## AFF BLOCKS

### AT: Spending Wasteful

#### 1. Spending does not cut waste, only reform can – cuts do more harm than good

**Diem Nguyen Salmon, 2015** (Diem Nguyen Salmon, Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy. January 30th 2015. “A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget,” *Backgrounder,* <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/BG2989.pdf>.Accessed Dec 4 2016. Page 6) ESG

Supporters of Defense Cuts Are Misguided. **Some argue that the spending reductions were not a problem because of the sheer size of the budget and excessive waste in the department.** This is a misperception of the DOD budget. **While waste does affect the DOD budget, it comprises a small portion of the overall budget, not nearly equivalent to the amount that was cut.** To illustrate this, in the “Department of Everything” former Senator Tom Coburn (R–OK) itemizes an expansive list of wasteful programs in the DOD amounting to $67.9 billion over 10 years.17 If Congress could eliminate every single one of the listed programs, the annual savings would amount to a little more than 1 percent of the budget**. It is also wrong to assume that simply reducing overall defense spending can eliminate waste. In truth, eliminating wasteful spending at the DOD (as in other government institutions) requires separate legislation and internal reform. The past several years of defense spending reduction not only cut the fat, but also much of the actual meat—real U.S. military capabilities.**

#### 2. Spending reform and more efficient spending is happening in the status quo

**Mackenzie Eaglen** from the American Enterprise Institute in **2016** (Eaglen, ‘Framing a defense reform agenda for 2017’, https://www.aei.org/publication/framing-a-defense-reform-agenda-for-2017/

Defense reform has been a primary focus for Congress over the last two years, and 2016 is no different. The combination of sustained advocacy for change and a defense budget drawdown has driven higher interest in ongoing structural repair at the Pentagon. In Congress, the House and Senate Armed Services committees have embarked on a comprehensive agenda spearheaded by the most ambitious defense acquisition revamp since the late Clinton era, an unprecedented transformation of the military retirement system, and the first reconsideration of Goldwater-Nichols since its passage in 1986. The latest efforts at reform, however, did not begin with Congress. In 2010, the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, a bipartisan, blue-ribbon commission, called for a comprehensive overhaul of the all-volunteer force, including a presidential commission to review the pay and benefits of US military personnel and revise the arcane career system for those in uniform. In 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates launched a limited set of “efficiency initiatives” aimed at reducing overhead in back-end offices and management.[1] Then in 2014, the National Defense Panel wholly endorsed structural defense reform, stating that “the Secretary [of Defense] cannot be expected to reform the Department without cooperation and support from the political authorities to whom he answers.”[2] Presidential candidates soon joined in. Former presidential candidate Jeb Bush penned op-eds in prominent defense outlets supporting robust defense reform,[3] and the plurality of the Republican field—including Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, and Carly Fiorina—has expressed a desire to rebuild the military while also changing the way the Pentagon does business.[4]

#### 3. The Pentagon waste number is over FIVE YEARS of spending- it’s waste is actually a very small amount relative to total spending

Sydney Freedberg, 2016. (Sydney J Freedberg Jr., Deputy Editor of breakingdefense.com and prominent defense journalist, December 7, 2016, “125 Billion in Savings? Not So Fast, Say Experts, Dod, Rep. Smith” from BreakingDefense.com. DOA-January 13 2017 <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/125-billion-savings-not-so-fast-say-experts-rep-smith/>) JJ

WASHINGTON: Want to save $125 billion by slashing Pentagon “waste”? Not so fast. If you take a closer look at the much-touted [Defense Business Board study](http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/investigations/defense-business-board-study-from-jan-2015-identifying-125-billion-in-waste/2236/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) proposing those cuts– which was published in 2015 but went viral after [Monday’s Washington Post story](https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/pentagon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) saying the Pentagon had “burie[d]” it — and talk to experts, officials, and [the top House Democrat](http://breakingdefense.com/tag/rep.-adam-smith/) on defense policy, the savings turn out to be less of a slam-dunk than advertised.∂ “I don’t necessarily think the report is overstating the ease with which that savings can be achieved,” said [Rep. Adam Smith](http://breakingdefense.com/2016/07/adam-mac-john-rep-smith-reaches-out-to-sen-mccain-on-ndaa/), the cerebral and snarky ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee. “But I certainly think the reporting on the report is overstating the ease with which we can save that $125 billion.”∂ **First, divide by five: A crucial detail the headlines always omitted is that the DBB forecast $125 billion in savings over five years. That makes the annual savings from their proposed efficiencies a still respectable but hardly game-changing $25 billion a year. “That’s [about] 4% of total DoD outlays,” calculates Capital Alpha analyst [Byron Callan](http://www.capalphadc.com/team/Byron_Callan%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), “which is well within the types of savings corporations would strive to achieve.”**

### AT: Too Much Spending

#### 1. While the US may spend a lot of money, our relative investment is low

**Justin Johnson, 2016** (Justin Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting Policy at The Heritage Foundation. January 25th 2016. “5 Bad Arguments for Cutting U.S. Defense Spending,” *The National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002>. Accessed December 1st 2016) ESG

**“The United States spends more than the next seven countries combined.” Statistically true, but not particularly helpful. The United States also spends more on health care than the next nine countries combined.** In 2012, Americans accounted for about one-third of the world’s total spending on entertainment. We’re a big, rich country—with a lot to protect and a host of vital interests around the globe. **More important is the trend in defense spending.** The same data set that pegs U.S. spending at more than the next seven countries today shows that we spent more than the next thirteen countries combined in 2011. **Our investment in national security compared with the rest of the world has dropped dramatically over the last four years.** Remember, robust defense funding serves a purpose. It allows the United States to preempt threats before they arrive at our shores. No other country is capable of protecting its interests around the world like the United States, and sustaining a military force that can project power worldwide comes at a cost.

#### 2. Spending figures are unrepresentative – they don’t adjust for income and more

**Robert Samuelson, 2011** (Robert Samuelson, a journalist for The Washington Post, where he has written about business and economic issues since 1977. October 30th 2011. “The dangerous debate over cutting military spending,” *The Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-dangerous-debate-over-cutting-military-spending/2011/10/28/gIQAnPWEXM_story.html?utm_term=.e56bba670597>. Accessed December 1st 2016) ESG

Second, we spend so much more than anyone else that cutbacks won’t make us vulnerable**. In 2009, U.S. defense spending was six times China’s and 13 times Russia’s**, according to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. **The trouble with these numbers is that they don’t truly adjust for differences in income levels. U.S. salary and procurement costs are orders of magnitude higher than China’s, for example. But China’s military manpower is about 50 percent greater than ours, and it has a fighter fleet four-fifths as large.** This doesn’t mean that China’s military technology yet equals ours, but differences in reported spending are wildly misleading.

#### 3. Furthermore, defense spending has grown more slowly than spending in other areas

**Justin Johnson, 2016** (Justin Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting Policy at The Heritage Foundation. January 25th 2016. “5 Bad Arguments for Cutting U.S. Defense Spending,” *The National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002>. Accessed December 1st 2016) ESG

“Defense spending has grown too much in recent years.” **Defense spending has grown since the 9/11 terror attacks—but not nearly as fast as the rest of the federal government. From 2001 through 2015, spending on social and economic programs dramatically outpaced spending on national security: 61 percent compared with 38 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars. Defense Department outlays now account for only 15 percent of all federal spending—less than its share before 9/11.** Add in state and local government spending, and national security accounts for only 10 percent of total public spending. As a percentage of America’s gross domestic product, total national security spending has fallen from a high of 4.7 percent in 2010 and to an estimated 3.3 percent in 2015. (It stood at 2.9 percent in 2001.) So where’s that so-called ‘surge’ in defense spending?

### AT: Biggest Military

#### 1. Though our military is *relatively* large, it’s shrinking rapidly

**Justin Johnson, 2016** (Justin Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting Policy at The Heritage Foundation. January 25th 2016. “5 Bad Arguments for Cutting U.S. Defense Spending,” *The National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002>. Accessed December 1st 2016) ESG

“We have more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world combined.” True, but no reason to cut military spending. **The size of our military should be based on security needs, not simple inventory counts.** As a global power with global interests, the United States has historically sized its military to have the potential to fight two conflicts simultaneously. This ensures that if we are fighting one war, another adversary cannot take advantage of the situation to launch an attack elsewhere. **Today, the U.S. military is smaller than any time since 9/11. America’s Navy, for example, has shrunk 14 percent since then. With only 272 ships, it’s our smallest fleet since 1916. This year the Army will fall below its 9/11 size. At its new end strength of 475,000 it will be our smallest Army since 1940 with more cuts planned for future years. Our Air Force has 12 percent fewer personnel and 26 percent fewer aircraft than it did on 9/11.**

### AT: Tradeoff Medicare

#### 1. ALWAYS done a mix of increased borrowing, increased taxation and cuts. The money will come from multiple areas and not just what they claim.

#### 2. Never a complete cut of entitlements – can’t actually quantify an impact

#### 3. Trump doesn’t even want to cut Medicare, silly

Lisa Mascaro 2016 (Lisa Mascaro, Congressional reporter for the Los Angeles Times, November 29th 2016, “Trump made promises to blue-collar voters. Democrats plan to make sure he follows through,” [http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-democrats-congress-20161129-story.html DoA 12/17/16](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-democrats-congress-20161129-story.html%20DoA%2012/17/16)) CJV

But unlike Republicans, whose preference is to shrink the size and scope of government, it’s in the DNA of Democrats to put government to work fixing the nation’s problems, something that Trump has endorsed at times. Trump has called for a $1-trillion infrastructure program to rebuild roads, bridges and airports. He’s promised to reopen factories and prevent jobs from fleeing overseas because of trade deals. And he has spoken against cutting entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Such campaign promises appealed to many blue-collar voters who traditionally align with Democratic lawmakers, and left small-government Republicans cringing over the president-elect’s apparent embrace of deficit spending to finance government job creation.

#### 4. Democrats will always work to stop cuts to entitlements, even as the minority

Julian Zelizer 2016 (Julian Zelizer, political historian at Princeton University and a fellow at the New America Foundation, December 12th 2016, “Why even the strongest Republican efforts can’t defeat the welfare state,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/12/why-even-the-strongest-republican-efforts-cant-defeat-the-welfare-state/?utm_term=.a758b58f4a29> DoA: 12/17/16) CJV

Conservative assaults on public policy frequently trigger a political backlash among activists who were dormant until that moment, meaning they end up encountering resistance their instigators weren’t prepared for. Liberals, for instance, created groups such as the National Coalition for the Homeless to protect the interests of disadvantaged and marginalized Americans. The Senate also provides a key line of defense for the welfare state. Unless Republicans employ the “nuclear option,” a parliamentary move that would empower a simple majority to limit or eliminate the filibuster, Senate Democrats still can use the filibuster to stymie proposals outside the budget reconciliation process. If McConnell ultimately signs on to the Medicare restructuring agenda, incoming Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) will be adept at using the procedural tools at his disposal to obstruct the bill’s progress. While Senate Democrats can no longer filibuster Cabinet appointments — a decision by Sen. Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) that the party is probably coming to regret — the narrow Republican majority means that they have to pick off only a few members of the GOP to block a nomination, although there is little precedent for the Senate halting a Cabinet nomination on social policy grounds.

### AT: Retrenchment Good

#### 1. Causes re-intervention- turns the impact

**Robert Lieber 2005** [Robert J. Lieber, PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates, “The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century”, pg. 54]

 Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but **the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests.** Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere **the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia** involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. **Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region** (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. **Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable.** Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit-tingly observed, "If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."2z Similarly, NiallFerguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson's warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, "apolarity," could bring "an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves."2

#### 2. American decline will mean a decline of the current world order

**Robert Kagan 2012** [Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, January 17, 2012, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline”, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/17-us-power-kagan>]

Is the United States in decline, as so many seem to believe these days? Or are Americans in danger of committing pre-emptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own declining power? A great deal depends on the answer to these questions. **The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity**, even with the current crisis, **than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers**—reflects American principles and preferences, and **was built and preserved by American power** in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. **If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse**, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. **American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.**

#### 3. Retrenchment unleashes a myriad of security threats

**Steven Metz, 2013** (Steven Metz, Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute and former Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies. October 22nd 2013. “A Receding Presence: The Military Implications of American Retrenchment,” *World Politics Review*, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13312/a-receding-presence-the-military-implications-of-american-retrenchment>. Accessed Dec 8 2016) ESG

Across all these regions, **four types of security threats are plausible and dangerous: protracted internal conflicts that cause humanitarian disasters and provide operating space for extremists (the Syria model); the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; the seizure of a state or part of a state by extremists that then use the territory they control to support transnational terrorism; and the old specter of major war between nations.** U.S. political leaders and security experts once believed that maintaining a full range of military capabilities, including the ability to undertake large-scale, protracted land operations, was an important deterrent to potential opponents. But the problem with deterrence is that it's impossible to prove. Did the U.S. military deter the Soviet seizure of Western Europe, or did Moscow never intend to do that irrespective of what the United States did? Unfortunately, the only way to definitively demonstrate the value of deterrence is to allow U.S. power to recede and see if bad things happen. Until recently, the United States was not inclined to take such a risk. But now there is increasing political support for accepting greater risk by moving toward a cheaper military without a full range of capabilities. Many Americans are willing to throw the strategic dice.

