# KG March 18’ NEG

**We Negate- Resolved: On balance, the current Authorization for Use of Military Force gives too much power to the president.**

## Our Sole Contention is: Slaying the Dragon

**Turak of CNBC reports that the destruction of strongholds in the Middle East have only been a motivating factor to strengthen militant capabilities to attacks on the west and terror attacks are likely to increase in the future.**

**Turak**, Natasha. “Terror attacks are likely to increase in 2018, with ISIS and al-Qaeda both still dangerous”. **CNBC**. Dec 28th, **2017**

 The "caliphate" may be in ruins, but that doesn't mean ISIS is gone forever**. Terror attacks are likely to increase in 2018, as the destruction of the Islamic State's physical stronghold in**[**Iraq**](https://www.cnbc.com/iraq/)**and**[**Syria**](https://www.cnbc.com/syria/)**will strengthen its will to strike out abroad, experts** say. "ISIS will want to show that they are still in the fight, and their followers remain as fanatical as ever," said Lewis-Sage Passant, a former British Army intelligence officer and founder of travel security company HowSafeIsMyTrip**. "The number of attacks globally will likely increase as the group switches focus from the war in the Middle East to international terrorism. "**Adam Deen, executive director of counter-extremism think tank Quilliam, makes a similar argument. "We're going to see without a doubt more attacks in the West," he told UK newspaper the Independent in October. Deen said ISIS is now more focused on revenge, and warned against the false sense of victory that many expressed after the death of [Osama Bin Laden](https://www.cnbc.com/osama-bin-laden/).

**In the status quo, there are three reasons as to why terrorism is an imminent problem.**

#### 1) First is ISIS. Bhojani of The Washington Post writes that currently, local governments give way to terrorism, meaning the influence of ISIS in areas over Pakistan attracts members and cause the threat of terrorism to grow. Problematically, the problem is materializing now as Mahmood of Yale University finds that the increase in influence of ISIS has led to a 90 percent increase in in terrorist violence.

**Bhojani**, Fatima. “Analysis | ISIS Is on the Decline in the Middle East, but Its Influence in Pakistan Is Rising.” **The Washington Post**, WP Company, 5 May **2017**, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/05/isis-is-on-the-decline-in-the-middle-east-but-its-influence-in-pakistan-is-rising/?utm_term=.e0253051c3ff>

In one of the deadliest attacks claimed by the Islamic State, 88 people were killed and hundreds injured when a suicide bomber detonated his vest inside a Sufi shrine in February. The attack came just three weeks after 25 civilians were killed and scores injured in an explosion at a market, which was claimed by Islamic State partner Laskhar-e-Jhangvi-Alami and the TTP. **When casualty reports are added up, Islamic State-claimed attacks have killed or injured more than 800 civilians in Pakistan so far, even as the military claims it has arrested more than 300 Islamic State operatives and thus thwarted its expansion. Government and security officials have adopted contradictory stances on the Islamic State, mostly downplaying or outright denying the threat posed by the group — while also, on rare occasions, acknowledging the gravity of the situation. But as the group and its radical ideology attract members and strengthen local ties in Pakistan, the threat is only likely to grow.**

**Mahmood**, Faiqa. “The Efficacy of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan: The Long View.” **Yale Journal**, 2 Feb. **2016**,[Faiqa Mahmood is a visiting fellow at the South Asia Program of the Stimson Center, where she is currently conducting research on nuclear discourse in Pakistan. She graduated from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy with a focus on International Security Studies and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. Ms. Mahmood is also a licensed attorney at the Islamabad High Court, Pakistan and has been called to the Bar of England and Wales. Her writings have appeared in Foreign Policy's South Asia Channel, Harvard Kennedy School's Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, Georgetown Security Studies Review, and the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, among others.] [yalejournal.org/article\_post/the-efficacy-of-u-s-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-the-long-view/](http://yalejournal.org/article_post/the-efficacy-of-u-s-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-the-long-view/)

Karachi’s **terrorist violence increased by 90 percent, and the city’s 2,700 casualties from violence set a new record**.[58] Some of the highest-profile U.S. targets have also been found in Pakistan’s major cities, including Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, an alleged mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Abu Zubayda, an alleged top al-Qaeda operations planner, and, of course, Osama bin Laden himself. **By providing ample opportunities for fundraising and recruiting, this militant migration has strengthened and emboldened militant groups while also spreading their influence from the fringe of the country to the very center.**

#### 2) Second is Al-Qaeda. Beauchamp of Vox writes that while counterterrorism efforts were focused on ISIS in the past, Al Qaeda focused on rebuilding and strengthening their forces leading to a four times increase in their power. Critically, Beauchamp concludes that Al-Qaeda now poses a direct and deadly threat to the west.

