

We affirm Resolved: The United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

Our sole contention is bringing peace to the Middle East.

Thrall of CATO in 2018 writes that “prospects for snapping up market share of the global arms industry” have historically powered arms sales. Unfortunately, Thrall also finds that increased arms transfers increase the chances of states starting militarized conflicts and decreases cooperative foreign policy behavior.

By affirming, we have the chance to reverse this trend.

Ending arms sales to Saudi Arabia saves lives in three ways.

1. Cutting off Saudi Arabia’s supply of deadly weapons. Guay of The Conversation writes in 2018 that because Saudi Arabia doesn’t have an arms industry, it has purchased nearly 90 billion dollars worth of weapons from the United States. Furthermore, Caverly of the New York Times explains in 2018 that transforming the Saudi military to use the technology of other countries would cost a fortune, require years of retraining, and greatly reduce its military power for a generation because the military is currently set up to conform to US standards. Crucially, Chatzky of the Council on Foreign Relations in 2010 explains that Saudi Arabia is completely dependent on the United States during the entire lifecycle of every warplane sold to maintain and service them. In fact, Myre of NPR writes in 2018 that if the US cut off the sales of plane parts today, the Saudi Air Force would be grounded tomorrow.
2. Congressional oversight. The United States would be most likely to end its arms sales through an act of Congress under the Arms Export Control Act, or AECA. Notably, Kerr of the CRS writes in 2018 that Congress has never blocked an arms sale under the AECA. Indeed, in October, Schor of Politico reports that an arms sale could not pass the Senate or the House today. Thus, Affirming sets a precedent of arms sales oversight. This is crucial because Dorminey of CATO explains in 2018 that the US sells more weapons to riskier nations than safe nations, such as Iraq, Sudan, and Afghanistan, unchecked by Congress.
3. Using arms as punishment to reduce conflict. Hamid of The Atlantic in 2018 explains that right now, Saudi Arabia has little fear for the repercussions of their actions, emboldening them to commit human rights abuses. Thus, Caverly of the New York Times in 2018 finds that if American officials really want to encourage a change in Saudi Arabian policy, they need to take away Saudi weapons. Brinley of NBC thus concludes in 2018 that “the best way to force the Saudis to change their ways is to stop sending weapons.”

The impact is stopping the genocide in Yemen. In total, Ensor of the Telegraph, killed 60,000 people through the military conflict. In one especially horrifying instance, Borger of The Guardian in 2018 reports that the US supplied the bomb that Saudi Arabia used to kill 40 children on a Yemen school bus.

US weapons sales are also contributing to the famine in Yemen. Mundy of the London School of Economics in 2018 finds that Saudi Arabia is using airstrikes to destroy food production and distribution centers in Yemen, while conflict drives the currency down, limiting imports of the food that Yemenis need. The United Nations in 2018 warns that as a result of the food shortages, 12 to 13 million civilians are at risk of starvation. Ceasing arms sales would prevent the strikes.

Overall, Maitland of the University of Pennsylvania writes in 1998 that “without the moral courage to stand up and take responsibility for our actions, arms will continue to be supplied for unethical purposes.” To save innocent lives, vote pro.

4. Signaling to Saudi Arabia that their actions are unacceptable. Cambanis of the Century Foundation in 2018 explains that because the US continues to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia in face of their flagrant human rights abuses and disregard of US requests of how the weapons should be used, the country has “lost considerable face in the region, which has further diminished its ability to condemn war crimes with authority and to call for reasonable dispute resolution between the Middle East’s competing regional powers.” Furthermore, DePetris of The Hill in 2018 writes that following the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the time to end arms sales is now to get Saudi Arabia’s attention and propel change.