#### 4. Retrenchment frightens allies and encourages our enemies

**Colin Dueck, 2015** (Colin Dueck, senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. April 2015. “The Strategy of Retrenchment and Its Consequences,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, <http://www.fpri.org/docs/dueck_-_retrenchment.pdf>. Accessed Dec 11 2016) ESG

In truth, retrenchment in US military spending, force posture, and security strategy under President Obama has had several consequences he probably did not intend. First, while there is less immediate expense in maintaining a smaller-sized force, sized to handle only one major regional contingency at a time – and with no intention of engaging in large-scale ground campaigns – there is obviously a trade-off here in terms of cost and risk. Naturally, **when the United States downsizes its presence overseas, this tends to unnerve allies and encourage adversaries. Allies depend upon believable, material indicators of American commitment, including a strong military presence together with a credible readiness to use it. Adversaries are deterred by the same.** Some leading strategic statements issued by the administration, such as the new National Security Strategy, do not really spell out or concede any such trade-off between cost and risk. Instead, they simply take it for granted that the increased risk is manageable. In effect, current plans assume or perhaps hope that international adversaries will not take advantage of America's scaled-back ability to handle a range of possible challenges. US adversaries may not be so forgiving. They might also misperceive the true extent of American commitment and resolve, under the impression the US won't respond. Indeed this is how many of America's wars have begun in the past. **So a smaller force, together with indicators of limited US capabilities, is hardly a guarantee of peace, either for the United States or for others. On the contrary, it has often preceded the outbreak of war.**

#### 5. Retrenchment doesn’t resolve budgetary problems AND more spending won’t exacerbate budgetary problems

Stephen Brooks et al, 2013 [Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John IKENBERRY, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William WOHLFORTH, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2013, “Lean Forward” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

Many advocates of retrenchment consider the United States' assertive global posture simply too expensive. The international relations scholar Christopher Layne, for example, has warned of the country's "ballooning budget deficits" and argued that "its strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them." Calculating the savings of switching grand strategies, however, is not so simple, because it depends on the expenditures the current strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement -- numbers that are hard to pin down. If the United States revoked all its security guarantees, brought home all its troops, shrank every branch of the military, and slashed its nuclear arsenal, it would save around $900 billion over ten years, according to Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan of the Cato Institute. But few advocates of retrenchment endorse such a radical reduction; instead, most call for "restraint," an "offshore balancing" strategy, or an "over the horizon" military posture. The savings these approaches would yield are less clear, since they depend on which security commitments Washington would abandon outright and how much it would cost to keep the remaining ones. If retrenchment simply meant shipping foreign-based U.S. forces back to the United States, then the savings would be modest at best, since the countries hosting U.S. forces usually cover a large portion of the basing costs. And if it meant maintaining a major expeditionary capacity, then any savings would again be small, since the Pentagon would still have to pay for the expensive weaponry and equipment required for projecting power abroad. The other side of the cost equation, the price of continued engagement, is also in flux. Although the fat defense budgets of the past decade make an easy target for advocates of retrenchment, such high levels of spending aren't needed to maintain an engaged global posture. Spending skyrocketed after 9/11, but it has already begun to fall back to earth as the United States winds down its two costly wars and trims its base level of nonwar spending. As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department was planning for cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, which it maintains will not compromise national security. These reductions would lower military spending to a little less than three percent of GDP by 2017, from its current level of 4.5 percent. The Pentagon could save even more with no ill effects by reforming its procurement practices and compensation policies. Even without major budget cuts, however, the country can afford the costs of its ambitious grand strategy. The significant increases in military spending proposed by Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate, during the 2012 presidential campaign would still have kept military spending below its current share of GDP, since spending on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would still have gone down and Romney's proposed nonwar spending levels would not have kept pace with economic growth. Small wonder, then, that the case for pulling back rests more on the nonmonetary costs that the current strategy supposedly incurs.

#### 6. Retrenchment proponents oversimplify the issue and ignore the facts

Stephen Brooks et al 2013. (Stephen Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. January/February 2013. “Lean Forward,” Foreign Affairs. <http://www.saintjoehigh.com/ourpages/auto/2013/1/7/40360647/13-0102%20Lean%20Forward.pdf> DOA: 21/1/17) CDY

**Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged** grand **strategy** wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and **generates resentment** among foreign populations and governments. A more modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the United States more secure. **They are wrong. In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of the current** grand **strategy** **and understate its benefits**. **In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the United States' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into unnecessary wars.** **The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments** reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They **help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats.** Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.

### AT: Hegemony Bad

#### 1. American decline will mean a decline of the current world order

**Robert Kagan 2012** [Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, January 17, 2012, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline”, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/17-us-power-kagan>]

Is the United States in decline, as so many seem to believe these days? Or are Americans in danger of committing pre-emptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own declining power? A great deal depends on the answer to these questions. **The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity**, even with the current crisis, **than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers**—reflects American principles and preferences, and **was built and preserved by American power** in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. **If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse**, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. **American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone.**

#### 2. Heg prevents war in East Asia war multiple ways

**Alex Ward 2012** (Alex Ward is Interim Assistant to the Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at Council on Foreign Relations, “Is the USA Still the Indispensible Power in East Asia?” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/>)

The foundations upon which hegemonic stability theory are build are underpinned by a neorealist weariness of multipolarity. With multiple competing powers, alliance and enmity structures are more fluid, producing an unstable security landscape (Waltz, 1981: npn), which, in turn, can lead to regional arms races due to the security dilemma (Goh, 2005). Thus, a decline in US hegemony is bound to “trigger sources of competition that well override others sources of peace” (Kupchan, 1998: 42) culminating in arms races (Nye, 1995), especially in view of the volatile mix of social and economic disparities between Asian states due to the rapid political and economic change therein. **In particular, US withdrawal could give way to an unstable power vacuum in which Sino-Japanese tensions could develop into a profound political impasse between the two states** (Beeson, 2003), **heightening security concerns**. Overall then, **America’s role as an extraregional balancer “keeps in check the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger war in East Asia”** (Kupchan, 1998: 62) and holds an inherently stabilizing effect upon the contours of the regional strategic order (Christensen, 1999). Another powerful medium through which US presence contributes to regional order is through its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances (Twining, 2007). It is not solely the presence of the US military in the region that promotes stability; rather it’s development of a coherent alliance structure wherein participants are ostensibly able to mutually set the agenda for regional security. Largely based around its key relationships with South Korea and the ‘linchpin’ of the alliance, Japan, the US hub-and-spoke system constitutes the basis for regional stability in mediating the security dilemma (Nye, 1995). **The alliance system further consolidates US primacy in the region through encouraging the bandwagonning of key regional players as they are induced to “rely on American alliance protection”** (Ikenberry, 2004: 354). **One major avenue for regional stability has been the incorporation and centrality of Japan in the security network. This has the multifaceted advantage of both suppressing the spectre of a remilitarized Japan and**, through its inclusion, **reducing the potential for the arms races that could arise if it were to rearm** (Ikenberry, 2004). The hub-and-spoke alliance system is further strengthened through the mutual adoption of democratic political systems that bestows upon it a degree of coherence. Key members of the alliance such as Japan, ROK, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines are all either republics or have already democratised to some extent (Goh, 2005). The centrality of democracy as the backbone of the alliance system is based in democratic peace theory under the rubric that “the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of powers” (Kupchan, 1998: 52), which further serves to consolidate the alliance network.

#### 3. Hegemonic decline brings the economy down with it–ends in nuclear war

**Aaron Friedberg and Gabriel Schoenfeld, 2008** (Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Princeton, Gabriel Schoenfeld, Visiting Scholar at the Witherspoon Institute, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 21 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>)

**If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum.** The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. **In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt**, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. **The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets.** Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. **Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage**. The choice we have before us is between the potentially

#### 4. Heg solves proliferation – liberalism and security umbrella

**Daniel Deudney et. al2011** (Daniel Deudney, associate professor of Political Science at John’s Hopkins University. Edited by Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government and Dean of Faculty at Dartmouth College, and G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William Wolforth, the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, where he teaches in the Department of Government, “Unipolarity and nuclear weapons” *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* pg. 305)

The diffusion of nuclear weapons in the international system is significantly entangled with the role of the unipolar hegemonic state. **The existence of a unipolar state playing the role of a liberal hegemon has** arguably **been a major constraint on the rate and extent of proliferation. The extended military alliance system of the United States has been a major reason why many potentially nuclear states have forgone acquisition. Starting with Germany and Japan, and extending to a long list of European and East Asian states, the American alliances are widely understood to provide a “nuclear umbrella.”** Overall, without such a state playing this role, proliferation would likely have been much more extensive. **The liberal features of the American hegemonic sate also have contributed to constrain the rate and extent of proliferation. American leadership, and the general liberal internationalist vision of law-governed cooperative international politics, both enabled and infuses the non-proliferation regime.** Similarly, the robust and inclusive liberal world trading system that has been a distinctive and salient feature of the American liberal hegemonic system offers integrating states paths to secure themselves that make nuclear acquisition less attractive.

### AT: Multilat Better

#### 1. Multilateralism is dead – besides, it is ineffective

**Global Ethics Corner, 2013** (Global Ethics Corner, part of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. February 25th 2013. “Is Multilateralism Dead?” *Carnegie Council*, [https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/en\_US/studio/multimedia/20130225/index.html/\_view/lang=en\_US](https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/en_US/studio/multimedia/20130225/index.html/_view/lang%3Den_US). Accessed November 20th 2016) ESG

Global problems need global solutions. Just ask members of the G-20 or the United Nations. Both groups were founded on the assumption that multilateral cooperation is key to solving major international challenges. **There's just one problem. Multilateralism isn't working. The last global agreement that included specific commitments and concrete benchmarks was the Millennium Development Goals. That was passed in the year 2000.** Since then, multilateral summits like Doha and Davos have amounted to lots of promises, but little action. Which is why **a growing number of analysts are questioning the merits of multilateralism and advocating something called "mini-lateralism."** Proponents of "mini-laterialism" say **multilateral negotiations have grown too inclusive.** They warn that new actors like the BRICS and NGOs like Oxfam have made the search for common ground on contentious global issues impossible. **More players mean more conflicts and ultimately, less consensus.** So "mini-lateralists" recommend restricting the number of negotiators to those countries actually capable of enacting policy change. In other words, major world powers

### AT: Soft Power Solves

#### 1. Diplomacy alone fails – military power is necessary to make it effective.

Doug Feith, 2013 [Doug Feith, Hudson Institute senior fellow, former Georgetown University national security professor, former US under secretary of defense for policy, published on Foreign Policy in a piece by Dana Stuster, 3-19-13, “The Iraq Syndrome” http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/19/the-iraq-syndrome/, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

About lessons learned: One of the most interesting things that I have seen that has come out of Iraq over the last decade has been the Iraqi Perspectives Project. And it was, I believe, a project launched by the Joint Forces Command, where they sent a bunch of historians to study the transcripts of the interrogations of Saddam and all his top military and civilian officials. And one of the really fascinating things in there was the reports on what Saddam said. And essentially what he said is, all of the American-led international diplomacy to try to get him to change his policies, or ultimately to leave Iraq, did not work with him, because he believed two things. He believed, first of all, the United States was a paper tiger. And he cited specific cases: Vietnam, Somalia, I think maybe Beirut, as examples of where the United States will not take casualties. And he said, it’s clear the Americans would have to take casualties to take Baghdad; therefore, they’re not coming to Baghdad. I just don’t believe the threats. The second thing he said is, he believed the French and the Russians would block any U.N. resolution, and that that would also help ensure that he wouldn’t have to face the execution of the threats that were being made. This is a textbook example of how military power relates to diplomacy. He did not believe our military threats, and therefore our diplomacy didn’t work with him. One of the consequences of the Iraq war, without a doubt, because it didn’t go well, is there’s a really profound swing of the pendulum toward reluctance to use military power, at the same time that there’s a great hope that diplomacy is going to be able to solve some of the major problems we have with North Korea, with Iran, elsewhere. And it’s important to understand that the likelihood of success of any kind of diplomacy with these difficult regimes hinges in large part on the credibility of our military threats, and when that’s undermined, our diplomacy is undermined.

#### 2. Hard power generates soft power and they don’t trade off.

Zachary Keck, 2013 [Zachary Keck, Harvard University Belfer Center researcher. 7-24-13, “The Hard Side of Soft Power” http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/the-hard-side-of-soft-power/, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

In fact, the United States has often used its military power for soft power ends. In rare instances, this is done in sweeping ways such as when the U.S. used its military superiority after WWII to transform Japan and Germany into democratic states. Originally this was done through pure coercion, but eventually the Japanese and German populations came to accept democratic values (and U.S. leadership) as legitimate. More frequently, the U.S. military is used more subtly for soft power ends. For instance, after the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, U.S. naval assets allowed the U.S. to be one of the first organizations on the scene helping in the rescue effort. The same was true after the 3/11 disasters in Japan. This undoubtedly made the U.S. in general, and the U.S. military’s presence in the region in particular, more attractive in the eyes of local populations who benefitted significantly from them being there. Similarly, when the U.S. military is used to fight piracy or uphold freedom of navigation in international waters, it is using both soft and hard power. It is using hard power towards the pirates and whichever party is threatening free navigation, by coercing or forcing them to seize their actions, but it is using soft power towards other populations who view the U.S. military’s presence in their neighborhood as legitimate thanks to these actions, and are attracted to the U.S. for its commitment to uphold freedom of navigation (assuming they are in favor of this.)

#### 3. Hard and soft power can compliment each other

Giulio Gallarotti 2011 (Giulio M. Gallarotti, Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University, January 20th 2011, Wesleyan University WesScholar, “Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used,” <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs> DoA 12/15/16) CJV

While the difference between soft and hard power revolves around the difference between extracting compliance with (usually) tangible resources as opposed to cultivating voluntary compliance through a positive image that endears soft-power nations in the world community, the relationship between hard and soft power is hardly simple. Indeed, their relationship is complex and interactive. The two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they rigid complements. Often, they can actually reinforce one another. In fact, it will often be the case that each set of power resources require at least some of the other for maximum effectiveness (i.e., Cosmopolitan power, discussed below). Hence soft power resources can enhance hard power, and vice versa. Certainly, a strong positive image can garner many more allies, which in turn can bolster a nation’s defenses. And of course, committing troops to defend a nation against invasion will certainly garner a better image for the protector state. Gilpin (2002) underscores the extent to which the global economic primacy enjoyed by America in the post-war period has been founded on the Pax Americana, which American military primacy has sustained. Furthermore, the possession of hard power itself can make a nation a role model in a variety of way. For example, Realists such as Waltz (1979) underscores the image generated by large military arsenals and successful military strategies. As a symbol of national success, this extensive hard power generates significant soft power by enhancing respect and admiration.23 But these hard power resources cannot be used in ways that undermine that respect and admiration. In other words, they cannot be used in ways that deviate from the politically liberal principles under girding soft power (see Table 1). So even the employment of force can generate soft power if it is used in the service of goals widely perceived as consistent with such principles: e.g., for protecting nations against aggression, peacekeeping, or liberation against tyranny.

### AT: Econ Harms

#### 1. There is no overstretch of economic resources – military spending bolsters prosperity and there is no tradeoff.

Brooks et al, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, 2013

Stephen Brooks et al, 2013 [Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John IKENBERRY, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William WOHLFORTH, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2013, “Lean Forward” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes -- infrastructure, education, scientific research, and so on -- that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them -- a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a dramatic outlier and spent around a quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense -- a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels -- just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance.

#### 2. Despite the incentive to keep the US on war footing, the military budget helps support millions of people

**Jonathan Turley 2014.** ( Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University. January 11, 2014. “Big money behind war: the military-industrial complex,” Aljazeera. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/big-money-behind-war-military-industrial-complex-20141473026736533.html> DOA: January 5, 2017.) EL

While few politicians are willing to admit it, we don't just endure wars we seem to need war - at least for some people. A study showed that roughly 75 percent of the fallen in these wars come from working class families. They do not need war. They pay the cost of the war. Eisenhower would likely be appalled by the size of the industrial and governmental workforce committed to war or counter-terrorism activities. **Military and homeland budgets now support millions of people in an otherwise declining economy.** Hundreds of billions of dollars flow each year from the public coffers to agencies and contractors who have an incentive to keep the country on a war-footing - and footing the bill for war.

