We negate Resolved: The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Our sole contention is that lifting Sanctions stifles long term economic reform.

While economic sanctions seem to incite short term problems, they catalyze long term progress. <u>Warman</u> of the London School of Economics in 2014 writes: in states targeted by sanctions, authoritarian leaders are more likely to change their basic political institutions.

Specifically, under sanctions, Venezuela and socialist president Maduro have begun to privatize the economy. <u>Vyas of The Wall Street Journal</u> reports: Maduro's..government, long a practitioner of tight state control of the economy, has...begun implementing free-market policies to tame hyperinflation and correct an economic contraction worse than America's Great Depression...Maduro regime's easing off [brought] hyperinflation rate down from seven to six figures

However, lifting sanctions would shell shock Venezuela's crucial economic reform in two ways.

The first is by ruining political motivation.

Maduro's regime currently stays afloat through the protection of his military. <u>The Miami Herald</u> in 2018 reports that Maduro purchases the loyalty of his military officers and consolidates wealth to them in exchange for regime stability. Indeed, <u>Reeves of NPR</u> in March explains that no one doubts that Maduro would fall if the people in charge of Venezuela's armed forces withdraw their support.

However, <u>Sanchez from the Associated Press</u> in 2019 writes: members of the government are deserting their positions. Discontent from sanctions is increasing as officials and the military are unsure of the government's ability to sustain their wellbeing in the long term, which is why thousands of troops are leaving their post.

The reason comes from <u>Rendon of CSIS</u> who finds that sanctions have cut off financing to the Maduro regime. Affirming grants Maduro the revenue to start funding his military officers once more, removing the need to liberalize his economy for more revenue.

The second is by changing the economic incentive.

<u>Rendon</u> of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains: economic sanctions limited [Maduro's] ability to finance his regime's antidemocratic activities by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings...he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to...engage with financial assets.

For example, Venezuela has lost money through oil sanctions. <u>Roache of Al Jazeera</u> reported in 2019: The sanctions...will result in more than \$11 billion in lost export revenue and block about \$7 billion in assets

Consequently, Venezuela has gradually privatized its economy to recover. The <u>Economist</u> in December reported: sanctions [have been]...a shock to force the [Venezuelan] government to retreat from socialism...Sanctions have "made the government more flexible....It has stopped trying to dictate the exchange rate and control prices. Private firms can import whatever they choose and set their own prices...It is not just the rich who can afford [everyday necessities].

However, with the removal of sanctions and the subsequent influx of export revenue, Venezuela's economy would grow back to similar levels it previously witnessed. <u>Kurmaenev for the New York Times</u> writes in 2019: [before sanctions, the] poor governance, corruption and misguided policies of President Nicolás Maduro... fueled runaway inflation, shuttered businesses and brought [Venezuela] to its knees.

Without disrupting the current economic path of Venezuela, there is potential to impact millions of lives.

For example, privatizing industries like oil has improved the economy. <u>Smilde at the Washington Office</u> on Latin America in 2019 confirms: Venezuela's oil production [is] slowly improving...[it] increased more than 20% from the prior month...the Maduro government will have more funds to provide a sense of economic recovery.

Venezuelan-style reforms have yielded positive effects throughout history. In his analysis of oil state privatizations, <u>Christian Wolf of the University of Cambridge</u>, concludes: Over the...period around the initial privatisation...return on sales increased by 3.6 percentage points, total output [increased] by 40%, [and] capital expenditure by 47%.

All in all, liberalization is the path to the future for Venezuela. <u>Hausmann</u> in 2017 writes: Policy reform...reintroduce[s] free market mechanisms so that society can self-organize and start producing again. This includes securing property rights... and changes in oil policy and other pro-market policies, [to end a process that, according to the <u>New York Times</u>, pushed 82 percent of the population into poverty].

In context of Maduro's broader liberalization efforts, <u>Brian Padden of VOA News</u> explains in 2019: "The moment you move from very high inflation to low inflation, the first thing that you see is a dramatic reduction in poverty rates.

Emperics

Negotiations frontlines/extra

<u>Allison Fedirka</u> for the Geopolitical Futures Organization last September confirms: Washington has come up with a new plan: negotiate a transition directly with the Maduro government. It's been able to do this only because the sanctions imposed on Venezuela have weakened the government enough to force it to the negotiating table.

Economist evidence also talks about bypassing guiado and direct new talks as of december 19ish between trump allies and maduro

Sanctions are the only form of pressure to keep elections competitive. <u>Nahal Toosi of Politico</u> this week finds: [the] Trump Administration plans to ramp up economic pressure" ... [as] "the it is getting more information...about new targets tied to the Maduro government". This would be crucial as Toosi continues that sanctions would be the support Guiado needs to overcome rampant "efforts to bribe and imprison" his supporters by Maduro, who knows that the "opposition leader [currently] had the votes needed" [to retain the assembly.]