THRALL Cato 2018 No Publication,

<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf>

Prospects for snapping up market share of the global arms industry and reaping profits

powered U.S. arms sales. President Bill Clinton was the first president to incorporate economic justifications into official policy. Clinton's 1995 directive stated that "the impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base" would be a key criterion for his administration's decisionmaking.³¹ With the abandonment of previous restrictions, many countries turned to the United States to upgrade their Soviet-era arsenals or to restock stores depleted from fighting civil wars.³² As a result, the United States expanded its customer base well beyond Cold War boundaries. In 1993 alone, for example, the Clinton administration approved a record \$36 billion in sales, good for a 72 percent share of the Third World arms market.³³

INSTABILITY, VIOLENCE, AND CONFLICT. First, arms sales can make conflict more likely.⁷⁹ This may occur because recipients of new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in the local balance of power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, for example, found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-power allies, they had the opposite effect in other cases, and concluded that "**increased arms transfers from major powers make states significantly more likely to be militarized dispute initiators.**"⁸⁰ Another study focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1997 found that "arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war."⁸¹ Recent history provides supporting evidence for these findings: since 2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar.

recent study regarding the impact of economic sanctions came to a similar conclusion, noting that, "The economic impact of sanctions may be pronounced . . . but other factors in the situational context almost always overshadow the impact of sanctions in determining the political outcome."⁶³ The authors of another study evaluating the impact of military aid concur, arguing that, "In general we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of the recipient state. **With limited exceptions, increasing levels of U.S. aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior.**"⁶⁴

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia's remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards,

would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation.

Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

Terrence Guay, 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

Saudi Arabia spent US\$69.4 billion on military expenditures in 2017, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the world's leading research organization on conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Only the U.S. and China spent more. But since it doesn't have an arms industry – like the U.S. and China – Saudi Arabia must import most of that from other countries. That's why, over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has imported more armaments than every country but India. **And U.S. companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon have benefited most from all that spending, making up the 55 percent of its weapons imports from 2008 to 2017.** That has made Saudi Arabia the top buyer of American arms, with 11.8 percent of all sales over that period. In fact, U.S. defense contractors have made almost \$90 billion selling arms to Saudi Arabia since 1950.

Thanassis Cambanis, 10-24-2018, "The War in Yemen Is a Tragedy—and America Can End Its Complicity," Century Foundation,

<https://tcf.org/content/commentary/war-yemen-tragedy-america-can-end-complicity/?session=1>

The United States is directly implicated in the air campaign because it refuels the bombers and provides targeting intelligence, although the extent of that support remains unclear. Many American policymakers were willing to shoulder the risks of involvement because they hoped that careful U.S. advice would reduce casualties and enable Saudi and Emirati forces to concentrate their fire on military targets. Sadly, that has not proven to be the case. Whether because the Saudi-led coalition has ignored advice or is technically incapable of operating more precisely and with oversight, the strikes have fallen short of the already low standards set by America's campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. **The United States has thereby lost considerable face in the region, which has further diminished its ability to condemn war crimes with authority and to call for reasonable dispute resolution between the Middle East's competing regional powers.** Iran has found a low-cost new venue in which it can successfully thwart Saudi ambitions, while cultivating another allied militia. And as a bonus, Iran has been able to tie up American resources and political attention. Furthermore, as the war has dragged on, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been unable to achieve any of their stated war aims. In private, some Gulf officials make clear that they no longer expect a military resolution in Yemen, and hope that a political agreement can give them a way out. The United States, meanwhile, is tethered to the bad choices of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman, now Saudi's de facto ruler.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

If American officials really want to encourage a change in Saudi policy, they should begin by looking at Saudi Arabia's largest imports from the United States: weaponry. Cutting off the flow of American arms to Saudi Arabia would be an effective way to put pressure on Riyadh with little cost to the American economy or national security.

Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign apparently to avoid jeopardizing \$2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much as how cheaply the United States can be bought. Given these sales' low domestic economic impact and the enormous costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

DePetris TheHill, 10-23-2018, "Want to get Saudi Arabia's attention? Let's stop selling arms to them,"

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/412813-want-to-get-saudi-arabias-attention-lets-stop-selling-arms-to-them>

Want to get Saudi Arabia's attention? Let's stop selling arms to them. Nearly two weeks after Saudi journalist and "Washington Post" columnist Jamal Khashoggi disappeared, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia officially acknowledged his untimely death. Riyadh's explanation of an interrogation gone wrong, one unauthorized by the royal family, was designed to shelter Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) of any culpability. Many lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the U.S. intelligence community and Turkey are not buying Riyadh's rationale — in a televised speech to the nation on October 23, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Khashoggi's murder a pre-planned, "premeditated" operation hatched and carried out by Saudi intelligence officials close to the Saudi Crown Prince. Throughout the crisis, President Trump has vacillated between threatening strong punishment on Saudi Arabia for Khashoggi's murder and being sympathetic to the notion that senior Saudi princes may not have known about the operation beforehand.