#### 3. Defense spending is great for the economy

**O'Hanlon 2015** (Michael O'Hanlon, from the Brookings Institute; 8/19/2015; Dollars at work: What defense spending means for the U.S. economy; Brookings Institute; doa: 1/9/16; <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/08/19/dollars-at-work-what-defense-spending-means-for-the-u-s-economy/>) AM

In Virginia—the most defense-dependent state in the country economically—defense spending reaches some 13 percent of state output. In Hawaii, the figure is nearly 11 percent. In Washington, D.C. and Maryland, as well as a few other states like Connecticut and Alabama, it’s more like 6 percent. **Defense procurement represents around 5 percent of national manufacturing output** (not even counting arms sales abroad). Defense-related research and development, depending on how one tallies it, represents perhaps 10 to 20 percent of national research and development from all sources combined. So clearly, **defense is still important to the economy, even if much less so than in earlier periods—like the Reagan era when it was nearly 6 percent of GDP, or the 1950s and 1960s when it averaged 8 to 10 percent of GDP.** That’s the first point. Let defense needs (not just budgets) drive policy The second point is one that Ben underscored. Defense policy and spending need not be overly influenced by deficit considerations at this juncture. **National debt is fairly high now, but deficits have leveled off and are expected to remain at tolerable levels for a decade.** So defense budgets do not need to be squeezed unduly. This is not a call for fiscal complacency, but it does suggest that in determining near-to-medium term defense needs**, the country can and should spend what it must to stay secure**. Economics cannot determine what that appropriate level of national security spending should be. But it should not be invoked to place excessive constraints on military budgets, either. To me, this is a very important point as we start to debate what the next American president should undertake by way of defense strategy and budgeting. In looking back to the great recession period when he was chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, moreover, Bernanke observed that if anything, the defense budget reductions that began in this period worked at some cross-purposes with other efforts to stimulate the economy (though he also noted that in the Vietnam period, defense spending hurt the economy). Positive spillover Both Bernanke and Muro developed a final point. In effect, they recognized the many ways in which **defense research and development can help the broader economy by promoting innovation and new technology. This was clearly true in the past and remains true,** albeit at lower relative levels of overall resourcing, today. This is not to say that the defense sector by itself should be relied upon to create a national research, innovation, or manufacturing strategy. But in effect, it has somewhat stealthily (in Muro’s words) provided one, or at least an approximation to one, in the past. In so doing, this has on balance helped the nation. Going forward, we may need to consider complementary efforts on the civilian side of things, rather than relying exclusively on the military sector and on laissez-faire decisionmaking within the private sector. We also need to bear in mind that basic research is generally of greater benefit to the broader economy than applied, mission-specific research and development and testing programs. But **defense has nonetheless played an important economic role in the innovation sector as well, and will continue to do so in the future.**

### AT: Causes Interventionism

#### 1. No risk of interventions – zero correlative evidence points to hegemony causing increased interventions.

Stephen Brooks et al, 2013 [Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John IKENBERRY, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William WOHLFORTH, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2013, “Lean Forward” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

If the U.S. military scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides, the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy; many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war. Likewise, continuing the current grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary operations -- what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.

### AT: Creates Conflict

#### 1. On the contrary, heg overall *prevents* conflict

Bradley Thayer, 2013 [Bradley Thayer, University of Utah international relations professor. 2013. International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, within The Forum: The Decline of War, “Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis” Wiley, p.409-10, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic¶ context—the Leviathan is good for safety and the decline of violence—he¶ neglects the role of power in the international context, specifically he neglects¶ US power as a force for stability. So, if a liberal Leviathan is good for domestic¶ politics, a liberal Leviathan should be as well for international politics. The primacy of the United States provides the world with that liberal Leviathan and has four major positive consequences for international politics (Thayer 2006). In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American¶ primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for¶ the world. The first has been **a more peaceful world**. During the Cold War, US leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists,¶ most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy and the security blanket it provides reduce nuclear proliferation incentives and help keep a number of complicated relationships stable such as between Greece and Turkey,¶ Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia.¶ Wars still occur where Washington’s interests are not seriously threatened,¶ such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war’s likelihood—particularly the worst form—great power wars. Second, **American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and many of the other positive forces** Pinker identifies**.** Doing so is a source¶ of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced.¶ This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Rather, it is¶ because they are more transparent, more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with US leadership. Third, along with the growth of the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an **economically liberal worldwide network** characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, mobility of capital, and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good. Fourth, and finally, the United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to also promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth’s leading source of positive externalities for the world. The US military has participated in over 50 operations since the¶ end of the Cold War—and most of those missions have been humanitarian in¶ nature. Indeed, the US military is the earth’s “911 force”—it serves, de facto, as¶ the world’s police, the global paramedic, and the planet’s fire department. There is no other state, group of states, or international organizations that can provide these global benefits. Without US power, the liberal order created by¶ the United States will end just as assuredly**.** But, the waning of US power, at least in relative terms, introduces additional problems for Pinker concerning the decline of violence in the international realm. Given the importance of the distribution¶ of power in international politics, and specifically US power for stability,¶ there is reason to be concerned about the future as the distribution of relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States.

#### 2. Heg underlies every reason for peace – history proves.

John Owen, 2011 [John Owen, University of Virginia politics professor, 2-11-11, “Don’t Discount Hegemony,” http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony, accessed 12-14-16]

These are all plausible mechanisms for peace**.** What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing**.** Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.¶ We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.¶ A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.¶ There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a **deep cause** of the **steady decline of political deaths** in the world.¶ How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.¶ The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.¶ Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.¶ The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.¶ The trouble with hegemonic stability theory is that it is difficult to test. The difficulty lies in the unobservable qualities of hegemony: it is about not simply material power—guns and money—but “soft power,” persuasion, ideas, things difficult to quantify and measure. Still, many scholars of international relations continue to think that there is much to the theory. The implications are large. If American hegemony does indeed underpin, at least indirectly, the virtuous macro-trends outlined in Professor Mack’s essay—the overall downward trend in wars and political deaths—then the decline in American hegemony many analysts are now seeing is about much more than the humbling of a superpower.

### AT: Overstretch

#### 1. Duh that’s why you increase spending

#### 2. A decline in hegemony triggers overstretch – history proves.

Stuart Brown, 2013 [Stuart Brown, Syracuse University public administration and international affairs professor. 2013. “The Future of US Global Power: Delusions of Decline” https://books.google.com/books?id=RgVBK3B1oOQC&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=us+hegemony+and+overstretch+and+overcommitment&source=bl&ots=-ieJQm4KyF&sig=AVzIF07mM02JkKWh75mpjACNj10&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjG8uPm\_PjQAhUnrVQKHTfvDmMQ6AEIJDAB#v=onepage&q=us%20hegemony%20and%20overstretch%20and%20overcommitment&f=false, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

Generally, **great powers** **do not decline because the find themselves over-committed. They** **decline when they fail to generate adequate investment to support great power responsibilities.** Predominant powers decline because the internal basis for financing their commitments is eroded. Such erosion usually triggers a societal inclination to draw inward, focusing on internal problems and reducing engagement with the outside world. Overstretch does not mainly explain the fall of the British, Spanish, or Roman empires; deterioration in resource generation capacity and socio-political cohesion marked the primary basis for their collapse. In sum, decline reflects dissipation in underlying capability. Kennedy and his followers thus have it exactly reversed; **decline generally engenders overstretch, not the other way around.**

### AT: Debt/Econ

#### 1. Overstretch doesn’t undermine growth.

Stuart Brown, 2013 [Stuart Brown, Syracuse University public administration and international affairs professor. 2013. “The Future of US Global Power: Delusions of Decline” https://books.google.com/books?id=RgVBK3B1oOQC&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=us+hegemony+and+overstretch+and+overcommitment&source=bl&ots=-ieJQm4KyF&sig=AVzIF07mM02JkKWh75mpjACNj10&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjG8uPm\_PjQAhUnrVQKHTfvDmMQ6AEIJDAB#v=onepage&q=us%20hegemony%20and%20overstretch%20and%20overcommitment&f=false, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

In its classical formulation, “imperial overstretch” refers to unrestrained and exorbitant foreign military campaigns. The latter can be said to redound to the detriment of great powers by crowding out more productive capital investments. Yet in contrast to widespread impression, the US fiscal challenge does not primarily reflect out-of-control defense spending and the burden of foreign entanglements. If this were the case, then the feasibility of financing an ever-expanding global power projection would be brought into question. This neither minimizes the sizable resources the US commits to military-related spending nor denies that cutbacks in such spending can help facilitate overall fiscal adjustment. Rather, the point is that an endemic failure to rein in explosive economy-wide health care costs with the latter’s implications for public sector health insurance programs – the real fiscal challenge – will do more to endanger macroeconomic stability and eventually erode the material foundation of US power (see Chapter 8).

#### 2. Military spending is driving the debt and US debt is not a threat – pro impacts outweigh.

Justin Johnson 2016, 2016 [Justin Johnson, Heritage Foundation Center for National Defense and Davis institute for National Security and Foreign Policy senior policy analyst. January 25th 2016. “Americans deserve an honest debate about the costs of national security.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002?page=show, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

“The national debt is the biggest security threat.” The debt is a serious problem, indeed. But it is not a national security threat, nor does it mean that we must cut defense spending even more. The national debt is a different kind of threat. The national debt is a significant drag on the economy and will make life much worse for future generations. But it will not launch nuclear missiles or suicide attacks. ISIS, Russia, China, Iran and North Korea do, however, pose real and potentially deadly threats—and those threats won’t become more manageable by directing spending away from national security. Nor can we fix the debt problem simply by reducing our security spending. From 2009 through 2013, annual federal deficits exceeded the entire national security budget. The Office of Management and Budget predicts that Defense Department spending will decline from 15 percent of total federal spending to just 11.7 percent by 2020. That’s because spending on Social Security, health care and interest payments are soaring. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that, left unchecked, spending on just those three programs will exceed federal revenues within 20 years. The only way to address the debt problem effectively is to reform our runaway entitlement programs.

### AT: PMCs Bad

#### 1. Nonunique – PMCs are not exclusively funded by the military

Tim Shorrock, 2015 [Tim Shorrock, reporter for *The Nation.* 3-31-15, “Blackwater: One of the Pentagon’s Top Contractors for Afghanistan Training” https://www.thenation.com/article/blackwater-still-top-pentagon-contractor-afghanistan-training/, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

Despite a sordid and deadly reputation in Iraq, the mercenary army that began as Blackwater and is now known as Academi was a top recipient of Pentagon contracts for training Afghanistan’s security forces from 2002 to 2014, a government watchdog reported Tuesday. The latest report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) also includes the surprising disclosure that IBM—a company not generally known as a defense contractor—was the largest beneficiary of a Pentagon program to stabilize Afghanistan by facilitating private investment in its vast mineral wealth. Both findings were included in a SIGAR report that attempts to account for $66 billion appropriated by Congress to the Department of Defense for Afghanistan reconstruction. Altogether, the government spent $104 billion between 2002 and 2014 for the program. The Pentagon issued the bulk of the contracts, and the rest came from the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. Of the $66 billion spent by the Pentagon, however, SIGAR said DoD could only report on $21 billion, or less than one-third of its total. It accounted for the huge “discrepancy” to differences in executing contracts between “DoD and Federal accounting systems.” The Pentagon was also “unable to provide” contract data from the pre-2010 time, SIGAR said.

#### 2. PMCs are indispensible to US hard power.

Jeremy Wilson, 2014 [Jeremy Wilson, reporter for *The Week*. February 7th 2014. “America's private sector army” http://theweek.com/articles/451720/americas-private-sector-army, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

Lessons have been learned by both the government and private companies from their flirtation over the last couple of decades and the legacy will have repercussions on future conflicts. The government has found a way to patch up their military personnel shortcomings with off-the-shelf and adaptable solutions. Employing private contractors also has the added benefit of deflecting some negative press: The deaths of PMC members don't make it onto the death toll statistics that get wheeled out by the press every time a soldier dies. The private sector has learned the hard way that despite being given a license to run around another country with a gun, they still have to exist in the glare of public relations. Academi's website now has pictures of children holding hands and is stuffed with buzzwords like "integrity," "excellence," and "dignity." Most of all they've learned that money is to be made by sticking their fingers in the military pie. By buying up experienced Army personnel, Blackwater have made themselves indispensable as a training institution for America's elite troops. And next time the U.S. goes gung-ho into another country? The contractors will be ready. Academi have developed and manufactured their own infantry mobility vehicle called The Grizzly APC. They were too late to the military hardware party this time around but they have all the pieces in place to take an even greater role in the U.S.' next major conflict. With military budgets being slashed all over the Western world, chances are if another major conflict happens, private contractors will be critical to the war effort.

#### 3. The worst abusers of human rights are no longer contracted by the US.

Max Boot, 2009 [Max Boot, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow. May/June 2009, “The Mercenary Debate: Three Views” *American Interest,* http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/faculty\_pubs/avant\_2007\_mercenary\_debate\_three\_views.pdf, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

While the use of mercenaries has been in a centuries-long decline, it has experienced a resurgence since the end of the Cold War—a time when armed forces have declined in size even as many areas of the globe have become more unstable. Most private military companies today offer logistical, training and other non-combat services, but some do provide armed security personnel as well. An even smaller number engage in offensive military operations. The most famous of these were the closely linked South African firms Executive Otit comes and Sandline. They are now out of business, but in their heyday in the 1990s they helped the governments of Papua New Guinea, Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone, among others, to put down savage insurgencies at a time when the rest of the world stood idly by. In 1995-96, for instance, Executive Outcomes made short work of a rebel movement in Sierra Leone known as the Revolutionary United Front, which was notorious for chopping off the limbs of its victims. As a result. Sierra Leone was able to hold its first free election in decades. Another private firm, MPRl, helped to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia in 1995 by organizing the Croatian offensive that stopped Serbian aggression. Today MPRI provides trainers who operate side by side with local poppy-eradication forces in Afghanistan—^a mission that NATO refuses to take on.’

