

Atharva and I affirm;

Contention one is uniting the gulf.

[Turak '18](#) of **CNBC** reports that “Saudi Arabia... [has] spearheaded an economic and diplomatic blockade against Qatar over accusations Doha supports terrorism.”

This has fractured the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC, as [Hajjar '17](#) of **Northeastern** writes that “the current diplomatic, economic, and political isolation of Qatar... poisons the well for any... GCC cooperation.” [Kabalan '17](#) of **Al Jazeera** continues that “since the beginning of the Qatar blockade... [the GCC has] failed to bring together the leaders of the six member states.”

The US has failed in ending the crisis, as [Paul '18](#) of **Reuters** finds that “Saudi Arabia is defying U.S. calls to mend ties with Qatar.” Fortunately, ending arms sales changes the narrative, as [Gramer '17](#) of **Foreign Policy** writes that “[ending arms sales] sends... [a] signal to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to bury the hatchet with Qatar.”

The impact is preventing proxies.

[Vakil '18](#) of the **Chatham House** explains that “GCC countries could facilitate... diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but this would first require the Gulf states to resolve the Qatar crisis.” This is vital, as [Ali '18](#) of **VNY** writes that “the Saudi-Iranian conflict has led to devastating proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Lebanon, and Bahrain.” Critically, the [ICRC '18](#) reports that “from the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen alone, 50 million people are in need of aid.”

Contention two is ending the forgotten war.

[Al Jazeera '16](#) explains that “Yemen... has been wracked by a bloody war between the Houthi rebels and... Yemen's [Saudi-backed] internationally recognized government.” Fortunately, voting affirmative ends the conflict in two ways.

First, by crippling Saudi Arabia.

[Dewan '18](#) of **CNN** writes that “over the past five years... the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis.” [McCarthy '18](#) of **Forbes** confirms, “[arms sales] between [the US]... and Riyadh over the past decade has formed the pillar of the Saudi onslaught in Yemen.” Critically, [Thrall '18](#) of **GMU** explains that “[as Saudi Arabia lacks a] large domestic defense

[industry, it relies] heavily on arms imports to sustain combat operations," concluding that "[Saudi Arabia could not] fight... for extended periods of time without resupply."

[Alfaqih '18 of Foreign Policy](#) corroborates, "the Saudis... couldn't continue their bombing campaign in Yemen without U.S. military support [as] American planes refuel Saudi aircraft... and Saudi... pilots drop bombs made in the [U.S.]... onto Yemeni homes and schools."

Second, by furthering diplomacy.

[Bazzi '18 of the Atlantic](#) writes that "as long as [the Saudi coalition] believes it can crush the Houthis, there's little incentive for it to negotiate [a settlement]." Thus, [Abdulkareem '18 of MPN](#) finds that "Saudi Arabia has violated the Hodeida ceasefire at least 50 times."

Fortunately, [Davis '18 of the New York Times](#) explains that "[ending] American military assistance for Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen [sends] a potent message of disapproval for [the] nearly four-year conflict." [Bazzi](#) concludes that "Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States... won't provide the military assistance required to keep the war... going."

The first impact of ending the war is saving civilians.

[MacAskill '16 of the Guardian](#) writes that "more than one-third of all Saudi-led air raids on Yemen have hit civilian sites, such as [schools], hospitals, [and] markets." Moreover, [Maxwell '18 of NC State](#) finds that "airstrikes... [create] famine conditions [by] deliberately targeting [the] agricultural sector... [and cut off] access to food supplies... [restricting] the ability of civilians to receive aid." [Summers '18 of the Guardian](#) concludes that "famine could engulf the country in the [coming] months, [with]... 13 million civilians at risk."

The second impact is importing peace.

Although agreements have been signed, [the IRC '19](#) writes that "recent clashes demonstrate the extremely fragile state of the [port Hodeidah ceasefire]." Indeed, [Barrington '19 of US News](#) finds that "the warring parties were meant to withdraw their forces... but have failed to do so as the... [Houthis and the Saudis] disagree on who should control the city and ports."

Thus, [Wintour '19 of the Guardian](#) reports that "commercial aid is not yet flowing to the level needed to restore vital imports of food and medicine." The aid from Hodeidah is vital, as [Ghobari '18 of Reuters](#) finds that "Hodeidah... handles 80 percent of the country's food imports and aid supplies... [which] 22 million Yemenis rely on."

Thus, we affirm.

