

We affirm; resolved: Unilateral military force by the United States is justified to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The Strategic Studies Institute defines military force as utilization of the concept of hard power, or **“the ability to affect the outcomes you want, and if necessary, change the behavior of others to make this happen.”** In recent decades, scholars and commentators have chosen to distinguish between two kinds of power, “hard” and “soft.” The former, hard power, is achieved **through military threat or use.**

*This means that any instance in which military funds are used to influence the actions of other nations fits the definition of **military force.***

Contention One: American force prevents proliferation of nuclear material to terrorists.

J. Danielson initially shows that¹

Edward Luttwak has argued that war has, among many other evils, the great virtue of being able to resolve political conflict and eventually bring peace. However, “this can [only] happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively.”¹⁹² It is profoundly ironic that **nuclear weapons**, in preventing such decisive conflict, **have prolonged the Indo-Pakistani conflict and led to countless civilian deaths.** Some authors have argued that nuclear weapons create macro-level stability, preventing great numbers of civilian casualties. Sumit Ganguly, Devin Hagerty, Paul Kapur, and Kenneth Waltz have made a strong case that nuclear weapons have prevented full-scale war between India and Pakistan, admitting, however, that **nuclear weapons have [not only] been unable to prevent smaller-scale conflicts.** This misses the point. In the case of India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons **[but] have actively prolonged conflict, leading to profound regional “bottom-up” instability.** Nuclear weapons have provided Pakistan with a shield against Indian conventional forces, leaving India unable to deal with Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism without resorting to the same tactics itself. **By investing in nuclear weapons programs, both states have been forced to withhold precious resources from other areas;** Pakistan, especially, suffers from a weak state and could use those same resources to strengthen the central government and improve the lives of its citizens. The feminist challenge to realist notions of security “security for whom and by what means?” seems especially apt in this case.¹⁹³ And further, **by funding non-state actors and encouraging their use of violence, Pakistan has further undermined the legitimacy of its state, both internally and internationally.** Pakistan’s “sorcerer’s apprentice” problem is very real; if Islamist groups with no qualms about using violence ever gained access to just one of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, millions of innocent civilians could pay the price. A recent piece in the Atlantic suggests that Pakistan is much more concerned with keeping its nuclear weapons safe from India and the United States than it is with keeping them safe from domestic terrorist groups; Pakistan has even carted fully assembled devices around in delivery vans to hide their locations from foreign spy agencies.¹⁹⁴ If these reports are true, it is a terrifying prospect. Further, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 demonstrate that Pakistan is still very much in the business of terror.

This domestic instability causes conflict and increases international terrorism. **Nauro Campos warrants that²**

On the basis of these results, we argue for the importance of the escalation effect in understanding international terrorism and suggest for future research more efforts to uncover the main mechanisms through which it operates. Our main conjecture is that **domestic instability escalates into international terrorism because it provides and perfects the skills** (military, strategic and organizational) **required to carry out international terrorist acts.** One example may help underscore the importance of this potential mechanism. In July 2005, the London public transport system suffered two terrorist attacks. The first, in July 7, unfortunately succeeded but the other, two weeks later (July 21), failed. There are many differences between the two events but an examination of the biographies of the two teams of perpetrators reveals one important distinction: the members of the first group seem to have received substantially more training and have received it much closer in time to the attack than those in the second group (Krueger, 2007, p.48).

Usage of both drone strikes and UAV drones helps combat terrorism. **Patrick Johnston explains³**

¹http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Danielson,%20J.%20Ryane_2012_Thesis.pdf

²<http://ftp.iza.org/dp4061.pdf>

Assuming that insurgent organizations are resilient to the loss of individual leaders holds intuitive appeal, especially when considering high-profile movements like the FLN or Vietcong, but the assumption's applicability to the wider universe of insurgencies is questionable. It is not unreasonable to think that many **guerrilla groups would lack therobust structures necessary to insulate themselves from the shocks associated with the loss of key leaders.** The Janatha Vimukthi Peramun (JVP), for example, a communist insurgency that staged uprisings against the Sri Lankan government in 1971 and 1987, suffered greatly in each conflict after its primary leader, Rohana Wijeweera, who masterminded the group's overall strategy and tactical operations, was taken off the battlefield. The JVP relied heavily on Wijeweera's operational skill and charisma, and after he was removed from each conflict, his subordinate commanders failed to execute the operations he had planned and the group was quickly defeated (Arasaratnam 1972). Finally, even though scholars correctly observe that leadership decapitation is rarely a silver-bullet solution to insurgency, this does not mean that killing or capturing an insurgency's leadership cannot diminish insurgencies' organizational capabilities and effectiveness. On the contrary, **removing key leaders** might have important effects, such as **[degrades] insurgencies' pool of skilled commanders, strategists and operatives [forces]; disrupting insurgents' planning, training, and execution of operations and attacks; and, in putting remaining insurgents on the defensive, assisting government forces in seizing or maintaining the tactical and operational initiative.**

Unless the US takes action, the impact of a terrorist attack would be substantial. **The New York Times impacts⁴**

A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism "would thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty" and create "a second death toll throughout the developing world."