#### 4. No link –

Military.com, the largest veteran membership organization in 2014 (Military.com, the largest veteran membership organization. May 14, 2014. “80% of Military Recruitments Turned Down,” Military.com <http://www.military.com/join-armed-forces/2014/05/14/80-of-military-recruitments-turned-down.html> DOA: 21/1/17) CDY

According to an article by [NBC](http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Army-Raises-Bar-on-Recruitment-Standards--211154521.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), another cause of **the rise in rejections is that joining the military is simply becoming more competitive**. Sgt. 1st Class Richard Teunis, a recruiter for the Army, claims that "instead of being able to talk to 90-percent of the population, you could only talk to 50 percent or maybe less than that." **The caliber of each applicant has increased, and a GED is no longer enough to enter the military. If individuals do not have a high school diploma, they are encouraged to obtain about a semester's-worth of college credits before reapplying. However, the overall most common cause for rejection is simple: obesity.** According to a 2009 report from [Mission: Readiness](http://cdn.missionreadiness.org/MR-Ready-Willing-Unable.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), "27 percent of young Americans are too overweight to join the military." Not all of them have attempted to join of course, **but the pool from which the military may draw upon for recruits is nearly 30% smaller due to obesity**. Air Force Brigadier General Jeff Lawson commented on the issue: "I know people who spent an extra six weeks in basic training while we ran them through a fat farm to lose the weight. Those don't exist anymore. You're either qualified to come in or you're not. We do not rehabilitate people anymore."

### AT: Stranglehold!!!

#### 1. This is not how it works. Congresspeople do not get to decide where military spending goes. That is done by the Pentagon. The way their argument works is functionally incorrect because defense contractors are not electing the members of the Pentagon that would do xxxxx

#### 2. Earmarks are not allowed – no stranglehold on Congress works on defense spending

**Jason Hopkins 2016** (Jason Hopkins, editorial coordinator for *Townhall*. November 17th 2016. “Speaker Ryan Halts Congressional Earmarks. Cited Trump as Reason,” *Townhall*, <http://townhall.com/tipsheet/jasonhopkins/2016/11/17/speaker-ryan-halts-congressional-earmarks-n2247165>. Accessed January 4th 2016) ESG

**Speaker Paul Ryan put a stop to a closed-door vote between House Republicans on bringing back legislative earmarks.** Ryan, citing Trump’s recent election victory, told his colleagues that now is not the time to bring back congressional earmarks. **A decision on the matter has been tabled until 2017. Legislative earmarks**, the practice of sending federal money to home districts for whatever projects, **was done away with when Republicans took control of the House in 2010.** Earmarks by that time had been given a bad name after numerous pork-barrel spending projects were publicized. Remember Alaska’s "bridge to nowhere?"

#### 3. Congress hasn’t declared war since WWII????

### AT: Army Corps of Engineers

#### 1. Funding already guaranteed/level

#### 2. The Army Corps of Engineers is obscenely wasteful

**Ryan Alexander, 2013** (Ryan Alexander, president of Taxpayers for Common Sense. October 24th 2013. “A Corps Skilled in Running Up the Debt,” *US News and World Report*, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/10/24/funding-the-army-corps-of-engineers-shows-congress-is-still-not-serious-about-spending>. Accessed 12/17/2016) ESG

Fresh off the 16 day government shutdown, the House of Representatives is back at work avoiding making the difficult choices that would help put the country on a better fiscal path. Yesterday, the House debated the inaccurately dubbed Water Resources Reform and Development Act, H.R. 3080, a huge bill that authorizes spending on billions of dollars of water projects, studies and policies for the Army Corps of Engineers. **The Army Corps of Engineers is an agency in desperate need of reform, priorities and fiscal discipline. It has a long history of cost overruns and mismanagement.** And in the past, among other systemic fiscal challenges, its budget was allocated primarily thorough the earmark system, which left project decisions particularly vulnerable to political pressure rather than merit and prioritization. Reforming the Army Corps of Engineers would have been a perfect opportunity for the House of Representatives to prove its seriousness about saving money, rooting out waste and holding government bureaucracies accountable. Unfortunately, the bill the House produced does little of those things. What's wrong with thebill? It's a long list, but let's look at a few top problems. First, the bill does little to correct a decades long problem of the Corps' project construction backlog. **The Corps has a long tradition of maintaining an enormous backlog of projects that are authorized or identified as in need of construction. Currently, the backlog is estimated to include between $60 - $80 billion in projects.** To put that in perspective, the Corps only gets about $2 billion in construction funding annually. **Spreading money around for all these projects ends up delaying project completion, increasing construction costs and delaying delivery of project benefits.** The bill directs the Corps to identify $12 billion worth of projects for deauthorization, but considering it spends upwards of $8 billion there's only a few billion dollars of net backlog reduction. Second, while H.R. 3080 does replace the earmark system for identifying projects to be authorized, it includes no prioritization system or performance measures to identify which projects should go forward and in what order. The system just enables local authorities, instead of lawmakers, to submit projects to be authorized rather than setting up criteria to ensure good decision making. Part of the inexorable growth of the backlog came from the perception that authorizations come cheap – they don't spend the money, they're just a license to hunt. Instead of demanding a higher return on investment of authorization or other performance measures, the bill keeps the low bar that any project which returns a penny on the dollar invested is green lighted. This will likely add to the backlog.

#### 3. Army Corps is wasteful, only works to solidify the interests of the wealthy, and already gets billions of no strings attached money

**Ryan Alexander 2013** (Ryan Alexander, president of Taxpayers for Common Sense; 3/27/13; The Army Corps of Engineers Excels at Wasting Money; US News; DOA: 12/17/16; <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/03/27/the-army-corps-of-engineers-excels-at-wasting-money>) AM

As budget watchdogs, we know that **some federal agencies are more wasteful than others** in almost every sense. **For nearly two centuries, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been one of those agencies that seems to excel at wasting taxpayer money**. (Someone on my staff has an 1836 House Ways and Means Committee report that documents 25 Corps projects that were over budget and demands, "actual reform, in the further prosecution of public works." Here at Taxpayers for Common Sense we are nerds—and proud of it.) The Corps, housed within the Department of Defense, is responsible for construction and maintenance of civil works projects across the country. **Among other things, the Civil Works division of the Corps is responsible for** flood and storm damage reduction (think: levees along rivers, seawalls along the Atlantic coast), navigation projects (port dredging and lock and dam systems on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers) and **environmental restoration (re-plumbing the Everglades—what a great gig, the Corps projects were largely responsible for degrading it, now they get paid to restore it**). These are important areas of responsibility and ones that even in this highly polarized time, many Republicans and Democrats agree require some role for the federal government. So it is particularly troubling that the Corps has such a great track record for wasting money. **There are lots of examples of Army Corps waste. First, let's talk about so-called coastal storm damage reduction projects, namely the pumping of sand along the nation's shorelines. The euphemistically named "beach nourishment" projects are a band-aid approach to providing communities protection from hurricanes and storm surge as well as naturally occurring erosion. By design, "beach nourishment" must be done over and over—the work on many of these projects extends as long as 50 years—since the sands will keep eroding over time** [**no matter how many times**](http://www.taxpayer.net/library/weekly-wastebasket/article/beach-budget-bingo) **we "replenish" the beaches. And who benefits from these programs? Mostly wealthy property owners with beachfront property**. Despite picking up two-thirds of the tab, the federal interest in beach nourishment projects is low and most of the costs should be left to local and state governments and private property owners. **And then there are all those levees and other flood control projects the Corps constructs. Too often the projects that get priority from the Corps just happen to have the right political champions rather than logic, or economics, on their side. Take for example the New Madrid Levee project in southeast Missouri. This is a $150 million levee and pumping project, paid for almost exclusively by the federal government, designed to protect a handful of large farming operations from seasonal flooding. The problem: this farmland is in a floodway—a naturally occurring old channel of the Mississippi River, which the Corps intentionally floods to protect the thousands of residents of Cairo, Illinois and other upstream communities from flooding. We just flooded this land with millions of gallons of water** [**in 2011**](http://www.taxpayer.net/library/weekly-wastebasket/article/engineering-boondoggles)**.** But for all of the many failings of the Army Corps of Engineers, Congress has not helped the matter. Before the earmark moratorium was put in place in 2010, most of the Army Corps of Engineers budget was set by earmarks, encouraging the agency to pursue projects that could catch the eye of powerful legislators but weren't necessarily in the national interest. **More recently, the Corps has been given significant increases in funding with almost no strings attached, including nearly** [**$3.5 billion in the emergency spending**](http://www.taxpayer.net/library/article/brief-analysis-of-selected-provisions-in-proposed-senate-supplemental-appro) **bill passed** after Super Storm Sandy. **In fact, the** [**Congressional Research Service**](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42841.pdf) **found that a third of the total Corps funding over the last 10 years (roughly $75 billion) has come in the form of emergency appropriations.** The solution to the problem of waste at the Corps is up to Congress—by including a clear mandate for prioritization in the authorizing legislation and then by providing consistent oversight—Congress could take important steps towards reforming this important agency. Unfortunately, the [Water Resources and Development bill](http://www.taxpayer.net/library/article/analysis-of-selected-sections-of-s.-601-water-resources-development-act-of) recently approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee goes in the opposite direction. The president can also insist on performance, transparency, and accountability. Over the years, we've learned that there is really no short cut to rooting out waste and holding the government to a high standard. We need Congress and the president to do the hard work of making important agencies work for all Americans.

### AT: Arms Races

#### 1. The Rider card is atrocious

#### 2. Heg solves proliferation – liberalism and security umbrella

**Daniel Deudney et. al2011** (Daniel Deudney, associate professor of Political Science at John’s Hopkins University. Edited by Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government and Dean of Faculty at Dartmouth College, and G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William Wolforth, the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, where he teaches in the Department of Government, “Unipolarity and nuclear weapons” *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* pg. 305)

The diffusion of nuclear weapons in the international system is significantly entangled with the role of the unipolar hegemonic state. **The existence of a unipolar state playing the role of a liberal hegemon has** arguably **been a major constraint on the rate and extent of proliferation. The extended military alliance system of the United States has been a major reason why many potentially nuclear states have forgone acquisition. Starting with Germany and Japan, and extending to a long list of European and East Asian states, the American alliances are widely understood to provide a “nuclear umbrella.”** Overall, without such a state playing this role, proliferation would likely have been much more extensive. **The liberal features of the American hegemonic sate also have contributed to constrain the rate and extent of proliferation. American leadership, and the general liberal internationalist vision of law-governed cooperative international politics, both enabled and infuses the non-proliferation regime.** Similarly, the robust and inclusive liberal world trading system that has been a distinctive and salient feature of the American liberal hegemonic system offers integrating states paths to secure themselves that make nuclear acquisition less attractive.

#### 3. US global hegemony is an underlying force for global peace and international stability.

Thayer, University of Utah international relations professor, 2013

[Bradley, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, within The Forum: The Decline of War, “Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis” Wiley, p.409-10, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic¶ context—the Leviathan is good for safety and the decline of violence—he¶ neglects the role of power in the international context, specifically he neglects¶ US power as a force for stability. So, if a liberal Leviathan is good for domestic¶ politics, a liberal Leviathan should be as well for international politics. The primacy¶ of the United States provides the world with that liberal Leviathan and has¶ four major positive consequences for international politics (Thayer 2006).

In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American¶ primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for¶ the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, US¶ leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists,¶ most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy and the security¶ blanket it provides reduce nuclear proliferation incentives and help keep a¶ number of complicated relationships stable such as between Greece and Turkey,¶ Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia.¶ Wars still occur where Washington’s interests are not seriously threatened,¶ such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war’s likelihood—particularly¶ the worst form—great power wars.

Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy¶ and many of the other positive forces Pinker identifies. Doing so is a source¶ of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because¶ liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic¶ to the American worldview. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced.¶ This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Rather, it is¶ because they are more transparent, more likely to want to resolve things amicably¶ in concurrence with US leadership.

Third, along with the growth of the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United¶ States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized¶ by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights,¶ mobility of capital, and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that¶ stems from this economic order is a global public good.

Fourth, and finally, the United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to also promote the welfare of people all over¶ the globe. The United States is the earth’s leading source of positive externalities¶ for the world. The US military has participated in over 50 operations since the¶ end of the Cold War—and most of those missions have been humanitarian in¶ nature. Indeed, the US military is the earth’s “911 force”—it serves, de facto, as¶ the world’s police, the global paramedic, and the planet’s fire department.

There is no other state, group of states, or international organizations that can provide these global benefits. Without US power, the liberal order created by¶ the United States will end just as assuredly. But, the waning of US power, at least¶ in relative terms, introduces additional problems for Pinker concerning the¶ decline of violence in the international realm. Given the importance of the distribution¶ of power in international politics, and specifically US power for stability,¶ there is reason to be concerned about the future as the distribution of¶ relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States.

#### 4. Heg prevents global conflict escalation and is the underlying reason for global peace.

Brooks et al, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, 2013

[Stephen, John IKENBERRY, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William WOHLFORTH, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2013, “Lean Forward” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2012-11-30/lean-forward, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

KEEPING THE PEACE¶ Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.¶Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier.¶But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas.¶ There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow.¶ Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.¶The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing.¶ On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing.¶ MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE¶ Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.¶A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship."¶ More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States.¶ The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.¶ CREATING COOPERATION¶ What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability.¶ U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others.¶ The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region.¶ The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."¶ THE DEVIL WE KNOW¶ Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits.¶ This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world.¶ A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

### AT: Hurts Diplomacy/Soft Power

#### 1. A strong military is key to diplomacy

**William Inboden, 2016** (William Inboden, PhD, Executive Director and Chair of the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin. 2016. “The Role of a Strong National Defense,” *2016 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH*, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/ims-2016/PDF/2016_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_ESSAYS_INBODEN.pdf>. Accessed Jan 6 2017. Page 15-16) ESG

**A strong national defense is thus indispensable for a peaceful, successful, and free America—even if a shot is never fired. The diplomatic successes in building and maintaining a stable and peaceful international order achieved by the United States over the past century have been enabled by America’s military dominance. Conversely, the calamitous defense budget cuts** and corresponding rise of potential peer competitors **in the present day are already undermining America’s diplomatic and economic influence.** **A well-appointed military improves diplomacy with adversaries, strengthens our alliances, signals credibility and resolve, deters aggression, and enhances national morale.** Yet this is not to disregard the manifest other dividends that a strong military can pay. There are multiple pathways by which investments in military hard power produce economic benefits. For example, the military’s role in protecting a stable international environment also creates predictable and secure conditions in which economic growth can flourish. The American security umbrella facilitated Western Europe’s postwar reconstruction and economic revival, and Asia’s half-century economic boom has been partly a function of America’s treaty alliances in the region maintaining peace and stability, exemplified by the United States Navy’s Seventh Fleet protecting an open maritime order, freedom of navigation, and secure sea lanes. Additionally, while America’s world-leading economy has largely been generated by free enterprise and private sector–led growth, innovations in defense technology can sometimes have economically beneficial civilian applications. There are numerous examples from the past 75 years of technological innovations that originated as defense projects but were eventually adapted for private-sector commercial use, including nuclear energy, jet propulsion, the Internet, global positioning systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

#### 2. Diplomacy alone fails – military power is necessary to make it effective.

Doug Feith, 2013 [Doug Feith, Hudson Institute senior fellow, former Georgetown University national security professor, former US under secretary of defense for policy, published on Foreign Policy in a piece by Dana Stuster, 3-19-13, “The Iraq Syndrome” http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/19/the-iraq-syndrome/, accessed 12-14-16, TAP]

About lessons learned: One of the most interesting things that I have seen that has come out of Iraq over the last decade has been the Iraqi Perspectives Project. And it was, I believe, a project launched by the Joint Forces Command, where they sent a bunch of historians to study the transcripts of the interrogations of Saddam and all his top military and civilian officials. And one of the really fascinating things in there was the reports on what Saddam said. And essentially what he said is, all of the American-led international diplomacy to try to get him to change his policies, or ultimately to leave Iraq, did not work with him, because he believed two things. He believed, first of all, the United States was a paper tiger. And he cited specific cases: Vietnam, Somalia, I think maybe Beirut, as examples of where the United States will not take casualties. And he said, it’s clear the Americans would have to take casualties to take Baghdad; therefore, they’re not coming to Baghdad. I just don’t believe the threats. The second thing he said is, he believed the French and the Russians would block any U.N. resolution, and that that would also help ensure that he wouldn’t have to face the execution of the threats that were being made. This is a textbook example of how military power relates to diplomacy. He did not believe our military threats, and therefore our diplomacy didn’t work with him. One of the consequences of the Iraq war, without a doubt, because it didn’t go well, is there’s a really profound swing of the pendulum toward reluctance to use military power, at the same time that there’s a great hope that diplomacy is going to be able to solve some of the major problems we have with North Korea, with Iran, elsewhere. And it’s important to understand that the likelihood of success of any kind of diplomacy with these difficult regimes hinges in large part on the credibility of our military threats, and when that’s undermined, our diplomacy is undermined.

