully and gently brushed off. So although the Chinese have kept the supply of guns, tanks, small arms, rockets, and other ammunition flowing profusely to Pakistan, they've drawn a line by publicly declaring that they won't extend any nuclear umbrella to any state, including Pakistan. This polite indifference towards Pakistan complicates the friendship narrative that the Islamic Republic intermittently brags about. On the economic front, the relations between the two countries have historically been promising in theory but weak in reality. The great irony of this commercial relationship has been that despite a spate of free trade agreements over the past several decades, bilateral trade has never genuinely taken off. Moreover, Pakistan has never had any comparative advantage over China, as over 75 percent of their trade is composed of Pakistani imports, tipping the trade balance in China's favor by a huge margin, and putting extra pressure on the Pakistani rupee.

Impact – R/T CN would protect Pakistan

1. Our case warrants
2. Hasn't stopped India from striking Pakistan across the border
3. China doesn't have investments in Kashmir, where India is going, but in the West
4. They need to win that China losing several million dollars worth of roads means that they go to war with India (ex. The US bombed the Chinese embassy in Bosnia, but they didn't go to war with us then)

For example, Pakistani militants literally bombed a Chinese consulate in Pakistan last year and China did nothing in response

Ahmad and Masood 18 Meher Ahmad and Salman Masood, 11-23-2018, "Chinese Presence in Pakistan Is Targeted in Strike on Consulate in Karachi," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/23/world/asia/pakistan-karachi-attack-chinese-consulate.html> //DF

In the most significant strike against Chinese interests in Pakistan in years, three militants assaulted

the Chinese Consulate in the southern port city of Karachi on Friday morning, killing two police officers and two civilians at a checkpoint before being gunned down by security forces. On a day of violence that included a bombing that killed at least 30 people in northwestern Pakistan, the attack on the consulate in Karachi was a rare moment of upheaval for a tightening economic and strategic partnership between Pakistan and China. A Twitter account associated with the Baluchistan Liberation Army, a separatist group in the sprawling and violent province of Baluchistan, said that three of its members had "embraced martyrdom" in an attack on the Chinese Consulate. And a spokesman for the group was quoted by Reuters as accusing China of "exploiting our resources." Pakistan has been a showcase for China's huge international development program, the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, in recent years. China is estimated to have spent some \$62 billion on those projects in Pakistan, mostly to build a transportation corridor through Baluchistan to a new, Chinese-operated deepwater port in the Pakistani town of Gwadar. The road corridor being built through Baluchistan, which is also rich in natural resources, is one of the most strategic projects associated with the Belt and Road initiative. Its stated purpose is to greatly reduce shipping costs and time for Chinese goods, but it would also give China an important alternative if faced with naval blockades by the United States or its Asian allies. Baluchistan has also been the center of two resilient insurgencies, making it one of the most sensitive areas for Pakistan's powerful military establishment: Ethnic Baluch separatists there have been pursued by a stifling Pakistani security presence, and part of the leadership of the Afghan Taliban also continues to take shelter there, in the city of Quetta.

Impact – R/T MAD Checks

A number of factors mean that escalation is much more likely than the opposite in future conflicts

Yusuf 18 Moeed Yusuf [associate vice president at the Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace. He is the author of *Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia*. The book examines crises between regional nuclear powers and specifically the role of stronger third parties in crisis management. This article draws on and extends the findings of the book],

1-20-2018, "How the India-Pakistan Conflict Leaves Great Powers Powerless," Foreign Policy,

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/10/954587-india-pakistan-mumbai-terror/> //DF

Terrorism isn't the only worry. The "Line of Control" that divides Indian and Pakistani control of Kashmir is also a likely flashpoint. Violence levels along the Line of Control were the highest in 15 years in 2017, with violations of a cease-fire agreed to in 2003 consisting of prolonged and often significant military hostilities. While Indian and Pakistani officials acknowledged rising tensions, both militaries believe that low-level military exchanges at this local level would not escalate to a major India-Pakistan crisis. Yet, unlike the pre-2003 period, the mushrooming of news media in both countries has meant that today's incidents in Kashmir create media frenzies, forcing bellicose rhetoric and raising tensions. In 2016, Modi famously broke from his predecessor's policy of restraint to order so-called surgical strikes across the Line of Control in retaliation for a terrorist attack on an Indian Army base in Kashmir that his government blamed on Pakistan. Last year, Indian claims of Pakistani rocket and mortar firing across the line, and the subsequent killing of Indian soldiers, created a standoff as national leaders on both sides threatened punishment and direct military action. Late last month, the Pakistani army chief directly warned India over its increased cease-fire violations on the Line of Control. These are precisely the kind of dynamics that can stoke war frenzy and raise a government's political costs of inaction, eventually making an escalatory response more likely. Still, arguably the most unnerving aspect of the South Asian dynamic is the continued absence of dependable escalation control protocols. India and Pakistan know how to enter a crisis, but they have not agreed to measures aimed at limiting escalation in an ongoing episode, let alone ones aimed at terminating a crisis altogether. Adding to the conundrum are Indian and Pakistani force modernization and investments in destabilizing platforms and postures. Since the Mumbai attacks, India has acknowledged the presence of its (previously denied) Pakistan-specific limited war doctrine, popularly dubbed "Cold Start." Through Cold Start, it seeks to use military force below Pakistan's (assumed) threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Notably, one of the attractions of the doctrine for Indian planners is that it can be employed swiftly enough to forestall the possibility of international pressure to hold India back from using force against Pakistan. Pakistan has developed a tactical nuclear weapon capability in response, which potentially further lowers its threshold for employing nuclear weapons, considerably reducing the time available to third parties seeking de-escalation to respond. The risks associated with this dynamic are especially acute given the potentially compromised positions third-party mediators may find themselves in going forward. In the past, as the United States and other states stepped in to mediate, India and Pakistan willingly transferred the crisis management burden on to them, asking them to pressure the other to concede ground. The countries' recognition that they were unprepared to manage the dangers of escalation on their own led them to do so. Over time, however, this dynamic has generated an expectation of U.S. bailouts. The trouble is that all previous crises occurred at a time when U.S. global supremacy and moral legitimacy were far more entrenched, and great-power competition had not resurged the way it has in the past two years. In past instances of crisis management, states like China and Russia did not try to outcompete the United States. In fact, all third-party states prioritized de-escalation over their larger foreign-policy and security interests, presenting a united front to India and Pakistan and preventing them from playing one third party against the other. This third-party convergence proved crucial to ensuring de-escalation of crises. The situation is radically different today. The U.S. National Defense Strategy now explicitly points to great-power rivals as the greatest threat to U.S. national security—ahead of terrorism and nuclear cataclysm. Competition between the United States, China, and Russia for influence in South Asia is only intensifying. In Afghanistan, their competitive policies are directly undermining prospects for peace—even though all three countries profess to be working toward the common goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. These new great-power dynamics can easily weaken U.S. resolve and ability to lead and coordinate a crisis management approach in the region. Shifting alliance structures in South Asia may further complicate the management of India-Pakistan crises. India now sees the U.S. role in a crisis with Pakistan as a litmus test of America's sincerity as a strategic partner. The U.S.-Indian partnership—as well as the all-but-broken U.S.-Pakistani relationship—has raised expectations among many in India that Washington will back New Delhi to punish Islamabad in a future crisis. Pakistani leaders, for their part, hope that China will come to their country's rescue. If great-power competition influences third parties to prioritize these alliances or to use India and Pakistan as proxies for their great-power gains over the immediate goal of crisis termination, they could transform from being agents of de-escalation to drivers of escalation. Even as these great powers have focused the global nuclear debate in recent times on rogue states like North Korea and Iran, the South Asian nuclear equation remains unstable enough to continue warranting

Clinton's damning characterization of the region nearly two decades ago. The world needs to encourage India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of war in the region and help the two neighbors restart an active peace process aimed at addressing underlying issues that cause crises to occur—their outstanding disputes, principally Kashmir, and continued operations by terrorist outfits in the region being the two most pertinent ones. In addition to focusing on crisis prevention, India and Pakistan need to work on creating dependable escalation control mechanisms before the next crisis emerges. At a minimum, this requires enhanced crisis-time communication channels between both countries' civilian and military leaderships. Broader risk reduction measures, including revisiting doctrines that make war and use of nuclear weapons more likely, are also crucial. Meanwhile, the United States and other great powers with influence in South Asia must remain prepared to mediate a future crisis. Their success in doing so will depend on their ability to isolate their larger competition from the overbearing need to ensure the absence of an India-Pakistan nuclear war—a decidedly more difficult task now than it was a decade ago.

Impact – R/T India no first-use

India says it won't strike first, but would strike first if it feared Pakistan was going to strike it

Joshi 19 Manoj Joshi [journalist and a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian public policy think tank], 3-1-2019, "Neither India Nor Pakistan Is Really Prepared To Fight A Conventional War," [https://www.outlookindia,](https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249)

<https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249> //DF

The recent Indo-Pak military clash seems to be taking place largely in the air. Beginning with the Balakot strike, it has now featured aerial battles on or near the LoC. Unfortunately, we had a parallel to the Kargil experience when this time too, on February 27, a day after the Balakot strike, an IAF Mig-21 Bison was shot down by the Pakistani air force and a pilot captured. **There is a red line** somewhere, notional of course, **which, if crossed, could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.** From the Indian perspective, that line is fairly clear—as a country that has pledged “no first use”, **nuclear weapons will be used only if the other country employs them against us first. However, most people would agree that were India convinced that it was facing a nuclear attack, it could pre-emptively use its nuclear weapons to strike first.** Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in the event of an Indian military attack with conventional weapons. They say that given their geography and smaller military, Indian penetration of their borders could pose an existential threat to the country. To this end, they have developed tactical nuclear weapons which, they say, they could use in the event of a large Indian military incursion.

Impact – R/T India loses conventional war

Both sides will fight regardless of capabilities because they see winning as an existential objective

Joshi 19 Manoj Joshi [journalist and a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian public policy think tank], 3-1-2019, "Neither India Nor Pakistan Is Really Prepared To Fight A Conventional War," [https://www.outlookindia,](https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249)

<https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249> //DF

Clearly, a conventional war by itself is not a threshold, in other words, if there were skirmishes along the LoC or even the international border, it would not necessarily trigger a nuclear conflict. But the danger here is the escalation as the nations seek to gain the edge in what began as a localised clash. Commanders seeking advantage in a particular tactical situation could lead to a competitive circumstance, resulting in a quick climb on the escalation ladder. **Neither India nor Pakistan is really prepared to fight a conventional war. But, to paraphrase General V.P. Malik during the Kargil war, they will fight with whatever they have.** Because they maintain large establishments, they suffer from obsolescence and thus, they are desperately seeking to modernise their forces. There is

little point in retailing the size, numbers and equipment of the two opposing forces. Suffice to say, Pakistan maintains enough strength to counter any Indian incursion. Through the decades, the Pakistani military has been oriented towards India. In contrast, the Indians have had to develop a serious conventional deterrence capability vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China alongside maintaining a substantial force deployed against domestic insurgents in the North-east and in Jammu & Kashmir. However, since 2008, the Pakistan army, too, has had to develop counter-insurgency capabilities in relation to the formidable threat it has faced from the Pakistani Taliban.

Impact – R/T Imran Khan stops war

The military controls Khan and would start a war with or without his consent

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, 4-10-2019 “Economy in Tatters, Pakistan’s Premier Calls for End to Armed Militias,” NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html>
//DF

“They hit our trees, so we thought we’d hit their stones,” he said. When asked whether he or the country’s military establishment controls Pakistan, Mr. Khan said that they work closely. Independent analysts don’t disagree, but many **Pakistanis still see Mr. Khan as the army’s puppet. Even some of Mr. Khan’s own ministers have said that they worry the relationship could sour if Mr. Khan**, famous for self-confidence and unpredictability, **crosses the army bosses**. But in this case, after Pakistani forces shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot, Mr. Khan and the military seemed to agree the best response was to release the pilot, which eased tensions. “I’ve played down the whole thing,” he said. Now Mr. Khan is back to wrestling with the economy. Pakistan has struggled for years with high unemployment, extremely low rates of tax collection, runaway corruption, and sluggish exports. The country’s trade deficit had swelled to \$33 billion when Mr. Khan took office in August. He blames Pakistan’s economic problems on his predecessors, especially the Sharif family, his political rivals. “You can’t have the ruling elite siphoning off money and taking it abroad,” he said. “If you don’t hold them accountable, the country has no future.”

Impact – R/T Mediation

- 1. The US won’t mediate. Zakaria 19 of CNN writes that trump, nor his staff, are interested in mediating as his focus is on Impeachment or North Korea; even if he does, if you think a man who cant spell should resolve a nuclear crisis, pleas**
- 2. India won’t listen to the US; Jaishankar 17 of Brookings explains that India does not like 3rd party negotiation, and now that they are stronger than they were in the past and the US is weaker they can stave off the US forcing them to negotiate.**
- 3. Great power-politics Yusef: increasing competition between the US and China for allies and influence gives the two rivals incentives to pit India and Pakistan against each rather resolving the dispute.**
- 4. India-Pakistan dialouge has been killed after the last terrorist attack. The Washington Post 19 explains: Among ordinary Indians, patience is wearing thin. All talk of dialogue and reconciliation — or even of a shared history — appears pointless**

when young men are routinely being killed by fundamentalists who have patrons across the border. There was already diminishing appetite for an internal dialogue process in Kashmir. And this attack may have eliminated it altogether.

Yusuf 18 Moeed Yusuf [associate vice president at the Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace. He is the author of *Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia*. The book examines crises between regional nuclear powers and specifically the role of stronger third parties in crisis management. This article draws on and extends the findings of the book], 1-20-2018, "How the India-Pakistan Conflict Leaves Great Powers Powerless," *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/10/954587-india-pakistan-mumbai-terror/> //DF

The trouble is that all previous crises occurred at a time when U.S. global supremacy and moral legitimacy were far more entrenched, and great-power competition had not resurged the way it has in the past two years. In past instances of crisis management, states like China and Russia did not try to outcompete the United States. In fact, all third-party states prioritized de-escalation over their larger foreign-policy and security interests, presenting a united front to India and Pakistan and preventing them from playing one third party against the other. This third-party convergence proved crucial to ensuring de-escalation of crises. The situation is radically different today. The U.S. National Defense Strategy now explicitly points to great-power rivals as the greatest threat to U.S. national security—ahead of terrorism and nuclear cataclysm.

Competition between the United States, China, and Russia for influence in South Asia is only intensifying. In Afghanistan, their competitive policies are directly undermining prospects for peace—even though all three countries profess to be working toward the common goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. These new great-power dynamics can easily weaken U.S. resolve and ability to lead and coordinate a crisis management approach in the region. Shifting alliance structures in South Asia may further complicate the management of India-Pakistan crises. India now sees the U.S. role in a crisis with Pakistan as a litmus test of America's sincerity as a strategic partner. The U.S.-Indian partnership—as well as the all-but-broken U.S.-Pakistani relationship—has [and has] raised expectations among many in India that Washington will back New Delhi to punish Islamabad in a future crisis. Pakistani leaders, for their part, hope that China will come to their country's rescue. If great-power competition influences third parties to prioritize these alliances or to use India and Pakistan as proxies for their great-power gains over the immediate goal of crisis termination, they could transform from being agents of de-escalation to drivers of escalation. Even as these great powers have focused the global nuclear debate in recent times on rogue states like North Korea and Iran, the South Asian nuclear equation remains unstable enough to continue warranting Clinton's damning characterization of the region nearly two decades ago. The world needs to encourage India and Pakistan to reduce the risk of war in the region and help the two neighbors restart an active peace process aimed at addressing underlying issues that cause crises to occur—their outstanding disputes, principally Kashmir, and continued operations by terrorist outfits in the region being the two most pertinent ones. In addition to focusing on crisis prevention, India and Pakistan need to work on creating dependable escalation control mechanisms before the next crisis emerges. At a minimum, this requires enhanced crisis-time communication channels between both countries' civilian and military leaderships. Broader risk reduction measures, including revisiting doctrines that make war and use of nuclear weapons more likely, are also crucial. Meanwhile, the United States and other great powers with influence in South Asia must remain prepared to mediate a future crisis. Their success in doing so will depend on their ability to isolate their larger competition from the overbearing need to ensure the absence of an India-Pakistan nuclear war—a decidedly more difficult task now than it was a decade ago.

Dhruva Jaishankar, 4-10-2017, "View From India: Pak May Want to Think Twice About US Mediation," *Brookings*,

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/view-from-india-pak-may-want-to-think-twice-about-us-mediation/>

Why US Mediation in South Asia is a Non-Starter. There are also at least three problems that the possibility of US diplomatic intervention raises.

One, India has been adamant that its differences with Pakistan must be settled bilaterally. This is in contrast to other disputes – say, Northern Ireland or the Middle East peace process – in which both sides have accepted American mediation. In 2009, India successfully resisted much more serious efforts by US diplomat Richard Holbrooke to intervene in the region. Today, in a world in which the United States is relatively weaker and India relatively stronger, New Delhi can be more confident in its ability to deny external involvement in its internal

affairs. Two, the prospect of American mediation – should it involve pressure on India to be more accommodating of Pakistan – would run counter to the Trump administration’s counterterrorism objectives. Such mediation would embolden those seeking to use terrorism to effect political change. American involvement of this sort could unintentionally justify the use of terrorism by Pakistan-based militant separatists. That may not be desirable from Washington’s standpoint.

Rafia Zakaria, 2-28-2019, "Absent US diplomacy, India and Pakistan stand at the precipice of war," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/27/opinions/india-pakistan-precipice-of-war-rafia-zakaria/index.html>

Pakistan and India's most recent squabble began February 14 when an armed militant in the disputed territory of Kashmir (claimed by both countries) drove an explosive-laden vehicle into an Indian paramilitary convoy and killed at least 40 soldiers. India immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack. "We will give a befitting reply. Our neighbor will not be allowed to destabilize us," irate Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared as his government, which is up for re-election in May, asked the international community to isolate Pakistan. Despite these menacing moves, there were few significant statements from the international community -- except for the UN Security Council, which issued a rather weak condemnation of the violence. And while the European Union did urge the two countries to de-escalate tensions, it offered no diplomatic efforts to do just that. Not surprisingly, tensions escalated even further. In the early morning hours of Tuesday, the Indian air force entered into Pakistani airspace and dropped a payload of bombs. India claimed it had attacked a terrorist training camp and killed "a large number" of militants. For its part, Pakistan insisted the attack had hit an uninhabited forest, damaging only trees. And while Dunford and Pompeo appear to have at least entered the fray -- at least in words, **President Donald Trump has remained largely silent.** Following the attack on Indian paramilitary personnel earlier this month, he said it was a "horrible situation" but that his administration would have a comment when "it was appropriate." **"It would be wonderful," the President added, if "India and Pakistan were to get along."** Indeed, it would be wonderful, but it seems unlikely, especially with **the United States [is] uninterested or unaware that it needs to play a key mediating role.** **Trump, likely diverted by his ambitions in North Korea and by the continuing accusations of obstruction of justice** and corruption against members of his campaign and administration, **seems unlikely to arrange a Clinton-esque meeting in which he insists that the parties involved recognize the scale of devastation at play.** Below the presidential level, there seems to be a similar forgetfulness about the brewing nuclear conflict. Though the United States has an ambassador in India, it **[the US] has no designated ambassador to Pakistan** (only a chargé d'affaires). **This lack of high-level diplomatic appointees able to manage the complex situation adds to the inertia and silence on the US end.** This was not always the case either. **Richard Armitage, a deputy secretary of state during the George W. Bush administration, was instrumental in pulling the two countries back from the brink of war.** Unlike seemingly anyone currently serving in the Trump administration, Armitage took the threat of nuclear cataclysm seriously when an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 caused both sides to threaten devastation. Armitage, who admitted he had no doubt that Pakistani generals would deploy nuclear weapons, shuttled between the two countries to ensure that neither they nor the Indians actually did so. **Dutt 19** Barkha Dutt, 2-14-2019, "Everything will change after the Kashmir attack," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/15/everything-will-change-after-kashmir-attack/?utm_term=.0dbe893c8cbd //DF

Kashmir has endured roughly 30 years of insurgency, and the region is almost tragically numbed to headlines about terrorism, turmoil and tragedy. But what unfolded Thursday — the worst terrorist attack in decades — will fundamentally change both India’s internal policy within the state and its relations with Pakistan. More than 40 paramilitary police officers were killed by a suicide bomber from the terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Indians are apoplectic. This is clearly an act of war. And the man reportedly behind it, Maulana Masood Azhar, is free and operating with absolute impunity in Pakistan. That he was released in 1999 from an Indian prison — in a swap deal for the safety of passengers taken hostage in a commercial airline — makes Indians even angrier. Two decades later, Masood Azhar has not been brought to justice. Instead, he hides in plain sight in Bahawalpur, in Pakistan’s Punjab Province, and is now allowed to address huge Islamist militant gatherings over audio speakers in other parts of Pakistan. There will almost certainly be a strong military response from India. In September 2016, when an army camp was assaulted by terrorists who had infiltrated from Pakistan into Kashmir, the Narendra Modi government sent in commandos to Pakistan to carry out targeted counterattacks. The scale of this attack is much bigger and, likely, so too will be the response from India. Pakistan has long operated on the assumption that two nuclear nations will not and cannot escalate their conflict above a certain threshold. It is this calculation that emboldens Pakistan’s

asymmetric war against India, in which terror groups are proxies for its deep state. Well before 9/11, India was already battling this terrorism — mostly alone. Today, as condemnations pour in from countries across the globe, leading international powers must take their share of blame for their unwillingness or inability to draw a red line around Pakistan's patronage of terror. India's response should be calibrated, restrained and responsible. Modi will be under enormous pressure to react swiftly. More so because the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has always claimed to be more nationalistic than the opposition. And with elections just a month or so away, the government has a short window to make its point. While India and Pakistan have gone through several phases of breakdown and repair in their relations, this time the breach is much more severe. Among ordinary Indians, patience is wearing thin. All talk of dialogue and reconciliation — or even of a shared history — appears pointless when young men are routinely being killed by fundamentalists who have patrons across the border. Indians are also exasperated at global double standards in the form of the United States' relationship of convenience with Pakistan because of its interests in Afghanistan, China's protection of Pakistan as it were its vassal and Saudi Arabia's bankrolling of a flagging Pakistan economy. There is a growing sense that India should forge tactical new alliances — if the United States sulks over India and Iran's growing collaboration so be it — or realize that it will always be left alone to fight for self-preservation. There was already diminishing appetite for an internal dialogue process in Kashmir. And this attack may have eliminated it altogether. In an interview with me, the governor of the state, Satyapal Malik, lashed out at both major political parties in Kashmir for being soft on terrorism. The attack has also brought home the very real problem of religious radicalism. The suicide bomber recruited by the Jaish was reportedly a 22-year-old named Adil Ahmad Dar, who lived just kilometers away from the site of the explosion. Kashmir has seen a surge in local militancy, with educated, relatively well-off boys embracing not just the gun but also the idea of a Caliphate in Kashmir. Dar's videos, which appear to have been filmed by the Jaish in advance, are now circulating on social media. He is strapped with weapons and explosives and exhorts others to join the "jihad." Many Kashmiris argue that talk of radicalism is an excuse to tar the larger political debate. This is simply not true. The growing and aggressive Islamist sentiment among an entire generation of young Kashmiris is very much part of the shifting sands in the valley. And it has dramatically shrunk the space for a rational conversation about Kashmir elsewhere in the country. Arun Jaitley, a minister in the Modi government, warned that India will deliver an "unforgettable lesson" in retaliation. In an angry, outraged and cynical country, this is unlikely to be an overstatement.