**Beauchamp,** Zach “ 16 years after 9/11, al-Qaeda is back” Vox. September 11th **2017.** <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/11/16288824/al-qaeda-isis-911>

Al-Qaeda has been able to rebuild in large part by capitalizing on the specter of ISIS. **As ISIS grabbed headlines by seizing territory in Iraq and Syria and staging terrorist attacks across Europe, al-Qaeda quietly focused on recruiting and building relationships with local militants fighting in chaotic civil wars. The result is that Western counterterrorism efforts focused on ISIS, doing tremendous damage to the group, while al-Qaeda flourished.** Our attention has “basically [been] captured by ISIS as it exists in Iraq and Syria,” says Katherine Zimmerman, a senior analyst on al-Qaeda at the American Enterprise Institute. “And now that it’s finally losing terrain in a rapid fashion, people are looking around the world and saying there’s still a huge threat — and it’s not ISIS Further, much of their phoenix-like success has come from being able to recruit in the shadows of civil wars. A massive attack on the American homeland would disrupt that. “For al-Qaeda, given that they’re on an upward trajectory in many theaters at once and in many cases trying to disguise their presence, carrying out a major attack against the West would be counterproductive,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and CEO of the terrorism analysis group Valens Global, says.  Allowing ISIS to distract the world while it quietly rebuilt itself was just about the best thing that could have happened to al-Qaeda. **But there are signs this calculus could be changing: that al-Qaeda believes it’s strong enough to once again begin targeting the West.** The point, then, is that localization may represent more of a tactic than an overall strategic shift. The group could well shift focus again if it decided that was in its interests, and redeploy its growing strength toward planning more major attacks in the West. **This is why it is, in the long run, scarier than ISIS: Its leadership is more deliberate, more strategic, and — at least when it comes to the US — historically far more deadly.**

Al-Qaeda has replicated this “localization” strategy — move into a civil war, embed with local forces and harness local grievances, and avoid high-profile attacks on the West — **in hot spots around the world. In Yemen, al-Qaeda has taken advantage of the bloody conflict there to further strengthen its already strong affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). According to US State Department figures, AQAP’s strength quadrupled between 2015 and 2016, from 1,000 members to 4,000. This is the al-Qaeda group that analysts believe poses the most direct threat to the West: It** planned three attacks on US targets between 2009 and 2012, and is home to master bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri. In Somalia, the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab has focused on exploiting clan politics and broader grievances with the corrupt and extremely weak central Somali government. The result, as Harvard fellow Christopher Anzalone explains, is that the group has proven resilient to multiple US and international efforts to crush it. Even in Afghanistan, where the US still has more than 11,000 troops ostensibly trying to fight al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies, al-Qaeda is regrouping, mostly muscling out a nascent ISIS expansion effort to remain the dominant transnational jihadist group in the country. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as Osama bin Laden’s son Hamza bin Laden, are believed to be located either in that country or in neighboring Pakistan.

#### 3) Third is a merger. Hoffman at Georgetown University predicts that by 2021, ISIS and Al-Qaeda will have merged into a tactical alliance due to similar ideologies of the two groups. Leaving this unchecked would be devastating, as Basit of The National Interest furthers that the fight versus a merged terrorist group would never have conflict termination or stabilization.