Regardless of the exact particulars of the journalist's death or whether MbS did in fact order a state-sanctioned murder of a dissident and permanent U.S. resident, this disturbing event should be a lesson for the Trump administration on the value of the Saudi Kingdom as a U.S. partner. The United States must stop looking at Riyadh as a strategic ally and start viewing the Kingdom for what it really is — a purveyor of extremist ideology across multiple continents, a country that feels entitled to U.S. protection but often provides Washington with half-hearted gestures of support, and one whose foreign policy has led to humanitarian crises and disaster. The Trump administration will attempt to draw a fine-line between retaliating for Khashoggi's murder and maintaining a relationship it deems essential in containing Iran. It would be the height of irresponsibility, however, for the White House to give Riyadh what amounts to a slap on the wrist.

Washington holds far better cards than the Saudis could ever hope to acquire. Saudi Arabia is entirely dependent on U.S. military training, maintenance, and spare parts in order to keep its fleet of F-15 fighter jets in the air.

Shadi Hamid, 10-8-2018, "Saudi Arabia Is Taunting Trump," Atlantic,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/saudi-arabia-trump-jamal-khashoggi/572707/>

Saudi Arabia Is Taunting Trump

The disappearance of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of an American ally shows how little Saudi Arabia fears the repercussions of its actions.

Donald Trump's Middle East policy is many things, but it is not incoherent. At the core of the president's approach has been a stark redrawing of the friend-enemy distinction: doubling down on support, often unquestioning, for allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, while refocusing the near-entirety of American ire on Iran. That Trump has bet big on the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, makes the Saudis' disappearing and likely assassination of the dissident Jamal Khashoggi in their Istanbul consulate—"monstrous" on its own terms—a different sort of escalation. For Trump, this has been personal. His son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, has worked to develop a close relationship with bin Salman, colloquially known as MbS, seeing the young crown prince as a strong partner in isolating Iran and softening Arab enmity toward Israel. In Trump's world, friends—particularly friends that are both Arab and authoritarian—are to be criticized as little as possible, especially on low priorities for the administration, like human rights. **This hands-off approach has emboldened and empowered**

MbS to increasingly destructive effect over the past year and a half, offering a reminder that the prospect of U.S. pressure—if not actual U.S. pressure—serves as a constraint on allies that tend toward overreach.

Annie Slemrod, 1-23-2019, "Saudi envoy says Hodeidah deal make-or-break for Yemen peace efforts," IRIN,

<https://www.irinnews.org/interview/2019/01/23/saudi-envoy-says-hodeidah-deal-make-or-break-yemen-peace-efforts>

Mohammed al-Jaber, who is the public face of Saudi Arabia in Yemen and is said to have a direct line to Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, suggested the Hodeidah deal could lead to further fruitful UN-backed peace talks if it succeeds but might be their undoing if it doesn't.

“I think there is no [next] effective round of talks between Yemenis if Hodeidah is not implemented,” al-Jaber told IRIN in an interview in his Riyadh office. “If the Houthis implement Hodeidah, everybody will pressure all parties to come to the table and make it succeed.”

The next round of what the UN officially calls “political consultations” are expected later this month, but warring sides are still at odds over the finer details of the Hodeidah deal and there are fears it might soon collapse. Aid groups warn of a spiral towards famine if fighting restarts around the city – a key entry point for commercial imports and humanitarian aid, especially for parts of the country under Houthi control.

Hashed out at December negotiations near Stockholm but still to come into effect, the ceasefire deal is supposed to see both Saudi-led coalition forces and Houthi rebels withdraw from Hodeidah city and eventually Hodeidah province, with “local security forces” taking over and the UN playing some role in managing the port.