The US under Trump will not be a mediator in a crisis

Waqar 19 Dr Annie Waqar [Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster], 3-6-2019, "Nuclear war between India and Pakistan? An expert assesses the risk," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-an-expert-assesses-the-risk-112892> //DF

Discontent in the Kashmir valley could also intensify and lead to further crises. No Indian government has thus far shown the political will to solve the Kashmir crisis, to demilitarise it, or to apply the diplomatic deftness needed to negotiate a solution with Pakistan. Nor has Modi been able to control and prevent hardline Hindus from forming vigilante squads in the region and threatening and killing those they think are defiling their religious convictions. And so, on a day-to-day basis, ordinary people continue to suffer. In the past, during episodes of global tension, the US has taken the lead in crisis management. But it seems unlikely that Islamabad or New Delhi would now turn to the Trump administration for assistance in deescalating the conflict. Indeed, leaders from both countries must also consider the reaction of Asia's third nuclear power, China, which has always been the primary focus of India's nuclear program. For now, India and Pakistan are showing some vital restraint. But they must also work towards a long-term fix. The last thing either government, or the world, needs is a mushroom cloud.

The only reason the Kargil war cooled down was because the US pressured Pakistan

Sehgal 19 Sameer Sehgal, 3-1-2019, "Why India and Pakistan Are Fighting Over Kashmir Again," Council on Foreign Relations,

<https://www.cfr.org/article/why-india-and-pakistan-are-fighting-over-kashmir-again//DF>

India and Pakistan have been bitter rivals since they emerged from British colonial rule in 1947. Pakistan views Kashmir, which like it has a Muslim majority, as a natural part of its state. For secular but Hindu-majority India, Kashmir is vital to its identity as a multiethnic state. Over the last seven decades, their competing claims for the mountainous territory have helped fuel three wars and periodic bouts of violence. The last major conflict came in 1999, triggered by Pakistani militants taking up fortified positions in India's section of Kashmir. The ensuing skirmish, known as the Kargil War, lasted two months and claimed more than a thousand casualties on each side. The episode was particularly worrisome around the world because both countries had tested nuclear weapons the previous year. The United States eventually leaned hard on Pakistan and compelled Islamabad to withdraw its troops and de-escalate the crisis. The struggle for Kashmir continues to simmer. JeM has been linked to several attacks in recent years, including a January 2016 attack on India's Pathankot air base. Last year was the deadliest in the region in a decade, with more than 360 people killed, according to India [PDF]. A human rights group put the death toll higher, at 586 people.

A) India relies on bilateral nego, now that they are stronger and US weaker this is unlikely
B) US Pak relationship is worse now bc US supports india, pak not listen to US

R/T Can mediate escalation

Don't have ways to de-escalate conflict (Yusef - Foreign Policy)

Yusef, December 2018, "How the India-Pakistan Conflict Leaves Great Powers Powerless"

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/10/954587-india-pakistan-mumbai-terror/> (NK)

Ten years after the Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008, the Indian-Pakistani rivalry remains as entrenched as ever. While the two countries have avoided major wars, they continue to flirt with crises and have been engaged in low-intensity conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir. This has unfolded in an environment devoid of any robust crisis management mechanisms aimed at reducing the risk of inadvertent escalation and providing dependable ways of directly negotiating a way out of a crisis. With nuclear weapons in the mix, the consequences of escalation could be catastrophic—and the possibility of such an outcome is greater today than it was on the eve of the Mumbai attacks.

All bilateral means of peace / de escalation seem to be done

Yusef, December 2018, "How the India-Pakistan Conflict Leaves Great Powers Powerless"

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/10/954587-india-pakistan-mumbai-terror/> (NK)

And yet, the centrality of U.S. crisis management in nuclear South Asia has been not only consistent but also a vital substitute for the missing bilateral escalation control mechanisms between India and Pakistan. Washington was also critical to crisis termination in the previous major crises under the nuclear umbrella: a 1999 limited war in Kashmir and a 10-month military standoff in late 2001 and 2002. U.S. success in all these cases was dependent on its ability to use real-time intelligence to clarify misunderstandings between the two antagonists and to step in with a mixture of threats and concessions to force them to pull back at moments when war seemed inevitable. None of the pacifying dynamics at play in the past necessarily hold today. The Mumbai attacks abruptly ended the peace process itself. Since then, bilateral tensions have remained high. Diplomatic dialogue between the two remains suspended. India's nationalist government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made total cessation of cross-border militancy emanating from Pakistan a prerequisite for formal dialogue.

No mediation now

Bhatnagar 18 Stuti Bhatnagar, 11-23-2018, "Mediation a long shot in Kashmir conflict," Lowy Institute, [//DF](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mediation-long-shot-kashmir)

Guided by the 1972 Simla Agreement, India's Kashmir policy has been characterised by an emphasis on bilateralism and resistance to any international third-party mediation. Pakistan, on the other hand, has frequently attempted to bring international attention to the dispute, an attitude that continues to irk Indian policymakers. Sporadic attempts to resolve the dispute have included bilateral dialogues, most notably the Composite Dialogue process from 2003-2008 (involving consideration of all disputes between India and Pakistan), back-channel negotiations, and civil society dialogues. A structured dialogue process, however, has been neither successful nor sustainable. While India has been steadfast in resisting international mediation, this is not to say international actors have failed to take an interest in the conflict in Kashmir. In the earliest years of the conflict, mediation was attempted through the UN Commission on India and Pakistan, followed by the 1965 Tashkent Declaration brokered by the Soviet Union. Since the turn of the century, the US has also begun to take a keen interest in the dynamics of the sub-continent and played a crucial role in mitigating tensions after the 1999 Kargil War and the border confrontation in 2002. The US also supported the Composite Dialogue process, however, after the attacks on Mumbai in 2008, the momentum for the Kashmir centric confidence-building measures and dialogue on key issues was lost and India and Pakistan were once again back to their traditional tango. Any hopes for international mediation on Kashmir were quelled when India reacted strongly against an offer of mediation by then US President Barack Obama. Since then, the US has cautiously side-stepped the issue of Kashmir to avoid annoying India. When Nikki Haley, former US Ambassador to the UN, hinted at a possible US mediation by the Trump administration in April 2017, Delhi again reacted with hostility. While dialogue has halted, violence has risen. This has been the case particularly since 2014 and has been exacerbated by the lack of political action and stability. There has been a total disregard for the 2003 ceasefire at the Line of Control; in fact, 2017 is documented as the worst year for relations since the ceasefire in 2003. Delhi's policies have been tested by a renewal of militant attacks and civilian unrest in the state. Between March 2014 and 2017, there were 795 militancy-related incidents in which 397 militants were killed while 64 civilians and 178 security personnel lost their lives.

Both China and the US would have to step in to prevent another conflict, and the US has backed out of stopping a war

Haegeland 18 Hannah Haegeland [an analyst in the Stimson Center's South Asia Program], 12-4-2018, "Who Will Prevent the Next India-Pakistan War?," Defense One, [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/who-will-prevent-next-india-pakistan-war/153236/](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/12/who-will-prevent-next-india-pakistan-war/153236//DF) //DF

Ten years have passed since 26/11, the three-day assault by Pakistan-based terrorists in Mumbai that stands as India's analogue to the 9/11 attacks in the United States. During and after the attack, U.S. officials were central to the crisis-management effort that prevented a larger conflict between India and Pakistan. Today, it is unclear whether the United States could play that role, thanks to the decline in its capacity for crisis management in South Asia. But as U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorate, Chinese influence in Pakistan grows — as does Beijing's economic and geostrategic stakes in maintaining stability in the region. Both U.S. and Chinese action may be necessary to walk the region back from a nuclear brink, and so U.S. leaders should adapt to changed circumstances by working with Chinese and other counterparts to shape co-management mechanisms. Historically, the United States has been the sole major third-party crisis manager in South Asia. Particularly since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States has taken a hands-on approach, pressing both sides to de-escalate. China's interests and involvement have historically been much more limited. However, in a book chapter published by the Stimson Center earlier this year, I demonstrate that China's role as a third-party crisis manager in South Asia has gradually grown. Unlike the U.S. approach, China's role has been mostly bilateral and limited to quiet, backroom diplomacy. Diplomatic initiatives by China to encourage de-escalation in the 1999 Kargil War and 2001-2002 "Twin Peaks" crisis, for example, focused largely on Pakistan. But by 2008, when the terrorists struck Mumbai, China had begun playing a third-party role more like that of a great-power broker. It engaged in public bilateral "shuttle diplomacy" with both India and Pakistan, sending high-ranking, political and military officials to both New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as bringing their Indian and Pakistani counterparts

to Beijing. Since then, nuclear and conventional arms buildup in the region has raised the potential costs of escalation. The possibility of a future India-Pakistan crisis remains high—all against a backdrop of heightened firing across the Line of Control, growing fissile material stockpiles, evolving strategic doctrines, and developments in nuclear delivery systems.

Meanwhile, U.S. leverage in Pakistan is in decline, and both the preparedness and inclination of the Trump administration to play the traditional U.S. third-party crisis manager role in a future

India-Pakistan standoff is uncertain. China's considerable incentives to ensure stability between India and Pakistan are further bolstered by its current and planned investment in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative. BRI's flagship is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, representing an investment of more than \$50 billion. Beyond that, the number of Chinese nationals living in Pakistan to work on these mega projects is multiplying quickly—from 2007 estimates at 5,000, to 2017 estimates at 30,000, to a 2023 forecast of 500,000 for Gwadar port residents alone. This Chinese diaspora introduces a new escalation risk. Consider the potential costs if India were to take retaliatory action against Pakistan for a Mumbai-like attack that inadvertently resulted in the death of Chinese nationals or destruction of Chinese investments in Pakistan. Analysts disagree on just what circumstances could turn Beijing into a supporter of Islamabad rather than a third-party crisis manager, but at least some envision it as a possibility. Beyond stakes and exposure in Pakistan itself, China is increasingly investing economic and political capital throughout South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The costs of an India-Pakistan crisis spinning out of control would be lasting and widespread, hurting Chinese economic and geostrategic plans for the region. U.S. interests in preventing mushroom clouds over the subcontinent would be well served by considering—and engaging in bilateral dialogue to plan—how China might be of use in crisis management in the future. The depleted state of U.S.-Pakistan relations indicates the United States will need

China to help bring Pakistan to the table for negotiating de-escalation. India and China's increasing economic and geopolitical competition in small states, together with the securitization of the Indian Ocean Region, will complicate any Chinese efforts at third-party mediation. A future India-Pakistan crisis will therefore likely require both U.S. and Chinese involvement to prevent escalation. Preparing for this multiplayer crisis management scenario requires new research and creative policymaking—both of which could draw useful lessons from and have interesting implications for the nuclear-tinged crisis unfolding on the Korean peninsula today.

R/T China can Mediate

underlying India China relationship - belt and road, India in the NSG, boundary dispute - mean tensions are rising between the two making negotiation unlikely (Krishnan - Brookings)

Ananth Krishnan, 1-14-2019, "The Trajectory of India-China Relations: The view from Beijing," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-trajectory-of-india-china-relations-the-view-from-beijing/> (NK)

Participants agreed that the post-Wuhan rapprochement between India and China was unlikely to last, given the unwillingness to resolve fundamental differences in the relationship. These include the boundary dispute, India's membership of the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), and differences over Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative. In the context of growing tensions between the major powers of today, and fears of a new cold war, Madan highlighted key differences between today's situation and the Cold War. Essentially, the world today is more multipolar than bipolar; India is in direct competition with one actor (unlike with US and USSR during the Cold War); and, different dynamics are at play in a more globalised and interdependent world.

Growing tensions in control of the South China Sea - there are 6 - 8 chinese warships in the Indian Ocean at any given time (Rajgopalan - Diplomat)

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, The Diplomat, 1-16-2019, "How Long Can India's China Juggle Last?," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/how-long-can-indias-china-juggle-last/> (NK)

On the other hand, **India's concerns about China's inroads especially in the maritime domain continue to grow.** Speaking at the same Raisina Dialogue, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba stated that **there are six to eight Chinese navy warships in the northern part of Indian Ocean at any given point of time, putting one quantitative metric down around India's rising concerns about Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.** He also supported the Quad idea, stating that it stood for inclusive, free, rules-based order. He predicted that the Quad — a grouping consisting of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States — will grow with time. Considering India's official reluctance on the Quad question, especially its military component, this was undoubtedly a surprising statement. Lamba particularly noted the presence of Chinese submarines in the area, wondering about their use in supposed Chinese anti-piracy operations. He is not alone; the Indian Navy's worries about Chinese submarines are growing. It is about to award Cochin Shipyards a contract for building eight new anti-submarine corvettes. The Navy also just inaugurated the Information Fusion Center, based in Gurugram in the National Capital Region, to coordinate maritime intelligence with multiple countries. **India has also just opened a new airbase, INS Kohasa, on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which host India's only triservice command center and are located at a critical spot close to Indonesia and the Malacca Straits.** There is little doubt that New Delhi is doing its best to calm the tensions in its relations with China, but **there is also little doubt that the pressure on India is growing. Whether these two can be reconciled remains to be seen**

Interventions

R/T India gives peacekeepers so likes R2P

India uses peacekeepers to win a sport on the UNSC

Yadav 16 Manish Kumar Yadav [College of Business and Social Sciences], 2016 "India's Quest for United Nations Security Council Permanent Seat with Special Reference to its Peace Keeping Credentials," International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, DOI: 10.6084/M9.FIGSHARE.3798903 //DF

India has deployed well over 100, 000 Troops, Military Observers and Police Officers in UN Missions over the years but it has not yielded much in terms of its efforts to seek a Permanent Seat in United Nations Security Council, or even in its attempts to seek a Greater Role in World Affairs. But **the large troop contribution does reinforce India's claim for a Permanent Seat when the UNSC is expanded.** Besides, it provides handsome monetary compensation and "International Exposure" to soldiers and accrues a lot of Good Will for India on the Global Stage, Especially in places like the Oil and Mineral Rich Africa, Where the new "Great Game" is now being played.¹¹ The killing of five Indian army soldiers serving in the recently created state of South Sudan is a Poignant Reminder of the Sacrifices our Troops have been rendering for Decades to make the World a better place. Why do Indian soldiers die fighting for distant causes like this? One of India's biggest contributions to global governance is its constant supply of able, highly skilled, and professional military forces to peacekeeping operations. Many developing countries are eager to depute their soldiers as Blue Berets, but India's Military has the quality that a few can match. India's peace keeping units are famed in global hot spots for their sensitivity in understanding local contexts, respecting human rights and remaining free of scandals. In 2001, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan singled out our peace keepers for special praise and told them "You have much to teach the Peace keepers of other Countries, Who may share your enthusiasm and determination, but lack your experience and training". **India's claim to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is buttressed by claims about our extraordinary talented peace keepers who have been huge assets for promoting safety and normalcy in war devastated countries. The goodwill they earn for our country is invaluable and every drop of blood they shed is worth its weight in gold.** Be it Somalia, Congo or Afghanistan, India has not fled after absorbing grave and dastardly attacks on our Peace keepers and Reconstruction Specialists. Despite losing five comrades in arms, The United Nations has described the present morale of the Indian contingent in South Sudan "Very High". India does not quit when the cause is a worthy one, and all Indians must appreciate the rationale behind this determination by learning in depth about distant conflict zones and their internal and regional

dynamics. When our soldiers are laying down their lives in far flung war zones, Indians cannot remain unaware of or indifferent to the fate of this countries.12.

As a permanent member of the UNSC India will manipulate its peacekeeping contributions to prevent interventions

Mappilly 18 Zachariah Mampilly [Professor of Political Science at Vassar College], 2018, SHIFTS IN GLOBAL POWER AND UN PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE: INDIA'S RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN AFRICA, Journal of African Affairs, doi: 10.1093/afraf/ady009 //DF

In the aftermath of the Kiwanja massacre, the reforms enacted by MONUC empowered commanders to determine their own distinct approach to community relations. At the micro/local level, commanders were able to garner a degree of influence over how the operation fulfills its mandate, thereby bringing about performance improvements. Yet, while empowering local commanders is increasingly recognized as a method for improving peacekeeping performance on the ground, peacekeeping remains an essentially political pursuit, one defined by the interests of states at the international level. In other words, national and international agendas will trump local initiatives.⁶⁹ As India assumed its seat on the UNSC, it sought to assert its rising power status by manipulating its contributions to UN peacekeeping. In 2011, soon after India began its term, the Libyan intervention set the stage for a standoff that led the government to leverage its contributions to African peacekeeping missions with consequences for the mission in North Kivu. After days of strained negotiations, ten members including the United Kingdom, France and the United States, the so-called P-3, voted in favor of a UN intervention, while five others, including India, Brazil, Germany and two permanent members, China and Russia, abstained. On 17 March 2011, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 establishing a no-fly zone in Libya and authorizing the use of force for the protection of civilians. The actual conduct of the Libya campaign incensed the abstaining council members. Once the campaign began, it became clear that the P-3 countries, which possess the power to draft UNSC resolutions (short of a veto by China or Russia), were pushing for regime change, a position the abstainers felt superseded the boundaries of the mandate itself. Though helpless to stop the intervention once it had begun, the Libyan war triggered a debate about one of the central questions driving peacekeeping missions in the contemporary period, the meaning and practice of the emerging international norm regarding a Responsibility to Protect (R2P).⁷⁰

Most importantly, despite agreeing to return its helicopters to North Kivu, the Indian government decided to replace the 8 Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and 9 Mi-17 transport helicopters deployed to the missions in Congo and Sudan with six light utility helicopters manufactured in India (Chetak and Cheetah). Beyond the net reduction in number, the Indian made helicopters have less military capacity than the Russian made Mis and can only undertake surveillance, observation, search and rescue, medical and reconnaissance missions.⁸⁷ By late 2011, the situation became so dire that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon drafted a letter to the UNSC warning that the lack of helicopters made the situation 'critical' and calling for members to 'think outside the box' to cover the shortfall.⁸⁸ Ukraine offered four Mi-24 attack helicopters in March 2012 and South Africa provided some transport helicopters to cover the shortfall, but neither was willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to retain MONUSCO's aerial advantage. In March 2012, a group of ex-CNDP soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda mutinied from the Congolese Army. Claiming that the government had failed to implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP, the group adopted the moniker M23 for itself. Despite possessing significantly less military power than its predecessor, M23 quickly took control of large territories in North Kivu, including the towns of Bunagana on the Ugandan border and marching on to Rutshuru and Rugari despite the presence of an Indian contingent at the Kiwanja base.⁸⁹ M23's advance led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Both the rebels and government forces were accused of war crimes, including the summary executions of civilians, mass rapes, and forced recruitment including children, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands.⁹⁰ The above evidence suggests that in its confrontation with M23, MONUSCO was hindered by the Indian decision to pull its helicopters and equally importantly, to cancel the reforms that improved relations between the mission and civilians. As the International Crisis Group noted, the failure to prevent M23's rise was related to the 'militarily passive' behavior of MONUSCO and demonstrated the 'ineffectiveness' of the mission.⁹¹ Relations with Congolese civilians also declined and both local and national political leaders criticized the mission's performance, a dramatic turnaround from the praise showered on it following the post-Kiwanja reforms.⁹²

R/T Moral Hazard

1. Non-unique: moral hazard will happen so long as there is any response to an atrocity

Kuperman 08 Alan J. Kuperman [University of Texas], 2008, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” *International Studies Quarterly*,

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.322.1966&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //DF

Humanitarian intervention is more common after the Cold War, but its practice is still quite variable. Typically, it only becomes a prospect after nongovernmental organizations prevail on international media to focus on a particular crisis (Bob 2005). Moreover, the likelihood of a specific type of intervention tends to be inversely related to its cost and intrusion on sovereignty: retorical condemnation is most common; nonconsensual troop deployment least so. But **any type or degree of humanitarian intervention can provide strategic benefit to rebels and raise hopes for more decisive intervention**—especially if there is precedent for such decisive action in recent or nearby cases (Crawford 2005)—**so even nonmilitary forms exacerbate moral hazard**. Spatially, intervention is more likely where at least one powerful state faces domestic pressure to intervene and where no permanent member of the UN Security Council has a strong national interest in vetoing authorization. Temporally, intervention is more likely when potential interveners are not already stretched thin by existing humanitarian or strategic commitments. The credibility of threats to intervene is enhanced by the extent that past threats either were carried out or are perceived to have deterred state violence. Conversely, credibility is decreased if past threats have proved to be bluffs.