**Hoffman,** George. “The Coming ISIS- Al Qaeda Merger” **Georgetown University**. March 29th **2016.** [https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/resources/other/The\_Coming\_ISIS–al\_Qaeda\_Merger.pdf](https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/resources/other/The_Coming_ISIS%E2%80%93al_Qaeda_Merger.pdf)

In fact, **by 2021 al Qaeda and ISIS might reunite**—or at least have entered into some form of alliance or tactical cooperation. Although admittedly improbable in the near term, **such a rapprochement would make a lot of sense for both groups and would no doubt result in a threat** that, according to a particularly knowledgeable U.S. intelligence analyst whom I queried about such a possibility, “**would be an absolute and unprecedented disaster for [the] USG and our allies.”**

**Basit**, Abdul. “An ISIS–Al Qaeda 'Frankenstein' Could Be On Its Way.” **The National Interest**, The Center for the National Interest, 14 May **2017**, [nationalinterest.org/feature/isis%E2%80%93al-qaeda-frankenstein-could-be-its-way-20648?page=2](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis%E2%80%93al-qaeda-frankenstein-could-be-its-way-20648)

**If the conditions that gave birth to the monsters of ISIS and Al Qaeda are not addressed, the international community might have to fight a new jihadi Frankenstein, born from Al Qaeda and ISIS’s marriage of convenience.** This is why a robust ideological counternarrative, conflict stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a viable political solution to the Syrian Civil War are central to defeating the jihadist by-product of these conflict-torn areas. **The perennial dilemma of the global fight against terrorism involves making promising starts but failing to finish the job through mature conflict termination and post-conflict political reconciliation and stabilization.** The upper hand against ISIS, and the opportunity created by Al Qaeda’s depletion, make for another promising start, but can it be converted into a strategic advantage to win the war, instead of just winning the battle?

**There are two ways in which the AUMF’s policy stops these growing threats:**

### A. Drone strikes. Drones help with counterterrorism in three distinct ways.

1) First is by limiting communication. Byman of Georgetown University finds that drones hinder terrorist organizations ability to communicate by forcing them to cut off all wireless contacts and maintain complete silence in order to avoid attracting attention to themselves.

Byman “Why Drones Work: The Case For Washington’s Weapon of Choice”. Brookings.[[Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also senior associate dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies .] 2013.

Drones have also undercut terrorists’ ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to “maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts” and “avoid gathering in open areas.”

2) Second is by cutting resources. Thompson of Time writes that oil sales are the single most important source of income for terrorist groups such as ISIS. Fortunately, he finds that recent drone strikes on terrorist oil tanks have been effective in limiting their supply, thus stopping the funding of these organizations. This is key, as Burke of the Guardian notes that the only way for terrorist organizations to stay afloat is through money, and cutting off this supply forces a shift from advancing to retreating.

Thompson, Mark. “ U.S Bombing of ISIS Oil Facilities Showing progress” Time. Dec 13th2015

The bombs barely struck ISIS’s economic aorta: the oil ISIS pumped and sold from the lands it has seized in Iraq and Syria. **Oil sales are the ISIS’s “single most important source of income,”** the Rand Corp. says. **ISIS has been selling up to 40,000 barrels a day, generating $1 million or more every 24 hours.** While individual terror attacks may be cheap, the self-declared ISIS caliphate that orders or inspires them costs an estimated $500 million annually to operate. Beyond paying for salaries, schools and other local services, the cash funds jihad at home and abroad: from Beirut, to Egypt, to Paris to San Bernardino. But eventually, the military worked its way around both obstacles. In mid-May, Iraq-based U.S. Army Delta Force soldiers killed Abu Sayyaf, known as ISIS’s “oil emir,” during a nighttime raid into eastern Syria. The commandos also vacuumed up extensive records, giving U.S. intelligence officials their best insight into ISIS’s oil network. By the fall, Pentagon officials say they had figured out how to shut off the oil’s flow while preserving key pieces of oil-production infrastructure. They also say they had learned how to distinguish between ISIS oil tankers and non-ISIS oil tankers. U.S**. officials now say ISIS oil production is shrinking, although they can’t yet estimate by how much. Strikes that damaged refineries have made each subsequent barrel of oil refined in cruder ways less valuable, they say, due to its poorer quality. Bombing oil-collection points has meant longer waits for empty tankers, cutting into ISIS revenue.** And attacking tankers has forced them to disperse while awaiting loading, further cutting ISIS’s petroleum profits. Much refining, the Financial Action Task Force said, has shifted to “burning the crude in open pits that produce limited yields of poor-

The biggest earner for Isis, as for most countries outside the Gulf, is tax. This is tax of the “I’ll make you an offer you cannot refuse” variety, but it is tax nonetheless. Imposed on businesses and smuggling, it raises vast sums. Bombing this is much harder – indeed, well-nigh impossible. This needs to be recognised, and expectations in this area reduced, if an effective broader strategy is to evolve**. What is clear is that the new caliphate depends on continued expansion for its existence. Expansion needs money, but also brings money.** **However, a virtuous cycle, from the point of view of Isis, could easily become a vicious one. Advance could rapidly become retreat**, then, quite quickly perhaps, rout.