#### 3. Hard and soft power can compliment each other

Giulio Gallarotti 2011 (Giulio M. Gallarotti, Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University, January 20th 2011, Wesleyan University WesScholar, “Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used,” <http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=div2facpubs> DoA 12/15/16) CJV

While the difference between soft and hard power revolves around the difference between extracting compliance with (usually) tangible resources as opposed to cultivating voluntary compliance through a positive image that endears soft-power nations in the world community, the relationship between hard and soft power is hardly simple. Indeed, their relationship is complex and interactive. The two are neither perfect substitutes nor are they rigid complements. Often, they can actually reinforce one another. In fact, it will often be the case that each set of power resources require at least some of the other for maximum effectiveness (i.e., Cosmopolitan power, discussed below). Hence soft power resources can enhance hard power, and vice versa. Certainly, a strong positive image can garner many more allies, which in turn can bolster a nation’s defenses. And of course, committing troops to defend a nation against invasion will certainly garner a better image for the protector state. Gilpin (2002) underscores the extent to which the global economic primacy enjoyed by America in the post-war period has been founded on the Pax Americana, which American military primacy has sustained. Furthermore, the possession of hard power itself can make a nation a role model in a variety of way. For example, Realists such as Waltz (1979) underscores the image generated by large military arsenals and successful military strategies. As a symbol of national success, this extensive hard power generates significant soft power by enhancing respect and admiration.23 But these hard power resources cannot be used in ways that undermine that respect and admiration. In other words, they cannot be used in ways that deviate from the politically liberal principles under girding soft power (see Table 1). So even the employment of force can generate soft power if it is used in the service of goals widely perceived as consistent with such principles: e.g., for protecting nations against aggression, peacekeeping, or liberation against tyranny.

#### 4. This has been effective in the past

Zachary Keck, 2013 [Zachary Keck, Harvard University Belfer Center researcher. 7-24-13, “The Hard Side of Soft Power” http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/the-hard-side-of-soft-power/, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

In fact, the United States has often used its military power for soft power ends. In rare instances, this is done in sweeping ways such as when the U.S. used its military superiority after WWII to transform Japan and Germany into democratic states. Originally this was done through pure coercion, but eventually the Japanese and German populations came to accept democratic values (and U.S. leadership) as legitimate. More frequently, the U.S. military is used more subtly for soft power ends. For instance, after the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, U.S. naval assets allowed the U.S. to be one of the first organizations on the scene helping in the rescue effort. The same was true after the 3/11 disasters in Japan. This undoubtedly made the U.S. in general, and the U.S. military’s presence in the region in particular, more attractive in the eyes of local populations who benefitted significantly from them being there. Similarly, when the U.S. military is used to fight piracy or uphold freedom of navigation in international waters, it is using both soft and hard power. It is using hard power towards the pirates and whichever party is threatening free navigation, by coercing or forcing them to seize their actions, but it is using soft power towards other populations who view the U.S. military’s presence in their neighborhood as legitimate thanks to these actions, and are attracted to the U.S. for its commitment to uphold freedom of navigation (assuming they are in favor of this.)

#### 5. Hard power necessary for soft power/diplomacy

Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2016 (“Limits of American Power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 132 Number 2) KSB

Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction.31 A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness. And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states—witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril.

### AT: Drones Bad

#### 1. Drones can reduce civilian casualties

**Michael Lewis 2013** (Michael W. Lewis Professor of Law at the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law and contributor to the Atlantic. August 21, 2013. “Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever,” The Atlantic. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/drones-actually-the-most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/> DOA: January 6, 2017.) EL

Like any other weapons system, **drones** have caused civilian casualties. But they also **have the potential to dramatically reduce civilian casualties in armed conflicts, and** particularly in **counterinsurgencies**. Their ability to follow targets for days or weeks accomplishes two things that contribute to saving the lives of innocents: **First, it confirms that the target is engaged in the behavior that put them on the target list, reducing the likelihood of striking someone based on faulty intelligence. Second, by establishing a "pattern of life" for the intended target**, **it allows operators to predict when the target will be sufficiently isolated to allow a strike that is unlikely to harm civilians.**

#### 2. Drone strikes kill significantly fewer people than conventional warfare

**William Saletan, 2015** (William Saletan, intelligence writer for *Slate Magazine.* April 24th 2015. “Don’t Blame Drones,” *Slate Magazine*, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/04/u_s_drone_strikes_civilian_casualties_would_be_much_higher_without_them.html>. Accessed Nov 19 2016) ESG

The outrage is understandable. But these two deaths, tragic as they are, don’t change the fundamental truth: **For civilians, drones are the safest form of war in modern history.** As I’ve documented before, **they’re more discriminating and more accurate. If you want to minimize civilian casualties, getting rid of drones—and steering warfare back to bombing and shelling—is the worst thing you could do.** Look at the record in Pakistan. The harshest tally of drone strikes, maintained by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, says drones have killed 2,449 to 3,949 people there, including 423 to 962 civilians. If you work with the low-end figures, that’s a civilian casualty rate of 17 percent. If you use the high-end figures, it’s 24 percent. In Yemen, the bureau counts 436 to 646 deaths by drone, of whom 65 to 96 were civilians. That’s a rate of 15 percent. If you factor in other incidents classified as possible but unconfirmed drone strikes, the rate in Yemen drops to somewhere between 8 percent and 14 percent. **The New America Foundation** keeps a different tally. Its figures **imply a civilian casualty rate of 8 percent to 12 percent in Pakistan and 8 percent to 9 percent in Yemen.** A third count, maintained by the Long War Journal, indicates a 5 percent civilian casualty rate in Pakistan (once Weinstein and Lo Porto are added to the tally) and 16 percent in Yemen. Compare those numbers with any other method of warfare. **Start with an apples-to-apples comparison: the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s analysis of “other covert operations” in Yemen.** According to BIJ’s methodology, this category consists of nondrone attacks by U.S. forces, “including airstrikes, missile attacks and ground operations.” **BIJ counts** 68 to 99 civilian deaths in these operations, among 156 to 365 total casualties. That’s **a civilian casualty rate of 27 percent to 44 percent: three times worse than drone strikes in the same country. Or look at the bureau’s data from Somalia. For drones, the BIJ counts 23 to 105 casualties, of whom zero to five were civilian. For other covert operations, the BIJ counts 40 to 141 casualties, of whom seven to 47 were civilian. If you go with the low-end numbers, drones have a perfect record in Somalia. If you go with the high-end numbers, drones are seven times safer than the alternatives.**

### AT: Loose Nukes/Nuke Terror

#### 1. Nuclear terrorism is not going to happen

**Steve Chapman, 2012** (Steve Chapman, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune. May 17th 2012. “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” *Reason*, <http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism>. DOA 1/7/2016) ESG

**Given their inability to do something simple—say,** shoot up a shopping mall or **set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious.** Far from being plausible, **argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller** in a presentation at the University of Chicago, **"the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory** of decommissioned warheads**. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing.** Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. **Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb.** It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. **It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause.** And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and **there is no way to test it.** Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it **to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.** That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears**, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.**

#### 2. No risk of loose nukes – empirically denied, command and controls check

Martin Matishak, The Hill, 12-18-14 [Martin Matishak, “Could Russia's economic meltdown lead to loose nukes?” [http://thehill.com/policy/defense/227451-could-russias-economic-meltdown-lead-to-loose-nukes](http://thehill.com/policy/defense/227451-could-russias-economic-meltdown-lead-to-loose-nukes%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), accessed 12-20-15, TAP]

While officials say there's no immediate reason to think Russia's weapons could be sold off to the highest bidder or stolen, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) intends to hold hearings next year on what Moscow is doing to keep its nukes safe. “We’re going to be taking on that whole issue in Armed Services Committee and we’ll be figuring out what needs to be done,” McCain, who will chair the panel in the next Congress, told The Hill. “Particularly, the state of the nuclear inventory.” Fellow Armed Services Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.) called the arsenal — estimated in the thousands of warheads — “a source of revenue” for the Russian government, as well as negotiating leverage. He said President Vladimir Putin “is getting pretty aggressive because he has problems at home and maybe if you go back to the old system” of being more confrontational about nuclear weapons, pressure would ease. On Tuesday, the White House announced President Obama would sign a bill imposing additional sanctions on Moscow. The legislation comes as the value of the country’s currency, the ruble, has tanked in recent weeks along with a dramatic fall in the price of oil, Russia’s No. 1 export. Russia’s current economic freefall is somewhat reminiscent of the early 1990s after the fall of Communism, when lawmakers in Washington labored to develop initiatives to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, most notably with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which was designed to lock down and eliminate unconventional arms. However, that joint U.S.-Russia program expired two years ago after Moscow declared it would not extend the agreement. Since then, the Kremlin has grown increasingly uncooperative on nuclear security. Diplomats in Vienna last month said Russian envoys skipped an initial planning meeting for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and that Moscow may boycott the biannual meeting, a cornerstone of the president’s nonproliferation agenda. The International Atomic Energy Agency's trafficking database has documented 2,477 incidents from the beginning of 1993 to the end of 2013 of "unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control." As recently as last week, authorities in Moldova accused seven people of smuggling uranium on a a train from Russia. Collaboration between the Washington and Moscow on nuclear security is “in the process of unraveling as a result of the decisions the Russians have made,” said Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. But **Russia’s nuclear assets are not nearly as vulnerable as during the breakup of the Soviet Union**, he said. Luongo said it would be “politically unthinkable” for Russia to sell atomic weapons, and that the global community would likely view it as the “ultimate crime against humanity.” But, “it doesn’t take much of this stuff to become a problem,” he noted. Russia has around 8,000 warheads, according to a recent estimate by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris from the Federation of American Scientists. For now, lawmakers are keeping a close watch on Moscow and how it reacts to the economic meltdown. “I would think that Russia’s economic challenges could be turned around by Russian leadership if it chartered a different course,” said Sen. Robert Menendez(D-N.J.), outgoing chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “There’s still time for them to do that, but in the interim I think that **there’s enough command and control to guarantee the security of the weapons,”** he added. Retiring Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said he has seen no indication of a return to a black market mentality in Russia. “I haven’t seen any evidence, doesn’t mean there isn’t any evidence,” he told The Hill. Levin said **the Russians “would be very much afraid of any loose nukes, as to whose hands they might fall in, as to whether they might be the first victims of any terrorist attack given the neighborhood that they live in. “I don’t foresee that they would be lax**, or more lax on that issue.” Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), another member of the Armed Services panel, voiced similar concerns. “**They do have an interest in ensuring that nuclear weapons don’t get in the hands of non-state actors because from their perspective they could be the subject of the bad end of that as well,”** she said.

#### 3. Loose nukes are only a marginal threat

**Felipe Umana, 2011** (Felipe Umana, research assistant at the Fund for Peace, writing for *Foreign Policy in Focus*. August 17th 2011. “Loose Nukes: Real Threat?” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, [http://fpif.org/loose\_nukes\_real\_threat/](http://fpif.org/loose_nukes_real_threat/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)) ESG

Most instances of theft have occurred in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the group of independent republics that originally formed part of the Soviet Union. The region’s low economic status after the end of the Cold War severely curtailed any intended improvement and upgrading of many research facilities and nuclear storage sites. Likewise, low salaries led to increased instances of theft by people seeking to sell machine parts and radioactive materials for money. The illicit trade of nuclear materials by the mid-1990s was well established, with plenty of suppliers and potential buyers. In 1996 alone there were more than 230 documented cases of unsuccessful trafficking in and from the CIS region. Some sources report that attempted transactions doubled in the 2000s from figures in the 1990s. **Yet, a nuclear attack by a belligerent actor who obtained materials through the black market is unlikely. The supply and demand for nuclear materials is not very robust**, and the suppliers and buyers constitute a relatively limited black market. Potential nuclear suppliers face the difficulty of finding a buyer. **States and the international community have also developed numerous deterrent methods to stop the trade. And non-state actors generally lack the nuclear know-how to put plans into practice. Loose nukes**are a frightening scenario. But they**remain only a marginal threat.**

### AT: Military Industrial Complex

#### 1. This is not how it works. Congresspeople do not get to decide where military spending goes. That is done by the Pentagon. The way their argument works is functionally incorrect because defense contractors are not electing the members of the Pentagon that would do xxxxx

#### 2. Earmarks are not allowed – no stranglehold on Congress works on defense spending

**Jason Hopkins 2016** (Jason Hopkins, editorial coordinator for *Townhall*. November 17th 2016. “Speaker Ryan Halts Congressional Earmarks. Cited Trump as Reason,” *Townhall*, <http://townhall.com/tipsheet/jasonhopkins/2016/11/17/speaker-ryan-halts-congressional-earmarks-n2247165>. Accessed January 4th 2016) ESG

**Speaker Paul Ryan put a stop to a closed-door vote between House Republicans on bringing back legislative earmarks.** Ryan, citing Trump’s recent election victory, told his colleagues that now is not the time to bring back congressional earmarks. **A decision on the matter has been tabled until 2017. Legislative earmarks**, the practice of sending federal money to home districts for whatever projects, **was done away with when Republicans took control of the House in 2010.** Earmarks by that time had been given a bad name after numerous pork-barrel spending projects were publicized. Remember Alaska’s "bridge to nowhere?"