Tore Refslund Hamming, 1-28-2019, "Global Conflict Tracker," No Publication,

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?cid=ppc-Google-grant-conflict_tracker-031116&gclid=CjwKEAiAj7TCBRcp2Z22ue-zrj4SJACG7SBEH9uE_raTezcIufDr28x3vGe1FFIO2Y7kt4ui1PzWKxoCO5Tw_wcB#!/conflict/war-in-yemen

22.2 MILLION Estimated number of people in need of assistance

17,000 Estimated civilian casualties since March 2015

2 MILLION Estimated number of displaced people

Adrian Bonenberger, 6-3-2017, "Arms Sales, Cash, and Losing Your Religion," Wrath-Bearing Tree, <https://www.wrath-bearingtree.com/2017/06/2752/>

The first part of his answer poses the sales of weapons to bad actors (in this case the Saudis) as hypothetical: "selling weapons to the Saudis that might be used in Yemen," is how he characterizes representative Chris Murphy (D-CT)'s objections to the deal. In general, hypotheticals can be good—we're not selling arms to the Ukrainians because hypothetically they might be used to start WWII. But the arms deal with Saudi Arabia is unusually clear and—what's the opposite of hypothetical?—actual. **Weapons sold to the Saudis are either the exact weapons being used in Yemen, or weapons used to arm and equip soldiers in Saudi Arabia, freeing different weapons (that would otherwise not have been available) to be used in Yemen (or against rebellious Saudis, or anyone else).** There's no hypothetical about arming and equipping a regime engaged in warfare—you don't get to choose which bullets Stalin uses to shoot Hitler and which he uses in a pogrom against Jews. It doesn't work that way. Also, in this specific case, fuck hypotheticals, we've had 16 years of killing in the Middle East. **"Uh, maybe they won't drop that specific bomb" is the rhetorical device of a coward.**

WARRANT THREE ON THE AFF

F. Brinley, 11-5-2018, "The U.S. wants the Saudis to end war in Yemen. And it has leverage.," NBC News,

<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-wants-yemen-war-end-will-it-stop-selling-n929921>

The best way to force the Saudis to change their ways is to stop sending weapons, according to Human Rights Watch's Yemen researcher Kristine Beckerle.

"You've gotten so many violations already over the past three and a half years, so what Pompeo and Mattis should be doing is saying, 'These are the benchmarks. We're going to hold up weapons sales until you actually fulfill these tasks,'" she said, referring to the apparent bombing of civilian sites by the coalition.

Irina Ivanova, 10-13-2018, "Saudi Arabia is America's No. 1 weapons customer," No

Publication, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-arabia-is-the-top-buyer-of-u-s-weapons/>

That year, the U.S. sold Saudi Arabia \$298 million worth of Paveway laser-guided missiles, \$98 million in ammunition for various types of firearms and \$95 million worth of programmable bomb systems. A recent attack on a school bus in Yemen that killed dozens of children was carried out with a bomb the U.S. sold to Saudi Arabia, CNN has reported.

Just this year, the State Department has approved sales to Saudi Arabia of \$670 million worth of BGM-71 TOWs, a type of anti-tank missile, \$1.3 billion worth of medium self-propelled Howitzers and at least \$600 million in "maintenance support services."

Julian Borger, 8-1-2018, "US supplied bomb that killed 40 children on Yemen school bus,"
Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/19/us-supplied-bomb-that-killed-40-children-school-bus-yemen>

The bomb dropped on a school bus in Yemen by a Saudi-led coalition warplane was sold to Riyadh by the US, according to reports based on analysis of the debris.

The 9 August attack killed 40 boys aged from six to 11 who were being taken on a school trip. Eleven adults also died. Local authorities said that 79 people were wounded, 56 of them children. CNN reported that the weapon used was a 227kg laser-guided bomb made by Lockheed Martin, one of many thousands sold to Saudi Arabia as part of billions of dollars of weapons exports. Saudi Arabia is the biggest single customer for both the US and UK arms industries. The US also supports the coalition with refuelling and intelligence.