3) Third is by decreasing recruitment. Young of Harvard University explains that because drone strikes interrupt planning, refocus attention, and change actions of a terrorist group, there is a shift in the groups from planning to survival, disrupting recruitment. This is why Wei of Dartmouth concludes that drones deter terrorist plots due to a lack of ability in the long run.

Young, Alex. “A Defense of Drones.” Harvard International Review, 25 Feb. 2013, [**hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=3058**](http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=3058)

Critics also claim that eliminating only the senior leaders of terrorist organizations does not make significant progress in eradicating the group as a whole. This argument falls short on two fronts. First, killing the leaders of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar networks does hinder their operations: decapitating terrorist groups interrupts their planning, recruitment, and execution of attacks – not necessarily because each leader is irreplaceably vital to the success of the group (although some are), but because the threat of death from the skies shifts the strategic calculations of living leaders, changing the actions of the group. The Los Angeles Times of March 22nd, 2009, quoting an anonymous counterterrorism official, reported that Al Qaeda leaders are wondering who's next to be killed in a drone strike and have started hunting down people inside al Qaeda who they think are responsible for collaborating with the US on drone strike planning. The threat of drone strikes sows divisive suspicion inside enemy groups and distracts them from accomplishing their objectives. Moreover, drone strikes have disrupted al Qaeda’s system for training new recruits. The Times of London reports that in 2009, Al Qaeda leaders decided to abandon their traditional training camps because bringing new members to a central location offered too easy a target for drone strikes. Foreign Policy emphasized this trend on November 2nd, 2012, arguing that, “destroying communication centers, training camps and vehicles undermines the operational effectiveness of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and quotes from operatives of the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network reveal that drones have forced them into a ‘jungle existence’ where they fear for the lives on a daily basis.” The threat of death from the skies has forced extremist organizations to become more scattered.

**Wei**, Jason “ The Case For Drone Warfare” Dartmouth University. November **2016.** <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jasonwwei20/files/2016/06/The-Case-for-Drone-Warfare.pdf>

As for the argument that drones scare and traumatize civilians, I contend that the opposite: drone strikes are carried out in collaboration with local governments and make civilians safer. Though it is often assumed that drone strikes are carried out against the will of foreign governments, it turns out that both Pakistani and Yemeni governments support U.S. drone strikes as a mechanism for fighting domestic terrorist threats. In Pakistan, former President Asif Ali Zardari said of drones: “…collateral damage worries you Americans. It doesn’t worry me,”37 while in 2013, former president Pervez Musharraf revealed his secret deal with the U.S. that authorized drone strikes when the Pakistani military was unavailable.38 In Yemen, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh reported covered for U.S. drone strikes by telling the public it was the Yemeni air force,39 while current president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi publicly endorses drones, remarking that “they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error.”40 Critics who often view drone strikes as secretive ploys with heavy collateral damage are wrong; drones are sanctioned by foreign governments and are more accurate than any military alternative. Finally, as for the counterargument that drones “wreck positive views towards the U.S.,” I employ the refutation technique of “biting the bullet.” While it may be true that uninformed populations dislike Americans because of drones, military engagement is absolutely necessary in deterring terrorist operations, and drones are more accurate than any other alternative. Furthermore, ending drone strikes would not fix the problem of anti-American sentiment, or as political science professor Avery Plaw stated, it is highly unlikely that “ending drone strikes would substantially reduce anti-Americanism in the Islamic world or put a dent in radical recruitment.”41 While drones may temporarily disrupt local populations, **their role in deterring domestic terrorism is more important, and they actually protect citizens in the long run.**

The impacts are threefold.