#### 3. MIC is no more – market share is 33 percent

Sandra Erwin, Sept. 12, 2016 (writer National Defense Magazine, “Collapse in Defense R&D Spending Hits Contractors Hard” <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=2294>, Accessed January 14, 2017) RSS

The current state of play in R&D spending is likely to cause major disruptions in the defense industrial base, the CSIS study indicates. The deep cuts to SDD spending are particularly alarming for the Pentagon’s top five contractors — Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics. The Big 5 are holding their market share overall but are dramatically losing market share in R&D contracts, Hunter says. “There is a massive disinvestment from the traditional defense contracting R&D enterprise that has been there for many decades.” The Big 5 had a 50 percent market share in 2000, which peaked at 60 percent in 2006, and is now down to 33 percent. At the same time, the size of the pie has shrunk dramatically. “They’re getting half the share they used to get of a pie that is half as big,” Hunter says. “This was a surprising finding,” he adds. “We’re not crying big tears for the Big 5 but we think this is notable in terms of what’s happening in the industrial base.” While the large firms lost share, more small and primarily medium size business have grabbed more work. “We see a move away in the R&D space from the Big 5.”For nontraditional companies looking to get into the defense sector, the budget trends are “terrible,” Hunter says, “but the market access looks pretty good.” It is a reasonable conclusion to draw from the data that the dominance of traditional heritage companies is in peril even if fewer new competitors are interested in entering the defense market. The conventional wisdom that big companies with large programs — with supposedly strong political support — are immune from cuts is completely disproven by the contracting numbers, says Hunter. “The theory that everything is tied to campaign contributions, that there is an inelasticity in procurement because of the political influence of big contractors: We didn’t see that in our data.”The system is “less entrenched than it appears,” he says. “The notion that you can’t beat the Big 5, that they have so much political influence that they’re going to knock everyone out of the way is essentially the opposite of what we see.”

#### 4. Congress hasn’t declared war since WWII????

### AT: Terror

#### 1. Leadership key to managing global problems like terrorism.

Edelman, Harvard Belfer Center for International Affairs International Security Program Senior Associate, 2010,

(Eric S., “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Pg. XVIII-XIX) <http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20101021.Understanding_Amer/R.20101021.Understanding_Amer.pdf>, 1-25-17, TAP

An additional, and extremely important, long-term factor underpinning likely continued US global economic leadership is demographics. The US fertility rates are among the highest in the developed world and are virtually at replacement. With a growing population that will be more youthful than other developed countries (or China) the United States would appear to be in a favorable position. One could also add to the long list of US advantages the political and social stability that has made it safe haven for global investors. None of these advantages, however, including the United States’ military power, mean that the United States is destined to remain the preponderant power or that unipolarity will continue to characterize the international system indefinitely. Bad policy decisions in a number of areas could negate or squander US advantages. In addition the United States faces many of its own challenges. Despite its demographic health the United States will have to meet the unfunded pension liabilities represented by the aging of the baby boom generation. The nation’s standing has also suffered from the mismanagement of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without a concerted effort by the United States, the international system could move in the direction of nonpolarity or apolarity with no nation clearly playing a leading role in trying to organize the international system. The result would be a vacuum of leadership unable to manage the plethora of contemporary problems besetting the world like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic and sectarians wars, humanitarian disasters, crime, narcotics trafficking, pandemic disease and global climate change to name just a few.

#### 2. Heg solves terrorism – denies safe havens.

Kagan, Brookings Institution foreign policy senior fellow, 1-24-11

[Robert, Weekly Standard, Vol 16 Number 18, “The Price of Power” <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>, accessed 1-25-17, TAP]

The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed.

### AT: Dollar Heg

#### 1. US dollar will stay on top

**Carl Delfeld 2012** (Carl Delfeld, Forbes Asia columnist and founder of Jetsetter Capital, a specialist on emerging and frontier markets. May 6th 2012. “Will the Dollar Be Replaced As A Reserve Currency?”, Seeking Alpha, May 6th, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/563461-will-the-dollar-be-replaced-as-a-reserve-currency>)

The greenback gets no respect these days. Every morning my inbox is bursting with emails from gurus advising investors to run for their financial lives – away from the U.S. dollar. Jim Rogers even suggested that the dollar could go to confetti. Other investors are predicting that the U.S. currency is on its last gasp. Well, I hate to burst their bubble… **The dollar is going to stay on top through the twenty-first century for two reasons: The weakness of competitors and the stable, flexible and open political institutions of America.** Both are important factors to observe after you look at the three basic characteristics of a durable reserve currency:

Durable reserve currencies are strong, stable and provide ample liquidity – A reserve currency should demonstrate deep liquidity so investors can move in and out of it without sharp movements in price. It also needs to be widely recognized by global investors as a reserve currency.

Reserve currencies require financial and political stability – The fiscal discipline and political stability of the country needs to be unquestioned. Countries with large fiscal deficits are unable to be dependable safe havens since the path of least resistance is to devalue the currency to make debt loads more manageable. Reserve currencies come from market-based, rules-driven, open economies –Investors and trading partners thrive best in a market-oriented economy where the rules are clear and transparent. Faith in the fairness of the judicial system and institutions is vitally important. I know you’re looking at the above characteristics on my reserve currency report card, and thinking it really doesn’t look so great for the greenback. But remember, while the United States needs significant reform and fiscal discipline, currencies are valued on a relative basis. So let me ask the obvious question: What rival currencies do these pundits have in mind? First, take a look at the euro. Europe has been in a non-stop financial crisis for some time. Most of the continent’s banks are not only shaky but also downright scary. German, U.K. and French banks are just trying to keep the balls in the air. That’s not very reassuring. The monetary union needs to be much more closely aligned with political and economic union. But that requires 26 states signing over their sovereignty. That’s not going to happen anytime soon. **The other reserve currency idea on many pundits’ lists is the Chinese yuan**. No offense, but **this is simply ridiculous**, and here’s why… **The first important issue is liquidity. The Chinese yuan isn’t even convertible.** The government forces Chinese exporters who receive U.S. dollars to turn them over to the Central Bank. (This is how China built its $3 trillion in reserves). Citizens can’t take it out of the country. It isn’t accepted as legal tender anywhere outside of China. **The other problem with the yuan or Renminbi is that it’ll be a long, long time before China allows its currency to float freely. China built its entire system on tightly controlling their currency’s value.** If the currency strengthened 10% against the U.S. dollar in six months, millions of exporters already on razor-thin margins would go bust. In addition, China’s weaknesses as a global safe haven are glaringly obvious. Two examples should suffice: All of its strategic industries are firmly in state hands and its judicial system is anything but independent. That shouldn’t instill much global confidence. Next, I can’t top how Fraser Howie, a managing director at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise, sums up China’s financial shell games: There’s an awful lot of money just going round and round from one pocket to another, giving the appearance of strength when it’s really not there.” Finally, there’s the basic question of political stability and durable transparent institutions. We may see our political process as gridlock, but others see it as stability. Institutions like our independent judiciary, free speech and free press. Likewise, the smooth and transparent transfer of power after each election is reassuring to global investors. A new book, Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, based on 15 years of original research, does an excellent job of getting to the core of why China’s present system and course isn’t sustainable. The authors contend that countries such as China that lack inclusive and open political economic institutions eventually face roadblocks. Economic growth can be achieved by “extracting” profits for some time, but eventually radical reform is necessary to achieve long-term success. So go ahead and diversify your global portfolio with the Swiss franc, through the CurrencyShares Swiss Franc Trust (NYSE: FXF), or the Australian dollar, through the CurrencyShares Australian Dollar Trust (NYSE: FXA), but I would avoid the WisdomTree Dreyfus Chinese Yuan ETF (NYSE: CYB). Just don’t go overboard. You’ll likely get crushed by a snapback in the U.S. dollar.

### AT: Arms Sales

#### 1. TURN: When the US purchases fewer weapons from our arms manufacturers that only pushes them to sell abroad

**Nicole Gaouette 2016** (Nicole Gaouette, CNN reporter; May 10, 2016; U.S. official: Terror kills as many or more in Africa than Mideast; CNN; doa: 1/26/17; <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/10/politics/africa-terror-isis-boko-haram/index.htmlI>) AM

Hunter said that **U.S. defense companies were explicit in their desire to boost international exports in the wake of recent defense budget cuts.** At a media day event in March, **the CEO of U.S. defense giant Lockheed Martin, Marillyn Hewson, said, "One area where we expect the majority of our growth potential to come from in the years ahead is our international customers."** [Opinion: 'Sham democracy' is fueling Africa's terrorism](http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/10/opinions/africa-terrorism-democracy/index.html)

#### 2. If we decrease arms sales China will fill our vacuum—they already are

**Gaouette 2016** (Nicole Gaouette, CNN reporter; May 10, 2016; U.S. official: Terror kills as many or more in Africa than Mideast; CNN; doa: 1/26/17; <http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/10/politics/africa-terror-isis-boko-haram/index.htmlI>) AM

Other major arms exporters after the U.S. include Russia, China, France, and Germany. While Hunter **said Russia will always have a market for its** "cheaper" **arms exports** to countries that are accustomed to Soviet-era weaponry, he sees **China as being increasingly active in the international market. "You are seeing more and more** [**Chinese at arms shows trying to compete with the U.S.**](http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/22/news/china-arms-exports-rising/index.html)**," he said. China has upped its share of global arms exports by over 60%** compared to the 2006-2010 period, according to SIPRI. One area where China has been particularly active is drone technology, with [**reports of China exporting drones**](http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/china-drone-sales-kreps/) **to Nigeria, Iraq, and Pakistan.** He added that China was facing challenges to growing its market share due to increased tensions over competing claims in the South China Sea, as many of the countries in the region, like Vietnam, are also amongst the fastest-growing markets for arms exports.

### AT: Environmental Harms

#### 1. Even if we were to be successful, it does not matter in a global context.

Lee Lane 2014 (Lee Lane, a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute, he co-directed the American Enterprise Institute’s Geoengineering Project, and he consults on a range of energy issues); July 17 2014; “The Risky Business of a Carbon Tax,” *Forbes*, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/07/17/the-risky-business-of-a-carbon-tax/#52f044da48b0> ) AM

Mr. Paulson also maintains that the carbon tax is vital to persuading China to curb its emissions. This claim is crucial, because **U.S. emission controls can have only a trivial direct effect on global climate.** **Since 2005, U.S. emissions have fallen while those of the developing countries have soared. Developing country emissions now exceed those of the entire industrialized world. China is by far the world’s biggest emitter. This new reality implies that nothing Washington can do domestically will stop climate change.** Nor, despite Mr. Paulson’s claims, is there much reason to think that adopting a U.S. carbon tax would cause Beijing to do the same. China’s Communist Party, after all, flouts Western norms on human rights, on intellectual property, and even on market-based exchange rates. Why should climate be different? To the contrary, that high Party officials are extracting fortunes from the massively polluting state owned enterprises would seem to cast an especially dark shadow of doubt over hopes for change in this area. Yet Mr. Paulson, a self-proclaimed expert on avoiding needless risks, urges the United States to incur the costs of a carbon tax based mainly on the rather far-fetched hope that it will induce Beijing to change its behavior.

#### 2. If we used less fossil fuels, other countries would just consume more

**Carolyn Fischer, 2015.** (Carolyn Fischer, senior fellow at Resources for the Future and currently a Marie Skłodowska–Curie Fellow of the European Commission. May 27th – May 28th 2015. “The challenge of achieving participation and compliance,” *Yale Center for the Study of Globalization*. <http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/assets/downloads/carbon_pricing/session-4.pdf>. Page 6-7) ESG

This is a session on participation and compliance. I’m going to talk about border carbon adjustments and why they’re not just for participation and compliance. I think fundamentally, the big reason we’re here is the problem of carbon leakage. When countries take actions unilaterally or sell globally it’s like squeezing on a balloon. If you price carbon when not everyone else is, you may be sending emissions elsewhere. There are several channels for carbon leakage. I think the one that pops up in most people’s minds, especially politicians’ minds, is the competitiveness angle: the concerns that economic activity manufacturing in energy intensive industries is going to shift abroad where it’s cheaper because they don’t have to pay the carbon penalty. But actually, modeling shows the bigger effect is through global energy markets. **If some countries, the U.S.,** Europe, **would draw our demand for fossil fuels and we run down that supply curve, the prices fall, and that just makes it cheaper for India to pay for oil and consume more, even without moving any manufacturing plants.**

### AT: Russian Econ Solves

#### 1. Russian economic decline causes war - Putin must show strength in the face of weakness.

Fisher, Vox, 6-29-15

[Max, “How World War III became possible” http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war, accessed 12-20-15, TAP]

Should the warnings prove right, and a major war break out in Europe between Russia and the West, then the story of that war, if anyone is still around to tell it, will begin with Russian President Vladimir Putin trying to solve a problem. That problem is this: Putin's Russia is weak. It can no longer stand toe to toe with the US. It no longer has Europe divided in a stalemate; rather, it sees the continent as dominated by an ever-encroaching anti-Russian alliance. In the Russian view, the country's weakness leaves it at imminent risk, vulnerable to a hostile West bent on subjugating or outright destroying Russia as it did to Iraq and Libya. This is made more urgent for Putin by his political problems at home. In 2012, during his reelection, popular protests and accusations of fraud weakened his sense of political legitimacy. The problem worsened with Russia's 2014 economic collapse; Putin's implicit bargain with the Russian people had been that he would deliver economic growth and they would let him erode basic rights. Without the economy, what did he have to offer them? Putin's answer has been to assert Russian power beyond its actual strength — and, in the process, to recast himself as a national hero guarding against foreign enemies. Without a world-power-class military or economy at his disposal, he is instead wielding confusion and uncertainty — which Soviet leaders rightly avoided as existential dangers — as weapons against the West. Unable to overtly control Eastern Europe, he has fomented risks and crises there, sponsoring separatists in Ukraine and conducting dangerous military activity along NATO airspace and coastal borders, giving Russia more leverage there. Reasserting a Russian sphere of influence over Eastern Europe, he apparently believes, will finally give Russia security from the hostile West — and make Russia a great power once more. Knowing his military is outmatched against the Americans, he is blurring the distinction between war and peace, deploying tactics that exist in, and thus widen, the gray between: militia violence, propaganda, cyberattacks, under a new rubric the Russian military sometimes calls "hybrid war." "This was the theory of the Kaiser before World War I: The more threatening you are, the more people will submit to your will. Putin’s going to threaten and threaten and hope that NATO bends. But the long run of international relations suggests that it goes the other way." Unable to cross America's red lines, Putin is doing his best to muddy them — and, to deter the Americans, muddying his own. Turning otherwise routine diplomatic and military incidents into games of high-stakes chicken favors Russia, he believes, as the West will ultimately yield to his superior will. To solve the problem of Russia's conventional military weakness, he has dramatically lowered the threshold for when he would use nuclear weapons, hoping to terrify the West such that it will bend to avoid conflict. In public speeches, over and over, he references those weapons and his willingness to use them. He has enshrined, in Russia's official nuclear doctrine, a dangerous idea no Soviet leader ever adopted: that a nuclear war could be winnable.