At the point where terrorists have expressed interest in nuclear weapons, it is evident that drones help combat the threat of proliferation to terrorists. Thus, because we prevent an asymmetrical threat, it is justified.

Contention Two: US deterrents in response to North Korea prevent proliferation.

American military deterrents of nuclear proliferation are vital to ensuring that an arms race in a tense region does not occur. In the absence of such deterrents, both South Korea and Japan would be greatly incentivized to proliferate.

The American Enterprise Institute highlights⁵

If forced to pursue a wholly independent self-defense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chilling—especially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing.

Japan also relies on American deterrence. **Joseph Nye explains⁶**

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that **extended deterrence** depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it **[this] depends on a combination of capability and credibility.**

In other words, without US presence, Japan would be forced to create its own nuclear defense program.

³<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Johnston.pdf>

⁴http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=0

⁵<http://www.aei.org/article/26924>

⁶ http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/07/137_48423.ht

The US is able to keep both scenarios from occurring in three ways:

Joseph Nye furthers

During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, **the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops** (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

Next, the 'Asia Pivot' is a means of preventing proliferation. **The National Strategy Forum Review justifies⁷**

The overall impacts on South Korean defense and military planning are six-fold. First, **enhanced reassurance of the U.S. extended deterrence has been the most important effect** of this new strategy. Second, China's so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability and the U.S. AirSea Battle concept have captured the attention of South Korean defense and military planners. Third, **the pivot to Asia has implicitly affected South Korea's military posture and military doctrine**. Fourth, the pivot to Asia may indirectly change the content and format in which burden-sharing is to be negotiated. Fifth, the pivot to Asia has led an increasing number of South Korean security and military experts to ponder the indirect impact on the transfer of U.S. Forces Korea wartime operational control (OPCON) of all troops on the peninsula to South Korea scheduled for December 2015. Finally, it appears that the pivot to Asia has **[and] indirectly influenced** the ROK's **defense reform** – the force structure, the end-strength of its armed forces, weapons systems and procurement policy, and the upper-tier command structure.

Finally, ballistic missile defense systems, or BMD's are essential to deter allies. **The New York Times explains⁸**

The new deployments [of BMDs], announced by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on Friday, will increase the number of ground-based interceptors in California and Alaska to 44 from 30 by 2017. The missiles have a mixed record in testing, hitting dummy targets just 50 percent of the time, but officials said Friday's announcement was intended not merely to present a credible deterrence to the North's limited intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. They said it is **[are] also meant to show South Korea and Japan that the United States is willing to commit resources to deterring the North** and, at the same time, warn Beijing that it must restrain its ally or face an expanding American military focus on Asia.

US ballistic missile defenses deter other actors from proliferating. **Andrew Futter warrants**

Missile defenses may also act as a disincentive to those countries wishing to challenge the prevailing security order. Put simply, any missile defense deployments by the United States and its allies will significantly raise the cost to would-be or current nuclear pariahs by lessening the possibility that a nuclear strike would be successful. This would also force such nations to build more sophisticated or larger numbers of nuclear weapons to ensure the same type of leverage a crude device would have under pure retaliatory nuclear deterrence. **As many [nuclear pariahs] of these countries tend to be impoverished, and as such technology is both hard to acquire and master, the expansion of BMD seems likely to become a strong disincentive to states wishing to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. As such, missile defenses could "help both to counter an important threat and deter it in the first place."**

The impact of this deterrence is vital to global stability and security. **The Congressional Research Service finalizes⁹**

Any reconsideration of Japan's policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, **Japan's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could damages the most durable**

⁷<http://www.nationalstrategy.com/Portals/0/documents/Spring%202013%20NSFR/South%20Koreas%20Adaptive%20Response%20to%20the%20US%20Pivot%20to%20Asia%20-%20Kim.pdf>

⁸http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/us-to-bolster-missile-defense-against-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁹ <http://opencrs.com/document/RL34487/>

international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled **to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability**.

Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo’s lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.