Contention One: GCC

F2: No interest in unity

1. Even if there was no interest in unity, they only stopped meeting eighteen months ago when the Qatar crisis began, so that is the unique reason they have failed.
2. Affirming restores their interest since they get a goal of negotiating between Iran and Saudi Arabia for stability. **O/W: Velasco '13 of UCF** finds that “regional organizations are 6.7 times more likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.”

F2: They can meet outside Qatar

1. That’s not our argument. They just refuse to meet as long as the Qatar crisis continues.

Contention Two: Yemen

F2: Houthis empowered

1. **Feltman '18 of Foreign Affairs** finds, “for Saudi Arabia... to stop its military campaign... and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind... [would] create the conditions necessary for peace talks to gain traction,” bringing the Houthis to the table.
2. **Al Jazeera '18** writes that “Yemen's Houthi rebels... will halt all rocket and drone attacks... and [are] ready to institute a ceasefire [but only] if the Saudi-UAE alliance... is prepared to do the same.”

F2: Alt Supplier

1. **Larison '18 of the AC** explains that “transforming the Saudi military to [other nation's] weapons would cost a fortune... require years of retraining and... greatly reduce [Saudi] military power for a generation.”
2. (If Russia or China) **Caverley '18 of the New York Times** finds that “Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft... [and] China has not produced, never mind exported... sophisticated aircraft.”

F2: Stockpiles

1. (If Knights evidence) This evidence is about PGMs, not standard US arms sales.
2. Even if they have a stockpile, Saudi Arabia would still be limited because a) they still require logistics and refueling from the US and b) they will be more conservative since they know that their weapons supply is finite.

F2: Cutting military spending

1. [McCarthy '18 of Forbes](#) writes that “even though the military budget is slightly lower than last year, Riyadh retains an insatiable thirst for American weaponry.”

F2: Peace in the squo

1. (Hodeidah ceasefire) This agreement has been shattered. **Abdulkareem** from case tells you that “Saudi Arabia has violated the Hodeida ceasefire at least 50 times.” Moreover, [Wasmi '19 of the National finds](#) that “Yemeni rebels violated [the] Hodeidah ceasefire more than 700 times in January.”
2. Even if you do buy that there is a ceasefire, [Wintour '19 of the Guardian](#) writes that there is “a shortening window of opportunity to turn the ceasefire into a durable path to peace,” so its days are numbered and peace is unlikely.
3. (Recent troop withdrawal) [Xinhua](#) reports on Wednesday that “Houthi rebels refused to withdraw from two [of] Hodeida's ports on Monday.” Additionally, **Barrington** from case tells you that historically, the parties have never agreed on troop withdrawals.

F2: Saudi blockade

1. Affirming solves. [Hartung '16 of the Security Assistance Monitor](#) reports that “the United States announced a \$10 billion deal to supply Saudi Arabia with 4 ships... [to] enhance [the] Saudi Navy’s ability to enforce a future blockade of... Yemen.”
2. Remember our second warrant. When you end arms sales, Saudi Arabia is forced to negotiate an end to the war, which would most likely include ending the blockade.

F2: US leverage

1. Leverage isn’t working. [Walsh '18 of the New York Times](#) finds that “[Saudi Arabia is] just not willing to listen [to U.S warnings and recommendations on military targets].”
2. As arms sales continue, leverage steadily declines. [Rogin '18 of the Washington Post](#) explains that “[by continuing arms sales] the White House seems to be saying ... that the U.S. will ignore your human rights abuses, assassinations or war crimes.” Luckily, **Davis** from case says that ending sales sends a signal of disapproval for Saudi actions.

Feltman '18 finds that ending the war in Yemen would actually halt Iranian expansion.

Jeffrey Feltman, 11-26-2018, "The Only Way to End the War in Yemen," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2018-11-26/only-way-end-war-yemen>

But today, even though the Houthis are still not quite a subsidiary of Iran in the same way as, say, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian influence in Yemen has grown significantly. **The threat of expanding Iranian influence is not a reason to delay a cease-fire**, however. **While ending the war unilaterally and focusing on UN-sponsored political talks will not eliminate Iranian influence, such steps could halt its expansion. A drawn-out war in Yemen, on the other hand, will only produce the same result as the wars in Iraq and Lebanon: a permanently entrenched Iranian presence that operates through military proxies and is eventually able to direct domestic policy.** A Saudi cease-fire is not a

panacea. There is no guarantee that the Houthis would respond by agreeing to share power with Saudi-backed Yemeni leaders or that the south would stop trying to secede.