**1) First is civilian safety. Saletan of Slate finds that drones are safer than any alternative military engagement methods ever, and furthers that the use of drones in Afghanistan has led to a 46 percent drop-off in civilian casualty rates.**

**Saletan**, William “In Defense of Drones” Slate. Feb 19th, **2013.** <http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/drones_war_and_civilian_casualties_how_unmanned_aircraft_reduce_collateral.html>

In addition, **drone warfare is also safer than other alternative military engagement methods such as Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos,** since drones can loiter above targets for extended periods of time, striking at the ideal moment and **minimizing civilian casualties.** With drones killing a fewer percentage of civilians than any other form of military engagement, they are not just the most effective counterterrorism weapon, but the only effective counterterrorism weapon. Start with that U.N. report. Afghan **civilian casualties** caused by the United States and its allies didn’t go up last year. They [**fell 46 percent**](http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US)**. Specifically, civilian casualties from “aerial attacks” fell 42 percent.** Why? Look at the incident featured in the U.N. report (Page 31) as an example of sloppy targeting. “I heard the bombing at approximately 4:00 am,” says an eyewitness. “After we found the dead and injured girls, the jet planes attacked us with heavy machine guns and another woman was killed.” How do drones measure up? Three organizations have tracked their performance in Pakistan. Since 2006, [Long War Journal](http://www.longwarjournal.org/)says the drones have killed [150 civilians](http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php), compared to some 2,500 members of al-Qaida or the Taliban. That’s a civilian death rate of 6 percent.\* From 2010 to 2012, **LWJ counts 48 civilian and about 1,500 Taliban/al-Qaida fatalities. That’s a rate of 3 percent.**

**2) Second is troop safety. Weiner of The San Diego Tribune writes that drones minimize pilots risks of dying as they are nowhere near the battle sites, which is also why Chappelle of The Brookings Institute finds that army members who work with drones experience PTSD at a rate 3 times less than traditional combat. Weiner furthers that ground troops are protected as well, as he quantifies that drones make soldiers three times safer in war zones.**

**Weiner**, Robert “ Drones Spare Troops, Have Powerful impact” The San Diego Tribune. October 9th **2014.** <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sdut-drones-troops-impact-2014oct09-story.html>

**Finally, one of the greatest militaristic and moral successes of drones is their ability to save the lives of American military personnel**. By definition, drones are operated remotely, as most drones are deployed from air bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan but controlled by pilots at home in the United States.85 **Because pilots are not actually near the battlefield sites, they are at no risk of dying,** regardless of whether drone missions are successful. U.S. troops are thus able to avoid profound risks such as firefights with tribal communities, land mines, explosive devices, snipers, and suicide bombers, and even attack terrorists in areas that are distant and environmentally unforgiving.86 In addition, **drones also save American lives in situations where there are both drones and boots on the ground. Because remote pilots can fly drones low without fear of death and study targets carefully instead of reacting in the heat of the moment, U.S. troops are “three times safer from friendly fire attacks when deployed in war zones covered by drones** compared with traditional warfare.”88 The benefits of allowing the United States military to fight terrorism from home are typically undisputed;

PDF: [file:///Users/nilay/Downloads/ADA578676 (1).pdf](file:///Users/nilay/Downloads/ADA578676%20%281%29.pdf)