Anup Shah, 1-21-2006, "Small Arms—they cause 90% of civilian casualties — Global Issues,"
No Publication,

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/78/small-arms-they-cause-90-of-civilian-casualties>

Small Arms—they cause 90% of civilian casualties

The growing availability of small arms has been a major factor in the increase in the number of conflicts, and in hindering smoother rebuilding and development after a conflict has ended. It is estimated, for example, that:

There are around half a billion military small arms around the world;

Some 300,000 to half a million people around the world are killed by them each year;

They are the major cause of civilian casualties in modern conflicts.

This section attempts to look at some of the issues surrounding small arms.

Mundy London School of Economics

Declan Walsh, 10-26-2018, "The Tragedy of Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-war-yemen.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&ion=Footer>

Economic warfare takes other forms, too. In a recent paper, Martha Mundy, a lecturer at the London School of Economics, analyzed coalition airstrikes in Yemen, **finding that their attacks on bridges, factories, fishing boats and even fields suggested that they aimed to destroy food production and distribution in Houthi-controlled areas.**

“This is an income famine,” said Lise Grande, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator for Yemen. “The key to stopping it is to ensure that people have enough money to buy what they need to survive.”

The priority should be to stabilize the falling currency, she said, and to ensure that traders and shipping companies can import the food that Yemenis need.

Above all, she added, “the fighting has to stop.”

Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea>

Fourth, the proposed arms sale package creates a level of interdependence that gives both the current Saudi government as well as Saudi governments for the next fifteen to twenty years a strong incentive to work with the United States. **Saudi Arabia will need continuing support from the United States during the entire lifecycle of every major system sold, and no future Saudi government can ignore this fact.** Moreover, the sales are large in dollar terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive build-up. Saudi Arabia had an air force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it now has only 219. The Saudi F-15 buy will not even restore the force to 2000 numbers. It will take some three to five years to deliver and put fully in service, replace some eighty-seven obsolete F-5A/Bs and F-5EIs that were in service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits on 107 aging Tornados still in service.

United Nations

Hannah Summers, 10-15-2018, "Yemen on brink of 'world's worst famine in 100 years' if war continues," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/15/yemen-on-brink-worst-famine-100-years-un>

Yemen could be facing the worst famine in 100 years if airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition are not halted, the UN has warned.

If war continues, famine could engulf the country in the next three months, with 12 to 13 million civilians at risk of starvation, according to Lise Grande, the agency’s humanitarian coordinator for Yemen.

She told the BBC: “I think many of us felt as we went into the 21st century that it was unthinkable that we could see a famine like we saw in Ethiopia, that we saw in Bengal, that we saw in parts of the Soviet Union – that was just unacceptable.

“Many of us had the confidence that would never happen again and yet the reality is that in Yemen that is precisely what we are looking at.”

Maitland of University of Pennsylvania UPenn

No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, ", " No Publication,

<https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4214-maitland-g-the-ethics-of-the-international-arms>

can be unpleasant, an instinct for selfpreservation takes over. A certain amount of moral courage is constantly required. Even when it may be easier or more profitable to take an alternative course of action, arms companies must be able to demonstrate the moral courage to not just recognise, but to actively pursue, the ``right" course of action. Without the moral courage to stand up and take responsibility for actions, arms will continue to be supplied for unethical purposes.

Josie Ensor, Middle East Correspondent, xx-xx-xxxx, "Yemen death toll 'six times higher' than estimated," Telegraph,

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/12/yemen-death-toll-six-times-higher-estimated/>
More than 60,000 people have been killed in Yemen in the last two years, according to a new assessment, a figure six times higher than previous estimates.

The figure of 10,000 used by the United Nations is outdated and nowhere near the likely true fatality figure of 60,223, according to UK-based independent research group Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

Calculating death tolls in Yemen, which is approaching its fourth year, is complicated by the lack of access.

The figure offered by ACLED, which looked at open-source data and local news reports, does not include those thought to have died from malnutrition. Save the Children charity says some 85,000 may have died from starvation since 2016.

The death toll “is far higher than official estimates - and still underestimated,” Clionadh Raleigh, ACLED’s executive director, said. □

Elana Schor, 10-11-2018, "Senators push vote to block Saudi arms sales after Khashoggi disappearance," POLITICO,

<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/11/senators-saudi-arms-sales-khashoggi-895341>

Murphy and Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), his ally in pushback against the arms sales, fell four votes short of blocking a Saudi weapons deal last year — and Murphy predicted that they would fare better this time around.