Even if India doesn't support boots-on-the-ground interventions, they would definitely still respond to atrocities

Puri 12 H.E. Ambassador H.S. Puri [Permanent representative of India to the UN], 9-5-2012, “An Imformal Dialouge on the Report of the Secretary General on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Action,” Statement by H.E. Ambassador H.S. Puri to the UN at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/India.pdf> //DF

Mr. President, in my view, the R2P should start with an early political engagement with the parties concerned. Any specific needs of the state concerned should be given due consideration and support. Sufficient time should be allowed to see that the non-coercive measures employed are bringing desired results. It is only when an honest and serious attempt at peaceful settlement fails that the international community, acting under the United Nations, should respond with coercive measures. And the response should again be calibrated and gradual, rather than immediate recourse to Article 42. Armed intervention should be a measure of last resort when everything else has failed. Selectivity must be avoided at all cost and the principle must be applied uniformly to all parties to a conflict. Most importantly, whenever the use of all necessary means is authorized, there must be provisions in the resolution for monitoring and reporting mechanisms so that the principles of neutrality, impartiality and proportionality is ensured. In this context, responsibility while protecting (RwP), as proposed by Brazil, is equally important. If R2P is to regain the respect of the international community, it has to be anchored in the concept of RwP.

1. Margins: how many more genocides?

2. Humanitarian interventions are good because the end state is better than the authoritarian state people used to live under

R/T Peacekeepers don't have money

Even though they have a small budget, they still are effective

Hultman 13 Lisa Hultman [Uppsala University], Jacob Kathman [University at Buffalo, SUNY] and Megan Shannon [Florida State University], 10-2013, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War," American Journal of Political Science, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23496662.pdf> //DF

Not only are properly constituted missions effective at preventing civilian deaths, but PKOs are also a cost effective form of intervention (Collier and Hoeffler 2006). For instance, the 8,000 troops needed to substantially reduce civilian killings in a given conflict month cost slightly more than \$8 million, according to the flat monthly reimbursement rate for troop-contributing countries.¹¹ To pay an additional 100,000 troops to serve would cost the UN approximately \$1.2 billion. This would be a radical troop increase, more than doubling the number of UN military troops serving worldwide in 2011. But the cost of this increase is less than 1% of global military spending, which was \$1.6 trillion in 2010 (Stockholm Peace Research Institute 2001). The cost of peacekeeping is also likely to be lower relative to other military intervention options. Consider the spending on UN peacekeeping troops worldwide in 2008 compared to the spending on U.S. troops in Iraq in 2008. The UN allocated \$6.7 billion to peacekeeping for fiscal year 2007-2008 and deployed 91,172 personnel worldwide. The United States was responsible for 26% of the UN peacekeeping budget in 2008, accounting for \$1.74 billion, or about \$19,000 per blue helmet. Comparatively, the United States deployed approximately 145,100 troops to Iraq in fiscal year 2007-2008, and the Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States spent \$127.2 billion on military operations in the country for a total of approximately \$877,000 per troop (Belasco 2011).¹² Considering the extreme human cost and the negative externalities caused by civilian atrocities, UN military troops and police units can be regarded as fairly economical options for the UN to enhance human security. Further research should investigate the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping relative to other instruments available to the international community, including coercive measures like sanctions and other approaches like diplomacy and economic aid.

R/T Will Send Troops

Even if they don't really believe in sovereignty, they'll use it as a tool to keep their soldiers safe

R/T Already Gridlock

Every intervention matters a lot and can save many lives.

Almost always Intervene in the most important and deadly conflicts (Hageboutros - Swarthmore)

Joelle Hageboutros, 2017, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period" Swarthmore, <https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=swarthmoreirjournal> (NK)

The recent deadlocks among the P5 over Syria, Libya and Ukraine obscure the overall trend of a high rate of cooperation among the P5. Current Under-Secretary General David Malone argues that too often one forgets “**on 90% of the Council’s agenda which are even more murderous conflicts [than Syria, Libya, Ukraine] often in Africa, places like the Congo, the council has no trouble agreeing.**” (Malone, March 9) **In 2014 alone, the SC passed 60 out of 63 resolutions unanimously.** (United Nations Security Council, January 2015, 8) The three aforementioned cases are nevertheless important signifiers of new trends emerging in the Council where Russia and China have become more vocal opponents.¹ Cooperation among the P5 members of the SC since the late 1980s has resulted in a redistribution of tasks and prestige once accorded to the General Assembly and the Secretariat, that now favor the Council.

R/T Not Enough Peacekeepers Deployed

Ruggeri, Cambridge, 2016

<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/winning-the-peace-locally-un-peacekeeping-and-local-conflict/9B61C8D64514F995C96A994AD5613CA3> (NK)

Figure 4 shows that an increase in the number of peacekeepers (from no troops to 300 troops) reduces the probability that conflict continues into the next time period. Even a small deployment of 20 peacekeepers already reduces the probability that conflict continues in a particular location from 90 percent to 75 percent. **A more substantial deployment of about 500 peacekeepers reduces the probability that the conflict continues down to 48 percent.** However, 500 units appear to be a threshold because the marginal effect of adding further units seems negligible. **To put these figures in context: the median value of peacekeepers size, where UN is deployed, is 562 units,** the 25th percentile is 150 and the 75th percentile is 1703.

R/T Congo Etc Failed

Peacekeepers more effective now because they intervene earlier than they used to, which is crucial to a) ending violence earlier, and b) diffusing tensions prior to the peace process (Hultmann - American PolySci Review)

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, “Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting”

<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

The nature of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has changed over the last two decades. While once intended primarily to bolster post-conflict peace processes, contemporary peacekeeping missions are commonly deployed to states in which the guns on the battlefield have not yet silenced. Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has deployed 28 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to Africa, 21 of which served during an active civil conflict. Intervention into active conflict has dramatically changed the responsibilities of peacekeepers and the challenges they face. **Peacekeepers are no longer meant simply to keep the peace. Modern operations must also reduce hostilities between conflicting parties and establish favorable conditions for a subsequent peace process.** As an illustration, **consider the UN’s 1992 mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and its current mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO).** **ONUMOZ was a fairly modest mission deployed to uphold an agreement ending Mozambique’s civil war. ONUMOZ monitored the implementation of the peace agreement, facilitated elections, and coordinated humanitarian assistance—all tasks associated with keeping peace after conflict. In contrast, over 18,000 military troops serving with MONUSCO have been deployed to intercede between combatants, disarm and demobilize rebel and paramilitary factions, protect civilians, and at times, confront belligerents directly** The differences between missions to Mozambique and the Congo underscore a fundamental transformation in peacekeeping. The UN is increasingly asked to halt active conflict. Yet, we know little about the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in reducing battlefield violence. Recognizing the traditional role of peacekeeping to prevent conflict recidivism, a number of studies examine the UN’s efforts in post-conflict environments (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2008). Popular accounts of UN efforts in active conflicts suggest that the UN is deficient in stopping

ongoing hostilities (Boot 2000). Unfortunately, little research has used broad empirical analyses to understand the UN's ability to reduce battlefield hostilities

R/T China already opposes R2P

China supports R2P, examples include Mali, Darfur, Somalia (Fung - US Institute of peace)

Fung, United States Institute of Peace, 6-8-2016, "China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy,"

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/china-and-responsibility-protect-opposition-advocacy> (NK)

If the state is incapable of doing so, then the international community has a responsibility to act. The principle reflects a broader trend of global governance, showing a gradual pushback on the boundaries of sovereignty in regards to human security, statebuilding activities, and coercive intervention.³ **China has traditionally held a hard conception of sovereignty and shown a reluctance to further the liberal order.**⁴ Yet its position on the Responsibility to Protect has continued to evolve. **Despite China's initial outright opposition to the principle, and predictions that it would at best adopt a cautious approach,**⁵ **China now firmly advocates building state capacities for the prevention of mass atrocities consistent with R2P pillars one and two.** As a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), **China has endorsed the principle's application in multiple countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi (2006); Darfur (2006); Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, South Sudan, and Yemen (2011); Mali (2012); Somalia (2013); and Syria (2014).** However, it has also vetoed use of the principle, including in Myanmar, following its refusal of aid after Cyclone Nargis in 2007. These cases illustrate that while China accepts the prudent use of R2P—even permitting the use of force—it does so under two conditions: (1) the principle is invoked strictly within the confines of the 2005 World Summit Outcome language, and (2) applying R2P does not result in significant reforms of the target state's political infrastructure.

R/T Russia Opposes R2P

Russian intervention in Syria on behalf of Assad against ISIS changed Putin's attitude to R2P; while still considerate of sovereignty issues, they still understand the need to accomplish humanitarian objectives (Lutta - Russian law Journal)

Lutta, 2018, "How russian intervention in syria redefined the right to protect in armed conflict," Russian Law Journal,

https://www.russianlawjournal.org/jour/article/view/498?locale=en_US (NK)

The use of military force to forestall humanitarian crisis remains a controversial issue in international law. This strategy is considered antithetical to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host country. This legal quandary emanated in 1998 after NATO launched a series of airstrikes against the Yugoslavian forces under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This legal conundrum prompted the United Nations to craft comprehensive legal principles to determine the parameters of foreign interventions in armed conflict. **The objective was realised in 2005 after the UN adopted the Right to Protect (R2P) as means of resolving humanitarian crisis.** This doctrine intended to harmonise the foreign intervention in light of the shortcomings of unilateral humanitarian intervention. However, **the abysmal failure in resolving the Libyan crisis exposed its soft underbelly as tool for perpetuating regime change against unpopular leaders. Subsequently, when Security Council proposed similar remedy for Syrian conflict, Russia strenuously objected and advocated for a political and diplomatic solution.** This geopolitical gridlock prompted the divided council to adopt a different scenario in dealing with the Syrian conflict with the west supporting the rebels while Russia stood by Assad. **This prompted Assad to appeal for assistance from Russia in counteracting ISIS and rebel forces that threatened to depose his government. In 2017 President Putin announced the success of the Russian intervention and called for peace talks among the various warring factions. As such Russia had realised the humanitarian objective behind R2P while respecting the sovereignty of Syria.**

R/T India will have no veto

Now even China - the historic naysayer of India UNSC membership - supports their entrance so there's no need to sacrifice the veto to be on the council (Guruswamy - National Herald)

Mohan Guruswamy, 8-1-2018, "A second class seat on the Security Council; Is this what India wants?," National Herald, <https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/a-second-class-seat-on-the-security-council-is-this-what-india-wants> (NK)

To that extent, it is not a reform of the UN system but a little tweak to it. This idea has so infatuated us that we now insist that support for India's membership is a part of every joint communiqué with any foreign government. Except for an obvious handful, most governments oblige.

Even China, which probably most resists the expansion of the P-5, says it would like to see India on the UNSC.

Even President Donald Trump with his many pre-occupations supports a seat in a reformed UNSC and in other multilateral institutions like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Following Trump's support, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the White House to thank him. Inevitably the India-US joint statement reflected this. "President Trump reaffirmed the support of the United States for India's permanent membership on a reformed UN Security Council." How this support translates in real life is something else. When former US President Barack Obama last visited India, he said that he supported a reformed UNSC with India as a permanent member.

EXTRAS

India-Pakistan

Wanna start with a little poetry?

Rao 19 Nirupama Rao, 3-11-19, "How India and Pakistan can step back from the brink of war," Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.671d0a078b86](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-war-risk%3Aindia-pakistan%3Ahomepage%2Ft-1&hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main-war-risk%3Aindia-pakistan%3Ahomepage%2Ft-1&utm_term=.671d0a078b86) //DF

More than five decades ago, the Indian poet Sahir Ludhianvi wrote about India and Pakistan:

Delay the war, it is better

Your yard or mine,

If the lights stay on, it is better

The blood be your own or foreign

It is the blood of Adam, after all

The war, it may be in the west or east

It is the murder of world peace, after all.

Uniqueness

Historic tensions in Kashmir (Goel - NYT)

Vindu Goel, March 8 2019, "India-Pakistan Crisis: Why They Keep Fighting Over Kashmir," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/india-pakistan-crisis.html>

When the British finally gave up their colony of India in August 1947, they agreed to divide it into two countries: Pakistan, with a Muslim majority, and India, with a Hindu majority. (Bangladesh was initially part of Pakistan but gained its own independence in 1971 after a short war between India and Pakistan.) The sudden separation prompted millions of people to migrate between the two countries and led to religious violence that killed hundreds of thousands. **Left undecided was the status of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state in the Himalayas that had been ruled by a local prince. Fighting quickly broke out, and both countries eventually sent in troops, with Pakistan occupying one-third of the state and India two-thirds.** Although the prince signed an agreement for the territory to become part of India, the United Nations later recommended that an election be held to let the people decide. That election never took place, and **both countries continue to administer their portions of the former princely territory while hoping to get full control of it. Troops on both sides of the "line of control" regularly fire volleys at each other.** Muslim militants have frequently resorted to violence to expel the Indian troops from the territory. Pakistan has backed many of those militants, as well as terrorists who have struck deep inside India — most brutally in a four-day killing spree in Mumbai in 2008 that left more than 160 people dead.

Both Pakistan and India claim Kashmir as part of their own territory

Guy 19 Jack Guy, Katie Hunt, Nikhil Kumar and Helen Regan, 2-28-2019, "Why Kashmir means so much to both India and Pakistan," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/30/asia/kashmir-explainer/index.html> //DF

Predominantly Hindu India and Muslim-majority Pakistan have fought three wars since 1947, when the two nuclear powers both gained independence from the UK, and came close to another in 1999. Wars in 1947 and 1965 were fought directly over Kashmir, and ongoing violence has killed more than 47,000 people since 1989. This toll doesn't include people who have disappeared due to the conflict, and some human rights groups and nongovernmental organizations put the death toll at twice that amount. So why does the mountainous region mean so much to the two countries? **Kashmir initially remained independent and was free to accede to either nation. When the Hindu king of Kashmir chose to join India in exchange for military protection, Jammu and Kashmir state became the only Muslim-majority state in the country.** Jammu and Kashmir covers around 45% of Kashmir, in the south and east of the region, while Pakistan controls Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan, which cover around 35% of the total territory in the north and west. Both countries claim complete ownership of Kashmir; also in the picture is China, which controls around 20% of Kashmir territory known as Aksai Chin. The issue is also one of the oldest items on the agenda at the United Nations, where India and Pakistan took their dispute soon after independence. **Both countries agreed to a plebiscite in principle, to allow Kashmiris to decide their own future, but it has never been held because it was predicated on the withdrawal of all military forces from the region, which has not happened even decades on. Indian authorities wanted to show that they could guarantee the rights of Muslims in a secular state, but Kashmir is also key to Pakistani identity as a homeland for Muslims after partition in 1947,** said Simona Vittorini, a specialist in South Asian politics at SOAS University of London. "Kashmir has become a symbolic issue for both countries," Vittorini told CNN via telephone, who added that the situation is further complicated by a growing Kashmiri independence movement that works against the interests of both countries. Both countries have maintained a fragile ceasefire since 2003, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, although the two rivals regularly exchange fire across the border.

Link – Indian Attack

1. India would become emboldened to attack.

Oliver Stuenkel 10 of the Getulio Vargas Foundation explains: India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.

Furthermore, India fears inviting other actors into the conflict, known as the tripwire effect.

Stuart Nagel explains in his 2001 book *Resolving International disputes*: One role of peacekeeping troops could be as a tripwire against attack from either disputant. Attacks from either disputant would have to pass through the peacekeeping, thereby sounding an alarm for the international community.

Aamir Khan of the University of Balochistan furthers in 2015:

India has been able to draw out the issue of Kashmir for over 68 years, intending to wait for the opportune moment to accrue maximum benefit. The permanent seat at the Council is one such moment through which India can extract a favorable outcome.

Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, is particularly likely to take aggressive action against Pakistan now because he is in the middle of a tight re-election bid. Bobby Naqvi of Gulf News writes in 2019: Modi's decision to hit Pakistan has definitely given a collective adrenaline rush to his supporters who love aggressive nationalism. They are willing to endure unemployment, farm distress and even willing to close an eye on corruption as long as Pakistan is taught a lesson.

Not only would India oppose interventions, but it would likely instigate conflicts and then prevent the UN from intervening in them.

Khan 2015 Aamir Hussain Khan [Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army M.A., University of Baluchistan], 12-2015, "UNSC'S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>. //DF

India is a big country and has remained relatively democratic since its independence in 1947. It has contributed a large troop commitment toward the U.N. peace efforts in the world. India has provided leaders for both civilian and military leadership to the U.N. India has the third-largest military and is bracing to become a rising economic power in the world. India, along with the other G4 countries, is striving for permanent membership in the UNSC, which will further increase its influence in the world and South Asian region. India, however, has a number of disputes with its small regional countries, especially Pakistan. Interestingly, all South Asian countries border India, but do not have contiguous borders with each other. Therefore, most of the South Asian countries, being India's neighbor, depend on India's support for their security and economic assistance. For instance, Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked countries and depend on Indian seaports for their trade. Additionally, Bangladesh has unresolved border and water dispute with India. Similarly, Sri Lanka has suffered from Tamil's insurgency that was supported by India. Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an influential regional state, India has failed to play the required leadership role to amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India, however, considers that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as subordinate states. Thus, India's permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications for the South Asian region. **India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed to regional issues, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has violated UNSC's resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the future as well. India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through economic strangulation and by**

involving them in political problems and disputes. India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention through India's influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the region.

India wants to use its seat on UNSC to achieve its goals against Pakistan

Dabhade 17 Manish S. Dabhade [Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India], 12-2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms," ORF Occasional Paper,

https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf //DF

Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of peacekeepers deployed in the ground as do China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States combined – also known as the P5, the five countries that wield veto power at the Council. In terms of financial contributions to the UN, India with US\$ 20.46 million ranks 23rd in the list of contributors. India had emphasised on this back in 1993: "...not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into account." Adding further, India asserted: "the financial contribution does not remain static forever, and the crucial issue is the readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a particular point in time. The point is India could emerge before long, if its economy performs well, as a sizeable contributor to UN budget." (Menon 1995, p.15) Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by its history of interacting with the Security Council. **In the early years of its independence during its armed conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir, India paid the price for being "idealistic". India took the Kashmir issue to the UN, wherein it had to battle the hard realpolitik of the Cold War** years that led the UN interventions over the Kashmir dispute. **To prevent this negative outcome again, it is hoped that an Indian presence at the Security Council will ensure the nation's interests are not sacrificed at the altar of great power politics.** Most importantly, **it will stall any possible intervention by China, a permanent member at the behest of its ally Pakistan.** Indian interests in the Security Council also flow from the many larger foreign policy debates in India on whether it will be a status quo power that accepts liberal norms and positions itself as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system or a revisionist power that seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits agree that India would be moderately revisionist, in that it will seek to adjust international norms and frameworks that suits its global vision, without seeking to overthrow the current international system.

Stuenkel 10 Oliver Stuenkel [Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo], 2010, "Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN Security Council," Carta Internacional,

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf> //DF

But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. * is interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to an ever more important organ.⁸⁴ Finally, **India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.**⁸⁵ Specifically, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-permanent members. * e G4's proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied by two African nations, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).⁸⁶

India has conducted egregious human rights violations in Kashmir. Granting them a permanent seat would greenlight future violations of international norms.