issed this claim as “sensational,”5 the psychological health of RPA crew members remains a topic of military public health and operational concern. Research by Chappelle and colleagues at the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, Department of Neuropsychiatry, has demonstrated high levels of stress and fatigue among the pilots, sensor operators, and image analysts who comprise the RPA crews. Among 600 crew members of the weapon-deploying Predator and Reaper RPAs who completed a voluntary survey, 15.3% reported feeling very or extremely stressed and 19.5% reported high emotional exhaustion. Among 264 crew members of the RQ-4 Global Hawk, a non-weapon-deploying RPA, these proportions rose to 19.4% and 33.0%, respectively.6 **At the Brookings Institution in 2012, Chappelle noted that 4% of active duty RPA pilots were at “high risk for PTSD” based on this survey. Although this represents a substantial number of service members, it is lower than the 12-17% of soldiers returning from OEF or OIF/OND who are placed in this high-risk category based on postdeployment questionnaires.7 Along with witnessing traumatic experiences, such as those associated with PTSD in traditional combat,** RPA crew members may face several additional challenges, some of which may be unique to telewarfare: lack of deployment rhythm and of combat compartmentalization (i.e., a clear demarcation between combat and personal/family life);5 fatigue and sleep disturbances secondary to shift work;8 austere geographic locations of military installations supporting RPA missions;6 social isolation during work, which could diminish unit cohesion and thereby increase susceptibility to PTSD;9 and sedentary behavior with prolonged screen time, implicated as psychological challenges in the adult video gaming community.10 Th is retrospective cohort study is the fi rst to document the frequencies, incidence rates, and trends of mental health (MH) outcomes among RPA pilots within the active component of the USAF, and how these rates compare to those among manned aircraft (MA) pilots (fi xed wing and rotary wing) and among airmen in other USAF occupations during the same time period. For the purposes of this study, “combat” is defi ned broadly as actual or remote deployment to a combat zone, and not necessarily as engagement with enemy combatants.

**3) Third is eliminating top threats. Anderson of American University explains that the technical abilities of drones allow them to be precise and effective in decimating key parts of terrorist groups. Mazzetti of the New York Times furthers that killing top leaders, known as ‘decapitation’, has become easier with drones as in just one year, over 50 senior leaders of Al- Qaeda were killed by drones. Price of MIT quantifies that when drones eliminate terrorist groups leaders through decapitation, the group is 8 times more likely to collapse and that, on average 30 percent of decapitated groups end completely within two years of leadership vacancies.**

Anderson, Kenneth. “The Case for Drones” American University. June 1st 2013. <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the_case_for_drones_118548.html>

First, I assert that the technical abilities of drones make drone warfare outstandingly precise and effective, allowing drones to decimate terrorist groups. The two primary types of drones, pure surveillance drones and attacking drones, both have unique technical ad- vantages that allow them to effectively fight terrorism.60 Surveillance drones are typically used in reconnaissance missions, where they circle around targets for many hours and collect data for months, often outstripping the amount of intelligence that a manned spy team could gather.61 Offensive drones use this surveillance to employ targeted killing, in which specific terrorists are identified, targeted, and killed. Compared to manned aircraft strikes, in which pilots are miles in the sky and only have instrumental data, all drones have live situational awareness, allowing them to pinpoint targets and strike terrorist militants at ideal times. With such technical advantages, it becomes obvious how the Obama Administration has used drones so effectively in the war against terror.

Mazzetti Mark, “Drones Said to kill Qaeda No. 2” The New York Times. August 27th, **2011.** <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jasonwwei20/files/2016/06/The-Case-for-Drone-Warfare.pdf>

Among these terrorists, which included passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers, were over 50 senior leaders of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, al-Qaeda’s second-ranking figure, Atiyah Abd al- Rahman, was killed in the Waziristan region of Pakistan by a drone operated by the CIA.63 Though Osama Bin Laden was killed by a Navy SEAL raid and not a drone strike, it turns out that drones also played a crucial role in his assassination, as high-resolution video re- cording of the compound he was hiding in was captured by a stealth drone aircraft known as the RQ-170 Sentinel,64 providing a “secret and vital piece of the intel puzzle.”65 In terms of both low-ranking terrorists and the most important extremist leaders, drones have played a crucial role in directly decimating terrorist populations.

**Price** C. Bryan, “Targeting Top Terrorists”. MIT Press Journals. **2012.** <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00075>

First, **decapitated terrorist groups have a significantly higher mortality rate than non-decapitated groups.** Regardless of how I specialized the duration of the effect from leadership decapitation (i.e., whether I limited it to the year in which decapitation occurred, limited it to two years, or allowed it to linger indefinably), killing or capturing a terrorist leader increased the mortality rate of the group. There is no guarantee, however, that organizational death will be immediate; only **30 percent of decapitated groups** (40 of 131) **ended within two years of losing their leader.** Second, the earlier leadership decapitation occurs in a terrorist group’s life cycle, the greater the effect it will have on the group’s mortality rate. Additionally, the magnitude of this effect decreases over time. **Killing or capturing a terrorist leader in the past year of the group’s existence makes the group more than eight times as likely to end than a non-decapitated group**. The effects, however, diminish by half in the past ten years, and after approximately twenty years, leadership decapitation may have no effect on the group’s mortality rate. This ending is in line with the conclusion of other scholars who argue that a terrorist group’s organizational capacity increases with age, making it more durable with time.