## AFF EXTENSIONS

### EXT: Salmon

#### 1. Overuse of the military with a lower budget increases risk and failure

**Diem Nguyen Salmon, 2015** (Diem Nguyen Salmon, Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy. January 30th 2015. “A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget,” *Backgrounder,* <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/BG2989.pdf>.Accessed Dec 4 2016. Page 3-4) ESG

Response and Responsibilities. While there is a significant debate about how to respond to these developments, most in Washington recognize these situations for what they are—threats to U.S. interests—and have once again turned to the military for solutions, placing new demands on an already stressed force. **To counter Russia, the U.S. is returning some of the previously withdrawn troops to Europe. More than 3,000 troops are in Iraq, and U.S. and coalition forces have conducted more than 1,000 airstrikes to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria.8 The troop presence in Afghanistan, while absent from the headlines in recent years, continues. In Liberia, 2,300 troops are helping to contain the Ebola epidemic.**9 It is difficult, however, to reconcile policymakers’ inclination to employ the military as a bulwark against all manner of threats with their inaction on the crippling spending cuts of the past several years. The defense budget can only impact the state of the military, not when policymakers call upon it for the next mission. **As demonstrated in recent years, cutting the military budget does not necessarily mean the military will do less.** Matching resources to missions for the Department of Defense (DOD) is further complicated by the unique military “can-do” ethos. **In other words, even if the military is not fully prepared for a particular mission, they will still undertake that mission if ordered by the President. When the military is called upon to act, but constrained in its means, it runs greater risks in the endeavor. In conflict, greater risk can mean higher casualty rates or outright failure to complete the mission.** If the military is ordered to war without a proper consideration of resources, that risk will be absorbed by the men and women in uniform.

### EXT: Deters China

#### 1. **Decades of empirics prove that a concessionary allows China to still be aggressive in the SCS**

Newsham 2014 (Grant Newsham, 2014. “China, America and the "Appeasement" Question.” From National Interest DOA: 1/5/16 [http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226?page=1](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226?page=1" \t "_blank)) ESM

US policy towards China over the last 30 years, and particularly in recent times, seems familiar. The United States does its best to understand the PRC’s concerns and its resentments going back to the Opium Wars and the ‘century of humiliation’, to accommodate these resentments, and to ensure China does not feel threatened. Defense and State Department officials enthusiastically seek greater transparency and openness – especially in the military realm – as such openness is perceived as inherently good. In return, the PRC is expected to change, to show more respect for human rights and international law and to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community. We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, [we invite the PRC to military exercises](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-maritime-surveillance-gambit-10970) and repeat the “engagement” mantra – expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as naïve or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlain’s 1930’s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice. [One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442) – and the US Government’s unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generation’s “Rhineland”. Had the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War. Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation. Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized world’s rules? While ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense – both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it – it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society. We should constantly stress that China is welcome as a key player in the international order – but only under certain conditions. The US and other democratic nations have not done enough to require China to adhere to established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper. Human nature and history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that a strong defense and resolutely standing up for one’s principles is more likely to preserve peace.

### EXT: Deters Russia

#### 1. Increased military spending is critical to countering Russia and sustaining US global leadership – only hard power solves.

McKew, governmental adviser, 1-1-17

[Molly, an adviser to Georgian President Saakashvili’s government from 2009-2013, and to former Moldovan Prime Minister Filat in 2014-2015, “Putin’s Real Long Game” http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/putins-real-long-game-214589, accessed 1-4-17, TAP]

Exposing how the Kremlin’s political and information warfare works is a critical component of this strategy, as is acting to constrain it. We must (re)accept the notion that hard power is the guarantor of any international system: security is a precondition for anything (everything) else. That the projection of our values has tracked with and been amplified by force projection is no accident. Human freedom requires security. NATO has been the force projection of our values. It hasn’t just moved the theoretical line of conflict further forward: the force multiplication and value transference has enhanced our security. This is far cheaper, and far stronger, than trying to do this ourselves. It’s also important to acknowledge that a more isolated, more nationalist America helps Putin in his objectives even while it compromises our own. We need to accept that America was part of, and needs to be part of, a global system — and that this system is better, cheaper, and more powerful than any imagined alternatives. For many years, the United States has been the steel in the framework that holds everything together; this is what we mean by ‘world order’ and ‘security architecture,’ two concepts that few politicians try to discuss seriously with the electorate. Taken together, these steps would be a critical realignment to our strategic thinking and internal operations, and would allow us to plow through this era of upheaval with greater certainty and for greater benefit to the American people. \*\*\* In an era increasingly cynical about American ideals, and skeptical about intervention abroad, how can the US build support for a new, more muscular global resistance to what Russia is trying to do? We already have one model: the Cold War. Putin and his minions have spent the past 15 years ranting about how the West (specifically NATO) wants a new Cold War. By doing so, they have been conditioning us to deny it, and made us do it so continually that we have convinced ourselves it is true. This is classic reflexive control. The truth is that fighting a new Cold War would be in America’s interest. Russia teaches us a very important lesson: losing an ideological war without a fight will ruin you as a nation. The fight is the American way. When we stop fighting for our ideals abroad, we stop fighting for them at home. We won the last Cold War. We will win the next one too. When it’s us against them, they were, and are, never going to be the winner. But when it's “all against all” — a “multipolar” world with “multi-vector” policy, a state of shifting alliances and permanent instability — Russia, with a centrally controlled, tiny command structure unaccountable for its actions in any way, still has a chance for a seat at the table. They pursue the multipolar world not because it is right or just, but because it is the only world in which they can continue to matter without pushing a nuclear launch sequence. We must understand this, and focus now, as Putin does, on shaping the world that comes next and defining what our place is in it. Trump has shown willingness to reevaluate his positions and change course — except on issues relating to Russia, and strengthening alliances with the Kremlin’s global illiberal allies. By doing so, he is making himself a footnote to Putin’s chapter of history — little more than another of Putin’s hollow men. Trump should understand, regardless of what the Russians did in our elections, he already won the prize. It won’t be taken away just because he admits the Russians intervened. Taking away the secrecy of Russian actions — exposing whatever it was they did, to everyone — is the only way to take away their power over the US political system and to free himself from their strings, as well. Whatever Putin’s gambit was, Trump is the one who can make sure that Putin doesn’t win. Trump should set the unpredictable course and become the champion against the most toxic, ambitious regime of the modern world. Rebuilding American power — based on the values of liberal democracy — is the only escape from Putin’s corrosive vision of a world at permanent war. We need a new united front. But we must be the center of it. It matters deeply that the current generation of global revolutionaries and reformers, like my Ukrainian friend, no longer see themselves as fighting for us or our ideals. In a strange way, Trump could be just crazy enough — enough of a outlier and a rogue — to expose what Putin’s Russia is and end the current cycle of upheaval and decline. This requires non-standard thinking and leadership — but also purpose, and commitment, and values. It requires faith — for and from the American people and American institutions. And it requires the existence of truth. The alternative is accepting that our history and our nation were, in fact, not the beginning of a better — greater — world, but the long anomaly in a tyrannous and dark one.

### EXT: Spending = Heg

#### 1. Spending = heg

Justin Johnson 2016 [Justin Johnson, Heritage Foundation Center for National Defense and Davis institute for National Security and Foreign Policy senior policy analyst. January 25th 2016. “Americans deserve an honest debate about the costs of national security.” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-bad-arguments-cutting-us-security-spending-15002?page=show, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

Remember, robust defense funding serves a purpose. It allows the United States to preempt threats before they arrive at our shores. No other country is capable of protecting its interests around the world like the United States, and sustaining a military force that can project power worldwide comes at a cost.

### EXT: Deterrence Key to Allied Nonprolif

#### 1. Nuclear modernization is critical to extended deterrence – that prevents nuclear war through deterrence and allied assurance – prevents prolif in Europe, the Middle East, and Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

Baroudos, Lexington Institute, 2016

[Constance, 7-18-16, “Why Nuclear Modernization Is A Must-Have For America” http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/18/why\_nuclear\_modernization\_is\_a\_must-have\_for\_america\_109577.html, accessed 1-29-17, TAP]

One of the biggest budget challenges the next presidential administration will face is how to fund the modernization of the strategic deterrent of bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles. While this “triad” protects the American homeland from nuclear attack and blackmail, it also prevents nuclear proliferation through extended deterrence because countries do not need to develop their own nuclear arsenals for protection. U.S. leaders must fund the modernization of the aging nuclear triad to continue protecting the U.S. homeland and allies. The nuclear threat no longer focuses on two states, the U.S. and Russia, as during the Cold War. Nuclear material, technology and weapons have spread to the Indian subcontinent, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle East. As a result, we live in a more complex and volatile world than in the past. Regional conflicts and threats from nuclear-armed states have increased along with potential attacks from terrorist groups with nuclear weapons. The fact that one nuclear weapon can cause devastating damage leads some to think a large arsenal is unnecessary, but this is not so. Today Washington must tailor deterrence to discourage violence from multiple states and non-state actors. America must also have enough weapons to protect allies as promised. To address these challenges, America’s strategic nuclear triad is used every second of each day to provide deterrence from a nuclear assault or threat. A potential attacker would have more to lose than gain from attacking the U.S. because it has the capability to respond with devastating nuclear retaliation. Critics of nuclear weapons modernization often focus on the quantity of nuclear weapons and the cost, but fail to thoroughly understand the logic of nuclear deterrence, to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the first place. America also has increasing demands to extend its nuclear umbrella to protect allies and prevent nuclear proliferation. Allies in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East are protected by extended deterrence, but they must also trust that America’s promise will be credible and Washington must maintain the force structure necessary to be successful. A large nuclear arsenal provides options to protect America and assures allies’ safety with extra nuclear warheads and delivery systems that serve as a hedge in case technical problems occur – we do not want the U.S. to have limited options in response to a threat or attack. The strategic deterrent must be modernized to provide security to America and its allies in the future. Between 2014 and 2023, modernizing the nuclear triad will require about $350 billion to purchase new nuclear weapons production facilities and labs, refurbish warheads, land-based ballistic missiles, and submarines, build new strategic bombers and nuclear-capable fighter aircraft, and develop a new nuclear cruise missile. According to Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord, the Pentagon needs an additional $10 billion per year beginning in 2021 to pay for the upgrade. This will be challenging in the fiscally constrained environment created by the 2011 Budget Control Act, and the Pentagon will have to make difficult tradeoffs when it comes to other military programs. Even though President Obama promised to support nuclear arsenal modernization in return for Senate ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, some critics characterize America’s triad as excessive. No one can really say with certainty that the U.S. will have a credible deterrent with fewer warheads and delivery systems — we are currently at the lowest level of nuclear weapons since the early years of the Cold War. What we do know is that since August 1945, when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, about seven to 10 million people have died from conflict. Compare this to the two world wars that caused about 70 to 100 million deaths prior to the existence of nuclear weapons. If America’s extended deterrence did not reassure allies, more countries in Europe would likely have nuclear weapons to deter Russian threats and attacks, especially with Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and its recent liberal threats of employing nukes. South Korea, Japan and Australia would also likely feel the need to develop their own nuclear arsenals to deter threats and attacks from China and North Korea. If countries in the Middle East feel America can no longer protect and defend their interests, they may seek to develop security guarantees with other countries or create their own nuclear deterrents to balance Iran’s desire of regional dominance. Capabilities provided by non-strategic nuclear weapons are important when considering America must tailor deterrence to various allies and regions. To further boost extended deterrence, America should expand its non-strategic nuclear forces. The use of strategic nuclear weapons is very limited due to the massive destruction they would cause. Since non-strategic nuclear weapons have a lower explosive yield, they could hold global assets at risk on behalf of allies and improve Washington’s ability to respond promptly and proportionately in a variety of scenarios. Sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons in particular would be one way the U.S. can defend nations in complicated regions where basing nuclear weapons on their territory is not possible. Modernization plans to extend the life of B61 gravity bombs and enhance dual-capable aircraft are also important capability upgrades. After all, the flexibility of non-strategic forces is why other countries such as Russia have about 2,000 of them, are modernizing them, and allow their use to deescalate a conflict. Nuclear weapons are often criticized in the media as destructive, expensive, and unusable. America’s strategic arsenal actually aims to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, protects allies and hinders further nuclear proliferation. However, the U.S. must modernize its aging nuclear triad to continue protecting itself and allies while preventing nuclear proliferation. Expanding non-strategic weapons will also provide Washington with capabilities to enhance extended deterrence and assure allies that developing their own nuclear weapons is unnecessary. While the expense of modernizing and maintaining the triad is considerable, it pales in comparison with the costs that even a limited nuclear exchange would impose.

#### 2. Allied confidence is key to prevent Japanese prolif.

The Economist, 2015

[3-7-15, “The new nuclear age” http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645729-quarter-century-after-end-cold-war-world-faces-growing-threat-nuclear, accessed 1-19-17, TAP]

China poses a more distant threat, but an unignorable one. Although Sino-American relations hardly look like the cold war, China seems destined to challenge the United States for supremacy in large parts of Asia; its military spending is growing by 10% or more a year. Nuclear expansion is designed to give China a chance to retaliate using a “second strike”, should America attempt to destroy its arsenal. Yet the two barely talk about nuclear contingencies—and a crisis over, say, Taiwan could escalate alarmingly. In addition Japan, seeing China’s conventional military strength, may feel it can no longer rely on America for protection. If so, Japan and South Korea could go for the bomb—creating, with North Korea, another petrifying regional stand-off. What to do? The most urgent need is to revitalise nuclear diplomacy. One priority is to defend the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which slows the spread of weapons by reassuring countries that their neighbours are not developing nukes. It was essential that Iran stayed in the treaty (unlike North Korea, which left). The danger is that, like Iran, signatories will see enrichment and reprocessing as preparation for a bomb of their own—leading their neighbours to enrich in turn. That calls for a collective effort to discourage enrichment and reprocessing, and for America to shore up its allies’ confidence.