Nawaz '17 Nawaz, Shamsa (Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad). "Violation of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India's Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership." *Strategic Studies*, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/37138288/Violation_of_the_UN_Resolutions_on_Kashmir_Indias_Quest_for_UNSC_Permanent_Membership. [Premier]

Kashmiris want an honourable space for themselves according to the UN Charter. In 1990, when a popular uprising broke out, the most shouted slogan was, 'until a plebiscite is held, our struggle will continue.'³⁷ The history has seen large processions heading towards the UNMOGIP headquarters demanding for their independence. The protests were relodged on August 18, 2008, and called for the implementation of the UN resolutions. On March 1, 1990, more than one million Kashmiris marched towards the UNMOGIP headquarters and called for the UN-supervised plebiscite. More than 600 memoranda were submitted for the UN Secretary General to urge India to grant Kashmiris their right of self-determination.³⁸ The disputed status of Kashmir and the continuous denial of India to their right of self-determination have further strengthened their national identity. The Plebiscite Movement, originated by the Plebiscite Front in 1955, has greatly contributed to keeping the demand alive along with the presence of the UN resolutions. It represents the popular demand. On the other hand, the role of the UN has been invalidated with the passage of time. The most recent UN attempt was made in 2002, when Indo-Pak forces confronted each other at the borders. India mobilised half a million troops to pressurise Pakistan, not to side with the Kashmiri freedom fighters on their principle demand. However, the current wave of atrocities by India to suppress the movement after the extrajudicial killing of the freedom fighter, Burhan Wani, in July 2016, and the use of pellet guns to blind several have not been able to stir the world's conscience. The use of the brutal force by India is impertinence to an international organisation. It compounds vulnerability for peaceful world governance. The functions and the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are to maintain international peace and security and investigate the disputes, which eventually might lead to any international friction. The threats, which might violate peace, are also determined and terms of settlement are recommended. The UN needs to assume its role more assertively. Furthermore, the US support to **India's bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC** would give a **free rein** to India to continue with the **violation of international norms** and further lead to the **failure** of yet another crisis management body.

The presence of peacekeepers increases international attention and makes a response possible

Lodin 16 Major General Per Lodin [joined UNMOGIP as Head of Mission and Chief Military Observer in July 2016], 2016, "THE OBSERVER: FOR PEACE IN KASHMIR," United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan MAGAZINE 2016,

https://unmogip.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmogip_magazine_2016_web.pdf //DF

What has been UNMOGIP's contribution to peace and security of the regions over the years? UNMOGIP has been here for quite a long time. The first military observers arrived on 24 January 1949 and we are still here. We observe, monitor, report and investigate complaints of alleged ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and incidents along the Working Boundary. I think that even if we are a few, we show the presence of the international community. This is important. I think it helps to maintain peace and security in the area. And then, of course, we shall remember that the two host countries, Pakistan and India, are regional and nuclear powers. It is a demanding situation. You said your presence is important. So how does UNMOGIP's reporting help in preventing the conflict from escalating? Let's look at it in another way. **If UNMOGIP was not present, who should then report about the situation -- positive or negative -- to the UN? We are the eyes of the international community along the Line of Control** and the Working Boundary. **Just the fact that our host nations and others know that we are there, it actually helps.**

And that is also the view of the Secretary-General, whose position is that UNMOGIP's mandate can only be terminated by a decision of the Security Council and in absence of such decision, the Mission will be maintained with the same arrangements. Does UNMOGIP's reporting also help with the diplomatic efforts for peace between India and Pakistan? That is not up to me to comment on. Our mandate is to report to the Secretary-General and UN Headquarters (UNHQ) and to share information about the results of our investigations with the latter. Like all other peacekeeping missions, UNMOGIP is impartial. We only share information with the diplomatic community about our mandate and how we're trying to fulfill this mandate and where we are based. The Secretary-General has repeatedly offered assurances to the two parties of the UN's good offices and UNMOGIP's objective is to maintain strong working relationships with the Government of Pakistan and India.

Tough Indian policies in Kashmir increase terrorism

Economist 19 2-15-2019, "The beginning of a spiral: A deadly bombing provokes a crisis between India and Pakistan," Economist,

<https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/02/15/a-deadly-bombing-provokes-a-crisis-between-india-and-pakistan> //DF

A HUGE CAR bomb struck a convoy of paramilitary police in Indian-administered Kashmir on February 14th, killing at least 40 paramilitary police. The suicide attack, claimed by a Pakistan-based Islamist terror group, was the deadliest single blow to Indian security forces since the start of unrest in Kashmir 30 years ago. Amid public outrage in India, and with national elections approaching in April, Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, has promised a "jaw-breaking response". Having boosted his nationalist credentials by ordering retaliatory "surgical strikes" across the Pakistani border following a similar attack in 2016, Mr Modi will be pressed to react even more harshly this time. **Chronically tense relations between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed states, appear headed towards a dangerous**

showdown. Indian officials were quick to underline Pakistan's links to Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), the group that claimed responsibility for the attack. Its leader, Masood Azhar, "has been given full freedom by the government of Pakistan...to carry out attacks in India and elsewhere with impunity," declared a statement from India's foreign ministry. Many Indians have also expressed anger with China, which has repeatedly blocked Indian efforts to get Mr Azhar included on the UN Security Council's list of designated terrorists. Pakistan, a close ally of China, condemned the attack but in the same breath rejected "insinuations" of any link to the Pakistani state. Those links are not hard to find, however. Mr Azhar has a long history of involvement in terrorism. His group has been particularly active in Kashmir, a territory that ended up divided following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, but which both countries claim. Freed from an Indian prison in a hostage swap that ended a hijacking in 1999, Mr Azhar soon after addressed a crowd of 10,000 people in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Although JeM has often struck just when Indo-Pakistani relations were improving—as in its attacks in 2001 on India's parliament building and in 2016 on two Indian military bases—Pakistani authorities have repeatedly released Mr Azhar after brief spells in detention. In 2014 he publicly announced a "resumption of jihad" in Kashmir, and in 2016 he inaugurated a grand new headquarters in his hometown of Bahawalpur, from where he last year announced a speaking tour around Pakistan. Indian police say that although JeM had been virtually wiped out in Kashmir by 2015, it has recently rebuilt its network and overtaken two rival Pakistan-backed groups,

Hizbul Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in the pace of its attacks. This week's car bombing marked a significant escalation. Estimates put the size of the bomb at a hefty 350kg, enough to leave nothing except tangled undercarriages of the SUV carrying the device and its objective, a bus that was part of a lumbering 78-vehicle military convoy ferrying some 2,500 conscripts from the Central Reserve Police Force.

The bomber was identified in a video as a 22-year-old youth from a nearby village. All this indicates that despite India's heavy security presence, and a fierce campaign against militants that has left 20 dead so far this year, JeM was able to recruit locally and to construct and deploy a sophisticated bomb, as well as to plan and execute a deadly attack on an obvious target. Although initial responses in India have focused on grief for the fallen and anger with Pakistan, some have pointed to intelligence lapses, as well as policy choices that have failed to address the underlying problems of Kashmir. Violence has ebbed and flowed in the densely populated Kashmir Valley, a Muslim-majority region of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, since Pakistani-backed separatist militants took up arms in 1988. Massive deployments of Indian forces and pressure on Pakistan, plus efforts to woo the valley back into mainstream politics, had slowly dampened tensions. By 2012 the number of people killed each year had fallen from more than 4,000 at its peak to below 150. But since the election of Mr Modi in 2014, his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has pursued a get-tough policy that, far from calming the region, has provoked rising unrest. The annual number of "terror-related incidents" in the state rose by 177% between 2014 and 2018, according to police statistics. The death toll of security forces increased by 94%, to 91 last year. Perhaps more tellingly, police estimates of the number of active insurgents in the area have also risen, despite the killing of more than 800 of them over the past five years, and despite the fact that infiltration from Pakistan has slowed. The rise in local recruitment, say analysts, in part reflects resentment against harsh policing methods. Police routinely quell stone-throwing crowds with shotguns. Although the pellets these fire are usually not lethal, they have left

hundreds with impaired eyesight and other with severe injuries. Kashmiri resentment also reflects disillusionment with Indian politics. Last year Mr Modi's BJP pulled out of a coalition to topple the elected state government, and then imposed direct rule from Delhi. Adding to unhappiness in the Kashmir Valley, freezing temperatures this winter have been accompanied by lengthy power cuts—in a state that exports hydro-electricity to the rest of India. Wiser heads would argue that winning hearts and minds in Kashmir is just as important as getting tough with Pakistan. But the vast majority of Indians have little time for nuance just now.

Link – Pakistani opposition

Pakistan will not support India on the UNSC

Dawn.com 2015 (Dawn.com, most widely read English newspaper based in Pakistan that covers news from around the world, 12 February 2015, "Pakistan will not accept India as a permanent member:

Nawaz,

<https://www.dawn.com/news/1163163/pakistan-will-not-accept-india-as-unscc-permanent-member-na-waz>, DOA: 12 March 2019) AMS

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan made it clear to the United States on Thursday it would not accept India as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed these reservations while speaking with US President Barack Obama on the phone, the PM House said in a statement. The prime minister said India cannot become a UNSC permanent member due to its non-compliance of all the resolutions passed by UN regarding Kashmir, added the spokesman. The US president called Nawaz in the evening where both the leaders discussed issues of mutual interest and those related to regional stability and peace for over half-an-hour, said the statement. The spokesman said the prime minister made it clear upon the US president that permanent slot for India at the UNSC will not be tolerated at any cost as India has not fulfilled any resolution passed by UN aimed at assuring the right of self determination for the people of Kashmir. During his visit to India last month, Obama had lent his support to India's bid for UN Security Council's membership which was seen in Pakistan as contempt of democracy and human rights. "India is by no means eligible to become a permanent member of UN," the prime minister was quoted as saying. Nawaz also conveyed Pakistan's desire to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Meanwhile, Obama informed Nawaz about his recent trip to India and also congratulated the prime minister on the success of Operation Zarb-i-Azb. Barack Obama visited India on January 25 and became the first US president to make two official visits to India during his tenure.

IL – Pakistani terrorism

India uses terrorism to get international attention, but now it is more likely to lead to conflict

Haqqani 19 Husain Haqqani [A Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director for South and Central Asia, Ambassador Husain Haqqani served as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States from 2008-2011 and is widely credited with managing a difficult partnership during a critical phase in the global war on terrorism], 3-1-2019, "Pakistan Released the Indian Pilot. But It Needs to Do More for Peace.," Hudson Institute,

<https://www.hudson.org/research/14839-pakistan-released-the-indian-pilot-but-it-needs-to-do-more-for-peace> //DF

On Friday, Pakistan released an Indian pilot shot down in Pakistani-controlled territory amidst rising hostilities. But the peace gesture, as Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called it, is unlikely to end the conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. There appears to be international consensus that, to truly end hostilities, Pakistan must shut down support for terrorist groups whose actions have brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war several times over the past two decades. Since 1999, crises between India and Pakistan have tended to evolve in four stages. First, eager to get international attention for the dispute over

Kashmir, a Pakistan-based militant group launches an attack in India or Indian-controlled Kashmir. Then India threatens retaliation, which in the past involved mobilization of troops along the Pakistan border but this time comprised an air strike on a terrorist training camp inside Pakistan. Faced with Indian threats, Pakistan raises the specter of nuclear confrontation and asks the United States and other major powers to help defuse the situation. Finally, American diplomacy provides Pakistan a face-saver, and the threat of war subsides. This scenario played out in 1999, during the Kargil crisis. It was repeated after the attack on India's Parliament in December 2001 and again following the carnage at several Mumbai hotels in November 2008. As Pakistan's ambassador to the United States during the Mumbai attacks, I witnessed firsthand the American efforts to smooth out India-Pakistan tensions. President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and national security adviser Stephen Hadley spoke on the phone with prime ministers of both countries multiple times. The CIA shared intelligence that enabled Pakistan to arrest several individuals connected with the attacks. But after the immediate threat of Indian retaliation had passed, Pakistan backed away from punishing the attack's masterminds and perpetrators. In 2016, India tried to change the pattern by following a terrorist attack inside its territory with a surgical strike against a terrorist launchpad across the de-facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan avoided escalation by pretending that the strike had not taken place. As in 2016, the latest confrontation also deviates from the usual pattern. After a Feb. 14 terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, India undertook a retaliatory strike on an alleged militant facility in Pakistan. Pakistan responded to India's strike with an air raid of its own. It was while chasing the intruding Pakistani aircraft that the Indian pilot being released on Friday was shot down. In military terms, Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment counts on India's fear of conflict escalating to the nuclear level while planning terrorist attacks. Instead of nuclear weapons being a deterrent to war, this approach allows for low-cost, low-intensity war, which can be carried on endlessly under a nuclear umbrella. But now India feels it has found a soft spot where it can strike — whether on ground using special forces, as in 2016, or using air strikes as they have in the current crisis — without crossing the threshold for all-out war between the nuclear powers. These hostilities come amidst rising hyper-nationalist sentiment in both India and Pakistan. Politicians and shrill anchors on Indian evening television talk shows have been clamoring for India to teach Pakistan a lesson over its support for terrorism. On the Pakistani side, national pride has been constantly invoked to assert that India cannot dictate to Pakistan. Yet Pakistan's support for terrorist groups is well documented, even as it has been officially denied by successive Pakistani governments. Pakistan-based groups, operating openly despite official bans, have often been eager to claim responsibility for attacks inside India.

Pakistan uses terrorism to get leverage over India

WP 19 Editorial Board, 2-19-2019, "The Kashmir attack leaves the U.S. and India facing a dilemma about Pakistan," Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-kashmir-attack-leaves-the-us-and-india-facing-a-dilemma-about-pakistan/2019/02/19/f7e571f2-347b-11e9-a400-e481bf264fdc_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b977e64f7a85 //DF

While the Indian government is saying it has "incontrovertible evidence" that Pakistan had a "direct hand" in the attack, Islamabad is responding with familiar dodges. Prime Minister Imran Khan denied responsibility without explicitly condemning the bombing, and pledged to take action if India provided proof of Pakistani involvement. If the record of past terrorist attacks in India is any indication, Pakistan will not act even if evidence is provided. The same has been true of its response to terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, such as assaults on the U.S. Embassy and other Western targets by a Taliban faction known as the Haqqani network, which Pakistan is also believed to support. Pakistan has long sought to use terrorists to gain leverage over India, with which it disputes control of Kashmir, and the United States, which it would like to force to accept rule by the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is making headway on the latter goal with the Trump administration, which has been negotiating with the Taliban about withdrawing U.S. troops. That increases the complications for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who faces a national election in the coming months. Mr. Modi has vowed "a befitting reply" to the attack, and other officials have used harsher rhetoric; one promised an "unforgettable lesson" for Pakistan. The government has already suspended trade preferences and withdrawn its ambassador. It appears to have at least the rhetorical support of the White House; national security adviser John Bolton told his counterpart that the United States supports India's right to defend itself, according to an Indian statement.

IL – War risk high now

Tensions at highest point in decades (Perrigo - Time)

Billy Perrigo, February 28, "What to Know About Rising Tensions Between India and Pakistan," Time, <http://time.com/5538756/india-pakistan-kashmir-tensions-airstrikes/> (NK)

With tit-for-tat airstrikes across a cease-fire line in late February, tensions between India and Pakistan rose to their highest point in years. The two nuclear-armed states have long clashed over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, which each claims as its own. But **the situation deteriorated there after a Feb. 14 bombing by a Pakistan-based militant group, Jaish-e-Mohammed, killed 40 Indian paramilitaries in the Pulwama district of Kashmir.** It was the deadliest attack in the insurgency that has raged for 30 years in the contested Himalayan region that borders the two countries. **Twelve days later, on Tuesday, India sent jets into Pakistani airspace for the first time since 1971, and bombed what it said was a training camp for Jaish-e-Mohammed for the Feb. 14 attack.** (Pakistan denied any such sites were hit.) India and Pakistan last went to war over Kashmir back in 1999, and now, with Indian elections approaching in April and May, India's retaliation threatens to escalate tensions even further. **The situation is more fraught than it has been for decades,** analysts say, though both sides have kept open the possibility of de-escalation. At least 40 incidents of violence against Kashmiris were recorded across India in the days following the Feb. 14 attack. Here's what to know.

The Kashmir attack ratcheted up tensions between the two nations, bringing them to the brink of war

Robertson 19 Nic Robertson, Adeel Raja and Helen Regan, Cnn, 3-6-2019, "Pakistan denies terror clampdown is result of Indian tensions," CNN,

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/06/asia/pakistan-militant-groups-india-intl/index.html> //DF

The Pulwama attack prompted retaliatory measures by India, which said last week that it had struck a JeM camp within Pakistan. Pakistan disputes the existence of the camp but acknowledges that Indian jets had dropped a payload within its borders. "Not even a single brick has been found there if there was infrastructure, and not even a dead body found there. Their claims are false," Ghafoor said. **Islamabad retaliated for the strike by sending its planes over the line of control** that marks the de facto border between the two countries. **In the ensuing dogfight, Pakistan claimed its air force shot down two Indian fighter jets, capturing one pilot.** India said just one plane was downed. Pakistan Ghafoor told CNN that **the countries "came close" to conflict but the release of Indian Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman from Pakistani custody** last Friday **brought the two neighbors back from the brink of war.** The two sides have been "eyeballs to eyeballs" in Kashmir, he said, and that it was now "up to India" to "move forward towards de-escalation." "Should they decide to escalate more, this situation will go bad," Ghafoor said. **While tensions along the disputed border have somewhat cooled, the situation remains "serious,"** Islamabad's ambassador to the US, Asad Majeed Khan, said Monday. On Monday, **the Pakistan navy said it intercepted an Indian submarine in its waters,** a claim India denies.

India's February bombing in Pakistan shows that it's going to respond militarily to future incursions

Sharma 19 PRANAY SHARMA, 3-1-2019, "The War Mirage: India-Pak Standoff Can Assume Many Shades," Outlook India [Indian magazine],

https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-the-war-mirage/301247?utm_source=bottom_floater //DF

The current spell of armed skirmishes between India and Pakistan has raised questions and forced diplomats and experts from both nations to find innovative ways to describe the fast-paced developments. **"The signal going out of India is clear: New Delhi will no**

longer be subject to nuclear blackmail and allow Pakistan to push jihadis into India to achieve its political agenda,” says Ahmed. Its efficacy will be measured in the near future, he adds. In the early hours of February 26, 12 Mirage 2000 fighter jets, accompanied by other aircraft of the IAF, crossed the Line of Control and bombed with laser-guided missiles a Jaish-e-Mohammed hideout and training facility in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Balakot. It **[India’s bombing in Pakistan] was a paradigm shift in India’s strategic doctrine vis-à-vis dealing with terrorist attacks. Until now, as most Indian security measures against Pakistan were conducted from within its territory,** gung-ho experts in Delhi feel that **India has finally managed to break its defensive mindset with Tuesday’s airborne operation.** Indian foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale fell back on innovative adjectives to describe it. “This non-military pre-emptive action was specifically targeted at the JeM camp,” he said, while recalling that the UN proscribed terror group perpetrated the Pulwama attack and was responsible for other terror acts in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack. “The selection of the target was also conditioned by our desire to avoid civilian casualties. The facility is located in thick forest on a hilltop far away from any civilian presence,” he added.