“I don’t think that a military sale could pass the Senate today. I don’t think that it could pass the House,” Murphy told reporters.

Murphy and 21 other senators in both parties aligned on Wednesday to urge President Donald Trump to investigate Khashoggi’s disappearance and sanction those responsible — even if they hailed from the Saudi government. Murphy said, however, that he’s “very doubtful” that the Trump administration would slap on sanctions.

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Trump said Thursday that he's not interested in stopping arms sales to Saudi Arabia, \$110 billion of which he rolled out during a trip to the kingdom last year. "I don't like the concept of stopping an investment of \$110 billion into the United States," Trump told reporters, adding that the money from sales the U.S. lost out on would likely would flow to China or Russia instead.

However, any move that senators can make against Saudi arms deals couldn't begin until Congress is formally notified of the next sale, which Murphy said he expects within the next 30 to 60 days. And that clock won't start until an informal hold by the Foreign Relations Committee's top Democrat, New Jersey Sen. Robert Menendez, is relinquished.

Paul K. Kerr of the Congressional Research Service

2018 No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, ", No Publication, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31675.pdf>

In summary, in the absence of a strong majority in both houses of Congress supporting legislation to block or modify a prospective arms sale, the practical and procedural obstacles to passing such a law—whether a freestanding measure or one within the AECA framework—are great. Even if Congress can pass the requisite legislation to work its will on an arms sale, the President need only veto it and secure the support of one-third plus one of the Members of either the Senate or the House to have the veto sustained and permit the sale. It should be noted that Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale by use of a joint resolution of disapproval, although it has come close to doing so (see section below for selected examples). Nevertheless, Congress has—by expressing strong opposition to prospective arms sales, during consultations with the executive branch—affected the timing and the composition of some arms sales, and may have dissuaded the President from formally proposing certain arms sales.

Posted By, 11-9-2009, "Of Arms and the Man: the global arms trade and the Philippine context," No Publication,

<http://lilashahani.blogspot.com/2009/11/of-arms-and-man-global-arms-trade-and.html>

In this day and age of things unprecedented -- where climate change, economic recession, H1N1 fears and global poverty continuously assault our weary and shell-shocked senses with every passing minute -- one thing that rarely gets talked about, except in the tiniest enclaves, is the global arms trade. **Many may not know this, but the global arms trade now produces a death a minute.**¹ In fact, 2.1 million people -- or 2,000 every day -- have already died as a result of armed violence.² Light weapons continue to remain the principal cause of death in conflicts around the world, and the vast majority of casualties happen to be civilians.³ If you didn't already know all this, you actually have an excuse, because this is regrettably a subject that commands far too little attention. Today, the global arms trade accounts for over \$55 billion, and is the second largest international trading market after narcotics. Principal sellers are the US, Russia, Italy, Germany, France, Britain and China; it is no small coincidence that these countries

also happen to have the largest defense budgets in the world. But the US has long dominated this global market: it is by far the largest exporter in the world, selling more weapons than the next 14 exporting countries combined. U.S. firms exported arms valued at \$37.8 billion in 2008, over 68 percent of all global business. The US was also number one in the arms bazaar to developing nations, with \$29.6 billion in conventional weapons agreements or more than 70 percent of the world's total, according to a recent U.S. government report.⁴ And if all this is not disturbing enough, NGOs have further calculated that the cost of armed violence to Africa alone is \$19 billion per year.⁵ Each year, at least a third of a million people are killed directly with conventional weapons, while many more are injured, abused, forcibly displaced and bereaved as a result of armed violence.⁶ In armed conflicts, the lives of skilled people are lost; infrastructure such as schools, clinics and homes are destroyed; economic production and markets are affected and investment takes flight. Even outside wartime, government arms purchases often exceed legitimate security needs, diverting substantial amounts of money away from health and education. In 'peace time,' the presence and availability of arms often intensifies violence engendered by crime, political protest, social disputes and violence within the home.