### EXT: Nuke Deterrence is the Bomb ;)

#### 1. Nuclear deterrence is critical to conflict de-escalation.

Klein, Analytic Services distinguished analyst, 3-27-15

[John, “ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORTH THE COST? – ANALYSIS” <http://www.eurasiareview.com/27032015-are-nuclear-weapons-worth-the-cost-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29>, accessed 4-21-15, TAP]

Is it wasteful for the United States to spend $348 billion on its nuclear forces over the next decade, as the Congressional Budget Office predicts? John Klein isn’t convinced. He argues that a robust nuclear arsenal is essential for international stability and therefore worth the high cost. By John J. Klein\* The role of nuclear weapons and their associated expense are topics of debate among defense analysts and nonproliferation advocates. The information in a January 2015 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) will likely continue to fuel this debate. In this report, the CBO estimates that over the next decade (2015–2024), the United States will spend $348 billion on its nuclear forces. Many critics have concluded that spending money on nuclear weapons is wasteful and that conventional forces are just as capable of providing the same level of security and deterrence. Despite the seemingly high expense, however, maintaining a robust nuclear arsenal is a cost-effective means of providing needed stability in the international community. The Congressional Budget Office report The current strategic nuclear forces—consisting of submarines that launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range bombers, and the nuclear weapons they carry—are reaching the end of their service lives. Over the next two decades, the U.S. Congress will need to make decisions about the extent to which U.S. nuclear delivery systems and weapons will be modernized or replaced with new systems. To help make those decisions, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 required the CBO to estimate the 10-year costs of the Administration’s plans to operate, maintain, and modernize U.S. nuclear forces. The recent CBO report is in response to this legal requirement. The CBO estimate of $348 billion over the next decade, or an average of about $35 billion a year, as the cost of the Administration’s plans for nuclear forces is close to the previous figure of $355 billion for the 2014–2023 period. The most recent estimate relies largely on official government figures, the CBO authors say, and does not include costs associated with missile defense, nonproliferation efforts, and related intelligence programs. The figure does, however, include the cost associated with strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons; tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons; Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratories and their supporting activities; and nuclear-related command, control, communications, and early-warning systems; and additional costs incurred by estimated program cost growth rates. Differences between the current and previous estimates are a result of changes in both the Defense and Energy departments’ nuclear programs, with the result that cost projections have increased in some areas but have declined in others. Current cost projections reflect a change in the plans for modernizing the Minuteman III ICBMs. Those added costs would be partially offset by cost decreases from the Defense Department’s plans to reduce headquarters staffing, as part of a department-wide effort to lower costs for command and control. The Department of Energy’s decrease in projected costs is primarily the result of its plans to postpone or reduce the scope of some weapon modernization programs and infrastructure construction projects. While some of those costs could still be incurred, it would be after the end of the current 10-year projection period. Taken as a whole, the CBO estimates that the costs of nuclear forces represent 5 percent to 6 percent of the total costs of the Administration’s plans for national defense for the next 10 years. Cost critics and the fiscal squeeze Frank Kendall , the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, recently noted in a March 4, 2015 Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee hearing that the plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal will face an ” affordability problem” starting in fiscal year 2021. Emphasizing his point, Kendall, who is also a senior member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, told the subcommittee that the affordability problem will arise in next year’s budget, when the Department of Defense will begin to have a problem finding ways to afford future nuclear systems. Kendall explained that the current U.S. nuclear force was built during the Cold War and most of the weapons are reaching the end of their service lives. The Defense Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration are pursuing several multibillion-dollar programs to replace the nation’s strategic submarines, bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles and to extend the life of aging warheads. In the conclusion of written testimony before the subcommittee, a warning was given: “We have reached a point where we have removed all flexibility from the nuclear weapons life extension programs and have worked with the U.S. Strategic Command to accept lower stockpile requirements where possible.” The fiscal squeeze is expected to continue through the 2020s and 2030s, as the replacement and modernization programs move into the production phase and compete against other non-nuclear priorities. One of the criticisms levied against the cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrent is that the expense is excessive considering that conventional, non-nuclear forces are just as capable of providing any needed military effect. This view contends that because conventional weapons provide the same explosive power as nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons are not relatively cost-effective because of their associated expense. Cost critics have estimated the total expense of having U.S. nuclear weapons programs to be almost double the figure provided by the CBO, stating that the U.S. is on track to spend approximately $640 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next decade. This higher number includes estimates related to environmental and health costs, nuclear threat reduction, missile defense, and incident management. Still others say the cost associated with modernizing and maintaining the nation’s nuclear arsenal is so high that it cannot realistically be implemented, and that given current budget constraints, implementing all of the modernization programs simultaneously would result in these major projects being canceled midstream. Affordable deterrence? Perhaps one of the most remarkable turnarounds in public comments regarding the need for nuclear weapons came from former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. In May 2012, the arms control group Global Zero, of which Hagel was a member, argued for the U.S. to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons during the next 10 years, estimating the associated cost to exceed $1 trillion over the next decade. Global Zero stated that the world can ill afford to lavish scarce resources on nuclear forces and that the huge investments in modernization plans are being driven by outmoded, Cold War logic. Yet in November 2014, Hagel announced that the U.S. must take action to ensure that its nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure, and effective in the future. He stated that the nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in ensuring U.S. national security and is the Defense Department’s highest priority mission. Hagel argued that the nuclear triad deters nuclear attack on the U.S., its allies, and partners. In particular, nuclear deterrence prevents potential adversaries from trying to escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression. Additionally, nuclear weapons provide the means for effective response should deterrence fail. Because of the role they play, billions of additional dollars in upgrades are needed in support systems to keep the nuclear arsenal reliable. Hagel said that a 10 percent increase is needed for the nation’s nuclear infrastructure in the next five fiscal year budget requests. The projected expense of $348 billion over the next decade is indeed a large sum of money. Consequently, how these funds are allocated should be vigorously debated to ensure that the nuclear arsenal can support U.S. national security objectives in the future. Such debate is especially meaningful because of the recent nuclear negotiations with Iran and Russia’s purported incursion into Ukraine. Despite their expense, the budget for the U.S. nuclear forces only represents about 5 percent of the total cost for national defense spending. It may be something of a paradox, but nuclear weapons help provide the deterrence that has led to greater peace and stability among the global community. In 1943, over 15 million people died as a result of war, but since the end of the Second World War, deaths as a result of war or conflict dropped to about 1-2 million per year and have remained near that level ever since. In fact, the last decade has seen fewer war deaths than any decade in the past 100 years. This lower number is due, in part, to the deterrence effect provided by nuclear weapons. Considering the low percentage relative to the overall defense budget, along with the associated benefits to peace and security, maintaining an effective and reliable U.S. nuclear arsenal is a good investment.

#### 2. AND deterrence is the controlling impact framing – prevents conflict escalation.

Robinson, Sandia National Lab President and Director, 2001

[Paul, "Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century" http://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/pursuing\_a\_new\_nuclear\_weapons\_p.html, accessed 12-17-16, TAP]

Let me first stress that nuclear arms must never be thought of as a single “cure-all” for security concerns. For the past 20 years, only 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget has been spent on nuclear forces. The other 90 percent is for “war fighting” capabilities. Indeed, conflicts have continued to break out every few years in various regions of the globe, and these nonnuclear capabilities have been regularly employed. By contrast, we have not used nuclear weapons in conflict since World War II. This is an important distinction for us to emphasize as an element of U.S. defense policy, and one not well understood by the public at large. Nuclear weapons must never be considered as war fighting tools. Rather we should rely on the catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons to achieve war prevention, to prevent a conflict from escalating (e.g., to the use of weapons of mass destruction), or to help achieve war termination when it cannot be achieved by other means, e.g., if the enemy has already escalated the conflict through the use of weapons of mass destruction. Conventional armaments and forces will remain the backbone of U.S. defense forces, but the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts from ever starting, can prevent their escalation, as well as bring these conflicts to a swift and certain end. In contrast to the situation facing Russia, I believe we cannot place an over-reliance on nuclear weapons, but that we must maintain adequate conventional capabilities to manage regional conflicts in any part of the world. Noting that the U.S. has always considered nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort,” we need to give constant attention to improving conventional munitions in order to raise the threshold for which we would ever consider nuclear use. It is just as important for our policy makers to understand these interfaces as it is for our commanders. Defenses Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to strictly consider “defensive” tactics and armaments, I believe it is important for the United States to consider a continuum of defensive capabilities, from boost phase intercept to terminal defenses. Defenses have always been an important element of war fighting, and are likely to be so when defending against missiles. Defenses will also provide value in deterring conflicts or limiting escalations. Moreover, the existence of a credible defense to blunt attacks by armaments emanating from a rogue state could well eliminate that rogue nation’s ability to dissuade the U.S. from taking military actions. If any attack against the U.S., its allies, or its forces should be undertaken with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, there should be no doubt in the attacker’s mind that the United States might retaliate for such an attack with nuclear weapons; but the choice would be in our hands. If high effectiveness defenses can be achieved, they will enhance deterrence by eliminating an aggressor’s confidence in attacking the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles, and thus make our use of nuclear weapons more credible (if the conflict could not be terminated otherwise.) Whereas, nuclear weapons should always remain weapons of last resort, defensive systems would likely be our weapons of first resort. Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Strategic Tool? Throughout my career, I have had the opportunity to participate in a number of “war games” in which the roles and uses of nuclear weapons had to be faced in scenarios that imagined military conflicts developing between the U.S. and other potential adversaries. The totality of those games brought new realizations as to the role and purpose of nuclear weapons, in particular, how essential it is that deterrence be tailored in a different way for each potential aggressor nation. It also seemed abundantly clear that any use of nuclear weapons is, and always will be, strategic. Thus, I would propose we ban the term “nonstrategic nuclear weapons” as a non sequitur. The intensity of the environment of any war game also demonstrates just how critical it is for the U.S. to have thought through in advance exactly what messages we would want to send to other nations (combatants and noncombatants) and to “history,” should there be any future use of nuclear weapons—including threatened use—in conflicts. Similarly, it is obvious that we must have policies that are well thought through in advance as to the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the use of, or retaliating for the use of, all weapons of mass destruction. Let me then state my most important conclusion directly: I believe nuclear weapons must have an abiding place in the international scene for the foreseeable future. I believe that the world, in fact, would become more dangerous, not less dangerous, were U.S. nuclear weapons to be absent. The most important role for our nuclear weapons is to serve as a “sobering force,” one that can cap the level of destruction of military conflicts and thus force all sides to come to their senses. This is the enduring purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. I regret that we have not yet captured such thinking in our public statements as to why the U.S. will retain nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of our defense policy, and urge that we do so in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Nuclear deterrence becomes in my view a “countervailing” force and, in fact, a potent antidote to military aggression on the part of nations. But to succeed in harnessing this power, effective nuclear weapons strategies and policies are necessary ingredients to help shape and maintain a stable and peaceful world.

#### 3. Failure to modernize does not speed disarmament – it simply makes the world order vulnerable

**Matthew Kroenig, 2015** (Matthew Kroenig, associate professor and international relations field chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. January 8th 2015. “Why US nuclear modernization is necessary,” *The Bulletin*, <http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881>. Accessed Jan 9 2017) ESG

Nonetheless, some argue that achieving the fond hope of complete nuclear disarmament requires the United States to cut its arsenal and refuse to modernize its forces. But other countries will not blindly follow Washington's lead. In recent years, **as the United States has slashed the size of its arsenal, other countries have moved in the opposite direction, building up their nuclear forces. Complete nuclear disarmament may be desirable, but achieving it will require nothing less than a major transformation of the international political system. Simply allowing the US arsenal to rust away**, therefore, **will not meaningfully affect chances for eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide. Failure to modernize would not contribute to disarmament—but more than that, it would be irresponsible. A crippled US nuclear force would embolden enemies, frighten allies, generate international instability, and undermine US national security. In other words, it would risk ruining the world that currently exists.** Rather than preparing for an alternate reality, therefore, Washington needs to build the nuclear forces that it needs in this reality. The United States must maintain a robust nuclear posture and fully modernize its nuclear forces, as planned. This means upgrading all three legs of the nuclear triad, refurbishing nuclear warheads, modernizing the production complex, and, if necessary, summoning the political will to build new capabilities to meet new demands. As Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel put it in November, "Our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring US national security, and it is [the Defense Department's] highest priority mission. No other capability we have is more important."

### EXT: “Significant Increase”

#### 1. Modernization is expected to cost north of $300 billion

**Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015** (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, academic journal, published by Taylor and Francis that covers global security and public policy issues related to the dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, climate change, and emerging technologies and diseases. January 2015. “Balancing modernization and disarmament,” *The Bulletin*, <http://thebulletin.org/modernizing-nuclear-arsenals-whether-and-how7881>. DOA Jan 9 2017) ESG

**Between 2014 and 2023, the United States expects to spend $355 billion to modernize its nuclear arsenal. In subsequent decades, even [higher expenditures are envisioned](http://nyti.ms/1C3cQ2y%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank).** But Washington is far from alone in modernizing its nuclear weapons. According to researchers from the Federation of American Scientists, "all the nuclear-armed states have [ambitious nuclear weapon modernization programs](http://bit.ly/13Ee8F0%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) … that appear intended to prolong the nuclear era indefinitely." Disarmament advocates believe such modernizations are fundamentally at odds with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons—while weapon states argue that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, arsenals must be modernized in order to keep them safe, secure, and effective. In a world where complete disarmament is nearly every nation's stated goal but disarmament seems by no means imminent, how should nuclear-armed countries approach the maintenance and modernization of their arsenals?

### EXT: T ☹

#### 1. Military spending isn’t solely defense spending

**Kimberly Amadeo, 2016** (Kimberly Amadeo, writer for *The Balance* with 20 years senior-level experience in economic analysis and business strategy working for major international corporations. “U.S. Military Budget: Components, Challenges, Growth,” *The Balance*, <https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320>. Accessed 26 January 2017) ESG

The U.S. military budget is $773.5 billion. That's the budget for Fiscal Year 2017 (October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017). There are four components. First is the Department of Defense (DoD) base budget ($523.9 billion). Second is the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for DoD to fight ISIS ($58.8 billion). But **there's more to military spending than the Department of Defense. Many other agencies are involved with protecting our nation. These expenses total $175.9 billion. They include the Department of Veterans Affairs ($75.1 billion), the State Department ($37.8 billion), Homeland Security ($40.6 billion), FBI and Cybersecurity in the Department of Justice ($9.5 billion), and the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy ($12.9 billion).** There is also $14.9 billion in OCO funds for the State Department and Homeland Security to fight ISIS. (Source: "Mid-Session Review Fiscal Year 2017, Table S-10." "2017 Budget, Summary Tables, Table S-11," Office of Management and Budget.)