While India and Pakistan have stopped escalating now, there are several warning signs that the region won’t get safer anytime soon

Mir 19 Asfandiyar Mir, 3-7-2019, “Why India and Pakistan are fighting again -- and the risks that remain,” Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/07/india-pakistan-tensions-escalated-last-week-this-is-why/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.428c65fb9da2 //DF

But South Asia remains at risk of conflict. **South Asia remains tense. A number of specific risks threaten a return to hostilities — and further escalation. The current postures of Indian and Pakistani military forces put this conflict at risk of re-escalating.** The two sides continue to exchange heavy artillery fire in the disputed region of Kashmir. Both militaries have intensified aerial and naval patrolling along their territorial borders, which can lead to escalation by accident. **And the Indian government hasn’t signaled a clear intent to de-escalate the crisis — in contrast to Pakistan’s repeated calls for de-escalation. Modi continues to raise his base’s expectations on acting against Pakistan.** This leaves the possibility that India may be flirting with options of another military action. **A major terrorist attack in India would also prompt conflict.** Such an attack can come from the deeply alienated Kashmiri youth — some of whom are turning to Islamist militant groups to take on the Indian government. Indian policies fueling resentment in the region seem unlikely to change anytime soon. **Pakistan-based Islamist militant groups also remain committed to attacks in India. Pakistan has announced a new crackdown against such groups but it has a track record of secretly backing the Kashmiri insurgency even after such pronouncements.** It remains to be seen if Pakistan will genuinely pull support from the militant groups. **And there’s an added challenge: misinformation related to the crisis,** often through social media. In the week since the military exchange, rumors about military and civilian deaths, imminent military actions and incorrectly attributed attacks have become common. Such misinformation **has added to war hysteria in a deeply polarized subcontinent. It also risks influencing civilian and military decision-makers in the two countries.**

IL – Nuke War

A situation between India and Pakistan could very easily spiral out of control; “miscalculation is South Asia’s middle name” – the risk is that there’s no command and control so Pakistan can act out. Even though governments are rational actors, individuals are irrational

Keck 19 Zachary Keck [formerly Managing Editor of The Diplomat where he authored The Pacific Realist blog. Previously, he worked as Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues], 2-15-2019, "Billions Dead: That's What Could Happen if India and Pakistan Wage a Nuclear War," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/billions-dead-thats-what-could-happen-if-india-and-pakistan-wage-e-nuclear-war-44682> //DF

Armed with what they believe is reasonable intelligence about the locations of Pakistan’s strategic forces, highly accurate missiles and MIRVs to target them, and a missile defense that has a shot at cleaning up any Pakistani missiles that survived the first strike, Indian leaders might be tempted to launch a counterforce first strike. With the world’s attention firmly fixated on North Korea, **the greatest possibility of nuclear war is** in fact on the other side of Asia. That place is what could be called the nuclear triangle of Pakistan, India and China. Although Chinese and Indian forces are currently engaged in a standoff, traditionally the most dangerous flashpoint along the triangle has been **the Indo-Pakistani border. The two countries fought three major wars before acquiring nuclear weapons, and one minor one afterwards.** And this doesn’t even include the countless other armed skirmishes and other incidents that are a regular occurrence. **At the heart of this conflict, of course, is the territorial dispute over the northern Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, the latter part of which Pakistan lays claim to.** Also key to the nuclear dimension of the conflict is the fact that **India’s conventional capabilities are vastly superior to Pakistan’s.** **Consequently, Islamabad has adopted a nuclear doctrine of using tactical nuclear weapons against Indian forces to offset the latter’s conventional superiority.** If this situation sounds similar, that is because this is the same strategy the U.S.-led NATO forces adopted against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the face of a numerically superior Soviet military, the United States, starting with the Eisenhower administration, turned to nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe from a Soviet attack. Although nearly every U.S. president, as well as countless European leaders, were uncomfortable with this escalatory strategy, they were unable to escape the military realities undergirding it until at least the Reagan administration. At an event at the Stimson Center in Washington this week, Feroz Khan, a former brigadier in the Pakistan Army and author of one of the best books on the country’s nuclear program, said that Pakistani military leaders explicitly based their nuclear doctrine on NATO’s Cold War strategy. But as Vipin Narang, a newly tenured MIT professor who was on the same panel, pointed out, an important difference between NATO and Pakistan’s strategies is that the latter has used its nuclear shield as a cover to support countless terrorist attacks inside India. Among the most audacious were the 2001 attacks on India’s parliament and the 2008 siege of Mumbai, which killed over 150 people. Had such an attack occurred in the United States, Narang said, America would have ended a nation-state. The reason why India didn’t respond to force, according to Narang, is that—despite its alleged Cold Start doctrine—Indian leaders were unsure exactly where Pakistan’s nuclear threshold stood. That is, even if Indian leaders believed they were launching a limited attack, they couldn’t be sure that Pakistani leaders wouldn’t view it as expansive enough to justify using nuclear weapons. This is no accident: as Khan said, Pakistani leaders intentionally leave their nuclear threshold ambiguous. Nonetheless, **there is no guarantee that India’s restraint will continue in the future.** Indeed, as Michael Krepon quipped, **“Miscalculation is South Asia’s middle name.”** Much of the panel’s discussion was focused on technological changes that might exacerbate this already-combustible situation. Narang took the lead in describing how **India was acquiring the capabilities to pursue counterforce strikes** (i.e., **take out Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in a preventive or more likely preemptive strike**). These included advances in information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be able to track and target Islamabad’s strategic forces, as well as a missile-defense system that could take care of any missiles the first strike didn’t destroy. He also noted that India is pursuing a number of missile capabilities highly suited for counterforce missions, such as Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) and the highly accurate BrahMos missiles that Delhi developed jointly with Russia. “BrahMos

is one hell of a counterforce weapon," even without nuclear warheads, Narang contended. As Narang himself admitted, there's little reason to believe that India is abandoning its no-first-use nuclear doctrine in favor of a first-strike one. Still, keeping in mind Krepon's point about miscalculation, that doesn't mean that these technological changes don't increase the potential for a nuclear war. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where the two sides stumble into a nuclear war that neither side wants. Perhaps the most plausible scenario would start with a Mumbai-style attack that Indian leaders decide they must respond to. In hopes of keeping the conflict limited to conventional weapons, Delhi might authorize limited punitive raids inside Pakistan, perhaps targeting some of the terrorist camps near the border. These attacks might be misinterpreted by Pakistani leaders, or else unintentionally cross Islamabad's nuclear thresholds. In an attempt to deescalate by escalating, or else to halt what they believe is an Indian invasion, Pakistani leaders could use tactical nuclear weapons against the Indian troops inside Pakistan. With nuclear weapons introduced, Delhi's no-first-use doctrine no longer applies. Indian leaders, knowing they'd face incredible domestic pressure to respond, would also have no guarantee that Pakistani leaders didn't intend to follow the tactical use of nuclear weapons with strategic strikes against Indian cities. Armed with what they believe is reasonable intelligence about the locations of Pakistan's strategic forces, highly accurate missiles and MIRVs to target them, and a missile defense that has a shot at cleaning up any Pakistani missiles that survived the first strike, Indian leaders might be tempted to launch a counterforce first strike. As former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon wrote in his memoirs (which Narang first drew people's attention to at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in March): "India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan."

Pakistan's threshold to use a nuclear weapon is incredibly low and triggered by multiple actions by India.

Roblin, 2019 (Sébastien, Master's Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. March 9th, 2019. "Why a So-Called "Limited" Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan Would Devastate the Planet." The National Interest.

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-so-called-limited-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-would-devastate-planet-46532> DOA 03/13/19)

Recurring terrorist attacks by Pakistan-sponsored militant groups over the status of India's Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state have repeatedly led to threats of a conventional military retaliation by New Delhi. Pakistan, in turn, maintains it may use nuclear weapons as a first-strike weapon to counter-balance India's superior conventional forces. Triggers could involve the destruction of a large part of Pakistan's military or penetration by Indian forces deep into Pakistani territory. Islamabad also claims it might authorize a strike in event of a damaging Indian blockade or political destabilization instigated by India.

Pakistan's use of nukes to respond to even conventional attacks dramatically raise the stakes and risk of war

Wilson 19 Geoff Wilson, 3-6-2019, "India and Pakistan on the Brink: A Nuclear Nightmare in South Asia," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/india-and-pakistan-brink-nuclear-nightmare-south-asia-46302> //DF

It could have been much worse. India and Pakistan possess two of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in the world. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, estimates that India possesses some 140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has around 150. Of particular

concern is Pakistan's growing inventory of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons. According to Kristensen, these weapons are part of an effort "to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory." This is extremely concerning. Just possessing nuclear weapons meant to be used against conventional forces, could lower the threshold for their use during a conflict. The Trump administration agrees, with officials having gone on the record saying, "we are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use [on the] battlefield. We believe that these systems... increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange in the region." These fears are more than just hyperbole. Earlier this week a retired Pakistani general told his colleagues that in order to deter India, "our response should be to escalate and push the envelope of hostilities so that nuclear war is a likely outcome." We know that this sort of thinking is misguided. Why? Because the United States once had a similar strategy. During the Cold War the United States stockpiled thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear bazookas, landmines and artillery shells as a counter to Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. The plan was simple. If an army of Soviet tanks rolled through the Fulda Gap, we would counter with small scale nuclear weapons. The theory went that by showing you were willing to use a small nuke, the enemy would consider that you might just be crazy enough to use your big ones too, causing them to back down. This strategy was unironically referred to as the Madman Theory. Unfortunately, under scrutiny, it turned out to be just that, mad. In 1955, the Department of Defense conducted a wargame called Carte Blanche in which more than three hundred simulated tactical nuclear weapons were used against Soviet targets on German soil with the aim of halting an advancing Soviet army. When the simulated dust settled, an estimated 1.7 million Germans had been killed, with 3.5 million wounded and incalculable number of additional casualties resulting from radiological fallout. When the results of the exercise were leaked to the press, they "produced widespread unrest and agitation" in West Germany over the proposed U.S. nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration tested the premise again in 1983 with the wargame Proud Prophet. This scenario saw NATO launch limited nuclear strikes against Soviet targets in response to a conventional provocation. But instead of backing down, the Soviet team doubled down. "The Soviet Union team interpreted the nuclear strikes as an attack on their nation, their way of life and their honor. So they responded with an enormous nuclear salvo at the United States," writes Department of Defense advisor and nuclear historian Paul Bracken. "The United States retaliated in kind. The result was a catastrophe that made all the wars of the past five hundred years pale in comparison... a half-billion human beings were killed in the initial exchanges and at least that many more would have died from radiation and starvation. NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Major parts of the Northern Hemisphere would be uninhabitable for decades." The results reportedly shocked President Ronald Reagan so badly that his schedule had to be cleared for the rest of the day. A few months later, he famously told the American people that, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." The lessons of these wargames apply to the Indian subcontinent as well. Recent studies have estimated that regional nuclear war, such as one between India and Pakistan, could lead to the deaths of some 2 billion people worldwide.

James 19 Kevin R. James, 4-1-2019, "India and Pakistan: making the stability/instability paradox go one way," Strategist,

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-pakistan-making-the-stability-instability-paradox-go-one-way/> //DF

Exploiting Kashmiri disaffection and the transnational jihadist movement, Pakistan is waging a deadly guerrilla war against India in Kashmir. Usually, of course, sponsoring an insurgency in a more powerful neighbouring country would provoke a very costly response (eliminating the incentive to sponsor the insurgency in the first place). In the case of Kashmir, however, Pakistan has cleverly combined its conventional and nuclear capabilities in a way that makes it impossible for India to impose such a penalty at a price that India is willing to pay. That's because Pakistan's conventional strength is sufficient to eliminate India's ability to impose significant costs with a low-intensity conventional response, and Pakistan has drawn its nuclear use red lines such that any high-intensity conventional response will lead to the risk of a nuclear war. In short, Pakistan has found a way to make the stability/instability paradox go one way. Pakistan's Kashmir strategy leaves India with two unpalatable options: live with the insurgency and terrorism that Pakistan promotes; or retaliate in a manner that crosses Pakistan's nuclear red lines (as currently defined). Given the state of India's military forces, India now has no choice but to live with the insurgency. But it's no surprise to find that India is making a considerable effort to develop the counterforce and anti-ballistic-missile capabilities required to put option 2 on

the table. It follows that the next crisis could play out very differently from the current one. Kashmir is a quagmire for India because Pakistan can intervene in ways that keep the conflict going essentially for free. Pakistan's civilian and military/security institutions are as one in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir, and the combination of the transnational jihadist network and the Kashmiri independence movement ensures that there's no shortage of insurgents to support. That support doesn't require any significant economic investment on Pakistan's part, and the death and destruction that the insurgency produces don't fall on groups that create political costs in Pakistan. So, Pakistan will continue its ideological and material support for the Kashmiri insurgency (to India's considerable detriment) unless India can devise some way to impose a significant cost on Pakistan for doing so. A realistic evaluation of **India's response to the 14 February suicide bombing** that triggered the current crisis shows that India has simply not been able to impose such a cost. The response **consisted of border clashes and a small number of airstrikes. But Pakistan's forces along the border have easily been able to match the low-intensity Indian initiatives such as limited artillery barrages, and so these tit-for-tat exchanges haven't led to any Indian advantage.** And while the Indian Air Force has been a bit more aggressive, it's clear that the Pakistan Air Force is more than capable of dealing with low-intensity Indian air operations. **India does have the capability to mount a high-intensity conventional response that would enable it to impose substantial costs on Pakistan.** For example, India could mobilise its more powerful land forces and destroy a significant proportion of the Pakistani army; use its more powerful air force to achieve air superiority over Pakistan and mount a sustained campaign on the jihadist infrastructure; and/or use its more powerful navy to put in place a blockade that would have devastating consequences for the Pakistani economy. **However, each of these high-intensity actions (or anything similar) would cross one of Pakistan's red lines and so trigger a risk of a nuclear response. Due to the current state of the India-Pakistan nuclear balance, India is unwilling to run that risk.** Consequently, it has no effective response to Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir. To change the game that India is otherwise destined to lose, India must find a way to limit Pakistan's nuclear threat. The way to limit this threat is to achieve nuclear superiority (which may not require an explicit change to Indian nuclear strategy). India is now striving to do just that. **Nuclear superiority will, somewhat paradoxically, enable India to exploit its massive conventional military superiority over Pakistan. If India has nuclear superiority, Pakistan will be far less willing to risk a nuclear exchange with India.** Pakistan will then redraw its red lines in a much more conservative way. The more restricted red lines will in turn enable India to mount a much more vigorous conventional response to any Pakistani-supported or -facilitated attacks without triggering a Pakistani nuclear response. The potential for (or the reality of) a more vigorous conventional response will in turn substantially limit Pakistan's incentives to support attacks on India. India's efforts to obtain nuclear superiority will induce a Pakistani response (if indeed they haven't already done so). That means the arms race is likely to move up a gear. However, Pakistan is at a considerable disadvantage in this race as it is far smaller and much poorer than India. So, while Pakistan will probably be able to prevent India from acquiring a perfect first-strike capability, it will not be able to stop India from acquiring nuclear superiority. It is now obvious to the entire Indian political-military establishment that the theoretically much more powerful India has no effective response to Pakistan's subconventional aggression in Kashmir. **This is not a sustainable situation, and India is now developing the nuclear and conventional capabilities required to put high-intensity response options on the table. If Pakistan continues on its present course, the inevitable next crisis is unlikely to end with pointless artillery barrages and pinprick airstrikes.**

India Cold start - conventional attack not triggering nuke response - could trigger Pakistan's nuke response, especially if they are outmatched. India could launch a large first strike in order to take out Pakistan's nuclear capability

Phillip Orchard, March 2019, "Why India and Pakistan Avoided Nuclear War," Real Clear World,

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2019/03/07/why_india_and_pakistan_avoided_nuclear_war_112984.html (NK)

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine once included something like credible minimum deterrence. But then India developed the notion of a "cold start" – the idea that it could launch a non-nuclear, conventional ground offensive that wouldn't meet Pakistan's threshold for nuclear use. Pakistan promptly revised its doctrine to "full spectrum deterrence," which does allow for first use. In a cold start, it's possible that Pakistan's weaker conventional forces wouldn't repel the Indian invasion, and Pakistan could use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons (that is, nuclear weapons meant to be used on the battlefield in conjunction with tactical maneuvers, rather than against strategic targets like military installations or cities) **to repel the attack. The problem with a cold start is in knowing exactly where Pakistan's nuclear retaliation threshold lies.** With that uncertainty, some Indian leaders have cast doubt on India's no-first-use policy in recent years. They concluded that **if**

India launches an invasion and a Pakistani tactical nuclear strike becomes imminent, India would want to launch the first strike and eliminate Pakistan's nuclear stockpile before it can be deployed against its invading ground forces. With India more willing to launch the first strike, Pakistan itself might be motivated to pre-empt with strategic strikes of its own on Indian military installations.

Such a state of heightened tensions, where all parties feel threatened and are rapidly militarizing, creates a hair trigger scenario where the outbreak of war is more likely.

Lerner 17 Mitchell Lerner, 8-24-2017, "We won't go to war with North Korea on purpose. But we might by accident," Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/08/24/we-wont-go-to-war-with-no-rth-korea-on-purpose-but-we-might-by-accident/?utm_term=.84763b824825 //DF

The great danger of the current crisis is thus not that decision-makers in Washington and Pyongyang will deliberately weigh the costs and benefits of another Korean War and decide it is worth pursuing. It is instead **that a sudden and unexpected moment triggers a hasty and emotional decision that leads both sides down a tragic path from which there is no return. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis demonstrates how easily foreign policy crises can spin out of control despite the best intentions** of those at the top of the decision-making process. Most Americans celebrate the wisdom demonstrated by President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who acted with restraint while working to avoid what surely would have been a devastating clash. Few Americans, however, understand **how close to war we actually came despite their efforts, as the actions of less well-known figures and the inevitable chaos of unanticipated circumstances threatened to undermine their best intentions.** On Oct. 27, 1962, Soviet forces shot down an American U-2 over Cuba, killing the pilot, Maj. Rudolf Anderson. Khrushchev had given specific orders not to fire on American targets unless war had started, but the Soviet commander on the ground, Gen. Stepan Naumovich Grechko, decided to shoot it down on his own authority. American officials had earlier agreed that such an action would probably evoke an American military response against Cuba, but Kennedy wisely chose to delay such a response. That same day, American ships were harassing a Soviet submarine in the Caribbean. With no contact from Moscow and unsure of the current status of events on land, the captain, Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky, ordered the launch of a nuclear torpedo. Only the opposition of his second-in-command prevented an act that surely would have sparked massive retaliation. In the end, the Cuban crisis was resolved peacefully. But **the fact that the world came perilously close to nuclear conflict because of actions taken by individuals outside of the world's capitals and based on erroneous assumptions should be a sobering warning for those who minimize the current dangers.** The path to other recent conflicts also demonstrates that the road to war seldom runs through an informed assessment of facts on the ground. **In June 1950,** North Korean forces swept over the 38th parallel, sparking the Korean War. Soviet Premier Joseph **Stalin had earlier rejected Kim Il Sung's request to launch an attack against the South. But he soon changed his mind,** in no small part **because of a mistaken belief that the United States would probably not intervene,** and because of Kim's unmerited assurances that massive indigenous backing from the South would ensure a quick victory before President Harry Truman could react if he chose to do so. Likewise, **the American role in the Vietnam War exploded after the alleged second Gulf of Tonkin attack on Aug. 4, 1964. We know now that this attack never occurred, but American military and political leaders believed that it had,** and President Lyndon Johnson used it as an excuse to obtain the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. In neither of these cases were the critical decisions for war made as part of a sober and thorough assessment of accurate evidence. And yet, war came nonetheless. **The current standoff in Korea seems particularly ripe for such an unintended conflict. A long history of rivalry has predisposed each side to read the worst possible motives into the other's actions. Official lines of communication between the two are virtually nonexistent;** at the moment, the United States doesn't even have an ambassador in South Korea. **The two leaders are inexperienced and emotional,** with a tendency to personalize strategic matters and unleash bellicose rhetoric that just heightens tensions throughout the region. North Korean defectors warn of Kim Jong Un's desperate and unyielding commitment to his nuclear program, which he sees as critical to the preservation of his regime, and of the growing doubts about his government at home. And **the North has launched a number of limited but**

deadly military operations against the United States and South Korea over the past decades, ranging from the attack on the USS Pueblo in 1968 to the attack on the Cheonan in 2010, but has never faced serious retribution for them, probably encouraging Kim to trust in the safety of a limited strike that could be a critical first step. Recent history thus suggests that the greatest danger we now face is not that Donald Trump and Kim will decide to go to war, but that isolated individuals who most have never heard of, operating within the inevitable chain of mistakes and miscalculations that are the by-product of human weakness and exigent circumstances, will decide for them. This concern seems particularly acute this week, as the United States and South Korea hold their annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills, which for the first time might include a nuclear war game and which the North has condemned for "adding fuel to the fire." "No one can guarantee that the exercise won't evolve into actual fighting," they noted ominously.

Election DA

UQ

Many voters in Indian elections are undecided until election day, meaning that there's many factors that could swing their decisions

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

"I hear farmers saying he is more decisive," he said. According to Gilles Verniers, an assistant professor of political science at Ashoka University, near New Delhi, 40 percent of India's 900 million voters typically remain undecided until right before the election. Unlike with politics in the United States, where people tend to pick a party and stick with it, many voters in India tack back and forth between the major parties depending on the candidates and the issues of the day. Mr. Verniers said the crisis with Pakistan was certain to "tame the decline" Mr. Modi had been facing. Before the attack in Kashmir, a disputed territory that both India and Pakistan claim, Mr. Gandhi, the leader of the Congress party and the scion of a storied political dynasty, had gained a new spring in his step. He was speaking out forcefully about a murky jet fighter deal that Mr. Modi's government made with France, and he enlisted his popular younger sister, Priyanka, to join the campaign, delivering it a jolt of energy.

IL – National Security

Moves that secure India's security increase Modi's popularity and make him more likely to win, even if those actions don't have real effects

Zargar 19 Arshad R. Zargar, 3-11-2019, "'Potential for armed conflict' looms over India's upcoming elections," CBS News,

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-narendra-modi-strongman-image-pakistan-tension-national-election-looms/> //DF

Last month, a suicide attack on an Indian military convoy in the disputed region of Kashmir, along India's border with Pakistan, killed more than 40 soldiers. Modi's India responded with airstrikes deep inside Pakistani territory, purportedly targeting a training camp of the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which India blamed for the attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes on Indian territory, prompting a dogfight in which one Indian fighter jet was shot down and its pilot captured by

Pakistan. Pakistan released him the next day as a "peace gesture," bringing the nuclear-armed south Asian neighbors back from the brink of full scale war. The two countries have fought three wars since 1947 over Kashmir -- a mountainous region divided between them but claimed in its entirety by both. "The airstrikes on Pakistan will likely boost Modi's election prospects," Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director of the Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at The Wilson Center, a Washington-based think-tank, told CBS News. Many believe that Modi, who seemed to be on the back foot after his party was dealt a series of state election losses, has shifted his campaign strategy from pushing for national development projects, to a platform focused on national security. "The airstrikes have had a rally-around-the-flag effect and reinforced a tough-on-Pakistan position that can only help Modi and the BJP at the polls," Kugelman told CBS News. Respected Indian news editor Raju Narisetti, now a professor at Columbia Journalism School in New York, said Modi's campaign would likely push "the overt and covert case that India simply needs a strong and decisive leader at the helm." Modi carries the image of a strong prime minister who has acted tough with the "enemy" next door. He has dismissed all offers of dialogue with Pakistan, "until it stops exporting terror to India." Narisetti said that while Modi's primary challenger Rahul Gandhi has been able to "shake off" his own devastating losses from elections last year, he and other challengers opposition leaders -- of which there are few with a high profile -- will be at a "relative disadvantage" to the incumbent. Political analyst Yogendra Yadav told an Indian news channel that if it weren't for the airstrikes, Modi's party could have lost at least 100 seats in the upcoming election, but now, "the impression is things have improved for BJP." Potential for armed conflict" Modi's firm stance with Pakistan and the Kashmiri militants his government insists Pakistan allows to operate has come under criticism, but it has consolidated his nationalist, right-wing base. Before he became the prime minister, Modi would often taunt the government led by the rival party as "weak." After he assumed the nation's highest office, he had to live up to expectations.