Thomas 2017

No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, ", " No Publication, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf>

One legal analysis has concluded that sales of arms, especially those used in airstrikes, to Saudi Arabia "should not be presumed to be permissible" under either the AECA and/or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), each of which limit to whom, and for what kinds of use, the United States may sell arms.¹¹⁶ These limitations include prohibitions against the sale of weapons to countries that consistently violate human rights, restrict the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or use weapons in a way that differs (whether intentionally or not) from their originally agreed-upon sale

A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, 6-13-2018, "A New Framework for Assessing the Risks from U.S. Arms Sales," Cato Institute,

<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/new-framework-assessing-risks-us-arms-sales>

In a recent study for the Cato Institute, however, we argue that the government's approach to arms sales is misguided. The United States accepts as given the potential benefits of selling weapons while underestimating or simply ignoring the potential risks. The result has been too many arms sales to too many countries where the risks are likely to outweigh the benefits. Between 2002 and 2016, America delivered \$197 billion worth of major conventional weapons, equipment, and training through its Foreign Military Sales program to 167 states worldwide. It is difficult to imagine

what sort of process would rate so many of the world's roughly 200 countries as safe bets to receive American weapons. **Indeed, using a "risk index" we created to assess U.S. arms sales, we found that in this time period, the average dollar value of U.S. arms sales per nation to the riskiest states was higher than to the least risky states. Even more disturbing was our finding that 32 of the 167 recipients had risk index scores higher than the average score of the 16 nations currently banned from purchasing American weapons.**

Once approved, the matter is turned over to Congress, which serves as an emergency brake for this process. Absent sufficient congressional opposition in the form of a veto-proof

resolution of disapproval, the sale is made. In reality, the outcome of this process is almost inevitably the same: approval.

Though the United States won't sell its latest technology to everyone, it will sell most things to just about anyone. Although a full explanation of this is beyond the scope of our work, three possible reasons are worth noting. First, the benefits of arms sales are obvious and immediate, while the negative consequences are often less obvious, tend to emerge much later, and often receive little media coverage. Second, there is no constituency in Washington opposing arms sales. Presidents see them as a foreign policy tool, Congress sees them as economically beneficial benefiting its constituents economically, and the defense industry provides financial encouragement all around through campaign donations. Finally, the United States has been the world's leading arms exporter for so long that the presumption that arms sales work seems to have become ingrained in the national security bureaucracy.

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After the Nixon Administration acted unilaterally with regard to specific arms transactions with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559), which laid the basis for the system that still exists in its essential form today.²⁴ The Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the act required the President to notify Congress of government-to-government arms sales above \$25 million, after which Congress would have 20 calendar days to veto the sale by concurrent resolution. Nelson-Bingham was quickly put to the test when the Ford Administration informed Congress in July 1975 of its intent to sell a number of air defense missile batteries to Jordan. Congressional concerns over the security of Israel (whose government opposed the sale), and over the fact that Congress was not consulted in advance, led the Ford Administration to withdraw the sale. The sale went through later in the year after a number of modifications mollified those concerns.²⁵ The episode marked an important precedent in the establishment of congressional prerogatives over arms sales.

Greg Myre, 10-15-2018, "Fact Check: How Much Does Saudi Arabia Spend On Arms Deals With The U.S.?", NPR.org,

<https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657588534/fact-check-how-much-does-saudi-arabia-spend-on-arms-deals-with-the-u-s>

MYRE: So the fighter planes and the F-15 are really the most significant single purchase right now because they're using that daily in Yemen in the bombing campaign that's now been going on for more than three years. But the Saudis don't have a lot of big contracts at the moment, as we just heard. And it's really the United States that has the leverage because the - in this relationship right now because of the way it supports and supplies the Saudi Air Force. Here's Bruce Riedel again.

RIEDEL: If tonight President Trump told the king he was cutting off spare parts to the Saudi Air Force, the Saudi Air Force would be grounded tomorrow morning.

MYRE: And the president has said that if the U.S. doesn't sell weapons to the Saudis, then Russia or China would step in and do it. But it's really not that simple. Riedel noted that you can't

simply strap a Chinese bomb on an American F-15. The - all the systems have to talk to one another. So the Saudis really would be in a tough spot if the United States were to use that leverage and cut them off.