### B. Increased Surveillance.

**The U.S. Justice Department reports that electronic surveillance through the AUMF as it is a fundamental strategy in counterterrorism.**

**U.S. Justice Department** “The NSA Program to Detect and Prevent Terrorist Attacks Myth V. Reality” *U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs.* 1/27/**06.**

“Congress confirmed and supplemented the President's constitutional authority to authorize this program when it passed the AUMF. **The AUMF authorized the President to use “all necessary and appropriate military force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”** In its Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the AUMF also authorizes the “fundamental incident[s] of waging war.” **The history of warfare makes clear that electronic surveillance of the enemy is a fundamental incident to the use of military force.”**

The impacts to better surveillance are twofold.

**1) First is stopping domestic attacks. Parkinson of ABC reports that as a result of previous surveillance since 9/11, over 50 potential terrorist attacks were thwarted by tracking.**

**Parkinson**, John R. “NSA: 'Over 50' Terror Plots Foiled by Data Dragnets.” **ABC** News, ABC News Network, 18 June **2013**, abcnews.go.com/Politics/nsa-director-50-potential-terrorist-attacks-thwarted-controversial/story?id=19428148.

**The director of the National Security Administration today told Congress that more than 50 potential terrorist attacks have been thwarted by two controversial programs tracking more than a billion phone calls and vast swaths of Internet data each day.** The attacks on would-be targets such as the New York Stock Exchange were prevented by caching telephone metadata and Internet information, including from millions of Americans since Sept. 11, 2001, Gen. Keith Alexander said during a hearing at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence**. Alexander had been less specific in testimony last week when he said "dozens" of possible attacks were foiled. He testified today: "In recent years, these programs, together with other intelligence, have protected the U.S and our allies from terrorist threats across the globe to include helping prevent the potential terrorist events over 50 times since 9/11."** He appeared in a rare public hearing of the House Intelligence Committee with officials from the FBI and Justice Department to discuss the phone and Internet programs that were disclosed in June by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden in the British Guardian newspaper and also The Washington Post.

**2) Second is stopping foreign attacks. Hewitt of Liberty University quantifies that surveillance has as classified thousands of individuals as terrorists, and convicting 20 percent of them before crime.**

PDF: <http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=honors>

Hatch did however note that the Justice Department has credited key provisions of the Patriot Act with playing a role in the terrorism-related convictions of hundreds of suspects. **It has largely been the tools of wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, which have received the credit for the success of hundreds of anti-terrorism operations since 2001.** Most notable among these operations was the "recent apprehension in England of scores of suspects, who were charged with making plans to blow up as many as ten airliners traveling to the United States" (Criminal, 2006, para. 24). In this operation, electronic surveillance played an instrumental part in allowing British agents to monitor the activities of a terrorist cell. "'We have been looking at meetings, movement, travel, spending and the aspirations of a large group of people' said Peter Clarke, head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorism branch" (ABCNews, 2006, para. 2). In this case, British agents substantially monitored the terrorist cell before making the arrests. (ABCNews, 2006, para. 24) Another such situation was the uncovering of "evidence indicating that a Pakistani charity was diverting funds originally Wiretapping 29 contributed for earthquake relief to finance the planned terrorism attacks on these jumbo jets" (Criminal, 2006, para. 16). It is, however, difficult to attain the exact details of the results of these operations, because in these investigations, "details leading up to the filing of formal charges is not usually revealed" (Criminal, 2006, para. 16). **It is known however, that since September 11, 2001 thousands of individuals classified as terrorists have been subjected to electronic surveillance procedures. The surveillance, specifically wiretapping, of individuals suspected of terrorist activities, has resulted in nearly a 20% conviction rate (Criminal 2006)**

**Thus, we urge you to extinguish the fires of war and vote CON.**

# F/2 AFF

### Patriot Act/FIS Act/NSA

**On face, false.**

However, our review of the government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance of phone and email communications records has had in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal. **Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we examined.**