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

Only one month ago, Narendra Modi, India's once unstoppable prime minister, seemed surprisingly vulnerable going into his re-election campaign. Economic growth had been slowing, thousands of farmers were marching on the capital (some even dumped gallons of nearly worthless milk in the streets), and unemployment had hit its worst level in 45 years — an unpleasant fact that Mr. Modi's government tried to hide. In a recent batch of critical state elections, his party got trounced. And with the country's weekslong election process set to begin on April 11, the rejuvenated opposition was landing punch after punch with corruption allegations. But one bombing in Kashmir, and weeks of military brinkmanship with Pakistan afterward, appears to have interrupted Mr. Modi's slump. A young suicide bomber blew up a military bus in Kashmir on Feb. 14, killing more than 40 troops. The group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which operates from Pakistan and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, claimed responsibility. Mr. Modi ordered airstrikes on Pakistan, which he blamed for the attack, and Pakistan struck back. Never before, experts said, had two nuclear-armed nations bombed each other. From the outside, Mr. Modi was widely criticized as being willing to risk war for even the chance at a political boost. And when an Indian pilot was captured in Pakistani territory — and was then quickly returned in a good-optics moment for Pakistan — some international analysts thought Mr. Modi's military adventurism had backfired. But that's not how it has played out within India. Political analysts say that Indians are rallying behind Mr. Modi again, and that he seems to be making crucial gains among independent and undecided voters. The fact that India's airstrikes probably missed their targets, and that a fighter jet was shot down by Pakistan, doesn't seem to matter to most Indians. Their country was hit, and Mr. Modi hit back. "Even if they go below the seven seas, I will find them," Mr. Modi said in a speech this month, referring to terrorists. "To settle the score is my habit!" Some of his supporters in India see Mr. Modi's aggressive stance not as pandering for votes, but as a return to his old passion and focus. "Whatever our criticisms about him regarding the economy and jobs, at the end of the day he has done an incredible job of delivering justice for the martyrs," said Prapti Bhattacharya, a law student and first-time voter. "Before this, I would have voted for Congress," the leading opposition party, she said. "Now I'm voting for Modi." The Pakistan crisis "has provided him with a golden narrative," said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The thing about a national security crisis is that it plays up decisiveness, leadership and nationalism. These are three characteristics he often touts." Still, a lot can happen over the next few weeks. India has a parliamentary system, and for Mr. Modi to return to power, his Bharatiya Janata Party must win a majority of the 543 elected seats in the lower house of Parliament or form a coalition with regional parties. The same goes for the

Indian National Congress party, which ruled India for about 50 of the country's 71 years of independence. Congress's leader, Rahul Gandhi, is determined to swing the election discussion back to domestic issues. Mr. Modi's biggest vulnerability is the economy. Even though the country's economy grew 6.6 percent in the most recent quarter, still faster than most developed countries, it was India's slowest rate in five years. With a population of 1.3 billion and improving education, India produces nearly half a million new job seekers each month. This would be an overwhelming burden for any leader, and Mr. Modi raised expectations even higher by promising to create 10 million jobs, a wildly ambitious goal that, by most accounts, he has failed to achieve. "We haven't created jobs — we have actually lost jobs," said Mahesh Vyas, the chief executive of the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. By his count, India now has about 400 million jobs, down slightly over the last three years. Another problem for Mr. Modi is dissatisfaction among Dalits. India's centuries-old caste hierarchy — with Dalits at the bottom, Brahmins at the top and many groups layered in between — still dominates life in many areas, especially rural ones. Lower castes still face horrendous abuse, and Dalits — who represent close to 100 million votes — have long distrusted Mr. Modi and his party, which is rooted in a Hindu nationalist worldview that favors upper castes and emphasizes India's Hinduness. But in the last election, in 2014, Mr. Modi played up his humble origins — the son of a tea seller from a relatively low caste. Analysts said that 24 percent of Dalits voted for his party, double the percentage from the previous election. This time around might still be very different, even with a bump from the showdown with Pakistan. Under Mr. Modi, hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims, who make up a sizable minority in India, have exploded. Dalits have been killed for such things as riding a horse or skinning a cow. Mr. Modi himself has not made disparaging remarks about minorities, but in the wake of this kind of violence, he is often silent. Many officials in his party, including ministers, have taken what are widely considered extremist positions when it comes to protecting cows, a sacred animal in Hinduism, or siding with vigilantes who target Muslim or low-caste butchers. While many conservative Hindus see Mr. Modi as an unswerving defender of some of their most deeply felt values, many Dalits and Muslims are frightened of their own government. Despite Mr. Modi's pledges to unify India — he often repeats his slogan, "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas," or "All together, development for all" — many observers say India has become more polarized along caste and religious lines during his time in power. Chandra Bhan Prasad, a well-known political commentator and a Dalit, said few Dalits would change their mind on Mr. Modi because of the action on Pakistan. "He's totally lost the Dalit vote," Mr. Prasad said. "Dalits will still vote for any party that can defeat the B.J.P." If true, that could mean the loss of millions of votes. Farmers were another concern for Mr. Modi, but here, the action on Pakistan could make a difference. At 260 million strong, farmers are the biggest single voting bloc in India, and many had been furious with Mr. Modi. He had promised to ensure that farmers received prices high enough to make a profit, but export controls and overproduction have cut deeply into prices for crops like onions and potatoes. Tens of thousands of farmers have descended on cities, pouring milk into the streets and dumping vegetables onto sidewalks. One farmer sent the paltry \$15 he had earned selling 1,600 pounds of onions to Mr. Modi. But after the crisis with Pakistan, the conversation on many farms has changed, said Vijay Jawandhia, a farmer and leader of a farmers' union from Maharashtra State. "I hear farmers saying he is more decisive," he said. According to Gilles Verniers, an assistant professor of political science at Ashoka University, near New Delhi, 40 percent of India's 900 million voters typically remain undecided until right before the election. Unlike with politics in the United States, where people tend to pick a party and stick with it, many voters in India tack back and forth between the major parties depending on the candidates and the issues of the day. Mr. Verniers said the crisis with Pakistan was certain to "tame the decline" Mr. Modi had been facing. Before the attack in Kashmir, a disputed territory that both India and Pakistan claim, Mr. Gandhi, the leader of the Congress party and the scion of a storied political dynasty, had gained a new spring in his step. He was speaking out forcefully about a murky jet fighter deal that Mr. Modi's government made with France, and he enlisted his popular younger sister, Priyanka, to join the campaign, delivering it a jolt of energy. Both Congress and the B.J.P. have struck alliances with regional parties in the hopes of forming a governing coalition. The biggest leftist parties, including communists and those dominated by lower castes, are likely to back Congress, while some of the largest parties in Punjab and Maharashtra, two populous states, are firmly on Mr. Modi's side. As of now, Mr. Modi is the "odds-on favorite," said Ashutosh Varshney, the director of the Center for Contemporary South Asia at Brown University. "But I think the narrative can change," he said. "There is still a great deal of anger at Mr. Modi."

Modi's bombings after the Pakistani attack have also increased his support among farmers

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, Vindu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

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Impact – Conflict

A Modi re-election would raise tensions with Pakistan and decrease the chance of dialogue

Zargar 19 Arshad R. Zargar, 3-11-2019, ""Potential for armed conflict" looms over India's upcoming elections," CBS News, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-narendra-modi-strongman-image-pakistan-tension-national-election-looms/> //DF

Modi's firm stance with Pakistan and the Kashmiri militants his government insists Pakistan allows to operate has come under criticism, but it has consolidated his nationalist, right-wing base. Before he became the prime minister, Modi would often taunt the government led by the rival party as "weak." After he assumed the nation's highest office, he had to live up to expectations. "This is a pivotal election for India-Pakistan relations and broader regional stability," analyst Kugelman told CBS News. "The election result will go a long way toward determining prospects for resuming dialogue, and for the willingness of India to take a different approach to Kashmir." He said that if Modi returns as prime minister, the tension between India and Pakistan could re-escalate. To drive that point home, cross-border shelling and small arms fire has continued since the flare up in mid-February. On Monday, Pakistan accused Indian forces of firing a shell that killed a 70-year-old man visiting his daughter in Pakistan administered Kashmir. India's army blamed Pakistani troops for initiating the exchange of fire on Sunday, saying four villagers on the Indian side of Kashmir were wounded. Last week, the U.S. State Department warned Americans not to travel to Kashmir or within about six miles of the India-Pakistan border, due to the "potential for armed conflict."

Impact – Economy

Modi failed on his economic objectives, and slowed the economy and hurt job growth

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

India has a parliamentary system, and for Mr. Modi to return to power, his Bharatiya Janata Party must win a majority of the 543 elected seats in the lower house of Parliament or form a coalition with regional parties. The same goes for the Indian National Congress party, which ruled India for about 50 of the country's 71 years of independence. Congress's leader, Rahul Gandhi, is determined to swing the election discussion back to domestic issues. Mr. Modi's biggest vulnerability is the economy. Even though the country's economy grew 6.6 percent in the most recent quarter, still faster than most developed countries, it was India's slowest rate in five years. With a population of 1.3 billion and improving education, India produces nearly half a million new job seekers each month. This would be an overwhelming burden for any leader, and Mr. Modi raised expectations even higher by promising to create 10 million jobs, a wildly ambitious goal that, by most accounts, he has failed to achieve. "We haven't created jobs — we have actually lost jobs," said Mahesh Vyas, the chief executive of the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. By his count, India now has about 400 million jobs, down slightly over the last three years. Another problem for Mr. Modi is dissatisfaction among

Dalits. India's centuries-old caste hierarchy — with Dalits at the bottom, Brahmins at the top and many groups layered in between — still dominates life in many areas, especially rural ones.

Modi has failed to raise prices for agricultural goods (which more than half of the population rely on), pursued misguided trade policy, and has overseen growing unemployment - he is no economic savior. (Basit - National Interest)

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/2019-elections-india-modi-wont-have-it-easy-40507> (NK)

The anti-incumbency factor has cost the BJP big time in state elections. The party could not live up to the hype and over-expectations of its voters. The grandiose promises of job creation for the youth, increasing farmers' income and development for all have begun to bite. **For instance, the farmers are angry for not getting the prices they wanted for their produce. Almost 55 percent of India's 1.25 billion population is affiliated with the agricultural sector,** directly or indirectly, and forms an important voting bloc. In recent weeks, there have been large-scale protests by the farmers in India over falling prices and natural disasters. Similarly, **traders are unhappy with the BJP for slow economic progress, controversial demonetization policy, and the institutionalization of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).** **Likewise, the lack of jobs and growing unemployment has left the youth disillusioned.** Meanwhile, the moderate voters feel alienated because of party's heavy reliance on the Hindutva rhetoric that has pushed the religious polarization in India to dangerous levels. The minorities, particularly Muslims, are full of resentment due to growing Islamophobia in India. The emergence of cow-vigilante groups that have tortured Muslims on allegations of eating and trading beef, the so-called "love-jihad" narratives which peddles conspiracy theories that Muslims are dating Hindu women to convert them to Islam have disenfranchised the Muslim electorate

Impact – Caste Violence

Modi has created an environment where extremism flourishes and hate crimes have increased, which he has remained silent against

Gettleman 19 Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

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Intervention DA

Full Case

Contention one: genocide interventions.

The UN Security Council is enjoying an era of cooperation that has enabled it to intervene in more humanitarian crises. Since the deadlocked days of the Cold War, the Security Council has become far more interventionist.

Joelle Hageboutros, 2017, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period" Swarthmore,
<https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=swarthmoreirjournal>
(NK)

One major trend following the increase in cooperation among the members includes the sharp decline of veto use among the P5. **During the Cold War, the use of the veto was predictable.** One camp would propose a draft resolution that was expected to be rejected by the opposing side. (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 20) The veto thus gained a propagandist nature as each side accumulated political points for its position on the resolution. **After the Cold War, however, forcing fellow council members to vote for or against a specific resolution was viewed as "irresponsible."** (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 20) **While voting blocks still exist among the P5 along certain issues (e.g. Syria, Ukraine, Libya) member states have become more autonomous and cautious in wielding their vote. From 1946-1995, the veto was used a total of 244 times** (approximately 29% by the U.S. and 50% by the USSR). (Global Policy Forum, 2015) The majority of vetoes that have been used since the Cold War **(31 from 1996-2014)** relate to issues concerning one member (e.g. Israel/Palestine for the US and Taiwan for China) who will predictably wield its veto alone. The recent deadlocks among the P5 over Syria, Libya and Ukraine obscure the overall trend of a high rate of cooperation among the P5. Current Under-Secretary General David Malone argues that too often one forgets **"on 90% of the Council's agenda which are even more murderous conflicts** [than Syria, Libya, Ukraine] **often in Africa, places like the Congo, the council has no trouble agreeing."** (Malone, March 9) In 2014 alone, the SC passed 60 out of 63 resolutions unanimously. (United Nations Security Council, January 2015, 8) The three aforementioned cases are nevertheless important signifiers of new trends emerging in the Council where Russia and China have become more vocal opponents.¹

The UN's interventions to stop mass atrocities are based on the responsibility to protect doctrine

Adams 19 Simon Adams [Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Dr. Adams has worked extensively with governments and civil society organizations in South Africa, East Timor, Rwanda and elsewhere. Between 1994 and 2002 Dr. Adams worked with Sinn Féin and former IRA prisoners in support of the Northern Ireland peace process. He is also a former anti-apartheid activist and member of the African National Congress. Dr. Adams has written on the Responsibility to Protect and mass atrocity situations for the New York Times, International Herald Tribune and many other publications.], 1-8-2019, "'IF NOT NOW, WHEN?': The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya and the Future of Human Rights," Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series, http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/adamsrohingya_opaper_final.pdf //DF

All of this has contributed to a perception that the norms and institutions that are supposed to protect human rights and safeguard humanity are under threat. The United Nations, in particular, is facing a credibility crisis. Historically, no issue has done more to tarnish the reputation of the UN than the failure to halt mass atrocities. The decades-long list of examples reaches back to Indonesia during the 1960s, Cambodia and Bangladesh during the 1970s, and the genocide against the Kurds in Iraq during the 1980s, to name just a few. Arguably, however, it was not until Rwanda and Srebrenica during the 1990s that the United Nations began to grapple with that failure and with the need for the international community to better respond to such crises. Linked to this debate was a recognition that the UN's long-term credibility depended upon its ability to not only provide a global debating chamber, but to offer practical solutions wherever and whenever people face the threat of the machete, the mass grave or the death squad.⁵ It was this political reality that former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was alluding to when he spoke of the need for a reformed twenty-first century UN to confront "problems without passports," such as poverty, climate change and "the persistence of deadly conflicts in which civilians are primary targets."⁶ It was also this thinking that led to the development of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a means of mobilizing "timely and decisive action" by the UN Security Council and the broader international community to prevent or halt mass atrocities wherever they may occur. Despite the historic adoption of R2P at the 2005 UN World Summit, and its growing influence on the international response to a number of significant conflicts, implementation was always going to be most difficult in those intractable cases where a state is manifestly unwilling to uphold its responsibilities because it is itself a perpetrator. In such circumstances it becomes incumbent upon the UN Security Council to prevent or halt these crimes. However, the civil war in Syria dramatically exposed the weakness of an international system where a permanent member of the Council can still use its veto power to insulate a state that is perpetrating atrocities from scrutiny or sanction. The "silent veto," whereby a permanent member privately threatens to veto a resolution that endangers the interests of a key ally, has also been an effective impediment to action. For example, in late 2017 the Rohingya minority in Myanmar (Burma) faced months of atrocities perpetrated by the security forces without the UN Security Council doing anything to halt the killing. This political failure had catastrophic consequences for the Rohingya, but also threatened to eclipse the incremental and uneven progress that has been made in preventing atrocities through diplomacy, peacekeeping and the pursuit of international justice.

The foundation of Security Council interventions is the doctrine of "responsibility to protect." Roland Paris, professor of International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, explains in 2014 that

Paris 14 Roland Paris [Professor of International Affairs in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, founding director of the Centre for International Policy Studies, and former foreign and defence policy advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada], 10-10-2014, "The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2014.963322> //DF The multinational military operation in Libya in 2011 was the first coercive intervention to be justified under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. **The core tenet of R2P, unanimously endorsed by members of the United Nations (UN) in 2005, is that every state has a responsibility to protect its inhabitants from mass atrocities and that this responsibility may fall to the broader international community** 'should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail **to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity**'.¹ 1. UN General Assembly, '2005 World Summit Outcome', UN doc., A/60/L.1, 15 Sep. 2005, paras. 138–9. Responsibility to Protect should not be confused with a related concept: the protection of civilians in situations of war. **R2P, by contrast, applies specifically to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity**. On the differences between the two concepts, see Thierry Tardy, 'The Dangerous Liaisons of the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations', Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol.4, No.4, 2012, pp. 424–48. View all **notes Although the doctrine prioritizes peaceful over coercive methods, it leaves open the possibility of preventive humanitarian**

intervention, or military force by outside parties to avert mass atrocities, should all other methods

fail. 2 2. There is no canonical definition of humanitarian intervention. For an analysis of several different definitions, see Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity, 2012, pp.6–15. For the purposes of this article, 'preventive humanitarian intervention' involves: (1) the use of military force, (2) by an outside state or coalition of states or by an international organization, (3) for the purposes of preventing mass atrocities including genocide and crimes against humanity, and (4) against the wishes of the target state. View all notes UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized coercive intervention in Libya, invoked the language of R2P when it called on UN members to use 'all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack' in Libya.³ 3. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 Mar. 2011, para.4. Although the UN had previously approved the use of 'all necessary measures', or armed force, for humanitarian purposes elsewhere, Resolution 1973 represented the first time the Security Council had 'authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against a functioning de jure government'. See Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, 'Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force', *Global Governance*, Vol.18, No.3, 2012, p.273. View all notes To some observers, including two of R2P's intellectual architects, Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, the Libya operation represented a 'coming of age' for the doctrine and its emergence as a 'powerful new galvanizing norm' in international affairs.⁴ 4. Gareth Evans, 'Responsibility While Protecting', *Project Syndicate*, 27 Jan. 2012 (at: www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/responsibility-while-protecting); and Ramesh Thakur, 'UN Breathes New Life into "Responsibility to Protect"', *Toronto Star*, 21 Mar. 2011 (at: www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2011/03/21/un_breathes_life_into_responsibility_to_protect.html). View all notes In some ways, they were right: from 2001, when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the R2P concept in its report,⁵ 5. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001. View all notes until 2011, when the Security Council approved Resolution 1973 with no dissenting votes,⁶ 6. Ten countries voted in favour of Resolution 1973 (Bosnia, Britain, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa and the United States) and five abstained (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). View all notes the doctrine had gained widespread support. Early opposition to R2P, including suspicions that it might be a smokescreen for imperial intervention, seemed to have given way to broad international endorsement.⁷

Even in cases of extreme violence, security council expert David Malone explains in 2013 that India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention.

Mukherjee 13 Rohan Mukherjee [doctoral candidate at Princeton University] and David M Malone [Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, is at the United Nations University and author of several books on the Security Council], 2013, "India and the UN security council an ambiguous tale," *Economics & Political Weekly*,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111_India_and_the_UN_security_council_an_ambiguous_tale //DF

Perhaps the most urgent goal for India at the UNSC since the cold war has been to act as "a voice of reason, calm and moderation" in the face of the western powers' increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention and (subsequently) the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities within their states,⁸ India's stance on military and humanitarian intervention, though somewhat flexible during the cold war, has since the early 1990s steadily hardened into one that generally places state sovereignty and territorial integrity above considerations of human rights and state-sponsored atrocities. At the same time, the UN itself - freed from the shackles of cold war gridlock - has become a far more interventionist organisation than before, and has sought to redefine and expand its role in the security sphere to include a host of non-traditional situations such as coups, humanitarian crises, internally and externally displaced populations, and terrorism (Malone 2003). Consequently, **India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention**, and at most a very reluctant supporter of specific missions. Its positions have become harder to defend as the global consensus on sovereignty – barring Russia and China – shifts from an absolute to a contingent view. The frequent association of India with China and Russia in western discourse on humanitarian intervention and R2P (the responsibility to protect) is telling of both, India's reflexive abstention on these issues and the West's lack of disposition to understand the constraints of a democratic state with multiple internal challenges to its authority such as India, which hosts a number of insurgencies (Mukherjee 2013). It is no surprise therefore that humanitarian intervention and R2P were the biggest bones of contention between India and the western powers on the UNSC in 2011-12. India

abstained on two crucial votes – on Libya in March 2011 and Syria in October 2011 – while repeatedly sounding alarm bells on sovereignty and the need for domestic resolution of domestic conflicts even when voting in favour of taking action. In February 2011, while supporting a resolution calling for an arms embargo, travel ban, asset-freeze and referral of Libyan leaders to the International Criminal Court, India indicated that it would have preferred “a calibrated and gradual approach” (PMUN 2011a). During the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire in March 2011, India voted for a resolution implementing targeted sanctions and civilian protection but warned that UN peacekeepers “cannot be made instruments of regime change” (PMUN 2011b), which they did eventually become. In reference to the air strikes on Libya, India’s ambassador to the UN alleged that the western powers did not pursue the same tactics in the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s because these countries lacked oil resources (Dikshit 2012). During thematic debates on intervention, the Indian delegation frequently reiterated that “force is not the only way of protecting civilians” (PMUN 2011c). On the whole, India’s statements and stances on issues of intervention and protection in 2011-12 – though widely criticised in the West – presented a coherent picture of conscientious objection, though one that resulted in it falling somewhat between the two stools of western pro-interventionism and eastern anti-interventionism. Consequently, India was not fully a member of either camp and at times found itself essentially isolated on the council, as in the case of its initial abstention on Syria in late 2011 that was followed by a change of course that some argue was largely provoked by representations from Delhi’s Saudi interlocutors (Aneja 2012). That India was neither able to sway the council on specific cases nor able to emerge from debates with widely well-received positions is indicative of the international pressures and domestic constraints it faced during this time.

Not only would India oppose interventions, but it would likely instigate conflicts and then prevent the UN from intervening in them.

Khan 2015 Aamir Hussain Khan [Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army M.A., University of Baluchistan], 12-2015, "UNSC’S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>. //DF

India is a big country and has remained relatively democratic since its independence in 1947. It has contributed a large troop commitment toward the U.N. peace efforts in the world. India has provided leaders for both civilian and military leadership to the U.N. India has the third-largest military and is bracing to become a rising economic power in the world. India, along with the other G4 countries, is striving for permanent membership in the UNSC, which will further increase its influence in the world and South Asian region. India, however, has a number of disputes with its small regional countries, especially Pakistan. Interestingly, all South Asian countries border India, but do not have contiguous borders with each other. Therefore, most of the South Asian countries, being India’s neighbor, depend on India’s support for their security and economic assistance. For instance, Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked countries and depend on Indian seaports for their trade. Additionally, Bangladesh has unresolved border and water dispute with India. Similarly, Sri Lanka has suffered from Tamil’s insurgency that was supported by India. Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an influential regional state, India has failed to play the required leadership role to amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India, however, considers that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as subordinate states. Thus, India’s permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications for the South Asian region. **India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed to regional issues, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has violated UNSC’s resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the future as well. India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through economic strangulation and by involving them in political problems and disputes. India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention through India’s influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the region.**

These interventions are effective and reduce violence in a few ways.

First, is the Security Guarantee:

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting"
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

First, **UN peacekeeping mitigates commitment problems, or conditions where one or both sides believe that gains from fighting outweigh the benefits of a possible settlement** (Powell 1999, 2012). Such problems loom large in ongoing civil wars, where rebel groups face a security dilemma. **For civil war hostilities to end, both factions must pull back from the battlefield, and rebels must disarm and demobilize. But by disarming, rebels sacrifice their only means of protecting themselves from a government that may renege on its commitments. Under these commitment problems, third parties such as the UN can provide security guarantees to improve the willingness of the parties to move toward peaceful resolution** (Walter 1997, 2002). The success of third party intervention depends upon the credibility of the third party's commitment to the conflict (Kathman and Wood 2011; Thyne 2009). **Having a credible security guarantee from UN peacekeepers in the form of troops on the ground allows belligerents to refrain from continued battlefield violence and initiate the process of demobilization**. By signaling to the combatants that the UN mission has the capacity to protect the parties against attacks from their adversary, peacekeepers can reduce tensions and battlefield hostilities.

Second, is increasing the cost of conflict

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting"
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

Next, **peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict make violence more costly relative to other forms of resolution**. Security guarantees may not always be enough, as some armed actors do not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers if they see potential gains to be made in combat. Thus, **PKOs also often pursue strategies that limit the opportunities warring actors have for advancing militarily on one another. Doing so affects each faction's cost calculus of combat as a means of achieving political goals. Research has shown that the expected cost of continued fighting is central to an actor's decision to use force or agree to a settlement** (e.g. Powell 2004). **Limiting opportunities for battlefield engagement increases the costs of continued hostilities, causing the utility of continued violence to decline**. In attempting to increase the cost of combat, the UN seeks to turn belligerents away from battle as a means by which to resolve the dispute. Both of these mechanisms work through two main operational activities that UN peacekeepers typically use during ongoing conflict. Separating the combatants is an important method by which UN peacekeeping reduces security concerns and makes it more difficult for combatants to engage militarily. **The UN frequently positions armed personnel on the frontlines of civil conflict to create a buffer zone between belligerents** (Fortna 2008), even when it intervenes short of a ceasefire (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2012) or without the combatants' consent. **By interceding between factions and monitoring combat behavior on the frontlines, UN PKOs reduce battlefield violence by increasing the cost of fighting**. The barrier provided by large numbers of blue helmets increases the costs that factions incur in any effort to make battlefield advances. International audience costs of circumventing UN barriers are severe, and combatants pay direct military costs for thwarting the UN's interposition.

The impact is reducing UNSC interventions. These interventions are effective and reduce violence. Hovad Hegre, a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, found in 2018

Hegre 18 Håvard Hegre [Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo], Lisa Hultman [senior lecturer in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University], and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård [research director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo] 6-28-2018 "U.N. peacekeeping really can be

effective. Here's how we tabulated this," Washington Post,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/28/u-n-peacekeeping-really-can-be-effective-heres-how-we-tabulated-this/?utm_term=.445344906241 //DF

Would a PKO have been able to resolve this conflict? Despite popular conceptions to the contrary (see also here and here), a large body of research has shown that PKOs are surprisingly effective at keeping the peace. How PKOs contribute to peace Here are four ways PKOs contribute to peace. This **intervention reduces the amount of violence during conflict, reduces the duration of conflict, increases the duration of peace following conflict — and limits the risk that conflict in one country spreads to neighboring countries.** "What you want to do is match up your sources and uses of capital as much as possible. Our job is to figure out what that mix of sources should be." In a new article in the Journal of Politics, we conducted the first comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping along all these proposed pathways. We found that **past studies have significantly underestimated the positive impact of U.N. peacekeeping.** A brief history of U.N. peacekeeping The number of PKOs deployed globally remained low and stable throughout the Cold War. Over the past three decades, both the funds spent and troops sent on U.N. peacekeeping operations have increased dramatically. Traditionally, U.N. PKOs took on limited tasks, often constrained to monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements. **An important shift occurred in the late 1990s when the U.N. started issuing increasingly more extensive PKO mandates.** These include "Multidimensional missions," such as the UNMIT in Timor-Leste, with activities intended to address the roots of the conflict, such as economic reconstruction and institutional transformation of police, army, and judicial systems, as well as holding elections. **In the early 2000s, the U.N. also scaled up the deployment of "Enforcement missions,"** exemplified by UNMIS in Sudan and the earlier UNPROFOR in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our study shows that **it is mainly these more ambitious PKOs with a mandate to change the situation that are "winning the war on war"** — not the missions that aim merely to maintain the status quo. Toward a more peaceful world **Existing studies tend to evaluate PKO effectiveness by looking at individual pathways separately. This approach is likely to severely underestimate the overall effectiveness of PKOs,** we found. Instead, we developed a methodology that allows us to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of PKOs along all of these pathways simultaneously. Based on a model trained on the period 1960-2013, we run a set of simulations to assess the impact of alternative U.N. peacekeeping policies for the period 2001-2013. We believe this approach allows our study to be one of the first to offer a comprehensive assessment of PKO effectiveness. We find that peacekeeping is even more effective than previous studies suggest. **In the short run, peacekeeping missions limit the amount of violence. But we also find clear evidence that the de-escalated conflicts are easier to end conclusively a few years down the road. Sierra Leone fits these patterns. The country experienced prolonged conflict until the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, UNAMSIL, in 1999. The level of violence dropped precipitously after the deployment of the PKO and three years after the PKOs deployed the conflict ended.** In a given year, our results imply that for each conflict that the U.N. manages to transform from a major conflict to a minor one, another conflict ends. In a hypothetical historical scenario where the U.N. completely shuts down its peacekeeping practice from 2001 onward, we estimate that three to four more countries would have been in major conflict in 2013 relative to what the world saw, given the actual level of peacekeeping activity.

Peacekeeping reduces the risk of a conflict restarting 75-85% of the time

Forna, 2008, "Does Peacekeeping Work?," Princeton University Press, <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8705.html> (NK)

Chapter 4 lays out a causal argument of peacekeeping. It draws on the existing literature on peacekeeping, moving beyond descriptions of peacekeepers' functions to hypothesize specific causal mechanisms through which their presence may make peace more stable. It suggests that peacekeepers can disrupt potential pathways back to war (1) by changing the incentives for war and peace of the peacekept; (2) by reducing their uncertainty about each other's intentions; (3) by preventing and controlling accidents or skirmishes that might otherwise escalate to war; and (4) by preventing either side from permanently excluding others from the political process. Through these causal mechanisms, peacekeepers can shape belligerents' decisions about whether to maintain peace or return to war. Chapter 5 assesses the overall effects of peacekeeping, asking whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers deploy than when they are absent. It employs primarily quantitative evidence to demonstrate that, all else equal, peacekeeping has a significant positive impact on the stability of peace. **Conservative estimates indicate that peacekeeping reduces the risk of another war by more than half.** Less conservative,

but probably **more accurate, estimates show that peacekeeping cuts the risk of renewed war by 10 CHAPTER ONE 75%–85%.** A brief qualitative comparison of the cases supports this conclusion. In short, peacekeeping works. Chapter 6 addresses the question of how peacekeeping works. It draws on the case studies, and especially evidence from interviews, to assess the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. It pays particular attention to the perspective of the peacekeepers in evaluating the causal impact of the presence or absence of peacekeepers. Chapter 7 summarizes conclusions and implications of this study, emphasizing lessons for policymakers.

3rd party intervention reduces the risk of peace settlement re-erupting into violence by 98%

Hartzell, 2001, Penn State, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables"

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.469.6894&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (NK)

In addition, because we distinguish between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods in terms of the amount of arms and aid available to insurgent groups, the fact that there has been an uncontrollable flow of black market arms across international borders in the post-Cold War period may indicate that we have failed to tap into any real difference between system structures and their effects on short-term settlement stability. **In the category of the settlement arrangements themselves, the statistically significant factors**

are arrangements for territorial autonomy and the offer of security enforcement by a third-party

state. Based on the hazard rate values, it appears that the presence of both these provisions in a negotiated settlement **increases the chances of maintaining the peace.** A territorial autonomy provision in an agreement reduces the hazard of its failure by

approximately 96 percent; **the inclusion of a third-party enforcer of the agreement reduces the hazard by an estimated 98 percent.** Because these two settlement provision variables are represented by dichotomous variables, we can illustrate their influence on the longevity of a negotiated agreement by using both tables and graphs.

Peace more than 2x more likely to hold with peacekeepers than without (Hegre - University of Uppsala)

Håvard Hegre, 2018, "Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations" University of Uppsala,

https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf

Fortna (2004) identifies a marked difference between the effectiveness of PKOs during and after the cold war. **She finds no significant effect of PKOs on peace duration for the full post-World War II period, but a substantial and**

significant effect of all types of PKOs after the cold war (Fortna 2004, 283). Similarly, Sambanis (2008) concludes from analyzing the short and long term effects of UN PKOs that 'the UN has actually become better at peacekeeping over time'. More generally, he finds that the effect of PKOs is strongest in the first few years, but in the long run only local economic recovery and institution building can ensure a lasting peace. The same conclusion is reached by Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008). They argue that **economic recovery is**

the best way to achieve a stable peace, but that PKOs can make a substantial difference. Looking more

broadly at third-party enforcement of peace settlements, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001, 200) find that **five years after 'the signing of a peace agreement, the survivor rate among settlements with an external assurance is 68 percent compared with 32 percent for arrangements lacking such promise'.**

Link – Gridlock

The UNSC works by consensus, where every resolution must be approved by all permanent members. Adding more members means that less resolutions will be passed. Ian Hurd, professor of political science at Northwestern University, writes in 2008: more interests on the table will necessarily mean that it will be harder to reach an agreement. The size of the Council is negatively correlated to its effectiveness. A negative correlation here would mean that it was a fatal flaw for all legitimacy-through-enlargement arguments if, in fact, Council legitimacy was primarily a function of its substantive effectiveness rather than its membership.

Hurd 08 Ian Hurd [assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council*], 2008, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform,” *Journal of Global Governance*, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55bc2903e4b0b7e056744a52/t/5935850ac534a52e4e3d2c98/1496679692124/myths+of+membership.pdf> //DF

Assessing the Hypotheses Does formal reform of membership contribute to legitimacy in any of the five hypotheses? The five are based on different empirical claims, but at least three general patterns emerge when one examines them as a group. First, each claim ultimately rests on a trade-off, and each trade-off involves a political decision regarding one’s priorities about the Council that cannot be resolved except by each state according to its own values and interests. Several of the hypotheses—H1 [the membership of the Council is representative of the General Assembly membership], H2, and H3—set up a trade-off between increasing the Council’s legitimacy for some states while necessarily reducing it for other states. We may not be able to predict which states will fall into each category, but we do know that the lack of consensus over metrics of representation and diversity means that privileging one interpretation over others will contribute to the delegitimation of an enlarged Council in the eyes of some states. This weakens H1 and H2. H3 can, at best, increase legitimacy in the eyes of the individual states that might be added to the Council while reducing it for those that are not. The deliberative models create a different kind of trade-off, one between increasing the range of voices and issues that can be raised in the Council (which is seen as the source of legitimation) and reducing the possibility of consensus in decisions. More interests on the table will necessarily mean that it will be harder to reach an agreement. Finally, all legitimation hypotheses involve a trade-off between increasing the Council’s legitimacy and furthering other values, such as efficiency, effectiveness, or power.⁵⁴ It is generally accepted that the size of the Council is negatively correlated to its effectiveness, and some countries raise this frequently as a cost of larger membership.⁵⁵ A negative correlation here would mean that it was a fatal flaw for all legitimacy-through-enlargement arguments if, in fact, Council legitimacy was primarily a function of its substantive effectiveness rather than its membership. Second, each hypothesis can be undermined by the possibility of “informal membership” in the Council. As the Council increases the opportunities for participation available to nonmembers, it steals the foundation from many of the reform arguments. The deliberative hypotheses, in particular, are weakened to the extent that Council rules of procedure, and Charter requirements, allow nonmembers of the Council to contribute to deliberation. The justification for adding new formal members is defeated if states’ presence and participation can be solicited on a case-by-case basis. What remains is the potential legitimating power of the pure membership argument, where formal presence is thought by itself to have a legitimating effect (as in H1, H2, and H3). In the end, it is not clear that the formal structure of Council membership is the most important constraint on deliberation, or that adding new members would necessarily add to its deliberative quality. Finally, the weakness of many of these arguments relative to empirical evidence makes it plausible to conclude that much of the “legitimacy talk” 212 Myths of Membership around which reform arguments are constructed is a false front, covering up the political interests of states. What aspirants to Council

membership seem to be really seeking are the status and prestige that they believe go along with a seat.⁵⁶ These real motives behind the rhetoric are not affected by the lack of evidence for the rhetorical claims. They are not without effect, however, given the nature of rhetorical power. Two new issues then come to the fore, each worthy of further research. First, the ubiquity with which reform arguments are defended by reference to the alleged "legitimacy deficit" of the Council suggests that the international community expects that proposals be couched in universal rather than particularistic values. Second, these generalizable claims may subject their speakers to the possibility of rhetorical entrapment, so that public statements about a principle of legitimation might be turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can't escape.⁵⁷ International talk may be cheap, but it is never free.

India's accession to the UNSC would likely result in even more gridlock because India is pushing for more permanent members, in addition to itself. Chris McGreal writes in the Guardian in 2015: India is pushing for expansion of the security council to include six more permanent members with the right of veto, as well as several more non-permanent members.

McGreal 15 Chris McGreal, 9-7-2015, "70 years and half a trillion dollars later: what has the UN achieved?," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations> //DF

The five permanent members, the victors over Germany and Japan, hold the whip hand through vetoes. For all the noise from the US, Britain and France in particular about modernising the UN, they show no willingness to give up the power they wield sometimes in ways governed entirely by political interest. Since 1982, the US has used its security council veto to block resolutions critical of Israel 35 times. The total number of resolutions blocked by other permanent members over the same period is 27. More recently, Russia and China have used their vetoes to block UN intervention in Syria. India, the world's second most populous nation, **is pushing for expansion of the**

security council to include six more permanent members with the right of veto, as well as several more non-permanent members.

Mukerji, the Indian ambassador to the UN, said his country had been pressing for several years for agreement on a document that will be the basis of negotiations. "It's incredible that in the United Nations, which produces negotiating texts on every other area it deals with, in the area of security council reform it has just not been able to put a text on the table," he said. Appetite for broader reform seems just as tepid.

Even if the new members of the Security Council could reach consensus, agreement would take longer. This would be very bad for humanitarian purposes. Political science professor Matthew Krain finds in a 2005 study: the longer a murderous policy has been in place, the more time the perpetrator has to learn how to kill more efficiently. The duration of a genocide or politicide has been found to increase its severity significantly.

Krain 2005 Matthew Krain [Professor of Political Science and Global & International Studies at the College of Wooster. Research examines the causes of consequences of repression and large-scale political violence, and the role of both of the state and the international community in causing, mitigating or preventing conflict and violence], 2005, "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides," International Studies Quarterly,

http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_International_Intervention_and_the_Severity_of_Genocides_and_Politicides.pdf //DF

Expectations of a Threat-Based Model: The severity of genocide or politicide should increase as the number of interventions supporting the target increases, and when the overall direction of interventions favors the target. The severity of genocide or politicide should decrease (or at the very least does not increase) as the number of interventions supporting the perpetrator increases, and when the overall direction of interventions favors the perpetrator. The number of impartial interventions should not have any effect on severity. The history of the genocide or politicide itself is likely to have an effect on the magnitude of the severity of genocide or politicide. **The longer the murderous**

policy has been in place, the more time the perpetrator has to learn how to kill more efficiently. The duration of a genocide or politicide has been found to increase its severity significantly (Krain, 1997).

Conversely, the longer a perpetrator engages in large-scale slaughter, the fewer potential victims remain. Regardless of the expected direction, it is important to account for how long the genocide or politicide has been ongoing. Moreover, one of the most robust findings in the literature on repression is that previous repression increases the likelihood that repression will be used in the future (Gurr, 1986, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 1999). Whether the reasons lie in habituation of the user to the use of repression, the reduction in costs to the user once the mechanisms of repression are in place, or the bureaucratic inertia that occurs once the specialists in repression are given power (Gurr, 1986, 1988), previous levels are likely to affect current or future levels of slaughter. Therefore, I control for both the Duration of the genocide or politicide and its Previous Magnitude of Severity.

Increasing UNSC membership would decrease its effectiveness because of more members

Hurd 08 Ian Hurd [assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council*], 2008, "Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform," *Journal of Global Governance*, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55bc2903e4b0b7e056744a52/t/5935850ac534a52e4e3d2c98/1496679692124/myths-of-membership.pdf> //DF

Assessing the Hypotheses Does formal reform of membership contribute to legitimacy in any of the five hypotheses? The five are based on different empirical claims, but at least three general patterns emerge when one examines them as a group. First, each claim ultimately rests on a trade-off, and each trade-off involves a political decision regarding one's priorities about the Council that cannot be resolved except by each state according to its own values and interests. Several of the hypotheses—H1 the membership of the Council is representative of the General Assembly membership], H2, and H3—set up a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy for some states while necessarily reducing it for other states. We may not be able to predict which states will fall into each category, but we do know that the lack of consensus over metrics of representation and diversity means that privileging one interpretation over others will contribute to the delegitimation of an enlarged Council in the eyes of some states. This weakens H1 and H2. H3 can, at best, increase legitimacy in the eyes of the individual states that might be added to the Council while reducing it for those that are not. The deliberative models create a different kind of trade-off, one between increasing the range of voices and issues that can be raised in the Council (which is seen as the source of legitimation) and reducing the possibility of consensus in decisions. More interests on the table will necessarily mean that it will be harder to reach an agreement. Finally, all legitimation hypotheses involve a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy and furthering other values, such as efficiency, effectiveness, or power.⁵⁴ It is generally accepted that the size of the Council is negatively correlated to its effectiveness, and some countries raise this frequently as a cost of larger membership.⁵⁵ A negative correlation here would mean that it was a fatal flaw for all legitimacy-through-enlargement arguments if, in fact, Council legitimacy was primarily a function of its substantive effectiveness rather than its membership. Second, each hypothesis can be undermined by the possibility of "informal membership" in the Council. As the Council increases the opportunities for participation available to nonmembers, it steals the foundation from many of the reform arguments. The deliberative hypotheses, in particular, are weakened to the extent that Council rules of procedure, and Charter requirements, allow nonmembers of the Council to contribute to deliberation. The justification for adding new formal members is defeated if states' presence and participation can be solicited on a case-by-case basis. What remains is the potential legitimating power of the pure membership argument, where formal presence is thought by itself to have a legitimating effect (as in H1, H2, and H3). In the end, it is not clear that the formal structure of Council membership is the most important constraint on deliberation, or that adding new members would necessarily add to its deliberative quality. Finally, the weakness of many of these arguments relative to empirical evidence makes it plausible to conclude that much of the "legitimacy talk" 212 Myths of Membership around which reform arguments are constructed is a false front, covering up the political interests of states. What aspirants to Council membership seem to be really seeking are the status and prestige that they believe go along with a seat.⁵⁶ These real motives behind the rhetoric are not affected by the lack of evidence for the rhetorical claims. They are not without effect, however, given the nature of rhetorical power. Two new issues then come to the fore, each worthy of further research. First, the ubiquity with which reform arguments are defended

by reference to the alleged “legitimacy deficit” of the Council suggests that the international community expects that proposals be couched in universal rather than particularistic values. Second, these generalizable claims may subject their speakers to the possibility of rhetorical entrapment, so that public statements about a principle of legitimation might be turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can’t escape.⁵⁷ International talk may be cheap, but it is never free.

More UNSC members would make any action more difficult

McDonald and Patrick ¹⁰ Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf //DF

The Effect of UNSC Reform on UNSC Effectiveness The case for expansion is often couched in terms of legitimacy, conceived as a function of how representative the body is of the broader UN membership. This has encouraged more debate over the right size and geographic parity of an enlarged UNSC, rather than about how effective it would be in performing its mandate. A close analysis suggests that 18 UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests expanding the UNSC would likely hinder its efficiency, but its impact on UNSC effectiveness is more difficult to predict. It depends on how big the enlargement is, what form it takes, and, most importantly, which countries are selected. Enlargement would certainly complicate U.S. tactics in negotiations, particularly in lining up votes for important resolutions. Larger bodies are often more hesitant to take decisive action, vulnerable to blockage, and susceptible to lowest-common-denominator decision-making. In the current fifteen-member body, it takes seven votes to block an agenda item and nine votes with no vetoes to pass a resolution.³⁰ Already, U.S. ability to form winning coalitions on the UNSC varies with the cohort of elected members.³¹ Any enlargement would require negotiating critical new thresholds, and the United States must consider at what point a body becomes too unwieldy to fulfill its mandate.

Link – Responsibility to Protect

India is against intervention and does not support the responsibility to protect

Mukherjee ¹³ Rohan Mukherjee [doctoral candidate at Princeton University] and David M Malone [Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, is at the United Nations University and author of several books on the Security Council], 2013, “India and the UN security council an ambiguous tale,” Economics & Political Weekly, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111_India_and_the_UN_security_council_an_ambiguous_tale //DF

Perhaps the most urgent goal for India at the UNSC since the cold war has been to act as “a voice of reason, calm and moderation” in the face of the western powers’ increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention and (subsequently) the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities within their states,⁸ India’s stance on military and humanitarian intervention, though somewhat flexible during the cold war, has since the early 1990s steadily hardened into one that generally places state sovereignty and territorial integrity above considerations of human rights and state-sponsored atrocities. At the same time, the UN itself - freed from the shackles of cold war gridlock - has become a far more interventionist organisation than before, and has sought to redefine and expand its role in the security sphere to include a host of non-traditional situations such as coups, humanitarian crises, internally and externally displaced populations, and terrorism (Malone 2003). Consequently, India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention, and at most a very reluctant supporter of specific missions. Its positions have become harder to defend as the global consensus on sovereignty – barring Russia and China – shifts from an absolute to a contingent view. The frequent association of India with China and Russia in western discourse on humanitarian intervention and R2P (the responsibility to protect) is telling of both, India’s reflexive abstention on these issues and the West’s lack of disposition to understand the constraints of a democratic state with multiple internal challenges to its authority such as India, which

hosts a number of insurgencies (Mukherjee 2013). It is no surprise therefore that humanitarian intervention and R2P were the biggest bones of contention between India and the western powers on the UNSC in 2011-12. India abstained on two crucial votes – on Libya in March 2011 and Syria in October 2011 – while repeatedly sounding alarm bells on sovereignty and the need for domestic resolution of domestic conflicts even when voting in favour of taking action. In February 2011, while supporting a resolution calling for an arms embargo, travel ban, asset-freeze and referral of Libyan leaders to the International Criminal Court, India indicated that it would have preferred “a calibrated and gradual approach” (PMUN 2011a). During the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire in March 2011, India voted for a resolution implementing targeted sanctions and civilian protection but warned that UN peacekeepers “cannot be made instruments of regime change” (PMUN 2011b), which they did eventually become. In reference to the air strikes on Libya, India’s ambassador to the UN alleged that the western powers did not pursue the same tactics in the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s because these countries lacked oil resources (Dikshit 2012). During thematic debates on intervention, the Indian delegation frequently reiterated that “force is not the only way of protecting civilians” (PMUN 2011c). On the whole, India’s statements and stances on issues of intervention and protection in 2011-12 – though widely criticised in the West – presented a coherent picture of conscientious objection, though one that resulted in it falling somewhat between the two stools of western pro-interventionism and eastern anti-interventionism. Consequently, India was not fully a member of either camp and at times found itself essentially isolated on the council, as in the case of its initial abstention on Syria in late 2011 that was followed by a change of course that some argue was largely provoked by representations from Delhi’s Saudi interlocutors (Aneja 2012). That India was neither able to sway the council on specific cases nor able to emerge from debates with widely well-received positions is indicative of the international pressures and domestic constraints it faced during this time.

India has demonstrated a resistance to the US and could end up like China if it joined the UNSC

McDonald and Patrick 10 Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf //DF

The recent performance of major developing countries as elected members of the UNSC is mixed. During its controversial 2007–2008 tenure on the UNSC, for example, South Africa used its position as a regional leader to weaken UNSC action on Sudan and impede discussion of wide-scale human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. Likewise, both Brazil and Turkey voted against a fourth round of UNSC sanctions on Iran in June 2010. UNGA voting patterns also provide grounds for caution. Unlike Japan and Germany, which are most closely aligned with U.S. preferences, Brazil, India, and South Africa frequently vote contrary to U.S. preferences, showing that close bilateral relations do not always translate into cooperation in multilateral settings (see Appendix 3). Ideally, developing countries elevated to positions of authority would seriously weigh their responsibilities for global security, abandoning the aspects of G77 and NAM diplomacy that often turn the UNGA into a circus. In his inaugural address to the UNGA in September 2009, President Obama spoke wistfully of the need to discard outdated bloc affiliations: The traditional division between nations of the South and the North makes no sense in an interconnected world; nor do alignments rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War. The time has come to realize that the old habits, the old arguments, are irrelevant to the challenges faced by our people.³⁴ But old habits die hard. India is a case in point. India has close relations with the United States, but in the UNGA, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and other forums, it continues to play bloc politics. The disparate approach between India’s bilateral and multilateral relations is striking, and it remains unclear which approach India would take as a permanent or long-term member of the UNSC. Today, India, like Brazil and South Africa, has the opportunity to criticize without real global responsibilities. Certainly the experience of China—whose seat in the UN and on the UNSC has been held by the People’s Republic of China since 1971—suggests that any process of “socialization” may be gradual, and recommends that permanent member expansion be based on demonstrated global leadership, including by contributing tangibly to international peace and security, providing global public goods, and defending international rules.³⁵

Indeed, a 2017 analysis of India's voting record by Aparajita Das revealed that, on human rights issues, India has voted closer to authoritarian states such as Russia and China than to the US, which is known for its vociferous defence of human rights.

Das 17 Aparajita Das [doctoral candidate in Economics at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. She earned her Bachelor's degree in Economics from Princeton University], 7-25-2017, "A fine balance: India's voting record at the UNGA," ORF,

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/fine-balance-india-voting-record-unga/> //DF

A similar pattern as Figure 8.5 is seen in resolutions pertaining to disarmament. Again, in the 1980s there seems to have occurred a considerable split between the positions taken by Russia and China and those taken by the Western P-5 members. Since the broad topic of disarmament under the UN deals with "global challenges and threats to peace," and is thus closely related to the nuclear threat, the patterns seen here may be an extension of the debate sparked by India's Pokhran-I tests in 1974. Human Rights **On human rights issues,**

India has voted closer to authoritarian states such as Russia and China than to the US, which is known

for its vociferous defence of human rights and its explicit government policy to "hold governments accountable to their obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments." However, India's position should not be interpreted as an acceptance of human rights violations, but rather as **evidence for India's policy of non-interference in the internal issues of other sovereign states, a position shared by Russia and China.** Colonialism India and the US — two former British colonies with very different historical trajectories and relations with their colonisers — take diametrically opposing voting positions on resolutions pertaining to colonisation. On this issue, as in the issues of economic development, it seems that the development status is an important predictor of a country's degree of support for UN resolutions. Here, India tends to side with the perspective of former colonies. As evidenced by Graph 8.8, status as an ex-colony does not necessarily lead to a policy of agreement with UN resolutions pertaining to the issue of colonisation.

India would veto resolutions and would be against things like interventions against genocide.

Intervention in just one conflict has huge impacts.

1. India wouldn't intervene in a genocide
2. Even if they would support interventions, it would take longer to persuade them to (Krain says that the longer it takes to respond, the more people are killed)

Impact Evidence

200 Billion investment in peacekeepers would've saved 150,000 lives from 2001-2013 merely from direct deaths - this does not include the thousands of civilian deaths, displacement, famine etc. (Hegre - University of Uppsala

Håvard Hegre, 2018, "Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations" University of Uppsala,

https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf

This ambitious but effective scenario would not be exorbitantly expensive – according to our simulations, it would require **maintaining a**

UN peacekeeping budget at about 17 billion USD every year, or twice the level of what it spent in

2012.³ Accumulated over the 13-year period the simulated peacekeeping costs would have amounted to 205 billion USD compared to 59 billion in actual budget expenses over the 13 years. This is a substantial investment, but the required budget would decline in the future since peacekeeping reduces considerably the global future risk of conflict. While the countries that contribute to UN peacekeeping with troops or funds are not necessarily those who reap the direct benefits, the humanitarian gains alone would be worth the expenses. A typical major conflict causes about 2,500 direct battle-related deaths per year. **Over the 2001– 2013 period, the 60 country-years of minor and major conflict removed by the ambitious scenario would have saved about 150,000 direct deaths. Massive indirect deaths due to conflict violence would also have been averted (Gates et al.**

2012). In addition, by reducing conflict peacekeeping can prevent the displacement of civilians, thus further reducing the humanitarian suffering that extends beyond the conflict countries. Moreover, as discussed at length in Collier et al. (2003), the negative externalities of internal conflicts re-percuss across the globe, be it in the form of massive refugee flows, reduced trade and economic growth, or acts of terrorism in countries far from the location of the original conflict.

Impacts of conflict far greater than direct conflict deaths (Gates - University of Oslo)

Håvard Hegre, 2018, "Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations" University of Uppsala, https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/653/c_653796-l_1-k_pko_prediction_preprint_main.pdf

Gates et al. (2012) estimate the consequence of conflict across all of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). They find, for instance, that a conflict of average intensity (2500 battle deaths over 5 years) in a medium size country of 10 million inhabitants increases the proportion of the country that is undernourished by about 300,000 people (Gates et al. 2012, 1717).

Impact – Information Flows

Third, Is increasing information Flows

Andrea Ruggeri, Cambridge, 2016, "Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection"

<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/kinds-of-blue-diversity-in-un-peacekeeping-missions-and-civilian-protection/54C5B7FB27C145335952A52592221DCD> (NK)

First, peacekeeping deterrence helps prevent conflict from spilling over into non-combatant areas, thus reducing the violence against civilians. Secondly, as a ceasefire may provide opportunities for government and rebel authorities to increase their bargaining power, the local presence of peacekeepers matters because it commits leaders to follow previously agreed rules, including the combatants' interdiction from civilian areas. Thirdly, **information flows can be crucial, as government and rebel leaders often lack information about their relative strength. By providing information, peacekeepers can assist the peace process. Furthermore, peacekeepers get vital information through their frequent interactions with civilians, which allows them to more proactively protect them.** Figure 2 summarizes our theoretical framework. In the following paragraphs we explore how internal diversity in UN peacekeeping missions can positively or negatively influence the effectiveness of multinational operations through the mechanisms we have briefly discussed. Identifying the effect of diversity on performance remains a challenging research problem, and contemporary organizational theory gives little guidance on the direction of the impact. Therefore our inventory of possible mechanisms is not meant to be exhaustive.

UNSC Legitimacy

India joining the UNSC will make their actions towards Pakistan look less legitimate

Bosco 09 David Bosco [associate professor at Indiana University's School of Global and International Studies. He is the author of books on the U.N. Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and is at work on a new book about governance of the oceans], 9-23-2009, "Think Again: The U.N. Security Council," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/23/think-again-the-u-n-security-council/> //DF

"Expanding the Council Would Increase Its Legitimacy." Don't be so sure. It has become a constant refrain at U.N. headquarters that the Security Council is anachronistic. And in many ways, it is. Japan, the organization's second-largest financial contributor, deserves a permanent council seat, as do rising economic stars India and Brazil. In the near future, the British and French seats should be combined into a seat for the European Union, a change that would give a regular voice to Germany and boost the EU's aspiration for a common foreign policy. These reforms would help the council more accurately reflect the world's power distribution. But **reorganization alone would not greatly increase respect for the body worldwide. Many of the crises and conflicts that the UNSC confronts spring from either rogue regimes or uncooperative non-state actors for whom the council's**

composition is all but irrelevant. Tyrants in Burma, militias in eastern Congo, and Al Qaeda disciples won't be impressed by a revamped council. And in some cases, **an expanded council would even introduce new legitimacy problems. Imagine, for example, a council with India as a permanent member that passed resolutions condemning Pakistan. From Islamabad, the new council would certainly look less legitimate than it does today.** Moreover, expansion of the UNSC requires the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly. Since small and mid-sized states often pool their votes, any reform package would have to compensate those blocs of power somehow. Most viable proposals for council reform envision adding five to 10 additional elected seats to compensate the broader U.N. membership for new permanent seats. All told, council membership might balloon to 25 states or more. Such a dramatic expansion could easily undermine the council's value as an important talking shop for major powers. A 25-member UNSC would often prove too large for the kinds of quiet, behind-the-scenes exchanges that have been one of the body's principal values — and contributions to security.

China Conflict?

China is opposed to its regional rival India joining the UNSC

McDonald and Patrick 10 Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests," Council on Foreign Relations, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf //DF

Among permanent members, France is most enthusiastic about enlargement, followed by the United Kingdom.¹⁹ This public stance may be motivated by the growing vulnerability of their own permanent seats, given perceptions that Europe is overrepresented among the P5. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty increases pressure to consolidate the two nations' membership into a single seat for the European Union, something neither seems prepared to contemplate. In March 2008, France and Britain jointly proposed creating an "interim" category of longer-term, renewable seats, to be held by a handful of countries, notionally for five to fifteen years. (At present, a country cannot serve consecutive elected terms.) This period would be followed by a review conference on final status. Reactions from the G4 have been mixed, with India most adamantly opposed. Unsurprisingly, each major coalition has in turn offered its own, self-serving *The Tough Diplomatic Landscape* 13 interpretation of this "interim" option. Some regard it as a temporary status leading to permanent membership; others as an enduring "intermediate" category that eliminates the prospect of additional permanent seats. Russia, sensitive to any decline in relative power, opposes additional permanent members and efforts to qualify the P5 veto. **China says it is open to UNSC expansion**, including additional elected members from Africa, **but will likely resist any new permanent members (with particular animus to adding Japan and, increasingly, regional rival India)**. Chinese officials argue that adding permanent members would only exacerbate representation issues and antagonize the next tier of countries. China has signaled openness to the "intermediate" approach, but may consider it a step to defer G4 ambitions.

Other Int'l Organizations

When the UNSC became less active and effective in 2018, other organizations stepped up

UN 19 1-10-2019, "Paralysis Constricts Security Council Action in 2018, as Divisions among Permanent Membership Fuel Escalation of Global Tensions," United Nations Press Releases, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13661.doc.htm> //DF

The Security Council remained largely paralysed by expanding rifts and mounting tensions involving its permanent members in 2018, a year characterized by the rise of nationalist movements and breaches of long-standing global norms that sparked questions about the very future of multilateralism. Over the course of the second-busiest year in its history, the 15-member Council convened a total of 275 public meetings, adopted 54 resolutions and issued 21 presidential statements. It also failed to adopt a total of seven draft resolutions, three of them due to a permanent member's exercise of its veto and four owing to a lack of sufficient votes in their favour. Meanwhile, a greater percentage of resolutions adopted in 2018 lacked the Council's unanimous support than in the previous year. The Council's five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States — remained gridlocked on several of the organ's oldest agenda items, with fresh divisions also emerging over newer issues. Against that backdrop, regional organizations such as the African Union took an increasingly prominent role in addressing their own challenges, raising new questions about the role and responsibilities of the United Nations in an evolving and more complex world. One of the Council's most intense divisions revolved around a worrying spike in the reported use of chemical weapons, from the battlefields of Syria to the tranquil United Kingdom town of Salisbury. Such allegations prompted many Council members to express grave concern over a perceived erosion of critical, long-held international norms governing warfare. More broadly, Council members, as well as the wider United Nations membership, repeatedly voiced alarm over indications that — seven decades into the world's grand experiment in multilateralism — deepening divisions and a rising tide of nationalism threaten to derail hard-won gains.

OLD CASE

We negate, resolved: the United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our sole contention is that India's accession to the Security Council would harm humanitarian interventions.

The UN Security Council is enjoying an era of cooperation that has enabled it to intervene in more humanitarian crises. Joelle Hageboutros of Swarthmore University writes in 2017: On 90% of the Council's agenda which deal with murderous conflicts, often in Africa, places like the Congo, the council has no trouble agreeing.

The foundation of Security Council interventions is the doctrine of "responsibility to protect." Roland Paris at the University of Ottawa, explains in 2014 that: The core tenet of R2P, unanimously endorsed by members of the United Nations (UN) in 2005, is that every state has a responsibility to protect its inhabitants from mass atrocities and that this responsibility may fall to the broader international community. The doctrine leaves open the possibility of preventive humanitarian intervention, or military force by outside parties to avert mass atrocities, should all other methods fail.

However, India opposes UN humanitarian interventions because it fears those interventions would be targeted against its own crimes. Arya Pimpale at Leiden University writes in 2016: India fails to uphold the responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocity crimes. The government has normalized communal violence and sees it as a regular feature of domestic politics. Therefore, India is concerned of

being intervened into for its domestic human rights abuses and the R2P norm is a direct threat to the sovereignty of India.

Even in cases of extreme violence, security council expert David Malone explains in 2013 that India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention. India refused to support a mass killing in Syria in October 2011 – while repeatedly sounding alarm bells on sovereignty and the need for domestic resolution of domestic conflicts.

Even if India and the rest of the Security Council could reach consensus, agreement would take longer because India is starting from a place of diametrical opposition. This would be very bad for humanitarian purposes. Political science professor Matthew Krain finds in a 2005 study: the longer a murderous policy has been in place, the more time the perpetrator has to learn how to kill more efficiently. The duration of a genocide or politicide has been found to increase its severity significantly.

These interventions are effective and reduce violence in a few ways.

First, by providing a security guarantee.

Hultmann of the American Political Science Review writes in 2014:

For civil war hostilities to end, both factions must pull back from the battlefield, and rebels must disarm and demobilize. But by disarming, rebels sacrifice their only means of protecting themselves. Under these commitment problems, third parties such as the UN can provide security guarantees to improve the willingness of the parties to move toward peaceful resolution. Having a credible security guarantee from UN peacekeepers in the form of troops on the ground allows belligerents to refrain from continued battlefield violence and initiate the process of demobilization.

Second is increasing the cost of conflict.

Hultmann continues:

peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict make violence more costly relative to other forms of resolution, PKOs also often pursue strategies that limit the opportunities warring actors have for advancing militarily on one another. Research has shown that the expected cost of continued fighting is central to an actor's decision to use force or agree to a settlement. The UN frequently positions armed personnel on the frontlines of civil conflict to create a buffer zone between belligerents. By interceding between factions and monitoring combat behavior on the frontlines, UN PKOs reduce battlefield violence by increasing the cost of fighting.

Hovad Hegre of Uppsala University, found in 2018: intervention reduces the amount of violence during conflict, reduces the duration of conflict, increases the duration of peace following conflict — and limits the risk that conflict in one country spreads to neighboring countries.

This effect is quantified by Forna of Princeton University in a study analysing situation where peacekeepers did and did not intervene, finding:
peacekeeping cuts the risk of renewed war by 75%–85%

Thus, we negate.